Reconciling with the Newer Middle East - Rima Khalaf

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Transcript

Reconciling with the Newer Middle East

Rima Khalaf Hunaidi

Under-Secretary-General and Executive Secretary, United Nations Economic and Social

Commission for Western Asia

12 September 2011

This speech was delivered at the conference, The Economics of the Arab Spring.

Transcript: Reconciling with the Newer Middle East

www.chathamhouse.org 2

Rima Khalaf Hunaidi:

Excellencies, distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen,

Allow me to begin by saying that I’m honoured to be invited to address you

here today at Chatham House, an institution that has a very long history of

facilitating sincere and much-needed debate. Today, in our efforts to

understand a rapidly changing world, Chatham House is more necessary than

ever.

I come from a part of the world that never ceases to surprise. In 1993,

Shimon Peres, the Israeli elder statesman, wrote a book entitled ‘The New

Middle East’. The vision he set forth in that book did not materialize. Later,

Neoconservatives in Washington predicted a New Middle East reshaped by

military intervention. They even perceived its birth pangs. Yet their predictions

also turned out to be terribly wrong.

When many countries in the region are undergoing radical transition, we need

to try to come up with a new narrative that re-evaluates where the Middle

East is, and where it is going. With so many ‘New Middle East’ narratives

being swept away, I should like to humbly set forth my vision of what I, for

want of a better term, will call the ‘Newer Middle East’. I, too, may be proved

wrong. But I believe passionately that this time of great change is a turning

point for Arabs, and that some things have changed for good.

In my speech, I would like to address three major issues:

Firstly: What are the new regional realities?

Secondly: What are the short-to-medium term challenges?

And lastly: How can the world help Arabs fulfil their aspirations?

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It has been nine months since the Arab revolt erupted. So far that revolt had

led to the overthrow of three dictators and has, at the very least, shaken the

thrones of almost all others.

Although some observers had predicted that change was coming to the

region, very few thought it would happen so quickly and on such a massive

scale. But the signs were there. Almost a decade ago, UNDP published its

first Arab Human Development Report. Authored by a team of distinguished

Arab intellectuals, the report offered a profound insight: that Arabs would

continue to lag behind other peoples until they overcame three key deficits: in



freedom, in knowledge and in women’s empowerment. Its message boiled

down to one simple fact: the status quo was untenable.

UNDP’s third report on this topic concluded that Arabs had become

disillusioned with promises of reform by Arab rulers, and with what they

perceived as insincere Western initiatives. Arabs were suffering multiple

injustices: domestic oppression and increasing marginalization, compounded

by foreign encroachment on Arab rights. Arabs, the report concluded, were

rapidly moving from a mindset of intimidation and apathy to a combustible mix

of righteous indignation and anger. A threshold would inevitably be crossed,

ushering in long-awaited change.

This is what happened. The old Arab order is crumbling. A new order is

evolving. Though its details are still unclear, this new order will be shaped by

five emerging realities.

Reality Number One: The theory of Arab Exceptionalism has been irrevocably

shattered

To the comfort of Arab autocrats, the theory of Arab Exceptionalism

postulated that ethnic traditions, religious practices and linguistic

characteristics rendered Arabs unsuitable for democracy. It was a convenient

theory that also allowed some foreign policymakers to ignore, or at least

suspend, their espoused values. Whether its proponents truly believed in it is

a moot point. But propagating such ideas has left an unpleasant aftertaste.

Reality Number Two: There is no going back to a pre-December 2010 world

The transformations that have taken place in Arab countries are non-linear

and irreversible. In such transformations, a very small and incremental

change in one variable, such as an uncalculated insult to a street vendor, can

lead to a breakdown of the whole system. It is like the last drop of water that

causes a landslide, or the straw that breaks the camel’s back.

The barriers of fear have been shattered. The Arab masses have discovered

that they have a voice, and that they can make a difference. The fall of

Mubarak and Ben Ali will continue to inspire others. To terrorize the masses

back into submission, regimes will have to resort to something bordering on

genocide.

Reality Number Three: Democracy will ultimately prevail but the road will be

rocky

The struggle for rights, freedoms and social justice will continue. In countries

that have crossed the first threshold, new mini uprisings may occur, either to



correct a path or to protect the new order against the old guard. With time, the

nascent forces of positive change will organize politically and gain a solid

footing. Social and economic benefits of the transition will start to accrue.

Regional and global powers will also find it more costly to challenge emerging

democracies. It is not inconceivable that, five years from now, a vibrant

democratic culture, and fully-functioning democratic institutions, will be firmly

established, at least in Egypt and Tunisia.

Moreover, a stable and democratic Egypt may well trigger another wave of

democratization in the region. But here a word of caution: in this next round,

there will be no hastily fleeing Ben Alis. Regimes will either willingly reform to

pre-empt change, or they will viciously fight back to smother the first signs of

protest.

Reality Number Four: The West will not be able to call all the shots

It is interesting to observe how Western reactions to the Arab revolutions

have evolved over the past nine months. Initially the West resorted to tried

and tested formulas, seeking to maintain the status quo. The French offer of

military support to Ben Ali is an apt example. But that approach no longer

works.

Then there was a cautious resignation to change; Western States called for

peaceful transitions and for presidents to step down. Ironically, and to the

chagrin of friendly despots, such calls seemed to occur more rapidly the

closer those despots were to Western administrations. The strong relations

that the West had with powerful institutions, such as the military and the

security establishment, provided the needed comfort for the disposal of a

friendly ruler. Much as some would like to present the case as ideals

prevailing over interests, Western Governments were often sacrificing a pawn

to save a king.

Lastly, the strategy shifted towards containing the change and controlling the

direction of the transition. To safeguard their interests, regional powers tried

to buy their way in, while global powers tried to clip the wings of revolutions.

In the process, both discovered that there were new limits on their powers.

Although willing, friendly interlocutors could no longer deliver reliably.

Reality Number Five: The moribund peace process will finally yield peace

Arab despotism, as much as superpower support, has helped sustain Israel’s

occupation of Arab land, despite its violation of international law and all moral

values. While paying lip service to the cause of Palestinian liberation,



authoritarian rulers tended to acquiesce in Israel’s oppression of the

Palestinians and the ongoing colonization of their lands.

However, Arab democracy will not tolerate indefinite Israeli occupation. The

Arab Revolts have revitalized Arab calls for Palestinian liberation. The new

wave of support for the Palestinians now emanates from the same principles

that brought millions onto the streets, namely dignity, and zero tolerance of

injustice and humiliation. Its non-ideological and non-violent nature, and its

solid grounding in universal human rights makes this new support for the

Palestinian cause more effective and durable.

Marginalized for decades, Arab public opinion will now have a decisive

influence over foreign policy. Together with the prospect of a further

expansion of democracy in the Arab world, this will have a major effect on the

behaviour of all stakeholders in the region. Israel will find a stalemate no

longer in its interest, the Palestinians, strengthened by genuine Arab support,

will get a deal they can live with. And Western powers, forced to rethink their

regional strategies, will, it is hoped, play a more constructive and proactive

role.

Now I would like to turn to the challenges the Arab world faces.

The prospect of freedom, justice and good governance for Arabs, and of

peace for the region and the world, has the power to keep all parties on track.

But the short-to-medium term outlook may not be so rosy. Four main

challenges stand out:

The first challenge is how to build inclusive institutions and foster a

democratic culture. As constitutions are redrafted, political forces will discover

that the process of achieving consensus is a greater challenge than the

technical details of the document itself. There will be very little disagreement

on issues related to basic rights and freedoms. However, two issues will give

rise to vibrant debate and a degree of polarization in transitioning countries:

number 1: the place of religion in the State and in its Constitution, and

number 2: the role of the military in a new democracy.

The process of achieving consensus on these two issues will be challenging,

particularly since those leading the fight for more progressive societies are

still struggling to move from the street to the political arena. This time around,

external powers cannot simply pull a Loya Jirga out of a hat and claim that all

is well. The process will have to be managed domestically. Furthermore, to be

successful and sustainable, it has to ensure the participation of all

stakeholders, including traditionally marginalized groups. Much of the future



prosperity and stability of the region will depend on how this process is

carried out.

The second challenge is how to avert a setback or a relapse into violence.

Those loyal to former regimes will not willingly give up their hold on power or

the rents they commandeered from it. Superpowers as well as regional

powers whose interests are jeopardized by the new order could well throw

their weight behind regressive forces. However, setbacks will come at a very

high price. Societies won’t just quietly resubmit to autocracy. Violence,

perhaps leading to civil war in some countries, cannot be ruled out.

One way to mitigate such risks is by ensuring that there are effective

transitional justice mechanisms that address the legacies of former regimes

and take steps to reinforce social cohesion. Whether such mechanisms are

based on the ‘truth and reconciliation’ model of South Africa or a ‘forgive and

forget’ model will depend on the particular conditions in each country. A

balance between justice and inclusiveness on the one hand and averting

future conflict on the other must be struck. And here a word of warning: one

model that will definitely not yield the desired results is witch-hunting along

the lines of the de-Bathification process that occurred in post-Saddam

Hussein Iraq.

In addition, the risk that a country may revert to autocracy can be mitigated by

swiftly rehabilitating the armed and security forces, and strengthening the role

of the judiciary in upholding the rule of law and safeguarding human rights.

The third big challenge is getting economic policies right. The short-term

outlook for transitioning economies does not look good. Growth rates will be

low or negative due to the decline in tourism, FDI and domestic economic

activity. Unemployment and poverty rates are rising. There is also the risk that

populist policies, enacted to win the support of the public, will drive up fiscal

deficits and increase borrowing costs. Inflation will rise and the current

account balance will deteriorate.

However, people will willingly pay such a price in exchange for the long-term

sustainable benefits that a transition to democracy can bring about. The big

challenge is to agree on the economic strategies that need to be adopted.

Though not many will dispute the objective of inclusive growth and social

justice, a huge divergence of opinion exists on optimal economic strategies to

achieve it.

What make decisions more difficult are the flaws inherent in economic

liberalization and structural adjustment policies that were implemented by

ousted regimes. In the absence of good governance they have bred



corruption and distorted the incentives we need for a healthy private sector to

emerge. Former ruling elites became increasingly wealthy, while the majority

of the population was further impoverished.

With people disillusioned with economic liberalization policies, decision

makers may have an understandable tendency to shun them in the short

term. It will be unfortunate if governments throw the baby out with the bath

water, so to speak. But once political life matures and true representative

processes take hold, a healthier and more constructive economic debate can

ensue. It is to be hoped that Arab countries will then be able to design

economic policies that are neither subject to the dictates of international

financial institutions, nor a mere knee-jerk reaction against them.

The fourth and biggest challenge is how to manage expectations in the short

term. The revolutions are all about freedom, dignity and social justice. People

believe that their lives will witness substantial improvements as they start

enjoying their freedoms and participating in decisions that affect their lives.

But few socio-economic benefits are likely to be achieved in the short term.

In the medium term, transparent governance systems, well functioning public

institutions, a strong and independent judiciary, and lower levels of corruption

will level the playing field and boost investment and growth.

But, as we know, economic reforms often take a long time to bear fruit.

Moreover, serious economic reform cannot really start before the political

process generates stable representative government. In the meantime, a free

and open political dialogue can help raise public awareness of the trade-off

between short-term gains and long-term prosperity.

Having addressed the new realities and the challenges, I would like to turn to

the last point.

How can the rest of the world help emerging Arab democracies?

Well, if the will is there, there is much that the Arab world’s partners can do.

They can help countries restart their economies. They can promote

administrative and institutional capacity-building, particularly in countries,

such as Libya, which have suffered from a weak or non-existent institutional

framework. And they can help countries to strengthen their economic

governance and regulatory mechanisms.

In the short term, three things will remain key: providing humanitarian

assistance where necessary, mitigating transition risks, and helping new Arab

democracies learn from the experience of other countries that have

undergone radical transition.



Providing technical support and financial assistance is now a top priority.

Although this can be financially profitable for all, serious political

disagreements may emerge. Beneficiaries, who now can claim a vision of

their own, will not always see eye to eye with donors. Though none of the

transitioning countries are expected to revert to centrally planned economies

or to advocate state control of the means of production, most are expected to

opt for a variation of free market economies that has more space for social

justice and equity.

In addition, the issue of trust may stand in the way of greater cooperation in

the short term.

Bilateral financial assistance has often been associated with a political price

that the generation of the revolution might not be willing to pay. Recent

threats to cut assistance to Egypt and the Palestinian Authority are just two

reminders of how unwelcome price tags are sometimes attached to bilateral

aid.

As for international financial institutions, the issue of trust is twofold. Firstly,

they were often perceived as representing creditors, particularly in the days of

financial stabilization and structural adjustment packages. The interests of the

country often seemed to come last. Secondly, those institutions are perceived

to embrace an economic ideology that makes them ill-equipped to provide the

innovative and unconventional solutions required by the ever-changing

problems of transition.

Finally, there is the question of intentions. Do outside powers, the West in

particular, have an interest in seeing a real transition towards democracy in

Arab States?

Well, if we look at those powers’ track record, the answer seems to be no,

they do not. Loyal dictators, whose thrones are dependent on outsiders’

support, are better instruments for those outsiders’ policies. This is

particularly the case when it comes to safeguarding their access to oil,

ensuring Israel’s hegemony over the region or bolstering their own security

against perceived threats. Furthermore, Western and other powers have

provided political backing to dictators across the region, as well as material

and logistical support to help them oppress their own people.

The new realities, however, call for revisiting this conventional wisdom. And,

when we examine the alternatives, Arab democracy may not be that bad for

Western interests after all.



If by security, the West means protecting its people from threats of violent

extremism, then a democratic Arab world that is committed to ending injustice

and marginalization is the better alternative; repression, renditions and abuse

by despotic regimes have actually exacerbated the problem of extremism, by

providing it with ideal breeding grounds.

If by oil, what is meant is its free flow at reasonable prices, and not the ability

to influence how its proceeds are spent, then a democratic Middle East is the

one without burning oil wells, blown up pipelines, and sudden price hikes

caused by instability and wars.

If protecting the interests of Israel means ensuring that it can enjoy peace like

any other State, as opposed to providing unquestioning support for its

colonialist and expansionist agenda, then Arab democracies are more

capable of upholding that peace.

For young Arabs, democracy does not come at the expense of social justice

and personal freedom. It does not exclude national liberation. Opening up to

the world does not mean you can’t be proud of your cultural identity. The

youth of today are our partners of tomorrow. They will be looking to us to see

how we act in the near future. How we support their aspirations for a

promising equitable future, how we uphold human rights and moral values,

how we vote on Palestinian statehood, how we defend political freedoms and

how we empower and support Arab women. And they will hold us

accountable.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Arabs have made their choice. They are determined to construct a better

world. It probably won’t be a replica of a Western style liberal democracy. But

if the West can live with such a vision, great partnerships can be forged.

As Arabs reinvent themselves, their partners will have to re-evaluate their

past practices and rethink their approach to the region. They need to resist

the temptation to shape the other unto their image. And they have to accept

the right of the other to disagree. They need to reconcile with the Newer

Middle East.

The Arab world is ready for change. Are we?

Thank you.

Reconciling with the Newer Middle East - Rima Khalaf

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