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Belief in an Age ofSkepticism

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‘THERE CAN’T BE JUST. ONETRUE RELIGION

“How could there he just one true faith?” ‘asked Blair, atwenty-four-year-old woman living in Manhattan. “'It’s’ar-rogant to say your’ religion is superior’ and trywto ironvert ev-eryone else to it. Surely all the religions are equallygood andvalidfor meeting the needs oftheir particularfbllowers.”

“Religious exclusivity is not just narr’o1v—it’s dangerous,” _added Geoff,‘ at twentysomething British man also living inNew ‘fork City. “Religion has led to untold strife, division,and conflict. It may he the greatest enemy of peace in theworld. lf Christians continue to insist that they have ‘thet’ruth’—-and ifother religions do this as well-—the world will’never know j1eace.”1 '

URING my nearly two decades in New York _,Ciq I’\ge hadI)/numerous opportunities to ask people, “What is your big-gest problem with Christianity? What troubles you the mostabout its beliefspr how it is practiced?” One of the most frequentanswers I have heard over the years can be summed up in oneword: exclusivity.

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4 THE REASON FOR GOD

I was once invited to be the Christian representative in apanel discussion at a local college along with a Iewish rabbi anda Muslim imam. The panelists were asked to discuss the differ-ences among religions. The conversation was courteous, intelli-Wgent, and respectful in tone. Each speaker affirmed that therewere significant, irreconcilable differences between the major faiths.A case in poinf was the person of]esus.‘We all agreed on the state-ment: “IfChristians are right about Jesus‘ being God, then Mus-lims and Iews fail in a serious way to love God as God really is,butifMuslims and Iews are right that Iesus is not God but rathera teacher or prophet, then Christians fail in a serious way to loveGod as God really is.’*» The bottom line was—-.We couldn’t all beequally right about the nature of God.

Several of the students we‘re quite disturbed by this.‘ One stu-dent insisted that what mattered was to believe in God and to bea loving person yourself To~ insist that one faith has a bettergrasp of the truth than others was intolerant. Another studentlooked at us clerics and said in his frustration, “We will nevercome to know peace on earth if religious leaders keep on makingsuch exclusive claims!”

It is widely believed that one ‘of the main barriers to worldpeace“ is religion, .<and especially the major traditional religionswith their exclusive claims to superiority. It may surprise you thatthough I am a Christian minister I agree with this. Religion,generally speaking, tends to create a slippery slope in the heart.Each religion informs its followers that they have “the truth,” andthis naturally leads them~ to feel superior to those with differingbeliefs, Also, a religion tells its followers that they are saved andconnected to God by devotedly performing that_ truth. Thismoves them to separate from those who are less devoted andpure in life. Therefore, it is easy for one religious group to stereo-

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type and caricature other ones. Once this situation exists it caneasily spiral down'*into the marginalization of others or even toactive oppression, abuse, or_ violence against them. '

Once we recognize hovwreligion erodes peace on earth, whatcan-we do about it? There _are three approaches that civic andcultural leaders around the world are using to address the divi-siveness of religion. There are calls to outlaw religion, condemnreligion, or at least to radically privatize it? Many people are in-vesting great hope in them. Unfortunately, I,_don’t believe anyi of-them will be effective. Indeed, I’m afraid they will only aggra--vate the situation.

1. Outlaw religion ‘ '

One way to deal with the divisiveness ofreligion has been to con-trol or even forbid it with a heavy hand. There have been severalmassive efforts to do thisin the twentieth century. Soviet Russia,Communist China, the Khinef Rouge, and (in a different way)Nazi Germany were all determined to tightly control religiouspractice in an effort to stop it éfromi dividing society or erodingthe power of the state. The result, however, was not more peacearid harmony, but more oppression. The tragic irony, of the situa-tion is brought out by Alister McGrath in his history of atheism:

The 20th century gave rise to one of the greatest and mostdistressing paradoxes ofhuman history: that the greatest in-tolerance and violence of that century were practiced by thosewho believed that religion caused intolerance and violencei

Going hand in hand with such efforts was a widespread beliefin the late nineteenth and early twentieth century that religion

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would "weaken and die out as the human race became more tech-nologically advanced. This view saw religion as playing a role in i

-human evolution. We once needed religion to help us cope witha very frightening, incomprehensible world. But as we becomemore scientifically sophisticated and more able to understand andcontrol our own environment, our need for religion would di-minish, it was thought.‘ '

But this has not happened, and this “secularization thesis” is-now largely discredited.5 Virtually all major religions are grow-i‘ng in number ofladherents. Chtistianity’s growth, especially~inthe developing world~, has been explosive. There are now six timesmore Anglicans “in Nigeria alone than there are in all ofthe UnitedStates. There are more -Presbyterians in Ghana than in the UnitedStates and Scotland combined. Korea has gone from 1 percent to40 percent Christian in at hundred years, and experts believe thesame thing is ‘going to happen in China. If there are half a billionChinese Christians fifty years from now, that will change thecourse of human. history.“ In 'm'ost cases, the Christianity thatis growing is not .the more secularized, belief—thin versions pre-dicted by the.» sociologists. Rather,‘it is a robust supernaturalistkind of faith, with belief in miracles, Scriptural authority, andpersonal" conversion.

Because of the vifality of religious“ faith in the world, efforts tosuppress or control it often serve only to make it stronger. Whenthe Chinese Communists expelled Western missionaries ' afterWorld War II, they thought they were killing off Christianity inChina. Instead, this move only served to make the‘ leadership oftheChinese church more indigenous and therefore to strengthen it.

Religion is not just a temporary thing that helped us adapt to,our environment. .-Rather it is a permanent and central aspect ofthe’ human iconditioh. This is a bitter pill for secular, nonreli-

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6 THE REASON FOR GOD - There Cant Befust One Tine Religion 7i;

gious people to swallow. Everyone wants to think that they arein the mainstream, that they are not extremists. But robust reli-gious beliefs dominate the World. There is no reason to expect

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‘2. Condemn religion

Religion is not going away and its power cannot be dimin-ished by government control. But can’t we—via educationI/and‘argument—find ways to socially discourage religions that claimto have ‘ithe truth” and that try to conv‘ert others to their beliefs?Couldn’t we find ways to urge all of our citizens, whatever, theirreligious beliefs, to admit that each religion or faith is just one ofmany equally valid paths to God and ways to live in the World?

This approach creates an environment in which wit is» consid-ered unenlightened and outrageous to make exclusive religiousclaims, even in personal conversations. Itldoes so by stating andrestating certain axioms that eventually achieve the status ofcommon sense. Those who deviate from them are stigmatized asfoolish or dangerous. Unlike the first strategy, this approach tothe divisiveness of religion is having some effect. It cannot ulti-mately succeed, however, because at its heart is a fatal inconsis-tency, even perhaps a hypocrisy, that Will ¢V¢m‘-lauY had to th¢collapse ofthis way of thinking. Whatfollows are several of-theseaxioms and the problems with each. ,

“All.major religions are equally valid and basically _teach the same thing.” '

This assertion is so common that one journalist recently wrotethat anyone who-believed that “there are inferior religions” isa right-wing extremist? Do we really want to say that the Branch

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Davidians or religions requiring child sacrifice are not inferiorto iany other faith? The great majority of people would almost-certainly agree that they are. I

Most people who assert the equality of religions have in mindthe major world faiths, hot splinter, sects. This was the form ofthe objection I got from the student the night I was on thepanel. He contended that doctrinal differences between Iudaism,Islam; Christianity, Buddhism, and Hinduism were superficialand insignificant,.‘that they all believed in the same God. Butwhen I asked him who that God was, he described him as anall-loving Spirit in the uhiverse. The, problem with this positionis itsjnconsistency. It insists that doctrine -is unimportant, but atthe same time assumes doctrinal beliefs about the nature of Godthat are at loggerheads with those of the all the major faiths.’Buddhism doesn’t believe in a personal God at all. Iudaism,Christianity, and Is1_am_'believe in a Godiwhoi holds people ac-countable for their beliefs and practices and whose attributescould not be all reduced to love. Ironically,. the insistence thatdoctrines do not matter is really a doctrine itself. It holds a spe-cific view of God, ‘which is touted asisuperior and more enlight-ened than tlie beliefs of most major religions. So the proponentsof this view d_o the very thing they forbid in others.

“Each religion seespart ofspiritual truth, but none can see thewhole truth.” '

‘Sometimes this point is illusfrated with the story of the blindmen and the elephaht. Several blind men were walking along andcame upon an elephant that allowedZthem toitouch and feel it.*“This creature. is long and flexible like a snake” said the- first‘blind man, holding the elephant’s trunk. “Not at all——it is thickand rdund like a tree trunk,” said the second blind man, feeling

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the elephant’s leg. “No, it is large and flat,” said the ‘third blindI man, touching the elephant’s side. Each blind man could feel onlypart ofthe elephant—none could envision the entire elephant. Inthe same way, it is argued,’ the religions of the world each have agrasp on part- of the truth about spiritual reality, but none cansee the whole elephant or claim to have a comprehensive vision ofthe truth.

This illustration backfires on its users. The story is told from‘the point of view of someone who is notnblind. How could/you-know that each blind man only sees part of the elephant unlessyou claim to be able to see the whole elephant?

There is an appearance of humility in the protestation thatthe truth is muchgreater than any one ofus cangrasp, but ifthis is used to invalidate all claims to discern the truth it is infact an arrogant claim to a kind ofknowledge whiih is supe-rior to [all others] . . . We have to ask: “What is the [absolute]vantagegroundfrom Wl7lCh!’Y0\1 claim to be able to relativize. - - sall the absolute claims these different scriptures make?” ,

How could you possibly know that no religion can see thewhole truth unless'you yourself have the superior, comprehen-sive vknowledge of spiritual reality you just claimed that none ofthe religions have? V

“Religious belief is too culturally and historically conditionedto be ‘truth.’3’ ‘

When I first came to New York City nearly-twentyyears ago,I more often heard the objection that all religions are equallytrue. Now, however, I’m*rnore likely'to be told that*all religionsare equally false. The objection goes like this: “All inoral and

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spiritual claims are the product of our particular historical andcultural moment, and therefore no one should claim they canknow the Truth, sinee no one can judge whether one assertionabout spiritual and moral reality is truer than another.” The so-ciologist Peter L..Berger reveals the serious inconsistency in thiscommon assumption. — _

In his book A Rumor ofAngels.Berger recounts how thetwentieth ‘century had uncovered “the sociology ofknowledge,”namely that peoplebelieve what they do largely because they aresociallyicbnditionéd to “do so. We’ljke to think‘ that we think forourselves, but it is not that simple. We think like the people wemost admire and need. Everybne belongs to a community thatreihforces-the plausibility ofsome beliefs and discourages others.Berger‘-notes that many have concluded from this fact that, _be-'cause we are all locked into our historical and‘ cultural locations,it is impossible to judge the rightness or wrorfgness ofcompetingbeliefs. \ ., *

Berger goes on, however, to. point out that absolute relativismcan only exist if the relativists exempt themselves from.their ownrazor.” If you infer from the social conditionedness of all beliefthat “no belief can be held as universally true for everyone,” thatitself is a comprehensive claim about everyone that is the productof social conditions—"so’it cannot be true, on its own terms.“Relativity relativizes itself,” says Berger, so we can’t have relativ-ism “all the way down.”1° Our cultural biases make weighing com-peting truth-claims harder, yes. The social conditionedness‘ ofbelief is a fact, but it cannot be used to argue that all truth iscompletely relative or.else the very argument refutes itself. Bergerconcludes that we cannot avoid“'Weighing spiritual and religiousclaims by hiding behind the cliche that “there’s no way to know

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the Truth.” We must still do the hard work ofiaskingz which af-jirmations about God, human nature, and spiritual reality aretrue and which are false? We will have to base our life' on sbmeanswer to that question. ‘ i

s The philosopher Alvin Plantinga has his own version of Berg-er’s argument. _People often say to him, “Ifyou were born in Mo-rocco, you wouldn’t even be a Christian, but rather a Muslim.” Heresponds: ~

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Suppose we concede that ifI had been born ofMuslim parentsin Morocco rather than Christian parents in Michigan, mybeliefs would have been quite diffirrent.» [But] the samegoesforthe pluralist. . . . If the pluralist had been born in [Zlorocco]he probably wouldn’t be a pluralist. Does itfollow that. . . hispluralist beliefs are produced in him by an unreliable beliefflproducing process?“ '

Plantinga and Berger make the same point. You can’t_say, “Allclaims aboutreligions are historically conditioned except the oneI am making right now.” Ifyou‘ insist that no. one can determinewhich. beliefs are right and wrong, why should w'e believe whatyou are saying? The reality is that we all make'truth-claims ofsome sort and it is very hard to. weigh them responsibly, but wehave no alternative but to try to do so.

“It is arrogant to insistyour religion_is right and to convertothers to it.” _

The noted religion scholarilohn Hick has written that onceyou become aware that there are many other equally intelligentand good people in the world who holcldifferent beliefs from

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you and that you will not be able to convince them otherwise,then, it is arrogant for you’to continue to try to convert them orto hold your view to be" the superior truth.“ .

Once again there is an inherent contradiction. Most people inthe world don’t hold to Iohn I-Iick’s view that all religions areequally valid,-and many of them are equally as good and intelli-gent as he is, and unlikely to change their views. That would makethe statement “all religious claims to-have a better view of thingsare arrogant and wrong” to be, on its own terms, arrogant andwrong.

Many say that it is ethnocentric to claim that our religion issuperior to othersa Yet isn’t that very statement ethnocentric? Mostnon-Western cultures have no problem saying that their cultureand i'eligion'is‘b‘est. Theidea thatit is wrong to do so is deeplyrooted in 'Western traditions of self-criticism and individualism.To charge others with the “sin” of ethnocentrism-is really a wayof saying, “Our culture’s approach to other cultures is superiorto yours.” We are then doing the very thing we forbid others todo.“ The historian C. Iohn Sommeryille has pointedout that “areligion can be judged only on the basis ofanother religion.” Youcan’t evaluate a religion exizept on the basis of some ethical crite-ria that §,in the "end amounts to your own religious stance.“

By now the tfatal flaw in this approach to religion in generaland to Christianity in particular should be obvious. Skeptics be-lieve that any exclusive claims to a superiof knowledge. of spiri-tual reality cannot be true. But this objection is itself_a religiousbelief. It assumes -God is unknowable, or that God is loving butnot wrathful; or that \God*-is an impersonalqfiorce rather than aperson who speaks in‘Scripture. All of these ~are.unprovable faithassumptions. In addition, their proponents believe they have asuperior way to view things. They believe the world would be a

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better place if everyone dropped the traditional» religions’ viewsofGod and truth and adopted theirs. Therefore,Itheir view isalsoan “ei<clusive” claim about the nature of spiritual reality. If allsuch views are to be discouraged, this one should be as well. If itis not narrow to hold this view, then there is nothing inherentlynarrow about holding to tr‘aditional religious beliefs. ll

Mark Lilla, a professor at the University of Chicago, spoke toa bright young student.at Wharton Business School who, to Lil-lafs bafflement, had gone forward at a Billy Graham crusade to/Vgive his life to Christ. Lilla writes: /l

Iwanted to cast doubt on the step he was about to take, to‘ helphim see there are other ways to live, dither ways to seek knowl-

.» ,edge, love. . . even self-transformation. I wanted to convincehim his dignqityaepended on maintaining afree, skeptical at-titude towards doctrine. I wanted . . . to save him . 1 .

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Doubt, like faith, has to be learned. It is a skill: But the curi-~ous thing about skepticism is that its adherents, ancient andmodern, have so often been proselytizers. In reading them, I’veoften wanted to ask: “Why do you care?-” Their skepticism offers nogood answer. to that question. And Idon"t have oneformyselfils ~

Lilla’s wise self-knowledge reveals his doubts about Christian-ity to be a learned, alternate faith. He believes that the individual’sdignity as a human being rests on doctrinal skepticism—whichis, of course, an article offaith. As he admits, he can’; avoid'- be-lieviang that it would be better for people if they adopted his be-liefs about reality and human dignity rather than Billy Graham’s.

It is no more narrow to claim that one religion is right than to

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claim that one way to think about all religions (namely that allare equal-) is ‘right. We are all ‘exclusive in our beliefs about reli-gion, but in different ways.

3. Keep, religion completely private

Another approach to. the divisiveness of religion is to allow thatpeople may privatelybelieve their faith is the truth and may “evan-gelize” for their faith’; but that religious beliefs should be keptou,t of the public sphere. ,Influential thinkers such as Iohn Rawlsand Robert Audi have argued that, in public political discus-sions, we may nonargue for a moral positioniunless it has a secu-lar, nonreligious grounding. ,Rawls-is well known for insistingthat what»he calls f‘comprehen'sive” religious views be excludedfrom public discourse.“ Recently a lafge array of scientists andphilosophers signed “A Declaration tin Defense aof Science andSeculari‘sm;’1 which called on theleaders ofour government “notto permit legislation or executive action to be influenced by reli-gious beliefs.”17 The signers included Peter‘Singer, E. O. Wilson,and‘ Daniel C. Dennett. The philosopher Richard Rorty, for ex-ample, has argued that religious faith must remain a strictly pri-vate “affair ‘and must n'ev<“:r be brought into discussions of publicpblicy. To ever use an argument grounded in a religious belief issimply a “conversation stopper,” which the nonbeliever cannotengage.“

1 To those who cornpla'in~ that this approach discriminatesagainst religion;-Rorty and others ‘retort that this policy is simplypragmatic?» They are not ideologicallyopposed to religion perse, nor are they seeking to »cohtrol» religious beliefs, so‘ long asthey are kept in the private sphere. However, in the public squareit is‘divisive and time-consuming to argue constantly -over reli-

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gibn. Religion-based positions are seen as sectarian and contro-versial, while secular reasoning for moral positions are seen? as

\~universal and available to .alll Therefore, public discourse shouldbe secular, never religious. Without reference to iiny divine reve-lation or confessional tradition, we should work together on thegreat problems of our time——-such as AIDS, poverty, education,and so on. We should keep our religious views to ourselves andunite around policies that’ “work” best for the,most people.

However, Stephen L. Carter ofYale responds‘ that it is impos;'§ible to leave religious views behind when we do any kind ofmoral reasoning at all. '

Efforts to craft a public squarefrom which religious conversa-tion is absent, no matter how thoughtfully -‘worked out, willalivays in the end say to those oforganized religion that theyalone, unlike everybody else, must enter public dialogue onlyafter‘ leaving behind thatpart ofthemselves that they may con-sider the most vital.”

How can Carter make such a claim? Let’s begin by askingwhat religion is. Some say it is a form'of belief in God. But thatwould not fit' Zen Buddhism, which does not really believe inGod at all. Some say it is belief in the supernatural. But that~doesnot fit Hinduism, which does not believe in a supernatural realmbeyond the material world, but only a spiritual reality Within theempirical. What is religion ihen?*It is a set of beliefs that explainwhat life is all about, who we are, and the most important thingsthat human beings should spend their time doing. For example,some think that this material world is all there is, that we are hereby accident and when we die we just rot, and therefore theportant thing is to choose to do what makes you'happy and not

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let others,impose their beliefs on you._Notice that though this isnot an explicit, “organized” religion, it contains a master narra-tive, an ’account aboutithe meaning of life along with a recom-mendation for how to live based on that'account of things.

Some call this a “worldview” while others call it a “narrativeidentity.” In either case it is a set ‘of faith-assumptions about thenature of things. It~1s an implicit religion. Broadly understood,faith 1I'1 some v1ew"of the world and human nature informs every-one-is life. Bveryone llVCS and operates put ofsome narrative iden-tity, whether it is thought outand reflected upon or not. All whosay “You ought to do this” or “You shouldn’t do that” reasonout of such an implicit moral and religious position. Pragmatistssay that we should leave our deeper worldviews behind and findconsensus about “what-works”——but our view ofwhat works isdetermined by (to,use a Wendell Berry title) what we think peb-ple are for. Any picture of happy human life that “works” is nec-essarilv informed by deep-seated beliefs about the ipurpose of

- 21 .human life. Even the most secular pragmatists come to_ the ta-ble with deep commitments and narrative accounts of what itmeans to be human. ' _

.Korty insists that religion-based beliefs are conversatjon,_stop-pers. But; all of our most fundamental convictions about thingsare beliefs that are nearly impossible to justify 'to,those who don’tshare them. Secular concepts such as “self-realization” and “au-tonomy” are impossible to prove and are ‘ficonversation stoppers”just as much as appeals to the Bible.”

Statements ‘that seem‘ to be common sense to the‘speakers arenonetheless often profoundly‘religious“-in nature; Imagine thatMs. A argues that all the safety nets for the poor should be re-moved, in the name of “survival of the fittest.” Ms. B might re-spond; “The poor have the right to a decent standard ofliving—.they

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are human beings like the rest of us!” Ms. A could then comeback with the fact that many bioethicists today think' the concept.of “human” is artificial and impossible to define. She might con-tinue that there is no possibility of treating all livihg organismsas ends rather. than means and that some always have to die thatothers may live. That is simply ‘the way nature works. If Béounters with a pragmatic argument, that we should help ‘thepoor simply because it makes society work better, Ms. A couldcome up with many similar pragmatic arguments about why le/t-ting some of the poor just die would be even more efficient. HowMs. B would be getting angry. She would respond heatedly thatstarving the poor is simply unethical, but‘ Ms. A could retort,“Who says ethics must be the same for everyone?” Ms. B wouldfinally exclaim: “I wouldn’t want to live in a society like the oneyou are describing!”

In this interchange. Ms. B has tried,to. follow Iohn Rawls andfind universally accessible, “neutral and objective” argumentsthat would convince everyone that we ._must not starve the p0..or.She has failed because there are none. In the>end Ms. B affirmsthe equality and dignity ofhuman individuals simply because shebelieves it is true and right. She_ takes as an article’ of faith thatpeople are more valuable than rocks or trees—.though she can’tprove such a belief scientifically. Her public policy proposals areultimately based on a religious stance.”

This leads a legal theorist, Michael I. Perry, to ‘conclude thatit is “quixotic, in any event, to attempt to construct an airtightbarrier between religiously grounded moral discourse . . . and[secular] discourse public political argument.”2‘* Rorty and oth-ers argue that religious argument is too controversial, but Perryretorts in Under God? Religious -Eaithi and Liberal Democracythat secular groundsfor moral positions are no less controversial

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18 THE REASON FOR GOD;

than religious grounds, and a very strong case can be made thatall“moral positions are at least implicitly religious. Ironically,_in-sisting that religious reasoning be -excluded from the public squareis itself a controversial “sectarian” point ofview.”

When you come out.into the publicsquare it is impossible toleave your convictions about ultimate values behind. Let’s takemarriage and divorce laws as a case study. Is it possible to craftlaws that we all agree “work” apart’ from particular worldviewcommitments? 1l1don’t believe so_,..Your views oflwhat is right willbe based on“_what you think the pufpose of marriage is. If youthink marriage ismainly fqrthe-rearing ofchildren to benefit thewhole societyfltheri you will make divorce very difficult. If youthink the purpose of marriage is more primarily for the happi-l

ness and emotional fulfillment of theadults »who*enter it, youwill make divorce much easier. The former view is grounded in aview of human flourishing and well-being in which the family ismore important than the individual, as is seen in the moral tradi-tions pf Confucianism, ludaism, and Christianity. The latter ap-proach is a more individualistic view .of human nature based onthe Enlightenment’s undersfindingpf things. The divorce lawsyou think “work_”..will"=de“pend on prior beliefs about what it meansto beehappy and fully human.“ Theie is no objective, universalconsensus about what “that is. Although many continue to callfor the exclusion of religious views from the public square, in-creasing numbers of t_hinkers,.both religious and secular, are ad-mitting that such a call is itself religious.” .

Christianity Can Save the World

I’ve argued against the effectiveness ofalllthe main efforts to ad-diess the divisiveness ofreligion in our world today. Yet I strongly

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sympathize with their purpose. Religion can certainly be one ofthe major threats to world peace. At the beginning ofthe chapterI outlined the “slippery-fslope” that every religion tends to set upin the human heart. .This slippery slope leads all too easily tooppression. However, within C.hristianity—-robust, orthodoxChristianity—there are rich resourees that can make its followersagents for peace on earth. Christianity has within. itself remark-able power to explain and expunge the divisive tendencies withinthe human heart. /--r’

Christianity provides a firm basis for respecting people ofotherfaiths. Iesus assumes that nonbelievers in " the culture» aroundthem will gladly recognize much Christiah ‘behavior as-.“good”(Matthew 5:16; cf. 1 Peter 2:12). That assumes some overlap be-tween the Christian constellation ofvalues and those of any par-iicular culture” and of any other religion.” Why would this‘overlap exist? Christians believe that all human beings are madein the image of God, capable ofgoodness and wisdom. The Bib-.lical doctrine of the universal image of God, therefore, leadsChristians to expect nonbelievers will be better than any of theirmistaken beliefs could make them. The Biblical doctrine of'uni-versal sinfulness also leads Christians to expect believers will beworse in practice than their orthodox beliefs should make them.So there will be‘ plenty of ground for respectful cooperation.P-Christianity not‘ only leads its members to ljelievepeople ofother faiths have goodness and wisdomfto offer, it also leads themto expect that many will live lives morally superior to their own‘.Most people in our culture believe that, if there is a God, we canrelate to him and go to heaven through leading a goocflife. Let’scall this the -“moral improvement” view. Christianity teaches thevery opposite. /In the Christian understanding, Iesus does nottell us how to live ‘so we can ‘merit salvation. Rather; he‘ comes to

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forgive and save us through his life and death in our place. (§od’sgrace,,does not come to people who morally outperform others,

. but to those “who admit their failure to perform and who ac-knowledge their need for a Savior, ~ .

Christians,.then, should. expect to, find nonbelievers who aremuch. nicer, kinder, wiser, and better than they are. Why? Chris-tian believers are not accepted God because of their moral‘performance, wisdom, or virtue, but because of Christ’s work ontheir behalf. Most religions and philosophies of life assunfiekthaton‘e’s_ spiritual statusdepends on~your religious attainments. Thisnaturally leads adherents to feel superior ,.to thosewho don’t be-lieve and behave as they do. The Christian gospel, in any case,should not have that effect.

It is common to say thatffundamentalism” leads to violence,yet as we have,seen, all ofus have fundamental, unprovable faith-commitments that we,think are‘ superior.to those. of others. Thereal question, thé'n,~is whichfundamentals will lead their believers“to be the most, loving and receptive to ,those with whom they differ?Which set of~unavoidably exclusive beliefs will lead us to humblepeace-loving behavior?

One of the paradoxes of history’is the relationship betweenthebeliefs and the practices of the early Christians as comparedto those of the culture around them. .

3

The Greco-Roman i2vorld’s religious -views were open andseemingly tolerant—everyoné had his or her own God. ~The prac-tices ofthe culture were quite brutal, however. The Greco-Romanworld was highly. stratified economically, with a» huge~ distancebetween the rich and poor. By contrast, Christians insisted thatthere was only one true God, the dying Saviortlesus Christ. Theirlives ahd practices‘ were, hbwever, remarkably welcoming to-thosethat the culture marginalized. The early Christians mixed people

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There Can’! Be fust One True Religion 21

those around them. The Greco-Roman world tended to de-the,poor, but Christians gave generously not only to theirpoor but to those ofother faiths. In broader society, womenvi.-y low status, being subjected to high levels of female in-

forced marriages, and lack ofeconomic equality. Chris-afforded women much greater security and equality than

previously existed in the ancient classical world.” Duringterrible urban plagues of the first two centuries, Chrisgans

for all the sick and dying in the city, often atthe cost »oftheir lives.“ ..

Why would such an exclusive belief system lead to behaviorthat was so open to others?_It was because‘Christians had withintheir belief system the strongest possible resource _for practicingsacrificial service, generosity, and peace-making. At the very heartof their,view of reality was a man who died for his enernies,pray-ing‘for their forgiveness. Reflect-ion on this could only lead to aradically different way of dealing with those who were"'diff,erentfrbm them. It meant they could not act in ‘violence and oppres-eion toward their opponents.

We cannot skip lightly over the fact that there have been‘ in-justices done by the church in the name of Christ, yet who _candeny that the force of Christians’ most fundamental beliefs canbe-a powerful impetus for peace-making in our troubled world?

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Of course there’s a God! We all basically knowthere is. _I know no such thing.Ofcourseyou do! Whenyou think toyourself—andmost of our waking life is taken up thinking toourself—you must have that feeling that yourthoughts aren’t entirely wasted,'that in some sensethey are being heard. I think it’s this sensation ofsilently being listened to with total comprehen-sion that represents our innate belief in a su-preme being, an all-comprehending intelligence.What it shows is that some kind ofbelief is innatein all of us. At some point most of us lose that,after which it can only be regained by a consciousact offaith.And you’ve experienced that?No, I‘haven’t. I hope to someday.

--Metropolitan (1990, USA, Whit Stillman)

» JONSERVATIVE writers and speakers are constantly com- Iplaining that the young people of'our culture a're relativistic 1 pf

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The Knowledge of God I49

and amoral. As a pastor in Manhattan I have been neck-deep in‘sophisticated twentysomethings for almost two decades, and Ihave not found this to be the case. The secular, young adults Ihave known have a very finely honed sense of right and wrong.There are many things happening in the world that evoke theirmoral outrage. There is a problem with their moral outlook,however. ‘

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Free-Floating Morality "

In many cases I have to put on my philosophy-professor hat inorder to be a good pastor to people. A young couple once cameto me for some spiritual direction. They “didn’t believe in much‘of anything” they said. How could they begin to figure out ifthere even was a God? I asked them to tell me about somethingthey felt was really, really wrong. The woman immediately‘ spokeout against practices that marginalized women. I said I agreedwith her fully since I was a Christian who believed God made allhuman beings, but I was curious why she thought it was wrong.She responded, “Women are human beings and human beingshave rights. It. is wrong to trample on someone’s rights.” I askedher how she knew that.

Puzzled, she said, “Everyone knows it is wrong to. violate therights of someone.” I said, “Most people in the World don’t‘know’ that. They don’t have a Western view of human rights.Imagine ifsomeone said to you ‘everyone knows that women" areinferior.’ You’d say, ‘TJ1at’s not an argument, it’s just an asser-tion.’ And you’d be right. So let’s start again. If there is.noGod as you believe and everyone has just evolved from animals,why would it be wrong to trample on someone’s rights?” Herhusband responded: “Yes, it is true we are just bigger~brained

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animals, but I’d say animals have rights too. You shouldn’t tram-ple on their rights,- either.” I asked whether he held, animalsguilty for violating the rights of other animals if the strongerones ate the weaker ones. “No, I couldn’t do that.” So he onlyheld human beings guilty if they trampled on the weak? “Yes.”Why this double standard, I asked. Why did the couple insistthat human beings had to be different from animals, so that theywere not allowed to act as was natural to the rest of the animal‘world. Why did the couple keep insisting that humans had thisgreat, unique individual dignity and worth? Why did they be-lieve in human rights? “I don’t know,”-the wonfin said, “I guessthey are just there, that’s all.”

The conversation was much more congenial than this verycompressed account conveys. The young couple laughed at theweakness of some of their responses, which showed me that theywere open to exploration andrthat encouraged me to be morepoin_tecL than I would ordinarily have been/However, this con-versation reveals lhow our culture differs from all the others thathave gone before. People still have strong moral convictions, butunlike people in other times and placesfthey don’t have any vis-iblelbaisis for why they find, some things to be evil and otherthings good. It’s almost like their moral intuitions are free—floatingin midair—far off the ground.

Polish poet Czeslaw Milosz spoke of this:

What has been surprising in the post-Cold War period arethose beautiful and deeply‘ moving words pronounced withveneration in places like Prague and Warsaw, words whichpertain to the old repertory of the rights of man and the dig-nity ofthe person. Iwonder at thisphenomenon because maybeunderneath there is an abyss. After all, those ideas had their

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foundation in religion, and I am not over-optimism aboutthe survival of religion in a scientific-technological civiliza-tion. Notions that seemed buried forever have suddenly beenresurrected. But how long can they stay afloat ifthe lmpmm i;taken out?‘

' I don’t believe Milosz is right. I think that people will defi-nitely go on holding to their beliefs in human dignity even whenconscious belief in God is gone. Why is this the case> I have aradical thesis. I think people in our culture know unavoidablythat there is a God, but they are repressing what they know.

The Concept ofMoral Obligation

It is common to hear people say, “No one should impose theirmoral views on others, because everyone has the right to findtruth inside him or herself” This belief leaves thespeaker opento a series of very uncomfortable questions. Aren’t there peoplein the world who are doing things you believe are wrong——thingsthat they should stops doing no matter what they personally be-lieve about the correctness of their behavior? Ifyou-do (and every-one doesl), doesn’t that mean you do believe that there is some kindof moral standard that people should abide by regardless of theirindividual convictions?_ This raises a question. Why is it impossible(in practice) for anyone to be a consistent moral relativist even whenthey claim that they are? The answer is thatwe all have a pervasive,powerful, and unavoidable belief not only in moral values but’ alsoin moral obligation. Sociologist Christian Smith puts it like this:

4’ B ' - . .Moral ...is an orientation toward understandingsabout what is right and wrong, just and unjust, that M;

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not established by our own actual desires or prefereflm 111"i instead are believed to exist apaflflflm 1315'": P""Vidi"5 -‘Wm’, .

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Allihuman beings have moral feelings. We call it a conscience.When Considering doing something that we feel would be wrong,we‘ tend to refrain. Our moral sense does not SYOP th°1:¢> how’ever. We also believe that there are standards “that exist apartfrom us” by which we evaluate moral feelings. Moral obligationis a belief that some things ought ‘not to be done regardlesshofhow a person feels about them within herself, regardless ofw ai‘the rest of her community and culture says, and r°g"d1°5s 0whether it is in her self-interest or not. The young couple had updoubts that people in other cultures ~. should honor womensrights, for example. l _

Though weliavebeen taught that all moral values are relativeto individuals and cultures, we ca_n’t livewlike that. In actual prac-tice‘ we inevitably treat some principlqs as ab$0l\1t¢ Stafldafds bywhich we judge the behavior of those who don’t share our val-ues What gives us the right to do that, if all moral beliefs QRrelative? Nothing ‘gives us the right. Yet we can’t stop it. Peoplewho laugh at the claim that there is a transcendent moral orderdo not think that racial genocide is just impractical or self-defeating, but that it is wrong.~The Nazis who exterminated Iewsmay have claimed that they “didn’t feel it was immoral at all. Wedon’t care. We don’t care if they sincerely felt they were doing aservice‘ to humanity. They ought not to have done it. I

We do not only have moral feelings, but we also have an in-eradicable belief that moral standards exist, outside of us, by

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which our internal moral feelings are evaluated. Why? Why dowe think those moral standards exist?

The Evolutionary Theory ofMoral Obligation

A common answer today comes from what I called in the lastchapter the “clue-killer,” sociobiology or eydlutionary psychol-ogy. "This view holds that altruistic people, those who act unself-ishly and cooperatively, survived in greater numbers than thtisewho were selfish and cruel. Therefore altruistic genes were passeddown to us and now the great majority of us feel that unselfishbehavior is “right.”

There are, however, many flalws in this theory, and it has beengiven some devastating critiques?’ An individual’s self-sacrificing,altruistic behavior toward his or her blood kin might result in agreater survival rate. for the individual’s family or extended clan,and therefore result in a greater nuinber ofdescendants with thatperson’s genetic material. For evolutionary purposes, however, theopposite response——hostility to all people outside one’s group-should be just as widely considered moral and right behavior. Yettoday we believe that sacrificing time, money, emotion, and evenlife-—-especially for someone “not ofour.kind” or tribe—is right.Ifwe see a total stranger fall in the river we jump in after him,~orfeel guilty for not doing so. In fact, most people will feel the ob-ligation to do so even if the person in the water is an enemy‘How could that trait have come down by a process of naturalselection? Such people would have been less likely to survive andpass on their genes. On the basis of strict evolutionary natural-ism (the belief that everything about us _is here because of a pro-..cess of natural selection) that kind of "altruism should have diedif

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out of the human race long ago. Instead, it is stronger thanever.

Other arguments to demonstrate the reproductive benefits ofaltruism have also run into trouble. Some contend that altruisticbehavior brings many indirect reciprocal benefits to the practi-tioner from others, but this can’t actount for our motivation topractice such aots when no one iknows about them. Others havecontended‘that sacrificial behavior benefits an entire group orsociety, enabling the entire society to pass on its “genetic code.However, there is consensus that hatural selection does not workon whole populationsfi -

Evolution, therefore, cannot account for the origin of ourmoral feelings, let ‘alone for the fact that we all believe there areexternal moral standards"by which moral feelings are evaluated.5

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This sense ofmoral obligation creates a problem for those with asecular understanding of the.world, Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban is

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an anthropologist whose professional field is dominated by whatshe calls “cultural relativism”——a view that all moral"beliefs areculturally created (that is, we believe them because we are part “ofa community that gives them plausibility) and that there is nobasis for objectivelyjudging one culture’s morality to be betterthan another..»Yet she was appalled by practices in societies ‘shewas studying that oppressed women. She decided that she shouldpromote women’s interests in the societies wherever she workedas an anthropologist.

This "immediately created a conundrum for hen "She knew thather belief in women’s equality was rooted in a socially located(Northern European, eighteenth century) individualistic mode of

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thought‘ What 1'ight did she have to promote her views over thoseof the non-Western societies-where she worked> Hcr ms. - ponse:

. Anthro l ' ' 'D po ogists continue to express strong supportfor culmml.,, relativism. One of the most contentious issues arisesfrom pk

e; d - . .1, fun amental question. What authority do we Westerners have. ._ t .o im ose ou .,&§. P 1‘ own concept of universal rights on the 1'33;

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1.; ~ humaiiit . . . r - - qf; . J’ /Bu the cultural relativists’ argument is of-ten used b re res - .V ériticism Jgthll -Zve governments to deflect international

4 1 0 Ely ll - ' ' -. l use of their citizens. . . . I believe that we, g should not let the pm_ I tept ofrelativism stop usfrom using nu-

tiona and internati -onal forums to examine way; to protgatll. the 5”“ “mi dignity offleople in every culture. . . . When phm;

isah' 1; .g ..l C om; Btwwnfiefindmfl human Tights and defending' cultural relati ' -_ V 1’”'m.» emtbropolqgists should choose to prom;

- . andpromote human rights. We cannotjust be byimndm. 6. . ~i '

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if d . a O umvcrsal human nghts, S0 how can I. cc‘ C to 1mP°$¢ my values on this culture?” But she doesn’tV answer her own ue t' ' -. q s ion. She has just said that her charge ofo -. . . pt ression is based on a We - - -stern concept of individual freedom"

*5 but she h - , ’as no answer for this conundrum. She simply declares-I that women are bein 0 -g. We haw to b . gwppressed and she feels she has to stop it.

~ . W rin our .8 estern values to these other nations. Our_" i values are better than theirs Period

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, _ . The Difficult Issue ofHuman Rights l il, Fluh-Lbb ' ' - ._ B C r O an ls stmggllllg with a major crisis in the field of

I human ri h "5 ,, g ts. Iur en'H - . _E g g abermas has written that, despite theirl-.:v ‘

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European origins, “human rights” in Asia, Africa, and SouthAmerica now “constitute the only language in "which the oppo-nents and victims of murderous regimes and civil wars can raisetheir voices against violence, repression, and persecution”? Thisreveals the enormous importance of the morality of humanrights, which Michael I. Perry defines as the.twofold convictionthat every human‘ being has inherent dignity and that it is obliga-tory.,that we order oui; lives in accordance with this fact. It; iswrong to violate the equal dignity of other human beings.“ Butwhy should we believe that? On what does.this dignity depend?

In his essay “Where Do Rights",Come From?” Harvard lawprofessor Alan Dershowitz lays out the possibilities. Some sayhuman rights come from GOd.i If we.were all created in God’simage, then every human, being would~ be sacred a/nd inviolable.Dershowitz rejects‘ this as an answer; ,since so many millions ofpeople are agnostic. Others say human, rights come from nature,or what has been called “natural law.”' They argue that natureand human nature, if it is examined, will reveal that some“ kindsof behavior ares “fitting” with the way things are, and are right.However, Dershowitz points~out that nature thrives on violenceand predation, on the survival of the fittest. There is no way toderive the concept of the dignity of every individual from the_way' things really work iii nature.

Another theory claims that human rights are created by us,the people who write the laws. Many,argue that it is in the inter-ests of societies to create human rights because honoring indi-vidual dignity, means that in the long run everyone in thecommunity is better off. However, what if a majority decides it isnot in their interest to grant human rights? If rights are nothingbut a majority creation then there is nothing to appeal to when

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thcl’ are kgislatfid Out of existence. Dershowitz quoting Ronald‘ 7

‘~ Dworkin ar ues that th' ' ' .> S 1S third view of human rights "is inade-quate:

It is no answer t ' ' ~ - l .the comm Dt o Slily that ifindividuals have these right; phmuni i c 'We my y ks e ter off in the long run . . . because when

someone ' - -as a right to speak his mindfreely, we mm"he is entitled to do so eve ' 'n if this would not be in theinterest. gmeml

If human ri hts a - - -they> Their val g 1' "rs ciimcd by majonncs’ of what use are- ue ie . ._ _ . in t at they can be used to insist that ma-J°1'1t1¢$.l10HOr the dignity of minorities and individuals des ‘ttheir conce tion of th ' “ i . pl €created‘ th: t b greater good” Rights cannot be— musY e iscovered, or they are ofino va1u¢_ AsDworkin concludes if, We want to defend individual ri ‘ghts, wemust t t d‘ ' ’ - . .these rirghtslo iscover something beyond utility that argues for

What could that “something” be? Neither Dworki Dshowitz can really give an answer Dworkin n not Cr-- ends up appealing toa fo f ' ' . , _ _

0" 0", ut anasia, a d I 41' ‘,1(1995), he writes: " n n nu uni Frmipm\

Th” hf? 0f a single human organism commands respect findprotection. . . because of our wonder at the P705553; thatPmduce new lives from old ones. . . . The nerve of the Sflgygdlies in th ' . 'e value we attach to a process or enterprise or projectrather than to 't ' -i s results considered independently from howthey were produced. . . . 11

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Law professor Michael I. Perry responds!

- - ' ' ' ' theThe nonreligious source of normativity, for Dworkin, is' d agreat value “we” attach to every human being unolet‘-W00 X

- - . - - <r >1 esses thata creative masterpiece, it is our wonder at the prov. - ' 'n

roduce new livesfrom old ones . . But to whom is DworkiP - ¢

referring with his “we” and “our”? Did the Nazi! V111"? the]ews intrinsically? The conspicuousproblem with Dworkin’s . . -.secular argument [for rights] is that Dworkin assumes a 1:2”-sensus among human agents that does not exist and never asexisted.“

Perry’s new book, Toward a Theory ”fH“"“m R’-ghvts’ is Veryu '. . ' ' h a re 1-significant. Perry concludes that though it is clear t ere isgious ground for the morality of human rights. . . It 18 far ff0mclear that there is a non-religious ground,” a secular ground, forhuman rights.”14 Perry lays out Nietzsche’s well-known insis-

e that “if God is dead any and all morality of love and hu-tenc , » _ -man rights is baseless. If there is no God, argues Nietzsche,

' k d to beSartre, and others, there can be no good reason to be H1 ,loving or to work for peace. Perry quotes Philippa Foot who says7 - ' G d andthat secular thinkers accepted the idea that there is no 0

‘ . cc ' '. - - divqn meaning to human life, but have not really joine11° 8 .battle with Nietzsche about morality. By and large WC haw lustgone on taking moral judgments for granted as if nothing had. . >happened.”15 Why do we keep on doing this.

The Grand “Sez Who?”

The reason is laid out in a classic essay by late Yale law professoiArthur Leff. Most people feel that human rights are not .create v

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by us but are found by us, that they are there and must be hon-ored by majorities, whether they like them or noti -But, Leffsays: -

When would it be impermissible to make the formal intellec-tual equivalent ofwhat is known in barrooms and schoolyardsas “the grand Sez Who’-’? Inthe absence of God . each. . .ethical and legal system . . . will be differentiated by the an*swer it chooses to give to pne key question: who among us. ,,ought to be able to declare “law” that ought to be obeyed?Stated that baldly,- the question is so intellectually unsettlingthat one would expect to find a noticeable number of legaland ethical thinkers trying not to come to grips with it. . . .Either God exists or He does not, but ifHe does not, nothingand no oneelse can take His place. . . . 16

If there is no God, then there is no way to say any one actionis 5‘moral” and another “immoral” but only “I like this.” If thatis the case, who gets the right to put their subjective, arbitrarymoral feelings into law? You may say “the majority has the rightto make the law,” but do you mean that then the majority hasthe right to vote to exterminate a minority? If you say “No, thatis wrong,” then you are back to square one. “Who sez” that themajority has a moral obligation not to kill the minority? Whyshould your moral convictions be obligatory for those in opposi-tion? Why should your view prevail over the will of the majority?The fact is, says Leff, if there is no God, then all moral state-Tments are arbitrary, all moral valuations are subjective a‘i1d inter-nal, and there can be no external moral standard by which apers0n’s feelings and values are judged. Yet Leff ends this intel-lectual essay in a most shocking way:

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A; things are, now, everything is up for grabs. Nevertheless:napalming babies is bad. Starving the poor is wicked. Buying i-.1»

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and selling each other is depraved. . . . There is such a thing as Yevil. All together now: Sez Who? God help us.

. - ' ' k <1 .Nietzsche, of course, understood this. “The masses blin an

Gaita, an atheist thinker, reluctantly writes:1.

Only someone who is religious can speak seriously ‘of 5 ‘Hsacred. . . .~ We may say that all hnmlw Mines M” '"“'mm““ly * ' “lprecious,, that they are ends in themselves, that they are owed 'unconditional respect, that Ithey possess inalienable nights, I K.and of course, that they possess inalienable dignity. In my _) . : _

judgment these are ways oftrying to say what wefeel a need. to . L »l my when “we are estrangedfrom the conceptual resources [i.e. 1‘ T

_ L. \ , t V. vGod] we need to say it. . . . Not one of[these Sm1»‘¢m¢"t~‘ “[70”human beings] [has the power of the ‘religious way of speak- lling that we are sacred because God loves us, his chil- “I ~ ldren.

Leff is not simply concluding that there is no basis for human -rights without God. He is also pointing out (as are Dershowitz 1 V

and Dworkin, in their own way) that despite the fact that we ij s7can»t justify or ground human rights in a world without God, we ' ,-

still know they exist. Leff is not just speaking gene_1'icallY> but ._ , rpersonally. Without God he"can’t jllstifl’ moral Obligation’ and Tyet he can’t not know it exists. l I

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The Knowledge of.God

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The Argument for God fromthe Violence ofNature

Why would we know this? To sharpen our focus on the signifi-cance of this indelible knowledge of moral obligation, considerthe observations ofwriter Annie Dillard. Dillard lived‘ for a.yearby a creek in the mountains ofVirginia expecting to be inspiredand refreshed by closeness to “nature.” Instead, she came to real-ize that nature was completely ruled by one central principle—violence by the strong against the weak. ,

There is not a person in the world that behaves as badly aspraying inantises. But wait, you say, there is no right or -wrongin nature; right and wrong is a human concept! Precisely! Weare moral creatures in an,amoral world. . . . Or consider thealternative. . . it is only human feeling that, is freakishlyamiss. . . . All right then—it is 'our emotions that are amiss.We arefreaks} the world isfine, and let us allgo have loboto-mies to restore us to a natural state. We can leave . . . loboto-mized,go back to the creek, and live on its banks as untroubledas any inuskrat or reed. Y‘oufirst.19

Annie Dillard saw that all of nature is based on violence. Yetwe inescapably believe it is wrong for stronger human individualsor groups to killweaker ones. If violence is totally natural wh

Ywould it be wrong for strong humans to trample.'weak ones?There is no basis for nioral obligation unless we argue'that "na-ture is in some part unnatural. We can’t k-now that nature isbroken in some Way unless there is some supernatural standard ofnormalcy apart from_ nature by which we can judge right andWrong. That means there would have_to be heaven or God or

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162 THE Ransom FOR coo

some kind of divine order outside ofnature in order to make thatjudgment. I s -

There is only one way out of this conundrum. We can pick upthe Biblical account of things and see if it explains our moralsense any better than a secular view. If the world was made by aGod of peace, justice, and love, ‘then that is whyiswe know thatviolence, oppression, and ‘hate are w,rong. If the World is fallen,broken, and needs to be redeemed, that explains the violence anddisorder wessee.

If you believe human rights are a reality, then it makes muchmore sense that God exists thanithat he does not. Ifyou insist ona secular view of the world ancl~ yet you continueto pronouncesome things right and some things wrong, then I hope you seethe deep disharmony betweeh the world your intellect has de-vised and the real world“(and God) that'*your heart knows exists.This leads us to a crucial question. If i premise (“There is noGod”) leads to a conclusion you know isn’t -true (“Napalmingbabies is culturally relative”) then why notschange the premise?

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The Endless, Pointless Litigation of Existence

I have not tried to prove the existence of God to you. My goalhas been to show you that you already‘ know God is there. To‘some degree I have been treating the nonexistence of God as anintellectual problem, but it‘ is much more than that. It not only‘makes all moral choices meaningless, but it makes all life mean-ingless too. The playwright Arthur Miller reveals this vividlythrough the character Quentin“ in After’ the Fall. Quentin says:

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For many years Ilooked at life like a case at law. It was a se-ries ofproofs. When you’re youngyou prove how brave you are,

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V W or smart; then, what agood lover‘,-~then, agoodfather;finally,Q-».u how wise, or powerful or [whatever.] But underlying it all, I

A see now, there was a presumption. That one moved on an_,_ upward path toward some elevation, where. . . God knows

I anyway. I think now that my disaster really began when

‘um-<My looked up one day . . . and the bench was empty. No judge in

sight. And all that remained was the endless argument withM onesefi this pointless litigation of existence befbre an empty

bench... . Which, of course, is another way of saying-i despair.”

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y What is he saying? Weiall live as if it is better to seek peaceL . _ '2 E,’ instead of war, to tell the truth instead of lying, to care and‘B - .I nurture rather than to destroy. We believe that these choicesJ are not pointless, that it matters which Way we choose to live.

, Yet if the Cosmic Bench is truly empty, then “who sez” thatone choice is better than the others? We can argue about it, butit’s jL1$t P0intless arguing, endless litigation. If the Bench is

1 '- I truly empty, then the whole span ofhuman civilization, even if. E, it lasts a few million years, will be just an infinitesimally brief

5 J: spark in relation to the oceans ofdead time that preceded it and‘; will follow it. There will be no one around to remember any ‘of" W it. Whether we are loving or cruel in the end would make no' difference at all.21.

_ I Once <we‘ realize this situation there are two options.‘ One isthat we can simply refuse to think out-the implications ofall this.

' We can hold on to our intellectual belief in anlempty Bench and: yet live as ifour choices are meaningful and as if there is a differ-.‘ ence between love and cruelty. Why would we do that? A cynic~ up might say that this is a way of “having one’s cake and eating it,

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163 ,

.164 THE REASON FOR 000

. ' ' htoo.” That is, you get the benefit of havinga §OClhW1tl1011t t ecost of following him. But there is no integrity in t at. h I a

The other option is to recognize that you do kI10W t “C 15God. You could accept the fact that you live as if bcallti’ and lovchave meaning as if there is meaning in life, as if human beingshave inherent dignity—all because you. know .GZd exlisgi £122dishonest to live as if he is therfi and Yet fall to ac now C 3°one who has given you.a1l tl'1¢5@ gifts-

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Can we doubt that presently our race will more than realize" our boldest imaginations, that itwill achieve unity andpeace,

a ' and that our children will live in ‘a world made more splen-* did and lovely than anypalace orgarden that we know, going'1 on from strength to strength in an ever-widening circle ‘ofY achievement? What man has done, the little triumphs ofhis

_ present state. . . form but the prelude to the things that man~ has yet to do., _ _ —H. G. Wells, A Short History ofthe World (1937)

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N The cold-blooded massacres of the defiznseless, the return ofll: deliberate and organized torture, mental torment, andfear

. to a world from which such things had’seemed well nigh’ banished—has come near to breaking my spirit altogether. . .’ “Homo Sapiens,” as he has been pleased to call himself,‘ is

played out. K_ ' -—-H. G. Wells, A Mind at the End ofIts Tkther (19446)

Z T is hardeto avoid the conclusion that there is something fun-damentally wrong with the world. According to Christianity

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