August Schlapfer

Reactors on the Ring of Fire: Implications for Indonesia’s Nuclear Program

Working Paper No. 65

July 1996

The views presented in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the Asia Research Centre or Murdoch University.

© Copyright is held by the author(s) of each working paper: No part of this publication may be republished, reprinted or reproduced in any form without the permission of the paper’s author(s). National Library of Australia.

ISBN: 0-86905-513-5 ISSN: 1037-4612

INTRODUCTION

Nuclear power is appearing increasingly less competitive in the market place. In his book

Global Fission, Jim Falk1 suggests that the nuclear industry’s economic fortunes are tied to the

growing community concern over nuclear hazards (1982: 62). In March 1992, an opinion poll

in the US found that 65% opposed the construction of more nuclear power plants, the largest

opposition since pollsters first started asking questions (Brown 1993: 11).

Shapar and Gale2 argue that the reasons for the interruption to US nuclear growth are due

to a slow down in electricity demand from about 7% per annum in the early 1970s to about 2%

in 1993, insufficient public acceptance, construction cost disallowances by state public utility

commissions, an inefficient and protracted federal licensing process and the United States

Government’s lack of progress in resolving the high-level nuclear waste issue (1993: 47).

World use of nuclear energy is expected to grow by about 1% per year between 1990 and

2010, the slowest rate of any major energy source. Concerns over cost, radioactive waste, plant

safety and nuclear proliferation continue to constrain the nuclear industry’s growth (USIS 1994:

15).

In his keynote address during the Eighteenth International Symposium ‘Uranium and

Nuclear Energy: 1993’, held by the Uranium Institute, Remy Carle, the Deputy General

Manager of Electricite de France speculated on the future of nuclear power worldwide.

According to him, ‘nuclear energy has become a political object in our societies, hence to a

large extent its treatment is irrational. On the face of it the present situation for nuclear power is

hardly encouraging: in Europe, with the exception of France, there is a ‘de facto’ moratorium.

The Americas, both North and South, are in the same situation. A recent communication from

the European Nuclear Society’s NUCNET service reminded us that we have to look to Asia to

find any dynamism ...’ (1993: 1). Carle is convinced that countries which are making strong

economic progress need to base their development on nuclear power. This makes Indonesia, in

the midst of rapid economic expansion led by the manufacturing sector, a prime target for the

nuclear industry.

Proponents of nuclear energy believe that the future of the nuclear fuel industry will be

secured ‘when other sources have been shown not to be as environmentally clean as they were

supposed to be, and not so cheap; and when the general economic context will allow an

increased consumption of electricity.’ (Herve 1993: 204).

Although Carle argues strongly for the continuation of the nuclear industry, his mission

statement is nevertheless an admission that the nuclear industry is in trouble. Firstly, the recent

history of nuclear accidents (or incidents) throughout the world shows that Chernobyl was not

an isolated or unique event. In 1991 and 1992, 342 incidents were reported to the World

Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO), the nuclear industry’s watchdog (Carle 1993: 4).

Since the 1986 accident, the number two reactor at Chernobyl experienced a fire in 1991, in

March 1992 there were radiation leaks at Sosnov Bor, in April 1993 a radioactive explosion

occurred at Tomsk-7, July 1993 saw a radioactive plutonium leak at Chelyabinsk-65, and in

April 1994 a flaw in the cooling system again forced the number three reactor at Chernobyl to

shut down (Schlapfer and Marinova 1995: 19).

The April 1986 explosion at Chernobyl was due to human error. The accident report

clearly states, ‘...operators disconnected safety systems and violated procedures...’ (Flavin

1987: 8). Experts in the West have blamed the lack of a secondary containment structure for

the accident. However, Morris Rosen, the top safety official at the International Atomic Energy

Agency (IAEA) argues that ‘Chernobyl was designed adequately for a loss-of-coolant accident

... It was not designed for the accident that occurred, but I would repeat that the containment

was adequate for what it was designed to do’ (Flavin 1987: 35). According to Liberatore, the

confusion and uncertainty which characterised the response during the Chernobyl disaster

would have been similar if there had been an accident in Italy (Liberatore 1993: 33-47).

Clearly, the nuclear industry continues to suffer from the ‘bad publicity’ it received from

the Chernobyl accident. Incidents, as the industry prefers to call them, happen not only in the

former Soviet Union. Western Europe and the United States have had their share of incidents

and near misses as well. Ever since an accident in 1957, the nuclear facility at

Sellafield/Windscale in Britain has been plagued by recurring mishaps.3 Greenpeace claims that

almost 1000 incidents have occurred at this site since its establishment in the 1940s (Hall 1994:

647). More recently, in 1993, authorities at the Wylfa nuclear power station on the island of

Anglesey, Wales mishandled a dangerous incident that could have resulted in a meltdown and a

radioactive disaster. They failed to shut down the reactor for nine hours after part of a metal

crane fell into a fuelling channel (West Australian September 14 1995).

Cronau, in his article in Australian Society, refers to an incident in which a Westinghouse

designed pressurised water reactor in Japan experienced a potentially catastrophic rupture that

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led to a near meltdown. According to this writer, fifteen of Japan’s pressurised water reactors

have suffered some sort of heat exchange damage (1992: 18). It is asserted by Japanese

authorities that the recent earthquake in Kobe, (Japan), did not cause any serious damage to

their nuclear power plants. Nevertheless, this latest seismic activity along the ‘Ring of Fire’4

should perhaps serve as a warning to those advocating nuclear projects within its vicinity.

In the developed world there has been a growing concern about what constitutes a safe

level of radiation. The prevailing scientific view at present appears to be that all radiation

presents a risk (Lenssen 1991: 15). Proponents of nuclear power obviously disagree with this

opinion. Duncan and Modigliani argue that in Ireland the natural background radiation dose is

4300 microsieverts per annum, whereas the equivalent figure at Sellafield is only 2200

microsieverts per annum (1993: 92).

The issue of the safe disposal of nuclear waste also appears to be creating some confusion

within the nuclear industry. On the one hand Carle talks about resolving the waste problem and

improving the management of all radioactive waste materials (1993: 2). On the other hand,

although people within the industry acknowledge that nuclear waste is potentially dangerous,

they assure the public that its disposal does not represent an insurmountable technical problem.

Our industry’s great achievement with nuclear waste is that it can safely handle and manage all types of radioactive waste, and can dispose of the great bulk of it, the 90% or so which is low level waste. The remainder is being conditioned to immobilise the radioactivity - putting it into stable and more easily controlled form. The plants to do this exist, not as paper studies, but as sophisticated and efficient waste treatment plants and radioactive waste stores which are built and operating at Sellafield and La Hague (Duncan and Modigliani 1993: 91).

The industry also claims that it is not the lack of technical knowledge which prevents the final

disposal of small volumes of intermediate and high level nuclear waste, but the absence of

political will. In addition, they point to the irrational fears and misperceptions by the public,

which are being perpetuated by the ‘so-called environmental organisations, who are out to close

us down’ (Duncan and Modigliani 1993: 91).

It appears that the nuclear industry is not only facing those people in society who are

‘pathologically opposed to nuclear’ (King 1993: 203), but rather more seriously, natural gas in

particular has now come to be regarded as an economically and environmentally popular

alternative to nuclear energy in many countries. This causes much dismay to the nuclear

proponents.5

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Carle laments the fact that the complex history of nuclear technology has acquired a

flawed image associated with high risks. This is a view the industry refuses to accept (Carle

1993: 2). Carle argues that the public will have to be educated to accept nuclear energy as a

‘normal’ and ‘essential’ energy source. He is confident that ‘whatever the irrational and

demagogic deviations of our societies, a good product, a product which achieves excellence in a

field so essential to our quality of life, will not be rejected when the day comes when there is a

need for it. And it will not be long before this need is felt’ (1993: 5-6).

The less than encouraging future prospects for nuclear energy in the OECD countries,

with the exception of Japan and France, has forced the industry to change its strategy. By its

own admission, ‘the best way to kill the nuclear industry is to deprive it of the continuity and

the development needed to maintain its skills and investments’ (Carle 1993: 5). Thus, a

considerable effort has been made to expand into Asia, with varying success.6

This brief outline of the state of the nuclear industry in the 1990s and its plans for a

worldwide nuclear revival serve as a backdrop for the main theme of this paper. With this in

mind this paper will analyse the proposed nuclear programme by the Indonesian government

and the ensuing debate arising from it within Indonesia.

Pro-nuclear forces within Indonesia have been toying with the idea of nuclear energy for

several years. In 1958 the Committee for Nuclear Energy was formed. The following year the

Institute of Atomic Energy was founded and in 1964 it was transformed into the National

Atomic Energy Agency (Badan Tenaga Atom National - BATAN), elevating it to the status of a

government department. Indonesia signed agreements for major research facilities projects

with Canada, France, Germany, Italy and the United States in the mid 1980s.7 Five years later

the Indonesian Research and Technology Minister Dr B. Yusuf Habibie confirmed plans for a

commercial nuclear energy programme (Brown 1993: 7).

The theme of this paper centres on the battle between a segment of the Indonesian

population who support the nuclear industry— which includes sections of the scientific

community, professional associations and media people, as well as a part of the New Order

regime8 closely linked with the industry— and the loosely organised network of opposition,

consisting of community groups, NGOs, academics and environmental organisations.

To put it another way, the nuclear debate in Indonesia needs to be seen as part of an

ongoing conflict between forces favouring a centralised government system that guarantees the

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power and influence of the existing conglomerates, and those forces looking for a more

democratic system which would allow them greater participation in the decision making

processes and perhaps have a greater share in Indonesia’s material wealth.

There are four parts to this paper. The first will survey the position of the proponents and

opponents of nuclear energy within the New Order regime as well as the somewhat ambiguous

position of the military. The second part of the paper discusses the environmental movement in

Indonesia, the extent of local opposition to the nuclear programme, and looks at the role of the

press. Section three explores the possible ramifications for the region, assessing the risks

associated with nuclear power in general as well as the specific risks related to the geographic

location of Indonesia. An assessment of the demographic and economic impact of a Chernobyl

type accident on Indonesia and the region will also be presented, as well as a discussion of the

possible economic and technological dependency arising from Indonesia embracing nuclear

technology. The fourth part looks at Indonesia’s substantial non-nuclear energy resources,

energy saving Supply-Side and Demand-Side Management methods, and discusses alternative

and perhaps more appropriate technology for Indonesia. Finally, questions are raised regarding

the proposed nuclear programme’s ability to provide cheaper energy and improved living

conditions for the people of Indonesia, or whether it is merely a means to increase the power of

the state apparatus and strengthen the nuclear corporations’ viability.

THE GOVERNMENT POSITION

In the first week of February 1995, the Director General of the Agency of Atomic Energy

(BATAN), Djali Ahimsa, announced to the Indonesian House of Representatives that the

construction of the first of twelve 600 and 900 MW nuclear power plants would begin in the

year 2000 (Indonesia Business Weekly February 1995).9 The main reason given by the

Indonesian Government for the proposed program is Indonesia’s, and particularly Java’s and

Bali’s growing energy shortage. Since Indonesia adopted its first five-year Development Plan

in 1968-69 the annual growth rate of electricity consumption has far exceeded expectations.

For example, electricity use in 1990-1991 increased at a rate of 17.9%, exceeding the projected

14.6%. Government sources estimate that by the end of the seventh five-year Development

Plan in the year 2003/4 the Java-Bali interconnected system, accounting for 80% of all

Indonesian electricity consumption will require a 28 848 MW peak load. This compares with a

peak load of 4 565 MW for the year 1990/1991 (Ahimsa and Adiwardojo 1993: 78-9).

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The Government’s realisation that oil reserves are finite has also contributed to the

adoption of the energy diversification policy in order to reduce domestic oil consumption. At

present Indonesia’s main power sources, other than oil, come from hydro, geothermal, gas and

coal. The government estimates that conventional non-nuclear energy resources would leave a

shortfall of 7 625 MW for the island of Java alone by the year 2015 (Sari 1992: 2). As far as

the pro-nuclear forces within the Government are concerned, this shortfall needs to be met by

nuclear power.

Prior to Ahimsa’s announcement, the Indonesian Government maintained that nuclear

power was the last alternative in an effort to find a solution to the energy crisis that is facing

Indonesia (Ahzam Razif February 13 1995, letter).10 However, the BATAN Director General’s

statement leaves little doubt that the Indonesian Government has definite plans for a nuclear

programme.

The Indonesian Government’s interest in nuclear energy is not new. Lembaga Tenaga

Atom (Agency for Atomic Energy) was formed as far back as 1958. By 1964 its name was

changed to its present one, Badan Tenaga Atom Nasional (BATAN or National Atomic Energy

Agency). BATAN is headed by a director-general, who is directly responsible to the President.

‘It has the authority to regulate, administer and control all nuclear activities in Indonesia while

it is responsible for conducting research and development in the use of nuclear energy for the

welfare of the Indonesian people’ (BATAN 2 1993: 2). In 1964 Indonesia’s first research

reactor began operating at the Nuclear Research Centre in Bandung, West Java, with an initial

capacity of 250 kilowatt (kW). This was upgraded to 1 MW by 1971. The first reactor built for

research purposes by Indonesian personnel was completed in 1979 and is located in

Yogyakarta, Central Java.11

During 1978-79 BATAN conducted a pre-feasibility study in conjunction with the

government of Italy. This investigation found that a location in the vicinity of Ujung Watu on

the Mt Muria Peninsula, Central Java could be further evaluated for a possible reactor site. In

May 1983 Interatom GmbH from Germany began construction of the 30 MW research reactor

at Serpong, which was completed in 1987 (BATAN 1 1993: 4). By 1985 additional studies

were completed together with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the US

government (through the services of Bechtel International), the French government (through the

services of Sofratome) and again the Italians, through CESEN and Motor Columbus, a Swiss

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Consultant Company (Ahimsa and Adiwardojo 1993: 78). The current feasibility project

conducted by NEWJEC (New Japan Engineering Company) bases its research on the findings

of that survey.

Proponents of the nuclear program

Arguments for the use of nuclear energy resound in Indonesia. Proponents claim that nuclear

capability opens up possibilities in the fields of agriculture and medical science, as well as

producing the power needed by industry (Ahzam Razif February 13 1995, letter). Electricity

needs, concerns for the environment and the depletion of conventional fossil fuels also

comprise powerful arguments. Indonesia’s chief advocate for nuclear energy is Dr Yusuf

Habibie, the Minister for Technology and Research. Dr Habibie, who is in charge of BATAN,

asserts that nuclear power is not only affordable, but also very competitive with other energy

sources. Indonesia’s oil resources are expected to be significantly depleted by the first third of

the next century and the main coal reserves are situated on Sumatra and not on Java, where the

electricity demand is greatest (Ahimsa and Adiwardojo 1993: 78).

Although Dr Ahimsa, the director-general of BATAN, admits that the start-up investment

for nuclear power is relatively high, he argues that in the long run energy production will be

cheaper, because the price of the fuel is cheap. Furthermore, it is the overwhelming view of the

nuclear experts at BATAN, that in order to avoid an energy crisis, Indonesia has no alternative

but to go nuclear (Setiawan/DSG 1993: 8).

In an interview with the Indonesia Business Weekly (IBW) in July 1993, Dr Ahimsa

outlined his main reasons for nuclear power.

We will run out of oil and the government wants to change from oil as a source of energy to coal and natural gas. But Java has a limited supply of coal and geothermal energies are also very limited. It is true that Shauman Samadikum (LIPI12 Chairman) said that geothermal can provide 1500 MW but there hasn’t been any cost analysis and the technology is very sophisticated. There are a lot of obstacles and risks to geothermal power generation. Coal has environmental limitations. As for natural gas, it is better to use natural gas to replace oil as a foreign exchange earner. It is not guaranteed that electricity from gas will be cheaper. (Setiawan and Octarina 1993: 8)

Despite Dr Ahimsa’s concerns for geothermal power generation, it could be argued that in

terms of complexity, obstacles and most certainly risks, nuclear power would rate worse than

geothermal. However, Ahimsa is convinced that nuclear energy carries not only less risk, but

is cost-wise on a par with coal power generation (IBW 1995: 18). One of the reasons why some

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nuclear power plants are more expensive in terms of production costs in the US, according to

Ahimsa, is the US Government’s adherence to stringent regulations.13 In Japan, he claims,

nuclear power is no more expensive than oil, and for Indonesia, the price of nuclear power will

be equal to other energy sources, but not cheaper (IBW 1993: 8). However, unlike Indonesia,

countries like Japan and France have few indigenous energy resources and are forced to import

most of their fuel (USIS 1994: 15).

Nuclear advocates in Indonesia, such as Jos Subki, the deputy director of BATAN,

laments how difficult it is to assure the community that nuclear power is safe and useful. ‘A

principal question for such a facility is not its technology, both hardware and software, but the

people’s perception who look at nuclear power as a terrifying matter’ (Clarinews@clarinet

1993).

The proponents of nuclear energy would argue that in terms of population density, size,

and infrastructure, the island of Java is an ideal place for nuclear power. Once in operation,

nuclear power stations will be able to supply the electricity grid with a constant source of

electricity. Barring accidents and shutdowns, Java’s growing industry would be guaranteed a

reliable supply of energy. This is not to say, however, that Indonesia’s only option is to go

nuclear. The non-nuclear energy resources of Indonesia are substantial. Figures produced by

the Centre for Research on Energy at the Institute of Technology in Bandung (1991) show the

availability of vast amounts of fossil as well as other energy resources (Table 1).

In its 1993 report on Indonesia’s energy and environment the World Bank found that:

...for Indonesia, as with most other developing countries in Asia, the role of nuclear in its total energy supply needs to be reviewed with care, due to: (i) the availability of less expensive alternative, such as gas and coal; (ii) the shortage of investment capital; and (iii) concerns with the feasibility of evacuation plans in densely populated areas, seismic, volcanic and soil conditions, and the availability of cooling water in many areas of Java, where the potential market is located (World Bank 1993: 38).

Table 1. Non-Nuclear Energy Resources of Indonesia

Source Reserve Oil 48.4 x 109 barrels Natural Gas 216.8 x 1012 scf Coal 28.3 x 109 tons Hydro 75 000 MW Geothermal 16 000 MW

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Peat 200 x 109 tons Source: Centre for Research on Energy, Institute of Technology, Bandung, 1991

During his visit to Australia in May 1995, Dr Habibie argued for a partnership with Australia in

such ventures as steel making, the international supply of military hardware and clean energy

(Australian May 30 1995). For a high-tech enthusiast like Habibie, this naturally includes

nuclear energy.

Opponents within the New Order regime

Within the Indonesian political sphere, Dr Habibie has had his share of opponents, including

officials like the Minister of Finance, Mari’e Muhammad, and the Director of the state-owned

electricity company PLN, alongside forces within the military, religious leaders, academics and

environmentalists.

In order to explain some of the unease expressed by opponents to Dr Habibie, it is helpful

to go back in history and look at the way the awarding of the contract for the construction of

the nuclear plant at Serpong was handled in the early eighties. On August 12, 1981, the Asian

Wall Street Journal published an article under the title: ‘Suharto Choice of Reactor Supplier

Angers Bidders, Government Aides’. The article alleged that President Suharto chose

Interatom, a subsidiary of the giant German engineering company Siemens AG, at the urging of

Dr Habibie, the then Minister of State, despite the recommendations of two Indonesian

government agencies (BATAN and BPPT)14 that General Atomic from the USA receive the

contract. BATAN’s chairman at the time, A. Baiquini, was said to be outraged over the

decision and Habibie’s interference. The article goes on to claim that internal Indonesian

government documents show that between May and November 1980, both BATAN and BPPT

not only awarded the contract to General Atomic on three separate occasions, but also rated

Interatom last in each of the eight areas of evaluation, including technical design, safety and

fuel needs. Businessmen, bankers and government officials in Jakarta agreed that because of

his connections in Germany, Dr Habibie has a reputation for vigorous lobbying in favour of

German companies (Asian Wall Street Journal August 12 1981).

Dr Habibie’s connections with Germany go back a long way. Not only was he educated

at the University of Aachen in Germany, but he was also the Director of Applied Technology

for Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm (MBB) before returning to Indonesia (Australian May 30

1995). During the mid 1970s Habibie established the Indonesian aviation industry (IPTN)15

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with the help of MBB (BUKO 1994: 47). Since his appointment as Minister of Technology, he

supervises the Indonesian military-industrial complex and is in charge of practically all

weapons acquisition from France, the US, Great Britain, Germany and Holland (Koekebakker

1994: 25).

In June 1994 three prominent weekly publications (Tempo, Detik and Editor) were

banned for criticism of the government’s acquisition and refurbishment of 39 former East

German warships, at a cost of $ 1.1 billion, recommended by Habibie. The Finance Minister,

Mar’ie Muhammad, refused to provide more than $ 319 million for the venture (Koekebakker

1994: 25). The articles attracted the ire of the authorities, because they highlighted a critical

struggle taking place beneath the surface of the New Order regime over questions of

accountability of the state and its officials. In the face of a growing overseas debt, power-

holders are being forced to listen to those who urge fiscal responsibility and constraint (Robison

1994: 1, 5).

Although there are no known links between Dr Habibie’s enterprises and the proposed

nuclear program, his multi-billion dollar state sanctioned empire of high-tech industry is well

situated to profit from the construction of numerous nuclear power stations and the

infrastructure associated with it. Nuclear energy is high-tech, capital intensive and, it could be

argued, favours centralised government and functions best under a totalitarian state apparatus.16

From all accounts though, there appears to have been a shift in Indonesia from a political

regime that can best be described as a form of authoritarian corporatism, dominated for almost

thirty years by president Suharto, the military and the bureaucracy, to a regime that reflects and

guarantees the power and wealth of a complex oligarchy. Many of the powerful conglomerates

are owned by the ethnic Chinese minority. However, quite a number are controlled by the

pribumi (indigenous Indonesian), such as those who emerged in the 1970s under the umbrella

of Pertamina (state-owned oil company) and Sekneg (State Secretariat) in the 1980s, as well as

the various children, relatives and friends of President Suharto (Robison and Hadiz 1993: 26).

This apparent shift is seen by some as a re-ordering of Indonesia’s political landscape by

Suharto in order to accommodate the political economic and social ascendancy of powerful new

families, headed by the president’s clan (Henuk 1994, Internet).

The potential connection between the proposed nuclear power program and Djali

Ahimsa’s family is perhaps more obvious, although not on the same scale as Dr Habibie’s. In

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an article published in Prospek titled ‘Uang di Balik Radiasi’ (Monetary gain from radiation),

two of Ahimsa’s sons are shown as being directly linked with a company called PT Perkasa

Sterlingdo (PTPS), which is involved in the sterilisation process of agricultural products and

pharmaceutical products, using radiation (Luthfie 1991: 31).

The two most prominent protagonists of nuclear energy, Dr Habibie and Djali Ahimsa,

are both closely associated with the industrial conglomerates that stand to gain the most from

the proposed program. They are representatives of an educated, wealthy elite who assist the

transplantation of complex and capital extensive technology, with its associated values, from

the developed world to Indonesia in order to enhance Indonesia’s reputation as an industrially

developing country and to enhance their own economic and political influence. Indications are

that the formation of this ‘compradore class’ is not only sanctioned by President Suharto, but is

in fact headed by his family.

Critics within the government such as Jusman Thatthar, a legislator from the Indonesian

Armed Forces (ABRI), expressed his concern about safety aspects of the nuclear program and

asked the government to provide more details of the plan. Similarly, Laksmiari Priyonggo,

from the Indonesian Democratic party (PDI), suggested that BATAN take the initiative in

conducting open discussions with the public and with Non-Government Organisations (NGOs).

She further questioned Habibie’s assurances that nuclear would be the last option to be taken in

the development of power generation and wondered whether BATAN’s plan implied that

Indonesia will have no other alternative by the year 2000 (Jakarta Post February 4 1995).

The present Minister for the Environment, Sarwono Kusumaatmadja, is also at odds with

the view of the proponents of nuclear power. In a statement he made at the CSIRO-United

Nations Conference on Economic Growth with Clean Production in Melbourne on February 8,

1994, he pointed out that his government was reconsidering going ahead with nuclear power.

He said: ‘Be assured, we are not going nuclear, at least not in my lifetime, I hope’ (Land 1994,

Internet).

The position of the military

The Indonesian military has always had a somewhat ambivalent position towards nuclear

energy. On the one hand, forces within ABRI—the armed forces (Angkatan Bersenjata

Republic Indonesia) —are drawn towards sophisticated technology: necessary in part to

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increase its striking power. On the other hand they are also aware of the potential for sabotage

that any nuclear installation will bring with it (Aditjondro, February 1994, interview). But

perhaps more importantly, there is a growing resentment by factions within the military towards

Dr Habibie. Although President Suharto has removed the most avid anti-Habibie generals from

the top military leadership, resentment to the Minister remains. In particular, opposition exists

over Dr Habibie’s move into the field of military hardware purchases. Sections of ABRI resent

being forced to obtain aircraft from IPTN, when better planes are available overseas. But it was

Habibie’s purchase of the East German ships that brought about an open alliance between the

economic technocrats and the military. When Minister of Finance Mar’ie Muhammad, cut

Habibie’s budget for the project, he was fully supported by the Minister for Defence and

Security, General Edi Sudrajat (Independent Monthly 1994, Internet).

Major General Sembiring Meliala, the former deputy chairman of the military faction in

parliament, belittled the political aspirations of Habibie in his now famous interview with the

weekly news magazine DeTik. According to McBeth, the military’s main concerns centre on

Habibie and his relationship with the armed forces chief of staff, General Feisal Tanjung, who

appears to have won President Suharto’s confidence. They are less than happy with a situation

‘where national development is the priority, and where Habibie has the authority to ensure that

the nature of military purchases fits with his own high-tech plans’ (McBeth 1994: 27).

Although ABRI has not made its position clear in regards to the nuclear program, it seems

that the factions within the military opposing Habibie would like to curb his ambitions and

influence and have decided to oppose the nuclear project for political reasons. For example,

during the weeks approaching the general elections in 1991, the newspaper Wawasan carried

an article with the heading ‘Upaya diskusi terbuka tentang PLTN’ (Aim for an open discussion

on nuclear power plants). In addition, Major General Hariyato, a regional military commander,

initiated a discussion about the nuclear project at Mt Muria -much to the surprise of the public

(Wawasan October 4 1991).

Clearly, ABRI is increasingly unhappy about Habibie’s growing role in economic policy

making and by the part he has played for Suharto in building an institutional support base in the

Muslim community through the Muslim Intellectuals’ Organisation, ICMI (Aspinall 1994: 3).

Although ICMI is Habibie’s power base, it is unclear whether the Minister is using them, or if

they are using him to get the president’s ear (McBeth 1994: 27). For Habibie, ICMI represents

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an important support base for his economic views and his political ambitions. On the other

hand, Habibie provides ICMI with protection in its formative years, and support for him will be

conditional on him fulfilling that function (Schwarz 1994: 183). No matter what, the Habibie

factor will continue to be central to the nuclear program, as well as in Indonesian politics

generally.

NGOS POSITION

The environmental movement in Indonesia

In his keynote address to the Asian Studies Association of Australia Biennial Conference held

in Perth in 1994, George Aditjondro, the well known Indonesian dissident academic, argued

that environmentalism means different things to the government, the private sector and NGO

activists. Initially, the government regarded environmentalism as neutral, benign and patriotic

and a way to maintain control over private business, as well as securing links to the student

movement. The private sector uses environmental issues as a self protecting device serving

large business vis-à-vis small business. NGO activists on the other hand, are using

environmentalism as a safe umbrella to oppose the Suharto regime. For them environmentalism

has provided a cover for expressing opposition to the growing strength of Indonesia’s

conglomerates, increasing economic dominance by the Japanese, as well as foreign investment

in Indonesia (Aditjondro 1994, keynote address).

Aditjondro further claims that environmentalism in Indonesia is not class free and that

very often rural and urban working class interests have been overlooked. The environmental

debate takes place overwhelmingly among the urban middle and upper classes, thus the

interests of the lower classes in the villages take a back seat.17 Urban slum dwellers are worse

off still, because of their working conditions and the slum environment in which they are forced

to live (Aditjondro 1994, keynote address).

The NGO Wahana Lingkungan Hidup (WALHI) was founded in 1980 to deal with

environmental and social issues. By 1983, WALHI could claim a list of more than 300

organisations involved in environmental activities (Johnson 1990: 80). WALHI is closely

associated with the Legal Aid Institute (LBH) which provides access to the judicial system in

environmental matters (Warren and Elston 1994: 12).

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Indonesian NGOs generally feel that a more thorough investigation is required in order to

find a solution to the perceived energy crisis. For example WALHI does not agree with the

projected energy requirements as suggested by the proponents of nuclear power within the

Indonesian Government. According to the NGO estimates, energy needs for Indonesia in the

year 2000, assuming that growth in GDP remains at 8.7%, and the import/export ratio is 85%,

would be 37 018 Gigawatt-hours (GWH). The capability of the National Electricity Board

(PLN) to supply non-nuclear electricity for the year 2000 is 79 050 GWH, which is more than

the estimated needs; thus, according to WALHI, there is no impending energy crisis (Sari 1992:

2).

Mohammad Anung, nuclear campaigner for WALHI, suggested that one of the main

problems contributing to Indonesia’s energy shortage is the wasteful usage of available energy.

What is needed is not more energy, but more efficient use of what is already available

(February 1994, interview). Similarly, M.S. Zulkarnan, the executive director of WAHLI, says

that Indonesia would be better advised to research the necessity as well as appropriateness of

energy alternatives, rather than to embark on a program of constructing expensive, and in the

long term dangerous, nuclear power plants. He also asserts that the easiest way to eliminate the

energy crisis in Indonesia is to improve energy efficiency with low-cost technology (Trisno and

Willy 1992: 9).

In an article published in the Jakarta Post on September 10, 1993, WALHI challenged

the right of the Indonesian Government to proceed with the nuclear program:

It is an illegitimate action because the government never officially and openly announced its decision to build a nuclear power plant ....the government has never asked whether the public wants the plant, or whether it would be prepared to face an accident, has never informed the public about the danger of radioactive radiation, and has never asked people at the planned site in Muria Peninsula if they would be willing to live near a nuclear plant (Jakarta Post September 10 1993).

The article went on to claim that the government never included its plan to build the nuclear

reactor at Ujung Watu on the Muria Peninsula in the Guidelines of State Policy or the State

Budget (Jakarta Post September 10 1993).

A decree of the Minister of State for the Environment of the Republic of Indonesia -

concerning the types of business activities required to prepare an environmental impact

assessment - lists nuclear reactor construction and operation as one that necessitates

environmental impact assessment study (BAPEDAL 1994). The New Japan Engineering

14

Consultants (NEWJEC) conducted a feasibility study of the proposed nuclear program in 1995.

However, at present, there appear to be no published results of an environmental impact study

available.18

Although WALHI’s main concern is the possible environmental impact of nuclear power,

the Jakarta Post article clearly suggests that WALHI would like to see more public

participation in the decision making processes. In effect, it is an attempt to make the

government more accountable for its actions to the people.

The executive director of ICEL (Indonesian Centre for Environmental Law), Mas

Achmed Santosa, argues that there is an uneven application of AMDAL (Indonesia’s

Environmental Impact Analysis) regulations and guidelines, and considerable procedural

inconsistencies within BAPEDAL (Environmental Impact Management Agency) itself.

According to him, no public notification procedure has been established to inform the

community, either of projects being reviewed by BAPEDAL, or of decisions made by them.

Further, neither libraries nor public information facilities have been established to provide

public access to AMDAL reports. While NGOs have been selected as temporary members of

the AMDAL commission, their inclusion is not guaranteed and they lack the funds to truly

represent local interests. The fact is that local public representatives are seldom invited to

commission meetings with AMDAL (February 1994, Santosa, interview).

Local opposition

The construction of a nuclear power plant anywhere requires clearing a large area of land,

involving the relocation of people within the immediate vicinity. Therefore, the main concern

of the people in Ujung Watu on the Mt Muria Peninsula, where the first nuclear power station is

planned, is eviction from their land. One local farmer interviewed on the nuclear issue, made

this statement: ‘We do not want a nuclear power station near our village, we consider it

dangerous and we do not want to move from here, but we are too scared to oppose the

government’s plan openly’ (February 1994, anon. interview in Ujung Watu).19 Traditionally,

Javanese people are reluctant to leave their land. There is a saying in the Javanese language,

which means ‘though it is only a piece of land as wide as our forehead and as long as our finger,

we will defend it till the end of our life’ (Purnomo 1989: 19).

According to a spokesperson for the Pamerdi Luhur Foundation in Jepara, the landowners

in and around Ujung Watu feel confused; they are worried about having to move to another

15

island. ‘It is rumored that the resettlement program (transmigration) is very often not to the

benefit of the people being resettled’ (February 1994, anon. interview in Jepara). The

Foundation has been involved in the distribution of information about nuclear energy in the

form of cartoons and pamphlets to local people. ‘The government has said, if we oppose the

construction of the nuclear power plant, we are against the government’ (February 1994, anon.

interview). To my question about whether they perceived the strong military presence as a

threat, they laughed and said: ‘It is OK for us to talk about this, it isn’t endangering our lives,

as long as you don’t mention our names’ (February 1994, anon. interview in Jepara).

Dr Arief Budiman,20 the pro-democracy advocate and nuclear opponent at Satya Wacana

Christian University in Salatiga, suggested to me in an interview in February 1994 that without

international assistance the Indonesian NGOs would find it difficult to put any pressure on the

government. Academics working for state universities are afraid to express their opposition to

the nuclear programme publicly. The middle classes are to a large degree ignorant of the wider

issues concerned with nuclear power. Their interest in the subject is largely deflected by

presentation of the issue in the context of energy consumption and economic growth.21

Budiman argues that the NGOs in the US in particular (where donations to NGOs are tax

deductible), and perhaps some in Europe, could make a difference by influencing their

respective governments (February 1994, Budiman, interview).

Local opposition also appears to be fragmented. One reason is that groups opposing the

project have different religious beliefs. The area around the proposed sites on Mt Muria

Peninsula is traditionally a stronghold of the Mennonites, a Christian sect which has been

involved in the anti-nuclear campaign from the start. Tensions between Muslims and

Christians have been exploited by the government. The Muslims were told that the anti-nuclear

campaign was more or less a publicity stunt by the Christians. However, this schism has been

largely resolved by now. One Christian anti-nuclear campaigner from Surakarta in Central Java

outlined to me the recently adopted strategy by local NGOs of sending Muslim activists to

predominantly Muslim areas and using Christian campaigners in Christian communities

(February 1994, Widyuatmadja, interview).

Perhaps more importantly, WALHI has made considerable efforts to resolve the

differences between Muslims and Christians, and according to Arief Budiman, ‘...the Christians

and Muslims are working together now’ (1994, interview). In a significant move Abdurrahman

16

Wahid, the leader of the largest Muslim organisation in Indonesia (Nahdlatul Ulama) has

expressed his opposition to the nuclear programme. He vowed to stage a fast at Mt Muria

should the government decide to go ahead with its plan (Kompas January 12 1994).22 The Mt

Muria Peninsula is of religious importance to Indonesia’s Muslims. Four of Indonesia’s nine

holy men live in that area (Aditjondro, October 1995 pers. comm’).

The campaign against the proposed nuclear programme in Indonesia is not limited to one

sector of the community. It encompasses the local Central Javanese community, from the

villagers to various NGOs, dissident academics like Arief Budiman and George Aditjondro, and

has become a national and international issue, with groups like Greenpeace keeping in close

contact with the local and national opposition.

However, since the introduction in 1985 of the Law on Social Organisations or the Ormas

Law by the New Order regime, all Indonesian NGOs are required to register with a government

ministry and submit to its guidance. The law empowers the government to ban any

organisation not following these regulations. At the village level, government control is even

more stringent. Outside groups are forced to work through the village head and under the

guidance of the Village Security Board (Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat) (Todd 1988: 29). It

is therefore not surprising that the local villagers often feel powerless and are afraid to speak up.

The role of the press

The New Order regime has been able to increase its control over the domestic

press through the introduction of the newspaper publishing enterprise permit Surat Izin Usaha

Penerbitan Pers — Press Publication Permit or SIUPP. The publisher of an Indonesia

newspaper is required to uphold the values of the free-and-responsible press and uphold the

ideal values of Pancasila (Tickell et al 1987: 43). President Suharto needs a docile press which

largely supports his programmes of economic development and political stability. The press is

more or less forced to work in partnership with the government. This partnership is vertical,

with the government on top, the media in the middle and the people at the bottom (Tickell et al

1987: 46).

In the past authorities have shown that they are willing to clamp down on the press if they

deemed it necessary. During the aftermath of the 1974 demonstrations, the New Order

government closed down 12 publications because the press was seen to support public criticism

17

of the government. Only the more moderate newspapers were allowed to resume operations;

the more radical ones were eliminated (Hill 1991: 5).

Despite proclamations of an ‘openness’ policy for the press, as shown above, the Minister

of Information Mr. Harmoko banned three important weekly publications, Tempo, DeTik and

Editor in June 1994. The reason for their suppression was the magazines’ critical comments

over the government’s purchase of 39 former DDR warships (Robison 1994: 1, 5).

Considering the history of repression of the Indonesian press, it seems remarkable that the

nuclear debate has been allowed to proceed in the print media over a number of years. For

example, between January 29, 1993 and January 25, 1994, Kompas carried 27 articles dealing

with the nuclear issue. Republika published 22, Suara Pembaruan 15, Bisnis Indonesia 14,

Media Indonesia 14, Merdeka 11, Suara Karya 7, Pelita 6, Antara 5, AB (Angkatan

Bersenjata) 5, Jakarta Post 2 and Tempo 1 news item on the nuclear issue (Indonesian Press

Clipping Service).

Although a large proportion of the press coverage about nuclear energy portrays a

positive picture, several articles point to the pitfalls and possible dangers, and a few are openly

critical of the government’s programme. June 3, 1993, Merdeka published an article under the

heading ‘Indonesia Harus Memiliki Pembangkit Listrik Tenaga Nuklir’ (Indonesia must obtain

a nuclear power plant). The same day Pelita wrote, ‘Menristek: Tahun 2003 Indonesia Harus

Punya PLTN’(State Minister of Research and Technology: By 2003 Indonesia must have a

nuclear power station). April 23 Kompas printed a plea by WALHI to the government not to

build a nuclear reactor, ‘WALHI: Batalkan Pembangunan PLTN’; on January 20, 1994, Media

Indonesia carried an article with the rather dramatic heading ‘Pembangunan PLTN Bom Waktu

bagi Generasi Mendatang’ (Construction of Nuclear Power Plant a Time Bomb for Future

Generations); and on July 24,1995, Republika assured the public that Indonesian reactors will

be 1000 times safer than the Chernobyl reactor (‘Reaktor Indonesia 1000 kali lebih Aman dari

Reaktor Chernobyl’). These headlines illustrate the fact that a fairly vigorous debate on the

nuclear issue is taking place in the press. This discussion started in the 1980s and gained

momentum in the early 1990s.23

Studies of media coverage of environmental issues have shown that the linkages between

state authorities, the scientific community and the media have traditionally been stronger than

that between the media and environmental pressure groups (Hansen 1991: 449). In the case of

18

Indonesia, where press control is substantial, the anti-nuclear movement has attempted to direct

public and political attention to the nuclear issue through the media. Despite this apparent

imbalance, and perhaps more importantly, because the authorities have regarded the

environmental movement as benign and patriotic, it has been able to partly raise public

awareness and achieve some success in turning local opposition to nuclear energy into a

national political issue. Thus, the role of the domestic press has in the past and continues to

remain an important linkage between the NGOs and the public.

POSSIBLE RAMIFICATIONS

The notion of nuclear power is always dual; besides civilian energy purposes, it always carries

the potential for military weapons applications. Therefore, in any discussion about possible

ramifications of the proposed nuclear programme, it is essential to keep in mind the fact that

development of civil nuclear power was merely a by-product of the production of plutonium for

nuclear weapons. Perhaps Oppenheimer,24 quoting from the sacred Hindu epic, the Bhagvad

Gita, expressed it best on that fateful day, July 16, 1945, when the first plutonium bomb

exploded in the New Mexican desert:

if the radiance of a thousand suns were to burst at once into the sky that would be like the splendour of the mighty one... I am become death, the shatterer of worlds (Pringle and Spigelman 1982: 31)

Risks involved with nuclear power

Risk, unlike fear, cannot be felt, and it is difficult to assess in meaningful ways. It can,

however, be calculated, albeit imperfectly (Allen 1992: 7). Risk is a combination of two

quantities: ‘the probability that an unwanted event will occur and the consequences of that

event’ (Allen 1992: 10). The ‘real’ risks associated with nuclear reactors are especially difficult

to measure, due to the fact that the long term effects of radiation on humans and the

environment are difficult to prove at this stage. The debate over potential health hazards arising

from low level radiation has been going on for some time. Whereas the effects of very high

doses of radiation on humans can be easily assessed, the low level effects, causing cancer and

birthdefects are conjectural, or random, and cannot be proved with any certainty, given the

ethical difficulty of carrying out controlled experiments with radiation on human populations.

19

However statistical correlations can be obtained in some cases (mostly accidents), and animal

studies provide useful indicators (Jennings, October 1995, pers. comm’). Before the Chernobyl

accident in 1986, the annual incidence of childhood thyroid cancer in the Gomel region in

Belarus was 1 in 2 million. By 1994 this had risen to 1 in 10 000, a 200-fold increase (Webb

1995: 7). Further, a survey conducted by American researchers on mutations in the DNA of

voles—a type of rodent—in the ‘hot zone’ around the Chernobyl nuclear plant revealed that the

voles from the contaminated zone have a mutation rate about 40 times that of the background

rate (Dickman 1995: 14).

Nuclear power stations are considered far more dangerous than any other type of energy

installation, and after the mishap at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl the US revised its safety

guidelines relating to the operation of nuclear power plants:

The risk to an average individual in the vicinity (1 mile radius) of a nuclear power plant of prompt fatalities that might result from reactor accidents should not exceed one tenth of one percent of the sum of prompt fatality risks resulting from other accidents to which members of the US population are generally exposed.

The risk to the population in the area (10 mile radius) of a nuclear power plant of cancer fatalities that might result from nuclear power plant operations should not exceed one tenth of one per cent of the sum of cancer fatality risks resulting from all other causes’ (Allen 1992: 126).

When discussing the perceived risks associated with nuclear power in Indonesia this section

will initially look at the external risks, relating to geographic location, and second, the internal

risks relating to reactor design and operating procedures.

Within Indonesia there are specific environmental problems relating to nuclear power.

The archipelago is situated at the conjunction of three tectonic plates—the main structural units

of the earth’s surface. The densely populated Island of Java,25 where the Indonesian

Government plans to build several nuclear reactors, is regarded as the second most active of

nine international seismo-tectonic zones (Hamilton 1993: 12).26

Emil Salim, the former Minister of Population and Environment conceded in an interview

with Indonesia Business Weekly that the tectonic factor must be considered carefully.27 ‘We

must choose a place which is less prone to earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. The dangerous

places are those along the ‘ring of fire’; along the west coast of Sumatra, south coast of Java,

and in the northern parts of Nusa Tengara’ (Suharyanto 1993: 7).

20

Consequently, out of sixty locations that underwent geographical evaluation to determine

their suitability for nuclear power generation projects, Ujung Lembahabang, Ujung

Genggrengan and Ujung Watu on the Muria peninsula in Central Java were considered the most

suitable (Republika January 3 1994).28 (See map 1).

However, Dr R.W. Johnson from AGSO (Australian Geological Survey Organisation)

argues that given its location so close to a tectonic plate boundary, anywhere in Java presents

some seismic risk. (See map 2). He further questions the lack of a recently conducted hazard

analysis for the proposed area29 (1995, pers comm’).30 Although Mt Muria, a volcano less than

30 km from Ujung Watu, is not considered active in that there are no historical records of

volcanic activity, it does beg the question of what constitutes active (Whitford 1995, Internet).

After sleeping quietly for more than 600 years Mt Pinatubo in the Philippines suddenly erupted

in a series of explosions (Nash 1991: 60). This recent volcanic eruption and the devastating

1995 earthquake in Japan serve as a timely reminder that long dormant volcanoes can come to

life again and earthquakes within the area of convergent tectonic boundaries occur frequently

and often with damaging force.

Furthermore, the proposed reactor site on the Muria peninsula is situated on the sea shore.

Thus, any nuclear plant would be at risk of exposure to tsunami, the potentially destructive

ocean waves caused by submarine earthquakes. The close proximity to the ocean shore

increases the danger of radioactive waste material escaping into the sea.

In addition to external risks relating to geographic location and climatic conditions, the

potential risk of low level radioactive contamination on a densely populated island like Java is

substantial. Further, George Aditjondro (February 1994, interview) points to the fact that the

shores of the Muria peninsula are the breeding grounds of milk fish (bandeng). As well as the

possible damage that could arise through radioactive contamination, the increase in the

surrounding temperature as a result of the water use for cooling would have a negative impact

on the fish population, as well as the general marine life within the area. This would have

serious implications for the large bandeng industry, supplying the markets of Semarang.

When asked about possible risks associated with nuclear power, Indonesia’s Minister for

Research and Technology, B.J. Habibie assured the public that the nuclear reactors to be built in

Indonesia are of the most sophisticated types in the world. Most certainly they could be

guaranteed free of potential disaster, with the risk of danger from radiation reckoned at zero31

21

(Trisno and Willy 1992: 7). The head of the Centre for Nuclear Energy Studies of BATAN,

Adi Wardoyo, told a press conference in June 1995 that ‘the use of nuclear technology is safe,

reliable, clean, environmentally orientated, and relatively economical.....We can assure you that

the Chernobyl tragedy will not occur here’ (Jakarta Post June 23 1995).

This optimism is supported by proponents of nuclear energy like Hore-Lacy and Hubery

who claim that the commercial nuclear power industry has an impressive safety record.

According to them the 1986 accident at Chernobyl was due to the lack of a substantial

containment structure, such as is standard in modern Western reactors. Thus, they conclude,

due to the thorough engineering of reactor structures and systems, a catastrophic radioactive

release like the Chernobyl accident is unlikely to occur in the West (Hore-Lacey and Hubery

1989: 69-70).32

However, the history of nuclear technology shows that most accidents in nuclear power

plants are due to human error. The Chernobyl accident report clearly states that operators

violated operating procedures (Flavin 1987: 8). Likewise, what led to the Three Mile Island

accident was a mixture of mechanical failure and human error (Pringle and Spigelman 1981:

425). No matter how sophisticated and advanced a technology is, the human element remains,

and it is human to make mistakes. Any nuclear installation is also a potential target for

sabotage. The threat of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant in Indonesia is always a

possibility, as it is in any country with nuclear installations.33

Furthermore, over time the uranium fuel load used in a nuclear power station will change

its isotope composition and the reactor becomes more dangerous as new isotopes form and

accumulate in the fuel.34 The only way to ensure an acceptable level of safety is to provide

multiple, normally redundant, protective devices. ‘Economic constraints, however, make it

impossible to achieve absolute safety: although we need safe power stations, we also need

cheap, or comparatively cheap, electricity’ (Medvedev 1990: 9).

On reactor safety in Indonesia, Hamilton states that a critical factor for ensuring the safety

of nuclear power plants is the establishment of a nuclear regulatory agency, independent of the

builders and operators of the plant and the government agencies that promote nuclear power

(1993: 12). That independence is, however, in even the most open political system, never

absolute. The official response to the October 10, 1957 accident at Sellafield was characterized

by the use of misinformation and outright lies. The United Kingdom Atomic Energy Agency

22

(UKAEA) issued a statement on October 11, 1957 categorically denying a local report that

large amounts of radioactivity had been released into the air around the reactor site. ‘Not until

October 1987 - thirty years later - did the UKAEA announce a ten year clean-up program for

the accident site’ (Hall 1994: 646-7). In Indonesia where political power often conflicts with

technical expertise, the potential for disregarding safety aspects in order to save money is

greatly increased.35

Finally, any discussion on nuclear hazards must consider the ‘upstream’ and

‘downstream’ impact of a nuclear project; in other words, the risks associated with the mining

of uranium, its transportation, and perhaps most importantly, the disposal of generated nuclear

waste. A World Bank Report on energy and the environment in Indonesia points out that the

environmental problems associated with radioactive waste have not yet been fully resolved in

the OECD countries. It cautions against a nuclear program, expressing concerns relating to

feasibility of evacuation plans in densely populated Java, seismic, volcanic and soil conditions,

and the availability of cooling water in many areas of Java (World Bank 1993: 37).

Demographic and economic impact of a Chernobyl type disaster

According to Vladimir Chernousenko,36 the Scientific Director of the Ukrainian Academy of

Science, the accident which took place at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant on April 26, 1986,

was one of the worst catastrophes to have happened on our planet. A considerable mass of

radioactive substances was released into the environment, resulting in grievous health and

environmental consequences.

On May 10, 1986, the situation in Ukraine and Belarus was as follows:

Over approximately 1100 km2 of territory the radiation level reached 20 mR/h; 3000 km2 where

the level was 5 mR/h; and 8000 km2 with a radiation level of 2 mR/h.37 The public limit set by

the International Commission on Radiation Protection (IRCP) is 0.01 mR/h (Jennings, October

1995, pers. comm’).

At the beginning of 1990 the contamination density was as follows:

Approximately 3200 km2 where it reached or exceeded 40 Ci/km2; 7500 km2 with density

between 15-40Ci/km2; 14000 km2 between 5-15 Ci/km2; and 76100 km2 with a contamination

density between 1-5 Ci/km2.38 Normal background radiation is less than 1/1000 000 of 1Ci/km2

(Jennings, October 1995, pers. comm’).

23

This means that by 1990, 800 000 people were still living in areas where contamination

exceeded 5 Ci/km2; and 3 070 000 people were living in areas with contamination levels

between 1-5 Ci/km2.

Outside the established exclusion zone 144 000 ha of agricultural land was taken out of

cultivation and 116 000 people were evacuated from the 30 km radius danger zone

(Chernousenko 1991: 44). A further 2 000 000 ha of agricultural land was so contaminated that

special contamination measures had to be undertaken and the system of farming had to be

changed (Medvedev 1990: 106).

The feasibility of any evacuation plan for a densely populated island like Java in the event

of a nuclear accident on the scale of the Chernobyl disaster is almost nil. It is useful to consider

the population density for Java, Yogyakarta and Central Java in particular, for 1990, and the

projected figures for 1995 (see Table 2), for the purpose of assessing the demographic impact of

a Chernobyl type disaster on Java.

Table 2. Population Density 1990 and Projected Density for 1995 (Java, Central

Java and Yogyakarta) 1990 1995 Java Central Java Yogya-karta Java Central Java Yogya-karta

Population 107 527 000 28 516 000 2 913 000 114 987 700 29 688 100 2 916 700 Area 132 186 km2 34 206 km2 3 169 km2 132 186 km2 34 206 km2 3 169 km2

Density 814 /km2 834/km2 919 km2 870 km2 868 km2 920 km2 (Figures derived from Statistik Indonesia 1993: 43-6).

Thus, the situation immediately after a Chernobyl type disaster on Java could look as shown in

Table 3 and on map 3 (not taking into consideration the climatic conditions at the time of the

assumed accident):

Table 3. Possible Contamination and Population Affected

Area contaminated mR/h Population affected * 1 100 km2 20 MR/h 954 800 3 000 km2 5 MR/h 2 604 000 8 000 km2 2 MR/h 6 944 000

Note: mR/h = milliroentgen per hour, measuring radiation levels. *Based on average population density of Central Java.

24

Four years later, by 1999, the contamination impact would be as outlined in Table 4 and on map

4 (not taking into consideration climatic conditions).

Table 4. Possible Contamination and Population Affected

Area contaminated Ci/km2 Population affected * 3 200 km2 40 2 777 600 7 500 km2 15-40 6 510 000 14 000 km2 5-15 12 152 000 76 100 km2 1-5 66 054 800

Note: 1 Ci (Curie) = decay rate of 1g of radium, measuring the soil contamination * Based on average population density of Java.39

The total area that was exposed to radioactive pollution by the Chernobyl accident is larger than

100 000 km2 (Chernousenko 1991: 1). In Java this would mean 87 000 000 Javanese people

would be exposed. However, it must be stressed at this point that the official number of

fatalities caused by Chernobyl still stands at 31. The method of assessing the radiation risk as

numbers of possible radiogenic cancers is not precise, making it impossible to prove with

certainty what the long term affects of radiation exposure may be.40

In monetary terms the initial losses resulting from Chernobyl amounted to 900 million

roubles or at the 1989 exchange rate41 US$1.3 billion. The total sum spent on rectification

work for the period 1986-89 was 9.2 billion roubles or US$13.9 billion. A further 33 billion

roubles (US$50 billion at 1989 rates, but a mere US$7.4 million at the present exchange rate)42

was allocated for rectification work from 1990-95 (Chernousenko 1991: 44). Christopher

Flavin states that according to independent economists, the cost of Chernobyl could eventually

climb over US$10 billion (1987: 19), or at the present exchange rate over 44 670 billion

rubles.43

The Island of Java, with an area of 132 186 km2 makes up only 6.89% of the total

landmass of the Indonesian archipelago (Statistik Indonesia 1993: 42), but supplies 62% of the

total population with rice. Because of its fertile soil and consequently favourable agricultural

conditions Java has historically been the centre of cultural development as well as colonial

exploitation. By 1993 almost two thirds of Java’s land was used for intensive agricultural

production. In addition, Java remains Indonesia’s industrial centre, with around 80% of

Indonesia’s industrial production concentrated there.44

25

If we assume that a nuclear accident of Chernobyl proportions happened on Java, it would

have the potential to cause radioactive pollution over an area of 100 000 km2 and about 75% of

the total landmass of Java would be contaminated to some degree. Therefore it is plausible to

argue that over 46% of Indonesia’s total population, or approximately 96 000 00045 people

would be affected by the contamination of its major food source, rice. Considering that normal

background radiation is less than 1/1000 000 of 1Ci/km2, and contamination density over 76

1000 km2 would be between 1-5 Ci/km2, and the remaining 239 000 km2 would be no less than

1 Ci/km2, the economic cost of a rectification programme on that scale would be astronomical.

Chernousenko further states that the Chernobyl accident resulted in the disruption of

normal life and work in a number of regions of the Ukraine, Belorussia and the Russian

Federation. Losses to agriculture and other industries was estimated at 200 million rubles for

the period of 1986-89 (1991: 44). The impact on industry, other than agriculture, on Java and

the rest of Indonesia would also be of enormous proportion.

More importantly, five years after the Chernobyl accident, the problem of what happened

to the affected people had still not been properly addressed. No plans had been put in place to

decontaminate nearby villages, lakes and rivers, despite a buildup of radioactivity in the rice

fields around the mouth of the Dniepr river. There were still 3 million hectares on which the

contamination level was 15 Ci/km2. No more radiation maps were made available to the public

and no hydrological maps existed to forecast the contamination spread (Chernousenko 1991:

263-4).

The problems facing the Indonesian authorities in the aftermath of a nuclear accident

would be similar to those the authorities of the former Soviet Union encountered. However, the

much higher population density in Java, combined with Indonesia’s heavy reliance on the

island’s agricultural and, to a lesser degree, industrial production, would make the task for the

Indonesians many times more difficult, if not impossible.

Economic and technological dependency

According to Djali Ahimsa, the Director General of BATAN, the total cost of the twelve

nuclear power plants should be around US$17.5 billion. As to the mode of financing, he

suggested it would be either through the BOT system (Build, Operate and Transfer) or a joint

venture company (IBW 1995: 17). Several corporations from Canada, Japan, the US and

26

Europe have shown an interest in the project. It appears that the Canadian company CANDU

(Canadian Deuterium Uranium) is the current favourite (Kompas 1996).

No matter which foreign corporation wins the contract, the proposed BOT scheme, or

joint venture scheme, will result in an escalation of Indonesia’s political, economic and

technological dependency on industrial countries (Anung 1992: 18). As J. Sabato, the former

manager of technology for the Argentinean Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) points out:

Nuclear power is perhaps the most striking example of how the introduction of a new technology leads a developing country automatically to become a market for virtually the whole spectrum of the developed countries technology. Once the door is open to one technologically advanced country the others follow, resulting in more technological dependence and cultural alienation (Falk 1982: 122).

Similarly, Cardoso, a key figure of the ‘new dependency’ studies, argues that independent

development of a nation is crippled because it lacks autonomous technology; it is forced to use

imported technology and must bear the economic and social consequences of absorbing capital-

intensive, labour-saving technology (So 1990: 141).

Mohammad Anung, WALHI’s nuclear campaigner, claims that access to nuclear

technology remains in the hands of the northern countries who developed them.

‘Eager to maintain their economic and military superiority, they profit from, and also limit its

spread through charging exorbitant consulting fees for constructing power plants and training

people to operate them. This in turn means that developing countries become even more

dependent upon bilateral and multilateral funding agencies, which the North controls as well’

(Anung 1992: 18).

The nuclear power advocates in Indonesia, like the Director General of BATAN, argue that

cost-wise, electricity emanating from nuclear power plants would be competitive and on a par

with energy produced by coal powered generators. ‘A nuclear power plant is the favourable

answer to the energy problem’ (IBW 1995: 18), a claim that is disputed in the World Bank’s

report on energy and the environment. The report clearly states that, simply based on generic

comparisons, it can be expected that the cost of nuclear power will be about 50% higher than

those of coal based generation without the polution-reducing Flue Gas Desulfurization (FGD)

and 20-30% higher with FGD. On this basis, the nuclear option does not appear to be

competitive with coal (World Bank 1993: 38). Similarly, an analysis by the Indonesian public

27

electricity utility shows that each kilowatt hour of electricity from nuclear power costs 7.9

cents compare with 4.5 cents for a conventional coal-fired plant (Hamilton 1993: 27).

Further, as can be seen in the case of Bulgaria, technology transfer leads invariably to

economic, political and technological dependency by the developing country on the donor

country. Not unlike Indonesia, Bulgaria chose nuclear power, despite strong opposition,46

because of an increasing energy demand, coming mainly from the industrial sector. The

reactors were manufactured and supplied by Russia and at the beginning of 1974 the first

nuclear plant started its operation. The propaganda surrounding the construction and operation

of the plant claimed that nuclear energy was the best option for humanity and the environment.

Bulgaria has been dependent on Russia for the supply of nuclear technology as well as nuclear

fuel, ever since.47

After the collapse of the Socialist block, the supply of energy and petrol ceased from the

former Soviet Union, making Bulgaria even more dependent on its aging nuclear power

industry. Today Bulgaria finds itself in the unenviable situation where it has no other option

but to support even the oldest reactors, because they provide desperately needed energy, despite

the threat of radioactive contamination for Bulgaria and the rest of Europe (Schlapfer and

Marinova 1994: 6-7).

Indonesia could find itself in a situation similar to Bulgaria in another 20-40 years,

depending on an outdated and costly technology. The developed nuclear countries will ensure

that Indonesia will have to rely on them for the fuel, the technology and the waste disposal. It is

not in the nuclear industry’s interests to allow client countries to become technologically

independent (Greenpeace 1992: 21).

Any nuclear project of this magnitude will generate significant wealth for the companies

involved within Indonesia. As mentioned above, Habibie’s enterprises and other large

conglomerates are well placed to profit from any such venture. More direct beneficiaries will

be the technically trained elite from BATAN who will participate in managing the imported

technology. Out of this situation a ‘nuclear lobby’ develops which argues that the purchase of

technology is essential to help lift the country from its position of dependence. In other words,

Indonesia’s ruling elite facilitates the transplantation of technology and associated values from

the developed countries, because its members are the beneficiaries of northern style

prosperity.48 And in the process they lead their country into nuclear dependency.

28

Regional ramifications

The impact that an Indonesian nuclear programme will have on the region needs exploring.

There are several aspects to consider. The first, and perhaps most obvious, is the possible

contamination of Indonesia’s neighbouring countries in the case of a nuclear accident. Second,

the likely burial of waste on some of the outer islands, as well as the mining and transportation

of uranium, are an international concern. The last and, some might argue, most important factor

is the possibility that nuclear technology within Indonesia has the potential for military weapons

applications.

During the time of the main release of radiation following the Chernobyl accident, a

complex and varying set of meteorological conditions developed over Europe, dispersing the

radioactive cloud over a wide area. Initially, the prevailing wind direction was to the north-

west, carrying the cloud over the Baltic Sea and into Scandinavia. A few days later, the wind

direction changed, causing the cloud to travel eastwards across the former USSR and

southwards to Turkey. During the last days of the main release, the radioactive cloud was

blown towards the south-west, over the Mediterranean. The initial cloud over Scandinavia split

into three segments. One travelled east across the northern USSR, and was later detected over

Japan and China. The second moved over Norway and the Norwegian Sea, travelling as far as

North America. The third headed south-westwards over central Europe, moving over Italy and

southern France before turning north-west over Great Britain and Ireland. The radioactive

material was deposited on the ground over large areas in Europe, depending on the

meteorological conditions, with radio nuclides from the accident found as far away as Japan,

Canada and the United States (Nuclear Energy Agency 1987: 16).

However, because the effects of low-level radiation are difficult to determine, the Nuclear

Energy Agency (NEA) argues that:

although the radiological consequences of the accident were serious in the region surrounding the Chernobyl site, only in some countries of the OECD area did the levels of radioactive contamination resulting from the release warrant protective actions directly motivated by radiation protection considerations. On the whole, however, these consequences do not raise any major concern for the health of the population in OECD Member countries (NEA 1987: 10)49

Admittedly, there are uncertainties about the calculation of potential health effects associated

with radioactive contamination. Between 1986 and 1990, 150 scientific articles appeared in

Western medical and academic journals about the health impact of Chernobyl in various

29

countries (Medvedev 1990: 131). Nevertheless, the potential of adverse long term health effects

on Indonesia’s neighbours in the case of a major nuclear accident remains a distinct possibility.

Map 5 illustrates the possible contamination of Indonesia and its neighbouring countries

using the data available from the NEA report. In the wet season the eastern part of Indonesia is

under the influence of northeasterly winds coming from the North Pacific. Near the equator

the winds become northwesterly due to the coriolis force. The western part of Indonesia is

under the influence of an air mass from the winter anticyclone on the Asiatic mainland. This

mass also becomes northwesterly after crossing the equator (Arakawa 1969: 219). Thus, a

nuclear accident during the wet season, from December to February, has the potential to

contaminate the north-western part of Australia.

During the dry season, between June and August, the southeasterly winds from Australia

dominate. As a result the mainland of Southeast Asia as well as the Philippine Islands would be

effected. During the transition periods, between March and May, and September to November,

the wind patterns are less pronounced (Arawaka 1969: 221-2). Consequently, the possible

contamination from a nuclear accident during these transition periods is more difficult to

predict.50

The second concern for the region are the hazards associated with transportation of

nuclear material from the mines to the nuclear plants, as well as the transportation of nuclear

waste to its burial, or storage place.51 Indonesia has uranium deposits on Kalimantan, Irian Jaya

and East Timor. However, an analyst working with a large mining company in Indonesia

claimed that any uranium deposits in Indonesia are negligible and a science attache with a

foreign embassy who wished to remain anonymous, suggested that Indonesia will have to buy

its nuclear fuel (Setiawan/DSG 1993: 6). An obvious option Indonesia has is to buy uranium

from Australia.52 One of the possible nuclear waste sites being considered is on the Natuna

islands between Malaysia and Vietnam. The question whether Indonesia will have the

expertise to ensure the safe transportation, handling and storage of nuclear material should

concern its neighbours greatly (February 1994, Aditjondro, interview).

Radioactive toxic waste sites are a problem in the US as well as Russia and Europe. For

example the Barent, Kara and White Seas and the Sea of Japan are used as nuclear waste

dumps. All nuclear waste sites are potentially dangerous, in both the short and long term,

30

because of possible leakage of radioactivity into the environment (Schlapfer and Marinova

1994: 3).53

Surprisingly little interest in Indonesia’s nuclear programme has been shown by the

governments of its neighbouring countries. Australia has shown some interest, but as expressed

by the former Foreign Affairs Minister, Senator Evans, of primary concern were the possible

trade benefits that could flow on to Australia from such a venture (Jennings, October 1995,

pers. comm’).

Finally, a nuclear power station may be a key strategic target. Perhaps more importantly,

it may be a resource for the production of plutonium for nuclear weapons. France’s recent

resumption of underground testing at the Mururoa atoll in French Polynesia serves as a

reminder that a change in government in any country with nuclear capabilities can mean the

difference between nuclear proliferation and nuclear disarmament. Although Indonesia is a

signatory to the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the treaty allows a nation to withdraw by

simply giving three months notice of its intention to do so (Jennings, October 1995, pers.

comm’). The civilian nuclear power industry is an important source of weapons material and

has the potential to provide training for technical personnel. Thus, the spread and development

of civilian nuclear power increases the risk of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Any

country choosing the civilian fuel-cycle route has the ability to guard its intentions and still

politically exploit its quasi-nuclear status (Greenwood et al 1977: 7). India, Israel, Pakistan and

South Africa have already produced nuclear weapons by this method (Worsley et al. 1987: 19-

23).

The nuclear ‘haves’, including France and China, argue that nuclear weapons are

essential for the defence of their countries and the preservation of world peace. For example

President Chirac claims that the tests at Mururoa are needed to ensure the ‘safety, security and

reliability’ of France’s nuclear deterrent (Patel 1995: 8). The five major nuclear powers54 are

also the five permanent UN members to whom the security of the world is entrusted (Arms and

Disarmament 1994: 31). In recent years elites in Third World countries like Iran, Iraq,

Pakistan, Nigeria and Brazil have argued that they too should have nuclear weapons in their

arsenals (Worsley et al 1987: 15). Nuclear proliferation in Southeast Asia would be a cause of

great concern to ASEAN countries.

31

The possible reasons, other than personal profit, why forces within Indonesia’s New

Order are intent on embarking on a nuclear power programme, despite the fact that it appears

uneconomic and of questionable benefit, are prestige and the link with weapons technology.

Should Indonesia embark on a nuclear weapons programme sometime in the future, countries

like Australia would feel compelled to match them, leading to a possible arms race in the

region.

ENERGY ALTERNATIVES

Indonesia’s non-nuclear energy resources

The feasibility study by NEWJEC Inc., of the first nuclear power plant site at the Mt Muria

Peninsula area, includes an evaluation of Indonesia’s other energy resources. Non-nuclear

energy resources in Indonesia such as coal, oil, natural gas, hydro, geothermal and peat are

substantial. The figures used in this section for energy resources other than peat are taken from

the 1993 revised version of the Feasibility Study of the First Nuclear Power Plants at Muria

Peninsula Region produced by NEWJEC.

There are vast reserves of coal in Indonesia, which is in direct competition with nuclear

power. The proven reserves are approximately 4.8 billion tons and with probable reserves

totalling 18.8 billion tons. In addition, geological potential indicates that a further 10.7 billion

tons of coal resource is available. At a production rate of 10.6 million tons per year,55 the coal

reserves would last for another 350 years. The major reserves are located on Sumatra and

Kalimantan, with some smaller ones on Java, Sulawesi and Irian Jaya. However, as NEWJEC

points out, only 35% is classified as sub bituminous and bituminous as well as anthracite; the

remaining 65% is lignite, which has a lower calorific value and a higher moisture content (Task

No.2: 6). When all the royalty and corporation taxes have been added on, the average

production cost of Indonesian coal is estimated to be approximately US $ 30-60 per ton (Task

No.2: 7), which still makes coal more economical than nuclear energy.56

Like coal, geothermal is another form of energy that is in direct competition with

nuclear.57 The total potential for geothermal power is estimated at 17 690 MW, where 10 825

MW can be considered as proven reserves (Task No.2: 8). Since geothermal is not suitable for

export, its main use is for electricity generation. The world’s largest producer of geothermal

32

energy, Oncocal from the US, has stated that it could build geothermal power plants in

Indonesia for considerably less than coal or nuclear power (Schwarz 1990: 42).

There is growing concern within the nuclear industry that natural gas is fast becoming its

most serious competitor.

New gas turbines, developed from aircraft research, have efficiency rates for once-through cycles of over 50%, and in combined cycles, such as a chemically recuperative cycle, efficiencies are over 60%.... Thus natural gas is a strong competitor, and, incorrectly I think, it has the support of the environmental movement (King 1993: 202).

Indonesia’s proven natural gas reserves are about 63.6 trillion standard cubic feet (tscf). The

potential gas reserves are estimated at 216.8 tscf, consisting of 44.9 tscf from onshore and 171.9

tscf from offshore fields. There are indications that Indonesia has a further 38.2 tscf of

unexplored natural gas potential. NEWJEC estimated that at the existing production rate of 2.7

tscf/year, the reserves to production ratio is about 24 years (NEWJEC 1993, Task No. 2: 3).

NEWJEC argues that to develop the enormous Natuna gas reserves would require an

extremely large investment. Among other things, it would require the construction of a 2000

km pipeline to Arun in North Sumatra, in order to make use of the existing railway. To supply

Java would mean either the construction of a further pipeline, or the use of Liquid Nitrogen Gas

(LNG) tankers (Task No. 2: 5).

By 1993 Indonesia’s proved oil reserves amounted to 5.3 billion barrels, or at 1993

production rates, equivalent to a reserves to production ratio of 10 years. In addition, Indonesia

could convert 5.4 billion barrels of probable oil reserves by intensive geological exploration.

The so called frontier areas are suspected to contain another 37.4 billion barrel of oil. NEWJEC

argues that high risk exploration and intensive capital investment may be necessary to prove

this oil potential (Task No. 2: 1).

The total potential for hydropower in Indonesia is estimated at 75 000 Megawatt (MW).

Until 1990 only 3200 MW had been used for electricity generation. Unfortunately, the biggest

share of the potential is situated in Irian Jaya and Kalimantan, where there is insufficient

demand for electricity to justify large-scale hydropower investment. The heavily populated

island of Java has only a total potential of 4500 MW of hydropower, and about half of that has

already been tapped.58 NEWJEC argues that the main problem with hydropower in Indonesia is

the mismatch between population distribution and the sites where hydropower resources are

found (Task No.2: 10-11).

33

Peat is another substantial energy resource in Indonesia, although not mentioned in the

NEWJEC study. The Centre for Research on Energy, Insitute of Technology in Bandung

estimated in 1991 that the total energy resource from peat amounted to 200 billion tonnes (See

Table 1).

And finally, Indonesia’s archipelago has an abundance of wind and sun, as well as wood,

animal and vegetable waste (e.g. rice husk). The availability of these renewable resources

makes it attractive to consider wind generators, photovoltaic systems and gasifier units for

diesel power (Wachjoe 1994: 1), particularly in remote or rural areas where the main electrical

grid does not reach, or as a means to reduce pressure on the grid.

Supply-side and demand-side management

Increased population and continued economic development have seen the demand for energy

grow rapidly in Indonesia. Thus energy conservation by improvements in energy efficiency is

crucial to Indonesia’s economic development. The potential of supply/demand-side energy

efficiency measures to reduce energy use is not disputed, although the amount of the savings is

widely debated. Amory Lovins, the United States based energy efficiency expert claims that

total savings of 75% are attainable. A more conservative estimate used by other authorities is

around 20% (Renewable Energy Advisory Council 1993: 81).

The Energy Conservation Strategy for Western Australia explains how this reduction can

be attained. Firstly, energy efficiency improvements can be achieved by supply-side

management (SSM), selecting the best resources and technologies for producing secondary

fuels and supplying customers needs, and reducing losses in energy conversion, refining and

transmission, e.g. more efficient power stations (Energy Policy and Planning Bureau WA 1990:

5). Second, by demand-side management (DSM), increasing efficiency of existing end-use

technologies, reducing the need for energy consumption, switching to alternative low energy

options and selecting the best fuels in end-use applications (DSM) (Energy Policy and Planning

Bureau WA 1990: 5).

A recent study on the potential of DSM in Indonesia, conducted by the World Bank,

concludes that the implementation of a DSM program it proposes could save 1.4% of total

generation and 4.6% of peak demand by the year 2000. The measures proposed by the report

are as follows:

34

a) Industrial Sector Programs:

• improved motors • high efficiency lighting • time of use tariffs • interruptible tariffs • energy management audits

b) Commercial and Public Sector Programs:

• improved air conditioning • high efficiency lighting • building energy performance standards

c) Residential Programs:

• improved refrigerators • high efficiency lighting

The study suggests that the projected energy savings will be about 486 MW and 1716

GWh, or in monetary terms US $ 144 million/year (World Bank 1993: 33). Supply-side

management (SSM) is not included in the above evaluation. The World Bank estimates that the

potential for total energy efficiency improvements amounts to about 23% (1993: 25).

Indonesia’s NGOs are in agreement with the World Bank report. WALHI claims that 15-

30% of the energy used by the industrial sector alone could be saved through improved

efficiency and conservation. Agus Sari argues that the potential for energy savings by adopting

the measures suggested by Levine and Deringer in Energy Options in Indonesia, which are

similar to the World Bank recommendations, is around 25-40%. ‘If this target was reached,

nuclear energy would definitely not be needed’ (Sari 1992: 3).

Appropriate technology

Although Dr Habibie, the State Minister for Research and Technology, and his predecessor

Professor Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, both advocate and promote the transformation of

Indonesia into an advanced technological nation, they have different views on how to achieve

this transformation. Whereas Habibie values the mastery of advanced technology as a goal in

itself, Sumitro thinks of technology as an instrument to solve problems and to achieve basic

objectives such as increasing per capita income, creating productive employment and

improving the balance of payment (Rice 1990: 56-7).

35

Clearly, the Indonesian Government has adopted Dr Habibie’s approach of selecting and

subsidising industries until they become internationally competitive vehicles for the

transformation of technology and industry (Rice 1990: 57).59 The creation of Indonesia’s

aviation industry, ITPN (Industri Pesawat Terbang Nusantara) by Dr Habibie is just one

example of this process.

Some Indonesians are concerned about Dr Habibie’s view of technology. In relation to

nuclear energy for Indonesia, Dr Liek Wilardjo,60 lecturer in physics at Satya Wacana Christian

University, states that there is a definite need for technology to solve the growing energy

shortage. However, he questions the wisdom of choosing nuclear and cautions that technology

needs to be carefully and judiciously applied to helping humankind solve its problems

(Wilardjo 1990: 3). One of the dangers of technology transfer is that developed countries

persuade developing nations into making inappropriate technological choices (Cromwell 1989:

209). The nuclear industry by its own admission is looking for markets in Asia (see above).

Indonesia has the opportunity to learn from the mistakes of industrialised countries and

create energy saving technologies that are sustainable in the future, rather than relying on a few

monolithic and capital intensive technologies. There is a trend in the developed world to opt for

smaller power plants, because of difficulties with accurately forecasting demand growth over

the long lead and planning times associated with large plants. Committing capital to a large

power project reduces the ability of the system to adapt to changes in both energy demand and

technological innovation. If demand does not increase as predicted then there is a significant

financial penalty. Furthermore, there is an incentive to sell surplus energy at marginal costs,

resulting in a disincentive to invest in energy efficiency. For example, France sells its surplus

energy to Belgium at a very low price (Jennings, October 1995, pers. comm’). Small power

plants are more able to meet demand and can incorporate technological improvements more

easily (Renewable Energy Advisory Council WA 1994: 5).61

Energy technologies within Indonesia have to be developed for its specific environments.

Developing countries, especially countries with such diversity in environment, population

density and dispersed territory/land mass like Indonesia, cannot rely solely on technology

transfer and foreign supply to sustain their technological progress. Traditional sectors need to

be supported and developed, and imported technologies have to adjust to the local context (de

Oliveira 1991: 161).

36

Any energy strategy for Indonesia that can ensure a sustainable future has to include the

promotion of passive solar construction, bicycles and animal draft power, development of

micro-hydropower and wind power, as well as solar cooking and heating devices.

Governments and communities need to ensure that the incentives, like appropriate energy

pricing, are in place for inducing the necessary technological behavioural changes that are

required for achieving sustainability.

A strategy for a sustainable energy future can never be considered in isolation from a global socio-economic strategy that will bring all forms of economic production and social and individual consumption within the limits imposed by nature (Kamenetzky and Maybury 1989: 105).

Besides accepting ecological limits on maximum per capita energy use as a condition for

physical survival, Indonesia might consider that only a ceiling on energy use can lead to social

relations characterised by high levels of equity, a principle goal of the Indonesian revolution

and one of the basic principles of the national philosophy, Pancasila.62

Power for the people or power for the elite

Two pervasive forces are driving up energy demand in developing countries like Indonesia.

The first is the steady population growth and the second is the spread of socio-economic

development into all sectors of their economies. The spread of development is increasing

demand for commercial energy, while the rise in population is pushing up the demand for

traditional energy (Kamenetzky and Maybury 1989: 95).63

There is an obvious need for technology, and most certainly a need for more energy in

Indonesia. However, the question needs to be asked: Is modern science and technology to be

used primarily as a tool for economic growth rather than as a participatory process towards

achieving the people’s needs. In Indonesia, and specifically Java, the exploitation of

technology manifests itself in the sprawling industrial zones, which displaces the poor from

their traditional places of work and living, and in the conglomerization of big economic powers

that threaten to drive the informal sectors out of business, and in the striving for material

abundance on the part of the consumeristic, affluent minority (Wilardjo 1990: 1-2).

On the one hand, nuclear power for Indonesia means energy for urban Java and Bali. The

Java-Bali interconnected system accounts for 80% of all Indonesian electricity consumption

(Ahimsa and Adiwardojo 1993: 78). The lack of infrastructure on the outer islands and the

37

rural areas of Java and Bali limits the potential benefits of nuclear power to those areas and in

particular to the household sector.

On the other hand, high-technology, capital intensive energy will mainly benefit energy-

intensive industries like the aluminium industry in North Sumatra; iron and steel in West Java;

other mineral processing, such as copper (Freeport - Irian Jaya) and nickel (INCO - Central

Sulawesi); petrochemicals, fertilizers, the cement industry and heavy and medium

manufacturing industries (NEWJEC 1993, Task 4: 11-12).64

The majority of Indonesia’s population lives in rural areas with a weak economic sector

and low income levels. The cost of providing electricity to rural areas using conventional

approaches is considered inefficient. For example, by March 1991, only 56% of East Java’s

8378 villages were electrified. However, that does not mean that every household in the village

had electricity. Generally it is only the central part of each village which is electrified.

Furthermore, most electrified rural areas rely on diesel power plants and the rest use

microhydro power plants, which are installed by private bodies and do not come under the

administration of the State Electricity Company (Perusahaan Umum Listrik Negara, PLN). At

present PLN is unable to connect rural electrification to the national electricity network,

because of limited funding and (ironically), low electricity consumption (Masdar 1993: 7).

Since consumption in the household sector is mostly for cooking and lighting, Indonesia’s

rural and urban poor and lower middle classes will not benefit greatly from a nuclear power

programme. The bulk of the energy will be consumed by industry and the affluent minority,

who will be given first priority and can afford the technology, like electric stoves and other

electric appliances. Capital intensive technology almost always tends to give a greater benefit

to those groups within society who are rich and powerful. Therefore, the production of nuclear

energy, which is supposed to help all Indonesians, will most certainly benefit the rich more than

the poor.

The nuclear power programme in Indonesia would create employment for the modern

sector where the patterns of working and living are similar to those in the developed countries.

The creation of a nuclear establishment would result in the formation of a highly specialised

elite whose livelihood is linked to the proliferation of the nuclear industry, thus making the

switch to other energy sources more difficult. There would be a lot of social pressure to keep

the nuclear power sector going (Falk 1982: 122-3).

38

However, for the traditional sector, accounting for the majority of the population, where

standards of living and working are already unsatisfactory, nuclear energy would do nothing to

prevent the process of accelerating decay. Not only would a nuclear power plant create

minimal employment for the rural sector, it would result in displacement for many.

Furthermore, those least likely to benefit from nuclear energy production will carry the greatest

risks of living near a nuclear waste dump.

CONCLUSION

The nuclear industry has been trying hard to convince the world that a Chernobyl-type disaster

could not happen again. Nuclear proponents within the Indonesian Government have

repeatedly stated that the risks associated with nuclear energy would be negligible. However,

the history of nuclear technology shows that accidents do occur, and most of them are due to

human error. In addition, Indonesia has substantial geological hazards that make a compelling

arguement against nuclear power. Earthquakes with a magnitude greater than 8.0 on the

Richterscale occur frequently in the Indonesian region (Hamilton 1979: 9). As was

demonstrated in chapter 3.1, the consequences of a Chernobyl-type disaster on Java would be of

enourmous proportions.

Civil nuclear technology has failed worldwide. The dream of unlimited clean and cheap

energy from nuclear power has remained just that. Indonesia should learn from the mistakes

made by many industrialised countries and adopt a more energy efficient development process.

Economically, nuclear energy does not compare favourably with its competitors, such as coal,

geothermal and natural gas. Indonesia has vast amounts of non-nuclear fossil and renewable

energy resources. The advantages in using renewable energy systems are the modest technical

support needed, and the minimal risk posed to the population and the environment. A high-

tech, capital intensive nuclear industry, on the other hand, will expose millions of Indonesians

to the very real danger of radioactive contamination.

Indonesia stands at the crossroads. The outcome of the nuclear debate will have far

reaching consequences for the future of Indonesian society. Once the nuclear programme has

been set in motion, Indonesia will be totally committed to follow the path of a dangerous and

capital intensive energy generation system, mainly feeding the industrial sector. The major

beneficiaries from such an ambitious scheme will be Indonesia’s industry and the elite. The

cost of nuclear energy generation will rise steadily due to the expenses of decommissioning and

39

the long term storage of radioactive waste. Rather than coming of age, Indonesians will find

themselves increasingly dependent, financially and technologically, on the industrialised world.

It is possible that, by following the dream of becoming a high-tech nation - by relying on

nuclear power - in a few decades, Indonesians might find themselves in a position where they

are forced to rely on an expensive and possibly outdated technology; one that has been

superseded by more efficient and cost effective alternatives that do not pose a threat to the

environment for generations to come.

The possible regional ramifications associated with Indonesia’s nuclear programme are

threefold. First, there is a distinct possibility of radioactive contamination of Indonesia’s

neighbours in the event of an accident. The nuclear disaster at Chernobyl has shown the world

that radioactive contamination does not respect national borders. Second, the mining and

transportation of uranium, and most importantly, the storing of the radioactive waste, will be of

concern to the region. Finally, the potential for Indonesia to become a nuclear power in

military terms will have a dramatic effect on the region. Indonesia’s neighbours, such as

Australia would be forced to rethink their strategic position. This could lead to an escalation of

nuclear proliferation. As shown in chapter 3, any nation with civil nuclear energy has the

potential to become a military nuclear power in a very short time.

Many Indonesians are aware of the environmental risks associated with nuclear energy, as

well as the enormous investment nuclear installations require. Although the debate is

widespread, the decision whether to choose nuclear or not remains firmly in the hands of

Indonesia’s elite. The New Order regime has shown in the past that it favours capital intensive

institutional growth with a centralised power system, which is suited to nuclear energy, rather

than a minimum energy economy, reliant on soft or light technologies that are sustainable and

would guarantee a degree of independence and freedom of choice to the Indonesian people.

The nuclear debate has to be placed in the wider context of socio-political relations within

Indonesia. Besides the more obvious environmental and economic impacts nuclear energy will

have on Indonesia and its people, the nuclear issue raises questions of equity. Critics of the

scheme are not only concerned with safety aspects and the economics of nuclear technology,

but also seek to participate in the decision making processes that will impact on their lives as

well as on future generations.

40

ENDNOTES 1Jim Falk took his Phd in theoretical physics at Monash University in 1974. He has taken an interest in

energy policy and has been involved in the Australian controversy over uranium mining. 2Shapar and Gale presented a paper to the Eighteenth International Symposium held by the Uranium

Institute in 1993 on ‘The Prospects for Nuclear Power in the United States’. Mr. Shapar is a counsel to the Washington DC law firm Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge; Dr Gale is the founder of the Washington International Energy Group.

3The Sellafield complex is made up of reactors and fuel reprocessing plants: most of the post 1957 'incidents' occurred in the reprocessing areas. (Hall 1994, p. 647)

4 The Ring of Fire is a crescent of volcanic activity that runs around the rim of the Pacific Ocean through the edges of Asia, North America and South America. It contains 75% of the earth's 540 historically active volcanoes (Time Australia 1991 vol.6, no.25, June 24, pp. 60-2).

5The trade in liquefied natural gas is growing by 10% a year. At an international meeting on liquefied natural gas held in Kuala Lumpur in 1992, taking gas into Korea, Japan and Taiwan and developing large plants with gas turbines as an alternative to nuclear energy were discussed (King 1993, p. 203).

6The most spectacular failed attempt of a nuclear contractor entering a Southeast Asian country is the Westinghouse scandal in the Philippines. After the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) identified some major problems with the site on Bataan Peninsula, mainly its close proximity to several volcanoes, and the poor economics of the project became apparent, President Marcos suspended construction (Pringle and Spigelman 1982, pp. 395-6).

7Indonesia has currently three research reactors, the most recent one was opened in 1989 at Serpong, considered the third largest of its kind in the world (Brown, 1993, p. 7).

8Indonesia's New Order came to power on March 11, 1966. Sukarno was forced to transfer authority to Suharto, and Indonesia passed from the Old Order into the New Order (Steinberg (ed.) 1987, p. 425.

9On January 24,1996, Ahimsa brought the date of the start of construction forward by two years and upgraded the proposed reactor from 600 to 900 MW to 1800 MW (Aditjondro, 1996).

10On 13 February 1995, Ahzam B. Razif, Counsellor/Head of Press and Information Section of the Indonesian Embassy in Canberra wrote to a concerned Australian citizen: ‘Indonesia does not intend to go nuclear but is trying to diversify from various energy resources that might be feasible to meet energy demands in the part of this century. A nuclear reactor is proposed as an alternative, but not the only one’.

11This reactor is named after the Indonesian heroine 'Kartini'. Cited in a brochure produced by BATAN in 1993.

12LIPI is the Indonesian National Research Institute. 13Carle sees the adherence to stringent regulations as a positive and essential part of the nuclear industry.

He claims that since the Three Mile Island accident in 1979 the predicted risk of an accident leading to core damage has been reduced by a factor of 100. This improvement has been due to the efforts of the utilities themselves, but would not have been possible without the co-

41

ordinating and cataclytic effect of the US Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (1993, p. 5). In other words, there is a direct relation between increased cost and reduction of risk.

14BPPT is the Ministry of Research and Technology's Agency for the Development and Application of Technology.

15A World Bank Research Report on The East Asian Miracle refers to 'Indonesia's Turbulent Leap into High Technology', warning about the risks involved with ‘Sectoral targeting to achieve rapid productivity’ ... ‘particularly when publicly funded firms are permitted to rely on protected domestic markets rather than being subjected to international competition’. The dangers of such a course are evident in the difficulties encountered by Indonesian aircraft producer P.T. Industri Pesawat Terbang Nusantara (IPTN), which has absorbed $1 billion in government funds since its establishment in 1979 but has yet to become internationally competitive or genuinely profitable’ (World Bank 1993, p. 313).

16Nuclear power requires a centralised system of government to safeguard the nuclear installations and waste dumps.

17For example, excess dye generated by the textile factory in Salatiga, Central Java is regularly pumped into the river system. During a visit to Salatiga, I overheard an obviously disgusted German engineer saying: ‘Today is a good day for dumping dye in the river, because with all the rain, nobody will notice’ (February 1994).

18A spokesperson for Yayasan GENI, a student organisation involved in Indonesia's anti-nuclear movement in Salatiga knows of no environmental impact assessment taking place (pers. comm' September 1995, internet).

19Although the names were recorded, of the local people prepared to express their opposition to the proposed nuclear project, I believe it would not be in their best interest to publish their identity.

20Dr Budiman is a prominent Indonesian scholar who graduated as a sociologist from Harvard university. He has just recently won a legal battle against his former employer, Satya Wacana Christian University over his dismissal last year for criticising the selection of the university's new rector as undemocratic (Hendardi, August 8, 1995, Internet).

21However, a survey published by Kompas found that 52% of respondents - selected from the educated middle class in big cities accross Java - rejected the proposed nuclear program, 42% accepted it and 6% did not have an opinion (Jakarta PostJune 7, 1996), perhaps suggesting that the nuclear debate has raise the awarenee within some parts of the middle class since the interview with Dr Budiman in 1994.

22February 12 1994 Kompas published an article with the title: Kalau PLTN Dibangun Gus Dur akan Puasa di Muria (If the Nuclear Power Plant will be built, Gus Dur will stage a Fast at Muria). Abdurrahman Wahid is also known as Gus Dur.

23Yayasan GENI, a student organisation in Salatiga, Central Java supplied the author with a copy of their substantial collection of newspaper articles on the nuclear issue, dating from 1986 through 1993.

24Robert Oppenheimer was an American physicist from the Universiy of California at Berkeley who played a major part in the development of the worlds' first atomic bomb. He was chief physicist of the Manhatten Project (Pringle and Spigelman 1982, p. 18).

25According to Statistik Indonesia Java's total landmass is 132 186 km2 and it's population in 1990 was 107 527 000. The area of Central Java measures 34 206 km2 and the population in 1990 was 28 516 000. Thus the population density for Central Java in 1990 was 834/km2 (1993, pp42-3). The projection of the population for 1995 in Central Java was 29 688 000, resulting in a density of 868/km2 (p. 46).

42

26Dr Clive Hamilton was research director for the Resource Assessment Commission and spent two

years as senior advisor to the Indonesian Government on natural resources and economic policy (Hamilton 1993, p. 27).

27In his book Tectonics of the Indonesian Region, Warren Hamilton explains that plate boundaries are broadly defined by zones of active seismicity....Great earthquakes, magnitude greater than 8.0 on the Richter Scale occur primarily along subducting plate boundaries. The Indonesian region accounts for a substantial proportion of these earthquakes, also some of the world's most severe. Most of the minor and major seismic events within Indonesia occur in the Java-Banda subduction system (1979, p. 9).

28Out of those three sites Ujung Watu appears to be the frontrunner. All the NGOs the writer spoke to in Jakarta and Central Java believed, that Ujung Watu was to be the first site for a nuclear power plant.

29Dr RW Johnson is Chief Research Scientist with AGSO and Secretary General of the International Association of Volcanology and Chemistry of the of the Earth's Interior (IAVCEI). He has been involved in volcanological work in Papua New Guinea and Indonesia and participated in the compilation of the recently published Natural Hazards Potential Map of the Circum - Pacific Region (1995).

30The results of the feasability study undertaken by Newjec has not been published todate. An interim report completed by Newjec in 1993 only deals with the ‘Evolution of Energy Market’, the ‘Evaluation of Energy Resources’, the ‘Forecast of Energy Demand’ and the ‘Analysis of Energy Demand Management Options’.

31Zero risk is, however, scientifically not possible (Jennings, October 1995, pers. comm'). 32Hore-Lacey and Hubery argue that due to the containment structure at Three Mile Island, the total

radioactivity released after the 1979 accident was small, ‘and the maximum dose to individuals living near the power plant was well below internationally-accepted limits. Containment works’ (1989, p. 70).

33A terrorist group could cause considerable damage, causing the spread of harmful radiation with a truck bomb, or rocket attack on a nuclear power plant (Pringle 1987, p. 11).

34At the end of its normal fuel cycle the standard 1000 MW nuclear reactor contains nearly three billion curies of radionuclides in its spent fuel rods. If these radionuclides were to be spread evenly over the land surface of the planet, each km2 would receive at least 20 microcuries, making it temporarily unsafe for farming and fishing (Mevedev 1990, p. 9).

35The Marcos Regime in the Philippines attempted to go down the nuclear path in the 1970s against the advice of it's senior economics minister. By 1978 the reactor on the Bataan Peninsula was declared unsafe by the IAEA and it was alleged that the Philippine Atomic Energy Commission was not an independent body. Furthermore, the IAEA report stressed that the close proximity of the site to several volcanoes (one of them within 16 km, although dismissed as 'extinct') and the poorly drafted earthquake protection specifications were enough grounds to change the reactor licence. These concerns and the poor economics of the project persuaded the Philippine Government to halt construction (Pringle and Spigelman 1981, pp. 395-6). The people of the Philippines are still paying for that mistake.

36Physicist Vladimir Chernousenko was in Chernobyl from May 1986 until March 1991, and is the co-author of verious reports on Chernobyl.

37mR/h is the abbreviation used in Soviet literature for milliroentgen per hour to show radiation levels (Medvedev 1990, p. 317).

43

381 Ci (Curie) is the decay rate of 1 g of radium (Medvedev 1990, p. 316), it indicates radioactive

contamination of the soil. 39At the time of this survey no data relating to Indonesian population density was available on the

Geographic Information System (GIS). The degree of accuracy and detail of the information provided here is therefore limited. However, Micheal Mickler at Curtin University, who is a member of the Asian Spatial Information and Analytics Network (ASIAN) centered at Griffith University in Queensland, assured the author that the censor data for Asian countries, including Indonesia, will be available on the GIS system in the near future (M. Mickler, November 1995, pers. comm'). This means any survey on possible nuclear contamination on Java in the future will be able to make use of GIS and therefore allow for far greater accuracy and detail.

40The International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG) of the IAEA describes the risks to the population from radiation exposure at Chernobyl as follows: ‘The spontaneous incidence of all cancers (for 135 000 evacuees) would not likely to be increased by more than 0.6%...The relative increase in the mortality due to thyroid cancer could reach 1%. Health impairment due to genetic effects may be judged not to exceed 20-40% of the excess cancer doses (Medvedev 1990, pp. 130-1)

41In 1989 1 $US was worth 0.6594 roubles (Asian Wall Street Journal, June 19, 1989) 42In 1995 1 $US was equivalent to 4467 roubles (Asian Wall Street Journal, September 18, 1995). 43According to an article in the Jakarta Post, a bill on nuclear energy, sponsored by the Indonesian

Government, has set the maximum liability of a nuclear power plant operator or developer at Indonesian Rp 450 billion (US$ 120 million) for damages caused by leakage or any other type of accident (June 7, 1996). This would cover 92% of the initial losses of US $ 1.3 billion resulting from Chernobyl, but only 1.2% of the estimated cost of US $ 10 billion.

44Presented by IMBAS (Initiative fuer die Menschenrechte aller BuergerInnen der ASEAN-Staaten) at an Energy Seminar in Frankfurt in 1993.

45The figures used in this exercise are a rough estimate, not taking into consideration the variation of population density between Java and some of the outer islands.

46There were three main reasons why nuclear power was opposed by many Bulgarians. First, Bulgaria did not have the knowledge and skill to operate or maintain a nuclear plant, which meant the country's dependence on Russia would increase. Second, there were wide-spread prejudices against nuclear technology, making employment opportunities in the nuclear industry unattractive. And lastly, there was concern about the environmental impact of nuclear waste and contamination of the waterways as well as the land surrounding the power station (Schlapfer and Marinova 1994, pp. 5-6).

47The 1960's Soviet-designed pressurised light water reactors in use in Bulgaria rely for the time being solely on Russian fuel. The same applies to the maintenace and upgrading of the reactors (Schlapfer and Marinova 1994, p. 6).

48Cardoso argues that external domination appears as an internal force, through the social practices of local groups and classes which try to enforce foreign interests because they may coincide with values and interests that these groups pretend are their own (So 1990, p. 136).

49Although scientists in the OECD countries seem unconcerned as yet, it is interesting that IBFAN (the International Baby Food Action Network) discovered that a consignment of infant formula from European pasturelands contaminated by radioactive fallout after the Chernobyl disaster was sold to the Philippines without informing purchasers that the milk was affected. ‘If there was no problem, why the need for secrecy ? Radioactive cow's milk was passed on to other developing

44

countries: some Polish milk went to Bangladesh; some Dutch milk went to Thailand and the Philippines; and another European consignment went to Ghana. Around this time the safety limit for radioactivity levels in infant formula was reduced by 75 per cent’ (Stanway 1990, p. 80).

50The discussion of possible environmental effects for the region does not take into consideration the contrast between the polar continental air of Eastern Europe with the tropical maritime air of Indonesia, which is substantially warmer, more humid, and slow moving.

51Agus Salim, the head of technical management at the Nuclear Research Installation in Serpong, West Java argues that a nuclear reactor creates only a small amount of waste, which can be contained. ‘Soil is a good filter. If we bury the highly radioactive waste 600 metres deep without sealing it and let the ground water run through it, by the time the ground water reaches the surface , it will be one million years later and the radiation will be gone by then. If we seal it with cement, it will take a longer time’ (Setiawan 1993, p. 7). According to Lenssen however, geological and climatic changes will affect the ability to isolate nuclear waste. The most intractable problem with deep burial is water (1991, pp. 21,26). Given that the Indonesian archipelago is situated at the conjunction of three tectonic plates, there is a real possibility that structural changes will happen. Geological processes are at work throughout the world and anywhere near the Ring of Fire would have to be considered extremely active (AGSO 1995, pamphlet on Geological Hazards).

52Australia has ambitions of not only supplying Indonesia with uranium, but also providing them with expertise on safety and other aspects of nuclear technology. However, Clive Hamilton argues that Australia does not have much expertise in nuclear power technology (1993 interview)

53‘The most dangerous radioactive waste of all, in its overall threat to life on earth, is irradiated uranium fuel from commercial nuclear power plants’ (Lenssen 1991, p. 9).

54Since 1945, the five declared nuclear powers have conducted a total of 2036 nuclear tests (NRDC Nuclear Notebook 1995, p. 70).

55The production rate by the end of 1990 was 10.6 million tons. This is planned to increase to 60 million tons by the year 2000, of which 25 million tons are to be exported and the remaining used for the domestic market (Newjec Task No.2 1993, p. 7).

56The World Bank estimates that for a generic plant, the cost of coal-based power is about US $ 0.0386/kWh as compared to US $ 0.0572/kWh for nuclear power (1993, p. 38).

57Coal, geothermal and nuclear energy are all well suited to provide a continious base load to the power grid,, whereas gas and hydro power are more suited to provide a boost during peak requirement (Jennings, October 1995, pers comm').

58By 1990 48 large dams (higher than 15m) were in opeartion in Indonesia, 39 in Java alone and out of those 24 were used for electric power generation. As the case of Kedungombo shows, the anti-large dam movement in Indonesia and particularly in Java is growing (Aditjondro 1994, pp. 1-3).

59Because several of the vehicle industries are capital intensive, Indonesia will not become internationally competitive in producing some of their products in the foreseeable future (Rice 1990, p. 57).

60Dr Wilardjo holds a PhD in theoretical nuclear Physics from Michigan State University (Van Klinken 1992, p. 14)

61For this reason Western Australia opted for a 300 MW coal power station instead of the originally proposed 600 MW (Jennings, October 1995, pers. comm').

45

62The five basic principles of Pancasila are: the belief in God Almighty, humanity that is just and

civilized, the unity of Indonesia, democracy guided by the wisdom of representative deliberation, social justice for all Indonesians (Echols and Shadily 1992, p. 406).

63The rapid industrialisation in Indonesia has led to a substantial increase in industrial energy consumption. In 1990, in terms of fuel use, the industrial sector was the major consumer, with 37.2%, with transportation amounting to 36.7% NEWJEC 1993, Task No.1, p. 5).

64 According to Newjec, the estimated total energy consumption in the year 2000 by the aluminium industry will be 29-30 million barrel of equivalent (boe), for iron and steel between 27-34 million boe, for other minerals, such as copper and nickel it will be 14 million boe, the cement industry between 42-50 million boe and for heavy and medium manufacturing industries between 69-90 million boe (NEWJEC 1993, Task No.4, pp. 11-12).

46

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

Agencies

ABRI Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia - Indonesian Armed Forces AEC Argentinian Atomic Energy Commission AGSO Australian Geological Survey Organisation ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations BAPEDAL Badan Pengendalian Dampak Lingkungan (Environmental Impact Management Agency) BATAN Badan Tenaga Atom National - National Atomic Agency BOT Build Operate Transfer BPPT Badan Pengkajian dan Penerapan Teknologi (Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology) DDR Deutsche Demokratische Republik (German Democratic Republic) DSM Demand-Side Management FGD Flue Gas Desulfurization GOLKAR Indonesia’s current ruling party IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency ICEL Indonesian Centre for Environmental Law ICMI Organization of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals IMBAS Initiative fuer die Menschenrechte aller BuergerInnen der ASEAN-Staaten - Human rights initiative for all citizens of the ASEAN states INSAG International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group IPTN Industri Pesawat Terbang Nusantara - Indonesian Aviation Industry

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LBH Lembaga Bantuan Hukum - Legal Aid Institute LNG Liquified Natural Gas LPSM Lembaga Pengembangan Swadaya Masyarakat - Organisations for Guiding Community Self-Help LSM Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat - Self-help organisations in which members share common interests NEA Nuclear Energy Agency NEWJEC New Japan Engineering Consultants NGO Non Government Organization NPT Non Proliferation Treaty PDI Partai Demokrat Indonesia - Indonesian Democratic Party PLN Perusahaan Umum Listrik Negara - State Electricity Corporation PLTN Pembangkit Listrik Tenaga Nuklir - Nuclear Power Plant SIUPP Surat Izin Usaha Penerbitan Pers - Press Publication Permit SSM Supply-Side Management UKAEA United Kingdom Atomic Energy Agency WALHI Wahana Lingkungan Hidup - Indonesian Environmental Forum WANO World Association of Nuclear Operators

Units

boe barrel of oil equivalent Gray (Gy) The unit of measurement of absorbed dose. It is the amount of radiation that deposits one joule of energy in one kilogram of material. Replaces the rad: 1Gy = 100 rads. kilowatt (kW) 1 kW = 1,000 watts. 1 watt = 1 joule per second. Megawatt (MW) 1 MW = 1,000,000 watts. 1 watt = 1 joule per second.

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scf Standard Cubic Feet Sievert (Sv) The unit of measurement of dose, effective dose or equivalent dose. It is equal to the absorbed dose or equivalent dose. It is equal to the absorbed dose (in grays) multiplied by a factor related to a particular part of the body. It is the unit used to assess the effects of ionising radiation on living cells. usually measured in millisieverts (mSv), the whole-body dose that every person receives from natural background radiation in one year is 2 millisieverts.

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