Jessica Ma. B. Rey

Reconciliare

March 20, 2014

Have faith in the universe and its capability to lead you to the path of abundance. Stephen Richardsi

What does it mean to see nothing? It means to see something that is out of sight. One does not simply mean that seeing nothing is seeing something not visible. Hence, you see nothing2. One sees the somethingness of nothing. Seeing is not only limited to the eyes but it also pertains to the other senses that confirms the presence of something that is nothing. It is safe to say then that the presence of something is not only limited to what the eyes can see. It extends all the way to what one cannot see, what one cannot feel or hear or taste or smell. There is something more than what our senses can perceive and it encompasses all that one cannot intuit. This paper concerns the nothing, the nothing that is present in the absence of our capability to comprehend and is present in the presence of our senses; the nothing that extends its invisible self to what is visible, to the receiver of the perception, to the subject.

It is something that one does not know, precisely, and one does not know if precisely it is, if it exists, if it responds to a name and corresponds to an essence. One does not know: not out of ignorance, but because this non-object, this non-present present, this being-there of an absent or departed one no longer belongs to knowledge. At least no longer to that which one thinks one knows by the name of knowledge. One does not know if it is living or if it is dead The

Thing is still invisible, it is nothing visible at the moment one speaks of it and in order to ask oneself if it has reappeared. It is still nothing that can be seen when one speaks of it.3

As the apple touched the ground as it fell from the tree, Sir Isaac Newton supposed that there is an invisible force that made the apple fall down from where it had been originally placed. This force is that which cannot be seen but can be perceived by the senses. What is this force that brought about the falling of the apple? It is gravity. This is the working of the gravity, an unseen force, a force that is outside the range of what the eyes can see. There are also other forces that are even much stronger than gravity and are not in the range of human senses. There is the nothing; but it can never be reduced to a mere force or a presence or be supposed to be similar as gravity. This nothing is not only present as a steady passive being that receives action. It is a very dynamic being and it affects other things around it. Like gravity or electromagnetic waves, this nothing manifests itself through effecting traces of its presence to make sure that it marks its being present in the world. It gravitates itself as it gravitates to the person, the very concept of

attracting one another like the apple that had fallen from the tree being attracted to the ground. Revisiting GWF Hegel:

But the pure concept or infinity as the abyss of nothingness in which all is being engulfed must signify the infinite grief [of the finite] purely as a moment of the supreme Idea, and no more than a moment.4

What is this nothing and why am I problematizing it? This paper aims to reconcile the relationship between the object of faith the nothing, the supreme Idea as Hegel may suppose it and the subject of faith, the person, the self, the I. This is the very reason why this paper is entitled Reconciliare, the latin word for Reconciliation.5

This nothing I have been concerned this afternoon with is the object of faith. It is where faith is being grounded on. It is the believing in something that is nothing, that which cannot be comprehended fully by the human senses and which presence is cannot be traced wholly but that which affects every single object. We seek to know the nothing as we maintain on believing in it. This nothing is present now. It is never docilely given a date in the chain of presents, day after day, according to the instituted order of a calendar.6

In its possibility as in the experience of the impossible that will always have constituted it, it is never a stranger to the event, that is, very simply, to the coming of that which happens.7

What does it mean to have faith then into something that is incomprehensible or that which presence does not exist in the range of the senses and cannot be fathomed fully? Perhaps, it is in the understanding of Jean Jacques Derrida that we open ourselves to the infinite possibility of meaning. That there is more than what it is as defined by the dominant ideology of the present, that meaning along with history. The coming of meaning, therefore, is in process. But one must also be careful in the coming of meaning, for it has to be understood that one must be in constant search for it as well. It is then a mutual searching or mutual coming to the arrival of meaning that meaning does not only come to the seeker but the seeker must also come to the meaning.

It is there that differance, if it remains irreducible, irreducibly required by spacing of any promise and by the future-to-come that comes to open it, does not mean only (as some people have too often believed and so naively) deferral, lateness, delay, postponement. In the incoercible differance the here-now unfurls.8

But it is also important to note that this process is a continuous, dynamic process. One does not arrive to the meaning as soon. One can never know when

or what point in time will it come to the seeker. It opens now the person to the concept of infinity: the ever-coming of now. This nothingness, this meaning as to which why we have faith to the nothing is in constant question as to when to arrive. A venir. To come. One can never know. One can never predict or assume or expect or make a schedule as to when it will arrive. This supposes an infinite waiting and coming to the meaning as to knowing the nothing. And since one can never know, that person is left to assume or to suppose that, perhaps, it may never come or, perhaps, it may come soon. This concept introduced by Derrida is called differance, understanding through the networks of meanings that lie under.

Without lateness, without delay, but without presence, it is the precipitation of an absolute singularity, singular because differing, precisely [justement], and always other, binding itself necessarily to the form of the instant, in imminence and in urgency: even if it moves toward what remains to come, there is the pledge [gage] (promise, engagement, injunction and response to the injunction, and so forth). The pledge is given here and now, even before, perhaps, a decision confirms it. It thus responds without delay to the demand of justice. The latter by definition is impatient, uncompromising and unconditional.9

Though, one must keep in mind that this is nothing. One must come to understand that the nothing is out within the range of the senses that one comes to partially understand the nothing as suppose to everything that it is not.10 One only supposes its meaning through the presence of something which is not nothing.

Therefore, neither external Nature nor mere feeling has a right to that name. Immediate feeling that has not been purified by rational knowing is burdened with the quality of the natural, the contingent, of self-externality and asunderness. Consequently, in the content of feeling and of natural things, infinity is present only formally, abstractly. Mind, on the contrary, in conformity with its Notion or its truth, is infinite or eternal in this concrete and real sense: that it remains absolutely self-identical in its difference.11

In this sense, nothing is presupposed as similar to a higher being. In Hegels terms, the nothing is the absolute. Incorporating Derrida, the nothing is introduced to the concept of infinity. It is the infinite coming of the nothing. It is the infinite waiting of man to the coming of meaning, to understand and grasp the totality and actuality of nothing. But this nothing is cannot be simply reduced to any representation of its being. Since we cannot fully comprehend it, one cannot be entitled to participate in the creation of its representation.12 Even mere speech or thought cannot suffice to the interpretation of the nothing.13 In Jean-Luc Nancys interpretation of Hegel, he supposes that any representation of any being desaturates its beingness. Likewise in the Phenomenology of the Face byEmmanuel Levinas, any representation is invalid and reduces the being as mere

representations of the interpreter. It robs the being-interpreted the chance to express itself on its own.

A face is not like a plastic form, which is always already deserted, betrayed, by the being it reveals, such as marble from which the gods it manifests already absent themselves. It differs from an animal's head, in which a being, in its brutish dumbness, is not yet in touch with itself. In a face the expressed attends its expression, expresses its very expression, always remains master of the meaning it delivers. A pure act" in its own way, it resists identification does not enter into the already known, brings aid to itself, as Plato puts it, speaks.14

It may be a good question to ask as to How is the nothing perceived if it is unavailable to the senses? Nothing presents itself through grace. This grace is the trace of the nothing15 for one cannot fully grasp the ontology of the nothing; the phantasm of the nothing that reaches out to man, the people. This is a trace of whats to come. A revenant may already mark the promised return of the spectre of living being.16 Grace partially reveals the nothing and expresses its wanting to become into being, to be realized and actualized. 17

[I]s doubtless a supernatural and paradoxical phenomenality, a furtive and ungraspable visibility of the invisible or an invisibility of a visible X. that non-senuous senuous of which capital speaks with regard to a certain exchange-value; it is also, no doubt, the tangible intangibility of a proper body without flesh but still the body of someone as someone other.18

Since the person is only left to presuppose to himself as how to understand the meaning of his faith to the nothing, Immanuel Kant invites man to use his rational capacity to acquire truth and meaning. It calls out for an infinite obligation of the self to know the nothing through ones own thinking.19

Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-imposed immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one's understanding without guidance from another. This immaturity is self-imposed when its cause lies not in lack of understanding, but in lack of resolve and courage to use it without guidance from another. Sapere Aude! [dare to know] "Have courage to use your own understanding!"--that is the motto of enlightenment.20

Kant also invites man to the life in the community. It is in the public use of reason without any hindrance that man is continuously enlightened, that man is made available to the creation of meaning. He also highlights the presence of other people in verification of thoughts.21 It now calls for collective participation. This

enlarged mentality brings man to understand faith and to bring meaning to it in the view of different interpretations. Kant supposes both autonomy and heteronomy of reason. What does it say, then, about reasoning and acquiring meaning? As Foucault posits, ambiguity should be embraced.22 And the same is true for the Marxists who are anxious of heterogeneity. For them, they fear that the plurality of Marxism will bring decentrality in meaning.

Let us consider first of all, the radical and necessary heterogeneity of an inheritance, the difference without opposition that has to mark it, a disparate and a quasi-juxtaposition without dialectic (the very plural of what we will later call Marxs spirits.) An inheritance is never gathered together, it is never once with itself. Its presumed unity, if there is one, can consist only in the injunction to reaffirm by choosing.23

For Derrida, meaning creation is the main tenet of Marxism. The real spirit of Marxism lies in the ground of groundlessness. The real spirit of Marxism is its very suspicion to foundation. It is the very act of inheritance. Inheritors that we are of more than one form of speech, as well as of an injunction that is itself disadjointed.24 Meaning creation, then, is in the very hands of the inheritors. Derrida through the critique of Marx brings us faith that is open to different meanings; through Kant, one is encouraged to look for the truth without hindrances; it is the closing of self from any dogma and actively waiting and participating in the coming of meaning that one takes faith in the invisible.

One must means one must filter, sift, criticize, one must sort out several different possibles that inhabit the same injunction. If the readibility of a legacy were given, natural, transparent, univocal, if it did not call for and at the same time defy interpretation, we would never have anything to inherit from it The critical choice called for by any reaffirmation of the inheritance is also, like memory itself, the condition of finitude. The infinite does not inherit, it does not inherit

(from) itself. The injunction itself (it always says choose and decide from among what you inherit) can only be one by dividing itself, tearing itself apart, differing/deferring itself, by speaking at the same time several time and in several voices.25

As Derrida critics Marx in falling into the pit of his critique, Derrida points out that Marx has failed in exorcising the spectre he has conjured. Marx has localized the spectre, in such a way that he had come to know and had familiarized himself to the ghost.26 But isnt it the very mark of humanity? That man is a limited being and could possibly err. It is in Marxs attempt to create a one unified

Marxism that he has failed.27 "This familiarity of the ghost, of the trace, of the extension of the nothing that allows man to exercise is his very act of faith. It is in familiarization of the nothing even if it does not exist yet and exists in the ever-coming now that provides even more fuel to the desire to fathom it. By localizing

and personifying the nothing, by giving it an artificial body to capture a partial totality of the incomprehensible nothing, man creates a certain knowing and believing of it.

This familiarization is possible through becoming.28 As the self negates itself, it knows the other, it comes to arrive in the process of knowing the negative.

Everything is in the absolute restlessness of becoming Its absolute restlessness is itself from the determination of the absolute.29 Nancy posits then that this process of negating opens up the possibility of partially knowing the negative as it undergoes the process of becoming. It is always the trembling of the finite seized by the infinite: it is the sensibility of the infinite in the finite.30 The very trembling in the face of the other, the infinite, the nothing brings the relationality of knowing each other, the thought penetrates the subject the knowing of the other by the subject and the knowing of the subject by the other. Thought cannot penetrate the thing without trembling.31

This tarrying with the negative is the magical power that converts it into being. This power is identical with what we earlier called the Subject, which, by giving determinateness an existence in its own element, supersedes abstract immediacy, that is, the immediacy that barely is, and thus is authentic substance: that being or immediacy whose mediation is not outside of it, but that is this mediation itself.32

How is it to have faith into nothing and maintain which without conjuration? Faith lives on the subjective personal interpretations of the subject. As for Hegel, the subject is in constant displacement in search for himself.33 Faith, then, also seeks autonomy in meaning creation aside from heteronomy. Faith is a personal decision. No one simply inherits faith34 This interpretation provided by the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines provides a very beautiful capturing of what faith is. Faith is a personal decision. It is coming from the inside, it reaches out from the core of the self to the outside to validate whatever belief he has believed in. It is the personal act of believing,35 a response to the object of faith In its very first figure, this relation to the other, and more precisely, this being-self-through-the-other, gives itself as that by which substance is made to tremble.36 No one simply inherits the meaning of faith for every subject is called to participate in the creation of meaning in themselves.

Maybe it is worth looking at language. Aside from knowing that the nothing is the object of faith, the center of faith, F-A-I-T-H, is I the subject. Faith, then, seeks autonomy in meaning creation.37 The subject then must reason out his faith and provide interpretation to his faith on his own, without hindrance. The meaning is coming from the inner self, from the center. The response to the nothing comes from the self; the subject seeks out the nothing to be one with it in the act of faith. It conjures the nothing in the hopes of knowing it, in being familiar with it; to

localize it. Not so much that the subject wants to be nothing but the subject wants to be in unity with the nothing. The eschatological truth of faith is the unity of the subject to the nothing the meaning of faith.

How can one be late to the end of history? A question for today. It is serious because it obliges one to reflect again, as we have been doing since Hegel, on what happens and deserves the name of event, after history; it obliges one to wonder if the end of history is but the end of a certain concept of history.38

Remembering the interpretation of Derrida in his Spectres of Marx, he says that Marx is concerned with the historicity of the subject that the subject is in perpetual displacement in search of the self in arriving to its meaning.39 What is faith then in this context of the self? Its subjectivity entails a certain inheritance of a responsibility this inheritance is not merely a given that provides meaning to faith but a responsibility of the person to contribute to the creation of meaning.

There will be no future without this.40 As for Marx, it can never happen without transformation:

Well, what remains irreducible to any deconstruction, what remains as undeconstructible as the possibility itself of deconstruction is, perhaps, a certain experience of the emancipator promise; it is perhaps even the formality of a structural messianism, a messianism without religion, even a messianism without messianism, an idea of justice. But this is perhaps what we must now be thought and thought otherwise in order to ask oneself where Marxism is going, which is also to say, where Marxism is leading and where is it to be led: where to lead it by interpreting it, which cannot happen without transformation, and not where can it lead us such as it will have been.41

The subject, then, has an infinite responsibility of contributing to the creation of meaning as it is continuously displaced. This meaning would come solely from the subject as the source of decision. Inheritance is never a given, it is always a task.42 Contribution to meaning creation is important but what does this decision-making call for? Karl Marx would simply say in his 11th thesis on Feuerbach, The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it.43 What should be our response to faith as Marx would point out? It is a call for bringing about change. This is a responsibility every person is accounted for. Marx emphasizes that every subject is [n]ot to flee from the responsibility.44

It remains before us just as unquestionably as we are heirs of Marxism, even before wanting or refusing to be, and, like all inheritors we are mourning. In mourning in particular for what is

called Marxism. To be, this word in which we earlier saw the word of the spirit, means, for the same reason, to inherit. All questions on the subject of being or of what is to be (or not to be) are questions of inheritance.45

Our faith should direct us to transformation. We do not simply believe, or have faith. We put it into practice. Marx underscores that it is what the subject chooses. He is concerned as to how the subject will take stand to his reasoning, to his beliefs. It now invokes the concept of Free Will. The subject is given the free will to decide on his own, to be the sole responsible figure to his own actions. It gives the subject a choice as to how he plans to do something about his faith. What he wants to do to the nothing which he cannot see but he believes on. It is then, for Marx, an invitation to do something about ones faith. It is not merely reasoning it out as Kant would suggest or waiting for the meaning to come for Derrida. It is in actualizing ones faith,46 ones subjective personal response to the nothing, that the person gets a partial grasp of the meaning. Sense never being given or readily available, it is a matter of making oneself available for it, and this availability is called freedom.47 That one must make himself available for it.

This call for action is fueled by desire, the desire of knowing and comprehending the nothing. It is not only that there is desire to feed the curiosity but the desire to feed the hollowness of the being that is denoted by the lack of comprehension of the nothing.48 In Nancys reading of Hegel, this desire is the The heart trembles because the self is indeed bound to disappear, and it is this disappearance that it must want in order to be in love, and in its freedom.49 That it must continue to desire for desiring is recognizing and experiencing loss which calls for action, it is the very experience of freedom in the making. Trembling from the trembling of the other, and with the other, the self comes into desire. Self-consciousness is essentially desire, because it is consciousness of self as and out of its consciousness of the other.50

Action would be less possible without the desire for this gives, perhaps, a kind of certainty as to why live out faith. We are in constant search for meaning for we have lost certainty.51 This experience of losing certainty brings the subject to yearn and to mourn. It calls for action, for something to be done about this hollowness that one is again given the choice to do something about it. By having the choice, one experiences freedom. Perhaps, it is one of the sweetest things in the world especially in knowing that faith is being lived out by the constant search of certainty of the nothing which gives the subject freedom to do something about it. There is beauty then in loss of certainty.

A mourning in fact and by right interminable, without possible normality, without reliable limit, in its reality or in its concept, between introjections and incorporation. But the same logic, as we suggested, responds to the injunction of a justice which, beyond right

or law, rises up in the very respect owed to whoever is not, no longer or not yet living, presently living.52

How do I reconcile, then, the middle ground between the subject and the object of faith if there is an infinite responsibility to create meaning and take action? The first step, perhaps, in taking action is to trust that hopefully the waiting for the coming will arrive; trusting that both of them will arrive at the same time that the middle ground between the subject and the nothing will be reconciled to the coming of the truth, to the coming of the kingdom.

The self must come from the other, and it is in this coming as this coming, that it has to be self which is to say, unity with itself.

This necessity makes desire: this unity must become essential to self-consciousness, i.e. self-consciousness is Desire in general.53

The coming of the kingdom, for Hegel, is the complete externalization process of becoming:

Yet this externalization is still incomplete; it expresses the connection of its self-certainty with the object, which, just because it is thus connected, has not yet won its complete freedom. The self-knowing Spirit knows not only itself but also the negative of itself, or its limit: to know ones limit is to know how to sacrifice oneself in its existence nothing but this eternal externalization of its continuing existence and the movement that reinstates the Subject.54

As for the Marxist, the coming of Marxism is regarded to as a messianic event. The eschatology of Marxism is the realization of communism.

Now if there is a spirit of Marxism which I will never be able to renounce, it is not only the critical idea or the questioning stance (a consistent deconstruction must insist on them even as it also learns that this is not the last or first word). It is even more a certain emancipatory and messianic affirmation, a certain experience of the promise that one can try to liberate from any dogmatics and even from any metaphysico-religious determination, from any messianism. And a promise must promise to be kept, that is, not to remain

spiritual or abstract, but to produce events, new effective forms of action, practice, organization, and so forth55

It is in trusting that the nothing will soon take form into something. The coming, the unity of the subject with the object of faith must always remain to be a promise or else it will be reduced to a mere presence which is without urgency and excessiveness. If that is so, it will lose its demand, its very desire to morph into being.56

But here-now does not fold back into immediacy, or into the reappropriationable identity of the present, even less that of self-presence. Although appeal, violence, rupture, imminence, and urgency are Blanchots words in the following paragraph, the demand that he says is always present must implicitly, it seems to us, find itself affected by the same rupture or the same dislocation, the same short circuit. It can never be always present, it can be, only, if there is any, it can be only possible, it must even remain a can-be or maybe in order to remain a demand. Otherwise it would become presence again, that is substance, existence, essence, permanence, and not at all the excessive demand or urgency that Blanchot speaks of so correctly [justement]. The permanent revolution supposes the rupture that which links permanence to substantial presence, and more generally to all ontology.57

Like what happened in the first few seconds of the universe, from nothing, something has exploded all the matter in the universe. The Big Bang happened. A very tiny and dense point that was compressed to zero volume, a point which is called singularity, exploded all the matter that is contained in the space now58. From absolute nothing to concrete something. This marks a rupture, like what Hannah Arendt would say. It creates a break in the history, a novelty, a new beginning. Without this rupture in the history, there will be no universe, there will be no us that has evolved after billions years since the explosion. And perhaps, it all lies in trusting, trusting the nothing that soon it will take form.

There exists, however, another. claim which comes closer to the heart of the matter. We have stressed the element of novelty inherent in all revolutions, and it is maintained frequently that our whole notion of history, because its course follows a rectilinear development, is Christian in origin. It is obvious that only under the conditions of a rectilinear time concept are such phenomena as novelty, uniqueness of events, and the like conceivable at all. Christian philosophy, it is true, broke with the time concept of antiquity because the birth of Christ, occurring in human secular time, constituted a new beginning as well as a unique, unrepeatable event.59

What does it mean then to have faith? To accept that the coming into being is now and that now is an ever-coming now. To trust that in the openness of meanings, that it is never to be limited to a mere representation. It is to trust that soon enough freedom will be actualized in the loss of certainty that as the end comes, the nothing will be realized in its purest and truest form and that the subject will be united with nothingness. Since I opened this paper with a quote, I shall close it with another, parallel to the first Have faith in the nothingness and its capability to lead you to the path of abundance.

Notes:

i Quoted from Think Your way to Success: Let Your Dreams Run Free by Stephen Richards

Translated from Jean-Luc Nancys idea of the negative, in this case, it is called the nothing everything which is opposite of something and that which presence resides in it, the concept of the other. It is also the absolute in the sense of

GWF Hegel.

Derrida, Jean Jacques. Spectres of Marx. p.6

God Himself is Dead. Hegel: Faith and Knowledge. trans. W. Cerf and H.S. Harris (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977) pp. 190-191

Reconciliare Latin for Reconciliation, in my attempts to stress the importance of language in creation of meaning as supposed by Jean Jacques Derrida.

Derrida, p.4

Ibid. P.89

Ibid, p.31

Ibid.

Nancys interpretation of the negative: one is the negative of the other. The nothing is nothing because it is not something.

Spirit as the Likeness of God from Section 441 of the Zustze in Philosophy of Mind, pp181-82

Mans limited rational capacity cannot fully grasp the infinite. Therefore, man is not qualified to make representations of it for man cannot equal the divine.

In Nancys Hegel, she explains in Trembling that any representation of pain through speech does not fully express the totality of pain.

The Idea of the Infinite and the Face of the Other. Philosophy and the Idea of the Infinite. Text and Commentary,. Emmanuel Levinas. p.110. The face is not simply a face. It is also a master of its own interpretation.

The idea of grace as a trace pertains to the idea of the spectre of Marxism. The ghost that manifests itself to present its longing for existence.

Derrida, p. 99

Ibid. It is always to come and is distinguished, like democracy itself, from every living present understood as plenitude of a presence-to-itself, as totality of a presence effectively identical to itself.

Derrida, p.7

Kant, Immanuel. What is enlightenment. (1784) p.1

Ibid.

By the very presence of other people, man knows that he is thinking on his own. He opens himself in the freedom to think in light of the perspectives other.

Michel Foucault: Acceptance of ambiguous ties to reconcile the autonomy and heteronomy of reason. Derrida, p.16

Ibid.

Ibid.

In reflection of Spectres of Marx, p.105, Marx has conjured a ghost which he has failed to control.

Ibid.

Nancy, Jean-Luc. Hegel: The Restlessness of the Negative. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 2002. p.10 presupposes the absolute. But this presupposition is made precisely in order to ruin all presupposition or pre-givenness.

Ibid. p.16 Everything is in the absolute restlessness of becoming Its absolute restlessness is itself from the determination of the absolute.

Ibid. p. 44

Ibid. p.45

The Tremendous Power of the Negative. Phenomenology of Spirit. pp. 18-19

Nancy, p.5 The subject and what it does, it is the act and its doing the experience of the consciousness of the negativity of substance as the concrete experience and consciousness of the modern history of the world that is also the passage of the world through its own negativity. CBCP, maturing in Christian Faith: National Cathetical Directory of the

Philippines. (Pasay City, PH: ST. Pauls Publication, 1984) 143, p.89 What is Catholic Theology About?

Nancy, p.43

Kant: autonomy of reason, reasoning without hindrance

Derrida, p.15

Check Differance

Derrida, p.13

Derrida, p.59

Spectres of Marx, p.54

Theses on Feuerbach. The Marx-Engels Reader. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. p.145

Derrida p.51

Ibid.

Marx and Engels, p.143

Nancy, p.7

Derrida, p.88

Nancy, p.59-60

Ibid. p.60

Losing certainty the constant awaiting for whats to come eliminates certainty of what or when is it coming.

Derrida, p.97

Nancy, p.61

Hegel, GWF. The Absolute concept. Phenomenology of Spirit. pp491-92

Derrida, p.89

Ibid. p32-33

Ibid. p.33 The note of Blanchot as spectres being political in nature.

The Big Bang: one of the most dominant theories on the origins of the universe on how the universe came to be as we know it in the present.

Arendt, Hannah. On Revolution. England: Penguin Books. p.27