Reconsider.petition.112164

8/2/2019 Reconsider.petition.112164

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_____________________________________________________________________________________

Case No. 11-2164

In the United States Court of Appealsfor the Seventh Circuit

Bryan J. Brown

Appellant

v.

Elizabeth Bowman, et al.

Appellees

____________________________________________________________________________

PETITION FOR REHEARING AND REHEARING EN BANC

OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT BRYAN J. BROWN

Bryan J. Brown

KS Bar No. 17634Attorney pro se827 Webster StreetFort Wayne, IN 46802(260) [email protected]


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CIRCUIT RULE 26.1 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Appellate Court No:

Short Caption:

To enable the judges to determine whether recusal is necessary or appropriate, an attorney for a non-governmental party oramicus curiae, or a private attorney representing a government party, must furnish a disclosure statement providing thefollowing information in compliance with Circuit Rule 26.1 and Fed. R. App. P. 26.1.

The Court prefers that the disclosure statement be filed immediately following docketing; but, the disclosure statement mustbe filed within 21 days of docketing or upon the filing of a motion, response, petition, or answer in this court, whichever occursfirst. Attorneys are required to file an amended statement to reflect any material changes in the required information. The textof the statement must also be included in front of the table of contents of the party's main brief. Counsel is required tocomplete the entire statement and to use N/A for any information that is not applicable if this form is used.

[ ] PLEASE CHECK HERE IF ANY INFORMATION ON THIS FORM IS NEW OR REVISEDAND INDICATE WHICH INFORMATION IS NEW OR REVISED.

(1) The full name of every party that the attorney represents in the case (if the party is a corporation, you must provide thecorporate disclosure information required by Fed. R. App. P 26.1 by completing item #3):

(2) The names of all law firms whose partners or associates have appeared for the party in the case (including proceedingsin the district court or before an administrative agency) or are expected to appear for the party in this court:

(3) If the party or amicus is a corporation:

i) Identify all its parent corporations, if any; and

ii) list any publicly held company that owns 10% or more of the partys or amicus stock:

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11-2164

Brown v. Bowman, et al

Bryan J Brown

Bryan J Brown

Not applicable

Not applicable

s/ Bryan J Brown February 15, 2012

Bryan J Brown

827 Webster Street

Fort Wayne, IN 46802

(260) 515-8511 (260) 423-1771 (prefer [email protected])

[email protected]

Save Form As Clear F


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Table of Contents

I. Introduction and Overview of the Petition Listing in Detail Those Points Allegedly

Overlooked or Misapprehended.............................................................................................................. 1

II. The Argument Introduced................................................................................................................. 4

A. Resolved: The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine is a great mischief maker....................... 4

B. Resolved: Rooker-Feldman is of extremely limited applicability .............................. 5

1. The Panel utilized mostly pre-2005 precedent .................................................................... 5

2. The 2002 Brokawopinion confesses confusion................................................................. 6

3. The 2004 Taylor Decision is philosophically opposed to a narrowing of Rooker-

Feldman ................................................................................................................................................. 6

C. Resolved: The 2006 Loubser opinion is the law of the Circuit governing Rooker-

Feldman analysis when corrupted state court proceedings are alleged ................................. 8

D. Resolved: Since the High Court wants Rooker-Feldman reined in the argumentsfound in Justice John Paul Stevens dissent should be considered ........................................ 9

1. Stevens identified an oxymoron at the heart of Rooker-Feldman ................................. 9

2. Stevens believed that Rooker-Feldman wrongly conflated appellate review and

collateral attack ................................................................................................................................. 10

3. Stevens believed that Equal Protection analysis would eventually unravel Rooker-

Feldman ............................................................................................................................................... 11

E. Resolved: The Equal Protection Clause is violated when a license-seeking applicant

is processed in a manner that is intentionally discriminatory.................................................. 11

F. Resolved: The federal courts employ Rooker-Feldman to intentionally treat bar

applicants differently from other license seekers but can cite no basis for said

differential treatment that can pass constitutional muster........................................................ 13

1. Does Rooker-Feldman trump the Fourteenth Amendment? ......................................... 13

2. Does Rooker-Feldman grant state bar committees license to unconstitutionally

discriminate?...................................................................................................................................... 13

G. Resolved: The Seventh Circuits 1974 Whitfield opinion allows all competing

interests at bar to be resolved through the application of Loubser and the allowance of

Plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment-based claims. ........................................................................ 14

III. Conclusion...................................................................................................................................... 15


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Cases

Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir, 1988) ..................................................................... 15

Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1,2 (1971) ....................................................................................... 15

Brokaw v. Weaver, 305 F.3d 660 (7thCir.2002). ..................................................................................... 6

Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967 (7th Cir.2009) .................................................................................. 14Edwards v. Illinois Board, 261 F.3d 723 (7thCir.2001) ...................................................................... 5, 6

Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990)........................................................................... 10

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d

454 (2005).......................................................................................................................................... 4, 5, 7

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries, 544 U.S. 280, 292-93 (2005) ...................................... 2

GASH Assocs. v. Village of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726 (7th Cir.1993) ................................................. 5, 7

Golden v. Sigman, 611 F.3d 356 (7th Cir.2010). .................................................................................. 14

Hale v. Comm. On Character and Fitness (Illinois), 335 F.3d 678 (7thCir.2003) ............................. 5

Kelley v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 548 F.3d 600 (7th Cir.2008) ................................................................ 7

Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459,126 S.Ct. 1198, 163 L.Ed.2d 1059 (2006) ......................................... 4, 5Long v. Shorebank, 182 F.3d 548 (7thCir.1999).................................................................................... 5, 6

Loubser v. Thacker, 440 F.3d 439 (7th Cir.), cert dend 548 U.S. 907 (2006). ....................... 2, 10, 11

Loubser v. Thacker, 440 F.3d 444 (7th Cir.2006) (Sykes, J., concurring and dissenting) ................. 8

Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972) ............................................................................................... 10

Nesses v. Shepard, 68 F.3d 1003 (7th Cir.1995).................................................................................... 8, 9

Remer v. Burlington Area Sch. Dist., 205 F.3d 990, 996 (7th Cir.2000) ............................................ 6

Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 247, 249 (1957) .......................................................... 14

Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) ........................................................................................ 10

Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. -- , 131 S.Ct. 1289, 1297, 179 L.Ed.2d 233 (2011).................................... 4

Taylor v. Fed.Natl Mortg. Assn, 374 F.3d 529 (7thCir.2004).......................................................... 6, 7

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 488, 490 (1973) (Stevens, J.,

dissenting ................................................................................................................................. 9, 11, 13, 15

Truserv v. Flegles, 419 F.3d 584, 590 (7th Cir.2005)............................................................................... 5

Whitfield v. Ill.Bd. Law Examiners, 504 F.2d 474 (7thCir.1974) ........................................................ 14

Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) ..................................................................................... 11, 12

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886) .......................................... 11, 15

Young v. Murphy, 90 F.3d 1225 (7thCir.1996)......................................................................................... 5

Rules

28 U.S.C. 1257........................................................................................................................................... 17

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) ............................................................................................................................... 3, 6


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I. Introduction and Overview of the Petition Listing in Detail ThosePoints Allegedly Overlooked or Misapprehended

This petition places at least three issues of great import before this Honorable Court: The

width ofRooker-Feldman abstention, the breadth of expert witness immunity and the

heights to which Equal Protection (and other constitutional doctrines) can ascend in the

context of law licensure.1

Petitioner argues that the Panels decision expands the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,

threatens the Nesses-Loubser exemption with extinction, approves invidious discrimination

against persons of faith in state court licensure cases and deputizes nonattorney state agents

with the authority to create absolutely immune reporting structures, among other concerns

set forth herein.

Front loading this petition with one of the most pressing concerns, Petitioner alleges that

the following paragraph (from the heart of the Panels analysis) erects a legal standard

opposed to the current state of the law, both within the Seventh Circuit and the nation over:

True, [Browns] complaint does notexplicitly request a lower federal court to

overturn an inconsistent state court judgment, but that is not the onlycircumstance in which Rooker-Feldman applies. The key question is whetherBrowns civil rights claims involving the process by which his application wasevaluated are so inextricably intertwinedwith the Indiana Supreme Courtsadjudication of his Bar application that inpractical effecta lower federal courtwould be required to review a state court decision.

Panel Opinion, p.11, lines 5 15 (emp.add.) Five pages later the Panel built upon this legal

standard to rule that Because Browns claims ofreligious bias require a federal district

court to review thejudicial process followed by the Indiana Supreme Court in deciding

the merits of Browns bar admission application, Browns claims are inexorably

1A factual record set forth in detail and anchored to affidavits and admissions is set forth in

Plaintiffs Appellate Brief (AB) at Section VII and Plaintiffs Reply Brief (RB) at SectionI(D,E&F). The facts are to be reviewed with deference to the Plaintiff since this Courts de novoanalysis is to take place against the rubrics of Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1).


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intertwined and fall squarely under Rooker-Feldmans jurisdictional bar. Id. at p.13, ln.

12-17 (emp.add.) Plaintiff fears that this language (and other sentences) fromBrown v.

Bowman(hereinafter Bowman) will be used in subsequent decisions to expand the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine and end the Nesses-Loubser exemption from the same. See

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries, 544 U.S. 280, 292-93 (2005) andLoubser v.

Thacker, 440 F.3d 439 (7th Cir.), cert dend 548 U.S. 907 (2006). This petition affords the

Court opportunity to apply the Nesses-Loubser line of cases after the flurry of Rooker-

Feldman decisions issuing from the High Court since 2005.2

Petitioner argues that Rooker-Feldman does not actually reach the instant litigation,

primarily because (1) he does not seek redress for harm caused by a state court judgment;

and (2) because he seeks remedies not allowed him in any previous court action; and (3) he

is currently suing persons never previously adverse to him (as defendants) in litigation; and

(4) he alleges that the Defendants corrupted an informal and nearly standardless state

judicial process, resulting in an unfavorable licensure application ruling.

The present petition also grants this Court opportunity to consider the merits of

Justice John Paul Stevens arguments issued at the birth of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in

light of the Supreme Courts repeated, recent calls for a narrowing of Rooker-Feldman.

2The Nesses-Loubser exemption applies to the instant case due, inter alia, to the following

paragraphs from the verified complaint: Upon information and belief all of the foregoingalleges that Plaintiff was the subject of a conspiracy to fail him through the JLAP process byDefendants and others, including the Doe Defendants, acting in collusion and out of biases,invidious discriminatory intent and animus causing them to target him because of his pro-lifebeliefs arising out of his traditional Christian worldview and constitutional, conservativepolitical perspective. ECF 1, 265. This litigation, at core, alleges a conspiracy todiscriminate against Plaintiff in the Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program that culminatedin the filing of fraudulent reports obtained through unconstitutional means with the Board ofLaw Examiners that influenced said governmental body to Plaintiffs detriment. ECF 1, 17.The JLAC processing and bar denial are linked by a common and discriminatory legal theory,seeECF 1, 153-56.
http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?mt=Indiana&db=708&rs=WLW12.01&tc=-1&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sp=003275592-4000&findtype=Y&ordoc=2017498155&serialnum=2006397495&vr=2.0&fn=_top&sv=Full&tf=-1&pbc=926D6DE2&utid=3http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?mt=Indiana&db=708&rs=WLW12.01&tc=-1&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sp=003275592-4000&findtype=Y&ordoc=2017498155&serialnum=2006397495&vr=2.0&fn=_top&sv=Full&tf=-1&pbc=926D6DE2&utid=3http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?mt=Indiana&db=708&rs=WLW12.01&tc=-1&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sp=003275592-4000&findtype=Y&ordoc=2017498155&serialnum=2006397495&vr=2.0&fn=_top&sv=Full&tf=-1&pbc=926D6DE2&utid=3


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Petitioner further argues that he faced invidious discrimination violative of the federal and

state constitutions during his processing by the government agents at bar, rendering him a

class of one as to his Equal Protection claim. This argument is presented against the

backdrop of the Supreme Courts Willowbrook v. Olech opinion, infra. This petition further

affords this Court the opportunity to revisit its 1974 Whitfield v. Illinois Bar Examiners

decision in light of the principles animating the Fourteenth Amendment, which were pled in

the complaint at bar.

Petitioner additionally argues that the District Court erred in extending absolute

immunity to nontestifying, nonwitnesses in circumstances far removed from the crucible of

judicial process. Petitioner posits that the Panel erred by approving the District Courts

analysis (in dicta), granting licensing bodies the license to discriminate against core First

Amendment rights. (Thisdicta could cause much mischief in subsequent use.)

The above constitute the major points of law that the Petitioner alleges the Panel to

have overlooked or misapprehended in the February 2, 2012 decision. Other points,

including points of overlooked or misapprehended fact, are set forth at the footnote below.3

3 Panel Opinion (PO) at p. 2, ln. 79: Plaintiff pled torts, statutory violations and conspiracy

besides constitutional claims. PO p.4, l.10: District Courts notice that Plaintiff was sentencedto five years ban when statute allows only two ignored. Springmann decision at p.6 versus p.12;PO, p.6, ln.12: Sixty complaints not found in record before Court. PO, p7, ln.5: Disciplinaryaction was nonaction, as that complaint was dismissed on merits and should in no way beutilized against Plaintiffs interests at this point in the litigation. PO, p7., ln.11: Brown did notsubmit Bowman report, see RB, p.10. PO, p7., ln.16: Report referenced contained no legalcitations. PO, p.12, ln. 17: Panel misrepresents Defendants as BLE rather than JLAC. PO,p.13, ln.12: Court misstates law of Circuit. PO, p.13, ln. 18-22: Panel adopts simple analysisand refuses to acknowledge numerous substantive differences between bar application motionpractice and federal litigation at bar. PO, p.14, ln. 17: Court errs by conflating Defendants atbar with the BLE. PO, p.14, ln.29: Court errs by labeling verified complaint at bar as similarto Bar Applicant 24128s filings before the Indiana Supreme Court. PO, p.16, ln. 10: Courterrs in concluding Defendants were court appointed experts as that no such appointmentrecords are at bar. PO, p.17, ln. 6: Court errs in finding Defendants were commissioned by theIndiana Supreme Court. No such commission testimony is at bar. PO, p.17, ln. 6: Court errs inconcluding Defendants acted in keeping with court-appointed duties. No accounting of suchduties or appointments are at bar.


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Finally, Petitioner avers that the Panel erred by weighing the facts at bar against him

during Rule 12(b)(1) analysis. The Panels decision presents no standard of review as to

factual interpretation. (SeeAB IX(A)(pp.17-18) for suggested standard.) This alleged failure

to heed the proper standard of review (as well as deferring to the government for the factual

record) was exacerbated by the governments alleged misrepresentation of the facts at bar.

See RB I(A-F).

II. The Argument Introduced

The District Court dismissed the instant litigation on jurisdictional and immunity

grounds: [The] Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the Plaintiffs claims and

the Defendants are entitled to immunity. Order, ECF 63, p.1. The Panel didthe same. The

Panels February 2, 2012 decision rightly describes Rooker-Feldman as a judge made

jurisdictional bar. The doctrine was forged at the Supreme Court in itsDistrict of Columbia

v. Feldman decision almost thirty years ago. See AB, IX(B)(4).

The High Court has showed increasing interest in the so-called Rooker-Feldman

Doctrine in the past seven years. AB, pp. 19 20 identifiesExxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi

Basic Industries Corp. (Mar.30,2005) (Exxon),Lance v. Dennis, (Feb.21,2006)(Lance)

andSkinner v. Switzer, (Mar.7,2011) (Skinner)as a Trifecta repeatedly ordering the

lower courts to rein in use of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See AB, IX(B) for full cites and

case presentations.

A. Resolved: The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine is a great mischief maker

Justice John Paul Stevens rejoiced in the alleged demise of Rooker-Feldman just afew short years ago:

Last Term, in Justice [Ginsburgs] lucid opinion inExxon, the Court finally interredthe so-called Rooker- Feldman doctrine. And today, the Court quite properlydisapproves of the District Court's resuscitation of a doctrine that has producednothing but mischief for 23 years.


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very font of overreaching from which the Trifecta repeatedly warns the lower courts to drink

of no more.

Two of the pre-2005 cases that the Panel relies upon merit greater review. Taylor v.

Fed.Natl Mortg. Assn, 374 F.3d 529 (7thCir.2004) andBrokaw v. Weaver, 305 F.3d 660

(7thCir.2002).

2. The 2002 Brokawopinion confesses confusion

TheBrokaw Court admitted that it was applying Rooker-Feldman in a less-than-ideal

juridic setting, noting that the exact parameters [of the Doctrine] are less than clear and

that discerning which claims are and which claims are not inextricably intertwined with a

state judgment is a difficult process.Id. at 664 (citingRemer v. Burlington Area Sch.

Dist., 205 F.3d 990, 996 (7th Cir.2000)). Brokaw dragsEdwards and Long into this

jurisprudential fog, admitting that

[w]hether [Plaintiff] is presenting an independent claim rather than a claimpremised on an injury caused by the state court's judgment is a complexquestion, as it is often difficultto distinguish between situations in which theplaintiff is seeking to set aside a state court judgment and ones in which the claim isindependent.Edwards v. Illinois Bd. of Adm. to the Bar, 261 F.3d 723, 72829

(7th Cir.2001 (quotingLong, 182 F.3d at 555)

Brokaw, 305 F.3d at 665 (emp.add.) Thankfully the Trifecta and post-Trifecta Seventh

Circuit precedent have since answered most of these complex and difficult then-pending

questions.

3. The 2004 Taylor Decision is philosophically opposed to anarrowing of Rooker-Feldman

The use of the analysis from Taylor, standing alone, justifies reconsideration of theFebruary 2, 2012 opinion. Issued in 2004, Taylor labors under the pre-Trifecta belief in an

expansive Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Major traps threatening pre-2005 federal plaintiffs

are showcased in Taylor, including the judicial bias against those claims [] inextricably

intertwined with a state court judgment. Id. at 534 The question of how such claims are
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recognized is answered only in the abstract, as that the TaylorPanel admitted to

approaching that question as a somewhat metaphysical concept. Id. After establishing

that Rooker-Feldman leads the Court into realms highly abstract,subtle, or abstruse, the

TaylorPanel then unveiled its test for inextricably intertwined as the subjective analysis of

whether the plaintiff indirectly seeks to set aside a state court judgment.Id.

The concept of reasonable opportunity to raise the issue in state court proceedings

is yetanother trap set forth in Taylor. Id.

The Panels use of these traps from Taylor renders Bowman a Seventh Circuit

precedent widening Rooker-Feldman in the face of the Supreme Courts numerous orders to

narrow the doctrine.4

Bowmanstands opposed to numerous recent, post-Exxon Circuit and District Court

cases, including Kelley v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 548 F.3d 600 (7th Cir.2008):

We note that the Tenth Circuit explicitly rejected the reasonable opportunity exception

prior toExxon Mobil,[ ]and the Sixth Circuit eliminated this exception as a result ofExxon

Mobil. [ ]By dramatically narrowing theRooker-Feldmandoctrine inExxon Mobil,the

Supreme Court ensured that litigants always will have subject matter

jurisdiction to bring claims that are independent of the state court judgment

in federal district court. Hence, there is no need for a reasonable opportunity exceptionin those types of cases. . The reasonable opportunity exception was developed during a

time when federal courts appliedRooker-Feldmanmuch more expansively. Post-Exxon

Mobil,the reasonable opportunity exception to theRooker-Feldmandoctrine is of

questionable viability.

Kelley, 548 F.3d at 607 (emp.add., int.cites.omit.).

4 By way of example, the Panel ruled that Plaintiff is estopped from filing civil

conspiracy claims against the instant defendants since he raised those or similar claims whilebeing processed for a state license (in a judicial process devoid of defendants). Yet [i]f afederal plaintiff presents an independent claim, it is not an impediment to the exercise offederal jurisdiction even if that the same or [similar] question was earlier aired between thevery same parties in state court.Exxon, 544 U.S. 292-93 (quoting GASH).
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C. Resolved: The 2006 Loubser opinion is the law of the Circuit governingRooker-Feldman analysis when corrupted state court proceedings are alleged

This Courts 2006Loubserdecision issued about two weeks after the second prong of

the Trifecta.Loubserbuilt upon

Nesses v. Shepard, 68 F.3d 1003 (7

th

Cir.1995) in the postExxon legal environment.See RB, II.

Circuit Court Judge Diana Sykes noted, in her dissent and concurrence, that

[t]here is no question that Loubser's amended complaint is an attack on theproceedings in her state court divorce case, alleging due process and equalprotection violations and, therefore, that the district court's [erroneous] conclusion thatRooker-Feldman blocked federal jurisdiction was thus quite understandable.

Loubser v. Thacker, 440 F.3d 444 (7th Cir.2006) (Sykes, J., concurring and

dissenting)(emp.add.). The same could be said of the complaint at bar, with this exception

Plaintiff Brown does not seek an order reversing (directly or indirectly) the Indiana Supreme

Courts denial of admission. He rather knowingly and purposefully swears off the same,

asking the federal court to join him in eschewing such a litigation goal. AB, VI(A) 10-11.

Judge Sykes noted that the Seventh Circuit had staked out unique ground on Rooker-

Feldman a full decade before the High CourtsExxon ruling:

But this court has held that Rooker-Feldman does not prevent litigants from seeking afederal remedy for alleged violations of their constitutional rights where "the violator so farsucceeded in corrupting the state judicial process as to obtain a favorable judgment." Nessesv. Shepard, 68 F.3d 1003, 1005 (7th Cir. 1995)

Loubser, 440 F.3d at 445. The instant Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants at bar so far

succeeded in corrupting a state judicial licensure process with anti-religious biases and

discrimination as to burden the Plaintiff with an unfavorable character and fitness report

from JLAC, which impacted (through the report of social worker Tim Sudrovech), but did

not necessarily dictate, an unfavorable licensure ruling from the Board of Law Examiners.

AB, Facts. EDF 1, 17, 55, 103, 151, 165, 204, 207, 265.

Judge Sykes plumbed the depths of the Loubseropinion (Posner and Williams) and

Nesses (Posner and Kanne), concluding [to] the extent that Loubser is contending she was

denied the right to be judged by an uncorrupted tribunaland seeks damages for the


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resulting harm,Nesses holds that Rooker-Feldman does not apply. Loubser, 440 F.3d at

445 (emp.add.). Judge Sykes ran the Nesses-Loubser analysis through the paces before the

Loubsercase ended with cert denied, (548 U.S. 907 (2006)) and before the High Court

issued its third warning in six years (AB, pp. 19-20) that Rooker-Feldman was being used

too freely to abort meritorious federal litigation. Given the subsequent legal developments

there is no foundation to deny the continued viability ofNesses andLoubser. Both should

be brought to bear on the verified complaint at bar, which seeks damages from those alleged

to have corrupted a licensure tribunal.5

D. Resolved: Since the High Court wants Rooker-Feldman reined in the

arguments found in Justice John Paul Stevens dissent should be considered

The High Court has directed the federal courts to cut back on Rooker-Feldman three

times since 2005. While a majority of the current Supreme Court Justices have joined

opinions critical of Rooker-Feldman, no currently sitting Justice has joined a Supreme Court

opinion advancing the doctrine.

1. Stevens identified an oxymoron at the heart of Rooker-Feldman

On the day of Rooker-Feldmans creation Justice Stevens may have overstated its

reach, reporting that: [Today] the Court concludes that a United States District Court

has no subject matter jurisdiction over a claim that [attorney licensing] rules have been

administered in an unconstitutional manner [by state bar examiners]. The District of

Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 488, 490 (1973)(Stevens, J., dissenting).

This may have been overstated since no mere statutory construction should be able to trump

First Amendment case law repeated ratified over the decades prior and the decades

5SeeECF 1, 44-47, 82-87, 103-05, 147-50, 154-55, 163, 174-80, 189, 196-203, 207 and

petition for certiorariat ECF 52-1, which demonstrate an ineffectual state remedy and farcicalnature of Indianas law licensure proceedings. Presentation of evidence of collusion could not betendered to the Indiana Supreme Court or United States Supreme Court. Neither was Plaintiffallowed opportunity to seek relief, in either damages or specific performance, before thosetribunals. See espECF 52-1.


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following. See, e.g.,Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (condition[ing] the availability

of benefits upon willingness to violate a cardinal principle of religious faith effectively penalizes

the free exercise of constitutional liberties.). See alsoEmployment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S.

872, 877 (1990) (government may not impose special disabilities on the basis of religious

views or religious status.) Yet the probing of religious and religiously informed views and

beliefs alleged (under oath) at bar support the inference that the government violated both

SherbertandSmith while processing Plaintiff.

Such violations may be by design: Curiously, Justice Stevens continued, the

Court today ignores basic jurisdictional principles when it decides a jurisdictional issue

affecting the licensing of members of the legal profession.Id.6

2. Stevens believed that Rooker-Feldman wrongly conflated appellatereview and collateral attack

Justice Stevens then addressed concepts that foreshadowed the analysis found in the

Nesses-Loubser line of cases:

The Court's opinion fails to distinguish between two concepts: appellate review andcollateral attack. If a challenge to a state court's decision is brought in United States

District Court and alleges violations of the United States Constitution , thenby definition it does not seek appellate review. It is plainly within the federal-question jurisdiction of the federal court. [] There may be other reasons for denyingrelief to the plaintiff-such as failure to state a cause of action, claim or issuepreclusion, or failure to prove a violation of constitutional rights.[] But it doesviolence to jurisdictional concepts for this Court to hold, as it does, that the federaldistrict court has no jurisdiction to conduct independent review of a specificclaim that a licensing body's action did not comply withfederal constitutionalstandards.

6In Justice Stevens defense, he was in the majority in Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972),

which had ruled (without dissent) a mere eleven years earlier that [t]he very purpose of 1983was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of thepeoples federal rights to protect the people from the unconstitutional action under color ofstate law, whether that action be executive, legislative or judicial. Id. at 242 (emp.add).


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Feldman, 460 U.S. at 490 (Stevens, J., dis.)(emp.add.) TheNesses-Loubseranalysis

parallels the above reasoning. It has set many a plaintiff free from Rooker-Feldmans

grasp, and should have done so in Bowman. Since it did not this question arises:

Does Nesses-Loubser reach those applying to become officers of the very system that

is supposed to be dedicated to due process, the rule of law and constitutional

governance ber alles?

3. Stevens believed that Equal Protection analysis would eventuallyunravel Rooker-Feldman

Justice Stevens closed his dissent with a hypothetical fact pattern strikingly

similar to the one at bar:

Constitutional challenges to specific licensing actions may, of course, fail on themerits. But in my view, if plaintiffs challenging a bar admissions decision by a statecourt prove facts comparable to the allegations made by the appellants inYick Wo v.Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886), they would clearlybeentitled to reliefin the United States District Court. If they were seekingadmission to any other craft regulated by the state, they would unquestionably havesuch a right.

Id., 460 U.S. at 488 (emp.add.) The instant fact-rich record affords this Court the

opportunity to vindicate Justice John Paul Stevens, as well as Bryan Brown, who clearly

alleges Equal Protection, Due Process and First Amendment claims. See ECF 1, Legal

Claims, esp. Claims 12 and 13 and ECF 52 (dend petition for cert).

E. Resolved: The Equal Protection Clause is violated when a license-seekingapplicant is processed in a manner that is intentionally discriminatory

Speaking ofYick Wo, the Supreme Courts decision in Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S.

562 (2000) grants this Court a path through the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. As the Panel

noted, Rooker-Feldman is judge made law. Bowman, p.18. The Equal Protection Clause

finds its genesis in a higher law. What is the result when the two collide on the docket, as is

the case at bar?
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Does Plaintiff lose out simply because theFeldman decision (which issued 115 years

after Congress adopted the Fourteenth Amendment) allegedly trumps his constitutional

right to be free from illegitimate government biases and discriminatory actions, even as to

religion and politics?

Willowbrook suggests that this show must go on. The municipality entered upon the

docket of the High Court after the Seventh Circuit had already determined thatthe citys

nemesis could allege an equal protection violation by asserting that state action was

motivated solely by a spiteful effort to get him for reasons wholly unrelated to any

legitimate state objective.Id. Brown alleges as much, and even more. See fn. 2, supra.

Willowbrookspetition for certiorari was granted to determine whether the Equal

Protection Clause gives rise to a cause of action on behalf of a class of one where the

plaintiff did not allege membership in a class or group. Id. The High Court determined that

[o]ur cases have recognized successful equal protection claims brought by a class ofone, where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treateddifferently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis

for the difference in treatment.[ ] In so doing, we have explained that [t]hepurpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure

every person within the States jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrarydiscrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by itsimproper executionthrough duly constituted agents.

Willowbrook, 528 U.S. 562(emp.add, cit.omit.). Willowbrook is difficult to square with the

dismissal ofBowmanvia Rooker-Feldman, since Brown, (a person), clearly alleges (on

oath) intentional and arbitrary discrimination through the improperexecution of state

authority byduly constituted agents that resulted in a five year law banishment from the

law licensure application process when the state statute allows for only a two year

banishment. See Judge Theresa Springmanns March 31, 2011 decision at p.6 (five year

ban) versus p.12 (two year statute). AB, appendix. Can this be anything save intentionally

different treatment that is both arbitrary and a revelation of official animus?
http://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/constitution.amendmentxiv.htmlhttp://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/constitution.amendmentxiv.html


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F. Resolved: The federal courts employ Rooker-Feldman to intentionally treatbar applicants differently from other license seekers but can cite no basis for saiddifferential treatment that can pass constitutional muster

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine targets unwanted bar applicants (be they attorneys or

nonattorneys of any race, any gender, any religion) with disparate treatment as compared to

all others seeking professional licenses from the State. Justice Stevens could not understand

why the law licensing process shouldbe immune from such just ends, opining that [t]he

fact that the licensing function in the legal profession is controlled by the judiciary is not a

sufficient reason to immunize allegedly unconstitutional conduct from review in the federal

courts. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 490 (Stevens, J., dissenting). It would seem that unwanted

bar applicants are nonpersons as far as Equal Protection analysis is concerned.

1. Does Rooker-Feldman trump the Fourteenth Amendment?

IfWillowbrookisnt applicable in this instance, that is, if Browns Equal Protection

claims need not apply, then Rooker-Feldmans judge made law has triumphed over the

Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. Bar applicants are cast outside

the zone of protection afforded land use zoning applicants, barbers, colonic hydrotherapists,

psychiatrists, nurses, engineers, motor vehicle operators and every other licensure applicant

in America.

2. Does Rooker-Feldman grant state bar committees license tounconstitutionally discriminate?

Given Bowman, the proper take-away for Indiana, Illinois and Wisconsin bar

application officials is do what thou wilt with applicants. Future applicants may face

affirmative action quotas (on most any characteristic) and weltanschauung reviews that

would make all but the most hardened statists blush. At footnote two and on page 13 the

Panel pre-approves discriminatory inquiries: Because Browns claims of religious bias

require a federal district court to review the judicial process followed Rooker Feldman bars

jurisdiction and thus approves the government to demand apostasy as the price for a law


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license. Future panels will have to determine ifBowman also authorizes blatant racial,

gender, ethnic, sexual orientation and political affiliation discrimination.7

G. Resolved: The Seventh Circuits 1974 Whitfield opinion allows allcompeting interests at bar to be resolved through the application of Loubser and theallowance of Plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment-based claims.

Nine years prior to theFeldman decision, Circuit Judge Stevens weighed the

complaint of an unsuccessful bar applicant. In Whitfield v. Ill.Bd. Law Examiners, 504 F.2d

474 (7thCir.1974), this Court determined it would be justified in interfering with bar

applicant processing if faced with proof that a denial was predicated upon a constitutionally

impermissible reason.Id. at 477.

The WhitfieldCourt stood on the shoulders of the Supreme Court when ruling that

there may very well be situations in which a capricious denial by state officials may give rise

to a federal remedy.Id. That Supreme Court decision held the courthouse door open to

individual bar applicants whose Fourteenth Amendment rights were denied, stating that

[r]efusal to allow a man to qualify himself for the [legal] profession on a wholly arbitrary

standard or on a consideration that offends the dictates of reason offends the Due Process

Clause. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 247, 249 (1957). (Frankenfurter, J.,

concurring, joined by Clark, J. and Harlan, J).8 While Richard Schware found his way to

7Plaintiff argued that the latitude as to court consultant immunity granted by Cooney v.

Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967 (7th Cir.2009) be reconsidered and narrowed in light ofGolden v. Sigman,611 F.3d 356 (7th Cir.2010). Bowman advances the proposition that any expert appointed bya government social worker enjoys absolute immunity for words raised against a bar applicant,no matter how libelous or irresponsible. Seewitness arguments, AB & RB.8The SchwareCourt famously added, We need not enter into a discussion whether the practice

of law is a 'right' or 'privilege.' Regardless of how the State's grant of permission to engage inthis occupation is characterized, it is sufficient to say that a person cannot be prevented frompracticing except for valid reasons. Certainly the practice of law is not a matter of the State'sgrace. 353 U.S. n.5. Yet if Bowman is allowed to stand as written, the take away is that it isall about the States grace and not about constitutional rights at all, opposing Black letter law:State-created rules governing the grant or denial of licenses must comply with constitutionalstandards and must be administered in accordance with due process of law. [It] should bebeyond question that a federal district court has subject matter jurisdiction over an individual'slawsuit raising federal constitutional challenges. 460 U.S. 488, 490 (1973) (Stevens, J.,


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the Supreme Court via 28 U.S.C. 1257, Justice Frankfurter and the WhitfieldCourt --

were of the opinion that Schware could have entered the federal system via the district court

given his civil rights claim.

The WhitfieldCourt concluded that, Since nothing in plaintiff's complaint indicates

that he was denied admission for a [constitutionally impermissible] reason, the district court

correctly rejected plaintiff's request to overrule the judgment of the Board of Examiners.Id.

Find at bar a verified complaint, affidavits and reports from government agents

demonstrating that political views, religious beliefs and empathywere weighed and found

lacking on route to law license denial. (See, e.g., Bowmanat n.2.) Baird v. State Bar of

Ariz., 401 U.S. 1 (1971) holds that views and beliefs are immune from bar association

inquisitions designed to lay a foundation for barring an applicant from the practice of law.

Id., at 2.But compare ECF 1, 37, 40, 52, 56, 85, 140-44, 149-50, 153-56, 160-64.SeeAB,

pp.7-15; see also RB,II.

Such was the case when the states were barring Marxists from the practice of law.

Does the rule of constitutional law fail when religious applicants are so processed?9

III. Conclusion

Rehearing or rehearing en banc should follow, for the good of the Republic.

dissenting) Bowman denies First and Fourteenth Amendment claims quarter in federal court,an end foreign to the jurisprudential history of our Republic and threatening the same.9InArchie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir, 1988), the en bancSeventh Circuit

interpreted Yick Woas standing for the proposition that a government may not selectivelyenforce their laws in ways that violate other rules, such as the prohibition of racialdiscrimination, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886), or the firstamendment--they could not, for example, rescue Republicans but not Democrats. In thepresent instance it appears that students of Karl Marx are approved but disciples of Thomas

Aquinas are not; which is to say, those mixing their religion with the governments politicsneed not apply.


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Respectfully submitted on February 16, 2012,

Bryan J. Brown

827 Webster Street

Fort Wayne, IN 46802

(260) 515-8511

[email protected]

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that I, Bryan Brown, timely delivered hard copies of this Petitionfor Rehearing to the following counsel of record via the U.S. Mails and this day deliveredthe same via electronic mail:

Mark BaeverstadFor Defendant Elizabeth BowmanRothberg , Logan & Warsco, LLP505 East Washington Blvd.PO Box 11647Fort Wayne, IN 46859-1647

Sharon L StanzioneStephen M. BrandenburgFor Defendant Stephen Ross11051 Broadway Suite BCrown Point, IN 46307

Francis BarrowFor JLAP/Supreme Court DefendantsShepard, Harrell and SudrovechIndiana Attorney General's Office - IAG/302Indiana Govt Center South, 5th Floor302 W. Washington Street

Indianapolis, IN 46204-2770.

Reconsider.petition.112164

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