Re-imagining New Paths to Peace

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R E - IMAGINING N EW P ATHS TO P EACE October- December 2011 A Quarterly Publication of the Institute for Autonomy and Governance ISSN 2243-8165-04 A UTONOMY UTONOMY UTONOMY UTONOMY UTONOMY & & & & & P EACE EACE EACE EACE EACE R R R R R EVIEW EVIEW EVIEW EVIEW EVIEW

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A quarterly journal of the Institute for Autonomy & Governance.

Transcript of Re-imagining New Paths to Peace

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RE-IMAGINING NEW

PATHS TO PEACE

October- December 2011

A Quarterly Publication of the Institute for Autonomy and Governance

ISSN 2243-8165-04

AAAAAUTONOMYUTONOMYUTONOMYUTONOMYUTONOMY & & & & & PPPPPEACEEACEEACEEACEEACE R R R R REVIEWEVIEWEVIEWEVIEWEVIEW

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AAAAABOUTBOUTBOUTBOUTBOUT THETHETHETHETHE I I I I INSTITUTENSTITUTENSTITUTENSTITUTENSTITUTE FORFORFORFORFOR AAAAAUTONOMYUTONOMYUTONOMYUTONOMYUTONOMY ANDANDANDANDAND G G G G GOVERNANCEOVERNANCEOVERNANCEOVERNANCEOVERNANCE

The Institute for The Institute for The Institute for The Institute for The Institute for Autonomy andAutonomy andAutonomy andAutonomy andAutonomy andGovernance (IAG) is an independent and non-Governance (IAG) is an independent and non-Governance (IAG) is an independent and non-Governance (IAG) is an independent and non-Governance (IAG) is an independent and non-partisan think tank founded in 2001 to generatepartisan think tank founded in 2001 to generatepartisan think tank founded in 2001 to generatepartisan think tank founded in 2001 to generatepartisan think tank founded in 2001 to generateideas on making autonomy an effective vehicleideas on making autonomy an effective vehicleideas on making autonomy an effective vehicleideas on making autonomy an effective vehicleideas on making autonomy an effective vehiclefor peace and development in the Southernfor peace and development in the Southernfor peace and development in the Southernfor peace and development in the Southernfor peace and development in the SouthernPhilippines.Philippines.Philippines.Philippines.Philippines.

IAG views autonomy as a broad and evolving concept thatIAG views autonomy as a broad and evolving concept thatIAG views autonomy as a broad and evolving concept thatIAG views autonomy as a broad and evolving concept thatIAG views autonomy as a broad and evolving concept thatencompasses any political structure that is less than anencompasses any political structure that is less than anencompasses any political structure that is less than anencompasses any political structure that is less than anencompasses any political structure that is less than anindependent state. It provides the country’independent state. It provides the country’independent state. It provides the country’independent state. It provides the country’independent state. It provides the country’s minority Muslim ands minority Muslim ands minority Muslim ands minority Muslim ands minority Muslim andIndigenous Peoples platforms to evolve self governance structuresIndigenous Peoples platforms to evolve self governance structuresIndigenous Peoples platforms to evolve self governance structuresIndigenous Peoples platforms to evolve self governance structuresIndigenous Peoples platforms to evolve self governance structureswhether federal, autonomous or associative.whether federal, autonomous or associative.whether federal, autonomous or associative.whether federal, autonomous or associative.whether federal, autonomous or associative.

IAG continues to conduct research, fora, roundtableIAG continues to conduct research, fora, roundtableIAG continues to conduct research, fora, roundtableIAG continues to conduct research, fora, roundtableIAG continues to conduct research, fora, roundtablediscussions, and conferences on the issues of autonomydiscussions, and conferences on the issues of autonomydiscussions, and conferences on the issues of autonomydiscussions, and conferences on the issues of autonomydiscussions, and conferences on the issues of autonomy, good, good, good, good, goodgovernance and political settlements between the GRP and thegovernance and political settlements between the GRP and thegovernance and political settlements between the GRP and thegovernance and political settlements between the GRP and thegovernance and political settlements between the GRP and theRebel Fronts (MNLF and MILF). It has published policy papersRebel Fronts (MNLF and MILF). It has published policy papersRebel Fronts (MNLF and MILF). It has published policy papersRebel Fronts (MNLF and MILF). It has published policy papersRebel Fronts (MNLF and MILF). It has published policy papersand journals on political, economic, and security issues that defineand journals on political, economic, and security issues that defineand journals on political, economic, and security issues that defineand journals on political, economic, and security issues that defineand journals on political, economic, and security issues that definethe much needed measures to be undertaken for meaningful self-the much needed measures to be undertaken for meaningful self-the much needed measures to be undertaken for meaningful self-the much needed measures to be undertaken for meaningful self-the much needed measures to be undertaken for meaningful self-governance in the region.governance in the region.governance in the region.governance in the region.governance in the region.

IAG also provides support to the IAG also provides support to the IAG also provides support to the IAG also provides support to the IAG also provides support to the ARMM Executive and theARMM Executive and theARMM Executive and theARMM Executive and theARMM Executive and theIranon Development Council (Buldon, Barira, Matanog, ParangIranon Development Council (Buldon, Barira, Matanog, ParangIranon Development Council (Buldon, Barira, Matanog, ParangIranon Development Council (Buldon, Barira, Matanog, ParangIranon Development Council (Buldon, Barira, Matanog, Parangand Datu Blah Sinsuat), specifically in capacity-building withand Datu Blah Sinsuat), specifically in capacity-building withand Datu Blah Sinsuat), specifically in capacity-building withand Datu Blah Sinsuat), specifically in capacity-building withand Datu Blah Sinsuat), specifically in capacity-building withfocus on the processes of policy formulation and legislation.focus on the processes of policy formulation and legislation.focus on the processes of policy formulation and legislation.focus on the processes of policy formulation and legislation.focus on the processes of policy formulation and legislation.

IAG is an institutional partner of the Konrad IAG is an institutional partner of the Konrad IAG is an institutional partner of the Konrad IAG is an institutional partner of the Konrad IAG is an institutional partner of the Konrad AdenauerAdenauerAdenauerAdenauerAdenauerStiftung in the Philippines.Stiftung in the Philippines.Stiftung in the Philippines.Stiftung in the Philippines.Stiftung in the Philippines.

IAG is located at the IAG is located at the IAG is located at the IAG is located at the IAG is located at the Alumni CenterAlumni CenterAlumni CenterAlumni CenterAlumni Center, Notre Dame University, Notre Dame University, Notre Dame University, Notre Dame University, Notre Dame University,,,,,Cotabato CityCotabato CityCotabato CityCotabato CityCotabato City, Philippines, T, Philippines, T, Philippines, T, Philippines, T, Philippines, Telefax (64)421-2071.Email:elefax (64)421-2071.Email:elefax (64)421-2071.Email:elefax (64)421-2071.Email:elefax (64)421-2071.Email:[email protected]@[email protected]@[email protected] and W and W and W and W and Website: ebsite: ebsite: ebsite: ebsite: wwwwwwwwwwwwwww.iag.org.ph .iag.org.ph .iag.org.ph .iag.org.ph .iag.org.ph and and and and andwwwwwwwwwwwwwww.iag2001.wordpress.com.iag2001.wordpress.com.iag2001.wordpress.com.iag2001.wordpress.com.iag2001.wordpress.com

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CCCCCONTENTSONTENTSONTENTSONTENTSONTENTS

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RRRRREVISITINGEVISITINGEVISITINGEVISITINGEVISITING THETHETHETHETHE D D D D DYNAMICSYNAMICSYNAMICSYNAMICSYNAMICS OFOFOFOFOF C C C C CONFLICTONFLICTONFLICTONFLICTONFLICT 13ANDANDANDANDAND E E E E EXCLUSIONXCLUSIONXCLUSIONXCLUSIONXCLUSION

Francisco J. Lara and Phil Champain

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Fr. Eliseo ‘Jun’ Mercado, OMI

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1.R1.R1.R1.R1.REPUBLICEPUBLICEPUBLICEPUBLICEPUBLIC AAAAACTCTCTCTCT N N N N NOOOOO. 10153. 10153. 10153. 10153. 10153 121

An Act Providing for the synchronization of theElections in the Autonomous Region in MuslimMindanao (ARMM) with the National and LocalElections and for other Purposes

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Editorial Board

Eliseo R. Mercado Jr., OMIEditor-in-Chief

Institute for Autonomy and Governance

Dr. Peter KoeppingerCountry Representative

Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung

Prof. Rommel BanlaoiExecutive Director

Philippine Institute for Peace, Violenceand Terrorism Research

Prof. Sheila AlgabreVice President for Mission and Identity

Notre Dame University

Amina RasulConvenor

Philippine Council for Islam and Democracy

Alber HusinProfessor

Ateneo de Zamboanga University

Ramie ToledoCommunications Specialist

Institute for Autonomy and Governance

Omar Vicente D. TadejaLayout Artist

Institute for Autonomy and Governance

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EDITORIALEDITORIAL

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EEEEEDITORIALDITORIALDITORIALDITORIALDITORIALELISEO “JUN” MERCADO,OMI

he present issue deals with varied waysof approaching the ‘problematic’ in the

Southern Philippines. The three papersattempt to unravel albeit from differentperspectives the persistence of conflict andexclusion.

The first article by Francisco Lara andPhil Champain of the International Alert is anattempt to revisit the dynamics of conflict andexclusion. It argues that at the core of theproblem is the exclusionary political economythat is developed and sustained through acomplex system of contest and violence.

It presents two types of conflict. The firstis the rebellion-related violence relating to thevert ical armed chal lenges against theinfrastructure of the state. The second is theinter- or intra-clan and group violence relatingto horizontal armed challenges between andamong families, clans, and tribes. These twotypes of conflict interact in ways that are poorlyunderstood and which sustain conditionsserving the interests of those with access toeconomic and political power and exclude the

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majority o f those in Mindanao fromopportunities to improve their lives.

The second article is an attempt to respondto the MILF continuing demand for a ‘sub-state’ as expression of the Bangsamoro self-determination. Judge Soliman Santos does itby way of ‘ imagining a const i tut ionalamendment’ specif ically addressing thiserstwhile dream and aspirat ion of theBangsamoro.The ‘imagined constitutionalamendment’ is an Article X-A to be insertedright after the existing Article X, Sections 15-21 on Autonomous Regions. The reader mayfind the proposed Article X-A on the verboseside.

The ‘imagined constitutional amendment’attempts to provide for a constitutional space,sti l l within the republic and Phil ippineterritory, for Bangsamoro minority to live outtheir distinct identity and way of life as well astheir centuries-old longing for self-rule.

The third art ic le is s imply randomthoughts on re-imagining the 19th centuryconcept of nation-state. They are randomthoughts simply because there is scarcity ofdebates and consensus on the subject and issueof nation states, sovereignty, territory and

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autonomy or self determination. Yet, they arethe very core of the heated and fiery debatesduring the del iberat ion on the‘constitutionality’ of the Memorandum ofAgreement on Ancestral Domain between thePhilippine Government and the Moro Islamicliberation front in 2008.

The understanding of nation state as ayoung construct is never put on the table. Yetparticularly in this part of the globe, suchconstruct is, indeed, very ‘divisive’. The BangsaFilipino or Bangsa Indonesia or Bangsa Malayoor Bangsa Moro, Bangsa Aceh, Bangsa Pattanietc. are all relatively young constructs. Thevery controversial issues of terr i tory,sovereignty and other elements of the so-callednation states are products of colonial heritagethat continues to exercise tyranny over ourspirits even after the years of de-colonization.

My article speaks of re-imagining nationstates , and I am actual ly rais ing thefundamental issue whether the 19th centuryconstruct of nation state is still valid today.

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REVISITING THE DYNAMICS OF

CONFLICT AND EXCLUSION

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Revisiting the Dynamics of Conflict andRevisiting the Dynamics of Conflict andRevisiting the Dynamics of Conflict andRevisiting the Dynamics of Conflict andRevisiting the Dynamics of Conflict andExclusionExclusionExclusionExclusionExclusion *****

Francisco J. Lara Jr. and Phil Champain1

Introduct ionIntroduct ionIntroduct ionIntroduct ionIntroduct ion

usheera lugs most o f her personalbelongings wherever she goes. She is used

to evacuating her children and her valuablesat a moment’s notice, and like other Muslimwomen caught in the long conflict in Mindanao,she has witnessed the mindless violence anddepredation caused by a conflict where thereare no bystanders, only perpetrators andvictims. She went through the same ordealwhen she evacuated her family fromKauswagan, Lanao del Norte to Iligan Cityfollowing a deadly attack on civilians by Muslimrebels in August 2008. Four years of workingfor peace has not diminished her fear ofreprisals. Musheera provides psycho-socialcounseling to Muslims and Christians whohave experienced the trauma of conflict.Sometimes the Christian victims could notbring themselves to trust a Muslim woman tohelp them recover from the trauma of violence.

*The full title of the article is Inclusive Peace in MuslimMindanao:Revisiting the Dynamics of Conflict and Exclusion by FranciscoJ.Lara Jr. and Phil Champain produced by International Alert, 346Clapham Road, London, United Kingdom. Reprinted with permission.

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‘We had been talking about peace in thismunicipality for more than ten years, engagingin countless rituals to promote solidarity andpeace, but it only took a single day of crueltyand violence to bring back all the fear, anger,and suspicion that we thought we had leftbehind’.

Makin used to join in rido (violent inter-and intra-clan feuds), believing that revengewas the only way his family could restore itshonour and protect i ts interests whenthreatened by other clans or tribes. In hisvillage, the rido are often due to land issues,but they can easily erupt out of jealousy,humiliation, and disrespect for the family. ‘It’sdangerous because you can get killed even ifthe problem involves a distant relative, soeveryone in the clan is cautious and alwaysprepared to fight’. Makin confesses that hisfamily was involved in a rido that led to severaldeaths. The violence prevented children fromgoing to school and men from working in thefields. He nearly left school, but his fatherhelped to settle the feud, enabling him to finishhis studies. ‘Thanks be to Allah… if I had notfinished school I would have no future. Thatwould have led me to the path of the rebels,since my father was a rebel commanderhimself. Worse, it could have steered me to the

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criminal gangs here’, Makin says.

The stories of Musheera and Makin2

underscore the recurring vio lence thataccompanies successful political settlements inthe Phi l ippines and other countries inSoutheast Asia. Musheera and Makin residein communities where violence was expectedto subside after a peace agreement was signedbetween rebels and the government in 1996.However, a few years after the agreement wassigned, a new war broke out and inter-clanconflicts intensified, exposing the fragility ofthe agreement and provoking a re-examination of strategies designed to ensurea lasting peace.

The situation in Muslim Mindanao begsan important question: Why is there so muchconflict in the post-conflict moment? 3

This paper examines the roots o fpersistent conflict by going beyond the originalnarrative of resistance and rebellion to shedlight on the shifting political and economicconditions that explain their longevity. Itdistinguishes between the original causes ofconflict (onset) and the emerging politico-economic conditions that underlie theirpersistence (duration).4 The paper argues thata gap exists in current analysis of persistent

Revisiting the Dynamics of Conflict and Exclusion

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conflict in Mindanao, which is based upon atraditional discourse of exclusion that fails tocapture the region’s shifting economic andpolitical conditions and the emergence of newforces that shape the possibilities and limits fora lasting peace.

This study offers a political economy andinstitutional approach to analysing conflictthat can help various stakeholders, namely:civil society groups (including those from thebusiness sector) ; local and nationalgovernment executives ; and, local andinternational development agencies engagedin creating conditions for a lasting peace inMindanao. The paper is also relevant to otherplaces that have witnessed enduring conflict inSoutheast Asia and includes a brief review ofthe Mindanao conflict in relation to thedynamics of conflict and exclusion in Aceh,Indonesia.

Injustice and exclusion at the onset of theInjustice and exclusion at the onset of theInjustice and exclusion at the onset of theInjustice and exclusion at the onset of theInjustice and exclusion at the onset of theMindanao conflictMindanao conflictMindanao conflictMindanao conflictMindanao conflict

Most studies of the Mindanao conflicthighlight the injustices and grievances againstthe colonial and post-colonial Philippine state,tracing the roots of violence to the historicalresistance of the Bangsamoro (Moro Nation)5

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people to foreign colonizers who ruledMindanao bringing with them the Christiansettlers and businessmen from the northernand central part of the Philippines, and thetransnational companies that grabbed thelands farmed and occupied by the Muslims andindigenous people.6 The theft of the Moro’s landwas facilitated and reinforced by an externally(Spanish and American) imposed set o fproperty rights institutions based on thecolonial system of titling, transfer, and sale ofland over the Moro’s traditional system ofcommunal ownership and stewardship ofproperty.

The colonization of land was made worseby the of f ic ial neglect o f poor ruralcommunities by the central state and localgovernments in Mindanao, accompanied bypol i t ical repression, mil i tarisat ion anddiscr imination towards Musl ims andindigenous people in the countryside.7 Incomparison to the ethnic and identity-basedstruggles that mostly defined the nature ofconflict in parts of Africa and South Asia, thescholarship on Mindanao paid little attentionto ethno-religious differences as the basis ofconflict.8 Scholars pointed out how ethno-religious identities were poor mobilisingsymbols for the secessionist movement, even

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though the rebels used them to instrumentallyproject their legitimacy to the internationalcommunity, particularly the Islamic states. Infact, ethno-religious discourse was often usedto blur the failures of governance, especiallyat a time when local governments were fallingunder the control of Moro “strong men” or therebels themselves.

The current rationale for resistance andrebellion remains anchored to this historicaldiscourse of injustice and discrimination,despite the shift in the economic balance ofpower, the changes in local political authority,and the different set of actors that play a rolein governance. They resonate in theproposition that a solution to the historicalinjustice of land grabbing and economicexclusion perpetrated against the Bangsamorois to be found in autonomous self-rule, whichis critical to achieving peace and development,and is best addressed through the recognitionof their ancestral homeland.9 However, as weshall discuss later, the sources of unrest andthe triggers of violence and conflict in theregion have markedly changed.

The Mindanao conflict is estimated tohave resulted in at least 120,000 dead, and thedisplacement of an estimated two million

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people since it started in the early seventies.10

In 1996, a peace accord between the MoroNational Liberation Front (MNLF) and theGovernment of the Republic of the Philippines(GRP) paved the way for the former to governan autonomous regional government called theAutonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao(ARMM) – a devolved political authorityestabl ished in 1991 that provided forautonomous rule by the Moro people . 11

Autonomy was aimed at the development of theeconomy and improvement of the welfare ofMusl im Mindanao, which includes thepopulation residing in the five provinces andone city that elected to join the autonomousregion.12 Establ ishing a separate regiondominated by Muslims was also expected toimprove the targeting of programmes andservices that would improve standards ofliving, and encourage the entry of domestic andforeign investors in the conflict-torn areas ofthe region.

However, more than ten years after the1996 agreement, economic growth, or the lackof it, has opened up new patterns of exclusion.

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The cont inued economic exc lus ion o fThe cont inued economic exc lus ion o fThe cont inued economic exc lus ion o fThe cont inued economic exc lus ion o fThe cont inued economic exc lus ion o fMuslim MindanaoMuslim MindanaoMuslim MindanaoMuslim MindanaoMuslim Mindanao

There are at least two aspects in thecurrent pattern of economic growth in MuslimMindanao that create hostile conditions for alasting peace.

a. Exclusion from benefits of national economicgrowth

The lives of the poor and disadvantagedin Muslim Mindanao have not improved duringtheperiods of economic growth that the country asa whole has enjoyed over the past decade. Asthe Philippines recovered from the 1997 Asiancrisis and its GDP grew at an average of 4percent , most o f the Mindanao regionsrecovered except for four of five provinceswithin the ARMM, which remain at the bottomof the ten low-growth provinces in the countryin terms of real per capita income.13

This had a palpable effect on the humandevelopment indicators of Muslim Mindanao.The economic and social conditions in MuslimMindanao lag behind other provinces andregions, evidenced by its poor record in termsof employment, poverty, and health (Table 1).

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Absolute poverty in Muslim Mindanao is 45percent, compared to the national average of36 percent. Unemployment is five times higherthan the national average. Meanwhile ,expected l i fe at b irth (ELB) in Musl imMindanao is only 52 years, in comparison tothe national average of 71 years for thePhilippines. In addition, infant mortality ishigher in Muslim Mindanao, where 55 infantsdie per thousand compared to 49 for the rest ofthe country. Muslim Mindanao displays asimilar trend in terms of education. Twenty-sixpercent of children of school age participate inprimary school compared to 43 percent inMindanao and 45 percent for the rest of thecountry. Of those that are able to enter school,cohort survival rates are the lowest in theARMM, with only 37 percent of studentsentering the elementary grade (Grade 1)making it to the sixth grade, versus 53 percentfor Mindanao and 66 percent for the rest of thecountry.

TTTTTable 1. Human Development Indicators: Muslimable 1. Human Development Indicators: Muslimable 1. Human Development Indicators: Muslimable 1. Human Development Indicators: Muslimable 1. Human Development Indicators: Muslim

MindanaoMindanaoMindanaoMindanaoMindanao

Province/Country ELB Poverty Infant Mortality (per 1000 live births)

Percentage of Unemployed

ARMM 52 years 45% 55 infants 56% Philippines 71 years 36% 49 infants 10%

Sources: The study was done by the UNDP’s PHDNetwork. Philippine Human Development Report(2005). Peace, human security, and human development in the Philippines. Makati City: PhilippineHuman Development Network, UNDP, NZAID; National Statistics Office (2008). Total populationand annual population growth rates by region: Population censuses 1995, 2000, and 2007. Quezon

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The divergence between provincial orregional figures and national indices exposethe geographical exclusion of Musl imMindanao from the gains of national economicgrowth and poverty reduction, despite theonset of a formal peace.

b. Unsustainable growth patterns

During the few instances when economicgrowth in Muslim Mindanao was comparableto, or exceeded the national pattern of growth,that growth has been unsustainable becauseit was based on reconstruction and election-driven consumption spending.

Economic growth in Muslim Mindanao ismuch lower than the national average, eventhough it followed the pattern of nationalgrowth except in 2000 and 2002 (Figure 1). Thefall in economic growth in 2000 is traced to the“al l -out war” between the Moro IslamicLiberation Front (MILF) and the GRP.14 Thespike in 2002 and the increase in 2004 can betraced to the infusion of reconstruction aidafter the 2000–2001 war, and the growth inconsumption during and after the regional andnational elections during those years (1998national elections, 2002 regional elections,2004 national elections).

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Figure 1. Percentage Increase in Real GDP: MuslimFigure 1. Percentage Increase in Real GDP: MuslimFigure 1. Percentage Increase in Real GDP: MuslimFigure 1. Percentage Increase in Real GDP: MuslimFigure 1. Percentage Increase in Real GDP: Muslim

Mindanao and the Philippines,1997–2007Mindanao and the Philippines,1997–2007Mindanao and the Philippines,1997–2007Mindanao and the Philippines,1997–2007Mindanao and the Philippines,1997–2007

Source: NEDA, 2008

Thus, except for the palpable increase inconsumption spending in Muslim Mindanaofollowing major political exercises and theonset of “post-conflict” aid and reconstruction,there is little improvement in terms of value-added production and sectoral productivity.Statistics (Mindanao Economic DevelopmentCouncil, 2006) demonstrate that productivitygains from 2000–2005 were limited to fisheriesand a few agricultural crops such as rice andcorn.

The unsustainable nature of ARMM’seconomic growth, coupled with the region’sexclusion from the benefits of national growth,

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make a durable peace more di f f icult toachieve.15 Studies have shown how the type ofeconomic growth that is directly caused by themassive infusion of aid and reconstructionexpenditures, or by the exploitation of bothlootable (e.g., valuable gems, drugs, timber,agricultural products) or non-lootable (e.g., oiland gas) resources in post-conflict areas opensup new arenas of competition and conflict, anda rise in separatist or non-separatist violence.16

Understanding conf l i c t durat ion inUnderstanding conf l i c t durat ion inUnderstanding conf l i c t durat ion inUnderstanding conf l i c t durat ion inUnderstanding conf l i c t durat ion inMuslim MindanaoMuslim MindanaoMuslim MindanaoMuslim MindanaoMuslim Mindanao

This paper differentiates between twotypes of violence in Muslim Mindanao: the firsttype is referred to in the conflict literature asseparatist, political, rebellion-related, top-down, or confl ict-related violence whichpertains to the vertical armed challengesagainst the infrastructure of the state and theinsurgent and rebel groups; the second is oftencalled non-separatist, bottom-up, inter- orintra-ethnic, clan, or group violence whichpertains to horizontal armed challengesbetween and among families, clans, andtribes.17 For this paper, we shall use the termsrebellion-related violence and inter- or intra-c lan or group vio lence , respect ively, in

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distinguishing between these two types ofconflict.

Rebellion-related conflict in Mindanao issub-national and separatist, while inter-orintra-clan or group conflict is community-basedand non-separatist. Both can be products ofresource disputes and pol it ico-economiccontestation at various levels. Rebellion-related violence is the outcome of armedconfrontation between the GRP and the MILFand MNLF.18 On the other hand, inter-andintra-clan or group violence can take variousforms, of which rido is the most widespread.19

The two types intersect in terms of politico-economic foundations and the forms they take.Their persistence is tied to the capacity ofprotagonists to engage in armed, organised,and protracted violence.

The two may also be distinguished interms of their beneficiaries. Rebellion-relatedviolence benefits the national or sub-nationalstates or the insurgent and rebelinfrastructure. Inter- and intra-clan or groupviolence benefits the families, clans, and tribesthat emerge victorious after violence andconflict subsides or ends.20 Other beneficiariesinclude business interests and specific ethnicor religious identity groups that alternately

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support the state, the rebels, or both.

Before the 1996 peace agreement, theprevious administrations of the ARMM hadbeen led by Muslim political elites backed bytraditional clans with strong connections to thecentral government.21 The entry of MNLFChairman Nur Misuari to the ARMMgovernorship can therefore be viewed as aformal turn-over of power and resources fromthe traditional Muslim clans to the rebelleadership of the MNLF.22 The transition ofpower was aided by Misuari’s popularity as asymbol of the Bangsamoro resistance. Misuarihad strong access to the central governmentunder Ramos and he enjoyed internationalsupport and recognition from the Organizationof the Islamic Conference (OIC).

Four years later in 2000, war wasreignited between the GRP and another rebelgroup called the Moro Islamic Liberation Front(MILF), after the then President JosephEstrada implemented a more bellicose policytowards insurgents and ordered an attackagainst MILF camps across and beyond theARMM. Armed conflict erupted again in 2003and 2008 under the administration of PresidentGloria Macapagal-Arroyo.

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The outbreak of hostilities in MuslimMindanao during the second half of 2008 aloneled to hundreds of fatal i t ies and thedisplacement of an estimated 250,000 people.23

These clashes were provoked by an aborted dealthat was to provide for the recognition of theancestral domain claims of the Moro people andthe establishment of a Bangsamoro JuridicalEntity (BJE). The Memorandum of Agreementon Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) washammered out after years of negotiationsbetween the MILF and GRP peace panels. Butafter the proposed agreement was declaredunconstitutional by the Philippines SupremeCourt after the deal was announced, thegovernment panel was disbanded and peacenegotiations were suspended. Negotiationshave since resumed, though few expect anysignificant breakthrough until after PresidentGloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s term ends in 2010.

The persistence of rebell ion-relatedviolence in Musl im Mindanao can beprincipally traced to the failure to reach aneffective political settlement between thedifferent rebel groups and the GRP. However,this sort of violence can also escalate when boththe rebels and the military take sides amongfeuding clans and tribes engaged in fights overland, resources, or political office. This in turn

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leads to a vicious cycle where continued armedchal lenges to the national and localgovernment cause militarization and humanrights violations that poison the formal peaceprocess.24

Studies have shown how the weaknessesin governance under Nur Misuari ’sadministration created conditions for thepersistence of rebellion-related violence.25 Theregional autonomous government was neitherautonomous nor capable of governing from thestart. The ARMM was weak and unable todeliver basic programmes and services in keyareas such as health care and education. Taxand revenue-generating power was inadequate,and the ARMM was beset by numerous andincreasing cases of graft and corruption. Theseproblems part ly explain why local andinternational aid and development agencieswere directly involved in the provision of publicgoods and other developmental programmesand services.

In addition, the ARMM did not wieldeffective command over the local police andarmed forces. The failure to monopolize thestate’s coercive power meant that the regionalgovernment had very little influence over theprovision of security and the direction of

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internal security reforms. The ARMM could noteven play an active part in preventing rido andother community-level conflicts.

Part of the reason behind the failure of thepost-1996 ARMM government was the absenceof genuine powers required by the regionalexecutive office and the regional assembly insuch important areas as fiscal autonomy whichremained under central control.26 These hadbeen part of the original agreement, but theirimplementation was blocked by Congress. Atthe same time, the new rebel-governors lackedthe required skill and capacity to deal with themultiple evolving conditions in the field: wherea new rebel challenger (MILF) was gettingstronger, community-level conflicts wereerupting, and criminality was increasing. Andnot unlike the clan-based governors thatpreceded him, Misuari was faced with chargesof mismanagement and corruption.

In real i ty, the Misuari - led regionalgovernment presided over the autonomousregion under peace terms aimed at securing theshort-term economic goals of the Ramosadministration (1992–1998) . The Ramosgovernment created the pol i t ical spacenecessary to undertake fiscal and economicreforms aimed at control l ing growth in

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expenditures and a refocusing of resourcestowards economic prior i t ies such asinfrastructure bui lding and energygeneration.27 The strategy was successful andviolence declined significantly in the periodprior to and shortly after the conclusion ofpeace talks with the MNLF (Figure 2). TheRamos administration can also be creditedwith stemming rebellion-related violence bysimultaneously entering into peacenegotiations with the MILF, the CommunistParty of the Philippines – New People’s Army(CPP-NPA), and military rebels associatedwith the Reform Armed Forces Movement andthe Young Officers Union (RAM-YOU).

Figure 2. Incidents of Rebellion-related violence

350350350350350

300300300300300

250250250250250

200200200200200

150150150150150

100100100100100

5 05 05 05 05 0

00000

Source: Philippine Human Development Report (2005). Peace, human

security, and human development in the Philippines. Makati City:

Philippine Human Development Network, UNDP, NZAID. Compiled by

P. Abinales and E. Ramos.

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However, a latent unrest continued togrow behind the peace bargains secured by theRamos government. Indigenous groups,Christian settlers and politicians, and some ofthe traditional Muslim clans that were excludedfrom the GRP-MNLF peace processes saw theirinterests threatened and their needs unmet bythe post-1996 rebel-led government whichstyled itself as a “representative” of the entireBangsamoro people . This unrest wasaccompanied by a spike in hostilities betweenthe GRP and the MILF and CPP-NPA after theend of Ramos’ term in 1998. As a result,business groups and investors continued toevade Muslim Mindanao, preferring to investinstead in the prosperous metropolitan centresof Davao, Cagayan de Oro, and GeneralSantos, and the East Asian Growth Area(EAGA) business initiatives being promoted bythe Ramos government.28

Without a doubt, the intensification ofrebellion-related violence after 1996 reinforcedthe causal relationship between social exclusionand conflict, but with a new twist. Whereas theoriginal discourse of social exclusion wassynonymous with the anti-statist political lineadvanced by the Moro separatists in thestruggle for an independent state, the currentdiscourse of exclusion is being wielded by

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indigenous peoples , inc luding localbusinessmen, Christ ian sett lers andpoliticians, and the powerful Muslim clansagainst the rebel-separatists themselves. Theirgrievance – economic and political exclusionfrom the outcome and benefits of the GRP-MNLF and the GFP-MILF peace processes.Their target – the Misuari-led ARMM, thecurrent ARMM administration, and the MOA-AD.

This reverse antagonism holds the key tounderstanding the connections betweenpolitical authority and the evolving shifts inthe region’s political economy. The region’sunderdevelopment can no longer be ascribedsole ly to the colonial and post -colonialexploitation of the region and discriminationtowards Muslims and indigenous people, butmust also be connected to the shifting balanceof economic and pol i t ical power withinBangsamoro society itself – between those whoprospered from the war and the ensuing“peace”, versus those who did not benefit, inparticular the many who remain impoverishedand vulnerable within the region. In reality,this represents a tug of war between theMusl im rebels and their advocates andfollowers on the one hand, and the Muslimaristocracy and the Christian settler-elites on

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the other. In the middle stand the mass of poorand vulnerable communities that were, andcontinue to be, excluded from the supposedbenefits of the peace process.

The traditional dichotomies underlyingthe Mindanao conflict have changed. Intandem with the central state, the powerfulMuslim and Christian clans and the leadersof the MNLF must share part of the blame forthe lingering violence, and the perpetualfailure to generate wealth and prosperitywithin the region. The MILF will be facing thesame challenges if a peace agreement isachieved, as inclusionary demands havestarted to rise among indigenous people,settlers, women, and local business groups inlight of the aborted MOA-AD.

The authenticity and urgency of localdemands cannot be discounted as crucial socio-economic issues have not been addressed.Access and secure rights to land, a just sharein the region ’s natural resources , theavailability of employment and credit forlivelihoods are fundamental demands whichthe different ARMM administrations failed toaddress, resulting in the steady deteriorationof people’s standards of living. The growingeconomic and political diaspora from Muslim

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Mindanao is recorded each year in theincreased density of Muslim ghettoes in Metro-Manila, Cebu, Davao, Baguio, and othersecondary urban centres. These ghettos offera poignant reminder that the change in theregion’s leadership has not produced thedesired development.

Unequal access to key resources such asland continues to provoke unrest and violence.Large tracts of land continue to evade agrarianreform in the ARMM, which ranks second interms of working scope (321,869 hectares)under the Phi l ippines ComprehensiveAgrarian Reform Programme (CARP) as of2003, yet has the lowest accomplishment report(60%) in the transfer of private agriculturalland (PAL) across Mindanao after more than adecade of agrarian reform implementation.Worse, almost all of the PAL areas that havebeen transferred were acquired throughvoluntary offers of sale or voluntary landtransfer (VOS-VLT), a system of land transferrife with fraud and corruption.29

The persistence of land-based conflict andthe inability to undertake an effective landreform programme creates a cr i t icalintersection between rebellion-related violenceand inter- or intra-clan or group violence. The

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outbreak of hostilities between the MILF andthe GRP in 2000, for example, was promptedby both parties taking sides in a local Muslim-Christian conflict over control of a parcel ofland in Lanao del Norte.30 The confluence ismanifested in inter- and intra-clan feuds whichhave escalated as a form of dispute settlementbetween competing clan and tribal interestsduring the post-1996 peace settlement period(Figure 3).

Figure 3. Column Chart of Figure 3. Column Chart of Figure 3. Column Chart of Figure 3. Column Chart of Figure 3. Column Chart of Rido Rido Rido Rido Rido Incidence, 1990–Incidence, 1990–Incidence, 1990–Incidence, 1990–Incidence, 1990–20042004200420042004

The persistence of inter- and intra-clan orgroup vio lence in Musl im Mindanao isdistinctly related to resource conflicts at thecommunity level particularly on the issue ofland.31 Numerous studies have also pointed tothe strong links between rido and the flawedinstitutional make-up of agrarian reform in the

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region. Indeed, the imposit ion of aconventional , top-down agrarian reformprogramme in a region where specific culturalinstitutions of communal and clan ownershipover land prevail is partly to blame for theviolence.32 An analysis of sources of ridoconfirms numerous cases where the survey andland titling processes undertaken under theCARP led to intra-family violence whenindividual titles encroached on land owned(through inheritance or “pusaka”) by anotherfamily member.33

Apart from land issues, election-relatedconflict constitutes a secondary but significantsource of community-level violence, as it leadsto control over political office that increasesaccess to firepower, or determines entry intobusinesses that are part of the undergroundeconomy. This represents another convergencepoint between sub-national and community-level violence, namely electoral disputes andconflicts over the illegal economy, such as inthe lucrative drug trade in Muslim Mindanao.It reveals the onset of a new dynamic ofexclusion that is distinct from its earlierrepresentations, and the emergence of new andpowerful clans with access to new sources ofeconomic power.

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Clans and conflict in Muslim MindanaoClans and conflict in Muslim MindanaoClans and conflict in Muslim MindanaoClans and conflict in Muslim MindanaoClans and conflict in Muslim Mindanao

Studies have shown how the power of theclans that were a fixture of traditional Muslimsociety were held in check by the rebel forcesof the MNLF and MILF in the long years ofconflict from 1970 to 2001. Several Muslimfamilies and clans were directly or indirectlyinvolved in the conflict, offering materialsupport and sending their young men andwomen to join and support the rebel armies.Other clans collaborated with the central state,strengthening their access to nationalresources in exchange for providing a securityapparatus for the central state in the region.However, even the clans that colluded with theMarcos regime saw the need for peacefulcoexistence with rebel forces in a bid toneutralize, and sometimes draw upon thelatter’s firepower.34

However, with the weaknesses of theMisuari government and its inability to controlthe violence that intensified following theincrease in rido and the war between the MILFand the GRP, a window was opened for rivalgroups to step up to the plate and (re)acquireeconomic and political power. Misuari’s demandfor the national state to del iver on i tscommitments and his stab at another revolt

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was a belated attempt at maintaining power.Misuari was arrested and imprisoned, pavingthe way for the restoration of clan politics andthe resurgence of clan institutions such as rido,and the emergence of warlord clans thatexercise power based upon their control overdevolved pol i t ical authority and a vastunderground economy.35

Clan control over the ARMM governmentand the informal economy in the region inducesmuch of the same vio lent competit ionassociated with the traditional clan controlover land. Fund transfers between the centralgovernment to the ARMM in the form ofinternal revenue allotments (IRA) constitutesthe bulk of funds placed under the control ofthe clans, amounting to an estimated 2.23billion pesos in 2006 alone.36 This underscoresthe violent, “winner-takes-all” nature ofelectoral competit ion. With governmentconsumption expenditures in the ARMMgrowing at a faster rate than the rest ofMindanao combined, it was clear that whoevercontrolled the state would corner these sums.37

It also explains why every election yearis alternately seen as a source of opportunityand danger by poor communities in MuslimMindanao. Elections offer the chance to sell

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votes and influence in exchange for money andother resources such as firearms, but they alsopresent countless dangers associated with thepotential rido that can erupt if a family or clanrelative runs for political office. The mode ofelectoral competition in Mindanao also createsa powerful link between rebellion-relatedviolence and inter-clan violence, particularlywhen violent feuds between rival clans escalatewhen rebel groups and the police and militarysupport rival candidates.38

Apart from government-to-governmenttransfers, a growing underground economymarked by the proliferation of illegal drugs,unlicensed firearms, control over small-scaleand unlicensed mining activity and smugglingprovides additional sources of revenue for localclans (TTTTTable 2able 2able 2able 2able 2). Earnings from illicit activitiesare deposited and laundered in commercialbanks in the key cities of Davao, Cagayan deOro, General Santos, Iligan, and ZamboangaCity. 39 A key aspect o f the boomingunderground economy is the existence of aninformal market for arable agricultural land.This study uncovered several instances of landtransferring ownership without any state lawregulating the sale or generating the requiredtaxes.

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The violent mix between a spreadingunderground economy and electoral corruptionalso reflects the forces and relationships thatbind the central Philippine state with MuslimMindanao. Sub-national state building isostensibly sacrificed for the central objectiveof sustaining the powerful coalitions at thenational level – in this case the government ofPresident Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Theunderground economy and a corrupt electoralsystem is permitted to exist, despite the loss ofvaluable revenues and the col lapse oflegitimate autonomous rule, in exchange fordelivering votes to the ruling coalition duringnational elections. The end result is a viciouscycle of violence that shapes and is shaped bypolitico-economic forces that further embed theexclusionary structures that prevail in theregion. Eventually these newly emergingpolit ico-economic forces weigh upon thehistorical issues of unequal access to land andnatural resources , d iscr imination, andeconomic neglect that have been the enduringsources of violent conflict in the region, andfurther weaken the cause of an enduring peace.

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TTTTTable 2. traditional and non-traditional sources ofable 2. traditional and non-traditional sources ofable 2. traditional and non-traditional sources ofable 2. traditional and non-traditional sources ofable 2. traditional and non-traditional sources ofRevenues from the Informal economyRevenues from the Informal economyRevenues from the Informal economyRevenues from the Informal economyRevenues from the Informal economy

traditional sources of Revenue

non-traditional sources of Revenue

Smuggling of goods from Sabah, etc.

Smuggling of goods from Hong Kong, China, etc.

Trade in small arms and long weapons

Drug production, distribution, and export

Unregistered transport of persons and goods

Illegal reproduction and sale of CDs, DVDs, etc.

Unregistered transfers of land Extortionary “sale” of right-of-way privileges, illegal tollgates

Illegal logging Kidnap for ransom (KFR) activities

Trade in armaments, explosives, and other munitions (especially before and after elections)

“Jueteng” and other forms of illegal gambling

Small-scale illegal mining activities

Carjacking and gun for hire

Smuggling of oil and fuel

Illegal and undocumented export of labour

Forgery and sale of official documents, including certificates of live birth, police clearances, etc.

Clans and Conflict Rsurgence in 2008Clans and Conflict Rsurgence in 2008Clans and Conflict Rsurgence in 2008Clans and Conflict Rsurgence in 2008Clans and Conflict Rsurgence in 2008

The resurgent violence in the second halfof 2008 demonstrates the aforementioned roleof clan institutions as an endogenous factorthat plays a decisive role in the outbreak ofviolence. When the government scuttled a draftmemorandum of agreement on ancestraldomain (MOA-AD), some base commands of theMILF went on a rampage, leading to theindiscriminate killing and injury of hundredsof civilians in some coastal towns of Lanao del

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Norte . 40 These attacks provided thejustification for the reversal of the GRP’soriginal position to support the MOA-AD, andthe launch of major offensive operationsagainst the MILF in Northern and CentralMindanao.

The confrontation between the GRP andthe MILF did not exist in a vacuum, but wasaided by forces outside the main protagonistsin the conflict. As war began to rear its head,preparations for the scheduled elections for theregional leadership of the autonomous regionwere underway. The MILF publicly called fora suspension of the ARMM elections. On theother hand, the clans wanted the elections toproceed, hoping that it would provide a barrierto the eventual creation of a BangsamoroJuridical Entity (BJE), as called for in theagreement.

The current ARMM governor comes froma strong clan in Central Mindanao, known forits firepower and political influence thatstretches beyond central Mindanao.41 The sameclan retains strong ties with the centralgovernment, and is alleged to have played akey role in the electoral fraud and violenceassociated with the 2004 and 2007 elections.42

The formation of a BJE posed a genuine threat

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to the traditional clans at a time when both thepolitical leadership of the ARMM regionalgovernment and several key provinces withinthe region were under their control. Thecollusion between regional power-brokers andspecific national agencies in spurious landdeals would also be affected by a successfulMOA-AD.43

A conjuncture was reached when theinterests of the ARMM-based clans and thelocal government officials near the regionconverged, with the latter engaging in armedactions against MILF field commands in theprovinces adjacent to the ARMM.44 The MOA-AD cast some uncertainty over the future ofinvestments in Mindanao and was ostensiblya threat to the economic and political base ofthe Christian political elites who stood to losepart of their territory to an expanded BJE. Theinflammatory rhetoric coming from severallocal government officials went unabatedprecisely because they enjoyed the support oflocal big business and the landed elite inMindanao.45 Their actions during the tense fewdays following the announcement, combinedwith a reciprocal vehemence against the MOA-AD from among the national political elite, hasbeen repeatedly cited as a major cause for therush to arms, and was subsequently used by

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several base commands of the MILF to justifytheir attacks.46

Accounts of the recent turmoil in Mindanaoprovide evidence that validates the analysis ofthe links between emerging economic sourcesof power and intensified social exclusion inMuslim Mindanao, namely:

• The interests of the powerful Muslimclans and Christian politicians converged in amanner that made it easy to scuttle the draftagreement on ancestral domain, aided by thenational government which withdrew from theagreement after encountering widespreadopposition. While there is no evidence of directcollusion between the Christian and Muslimclans, their responses to the threat of a BJEcoincided to undermine the agreement. Thescholarship on Muslim Mindanao has pointedto the role of “local strong men” who can eitherfacilitate or delay peace processes. A similarsituation occurred in the events leading to thesigning of the MOA-AD, except that this timethe Muslim clans had a stronger influence overthe central state. Their enhanced leveragederives from the strategic role that they haveplayed in shaping national electoral outcomes.• Apprehension over the loss of control overterritory and the revenue streams from

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business and investments, coupled with thehuge income from the illegal economy playeda central part in the “parallel” moves of thetraditional Christian and Muslim aristocracyto scuttle the agreement and in fomentingviolence in the events leading to the explosionof full-blown conflict. As aforementioned, theimportance of controlling political office isintertwined with the economic foundations ofpower in Muslim Mindanao, i.e., successfulelectoral struggles enable the control of formalpolitical authority that is required to cornerthe proceeds from both the expansion in localand foreign investments, government-to-government transfers, and the expandingunderground economy.47

• The peace process actually excludedseveral groups that could have rallied behindthe agreement, including the local businessand church leaders sympathetic to the causeof a lasting peace in Mindanao. In addition tothe social exclusion experienced by poorMusl ims, there exists an equal ly deepexperience of exclusion amongst women andthe indigenous people of Mindanao, whoseconstituencies contain widespread support forlast ing peace. Indeed, women take onadditional burdens in securing the householdand the family in the course of conflict-related

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violence, often taking the lead during times offorced displacement, and seeing to the needsof the family in evacuation camps. They havenot been effectively drawn into peace processes,despite the fact that they play a key role innegot iat ing an end to community- levelviolence, and often confront the risks anddangers associated with inter- and intra-clanviolence (rido). Not only does this fail toharness women’s potential contribution, itcontravenes UN Security Council Resolution1325 which stresses, amongst other things,supporting women’s political, economic andsocial participation in peacebuilding at alllevels.

The same is true for indigenous groupssuch as the Higaonon, Teduray, Iranun, andSubanen tribes who are often displaced whenconflict-related violence erupts in areas whichthey occupy. They possess deep-seatedanimosities towards rebel leaders who makeinstrumental claims that a consensus existsamong the Bangsamoro people over the futureof the ARMM, despite their exclusion from thenegotiations. They have repeatedly warned ofa new front opening in the Mindanao conflictif the MOA-AD were approved. While sometribes have been Islamised, the influence oftribal traditions and the distinct tribal claims

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over land and areas which they claim as partof their ancestral domain prevent them fromcomplying with the outcomes of any peaceagreement between the central state andMusl im rebels unless they are direct lyinvolved.

The poor and vulnerable peasantcommunities (mostly Muslim), women, andindigenous people are the new faces of socialexclusion in Muslim Mindanao, and theircontinued marginalisation from the peaceprocesses and the benefits of economic growthpresent formidable barriers to the cause of alasting peace.

A regional perspective: the case of acehA regional perspective: the case of acehA regional perspective: the case of acehA regional perspective: the case of acehA regional perspective: the case of aceh

Persistent violence afflicts other places inSoutheast Asia where political settlementshave been achieved between rebel forces andthe central state that led to devolved politicalauthority. The 2005 Peace Accords that endedthe civil war between the Gerakan AcehMerdeka (GAM) and the Government of theRepublic of Indonesia (RI) have produced afragile peace punctuated by violence betweenex-combatants of GAM and between differentethnic and political groups.48 Evidence has alsoemerged that some elements of the Indonesian

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armed forces (TNI) are unwilling to recognisethe legitimacy of GAM and its leaders, whichadds to the distrust and growing unrest underAceh’s new leaders.

What was a tentative peace began tounravel soon after the agreement was reached.Conflict erupted even before the holding of thefirst democratic elections in the autonomousprovince in 2005. Tensions arose within therebel forces over who should run as Acehgovernor, originating from a factional splitwithin GAM before the peace agreement wassigned. An official break-up then emerged afterYusuf Irwandi was elected governor.49

The split within the GAM led to theexclusion of a significant number of ex-combatants from the financial benefits of thereintegration programme, with several ex-GAM commanders being left out from thereinsertion and reintegration assistance thatwas cornered by the dominant faction withinGAM. The struggles within the rebels’ ranksspilled over to the allocation of choice politicalposts within the province. Meanwhile, some ex-combatants who were excluded tried to gettheir share by bullying local governmentofficials into giving them contracts during thepost-tsunami reconstruction.

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The unequal access to land and post-conf l ict re integrat ion benef i ts by ex-combatants, including the thousands ofAcehnese vict imised by conf l ict , part lyexplains the persistence of violence. However,there are other drivers of violence, includingthe continued exclusion of poor communitiesfrom revenues derived from Aceh’s naturalresources, the weakness of devolved governanceinstitutions, and the marginalisation of certainethnic groups especially those residing in thecentral highlands.

Aceh demonstrates a paradigm ofdemocratisation that has turned violent, aspolitical and inter-ethnic rivalries erupted soonafter the Helsinki agreement was signed in2005. These should have been anticipated, asprevious studies50 have called attention to thelikely consequences of a hastily-imposedwestern-type democracy on ethnically diversecommunities.

Aceh saw western-style democracy anddevolution imposed on a cauldron of inter-ethnic and inter-political animosities, resultingin the hardening of ethnic and politicaldivisions. As a result, poor rural and urbancommunities remained vulnerable to suddenoutbursts of ethno-political violence especially

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during the period before and after the 2009national legislative elections.51

Indeed, Indonesia faces several ethno-political conflicts within its borders, includingin places such as West Java, North Maluku,Central and Southern Sulawesi , wherel ingering problems with the system ofdemocratic and electoral competition are boundto worsen. In a similar way to the Philippines,constitutional reforms to address economic andpolitical issues that affect local conflict havearrived slowly due to competing agendas forcharter change in both countries.52

As with Muslim Mindanao, Aceh has beenexcluded from growth during the past decade(in this case Indonesia’s). Human developmentindicators expose the lagging state of healthand employment in the province (See Table 3).

TTTTTable 3: human development Indicators: aceh andable 3: human development Indicators: aceh andable 3: human development Indicators: aceh andable 3: human development Indicators: aceh andable 3: human development Indicators: aceh andIndonesiaIndonesiaIndonesiaIndonesiaIndonesia

Province/ country

ELB Poverty Infant Mortality (per 1000 live births)

unemployment rate

Aceh 55 years

35% 42 infants 29%

Indonesia 67 years

27% 35 infants 12.5%

Source: World Bank, 2008

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However, unlike Muslim Mindanao,Aceh’s source of domestic economic growth isshowing some signs of value-added productionin agriculture. This has been the product of themassive post -tsunami infrastructurereconstruction work that helped to facilitatethe flow of agricultural goods. Data on Aceh islimited to the period 2001–2007, but thefigures demonstrate positive growth arisingfrom farm productivity (See Figure 4).

Figure 4: comparative Real gdP growth in aceh andFigure 4: comparative Real gdP growth in aceh andFigure 4: comparative Real gdP growth in aceh andFigure 4: comparative Real gdP growth in aceh andFigure 4: comparative Real gdP growth in aceh andIndonesia 2001–2007 (Percentage IncreaseIndonesia 2001–2007 (Percentage IncreaseIndonesia 2001–2007 (Percentage IncreaseIndonesia 2001–2007 (Percentage IncreaseIndonesia 2001–2007 (Percentage Increase)))))

Source: World Bank, 2008

However, a marked depletion in oil andgas reserves threatens to impact negatively onthis pattern of growth. If the overall decline inthe value of these resources were included,Aceh’s economy would actually register acontraction of 2%. Moreover, while the increasein Aceh’s share in the revenues accruing from

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oil and gas reserves flowed into the provincialgovernment in the period prior to and followingthe armed conflict, few benefits trickled downto the grassroots level, as evidenced by thewide gap that remains between standards ofliving in Aceh compared to other provinces inthe North Sumatra region.

As in the case of Muslim Mindanao,research has also unveiled the spread of anunderground economy in Aceh, manifested inthe spread of loose firearms, bribery, andextort ion act ivit ies , part icularly in thetransport sector. This has had a substantialeffect on the costs of the post-tsunami and post-conflict reconstruction process.53

Nevertheless, the economic sources ofconflict in Aceh are eclipsed by the problems ofdemocratisation that accompanied the creationof a devolved authority within the province.This is underscored by two factors in particular.First, the worsening division amongst theAcehnese is depicted in the formation of sixlocal political parties, which joined 34 othernational parties in vying for electoral posts inthe recent elections. Second, the actions of thecentral Indonesian state that tried to favourone group within GAM to the detriment of theothers.

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As in the case of Muslim Mindanao,democratisation and devolution was marked bya “winner takes all” process of polit icalcompetition, as control over political officecarried with it control over government-to-government transfers, revenues from the oiland gas reserves, and reconstruction benefits.

The GAM-affi l iated Partai Aceh hasattained a significant victory in the 2009elections, but the political crevices that led tooutbreaks of violence in the provincial capitalremain as wide as ever. These flashpointsintertwine with the unsettled issues and claimsof ex-combatants dissatisfied with the post-conflict reintegration process and the demandsof indigenous people in the central highlandsand the southeastern part of the province,where armed groups continue to organiseadherents and foment secessionist demands.The unrest is further stoked by a rise inunemployment as the post-tsunamireconstruction phase begins to wind down, andas oi l and gas production decl ines withresources drying up along Aceh’s east coast.Placing the entire post-tsunami and post-conflict reconstruction process under thecontrol of a provincial government controlledby a dominant faction within GAM has been asource of continuing tensions.

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In conclusion, a confluence of events occurringat the same time as the peace process providesthe core of a crisis that threatens to engulf theprovince.

Conclusion: Fostering an Inclusive PeaceConclusion: Fostering an Inclusive PeaceConclusion: Fostering an Inclusive PeaceConclusion: Fostering an Inclusive PeaceConclusion: Fostering an Inclusive Peace

This study has pointed to newly emergingsources of violence and conflict in MuslimMindanao and focuses on the resurgence of clanpolitics, the recurrent property rights issuesthat fuel rido, and the expansion of an informaleconomy that provokes both rebellion-relatedand inter-clan or group conflict. The studyemphasises the decisive role played by electoralpolitics in determining access to and controlover government-to-government budgettransfers and the vast informal economy. Thepaper highlights the persistent social exclusionthat is being nurtured by the rapid changes inthe region’s political economy. And to enablean init ial analysis o f conf l ict from theSoutheast Asian regional perspective, a briefcomparison has been undertaken betweenMuslim Mindanao and Aceh.

Previous studies have pointed to theexclusion that Muslims in Mindanao and Acehexperience as the cause of the long warsbetween rebel challengers and the nation-state

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in the Philippines and Indonesia. These studieshave also shown how the secessionist causeoften fails to gain strong adherents at the locallevel. While the language of secession has beenreplaced by a discourse on autonomy, theoriginal claims of social exclusion continue toresonate at the local level – as the gains fromgrowth and autonomy fai l to lead to asignificant change in peoples’ standards ofliving.

Exclusion then remains an often-usedterm at the heart of explanations of violentconflict in Mindanao and elsewhere. Butexclusion is not a straightforward concept, andcannot be understood solely in terms of Muslimidentity. For identity at the local level inMindanao is more complex than this. Exclusionis also determined by other aspects of identitysuch as gender, c lan and age, and byrelationships and networks which either enableaccess to political and economic power or not.

As the sources and expressions ofexclusion have changed and become morecomplex since the onset of the struggle for aBangsamoro homeland (see Table 2 above forexample), so has it become more urgent to digdeeper into questions of who the excluded are,what they are excluded from, by whom, and

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why? These are difficult questions to answergiven a multitude of different actors andagendas. They can also be dangerous questionsto ask given that they lead swiftly to anexploration of who holds power and the natureof this power.

This paper posits the presence of a blockedtransition towards a lasting peace in Mindanaoand Aceh. The literature describes a blockedtransit ion as – a s i tuation where thegovernment directly or indirectly condones theuse of violence against independent politicalactions undertaken by the poor majority.54 Inthe particular case of Muslim Mindanao, werefer to a blocked transition as a situationwhere traditional local elites and the centralstate collude and condone the continued spreadof violence as a hedge against the politicalactions of opposition groups and armed rebels,and is most pronounced during electoralstruggles. In the case of Aceh, the continueduse of violence against other “claimants” in thepost-conflict process is inextricably linked tothe process of shoring up one rebel faction tothe exclusion of others. In both cases, thecontinuation of violence intimidates politicalopposition and cripples the ability of devolvedand autonomous political authority to endwidespread violent conflict.

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Part o f the l imitat ion of currentapproaches to peacebuilding is that theseapproaches often frame vio lent conf l ictpredominantly as armed, rebellion-relatedconflict. However, as this paper has sought toillustrate, the armed conflict between theMILF/MNLF and the GRP armed forces bothfeeds and draws on inter- and intra-clan conflict(rido). This conflict cocktail, with its roots inexclusionary politics and economics, createsnew opportunities for those benefiting fromexclusion. It underlines the lingering plight ofpeople like Musheera and Makin, who liveunder the terms of a formal peace that existsonly on paper.

International and local efforts to endarmed rebellion and that call for immediateceasef ires , e lect ions, autonomy, anddecentralisation as the key instruments forlast ing peace and development are le ftwanting. They are inadequate not becausethese are the wrong aspirations, but becausethey do not engage strategically with the lessvisible yet vital dynamics of inter- and intra-clan conflict and do not enable understandingof how these dynamics are inextricably linkedto key issues such as the unsettled propertyrights framework that governs access to land,the mode of democratic electoral competition,

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the expansion of an underground economy, andthe relationships between this economy andlocal clan politics. Without the full picture, afull solution is not possible. Certainly, theinformal economy may provide livelihoods forthe poor and vulnerable in conditions ofuncertainty and insecurity, but it also bringswith it risk of local conflict, and ultimatelyweakens the administrative capacity of thestate.

Peacebuilding strategies must, therefore,include consideration of local communityconflict dynamics and the ways in which armedrebel l ion interacts with them. Thisconsideration will inevitably lead to a closerexploration of the informal economy and thecontestation for political influence that bringscontrol of this economy. Such a process requiresdialogue with particular characteristics.Dialogue that operates at the nexus betweenarmed rebellion and local community conflict;that engages those towards both ends of theexcluded/included spectrum – in order toconfront and unpack current patterns of powerand control; that can draw in the private sectorsince this sector is key to the delivery of jobsand incomes; that develops practical andstrategic reforms – since dialogue in and ofitself is only a means to an end; that operates

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at multiple levels since managing conflict is theresponsibility of many; and that can sustainmomentum over an extended time period –since societal change takes time.

If this peacebuilding approach can bestrengthened and successfully complementothers then it is more likely that the resourcesfor equitable and sustainable development inMindanao can be used effectively, to bringabout the transition from persistent violenceand underdevelopment to peace and prosperityfor all.

Like a stone dropped into a pond, dialoguebetween di f ferent stakeholders , i fcharacterised as above, can create changes inattitudes and behaviours that, like ripples,spread out to influence institutions andpolicies, gradually creating a new environmentin which inclusion can eventually trumpexclusion (Figure 5). Such an inclusive statewould depend upon an open and fair process ofpolitical competition, and a political andeconomic infrastructure based upon theabsolute control by local states of the means ofcoercion.

The challenges are many. Such a situationmay not be favourable for national elites who

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seek to utilise weak electoral systems for theirbenefit. A representative state may also bevulnerable to the legitimate claims andgrievances of a dominant group that may seefew benef i ts from a discourse that isrepresentative of all sectors and a practiceaccountable to all citizens. Furthermore,identity-based regimes in the post-conflictperiod such as the GAM-led provincialgovernment, or the MNLF-led ARMM andMILF-proposed BJE would have to denythemselves the armed strength that isnecessary for their armed groups to survive.This truism remains at the core of the problemof continued violence, i.e., an identity-basedand instrumentalist regime possesses the seedsof its own instability and insecurity.

Figure 5: The Peacebuilding RippleFigure 5: The Peacebuilding RippleFigure 5: The Peacebuilding RippleFigure 5: The Peacebuilding RippleFigure 5: The Peacebuilding Ripple

Source: International Alert

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In the face of these challenges, new andinnovative interventions are required to stemcontinuing violence. These interventions must beowned by those with a stake in the requiredtransition from conflict to peace, and informedby an honest dialogue exploring the currentexpressions of exclusionary political andeconomic practices. They must build on thelearning of past and present dialogue initiatives,drawing on experience already gained.

International agencies must support sucha dialogue process which promises to develop anew template for development assistance basedon an understanding of the links between armedrebellion and local community conflict. Such atemplate will result in interventions that willenable vulnerable groups to adapt to conditionsof conflict and provide the building blocks for thesettlement of fundamental issues such as landownership, ancestral domain, and naturalresource distribution.

Only then will Musheera be able to livewithout the constant fear of displacement, andMakin bring up his children without the need toprotect them from rido, as his father had to dofor him. Only then will the principle of inclusion,the key to lasting peace, become a reality.

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EndnotesEndnotesEndnotesEndnotesEndnotes

1 F rancisco Lara Jr. is Research Associate at the Crisis

States Research Centre of the London School of Economics

and Pol i t ical Science . Phi l Champain is Director o f

Programmes for Asia and Eurasia regions at International

Alert.2 Not their real names.

3 T his puzzle is taken from Moxham’s (2007) paradoxical

challenge in the case of Timor-Leste, which in turn is based

on a study of the “post-conflict” moment in Afghanistan by

C. Cramer and J. Goodhand (2002).

4 Writing on conflict in Aceh, Collier and Sambanis (2005,

p.53) have pointed to the looting of resources that contributed

to the duration, rather than the onset of conflict.5 The term “bangsa” is a Malay term with Sanskrit roots

that refers to nations, castes, races, lines of descent, and

estates (Buendia, 2005). The Moro National Liberation Front

(MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)

popularized the term “bangsamoro” to promote their

advocacy for an independent Moro nation. See Noble (1976),

Jubair (1999), Muslim (1994), and Lingga (2007).

6 T .J.S. George, 1980; Ahmad, 1999; Muslim, 1994; Jubair,

1999.

7 Mercado, 1984; Ahmad, 1999.8 A binales, 2000; Buendia, 2005; Mc Kenna, 1998.

9 The Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain reads:

‘It is essential to lay the foundation of the Bangsamoro

homeland in order to address the Bangsamoro people’s

humanitarian and economic needs as well as their political

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aspirations’. (No. 2, Concepts and Principles, Memorandum

of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the

GRPMILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001.)

10 Schiavo-Ocampo and Judd, 2005.11 The first series of negotiations in the seventies led to the

Tripoli Agreement of 1976, which caused the MNLF to drop

their claim for independence and to agree to autonomy. After

the fall of the Marcos dictatorship, peace talks were revived

by President Corazon Aquino in 1986. The creation of an

autonomous region was eventually passed as a law in 1987

named The Organic Act for Muslim Mindanao or Republic

Act 6734 of 1987, and in 1989 a plebiscite was held to

determine the cities and provinces that would join the

autonomous region. See Cagoco-Guiam (2006) and Iribani

(2006).

12 The ARMM covers 27,500 square kilometers and has a

population of 2.7 million. In this article, we abbreviate the

Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) to Muslim

Mindanao, a region carved out of Western, Central, and

Northern Mindanao and comprising the provinces of Lanao

del Sur, Maguindanao, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, and

the Islamic City of Marawi.13 These provinces are Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-tawi, and

Basi lan . Their incomes amounted to an average o f

11,668pesos (£166.00), or only a third of the real per capita

income of the Northern Luzon province of Nueva Viscaya

(2005 Human Development Report, p.101).

14 The MILF is a breakaway faction from the MNLF that was

established in 1984 by Hashim Salamat, a devout Muslim

scholar who was part of the MNLF leadership. Salamat died

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in 2003. The MILF was not a party to the peace agreement

signed between the MNLF and the Philippine government

(GRP) in 1996.

15 The sort of economic growth experienced by Muslim

Mindanao further marginalises poor communities that did

not have access to reconstruction and reintegration funds,

nor the spoils from electoral contests. Studies show that some

post-conflict disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration

(DDR) policies and programmes that leverage one group over

another may harden ethnic divisions (See Berman, 1998; and

Snyder, 2000).

16 Often referred to as the “resource curse”, some scholars

have pointed to the connection between lootable resources

and non-separatist violence, and between non-lootable

resources and separatist violence (Ross, 2003, pp.47–67).

17 Reno, 2000; Tilly, 2003; Keen, 2008.18 Interviews conducted for this study validate the presence

of the Communist Party of the Philippines – New Peoples

Army (CPP-NPA) regulars operating in villages adjacent to

or within the ARMM, with frequent reports of tactical

cooperation among MILF and NPA field commanders in the

past. Meanwhile, another armed group that has captured

national and foreign attention is the Abu Sayyaf, which claims

to adhere to an ideological and political platform, though its

armed actions have focused on hostage-taking for ransom,

intimidation and extortion. It is more appropriate to describe

the latter as engaged in “criminal violence”. See Gutierrez

(1999, p.349).19 There are unwritten rules in rido that separate women and

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children from being the objects of violence. However, recent

cases of rido appear unmindful of these rules (See Durante et

al., 2007; UNYPAD, 2007).

20 Inter-and intra-clan and tribal conflicts are sometimes

unresolved, though the violence may dissipate after a major

confrontation as each side weighs the costs of escalating the

violence. Without a settlement of the original causes of

conflict, the feud is passed on to succeeding generations.21 The first ARMM governor was Zacarias Candao (1991–

1993), who comes from a powerful clan in Maguindanao with

close ties to the Aquino government. The second governor was

Liningning Pangamdaman (1993–1996), who comes from a

prominent clan in Lanao del Sur with political connections to

the Ramos government.22 Danguilan-Vitug and Gloria (2000) note that apart from

Nur Misuari, more than 30 members of the MNLF senior

leadership joined the ARMM regional government in 1996.

Other MNLF central committee members such as Cotabato

Mayor Muslimin Sema sought electoral office.

23 Clashes between government troops and MILF rebels in

August 2008 occurred following charges and counter-charges

of deception and indiscriminate killing by both sides.

Renewed f ighting actual ly erupted fo l lowing a court

injunctionthat prevented the signing of a memorandum of

agreement on ancestral domain (International Crisis Group,

23rd October 2008, Policy Briefing, Jakarta and Brussels).24 A review of security and militarization and their consequent

effects on the civilian population in Muslim Mindanao is

available in the 2005 UNDP report (Peace, Human Security,

and Human Development in the Philippines).

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25 Gutierrez and Danguilan-Vitug, 1999; Guiam, 2006.

26 Rasul, 2007.27 Ramos assumed the presidency in the midst of a fiscal

crisis and the breakdown of basic services such as water and

electricity. See Danguilan-Vitug and Gloria (2000).

28 While ostensibly promoting peacebuilding in Mindanao, the

Ramos government had few incentives within the EAGA to

attract investments to the conflict-affected areas within the

ARMM, preferring to promote instead the major urban

centres of Mindanao.29 Dela Rosa and Abreu, 2003.

30 Community-level conflict between Muslim and Christian

peasants over the right of use to a 30-hectare coconut farm in

Linamon, Lanao del Norte became the first flashpoint in the

2000 war, as the AFP sided with the Christians while the

MILF defended the Muslims. Interview with Musa Sanguila,

Executive Director of Pakigdait Inc. (2007).

31 A n extensive study on the causes and effects of rido showed

that land disputes were the principal sources of community-

level violence, followed by electoral competition.32 D urante et al., 2007.

33 Matuan, 2007.34 Interviews and focus group discussions conducted for this

study revealed the close links between the powerful clans

and rebel forces. The Lanao clans (Alonto-Lucman) including

that of the late Ali Dimaporo, were said to have been in

constant contact with some leaders of the MNLF in the 70s.

The respondents also revealed that some powerful clans in

Maguindanao and Lanao provided significant financial and

material support to the MILF, particularly during the

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leadership of the late MILF leader Hashim Salamat.35 Misuari was toppled from the ARMM leadership in 2001

by the so-called Group of 13 headed by Dr. Parouk Hussein,

who became the next ARMM governor. The Group of 13 is

composed of key leaders of the MNLF who were dissatisfied

with Misuari’s leadership. The Hussein-led ARMM was a

brief preface to the eventual take-over of the ARMM by the

powerful Ampatuan clan of Maguindanao.

36 Newsbreak and UNDP (2007) IRA Distribution by Provinces

2006, in Democracy and Governance in the Philippines

Project. Interview with Suharto Ambolodto, ARMM Judicial

Reform Activity Manager, USAID.

37 National Statistical Coordination Board, GRP, 2008.38 Torres, 2007, The Asia Foundation.

39 Interview with a senior bank officer (anonymous) of one of

the largest commercial banks in the Philippines in charge of

supervising regional fund transfers across Mindanao.40 The head of the MILF negotiating panel, Mohagher Iqbal,

denounced the indiscr iminate k i l l ing o f c iv i l ians in

Kolambugan, Linamon, and Kauswagan, and announced

publicly that an investigation would be internally conducted

by the MILF to determine the responsibi l i ty of base

commands under MILF commanders Umbra Kato and Bravo.41 A mong the groups affected were the Ampatuans. The

Ampatuan family is an important political force in Muslim

Mindanao. Andal Ampatuan is the former governor of

Maguindanao, while his son Zaldy Ampatuan was reelected

in 2008 as governor of the ARMM. See Philippine Daily

Inquirer, 13th August 2008 and 14th March 2007.42 See Philippine Daily Inquirer, 14th May 2007.

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43 Interview with a ranking official of the Department of

Agrarian Reform (DA R) (anonymous) in Manila reveals that

several powerful clans in Maguindanao were directly engaged

in anomalous voluntary offers of sale (VOS ) of land and

“right-of-way” transactions. These irregularities, he claims,

are the reason why the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP)

indefinitely suspended the payment of VOS claims.

44 C ongressional hearings after the August 2008 attacks

reported an increase in armed encounters between

paramilitary militias and MILF elements prior to the

announcement of the MOA -AD.

45 Local officials who were stridently opposed to the MOA -

AD included Vice-Governor Manuel Pinol (Cotabato) and

Mayor

Celso Lobregat (Zamboanga City).

46 Focus group discussions indicate a deepening of distrust

among ordinary Muslims towards national politicians and

parties that took the lead in blocking the MOA -AD.47 Lara, 2007.

48 GA M control over the Aceh Reconstruction Agency (KPA)

fuels most of the distrust (Jakarta Post, 6th March 2009).

49 F ormer GA M head Irwandi was elected in 2005 as governor

of Aceh.

50 S nyder, 2000; Berman, 1998.51 International monitoring groups have reported a surge in

violence as the nation approaches national elections in

2009.Several Partai Aceh candidates have been gunned down,

while candidates from other contending parties in Aceh have

been harassed and intimidated. The Associated Press, 13th

February 2009; World Bank, July-August 2008.

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52 Lara, 2008, 2009.

53 Studies reveal that illegal payments along the main route

between Banda Aceh and Medan substantially increase the

cost of business in Aceh (World Bank, 2006).

54 Lara and Morales, 1990.

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IMAGINING A CONSTITUTIONAL

AMENDMENT FOR A MORO

“SUB-STATE”

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Imagining a Constitutional amendmentImagining a Constitutional amendmentImagining a Constitutional amendmentImagining a Constitutional amendmentImagining a Constitutional amendmentfor a Moro “sub-state”for a Moro “sub-state”for a Moro “sub-state”for a Moro “sub-state”for a Moro “sub-state”Soliman M. Santos, Jr.1

s this not putting the cart before the horse?Why not wait for the Comprehensive

Compact outcome of the GPH-MILF peacenegot iat ions f irst? For al l we know,const itut ional amendments may not benecessary. But actually, we already know thatthey will be necessary if there is to be anenabl ing core framework that would bequalitative better in terms of self-governancethan the existing constitutional provisionsArticle X, Sections 15-21 on autonomousregions. We already know from existing draftsand statements of the MILF that the form ofself-determination that they seek has beenexpressed through catch words like notably“sub-state juridical entity,” “asymmetricalstate-substate relationship,” “asymmetricalstructure through compact of free association,”

1SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR. has been a long-time Bicolano humanrights and IHL lawyer; legislative consultant and legal scholar; peaceadvocate, researcher and writer esp. for and on the Mindanao peaceprocess, with several books on this, inc. The Moro Islamic Challenge:Constitutional Rethinking for the Mindanao Peace Process (UP Press,2001; with 2nd printing, 2009), where he has long made the first fullargument for charter change for that peace process. He is presentlyPresiding Judge of the 9th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) ofNabua-Bato, and Acting Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court(MTC) of Balatan, both in Camarines Sur

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“free association of state or union,” “associativerelat ionship,” “ free associated state , ”“associated free state” and the like which areunfortunately not readily understandable.

What is really important is not thesecatch words but the actual structural powerand sovereign relationship between the stateand “sub-state” (or by whatever term the“beast” is called) as would be detailed in theComprehensive Compact. Although there areseveral models of free association or associatedstates, including the U.S.-sponsored 1935-46Commonwealth of the Philippines (which waspreparation for independence), whateverBangsamoro “sub-state” to be created, willperforce have its own unique configurationarising mainly from the present-day Philippinecontext. In any case, all indications are, fromthe MILF drafts, that they envision a highdegree of se l f -governance short o findependence — certainly much higher thanthe low intensity and failed autonomy of theAutonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao(ARMM), which has a structural level thatultimately limits whatever reforms and newofficials are put into place.

It therefore makes some sense to try toimagine how the Bangsamoro “sub-state”

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might look when articulated as a part of theConstitution of its “parent” Philippine state.This is an attempt to answer in a moresubstantive and constructive way rather thanan argumentative and rhetorical way the validquestion “Substate, what’s this beast?” If wetry to answer this in more readi lyunderstandable terms, such as in the form andlanguage of a proposed const itut ionalamendment (which is what it will take for the“beast” to be born, if ever), then perhaps itbecomes clearer what this “sub-state” it. Andfor this purpose, our proposed constitutionalamendment deliberately avoids using theaforesaid catchwords.

Be that as i t may, our proposedconstitutional amendment is guided mainly bythe content of several MILF drafts in order toattempt to capture the essence of theirenvisioned “asymmetrical state-substate(associative) relationship.” But our proposedconstitutional amendment is also guided byseveral GRP/GPH drafts and establishedparameters and positions, most definitely thatthe “sub-state” must not be “on its way toindependence.” Final ly, our proposedconstitutional amendment likewise draws fromthe work of various independent civil societypeace advocates and academics, including that

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of the author. The latter takes ful lresponsibil ity though for the balancing,choices, formulations, nuances, omissions andown ideas that he has worked into the proposedconstitutional amendment, based on hisunderstanding of MILF, GPH and civil societyperspectives.

More important than just answering“Substate, what’s this beast?,” our proposedconstitutional amendment is offered as aninput in aid of the peace negotiations. One ideain putt ing this proposed const i tut ionalamendment “cart” before the ComprehensiveCompact “horse” is to help simplify theincreasingly complicated and di f f icultdiscussions on the Comprehensive Compactsubject matter, including the MILF’s long andcomplexly-worded draft amendatory Article on“Bangsamoro State” to the Constitution. Theremay be a need in the negotiations to focus onf inding the mutual ly acceptable coreframework for a negotiated political settlementthat would likely also entail a negotiatedconstitutional settlement. Without usurpingconstituent powers, the two peace panels mustnecessari ly engage in discussions of aconstitutional nature since what is reallyinvolved here is restructuring the power orsovereign relationship between the Philippine

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republic and the Bangsamoro people within itspolity. It thus deals with the constitutionalassociation between two nations or peopleswithin one country. In other words, it partakesof no less than re-defining the PhilippineState, re-imagining the Filipino nation, and re-writing a new Filipino-Moro social compact.

Finding that mutually acceptable coreframework is like cutting the proverbialGordian knot of an increasingly complicatedand di f f icult process and substance ofnegotiations. The core framework mutuallyagreed to be worked on until its entrenchmentas a constitutional amendment would be likethe key link in that whole process, facilitatingwhatever remaining necessary legislative,executive, administrative and even judicialmeasures. Otherwise, the tendency in theprocess, especially on the part of the GPH,would be to often piecemeal address specificMILF proposals in its draft ComprehensiveCompact through the prism of the Constitutionand national laws. And often enough, the latterconstitute blockages to those proposals becauseof the di f ferent frameworks they arerespectively coming from, including theconstitutional ARMM framework on the GPHside. In fact , supposedly implementinglegislation of peace agreements, without first

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“effecting the necessary changes to the legalframework,” may end up putting in placemeasures that are not really aligned to theright core framework, and which may have tobe undone, thus further complicating theprocess. The same might be said regardingunduly cumbersome transit ionalarrangements and an unduly long interimperiod, as proposed by the MILF. Simplify,don’t complicate, the already complicated.Time is flying.

Our proposed constitutional amendmentis offered as an independent civil societyinitiative for both parties. More of this sort ofinitiative, including an independent civilsociety draft Comprehensive Compact anddraft Bangsamoro Basic Law, may benecessary to help break impasses where bothpanels insist on their own drafts to be the“working draft” because of strong attachmentto its framing, concepts and even language.The MILF has proposed an amendatory Articleon “Bangsamoro State” to be appended as anOrdinance to the Constitution, similar to thefirst (1939) and second (1947) ordinancesappended to the 1935 Philippine Constitutionwhich dealt with transitory U.S.-Philippinerelations, including the infamous ParityAmendment. That could be one possible form,

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although it has been commented that such formmay be more suitable for only transitoryarrangements. Our proposed constitutionalamendment is instead an Article X-A to beinserted right after the existing Article X,Sections 15-21 on Autonomous Regions. Thisindicates better the constitutional-historicalsequence or segue from the ARMM to what wecal l generical ly the “Bangsamoro sel f -governing region” (BSR, for those who areacronym-conscious). The reader may find thefollowing proposed Article X-A on the verboseside. Better for a draft to err on the side ofverbosity, elucidation and clarity. As it is,certain terms are def ined and, mostimportantly, certain rationales for the proposednew region are stated. In any case, the draftcan be pared down, as desired, aside fromfurther refinement. Or, it could even be addedto where there may have been significantomissions. It is definitely not prefect but hereit is, gratis et amore:

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ARTICLE X-AARTICLE X-AARTICLE X-AARTICLE X-AARTICLE X-ABANGSAMORO SELF-GOVERNING

REGION

Sect ion 1Sect ion 1Sect ion 1Sect ion 1Sect ion 1. [Basic Concept o f theBasic Concept o f theBasic Concept o f theBasic Concept o f theBasic Concept o f theRegion ad Nature of its Relationship withRegion ad Nature of its Relationship withRegion ad Nature of its Relationship withRegion ad Nature of its Relationship withRegion ad Nature of its Relationship withthe Republic.the Republic.the Republic.the Republic.the Republic.] In lieu of but building on theexisting and reformed Autonomous Region inMuslim Mindanao (ARMM), there shall becreated a Bangsamoro self-governing region,to meet the aspiration for a system of life andgovernance suitable and acceptable to theBangsamoro people. This region shall exercisea high degree of self-rule short of independenceand not leading to it, exercising its ownlegislative, executive and judicial powers,subject to this Article X-A. There shall be inthis region a fair and just balancing of thenational sovereignty and territorial integrityof the Republic of the Philippines, on one hand,and the Bangsamoro people’s right of self-determination, on the other.

The national territory shall remainintact, with this region as an integral part ofit. The national sovereignty in this regionshall reside in and be shared by both theFilipino and Bangsamoro peoples throughtheir respective levels of government authorityin accordance with the sharing of government

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powers provided in this Article X-A. TheBangsamoro people have the right to self-government in matters relating to theirinternal and local affairs, as well as ways andmeans for financing their self-governingfunctions. The object of such self-governmentis to secure the Bangsamoro identity and wayof life, protect their homeland and its resources,and establish a system of governance as apeople possessing a unique history and culture.

Sec . 2Sec . 2Sec . 2Sec . 2Sec . 2 . [ Ident i tyIdent i tyIdent i tyIdent i tyIdent i ty, Nat ional i ty and, Nat ional i ty and, Nat ional i ty and, Nat ional i ty and, Nat ional i ty andCitizenship.Citizenship.Citizenship.Citizenship.Citizenship.] The Bangsamoro people are thecollective nation of the largely Islamizedthirteen ethno- l inguist ic groups of theMaranaw, Maguindanao, Tausug, Samal,Yakan, Sangil, Palawani, Badjao, Kalibugan,Jama-Mapun, Iranun, Kalagan, and Molbog inthe Southwestern Philippines, as well as thosewho choose to identi fy themselves asBangsamoro. They are a historically andculturally significant and distinct nation andport ion of the entire populat ion of thePhilippine State. This Bangsamoro nationalityis recognized even while retaining theirPhilippine citizenship. Their historic pre-colonial sultanates and subsequent role in theresistance to co lonial ism are l ikewiserecognized, as well as their historical andsystematic marginalization and minoritization

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in their ancestral homeland in the Mindanao,Sulu and Palawan islands. Social justice callsfor the acknowledgement and correction of thehistorical injustices against the Bangsamoropeople, in particular the injustices to theterr itor ial integrity o f their ancestralhomeland, as well as to their identity, politicalsovereignty and integral developmentconsistent with their distinct Moro Islamic wayof life.

The creation herein of a Bangsamoroself-governing region is itself a measure ofsocial justice which redresses those legitimateand core Moro grievances by restructuring thepower or sovereign relationship between thePhilippine republic and the Bangsamoropeople within its polity, as the key measuretowards enhancing the total i ty o frelationships, including between the Filipinoand Bangsamoro peoples and among the tri-peoples of Mindanao. Their relationships shallbe based on parity of esteem, full equality, andmutual recognition, respect, amity, cooperationand assistance.

Sec. 3Sec. 3Sec. 3Sec. 3Sec. 3. [Political TPolitical TPolitical TPolitical TPolitical Territoryerritoryerritoryerritoryerritory, , , , , AccessionAccessionAccessionAccessionAccessionThereto, and Homeland.Thereto, and Homeland.Thereto, and Homeland.Thereto, and Homeland.Thereto, and Homeland.] The core or initialterritory of the Bangsamoro self-governingregion shall be the present geographic area of

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the ARMM, plus the municipalities of Baloi,Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagaloan andTangkal in the province of Lanao del Nortethat voted for inclusion in the ARMM duringthe 2001 plebiscite, and the cities of Cotabatoand Isabela in the provinces of Maguindanaoand Basilan, respectively, which are alreadypart of the ARMM.

There shall be developed jointly, by theappropriate government authorities both ofthe republic and of the region, a democraticprocess for the accession to this region ofaddit ional geographic areas , inc ludingbarangays, of predominantly Muslim or ethnicMoro populat ion, preferably but notnecessarily always contiguous to the region.Similar authorities of both the republic andthe region shall l ikewise determine thedemarcation and status of territorial waters ofthe region based mainly on the archipelagicprinciple.

The Bangsamoro homeland is thehistorical and traditional territory in theMindanao, Sulu and Palawan islands that hadbeen inhabited, occupied and ruled by theBangsamoro people particularly during thetime of their pre-colonial sultanates andprincipalties. This historic homeland or

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ancestral territoriality constitutes a basis forBangsamoro sel f -governance, but suchhistorical sovereignty over these geographicalareas, while an important territorial criterionfor possible expansion of the region, shall nowhave to be subject to the free and genuineexpression of the will of their contemporaryinhabitants.

Sec . 4Sec . 4Sec . 4Sec . 4Sec . 4 . [Legis lat ive Powers :Legis lat ive Powers :Legis lat ive Powers :Legis lat ive Powers :Legis lat ive Powers :Exclus ive , Concurrent , and Residual .Exclus ive , Concurrent , and Residual .Exclus ive , Concurrent , and Residual .Exclus ive , Concurrent , and Residual .Exclus ive , Concurrent , and Residual . ]Within its political territory or territorialjurisdiction and subject to this Article X-A, theBangsamoro self-governing region shall havelegislative powers over all matters except thefollowing reserved exclusively for the NationalGovernment: Defense and external security;Foreign relations and policy; Territorialintegrity; Citizenship and naturalization;Coinage and monetary policy; Postal system;and Common market and global trade.

There shall be concurrent legislativepowers between the Congress and the region’slegislature on the following matters: Publicwelfare and humanitarian institutions; Socialwelfare, charities and charitable trusts; Publichealth and social services; Education andskills training; Registration of births, deaths,marriages and divorces; Registration of

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changes of residence; Cadastral land surveys;Land registration and distribution and waterregime; Agriculture and forest management;Inland waterways and coastal shipping; Inlandfisheries and coastal preservation; Aquaculture and marine matters; Protectionregarding the marketing of food, drink andtobacco ; Transport planning andinfrastructure; Tourism development; Ports,harbors and foreshores; Coast guards andborder patrols; Urban and rural development;Regional economic structures; Natureconservation and preservation of historical andcultural sites; Waste disposal and noiseabatement; and the equitable sharing ofcommon wealth.

Al l powers , funct ions, andresponsibi l i t ies not otherwise grantedexclusively or concurrently in this Article X-Ato the National Government shall be vested inthe region. Notwithstanding the aforesaidlimitation on the legislative powers of theregion, it may enact laws that promote thegeneral welfare of the Bangsamoro people.

Sec. 5Sec. 5Sec. 5Sec. 5Sec. 5. [Legal Regime, Human Rights,Legal Regime, Human Rights,Legal Regime, Human Rights,Legal Regime, Human Rights,Legal Regime, Human Rights,and Legal Pluralism.and Legal Pluralism.and Legal Pluralism.and Legal Pluralism.and Legal Pluralism.] The legal regime inthe Bangsamoro self-governing region shall begoverned principally by the following legal

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sources: this Article X-A; the Bangsamoro BasicLaw as organic act to be drafted by aconstituent assembly of the Bangsamoropeople; by international human rights lawand general ly accepted principles o finternational law which are both deemedadopted as part of the law of the region; andthe Bi l l o f Rights o f the Phi l ippineConstitution. The other Articles of theConstitution as well as national laws shallapply in a suppletory capacity insofar as theyare not inconsistent herewith. Theconstitutional principle of separation ofChurch and State, and the related non-establishment of religion clause, in particularshall not be applicable to a Moro Islamic systemas may be established in the region.

The protection and respect of humanrights, shall be guaranteed in the region,especially the following international humanrights treated in a unified way: the right toequality and non-discrimination; the right ofminorities to preserve their own culture,religion and language; the right of indigenouspopulations to preserve their traditions, as wellas their special rights to land and its naturalresources; and the right of peoples to self-determination. Among others, civil liberties,religious freedom, women’s rights, vested

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property r ights , and the r ights to sel f -determination and ancestral domain ofindigenous highlander tribes, as well as theirfreedom of choice, shall be recognized andrespected, including as provided in theIndigenous Peoples’ Rights Act, the UnitedNations Declarat ion on the Rights ofIndigenous Peoples , and the Mamalu-Tabunaway Pact between the Teduray andMaguindanaon tribes.

While the Bangsamoro Basic Law shall bethe main governing law in the region, the legalregime therein shall allow for a measure oflegal pluralism or a plural legal order in whichdiverse co-exist ing legal regimes aresuperimposed, interpenetrated, and mixed.These include Philippine law, international law,shari’ah or Islamic law, customary adat law, andindigenous tribal customary law. The regionallegislature may adopt, in whole or in part,national laws as well as Muslim MindanaoAutonomy Acts o f the ARMM RegionalLegislative Assembly, without necessarilythereby impliedly adopting theirconstitutional and legal bases. The appropriateauthorities both of the republic and of theregion, as well as of the concerned indigenoushighlander tribes within the region, shalldevelop jointly internal conflict-of-laws

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mechanisms for situations or disputes whereboth Bangsamoro nationals and non-nationalsare involved, with international human rightsas main common ground and normativestandard for conflict resolution.

Sec. 6. [Institutions and StructuresInstitutions and StructuresInstitutions and StructuresInstitutions and StructuresInstitutions and Structuresof Governance , Co-Relat ion with andof Governance , Co-Relat ion with andof Governance , Co-Relat ion with andof Governance , Co-Relat ion with andof Governance , Co-Relat ion with andRepresentat ion in the Nat ionalRepresentat ion in the Nat ionalRepresentat ion in the Nat ionalRepresentat ion in the Nat ionalRepresentat ion in the Nat ionalGovernmentGovernmentGovernmentGovernmentGovernment . ] The Bangsamoro sel f -governing region shall be empowered to build,develop and maintain its own institutions ofgovernance, inclusive of legislative, civilservice, electoral, legal, judicial, police andinternal security, correctional, educational,economic, financial and banking institutions,necessary for a progressive and modernBangsamoro society, including in co-relationwith national institutions of governance withinthe Philippine polity. The structure of theregional legislature, executive and judiciarymay be different from that of the NationalGovernment. Local governments shall begoverned by the legal regime in the regionwhich shal l provide for appropriatemechanisms for their representation in andconsultation by the regional government. Thelatter through its legislature may provide foran appropriate structure and configuration forthe more effective and viable governance of the

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two (2) main geographical parts, i.e. the centralmainland part and the southwestern islandspart, of the region, even as the latter level shallremain the center o f gravity for sel f -governance.

The appropriate government authoritiesboth of the republic and of the region shalldevelop jo int ly the mechanisms forcoordination, adjustments and conf l ictresolut ion such as where there may beoverlapping jurisdictions, especially in thematters of administration of justice and of localgovernment units. Among the major suchmechanisms shall be representation in theNational Government and veto-typemechanisms in case of national measures thatwould unduly prejudice the self-governanceand welfare of the region. The representationmechanisms shall include two (2) additionalSenate seats and three (3) additional Houseseats for the region with the concernedSenators and Representatives to be voted atlarge only in the region. Any Congressionalchange in the configuration or status of thecongressional districts and local governmentunits in the region shal l require theconcurrence of the regional legislature. Othermechanisms of representation as well as of vetoshall be provided by Congress, including in its

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internal rules , and by the appropriatemeasures of the executive, administrative andjudic ial departments of the NationalGovernment, in consultation and concurrencewith the proper regional authorities.

Sec. 7. [Ancestral Domain, ResourceAncestral Domain, ResourceAncestral Domain, ResourceAncestral Domain, ResourceAncestral Domain, ResourceUtil ization, and WUtil ization, and WUtil ization, and WUtil ization, and WUtil ization, and Wealth-Sharingealth-Sharingealth-Sharingealth-Sharingealth-Sharing.] TheBangsamoro ancestral domain does not formpart of the public domain but encompassesancestral, communal and customary lands,maritime, fluvial and alluvial domains as wellas all natural resources therein that haveinured or vested ancestral rights on the basisof native title to the Bangsamoro people intheir historic homeland, established not onlythrough occupation, possession and dominionsince time immemorial but also by culturalbond, customary law, historic rights and legaltitles. This special concept of ancestral domainshall apply only within the political territoryor territorial jurisdiction of the Bangsamoroself-governing region. The region shall, amongothers, exercise power or authority over thenatural resources, including subterraneannatural resources and strategic minerals,within i ts terr i tor ial jur isdict ion. Theexploration, development, and utilization ofthese natural resources shall reinforce theregion ’s economic sel f -suf f ic iency while

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safeguarding environmental security andintegrity for sustainable development. Thegeneral percentage ratio of wealth sharingbetween the region and the NationalGovernment shall be 75:25 in favor of theregion.

The ownership and use of land as well asvarious forms of land tenure, rights, claims andreform shall be governed by the plural legaland property regime in the region, with dueregard to vested property rights and legitimateprivate property. There shall be a thoroughreview of the public land acts and land tenuresystem as these have impacted on the region,with a view to more effectively accommodatingcustomary and indigenous land rights and lawas well as adopting modern internationaltrends of best practices and systems here.

Sec . 8 . [TTTTTransit ional Just ice ,ransi t ional Just ice ,ransi t ional Just ice ,ransi t ional Just ice ,ransi t ional Just ice ,Reparat ion, and Reconci l iat ionReparat ion, and Reconci l iat ionReparat ion, and Reconci l iat ionReparat ion, and Reconci l iat ionReparat ion, and Reconci l iat ion. ] Thehistoric and legitimate grievances of theBangsamoro people aris ing from unjustdispossession of their territorial, proprietaryand tenurial rights, as well as from theirsystematic marginal izat ion andminorit izat ion, is acknowledged by thePhilippine State. Where land restitution is nolonger possible, the National Government shall

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take measures of adequate reparation orcompensation collectively beneficial to theBangsamoro people, in such quality, quantityand form to be determined mutually by theappropriate government authorities of boththe region and the republic.

Transitional justice and reparation orcompensation shall also be justly due to thecivilian victims of war crimes and grossviolations of human rights committed by bothsides. There shall likewise be both substantiveand symbolic measures of transitional andrestorative justice as well as of nationalreconci l iat ion to heal inter-peoplerelationships and deep social, cultural andreligious cleavages, including through specialintervention of affirmative action for Muslimsor ethnic Moros in diasporas outside the regionand no less than a review, rewriting and re-teaching of Philippine and Mindanao history.

Sec . 9 . [Shared Securi tyShared Securi tyShared Securi tyShared Securi tyShared Securi tyArrangementsArrangementsArrangementsArrangementsArrangements.] The preservation of peaceand order within the Bangsamoro sel f -governing region shall be its responsibilitywhich shall be exercised through its police andinternal security force. The external defenseand security o f the region shal l be theresponsibility of the National Government

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which shall exercise it through the ArmedForces of the Philippines which, as the protectorof the people and the State, is also a protectorof the Bangsamoro people, since the AFP existsto protect the human rights of every Filipinocitizen. There shall be in the region an effectiveprogram for disarmament, demobilization andreintegration, or whatever it may be called, forthe Moro liberation armed forces. This programshal l a lso purposively deal withdemil i tarizat ion and normalizat ion,dismantling of paramilitary forces and privatearmies, and small arms and light weaponscontrol. It shall co-relate with national andMindanao-level efforts at security sectorreform, as well as peace education and cultureof peace efforts to address the “culture of thegun.”

Sec. 10. [Mechanisms and Time FrameMechanisms and Time FrameMechanisms and Time FrameMechanisms and Time FrameMechanisms and Time Framefor Tfor Tfor Tfor Tfor Transition, and Future ransition, and Future ransition, and Future ransition, and Future ransition, and Future AmendmentsAmendmentsAmendmentsAmendmentsAmendments.]Within thirty (30) days from the ratification ofthis Article X-A in a plebiscite called for thepurpose of voting on proposed constitutionalamendments, a Bangsamoro const ituentassembly, to draft the Bangsamoro Basic Lawas the organic act of the Bangsamoro self-governing region, shall be convened pursuantto an executive order to be issued by thePresident, the groundwork for which would

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have been laid by the broad-based Mindanaopeace process, including the peace negotiationsand agreements with the two (2) main Moroliberation fronts. Within six (6) months fromthe time of organization of the Bangsamoroconstituent assembly, it shall complete its workof draft ing the Basangmoro Basic Lawconsistent with this Article X-A, and with theassistance and participation of adequate cross-community, multi-ethnic and multi-partystakeholder consultation mechanisms to beprovided in the executive order.

Within forty-five (45) to sixty (60) daysfrom the completion of the draft BangsamoroBasic Law, it shall be submitted to theBangsamoro people for rat i f icat ion orotherwise in a referendum/plebiscite called forthe purpose in the core or initial territoryindicated in Sec. 3 above, with the majorityvote thereon to be reckoned on the basis of thatwhole territory. Upon such majority vote ofapproval, the Bangsamoro Basic Law shallcome into force and effect, and the Bangsamoroself-governing region shall be deemed created.The existing Organic Act for the ARMM shall,however, continue to be in force and effect asthe main governing law of the existing ARMMRegional Government which shall continue tofunction, albeit mainly to assist in the

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transit ion in support o f transit ionalmechanisms and bodies to be provided in theexecutive order, until the election of the newBangsamoro Regional Government under theBangsamoro Basic Law. This election shall beconducted within another forty-five (45) to sixty(60) days from the rat i f icat ion of theBangsamoro Basic Law. Upon the election ofand soonest assumption of office by the newBangsamoro Regional Government, theexisting ARMM Regional Government shallcease to function and the ARMM Organic Actshall be deemed repealed.

Any future amendments to this Article X-A shall require only the concurrence ofCongress and the Bangsamoro self-governingregion’s legislature on a co-equal basis as theprimary sovereign representative bodies of thesovereign Filipino and Bangsamoro peoples,respectively, in their herein provided sharedsovereignty over the region.

Final Remarks

Well , subject to ref inements to thisproposed constitutional amendment in the formof an Article X-A, the question to the Filipinomajority who would have to ratify it, if ever, isthis: Is this something we can live with? It

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clearly provides for a constitutional space, stillwithin our republ ic and terr i tory, forBangsamoro minority to live out their distinct(from our) identity and way of life as well astheir centuries-old longing for self-rule (eveni f not anymore their preferred or iginalaspiration of independence, just like we hadgained from Spain and the U.S.). If we can sayyes to this constitutional space, which is alsolike reaching out to our Moro brothers andsisters, then we have given a great chance toourselves and all concerned to finally see peacein Muslim Mindanao in our time, which is alsofor the sake of future generations of Filipinosand Moros. If both peoples can say yes andmake it happen, we should in the process bothcome out better as we bring out the best in eachother. We would show that Moro nation-building and “substate”-building need notundermine but can instead enhance Filipinonation-building and state-building.

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RA N D O M TH O U G H T S O N RE-I M AG I N I N G T H E NAT I O N-STAT E:CO N S E N S U S A N D CO N F L I C T O N

SOVEREIGNTY AND AUTONOMY

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Random Thoughts on Re- imagining theRandom Thoughts on Re- imagining theRandom Thoughts on Re- imagining theRandom Thoughts on Re- imagining theRandom Thoughts on Re- imagining theNation-State: Consensus and Conflict onNation-State: Consensus and Conflict onNation-State: Consensus and Conflict onNation-State: Consensus and Conflict onNation-State: Consensus and Conflict onSovereignty and Sovereignty and Sovereignty and Sovereignty and Sovereignty and AutonomyAutonomyAutonomyAutonomyAutonomyFr. Eliseo ‘Jun’ Mercado, OMI

Director-Institute for Autonomy and Governance

say random thoughts simply because thereis scarcity of debates and consensus on the

subject and issue of nation states, sovereignty,territory and autonomy or self determination.Yet, the debates before, during and post MOAAD imbroglio have caught us unprepared. Inever thought that Mindanao or a portion ofthe island would be subject of passionatedebates nationwide. Suddenly, we hear peoplesfrom all walks of life being interviewed aboutthe specter of an independent sub-state. Trueor false hardly matters when peoples gotentangled along the traditional religious andethnic fault lines that have marred the physicaland geographic contours of the country andnation. The theme of the convention hasintrigued me and it is for this sole reason thatI have accepted to insert in my busy scheduleyour convention.

More than twenty years ago, I attendedand addressed a similar convention of socialand political scientists organized by theMalaysian Association of Social Scientists.

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There were five Filipinos invited to thesaid convention - two from the imperial Manila,the venerable Renato Constantino, DodongNemenzo and Temy Rivera and fromMindanao, Nagasura Madale and myselfexpounded on the politics of separatismespoused by the MNLF.

The convention’s theme was the politics ofseparatism in Southeast Asia. Experts fromvarious countries of SEA tried to analyze theroot causes of politics of separatism beyond theusual culprits that a more traditional socialscientists and policy makers point. The tripleculprits are poverty, politics of exclusion andinjustice – perceived or real as the causes ofinternal conflicts. This analysis has led not afew scholars to think and believe that theeconomic causes explain the recurrence andeven the sustainability of internal conflict. (Cf.Paul Col l ier ’s Studies : Pol icy for Post -Pol icy for Post -Pol icy for Post -Pol icy for Post -Pol icy for Post -conflict Societies: Reducing the Risks ofconflict Societies: Reducing the Risks ofconflict Societies: Reducing the Risks ofconflict Societies: Reducing the Risks ofconflict Societies: Reducing the Risks ofrenewed Conflictrenewed Conflictrenewed Conflictrenewed Conflictrenewed Conflict: March 2000; EconomicEconomicEconomicEconomicEconomicCauses o f Civ i l Conf l i c t and theirCauses o f Civ i l Conf l i c t and theirCauses o f Civ i l Conf l i c t and theirCauses o f Civ i l Conf l i c t and theirCauses o f Civ i l Conf l i c t and theirImplications for PolicyImplications for PolicyImplications for PolicyImplications for PolicyImplications for Policy: June 2000; GreedGreedGreedGreedGreedand Grievance in Civil Wand Grievance in Civil Wand Grievance in Civil Wand Grievance in Civil Wand Grievance in Civil Wararararar: October 2001;and Doing WDoing WDoing WDoing WDoing Well out of Well out of Well out of Well out of Well out of Wararararar: April 1999 – WBWeb Site). But tragically, a peacemaking solelybased on these analyses has still to produce a

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success story of peacemaking andpeacebuilding.

The very understanding of nation state asa very young construct was never put on thetable. Yet particularly in this part of the globe,such construct is, indeed, very young. TheBangsa Fil ipino or Bangsa Indonesia orBangsa Malayo or Bangsa Moro, Bangsa Aceh,Bangsa Pattani etc. are all relatively youngconstructs. In fact the very controversial issuesof territory, sovereignty and other elements ofthe so-called nation states were products ofcolonial heritage that continues to exercisetyranny over our spirits even after the yearsof de-colonization.

Then and now but more specifically in ourpresent discourse, we need to point out thatnation state and all its claims of people,sovereignty, territory and government areyoung constructs that continue to evolve. Theywere not “natural” in the sense that they werethere from the very beginning… a sort of amythical “illo tempore” or one of the originmyths of society.

In a more radical way of speaking butperhaps c loser to truth, the Fi l ipinonationhood that our Gat Andres Bonifacio

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conceived in 1896 did not go beyond the“Katagalogan” or by beyond the communitiesand peoples that the eight rays of the sunsymbolize in our flag. In a similar vein the socalled “Republica ng Pilipinas” that Gen.Emilio Aguinaldo proclaimed in 1898 coveredmore or less the peoples and communities thatwere subjects of Spain. I do not believe evenfor the sake of argument that Gen. Aguinaldoclaimed sovereign power over the Moros andor the so called non-Christians tribes includingthe peoples of the Cordillera.

Our claim then and now to nationhood isakin to yet another slogan that is now writtenin the plate numbers of motor vehicles -“Matatag na Republika”. This reminds me ofthe late Sec. Ricardo Gloria’s rhetoric forquality education. He ordered the words“quality education” painted in the roof tops ofall public schools. And there remained ourquality education.

Then globalization has come… Peoplebegin to talk of bigger things, wider arena, allkinds of unions associations and federationscame to being… European Community whichbegan with three became six countries thenten, and then 25 and now we have the megaEuropean Union that continues to expand and

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grow. In the Pacific Basin, we hear of APECSummitry, in North America, it is NAFTA. Inour own backyard, we have our own ASEANthat has emerged from the original Maphilindo.All these refer to something bigger and largeridentit ies and belonging across diversenationalities, cultures and physical boundariesestablished by the 18th century construct akanation states.

The decade of the 90s that preceded thenew millennium had seen what was thendescribed as dramatic advances not only inscience and technology but also of the fastmovements of peoples and capitals acrossborders and frontiers. The whole concept ofvirtual world and plural communities broughtabout by fast movement of peoples andpopulations are new elements in the equationthat shake the traditional understanding ofterr itory, sovereignty, peoples andgovernments. The roles for the states andgovernments are evolving vis-à-vis thesedevelopments. And if they do not change, theywill be like dinosaurs condemned to extinctionin the years to come.

When we speak of re-imagining nationstates, we are actually raising the fundamentalissue whether the 19th century construct of

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nation state is still valid today. It is a morespeci f ic and pointed chal lenge to thetraditional view and it asks the questionwhether we are “r ightly” reading andinterpreting the ethnic and sectarian conflictsout there – in the neighborhood, in the localcommunity, in short “on the ground” by offeringthe 19th century construct that is expiring orgasping for its last breath.

A newer and more interesting challengeto the 19th century nation state construct comesfrom the trajectory or school more associatedwith the late Prof. Samuel Huntington. Hemade attempts to locate the path to socialcohesion or the mode of coming together thatwill give people confidence and trust in oneanother. He cited these in pairs, the one is bloodand the other is belief or, correspondingly,family and faith. In terms of these two elementswe live, develop our horizon, elaborate ourvalues and have confidence in one another andin our l i fe as a community or nat ion.Consequently, the possibilities of comingtogether gravitate around these two elementsof family relationships or blood and of faith orreligion (Cf. S. Huntington’s The Clash ofThe Clash ofThe Clash ofThe Clash ofThe Clash ofCivilizations and the Remaking of WCivilizations and the Remaking of WCivilizations and the Remaking of WCivilizations and the Remaking of WCivilizations and the Remaking of WorldorldorldorldorldOrderOrderOrderOrderOrder).

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In this light Prof. Huntington sees sevenmajor civilizations that are characterized bycertain consanguinity and a basic beliefsystem. His theory indicates that throughthese c iv i l izat ions, peoples wi l l shareunderstanding, concerns, a belief system andworldview. And these are the natural ways forpeople to come together. This is not somethingthat is often misunderstood as a return to the“pre-rational” and the superstitious stage.Instead it points to a post rationalist period inwhich a new set of human sensibilities and anurgent and promising new agenda is emerging.

In a similar vein, Prof. Francis Fukuyama(cf. his two works: The End of HistoryThe End of HistoryThe End of HistoryThe End of HistoryThe End of History andTTTTTrust, Social Vrust, Social Vrust, Social Vrust, Social Vrust, Social Virtues and the Creation ofirtues and the Creation ofirtues and the Creation ofirtues and the Creation ofirtues and the Creation ofProsperityProsperityProsperityProsperityProsperity) notes that for prosperity inbusiness there is need for trust between people.He acknowledges sets of values cited by Weberas keys to capitalism: diligence, saving,rationality, innovation, risk-taking, etc… ButFukuyama opines that these will not work inthe economic order unless they are undergirdedby a sense of honesty, reliability, cooperationand responsibility. If those are lacking andthere is no trust, then initiative cannot goforward nor will it achieve its reward. Thisfoundational set of virtues comes from thecultures, which in turn are grounded in faith.

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It is very interesting that the two mostpopular and thought-provoking thinkers todayview the future by pointing that rationality hasnot been enough and will not be enough, andthat there is need for an undergirdingconfidence and trust in culture built uponfamily and faith.

Moreover, both Huntington andFukuyama seem to point out the shifting focusfrom the economic and political concerns to self-identity and its religious roots in terms ofvalues, cultures, religions and civilizations.The same shift appears in various fora andbodies that include the UN, the White Houseand the Capitol Hi l l , the EU and theInternational Financial Institutions. This isparticularly discernable in various WorldSocial Forum (WSF), WTO, and the SummitMeetings and Conference in Rio on theEnvironment, Kyoto on Climate change,Johannesburg on Sustainable Development,Cairo on the Family and Beijing on Women.

Our departure from Huntington is the factthat we hold that values, cultures, the self-identity of cultures and religions that generatecivilizations need not be ‘conflictual’. But thiswill require a new hermeneutic of ethnicity,religion and civilization. It is a hermeneutic

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that reads and interprets various ethnicity andcivilizations albeit their diversities as able tocontribute one to another. It also provides thecapacity to the “secularists”, both in theacademe and the halls of power, who haveneither the capability to deal with religiousdifferences or people who for their own purposesmanipulate religions. The present “incapacityis a result of enlightenment prejudice and theseeming blind commitment to a 19th centurynation state construct in internationalrelations that exclude ethnicity, religions andcivilizations from the equation. Thus a newhermeneutic makes possible new attitudes andparadigm in the construction of new relationsbetween “nations” and civilization, which aremost important in addressing social fault linesand reconstruction work. The magic word innegotiating new paradigm is dialogue…

There are three basic steps that will helpus walk this new path of dialogue.

First is the recognition that our life,future and destiny are bound up witheach other. No, we cannot espouse apolitics of separatism, culture ofexclusivism, nor act as soleproprietors of the land.

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Second is to be open, that is ,Eph’pheta/Iftah, to each other -learning not only from each other butmore so to live and work as partnersin shaping our common lives anddestiny in peace, justice and care ofthe earth. Yes, we must not be afraidor hesitate to accept, to trust and towork with each other as partners.

Third is our commitment andinvolvement in the promotion andguarantee of the rights and dignity ofevery person regardless of faith,gender, culture and color within oursociety/community.

The basis of this commitment is our beliefthat all peoples even though they belong todifferent religions, nations, etc. all form ONEhuman family, created by the ONE and sameGod, living in the same world/community, anddestined for a common end.

Openness is NOT a universal element inhuman relations. It has to be slowly, patientlyand sometimes painfully built through time.

Certain premises need to be articulated atthe very outset of this journey…

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FirstFirstFirstFirstFirst, it is our belief that the 19th century nationstate construct is inadequate to address andunderstand the dynamics of war and peace making.The nation state theory, which attributes to poverty,politics of exclusion, injustices and greed as thebases, does not fully explain the relations that areinvolved in the conflicts neither they alonecontribute to the solutions to the conflicts.

SecondSecondSecondSecondSecond, we reiterate that in social cohesion, theneeded social capital is the capital we create not withour money or legislation, but essentially by workingtogether and participating in a civic way innegotiating peace and working for reconstruction.Peace and reconstruction is not simply a matter ofpolitics and economics, but more importantly, it is amatter of belief and trust which is the foundation ofmeaningful relationships in the community andsociety, including the civic life of the citizens.

ThirdThirdThirdThirdThird, religion has proved to be the enduring and“stubborn” inheritance of humankind both tobelievers and secularized modern peoples albeitacknowledged grudgingly. Notwithstanding thelegacy of the enlightenment, religion continues toassert its role in the public domain. Despite thedisputes (as in the EU Constitution) regarding itspublic role, religion shall continue to persist andoften puts in disarray the “secularized construct”of what is or should be in the peace equation. It is

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not simply neither thick nor thin but the very basisand glue of a faith-based peacemaking andpeacebuilding without which all attempts to peaceare rendered incomplete or futile or doomed to fail.

Why? The answer is simple. Peacemaking andpeople’s basic rights as well are not simple liberalconstructs in “Res Publica”. These values, too,constitute the religious and moral grammar ofhuman interaction. And in a plural societyenriched by religious understanding, we need a kindof religious “literacy” not a “bracketing” of religionsto be able to navigate the many metaphors, stories,myths and modes of telling them that dominate therelationships between our differing religious“families”.

Fourth, there is a need to “re-appreciate” andperhaps even “re-construct” the stories of conflictand war as well as peacemaking and peacebuilding,in the present age now labeled as both “postmodernism” and “post ideologies”. I turn to GilBailie (cf. VVVVViolence Unveiled: Humanity at theiolence Unveiled: Humanity at theiolence Unveiled: Humanity at theiolence Unveiled: Humanity at theiolence Unveiled: Humanity at theCrossroadsCrossroadsCrossroadsCrossroadsCrossroads: 1996) for the apt description of thisage. He takes the person of Bernard (a character inVirginia Woolf ’s novel, The WThe WThe WThe WThe Waves) aves) aves) aves) aves) to depict themodern person. In the novel, Bernard says: “I havemade up thousand stories. I have filled upinnumerable notebooks with phrases to be usedwhen I have found the true story, the one story to

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which all the phases refer, but I have never yet foundthat story.” Today, post modern descendants ofBernard continue to look for that story, in theabsence of which, they try to breathe life into thetexts, analysis and theories with which our study ofpeace and peacebuilding, to say the last, is in thestate of amorphous incoherence. There are noready-made story to proffer to peace makers andpeace activists… But the lesson of the story for ourage is perhaps the needs for a real dialogue; preciselyto connect the many texts and phrases once again…and believe me… we need to put aside our rhetoricand together provide that story…

Now that we have come at a critical juncturein defining and shaping our relationship in thecontext of a new enterprise beyond the narrowlimits of the nation state construct, there is a senseof urgency to dare break new ground both in ourdiscourses and actions. Our national andcommunal traditions need to rise above the heritageof mutual suspicion and fears and address squarelythe ‘conflictual’ relationships that continue to soilthe earth and divide our faith and ethniccommunities.

I wonder if this is what the martyred Presidentof Egypt Anwar Sadat expressed at the Knessetduring his historic visit of the Holy City ofJerusalem on November 7, 1977.

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“… Yet, there remains another wall. This wallcontinues and constitutes a psychologicalbarrier between us, a barrier of suspicion, abarrier of rejection, a barrier of fear, of deception,a barrier of hallucination without any action,deeds or decision. A barrier of distorted anderoded interpretation of every event andstatement. It is this official statement asconstituting 70% of the whole process. Today,through my visit to you, I ask why don’t westretch out our hands with faith and sincerityso that together we might destroy this barrier?”

Our new solidarity has to give birth to a newrelationship that heals, expands and empowers.Politics and economics are inadequate to shape thatmeaningful relationship. Here, I echo what Fr.Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, SJ said years ago:

“The age of nations is past. It remains for us now, ifwe do not wish to perish, to set aside the ancientprejudice and build the earth.”

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RRRRREPUBLICEPUBLICEPUBLICEPUBLICEPUBLIC AAAAACTCTCTCTCT

NNNNNOOOOO.....1015310153101531015310153

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Republic of the PhilippinesRepublic of the PhilippinesRepublic of the PhilippinesRepublic of the PhilippinesRepublic of the PhilippinesCongress of the PhilippinesCongress of the PhilippinesCongress of the PhilippinesCongress of the PhilippinesCongress of the Philippines

Metro ManilaMetro ManilaMetro ManilaMetro ManilaMetro ManilaFifteenth CongressFifteenth CongressFifteenth CongressFifteenth CongressFifteenth Congress

First Regular SessionFirst Regular SessionFirst Regular SessionFirst Regular SessionFirst Regular SessionBegun and held in Metro Manila, onBegun and held in Metro Manila, onBegun and held in Metro Manila, onBegun and held in Metro Manila, onBegun and held in Metro Manila, on

MondayMondayMondayMondayMonday, the twenty-sixth day of July, the twenty-sixth day of July, the twenty-sixth day of July, the twenty-sixth day of July, the twenty-sixth day of July,,,,,two thousand ten.two thousand ten.two thousand ten.two thousand ten.two thousand ten.

REPUBLIC REPUBLIC REPUBLIC REPUBLIC REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10153ACT NO. 10153ACT NO. 10153ACT NO. 10153ACT NO. 10153

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THESYNCHRONIZATION OF THE ELECTIONSIN THE AUTONOMOUS REGION INMUSLIM MINDANAO (ARMM) WITH THENATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS ANDFOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House ofRepresentatives of the Philippines in Congressassembled:

SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy.—Inaccordance with the intent and mandate of theConstitution and Republic Act No. 7166,entitled: “An Act Providing for SynchronizedNational and Local Elections and for ElectoralReforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor,and for Other Purposes”, it is hereby declaredthe policy of the State to synchronize national

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and local elections. Pursuant thereto, theelections in the Autonomous Region in MuslimMindanao (ARMM) is hereby synchronized withthe national and local elections as hereinafterprovided.

SEC. 2. Regular Elections.—The regularelections for the Regional Governor, RegionalVice Governor and Members of the RegionalLegislative Assembly of the AutonomousRegion in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) shall beheld on the second (2nd) Monday of May 2013.Succeeding regular elections shall be held onthe same date every three (3) years thereafter.

SEC. 3. Appointment of Off icers- in-Charge.—The President shall appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the RegionalGovernor, Regional Vice Governor andMembers of the Regional Legislative Assemblywho shall perform the functions pertaining tothe said offices until the officials duly electedin the May 2013 elections shall have qualifiedand assumed office.

SEC. 4 . Manner and Procedure ofAppointing Officers-in-Charge.—There shallbe created a screening committee, whosemembers shall be appointed by the President,which shal l screen and recommend, in

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consultation with the Speaker of the House ofRepresentatives and the Senate President, thepersons who will be appointed as Officers-in-Charge.

SEC. 5. Qualifications.—No person shallbe appointed officer-in-charge unless he or shecomplies with the qualifications for RegionalGovernor, Regional Vice Governor or Membersof the Regional Legislative Assembly of theARMM, as provided in Republic Act No. 6734,entitled: “An Act Providing for an Organic Actfor the Autonomous Region in Musl imMindanao”, as amended by Republic Act No.9054, entitled: “As Act to Strengthen andExpand the Organic Act for the AutonomousRegion in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for thePurpose Republic Act No. 67343.

SEC. 6. Study and Review of the OrganicAct.—The appointed Members of the RegionalLegislative Assembly of the ARMM shallconduct a study and review of Republic Act No.9054 and submit recommendations to theCongress of the Philippines within six (6)months from their assumption into office.

SEC. 7. Separability Clause.—In theevent any part or provision of this Act is heldinvalid or unconstitutional, other provisions

Republic Act No. 10153

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not affected thereby shall remain in force andeffect.

SEC. 8. Repealing Clause.—Republic ActNo. 9333 is hereby repealed. All laws, decrees,orders, rules and regulations and otherissuances or parts thereof which areinconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed,amended or modified accordingly.

SEC. 9. Effectivity Clause.—This Actshal l take ef fect immediately upon thecompletion, of its publication in two (2)newspapers of general circulation.

Approved,

(Sgd.) JUAN PONCE ENRILE(Sgd.) JUAN PONCE ENRILE(Sgd.) JUAN PONCE ENRILE(Sgd.) JUAN PONCE ENRILE(Sgd.) JUAN PONCE ENRILEPresident of the Senate

(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.Speaker of the House of Representatives

This Act which originated in the House ofRepresentatives was finally passed by the House ofRepresentatives and the Senate on June 7, 2011and June 6,2011, respectively.

(Sgd.) EMMA LIRIO-REYES(Sgd.) EMMA LIRIO-REYES(Sgd.) EMMA LIRIO-REYES(Sgd.) EMMA LIRIO-REYES(Sgd.) EMMA LIRIO-REYESSecretary of the Senate

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Sgd.) MARILSgd.) MARILSgd.) MARILSgd.) MARILSgd.) MARILYN B. BARUA-YYN B. BARUA-YYN B. BARUA-YYN B. BARUA-YYN B. BARUA-YAPAPAPAPAPSecretary GeneralHouse of Representatives

Approved: June 30, 2011

(Sgd.) BENIGNO SIMEON C. (Sgd.) BENIGNO SIMEON C. (Sgd.) BENIGNO SIMEON C. (Sgd.) BENIGNO SIMEON C. (Sgd.) BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO IIIAQUINO IIIAQUINO IIIAQUINO IIIAQUINO IIIPresident of the Philippines

Republic Act No. 10153

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SSSSSUPREMEUPREMEUPREMEUPREMEUPREME C C C C COURTOURTOURTOURTOURT D D D D DECISIONECISIONECISIONECISIONECISION ONONONONON

THETHETHETHETHE C C C C CONSTITUTIONALITYONSTITUTIONALITYONSTITUTIONALITYONSTITUTIONALITYONSTITUTIONALITY OFOFOFOFOF

RRRRREPUBLICEPUBLICEPUBLICEPUBLICEPUBLIC AAAAACTCTCTCTCT 10153 10153 10153 10153 10153

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Republic of the PhilippinesRepublic of the PhilippinesRepublic of the PhilippinesRepublic of the PhilippinesRepublic of the PhilippinesSupreme CourtSupreme CourtSupreme CourtSupreme CourtSupreme Court

ManilaManilaManilaManilaManila

EN BANCEN BANCEN BANCEN BANCEN BANC DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA,

in his personal capacity, and inrepresentation of MAGUINDANAOFEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUSIRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC.,HADJI MUHMINA J. USMAN,JOHN ANTHONY L. LIM,JAMILON T. ODIN, ASRINTIMBOL JAIYARI, MUJIB M.KALANG, ALIH AL-SAIDI J. SAPI-E, KESSAR DAMSIE ABDIL, andBASSAM ALUH SAUPI,

Petitioners,

- versus - SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,represented by its President JUANPONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES, thruSPEAKER FELICIANOBELMONTE, COMMISSION ONELECTIONS, thru its Chairman,SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR.,PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Office ofthe President Executive Secretary,FLORENCIO ABAD, JR., Secretaryof Budget, and ROBERTO TAN,Treasurer of the Philippines,

Respondents.

G.R. No. 196271 Present: CORONA, C.J.,CARPIO,VELASCO, JR.,LEONARDO-DECASTRO,BRION, PERALTA,BERSAMIN,DEL CASTILLO,ABAD,VILLARAMA, JR.,PEREZ, MENDOZA,SERENO, REYES,and PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ. Promulgated: October 18, 2011

Supreme Court Decision on the Constitutionality ofRepublic Act 10153

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x———————————xBASARI D. MAPUPUNO,BASARI D. MAPUPUNO,BASARI D. MAPUPUNO,BASARI D. MAPUPUNO,BASARI D. MAPUPUNO, Petitioner, - versus -

SIXTO BRILLANTES, in hisSIXTO BRILLANTES, in hisSIXTO BRILLANTES, in hisSIXTO BRILLANTES, in hisSIXTO BRILLANTES, in hiscapacity as Chairman of thecapacity as Chairman of thecapacity as Chairman of thecapacity as Chairman of thecapacity as Chairman of theCommission on Elections,Commission on Elections,Commission on Elections,Commission on Elections,Commission on Elections,FLORENCIO FLORENCIO FLORENCIO FLORENCIO FLORENCIO ABAD, JR. in hisABAD, JR. in hisABAD, JR. in hisABAD, JR. in hisABAD, JR. in hiscapacity as Secretary of thecapacity as Secretary of thecapacity as Secretary of thecapacity as Secretary of thecapacity as Secretary of theDepartment of Budget andDepartment of Budget andDepartment of Budget andDepartment of Budget andDepartment of Budget andManagement, PManagement, PManagement, PManagement, PManagement, PACQUITOACQUITOACQUITOACQUITOACQUITOOCHOA, JR., in his capacity asOCHOA, JR., in his capacity asOCHOA, JR., in his capacity asOCHOA, JR., in his capacity asOCHOA, JR., in his capacity asExecutive SecretaryExecutive SecretaryExecutive SecretaryExecutive SecretaryExecutive Secretary, JUAN, JUAN, JUAN, JUAN, JUANPONCE ENRILE, in hisPONCE ENRILE, in hisPONCE ENRILE, in hisPONCE ENRILE, in hisPONCE ENRILE, in hiscapacity as Senate President,capacity as Senate President,capacity as Senate President,capacity as Senate President,capacity as Senate President,and FELICIANO BELMONTE,and FELICIANO BELMONTE,and FELICIANO BELMONTE,and FELICIANO BELMONTE,and FELICIANO BELMONTE,in his capacity as Speaker ofin his capacity as Speaker ofin his capacity as Speaker ofin his capacity as Speaker ofin his capacity as Speaker ofthe House of Representatives,the House of Representatives,the House of Representatives,the House of Representatives,the House of Representatives, Respondents.x————————————————x REPREPREPREPREP. EDCEL. EDCEL. EDCEL. EDCEL. EDCEL C. LAGMAN C. LAGMAN C. LAGMAN C. LAGMAN C. LAGMAN, Petitioner, - versus - PPPPPAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., inAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., inAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., inAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., inAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., inhis capacity as the Executivehis capacity as the Executivehis capacity as the Executivehis capacity as the Executivehis capacity as the ExecutiveSecretarySecretarySecretarySecretarySecretary, and the, and the, and the, and the, and theCOMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.x———————————————x ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH,ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH,ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH,ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH,ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH,DADADADADATUTUTUTUTU

G.R. No. 196305G.R. No. 196305G.R. No. 196305G.R. No. 196305G.R. No. 196305

G.R. No. 197221 G.R. No. 197221 G.R. No. 197221 G.R. No. 197221 G.R. No. 197221

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CASAN CONDING CANA, andCASAN CONDING CANA, andCASAN CONDING CANA, andCASAN CONDING CANA, andCASAN CONDING CANA, andPPPPPARTIDO DEMOKRAARTIDO DEMOKRAARTIDO DEMOKRAARTIDO DEMOKRAARTIDO DEMOKRATIKOTIKOTIKOTIKOTIKOPILIPINO LAKAS NG BAPILIPINO LAKAS NG BAPILIPINO LAKAS NG BAPILIPINO LAKAS NG BAPILIPINO LAKAS NG BAYYYYYANANANANAN(PDP-LABAN)(PDP-LABAN)(PDP-LABAN)(PDP-LABAN)(PDP-LABAN), Petitioners, - versus - THE COMMISSION ONTHE COMMISSION ONTHE COMMISSION ONTHE COMMISSION ONTHE COMMISSION ONELECTIONS, through itsELECTIONS, through itsELECTIONS, through itsELECTIONS, through itsELECTIONS, through itsChairman, SIXTOChairman, SIXTOChairman, SIXTOChairman, SIXTOChairman, SIXTOBRILLANTES, JR., HON.BRILLANTES, JR., HON.BRILLANTES, JR., HON.BRILLANTES, JR., HON.BRILLANTES, JR., HON.PPPPPAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., inAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., inAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., inAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., inAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., inhis capacity as Executivehis capacity as Executivehis capacity as Executivehis capacity as Executivehis capacity as ExecutiveSecretarySecretarySecretarySecretarySecretary, HON. FLORENCIO, HON. FLORENCIO, HON. FLORENCIO, HON. FLORENCIO, HON. FLORENCIOB. B. B. B. B. ABAD, JR., in his capacityABAD, JR., in his capacityABAD, JR., in his capacityABAD, JR., in his capacityABAD, JR., in his capacityas Secretary of the Departmentas Secretary of the Departmentas Secretary of the Departmentas Secretary of the Departmentas Secretary of the Departmentof Budget and Management,of Budget and Management,of Budget and Management,of Budget and Management,of Budget and Management,and HON. ROBERTO B. Tand HON. ROBERTO B. Tand HON. ROBERTO B. Tand HON. ROBERTO B. Tand HON. ROBERTO B. TAN,AN,AN,AN,AN,in his capacity as Tin his capacity as Tin his capacity as Tin his capacity as Tin his capacity as Treasurer ofreasurer ofreasurer ofreasurer ofreasurer ofthe Philippinesthe Philippinesthe Philippinesthe Philippinesthe Philippines, Respondents.x——————————————xx——————————————xx——————————————xx——————————————xx——————————————x AAAAATTYTTYTTYTTYTTY. ROMULO B.. ROMULO B.. ROMULO B.. ROMULO B.. ROMULO B.MACALINTMACALINTMACALINTMACALINTMACALINTAL,AL,AL,AL,AL, Petitioner, - versus - COMMISSIONCOMMISSIONCOMMISSIONCOMMISSIONCOMMISSION ONONONONONELECTIONS and THE OFFICEELECTIONS and THE OFFICEELECTIONS and THE OFFICEELECTIONS and THE OFFICEELECTIONS and THE OFFICEOF THE PRESIDENTOF THE PRESIDENTOF THE PRESIDENTOF THE PRESIDENTOF THE PRESIDENT, through, through, through, through, throughEXECUTIVE SECRETEXECUTIVE SECRETEXECUTIVE SECRETEXECUTIVE SECRETEXECUTIVE SECRETARARARARARYYYYYPPPPPAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,AQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,AQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,AQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,AQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Respondents.x————————————————x

G.R. No. 197280G.R. No. 197280G.R. No. 197280G.R. No. 197280G.R. No. 197280

G.R. No. 197282 G.R. No. 197282 G.R. No. 197282 G.R. No. 197282 G.R. No. 197282

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LUIS “BAROK”LUIS “BAROK”LUIS “BAROK”LUIS “BAROK”LUIS “BAROK”BIRAOGOBIRAOGOBIRAOGOBIRAOGOBIRAOGO, Petitioner, - versus - THETHETHETHETHE COMMISSIONCOMMISSIONCOMMISSIONCOMMISSIONCOMMISSIONON ELECTIONS andON ELECTIONS andON ELECTIONS andON ELECTIONS andON ELECTIONS andEXECUTIVEEXECUTIVEEXECUTIVEEXECUTIVEEXECUTIVESECRETSECRETSECRETSECRETSECRETARARARARARY PY PY PY PY PAQUITOAQUITOAQUITOAQUITOAQUITON. OCHOA, JR.N. OCHOA, JR.N. OCHOA, JR.N. OCHOA, JR.N. OCHOA, JR., Respondents.x———————————x JACINTO VJACINTO VJACINTO VJACINTO VJACINTO V. P. P. P. P. PARASARASARASARASARAS, Petitioner, - versus - EXECUTIVEEXECUTIVEEXECUTIVEEXECUTIVEEXECUTIVESECRETSECRETSECRETSECRETSECRETARARARARARY PY PY PY PY PAQUITOAQUITOAQUITOAQUITOAQUITON. OCHOA, JR., andN. OCHOA, JR., andN. OCHOA, JR., andN. OCHOA, JR., andN. OCHOA, JR., andthe COMMISSION ONthe COMMISSION ONthe COMMISSION ONthe COMMISSION ONthe COMMISSION ONELECTIONSELECTIONSELECTIONSELECTIONSELECTIONS, Respondents.x———————————x MINORITY RIGHTSMINORITY RIGHTSMINORITY RIGHTSMINORITY RIGHTSMINORITY RIGHTSFORUM,FORUM,FORUM,FORUM,FORUM,PHILIPPINES, INC.,PHILIPPINES, INC.,PHILIPPINES, INC.,PHILIPPINES, INC.,PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents-Intervenor.

G.R. No. 197392 G.R. No. 197392 G.R. No. 197392 G.R. No. 197392 G.R. No. 197392

G.R. No. 197454G.R. No. 197454G.R. No. 197454G.R. No. 197454G.R. No. 197454

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D E C I S I O ND E C I S I O ND E C I S I O ND E C I S I O ND E C I S I O N BRION, BRION, BRION, BRION, BRION, J . :J . :J . :J . :J . :

On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No.

10153, entitled “An Act Providing for theSynchronization of the Elections in theAutonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao(ARMM) with the National and Local Electionsand for Other Purposes” was enacted. The lawreset the ARMM elections from the 8th ofAugust 2011, to the second Monday of May2013 and every three (3) years thereafter, tocoincide with the country’s regular nationaland local elections. The law as well granted thePresident the power to “appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) for the Office of the RegionalGovernor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and theMembers of the Regional Legislative Assembly,who shall perform the functions pertaining tothe said offices until the officials duly electedin the May 2013 elections shall have qualifiedand assumed office.”

Even before its formal passage, the bills

that became RA No. 10153 already spawnedpetitions against their validity; House Bill No.4146 and Senate Bill No. 2756 were challenged

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in petitions filed with this Court. Thesepetitions multiplied after RA No. 10153 waspassed.

Factual Factual Factual Factual Factual AntecedentsAntecedentsAntecedentsAntecedentsAntecedents

The State, through Sections 15 to 22,Article X of the 1987 Constitution, mandatedthe creation of autonomous regions in MuslimMindanao and the Cordilleras. Section 15states:

Section 15. There shall be createdautonomous regions in MuslimMindanao and inthe Cordi l leras consist ing ofprovinces, cities, municipalities,and geographical areas sharingcommon and distinctive historicaland cultural heritage, economicand social structures, and otherrelevant characteristics within theframework of this Constitutionand the national sovereignty aswell as territorial integrity of theRepublic of the Philippines. Section 18 of the Article, on the other

hand, directed Congress to enact an organic act

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for these autonomous regions to concretelycarry into effect the granted autonomy.

Section 18. The Congress shallenact an organic act for eachautonomous region with theassistance and participation of theregional consultative commissioncomposed of representat ivesappointed by the President from alist of nominees from multisectoralbodies. The organic act shall definethe basic structure of governmentfor the region consisting of theexecutive department andlegislative assembly, both of whichshal l be e lect ive andrepresentative of the constituentpolitical units. The organic actsshall likewise provide for specialcourts with personal, family andproperty law jurisdict ionconsistent with the provisions ofthis Constitution and nationallaws.

The creat ion of the

autonomous region shal l beeffective when approved by amajority of the votes cast by the

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constituent units in a plebiscitecalled for the purpose, providedthat only provinces, cities, andgeographic areas voting favorablyin such plebiscite shall be includedin the autonomous region. On August 1, 1989 or two years after the

effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, Congressacted through Republic Act (RA) No. 6734entitled “An Act Providing for an Organic Actfor the Autonomous Region in Musl imMindanao.” A plebiscite was held onNovember6, 1990 as required by Section 18(2), Article Xof RA No. 6734, thus fully establishing theAutonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao(ARMM). The initially assenting provinceswere Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu andTawi-tawi. RA No. 6734 scheduled the firstregular elections for the regional officials ofthe ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 daysnor later than 90 days after its ratification. RA No. 9054 (entitled “An Act toStrengthen and Expand the Organic Act for theAutonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No.6734, entit led An Act Providing for theAutonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, asAmended”) was the next legis lat ive act

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passed. This law provided further refinementin the basic ARMM structure first defined inthe original organic act, and reset the regularelections for the ARMM regional officials to thesecond Monday of September 2001.

Congress passed the next law affectingARMM – RA No. 9140 [1] - on June 22,2001. This law reset the first regular electionsoriginally scheduled under RA No. 9054,to November 26, 2001. It likewise set theplebiscite to ratify RA No. 9054 to not laterthanAugust 15, 2001.

RA No. 9054 was ratified in a plebisciteheld on August 14, 2001.The province of Basilan and Marawi City votedto join ARMM on the same date.

RA No. 9333[2] was subsequently passedby Congress to reset the ARMM regionalelections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005,and on the same date every 3 years thereafter.Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No.9333 was not ratified in a plebiscite.

Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMMregional elections should have been heldon August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begunpreparations for these elections and had

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accepted certificates of candidacies for thevarious regional offices to be elected. Buton June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted,resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013, tocoincide with the regular national and localelections of the country.

RA No. 10153 originated in the House ofRepresentatives as House Bill (HB) No. 4146,seeking the postponement of the ARMMelect ions scheduled on August 8 , 2011.On March 22, 2011, the House ofRepresentatives passed HB No. 4146, with onehundred ninety one (191) Members voting inits favor.

After the Senate received HB No. 4146, itadopted its own version, Senate Bill No. 2756(SB No. 2756), on June 6, 2011. Thirteen (13)Senators voted favorably for its passage.On June 7, 2011, the House of Representativeconcurred with the Senate amendments, andon June 30, 2011, the President signed RA No.10153 into law.

As mentioned, the early challenge to RANo. 10153 came through a petition filed withthis Court – G.R.G.R.G.R.G.R.G.R. No. 196271No. 196271No. 196271No. 196271No. 196271[3] - - - - -assailing theconstitutionality of both HB No. 4146 and SBNo. 2756, and challenging the validity of RA

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No. 9333 as well for non-compliance with theconst itut ional plebisc i te requirement.Thereafter, petit ioner Basari Mapupunoin G.R. No. 196305G.R. No. 196305G.R. No. 196305G.R. No. 196305G.R. No. 196305 f i led anotherpetition[4] also assailing the validity of RA No.9333.

With the enactment into law of RA No.10153, the COMELEC stopped its preparationsfor the ARMM elections. The law gave rise aswell to the filing of the following petitionsagainst its constitutionality:

a ) Pet i t ion for Cert iorari andProhibition[5] filed by Rep. Edcel Lagman as amember of the House of Representativesagainst Paquito Ochoa, Jr. (in his capacity asthe Executive Secretary) and the COMELEC,docketed as G.R. No. 197221;G.R. No. 197221;G.R. No. 197221;G.R. No. 197221;G.R. No. 197221;

b) Pet i t ion for Mandamus and

Prohibition[6] filed by Atty. Romulo Macalintalas a taxpayer against the COMELEC, docketedasG.R. No. 197282;G.R. No. 197282;G.R. No. 197282;G.R. No. 197282;G.R. No. 197282;

c ) Pet i t ion for Cert iorari and

Mandamus, Injunct ion and Prel iminaryInjunction[7] filed by Louis “Barok” Biraogoagainst the COMELEC and ExecutiveSecretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., docketedas G.R. No. 197392G.R. No. 197392G.R. No. 197392G.R. No. 197392G.R. No. 197392; and

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d) Pet i t ion for Cert iorari andMandamus[8] f i led by Jacinto Paras as amember of the House of Representativesagainst Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa,Jr. and the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No.G.R. No.G.R. No.G.R. No.G.R. No.197454.197454.197454.197454.197454.

Petitioners Alamarim Centi Tillah andDatu Casan Conding Cana as registered votersfrom the ARMM, with the Partido DemokratikoPilipino Lakas ng Bayan (a political party withcandidates in the ARMM regional electionsscheduled for August 8, 2011), also filed aPetit ion for Prohibit ion andMandamus[9] against the COMELEC, docketedas G.R. No. 197280G.R. No. 197280G.R. No. 197280G.R. No. 197280G.R. No. 197280, to assai l theconstitutionality of RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333and RA No. 10153. Subsequently, Anak Mindanao Party-List, Minority Rights Forum Philippines, Inc.and Bangsamoro Solidarity Movement filedtheir own Motion for Leave to Admit theirMotion for Intervention and Comment-in-Intervention dated July 18, 2011. On July 26,2011, the Court granted the motion. In thesame Resolution, the Court ordered theconsolidation of all the petitions relating to theconstitutionality of HB No. 4146, SB No. 2756,RA No. 9333, and RA No. 10153.

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Oral arguments were held on August 9,2011 and August 16, 2011. Thereafter, theparties were instructed to submit theirrespective memoranda within twenty (20) days. On September 13, 2011, the Courtissued a temporary restraining order enjoiningthe implementation of RA No. 10153 andordering the incumbent elective officials ofARMM to continue to perform their functionsshould these cases not be decided by the end oftheir term on September 30, 2011. The The The The The ArgumentsArgumentsArgumentsArgumentsArguments The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140,RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 assert thatthese laws amend RA No. 9054 and thus, haveto comply with the supermajority vote andplebiscite requirements prescribed underSections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094in order to become effective. The petitions assailing RA No. 10153further maintain that it is unconstitutional forits failure to comply with the three-readingrequirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of theConstitution. Also cited as grounds are thealleged violations of the right of suffrage of thepeople of ARMM, as well as the failure to adhereto the “elective and representative” characterof the executive and legislative departments of

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the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners challengedthe grant to the President of the power toappoint OICs to undertake the functions of theelective ARMM officials until the officialselected under the May 2013 regular electionsshall have assumed office. Corrolarily, theyalso argue that the power of appointment alsogave the President the power of control overthe ARMM, in complete violation of Section 16,Article X of the Constitution. The IssuesThe IssuesThe IssuesThe IssuesThe Issues

From the parties’ submissions, thefollowing issues were recognized and argued bythe parties in the oral arguments of August 9and 16, 2011:

I. Whether the 1987 Constitutionmandates the synchronization ofelections

II. Whether the passage of RA No.

10153 violates Section 26(2), ArticleVI of the 1987 Constitution

III. Whether the passage of RA

No.10153 requires a supermajorityvote and plebiscite

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A. Does the postponement of theARMM regular elections constitute anamendment to Section 7, Article XVIIIof RA No. 9054?

B. Does the requirement of a

supermajority vote for amendments orrevisions to RA No. 9054 violateSection 1 and Section 16(2), Article VIof the 1987 Constitution and thecorollary doctrine on irrepealablelaws?

C. Does the requirement of a plebiscite

apply only in the creat ion ofautonomous regions under paragraph2, Section 18, Article X of the 1987Constitution?

IV. Whether RA No. 10153

violates the autonomy granted to the ARMM

V. Whether the grant of the power to appoint OICs violates:

A. Section 15, Article X of the

1987 Constitution

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B. Section 16, Article X of the 1987 Constitution

C. Section 18, Article X of the1987 Constitution

VI. Whether the proposal to hold specialelections is constitutional and legal.

We shall discuss these issues in the orderthey are presented above.

OUR RULINGOUR RULINGOUR RULINGOUR RULINGOUR RULING

We resolve to DISMISSDISMISSDISMISSDISMISSDISMISS the petitionsand thereby UPHOLDUPHOLDUPHOLDUPHOLDUPHOLD the constitutionalitythe constitutionalitythe constitutionalitythe constitutionalitythe constitutionalityof RA No. 10153 of RA No. 10153 of RA No. 10153 of RA No. 10153 of RA No. 10153 in totoin totoin totoin totoin toto.

I . I . I . I . I . Synchronizat ion as a recognizedSynchronizat ion as a recognizedSynchronizat ion as a recognizedSynchronizat ion as a recognizedSynchronizat ion as a recognizedconstitutional mandateconstitutional mandateconstitutional mandateconstitutional mandateconstitutional mandate The respondent Office of the SolicitorGeneral (OSG) argues that the Constitutionmandates synchronization, and in support ofthis position, cites Sections 1, 2 and 5, ArticleXVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987Constitution, which provides:

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Section 1. The first elections ofMembers of the Congress underthis Constitution shall be held onthe second Monday of May, 1987.

The first local elections shall beheld on a date to be determined bythe President , which may besimultaneous with the election ofthe Members of the Congress. Itshall include the election of allMembers of the city or municipalcounci ls in the Metropol i tanManila area.

Section 2. The Senators, Membersof the House of Representativesand the local officials first electedunder this Constitution shal lserve until noonof June 30, 1992.

Of the Senators elected in theelection in 1992, the first twelveobtaining the highest number ofvotes shall serve for six year andthe remaining twelve for threeyears.

xxx

Section 5. The six-year term of theincumbent President and Vice

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President elected in the February7, 1986 election is, for purposes ofsynchronizat ion of e lect ions,hereby extended to noon of June30, 1992.

The first regular elections forPresident and Vice-Presidentunder this Constitution shall beheld on the second Monday of May,1992.

WWWWWe agree with this position.e agree with this position.e agree with this position.e agree with this position.e agree with this position.

While the Constitution does not expressly

state that Congress has to synchronizenational and local elections, the clear intenttowards this objective can be gleaned from theTransitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of theConstitution,[10] which show the extent to whichthe Constitutional Commission, by deliberatelymaking adjustments to the terms of theincumbent of f ic ials , sought to attainsynchronization of elections.[11]

The objective behind setting a common

termination date for all elective officials, doneamong others through the shortening theterms of the twelve winning senators with theleast number of votes, is to synchronize the

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holding of all future elections – whethernational or local – to once every threeyears.[12] This intention finds full support in thediscussions during the Const itut ionalCommission deliberations.[13]

These Constitut ional Commissionexchanges, read with the provisions of theTransitory Provisions of the Constitution, allserve as patent indicators of the constitutionalmandate to hold synchronized national andlocal elections, starting the second Monday ofMay, 1992 and for all the following elections.

This Court was not le f t behind inrecognizing the synchronization of the nationaland local elections as a constitutional mandate.In Osmeña v. Commission on Elections,[14] weexplained:

I t is c lear from the

aforequoted provisions of the 1987Constitution that the terms ofoffice of Senators, Members of theHouse of Representatives, the localofficials, the President and theVice-President have beensynchronized to end on the samehour, date and year — noon ofJune 30, 1992.

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It is likewise evident fromthe wording of the above-mentioned Sections that the termof synchronizat ion is usedsynonymously as thep h r a s e h o l d i n gsimultaneously since this is theprecise intent in terminating theirOffice Tenure on the same day oroccasion. This commontermination date will synchronizefuture elections to once everythree years (Bernas, theConstitution of the Republic of thePhilippines, Vol. II, p. 605).

That the e lect ion forSenators, Members of the House ofRepresentatives and the localofficials (under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII)will have to be synchronized withthe election for President and VicePresident (under Sec . 5 , Art .XVIII) is likewise evident from thex x x records of the proceedings inthe Constitutional Commission.[Emphasis supplied.]

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Although called regional elections, the ARMMelections should be included among theelections to be synchronized as it is a “local”election based on the wording and structure ofthe Constitution.

A basic rule in constitutional constructionis that the words used should be understood inthe sense that they have in common use andgiven their ordinary meaning, except whentechnical terms are employed, in which casethe s igni f icance thus attached to themprevails.[15] As this Court explained in Peoplev. Derilo, [16] ”[a]s the Constitution is notprimarily a lawyer’s document, its languageshould be understood in the sense that it mayhave in common. Its words should be giventheir ordinary meaning except where technicalterms are employed.” Understood in its ordinary sense, theword “local” refers to something that primarilyserves the needs of a particular limited district,o f ten a community or minor pol i t icalsubdivision. [17] Regional elections in theARMM for the positions of governor, vice-governor and regional assemblyrepresentatives obviously fall within thisclassification, since they pertain to the elected

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officials who will serve within the limited regionof ARMM.

From the perspective of the Constitution,autonomous regions are considered one of theforms of local governments, as evident fromArticle X of the Constitution entitled “LocalGovernment.” Autonomous regions areestablished and discussed under Sections 15 to21 of this Article – the article wholly devotedto Local Government. That an autonomousregion is considered a form of local governmentis also reflected in Section 1, Article X of theConstitution, which provides:

Section 1. The territorial andpol i t ical subdivis ions of theRepublic of the Philippines are theprovinces, cities, municipalities,and barangays. There shall beautonomous regions in MuslimMindanao, and the Cordilleras ashereinafter provided.

Thus, we find the contention – that the

synchronizat ion mandated by theConstitution does not include the regionalelections of the ARMM –unmeritorious. Weshall refer to synchronization in the course ofour discussions below, as this concept

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permeates the consideration of the variousissues posed in this case and must be recalledtime and again for its complete resolution.

II . II . II . II . II . The President ’The President ’The President ’The President ’The President ’s Certif ication on thes Certif ication on thes Certif ication on thes Certif ication on thes Certif ication on theUrgency of RA No. 10153Urgency of RA No. 10153Urgency of RA No. 10153Urgency of RA No. 10153Urgency of RA No. 10153

The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280G.R. No. 197280G.R. No. 197280G.R. No. 197280G.R. No. 197280 alsochallenge the validity of RA No. 10153 for itsalleged failure to comply with Section 26(2),Article VI of the Constitution[18] which providesthat before bills passed by either the House orthe Senate can become laws, they must passthrough three readings on separate days. Theexception is when the President certifies to thenecessity of the bill’s immediate enactment.

The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary ofFinance, [19] explained the ef fect o f thePresident’s certification of necessity in thefollowing manner:

The presidentialcertification dispensed with therequirement not only of printingbut also that of reading the bill onseparate days. The phrase “exceptwhen the President certifies to thenecessity of i ts immediateenactment, etc.” in Art. VI, Section

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26[2] qualifies the two statedconditions before a bill can becomea law: [i] the bill has passed threereadings on separate days and [ii]it has been printed in its finalform and distributed three daysbefore it is finally approved.

xxx

That upon the certificationof a bill by the President, therequirement of three readings onseparate days and of printing anddistribution can be dispensed withis supported by the weight oflegislative practice. For example,the bill defining the certiorarijurisdiction of this Court which, inconsolidation with the Senateversion, became Republic Act No.5440, was passed on second andthird readings in the House ofRepresentatives on the same day[May 14, 1968] after the bill hadbeen certified by the President asurgent.

In the present case, the records show that

the President wrote to the Speaker of the House

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of Representatives to certify the necessity of theimmediate enactment of a law synchronizingthe ARMM elections with the national and localelections.[20] Following our Tolentino ruling,

the President’s certification exempted boththe House and the Senate from having tocomply with the three separate readingsrequirement.

On the follow-up contention that nonecessity existed for the immediate enactmentof these bills since there was no public calamityor emergency that had to be met, again wehark back to our ruling in Tolentino:

The sufficiency of the factualbasis of the suspension of the writof habeas corpus or declaration ofmartial law Art. VII, Section 18, orthe existence of a nationalemergency just i fy ing thedelegation of extraordinary powersto the President under Art. VI,Section 23(2) is subject to judicialreview because basic rights ofindividuals may be ofhazard. ButButButButBut the factual basis ofthe factual basis ofthe factual basis ofthe factual basis ofthe factual basis ofpres ident ia l cert i f i cat ion o fpres ident ia l cert i f i cat ion o fpres ident ia l cert i f i cat ion o fpres ident ia l cert i f i cat ion o fpres ident ia l cert i f i cat ion o fb i l l s , which involves do ingbi l l s , which involves do ingbi l l s , which involves do ingbi l l s , which involves do ingbi l l s , which involves do ingaway with proceduralaway with proceduralaway with proceduralaway with proceduralaway with procedural

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requirements des igned torequirements des igned torequirements des igned torequirements des igned torequirements des igned toinsure that b i l l s are dulyinsure that b i l l s are dulyinsure that b i l l s are dulyinsure that b i l l s are dulyinsure that b i l l s are dulyconsidered by members o fconsidered by members o fconsidered by members o fconsidered by members o fconsidered by members o fCongress , certa inly shouldCongress , certa inly shouldCongress , certa inly shouldCongress , certa inly shouldCongress , certa inly shouldel ic i t a di f ferent standard ofe l ic i t a di f ferent standard ofe l ic i t a di f ferent standard ofe l ic i t a di f ferent standard ofe l ic i t a di f ferent standard ofreviewreviewreviewreviewreview. . . . . [Emphasis supplied.]

The House of Representatives and the

Senate – in the exercise of their legislativediscretion – gave full recognition to thePresident’s certification and promptly enactedRA No. 10153. Under the circumstances,nothing short of grave abuse of discretion onthe part of the two houses of Congress canjustify our intrusion under our power ofjudicial review.[21]

The petitioners, however, failed to provide

us with any cause or justification for thiscourse of action. Hence, while the judicialdepartment and this Court are not bound bythe acceptance of the President’s certificationby both the House of Representatives and theSenate, prudent exercise of our powers andrespect due our co-equal branches ofgovernment in matters committed to them bythe Constitution, caution a stay of the judicialhand.[22]

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In any case, despite the President ’scert i f icat ion, the two-fo ld purpose thatunderlies the requirement for three readingson separate days of every bill must always beobserved to enable our legislators and otherpart ies interested in pending bi l ls tointel l igently respond tothem. Specifically, the purpose with respect toMembers of Congress is: (1) to inform thelegislators of the matters they shall vote on and(2) to give them notice that a measure is inprogress through the enactment process.[23]

We find, based on the records of the

deliberations on the law, that both advocatesand the opponents of the proposed measure hadsufficient opportunities to present their views.In this light, no reason exists to nullify RA No.10153 on the cited ground.

III . A. III . A. III . A. III . A. III . A. RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153

are not amendments to RA No.are not amendments to RA No.are not amendments to RA No.are not amendments to RA No.are not amendments to RA No.90549054905490549054

The effectivity of RA No. 9333 and RANo. 10153 has also been challenged becausethey did not comply with Sections 1 and 3,Article XVII of RA No. 9054 in amending thislaw. These provisions require:

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Section 1. Consistent with theprovisions of the Constitution, thisOrganic Act may be reamended orrevised by the Congress of thePhilippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of theHouse of Representatives and ofthe Senate voting separately.

Section 3. Any amendment to orrevision of this Organic Act shallbecome ef fect ive only whenapproved by a majority of the votecast in a plebiscite called for thepurpose, which shall be held notearlier than sixty (60) days or laterthan ninety (90) days after theapproval of such amendment orrevision. WWWWWe find no merit in this contention.e find no merit in this contention.e find no merit in this contention.e find no merit in this contention.e find no merit in this contention. In the first place, neither RA No. 9333

nor RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054. As anexamination of these laws will show, RA No.9054 only provides for the schedule ofthe firstfirstfirstfirstfirst ARMM elections and does not fix thedate of the regular elections. A need thereforeexisted for the Congress to fix the date ofthe subsequentsubsequentsubsequentsubsequentsubsequent ARMM regular elections,

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which it did by enacting RA No. 9333 andthereafter, RA No. 10153. Obviously, thesesubsequent laws – RA No. 9333 and RA No.RA No. 9333 and RA No.RA No. 9333 and RA No.RA No. 9333 and RA No.RA No. 9333 and RA No.10153 10153 10153 10153 10153 – cannot be consideredcannot be consideredcannot be consideredcannot be consideredcannot be consideredamendments to RA No. 9054 as they didamendments to RA No. 9054 as they didamendments to RA No. 9054 as they didamendments to RA No. 9054 as they didamendments to RA No. 9054 as they didnot change or revise any provision in thenot change or revise any provision in thenot change or revise any provision in thenot change or revise any provision in thenot change or revise any provision in thelatter lawlatter lawlatter lawlatter lawlatter law; they merely filled in a gap in RANo. 9054 or supplemented the law by providingthe date of the subsequent regular elections.

This view – that Congress thought it bestto leave the determination of the date ofsucceeding ARMM elections to legislativediscretion – finds support in ARMM’s recenthistory.

To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first lawpassed that rescheduled the ARMMelections. The First Organic Act – RA No. 6734– not only did not fix the date of the subsequentelections; it did not even fix the specific date ofthe first ARMM elections,[24]leaving the date tobe fixed in another legislative enactment.Consequently, RA No. 7647, [25] RA No.8176,[26] RA No. 8746,[27]RA No. 8753,[28] and RANo. 9012[29] were all enacted by Congress to fixthe dates of the ARMM elections. Since theselaws did not change or modify any part orprovision of RA No. 6734, they were notamendments to this latter law. Consequently,

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there was no need to submit them to anyplebiscite for ratification.

The Second Organic Act – RARARARARA No. 9054 No. 9054 No. 9054 No. 9054 No. 9054 –which lapsed into law on March 31, 2001,provided that the first elections would be heldon the second Monday of September 2001.Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9140[30] toreset the date of the ARMMelections. Significantly, while RA No. 9140also scheduled the plebiscite for the ratificationof the Second Organic Act (RA No. 9054), thethethethethenew date of the new date of the new date of the new date of the new date of the ARMM regional electionsARMM regional electionsARMM regional electionsARMM regional electionsARMM regional electionsfixed in RA No. 9140 was not among thefixed in RA No. 9140 was not among thefixed in RA No. 9140 was not among thefixed in RA No. 9140 was not among thefixed in RA No. 9140 was not among theprovisions ratified in the plebiscite heldprovisions ratified in the plebiscite heldprovisions ratified in the plebiscite heldprovisions ratified in the plebiscite heldprovisions ratified in the plebiscite heldto approve RAto approve RAto approve RAto approve RAto approve RA No. 9054 No. 9054 No. 9054 No. 9054 No. 9054. Thereafter,Congress passed RA No. 9333,[31] which furtherreset the date of the ARMM regional elections.Again, this law was not ratified through aplebiscite.

From these legislative actions, we see theclear intention of Congress to treat the lawswhich fix the date of the subsequent ARMMelections as separate and distinct from theOrganic Acts. Congress only acted consistentlywith this intent when it passed RA No. 10153without requir ing compliance with theamendment prerequisites embodied in Section1 and Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054.

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III. B. III. B. III. B. III. B. III. B. Supermajority voting requirementSupermajority voting requirementSupermajority voting requirementSupermajority voting requirementSupermajority voting requirementunconstitutional for giving RA No.unconstitutional for giving RA No.unconstitutional for giving RA No.unconstitutional for giving RA No.unconstitutional for giving RA No.9054 the character o f an9054 the character o f an9054 the character o f an9054 the character o f an9054 the character o f anirrepealable lawirrepealable lawirrepealable lawirrepealable lawirrepealable law

Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RANo. 10153 did in fact amend RA No. 9054, thesupermajority (2 /3) vot ing requirementrequired under Section 1, Article XVII of RANo. 9054[32] has to be struck down for giving RANo. 9054 the character of an irrepealable lawby requiring more than what the Constitutiondemands.

Sect ion 16(2) , Art ic le VI of theConstitution provides that a “majority of eachHouse shal l const itute a quorum to dobusiness.” In other words, as long as majorityof the members of the House of Representativesor the Senate are present, these bodies havethe quorum needed to conduct business andhold session. Within a quorum, a vote ofmajority is generally sufficient to enact lawsor approve acts.

In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RANo. 9054 requires a vote of no less than two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House ofRepresentatives and of the Senate, votingseparately, in order to effectively amend RA No.9054. Clearly, this 2/3 voting requirement is

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higher than what the Constitution requires forthe passage of bills, and served to restrain theplenary powers of Congress to amend, reviseor repeal the laws it had passed. The Court’spronouncement in City of Davao v. GSIS[33] onthis subject best explains the basis and reasonfor the unconstitutionality:

Moreover, i t would be

noxious anathema to democraticanathema to democraticanathema to democraticanathema to democraticanathema to democraticprinciplesprinciplesprinciplesprinciplesprinciples for a legislative body tohave the ability to bind the actionsof future legis lat ive body,considering that both assemblies areregarded with equal foot ing,exercising as they do the sameplenary powers . PerpetualPerpetualPerpetualPerpetualPerpetualinfa l l ib i l i ty i s not one o f theinfa l l ib i l i ty i s not one o f theinfa l l ib i l i ty i s not one o f theinfa l l ib i l i ty i s not one o f theinfa l l ib i l i ty i s not one o f theattr ibutes des ired in aattr ibutes des ired in aattr ibutes des ired in aattr ibutes des ired in aattr ibutes des ired in alegis lat ive bodylegis lat ive bodylegis lat ive bodylegis lat ive bodylegis lat ive body, and a, and a, and a, and a, and alegis lature which attempts toleg is lature which attempts toleg is lature which attempts toleg is lature which attempts toleg is lature which attempts toforestall future amendments orforestall future amendments orforestall future amendments orforestall future amendments orforestall future amendments orrepeals of its enactments laborsrepeals of its enactments laborsrepeals of its enactments laborsrepeals of its enactments laborsrepeals of its enactments laborsunder delusions of omniscience.under delusions of omniscience.under delusions of omniscience.under delusions of omniscience.under delusions of omniscience.

xxx

A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects, whetherpertaining to persons or things, within its

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territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce newlaws or repeal the old, unless prohibitedexpressly or by implication by the federalconstitution or limited or restrained by its own.It cannot bind itself or its successors byenacting irrepealable laws except when sorestrained. Every legislative body may modifyor abolish the acts passed by itself or itspredecessors. This power of repeal may beexercised at the same session at which theoriginal act was passed; and even while a billis in its progress and before it becomes alaw. This legislature cannot bind a futureThis legislature cannot bind a futureThis legislature cannot bind a futureThis legislature cannot bind a futureThis legislature cannot bind a futurelegislature to a particular mode of repeal.legislature to a particular mode of repeal.legislature to a particular mode of repeal.legislature to a particular mode of repeal.legislature to a particular mode of repeal.It cannot declare in advance the intentIt cannot declare in advance the intentIt cannot declare in advance the intentIt cannot declare in advance the intentIt cannot declare in advance the intentof subsequent legislatures or the effect ofof subsequent legislatures or the effect ofof subsequent legislatures or the effect ofof subsequent legislatures or the effect ofof subsequent legislatures or the effect ofsubsequent leg is lat ion upon exist ingsubsequent leg is lat ion upon exist ingsubsequent leg is lat ion upon exist ingsubsequent leg is lat ion upon exist ingsubsequent leg is lat ion upon exist ingstatutesstatutesstatutesstatutesstatutes.[34](Emphasis ours.)

Thus, while a supermajority is not a total

ban against a repeal, it is a limitation in excessof what the Constitution requires on thepassage of b i l ls and is const itut ional lyobnoxious because it significantly constrictsthe future legislators’ room for action andflexibility.

III. C. III. C. III. C. III. C. III. C. Section 3, Section 3, Section 3, Section 3, Section 3, Article XVII of RAArticle XVII of RAArticle XVII of RAArticle XVII of RAArticle XVII of RA No. No. No. No. No.9054 excess ive ly enlarged the9054 excess ive ly enlarged the9054 excess ive ly enlarged the9054 excess ive ly enlarged the9054 excess ive ly enlarged the

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plebisc i te requirement found inplebisc i te requirement found inplebisc i te requirement found inplebisc i te requirement found inplebisc i te requirement found inSect ion 18 , Sect ion 18 , Sect ion 18 , Sect ion 18 , Sect ion 18 , Art ic le X o f theArt ic le X o f theArt ic le X o f theArt ic le X o f theArt ic le X o f theConstitutionConstitutionConstitutionConstitutionConstitution

The requirements of RA No. 9054 not only

required an unwarranted supermajority, butenlarged as well the plebiscite requirement, asembodied in its Section 3, Article XVII of thatAct . As we did on the supermajorityrequirement, we find the enlargement of theplebiscite requirement required under Section18, Article X of the Constitution to be excessiveto point of absurdity and, hence, a violation ofthe Constitution.

Section 18, Article X of the Constitutionstates that the plebiscite is required only forthe creation of autonomous regions and fordetermining which provinces, cities andgeographic areas will be included in theautonomous regions. While the settled rule isthat amendments to the Organic Act have tocomply with the plebiscite requirement inorder to become effective,[35] questions on theextent of the matters requiring ratificationmay unavoidably arise because of theseemingly general terms of the Constitutionand the obvious absurdity that would result ifa plebisc i te were to be requiredfor every statutory amendment.

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Section 18, Article X of the Constitution

plainly states that “The creation of theautonomous region shall be effective whenapproved by the majority of the votes case bythe constituent units in a plebiscite called forthe purpose.” With these wordings asstandard, we interpret the requirement tomean that only amendments to, or revisions of,the Organic Act constitutionally-essential tothe creation of autonomous regions – i.e., thoseaspects speci f ical ly mentioned in theConstitution which Congress must provide forin the Organic Act – require ratificationthrough a plebiscite. These amendments tothe Organic Act are those that relate to: (a) thebasic structure of the regional government; (b)the region ’s judic ial system, i .e . ,the special courts with personal, family,and property law jurisdiction; and, (c) the grantand extent of the legis lat ive powersconstitutionally conceded to the regionalgovernment under Section 20, Article X of theConstitution.[36]

The date of the ARMM elections does not

fal l under any of the matters that theConstitution specifically mandated Congress toprovide for in the Organic Act. Therefore, evenassuming that the supermajority votes and the

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plebiscite requirements are valid, any changein the date of elections cannot be construed asa substantial amendment of the Organic Actthat would require compliance with theserequirements. IVIVIVIVIV. . . . . The synchronization issueThe synchronization issueThe synchronization issueThe synchronization issueThe synchronization issue

As we discussed above, synchronization ofnational and local elections is a constitutionalmandate that Congress must provide for andthis synchronization must include the ARMMelections. On this point, an existing law in factalready exists – RA No. 7166 – as theforerunner of the current RA No. 10153. RA No.7166 already provides for the synchronizationof local elections with the national andcongressional elections. Thus, what RA No.10153 provides is an old matter for localgovernments (with the exceptionof barangay and Sanggunian Kabataan electionswhere the terms are not constitutionallyprovided) and is technically a reiteration ofwhat is already reflected in the law, given thatregional elections are in reality local electionsby express constitutional recognition.[37]

To achieve synchronizat ion,

Congress necessarilynecessarilynecessarilynecessarilynecessarily has to reconcile theschedule of the ARMM’s regular elections

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(which should have been held in August 2011based on RA No. 9333) with the fixed scheduleof the national and local elections (fixed by RANo. 7166 to be held in May 2013).

During the oral arguments, the Courtidentified the three options open to Congressin order to resolve this problem. These optionsare: (1) to allow the elective officials in theARMM to remain in office in a hold overcapacity, pursuant to Section 7(1), Article VIIof RA No. 9054, until those elected in thesynchronized elections assume office;[38] (2) tohold special elections in the ARMM, with theterms of those elected to expire when thoseelected in the synchronized elections assumeoffice; or (3) to authorize the President toappoint OICs, pursuant to Section 3 of RA No.10153, a lso unti l those e lected in thesynchronized elections assume office.

As wi l l be abundantly c lear in thediscussion below, Congress, in choosing togrant the President the power to appoint OICs,chose the correct option and passed RA No.10153 as a completely valid law.

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VVVVV..... The Constitutionality of RAThe Constitutionality of RAThe Constitutionality of RAThe Constitutionality of RAThe Constitutionality of RA No. 10153 No. 10153 No. 10153 No. 10153 No. 10153

A.A.A.A.A.Basic Underlying PremisesBasic Underlying PremisesBasic Underlying PremisesBasic Underlying PremisesBasic Underlying Premises To fully appreciate the available options,

certain underlying material premises must befully understood. The first is the extent of thepowers of Congress to legislate; the second isthe const itut ional mandate for thesynchronization of elections; and the third ison the concept of autonomy as recognized andestablished under the 1987 Constitution.

The grant of legislative power to Congress

is broad, general and comprehensive.[39] Thelegislative body possesses plenary power for allpurposes of civil government.[40] Any power,deemed to be legis lat ive by usage andtradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress,unless the Const itut ion has lodged i te lsewhere. [41] Except as l imited by theConstitution, either expressly or impliedly,legislative power embraces all subjects andextends to all matters of general concern orcommon interest.[42]

The const itut ional l imitat ions on

legislative power are either express or implied.The express limitations are generally providedin some provisions of the Declaration of

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Principles and State Policies (Article 2) and inthe provisions Bill of Rights (Article 3). Otherconstitutional provisions (such as the initiativeand referendum clause of Article 6, Sections 1and 32, and the autonomy provisions of ArticleX) provide their own express limitations. Theimplied limitations are found “in the evidentpurpose which was in view and thecircumstances and historical events which ledto the enactment of the particular provision asa part of organic law.”[43]

The const itut ional provis ions on

autonomy – specifically, Sections 15 to 21 ofArticle X of the Constitution – constituteexpress limitations on legislative power as theydefine autonomy, its requirements and itsparameters, thus limiting what is otherwise theunlimited power of Congress to legislate on thegovernance of the autonomous region.

Of particular relevance to the issues of

the present case are the limitations posed bythe prescribed basic structure of government – i .e . , that the government must have anexecutive department and a legis lat iveassembly, both of which must be elective andrepresentative of the constituent politicalunits; national government, too, must notencroach on the legislative powers granted

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under Section 20, Article X. Conversely andas expressly reflected in Section 17, ArticleX, ”all powers and functions not granted by thisConstitution or by law to the autonomousregions shall be vested in the NationalGovernment.”

The totality of Sections 15 to 21 of Article

X should likewise serve as a standard thatCongress must observe in deal ing withlegislation touching on the affairs of theautonomous regions. The terms of thesesect ions leave no doubt on what theConstitution intends – the idea of self-rule orself-government, in particular, the power tolegislate on a wide array of social, economic andadministrative matters. But equally clearunder these provisions are the permeatingprinciples of national sovereignty and theterritor ial integrity of the Republ ic , asexpressed in the above-quoted Section 17 andin Sect ion 15. [44] In other words , theConstitut ion and the support ingjurisprudence, as they now stand, reject thenotion of imperium et imperio [45] in therelationship between the national and theregional governments.

In relation with synchronization, bothautonomy and the synchronization of national

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and local e lect ions are recognized andestablished constitutional mandates, with onebeing as compelling as the other. If theircompelling force differs at all, the difference isin their coverage; synchronization operates onand affects the whole country, while regionalautonomy – as the term suggests – directlycarries a narrower regional effect although itsnational effect cannot be discounted.

These underlying basic concepts

characterize the powers and limitations ofCongress when it acted on RA No. 10153. Tosuccinctly describe the legal situation thatfaced Congress then, its decision to synchronizethe regional elections with the national,congressional and all other local elections (savef o r b a r a n g a y a n d s a n g g u n i a n gkabataan elections) left it with the problemof how to provide the how to provide the how to provide the how to provide the how to provide the ARMM withARMM withARMM withARMM withARMM withgovernance in the interveninggovernance in the interveninggovernance in the interveninggovernance in the interveninggovernance in the interveningperiodperiodperiodperiodperiod between the expiration of the term ofthose e lected in August 2008 and theassumption to office – twenty-one (21) monthsaway – of those who wil l win in thesynchronized elections on May 13, 2013.

The problem, in other words, was

for inter im measuresinter im measuresinter im measuresinter im measuresinter im measures for this period,consistent with the terms of the Constitution

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and its established supporting jurisprudence,and with the respect due to the concept ofautonomy. Interim measures, to be sure, is nota strange phenomenon in the Philippine legallandscape. The Constitution’s TransitoryProvisions themselves collectively providemeasures for transit ion from the o ldconst itut ion to the new [46] and for theintroduction of new concepts.[47] As previouslymentioned, the adjustment of elective termsand of e lect ions towards the goal o fsynchronization first transpired under theTransitory Provisions. The adjustments,however, failed to look far enough or deeplyenough, particularly into the problems thatsynchronizing regional autonomous electionswould entail; thus, the present problem is withus today.

The creation of local government unitsalso represents instances when interimmeasures are required. In the creation ofQuezon del Sur[48] and Dinagat Islands,[49] thecreating statutes authorized the President toappoint an interim governor, vice-governor andmembers of the sangguniangpanlalawigan although these positions areessentially elective in character; the appointiveofficials were to serve until a new set ofprovincial officials shall have been elected and

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qualified.[50] A similar authority to appoint isprovided in the transition of a local governmentfrom a sub-province to a province.[51]

In all these, the need for interim measures

is dictated by necessity ; out-of -the-wayarrangements and approaches were adopted orused in order to adjust to the goal or objectivein sight in a manner that does not do violenceto the Constitution and to reasonably acceptednorms. Under these limitations, the choice ofmeasures was a question of wisdom left tocongressional discretion.

To return to the underlying basicconcepts, these concepts shall serve as theguideposts and markers in our discussion of theoptions available to Congress to address theproblems brought about by thesynchronization of the ARMM elections,properly understood as interim measures thatCongress had to provide. The properunderstanding of the options as interimmeasures assume prime materiality as it isit isit isit isit isunder these terms that the passage of RAunder these terms that the passage of RAunder these terms that the passage of RAunder these terms that the passage of RAunder these terms that the passage of RANo. 10153 should be measured, i.eNo. 10153 should be measured, i.eNo. 10153 should be measured, i.eNo. 10153 should be measured, i.eNo. 10153 should be measured, i.e.,.,. ,. ,. , givengivengivengivengiventhe const i tut ional ob ject ive o fthe const i tut ional ob ject ive o fthe const i tut ional ob ject ive o fthe const i tut ional ob ject ive o fthe const i tut ional ob ject ive o fsynchronizat ion that cannot legal ly besynchronizat ion that cannot legal ly besynchronizat ion that cannot legal ly besynchronizat ion that cannot legal ly besynchronizat ion that cannot legal ly befaulted, did Congress gravely abuse i tsfaulted, did Congress gravely abuse i tsfaulted, did Congress gravely abuse i tsfaulted, did Congress gravely abuse i tsfaulted, did Congress gravely abuse i tsdiscret ion or v io late the Const i tut iondiscret ion or v io late the Const i tut iondiscret ion or v io late the Const i tut iondiscret ion or v io late the Const i tut iondiscret ion or v io late the Const i tut ion

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when it addressed through RA No. 10153when it addressed through RA No. 10153when it addressed through RA No. 10153when it addressed through RA No. 10153when it addressed through RA No. 10153the concomitant problems that thethe concomitant problems that thethe concomitant problems that thethe concomitant problems that thethe concomitant problems that theadjustment o f e lect ions necessar i lyadjustment o f e lect ions necessar i lyadjustment o f e lect ions necessar i lyadjustment o f e lect ions necessar i lyadjustment o f e lect ions necessar i lybrought with it?brought with it?brought with it?brought with it?brought with it? B. Holdover Option is UnconstitutionalB. Holdover Option is UnconstitutionalB. Holdover Option is UnconstitutionalB. Holdover Option is UnconstitutionalB. Holdover Option is Unconstitutional

We rule out the first option – holdoverfor those who were elected in executive andlegislative positions in the ARMM during the2008-2011 term – as an option that Congresscould have chosen because a holdover violatesSection 8, Article X of the Constitution. Thisprovision states:

Section 8. The term of office ofterm of office ofterm of office ofterm of office ofterm of office of

e lect ive local o f f i c ia lse lect ive local o f f i c ia lse lect ive local o f f i c ia lse lect ive local o f f i c ia lse lect ive local o f f i c ia ls , exceptbarangay off icials, which shall bedetermined by law, shall be threeshall be threeshall be threeshall be threeshall be threeyearsyearsyearsyearsyearsand no such official shall serve formore than three consecutive terms.[emphases ours] Since elective ARMMofficials are local officials, they arecovered and bound by the three-yearterm l imit prescr ibed by theConstitution; they cannot extend theirterm through a holdover. As this Courtput in Osmeña v. COMELEC:[52]

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It is not competent for thelegislature to extend the term of officersby providing that they shall hold overuntil their successors are elected andqualified where the constitution has ineffect or by clear implication prescribedthe term and when the Constitutionfixes the day on which the official termshall begin, there is no legislativeauthority to continue the office beyondthat period, even though the successorsfail to qualify within the time.

In American Jurisprudence it hasbeen stated as follows:

“It has been broadly statedthat the legislature cannot, by anthe legislature cannot, by anthe legislature cannot, by anthe legislature cannot, by anthe legislature cannot, by anact postponing the election to fill anact postponing the election to fill anact postponing the election to fill anact postponing the election to fill anact postponing the election to fill anoffice the term of which is limitedoffice the term of which is limitedoffice the term of which is limitedoffice the term of which is limitedoffice the term of which is limitedby the Const i tut ion, extend theby the Const i tut ion, extend theby the Const i tut ion, extend theby the Const i tut ion, extend theby the Const i tut ion, extend theterm of the incumbent beyond theterm of the incumbent beyond theterm of the incumbent beyond theterm of the incumbent beyond theterm of the incumbent beyond theper iod as l imited by theper iod as l imited by theper iod as l imited by theper iod as l imited by theper iod as l imited by theConstitutionConstitutionConstitutionConstitutionConstitution.” [Emphasis ours.]

Independently of the Osmeña ruling, the

primacy of the Constitution as the supreme lawof the land dictates that where the Constitutionhas itself made a determination or given itsmandate, then the matters so determined or

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mandated should be respected until theConstitution itself is changed by amendmentor repeal through the applicable constitutionalprocess. A necessary corollary is that none ofthe three branches of government can deviatefrom the constitutional mandate except only asthe Constitution itself may allow.[53] If at all,Congress may only pass legislation filing indetai ls to ful ly operat ional ize theconstitutional command or to implement it bylegislation if it is non-self-executing; thisCourt, on the other hand, may only interpretthe mandate if an interpretation is appropriateand called for.[54]

In the case of the terms of local officials,their term has been f ixed c learly andunequivocally, allowing no room for anyimplementing legislation with respect to thefixed term itself and no vagueness that wouldallow an interpretation from this Court. Thus,the term of three years for local officials shouldstay at three (3) years as f ixed by theConstitution and cannot be extended byholdover by Congress. If it will be claimed that the holdoverperiod is effectively another term mandated byCongress, the net result is for Congress tocreate a new term and to appoint the occupant

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for the new term. This v iew – l ikethe extension of the e lect ive term – isconstitutionally infirm because Congresscannot do indirect ly what i t cannot dodirectly, i .e. , to act in a way that wouldeffectively extend the term of the incumbents.Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally donedirectly can be done indirectly, then all lawswould be illusory.[55] Congress cannot alsocreate a new term and effectively appoint theoccupant of the position for the new term. Thisis e f fect ively an act o f appointment byCongress and an unconstitutional intrusioninto the constitutional appointment power ofthe President.[56] Hence, holdover – whicheverway it is viewed – is a constitutionally infirmoption that Congress could not haveundertaken. Jurisprudence, of course, is not withoutexamples of cases where the question ofholdover was brought before, and given theimprimatur of approval by, this Court. Thepresent case though differs significantly frompast cases with contrary rulings, particularlyfrom Sambarani v. COMELEC,[57] Adap v.Comelec, [58] and Montesclaros v.Comelec,[59] where the Court ruled that theelective officials could hold on to their positionsin a hold over capacity.

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All these past cases refer toe l e c t i v e b a r a n g a y o r s a n g g u n i a n gkabataan officials whose terms of officeare not expl ic i t ly provided forin the Constitution; ; ; ; ; the present case, on theother hand, refers to local elective officials –the ARMM Governor, the ARMM Vice-Governor, and the members of the RegionalLegislative Assembly – whose terms fall withinthe three-year term limit set by Section 8,Article X of the Constitution. Because of theirconstitutionally limited term, Congress cannotlegislate an extension beyond the term forwhich they were originally elected.

Even assuming that holdover is

constitutionally permissible, and there hadbeen statutory basis for it (namely Section 7,Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past,[60] wehave to remember that the rule of holdoverthe rule of holdoverthe rule of holdoverthe rule of holdoverthe rule of holdovercan only apply as an avai lable opt ioncan only apply as an avai lable opt ioncan only apply as an avai lable opt ioncan only apply as an avai lable opt ioncan only apply as an avai lable opt ionwhere no express or implied legislativewhere no express or implied legislativewhere no express or implied legislativewhere no express or implied legislativewhere no express or implied legislativeintent to the contrary exists ; i t cannotintent to the contrary exists ; i t cannotintent to the contrary exists ; i t cannotintent to the contrary exists ; i t cannotintent to the contrary exists ; i t cannotapply where such contrary intent isapply where such contrary intent isapply where such contrary intent isapply where such contrary intent isapply where such contrary intent isevident.evident.evident.evident.evident. [61]

Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made

it explicitly clear that it had the intention ofsuppressing the holdover rule that prevailedunder RA No. 9054 by completely removing

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this provision. The deletion is a policy decisionthat is wholly within the discretion of Congressto make in the exercise of its plenary legislativepowers ; this Court cannot passupon quest ions o f wisdom, just ice orexpediency of legislation,[62] except where anattendant unconstitutionality or grave abuseof discretion results.

C . C . C . C . C . The COMELEC has noThe COMELEC has noThe COMELEC has noThe COMELEC has noThe COMELEC has noauthority to order special electionsauthority to order special electionsauthority to order special electionsauthority to order special electionsauthority to order special elections

Another opt ion proposed by the

petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 is for this Courtto compel COMELEC to immediately conductspecial elections pursuant to Section 5 and 6of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 881.

The power to fix the date of elections isessentially legislative in nature, as evidentfrom, and exempli f ied by, the fo l lowingprovisions of the Constitution:

Section 8, Article VI, applicable to the

legislature, provides:

Sect ion 8 . Unless otherwiseUnless otherwiseUnless otherwiseUnless otherwiseUnless otherwiseprovided by lawprovided by lawprovided by lawprovided by lawprovided by law, the regular election of theSenators and the Members of the House ofRepresentatives shall be held on the secondMonday of May. [Emphasis ours]

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Section 4(3), Article VII, with the sametenor but appl icable sole ly to thePresident and Vice-President, states:

xxxx

Sect ion 4 . xxx UnlessUnlessUnlessUnlessUnlessotherwise provided by lawotherwise provided by lawotherwise provided by lawotherwise provided by lawotherwise provided by law, theregular election for President andVice-President shall be held on thesecond Monday of May. [Emphasisours]

while Section 3, Article X, on local government,provides:

Section 3. The Congress shall The Congress shall The Congress shall The Congress shall The Congress shall

enact a local governmentenact a local governmentenact a local governmentenact a local governmentenact a local governmentcodecodecodecodecode which shall provide for xxx thequalifications, electionelectionelectionelectionelection, appointmentand removal, term, salaries, powersand functions and duties of locallocallocallocallocalofficials[officials[officials[officials[officials[.] [Emphases ours]

These provisions support the conclusion

that no elections may be held on any other datefor the positions of President, Vice President,Members of Congress and local officials, exceptwhen so provided by another Act of Congress,or upon orders of a body or officer to whom

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Congress may have delegated either thepower or the authority to ascertain or fill in thedetails in the execution of that power.[63]

Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM

elections by postponing the scheduled August2011 elections and setting another date – May13, 2011 – for regional elections synchronizedwith the presidential, congressional and otherlocal elections. By so doing, Congress itself hasmade a policy decisiona policy decisiona policy decisiona policy decisiona policy decision in the exercise of in the exercise of in the exercise of in the exercise of in the exercise ofits legislative wisdom that its legislative wisdom that its legislative wisdom that its legislative wisdom that its legislative wisdom that it shall not callit shall not callit shall not callit shall not callit shall not callspecial electionsspecial electionsspecial electionsspecial electionsspecial electionsas an adjustment measure insynchronizing the ARMM elections with theother elections.

After Congress has so acted, neither theExecutive nor the Judiciary can act to thecontrary by ordering special elections insteadat the call of the COMELEC. This Court,particularly, cannot make this call withoutthereby supplanting the legislative decisionand effectively legislating. To be sure, theCourt is not without the power to declare an actof Congress nul l and void for beingunconstitutional or for having been exercisedin grave abuse of discretion.[64] But our powerBut our powerBut our powerBut our powerBut our powerrests on very narrow ground and is merelyrests on very narrow ground and is merelyrests on very narrow ground and is merelyrests on very narrow ground and is merelyrests on very narrow ground and is merelyto annul a contravening act of Congress;to annul a contravening act of Congress;to annul a contravening act of Congress;to annul a contravening act of Congress;to annul a contravening act of Congress;i t i s not to supplant the dec is ion o fi t i s not to supplant the dec is ion o fi t i s not to supplant the dec is ion o fi t i s not to supplant the dec is ion o fi t i s not to supplant the dec is ion o f

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Congress nor to mandate what CongressCongress nor to mandate what CongressCongress nor to mandate what CongressCongress nor to mandate what CongressCongress nor to mandate what Congressitself should have done in the exercise ofitself should have done in the exercise ofitself should have done in the exercise ofitself should have done in the exercise ofitself should have done in the exercise ofits legislative powers.its legislative powers.its legislative powers.its legislative powers.its legislative powers. Thus, contrary towhat the petition in G.R. No. 197282 urges, wecannot compel COMELEC to call for specialelections. Furthermore, we have to bear in mind that theconstitutional power of the COMELEC, incontrast with the power of Congress to call for,and to set the date of, elections, is limited toenforcing and administering all laws andregulations relative to the conduct of anelection.[65] Statutorily, COMELEC has nopower to call for the holding of special electionsunless pursuant to a speci f ic statutorygrant. True, Congress did grant, via Sections5 and 6 of BP 881, COMELEC with the powerto postpone elections to another date. However,this power is limited to, and can only beexercised within, the specific terms andcircumstances provided for in the law. Wequote:

Sect ion 5 . Postponement ofelection. - When for any serious causesuch as violenceviolenceviolenceviolenceviolence, terrorismterrorismterrorismterrorismterrorism, loss orloss orloss orloss orloss ordestruct ion o f e lect iondestruct ion o f e lect iondestruct ion o f e lect iondestruct ion o f e lect iondestruct ion o f e lect ionparaphernal iaparaphernal iaparaphernal iaparaphernal iaparaphernal ia or records , forceforceforceforceforcemajeuremajeuremajeuremajeuremajeure, and other analogousother analogousother analogousother analogousother analogous

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causescausescausescausescauses o f such a nature that theholding of a free, orderly and honestelection should become impossible inany pol i t ical subdivis ion, theCommission, motu proprio or upon averified petition by any interested party,and after due notice and hearing,whereby all interested parties areafforded equal opportunity to be heard,shall postpone the election thereinpostpone the election thereinpostpone the election thereinpostpone the election thereinpostpone the election thereinto a date which should beto a date which should beto a date which should beto a date which should beto a date which should bereasonably close to the date of thereasonably close to the date of thereasonably close to the date of thereasonably close to the date of thereasonably close to the date of theelect ion not held , suspended ore lect ion not held , suspended ore lect ion not held , suspended ore lect ion not held , suspended ore lect ion not held , suspended orwhich resulted in a fa i lure towhich resulted in a fa i lure towhich resulted in a fa i lure towhich resulted in a fa i lure towhich resulted in a fa i lure toelectelectelectelectelect but not later than thirty daysafter the cessation of the cause for suchpostponement or suspension of theelection or failure to elect.

Section 6. Failure of election. - If,

on account o f forceforceforceforceforcemajeuremajeuremajeuremajeuremajeure, violenceviolenceviolenceviolenceviolence, terrorismterrorismterrorismterrorismterrorism, fraudfraudfraudfraudfraud,or other analogous causesother analogous causesother analogous causesother analogous causesother analogous causes thethethethetheelection in any polling place has notelection in any polling place has notelection in any polling place has notelection in any polling place has notelection in any polling place has notbeen held on the date fixed,been held on the date fixed,been held on the date fixed,been held on the date fixed,been held on the date fixed, or hadhadhadhadhadbeen suspendedbeen suspendedbeen suspendedbeen suspendedbeen suspended before the hour fixedby law for the closing of the voting, orafter the vot ing and during thepreparation and the transmission of theelection returns or in the custody or

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canvass thereof, such election resultssuch election resultssuch election resultssuch election resultssuch election resultsin a failure to electin a failure to electin a failure to electin a failure to electin a failure to elect, and in any of suchcases the failure or suspension of electionwould affect the result of the election, theCommission shall, on the basis of averified petition by any interested partyand after due notice and hearing, call forthe holding or continuation of theelection not held, suspended or whichresulted in a failure to elect on a datereasonably close to the date of theelection not held, suspended or whichresulted in a failure to elect but not laterthan thirty days after the cessation ofthe cause of such postponement orsuspension of the election or failure toelect. [Emphasis ours]

A close reading of Section 5 of BP 881

reveals that it is meant to address instanceswhere e lect ions have a lready beenelect ions have a lready beenelect ions have a lready beenelect ions have a lready beenelect ions have a lready beenscheduledscheduledscheduledscheduledscheduled to take p lace but have toto take p lace but have toto take p lace but have toto take p lace but have toto take p lace but have tobebebebebe postponedpostponedpostponedpostponedpostponed because of (a) violence, (b)terrorism, (c) loss or destruction of electionparaphernalia or records, (d) force majeure,and (e) other analogous causes of such a naturethat the holding of a free, orderly and honestelection should become impossible in anypolitical subdivision. Under the principleof ejusdem generis, the term “analogous

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causes” wi l l be restr icted tothose unforeseenunforeseenunforeseenunforeseenunforeseen or unexpected unexpected unexpected unexpected unexpected events thatprevent the holding of the scheduled elections.These “analogous causes” are further definedby the phrase “of such nature that the holdingof a free, orderly and honest election shouldbecome impossible.”

Similarly, Section 6 of BP 881 applies onlyto those situations where elections have alreadybeen scheduled but do not take place becauseof (a) force majeureforce majeureforce majeureforce majeureforce majeure, (b ) v io lencevio lencevio lencevio lencevio lence ,(c ) terror ismterror ismterror ismterror ismterror ism, (d) f raudfraudfraudfraudfraud, or (e ) o therotherotherotherotheranalogous causesanalogous causesanalogous causesanalogous causesanalogous causes the e lect ion in anythe e lect ion in anythe e lect ion in anythe e lect ion in anythe e lect ion in anypolling place has not been held on the datepolling place has not been held on the datepolling place has not been held on the datepolling place has not been held on the datepolling place has not been held on the datef ixed,f ixed,f ixed,f ixed,f ixed, or had been suspendedhad been suspendedhad been suspendedhad been suspendedhad been suspended before thehour fixed by law for the closing of the voting,or after the voting and during the preparationand the transmission of the election returns orin the custody or canvass thereof , suchsuchsuchsuchsuchelection results in a failure to elect.election results in a failure to elect.election results in a failure to elect.election results in a failure to elect.election results in a failure to elect. As inSection 5 of BP 881, Section 6 addressesinstances where the elections do not occur orhad to be suspended becauseof unexpectedunexpectedunexpectedunexpectedunexpected and unforeseenunforeseenunforeseenunforeseenunforeseen circumstances.

In the present case, the postponement ofthe postponement ofthe postponement ofthe postponement ofthe postponement ofthe the the the the ARMM elect ions isARMM elect ions isARMM elect ions isARMM elect ions isARMM elect ions is by lawby lawby lawby lawby law – i .e . , bycongressional policy – and is pursuant to thepursuant to thepursuant to thepursuant to thepursuant to theconst i tut ional mandate o fconst i tut ional mandate o fconst i tut ional mandate o fconst i tut ional mandate o fconst i tut ional mandate o f

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synchronizat ionsynchronizat ionsynchronizat ionsynchronizat ionsynchronizat ion o f nat ional and localelections. By no stretch of the imagination canthese reasons be given the same character asthe circumstances contemplated by Section 5or Section 6 of BP 881, which all pertain toextralegal causes that obstruct the holding ofelections. Courts, to be sure, cannot enlargethe scope of a statute under the guise ofinterpretation, nor include situations notprovided nor intended by thelawmakers.[66] Clearly, neither Section 5 norSection 6 of BP 881 can apply to the presentcase and this Court has absolutely no legalbasis to compel the COMELEC to hold specialelections.

D . D . D . D . D . The Court has no power toThe Court has no power toThe Court has no power toThe Court has no power toThe Court has no power toshorten the terms of elective officialsshorten the terms of elective officialsshorten the terms of elective officialsshorten the terms of elective officialsshorten the terms of elective officials

Even assuming that i t is legal lypermissible for the Court to compel theCOMELEC to hold special elections, no legalbasis likewise exists to rule that the newlyelected ARMM officials shall hold office onlyunti l the ARMM off ic ials elected in thesynchronized elections shall have assumedoffice.

In the f irst place, the Court is notempowered to adjust the terms of elective

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officials. Based on the Constitution, the powerto fix the term of office of elective officials,which can be exercised only in the caseof barangay officials,[67] is specifically given toCongress. Even Congress itself may be deniedsuch power, as shown when the Constitutionshortened the terms of twelve Senatorsobtaining the least votes,[68] and extended theterms of the President and the Vice-President[69] in order to synchronize elections;Congress was not granted this samepower. The settled rule is that terms fixed bythe Constitution cannot be changed by merestatute. [70] More part icularly, not evenCongress and certainly not this Court, has theauthority to fix the terms of elective localofficials in the ARMM for less less less less less, or more, thanor more, thanor more, thanor more, thanor more, thanthe const i tut ional ly mandated threethe const i tut ional ly mandated threethe const i tut ional ly mandated threethe const i tut ional ly mandated threethe const i tut ional ly mandated threeyearsyearsyearsyearsyears[71] as this tinkering would directlycontravene Sect ion 8 , Art ic le X of theConstitution as we ruled in Osmena.

Thus, in the same way that the term ofelective ARMM officials cannot be extendedthrough a holdover, the term cannot beshortened by putting an expiration dateby putting an expiration dateby putting an expiration dateby putting an expiration dateby putting an expiration dateearlier than the three (3) years that theearlier than the three (3) years that theearlier than the three (3) years that theearlier than the three (3) years that theearlier than the three (3) years that theConst i tut ion i tse l f commands. This i sConst i tut ion i tse l f commands. This i sConst i tut ion i tse l f commands. This i sConst i tut ion i tse l f commands. This i sConst i tut ion i tse l f commands. This i swhat wil l happen – a term of less thanwhat wil l happen – a term of less thanwhat wil l happen – a term of less thanwhat wil l happen – a term of less thanwhat wil l happen – a term of less thantwo years – if a call for special electionstwo years – if a call for special electionstwo years – if a call for special electionstwo years – if a call for special electionstwo years – if a call for special elections

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shall prevail. shall prevail. shall prevail. shall prevail. shall prevail. In sum, while synchronizationis achieved, the result is at the cost of aviolation of an express provision of theConstitution.

Neither we nor Congress can opt toshorten the tenure of those officials to beelected in the ARMM elections instead ofacting on their term (where the “term” meansthe time during which the officer may claim tohold office as of right and fixes the intervalafter which the several incumbents shallsucceed one another, while the “tenure”represents the term during which theincumbent actually holds the office).[72] As withthe f ix ing of the e lect ive term, neitherCongress nor the Court has any legal basis toshorten the tenure of elective ARMM officials.

They would commit an unconstitutionalact and gravely abuse their discretion if theydo so.

E. E. E. E. E. The President’The President’The President’The President’The President’s Power to s Power to s Power to s Power to s Power to AppointAppointAppointAppointAppointOICsOICsOICsOICsOICs

The above considerations leave onlyCongress’ chosen interim measure – RA No.10153 and the appointment by the Presidentof OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-

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synchronization period pursuant to Sections 3,4 and 5 of this law – as the only measure thatCongress can make. This choice i tsel f ,however, should be examined for any attendantconstitutional infirmity.

At the outset, the power to appoint is

essentially executive in nature, and thelimitations on or qualifications to the exerciseof this power should be strictly construed; theselimitations or qualifications must be clearlystated in order to be recognized. [73] Theappointing power is embodied in Section 16,Article VII of the Constitution, which states:

Section 16. The President shallnominate and, with the consent of theCommission on Appointments, appointthe heads of the executive departments,ambassadors, other public ministers andconsuls or officers of the armed forcesfrom the rank of colonel or naval captain,and other officers whose appointmentsare vested in him in this Constitution. HeHeHeHeHeshall also appoint all other officersshall also appoint all other officersshall also appoint all other officersshall also appoint all other officersshall also appoint all other officersof the Government whoseof the Government whoseof the Government whoseof the Government whoseof the Government whoseappointments are not otherwiseappointments are not otherwiseappointments are not otherwiseappointments are not otherwiseappointments are not otherwiseprovided for by lawprovided for by lawprovided for by lawprovided for by lawprovided for by law, and those whom, and those whom, and those whom, and those whom, and those whomhe may be author ized by law tohe may be author ized by law tohe may be author ized by law tohe may be author ized by law tohe may be author ized by law to

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appoint.appoint.appoint.appoint.appoint. The Congress may, by law, vestthe appointment of other officers lower inrank in the President alone, in the courts,or in the heads of departments, agencies,commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]

This provision classifies into four groups

the officers that the President can appoint.These are:

First , the heads of the executive

departments; ambassadors; other publicministers and consuls; officers of the ArmedForces of the Philippines, from the rank ofcolonel or naval captain; and other officerswhose appointments are vested in thePresident in this Constitution;

Second, a l l other o f f icers o f the

government whose appointments are nototherwise provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President mayThird, those whom the President mayThird, those whom the President mayThird, those whom the President mayThird, those whom the President may

be authorized by law to appoint; be authorized by law to appoint; be authorized by law to appoint; be authorized by law to appoint; be authorized by law to appoint; and

Fourth, officers lower in rank whoseappointments the Congress may by law vest inthe President alone.[74]

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Since the President ’s authority toappoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, itfalls under the third group of officials that thePresident can appoint pursuant to Section 16,Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, theassai led law facial ly rests on c learconstitutional basis.

If at all, the gravest challenge posed by

the petitions to the authority to appoint OICsunder Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertionthat the Constitution requires that the ARMMexecutive and legislative officials to be “electiveand representative of the constituent politicalunits.” This requirement indeed is an expressl imitation whose non-observance in theassailed law leaves the appointment of OICsconstitutionally defective.

After fully examining the issue, we hold

that this alleged constitutional problem ismore apparent than real and becomes very realonly if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenlymistakenlymistakenlymistakenlymistakenlyread as a law that changes the electiveread as a law that changes the electiveread as a law that changes the electiveread as a law that changes the electiveread as a law that changes the electiveand representat ive character o f and representat ive character o f and representat ive character o f and representat ive character o f and representat ive character o f ARMMARMMARMMARMMARMMpositions.positions.positions.positions.positions. RA No. 10153, however, does notin any way amend what the organic law of theARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms ofstructure of governance. What RA No. 10153in fact only does is to ”appoint officers-in-

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charge for the Office of the Regional Governor,Regional Vice Governor and Members of theRegional Legislative Assembly who shallperform the functions pertaining to the saidoffices until the officials duly elected in theMay 2013 elections shall have qualified andassumed office.” This power is far different fromappointing elective ARMM officials for theabbreviated term ending on the assumption tooffice of the officials elected in the May 2013elections.

As we have already established in our

discussion of the supermajority and plebisciterequirements, the legal reality is that RA No.RA No.RA No.RA No.RA No.10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RARARARARANo. 10153, in fact , provides only forNo. 10153, in fact , provides only forNo. 10153, in fact , provides only forNo. 10153, in fact , provides only forNo. 10153, in fact , provides only forsynchronization of elections and for thesynchronization of elections and for thesynchronization of elections and for thesynchronization of elections and for thesynchronization of elections and for theinter im measures that must in theinter im measures that must in theinter im measures that must in theinter im measures that must in theinter im measures that must in themeanwhile prevail.meanwhile prevail.meanwhile prevail.meanwhile prevail.meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No.10153 should be read – in the manner it waswritten and based on its unambiguous facialterms. [75] As ide f rom i ts order forAside f rom i ts order forAside f rom i ts order forAside f rom i ts order forAside f rom i ts order forsynchronization, it is purely and simplysynchronization, it is purely and simplysynchronization, it is purely and simplysynchronization, it is purely and simplysynchronization, it is purely and simplyan inter im measure responding to thean inter im measure responding to thean inter im measure responding to thean inter im measure responding to thean inter im measure responding to theadjustments that the synchronizat ionadjustments that the synchronizat ionadjustments that the synchronizat ionadjustments that the synchronizat ionadjustments that the synchronizat ionrequires.requires.requires.requires.requires.

Thus, the appropriate question to ask iswhether the interim measure is an

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unreasonable move for Congress to adopt,given the legal s i tuation that thesynchronization unavoidably brought withit. In more concrete terms and based on theabove considerat ions,g iven the p la ingiven the p la ingiven the p la ingiven the p la ingiven the p la inunconst i tut ional i ty o f providing for aunconst i tut ional i ty o f providing for aunconst i tut ional i ty o f providing for aunconst i tut ional i ty o f providing for aunconst i tut ional i ty o f providing for aholdover and the unavai labi l i ty o fholdover and the unavai labi l i ty o fholdover and the unavai labi l i ty o fholdover and the unavai labi l i ty o fholdover and the unavai labi l i ty o fconst i tut ional poss ib i l i t ies forconst i tut ional poss ib i l i t ies forconst i tut ional poss ib i l i t ies forconst i tut ional poss ib i l i t ies forconst i tut ional poss ib i l i t ies forlengthening or shortening the term of thelengthening or shortening the term of thelengthening or shortening the term of thelengthening or shortening the term of thelengthening or shortening the term of theelected elected elected elected elected ARMM officials, is the choice ofARMM officials, is the choice ofARMM officials, is the choice ofARMM officials, is the choice ofARMM officials, is the choice ofthe President’the President’the President’the President’the President’s power to appoint – for as power to appoint – for as power to appoint – for as power to appoint – for as power to appoint – for af ixed and speci f ic period as an inter imfixed and speci f ic period as an inter imfixed and speci f ic period as an inter imfixed and speci f ic period as an inter imfixed and speci f ic period as an inter immeasure, and as allowed under Section 16,measure, and as allowed under Section 16,measure, and as allowed under Section 16,measure, and as allowed under Section 16,measure, and as allowed under Section 16,Art ic le VII o f the Const i tut ion – anArt ic le VII o f the Const i tut ion – anArt ic le VII o f the Const i tut ion – anArt ic le VII o f the Const i tut ion – anArt ic le VII o f the Const i tut ion – anunconstitutional or unreasonable choiceunconstitutional or unreasonable choiceunconstitutional or unreasonable choiceunconstitutional or unreasonable choiceunconstitutional or unreasonable choicefor Congress to make?for Congress to make?for Congress to make?for Congress to make?for Congress to make?

Admittedly, the grant of the power to thePresident under other situations or where thepower of appointment would extend beyond theadjustment period for synchronization wouldbe to foster a government that is not“democratic and republican.” For then, thepeople’s right to choose the leaders to governthem may be said tobe systemicallysystemicallysystemicallysystemicallysystemically withdrawn to the point offostering an undemocratic regime. This is thegrant that would frontally breach the “electiveand representative” governance requirementof Section 18, Article X of the Constitution.

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But this conclusion would not be trueunder the very l imited c ircumstancescontemplated in RA No. 10153 where the periodis fixed and, more importantly, the terms ofgovernance – both under Section 18, Article Xof the Constitution and RA No. 9054 – willnot systemicallysystemicallysystemicallysystemicallysystemically be touched nor affected atall. To repeat what has previously been said,RA No. 9054 will govern unchanged andcontinuously, with full effect in accordance withthe Constitution, save only for the interim andtemporary measures that synchronization ofelections requires.

Viewed from another perspect ive ,synchronization will temporarily disrupt theelection process in a local community, theARMM, as well as the community’s choice ofleaders, but this will take place under asituation of necessity and as an interimmeasure in the manner that interim measureshave been adopted and used in the creation oflocal government units[76] and the adjustmentsof sub-provinces to the status ofprovinces.[77] These measures, too, are used inlight of the wider national demand for thesynchronization of elections (considered vis-à-vis the regional interests involved). Theadoption of these measures, in other words, isno different from the exercise by Congress of

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the inherent police power of the State, whereone of the essential tests is the reasonablenessof the interim measure taken in light of thegiven circumstances.

Furthermore, the “representat ive”character of the chosen leaders need notnecessarily be affected by the appointment ofOICs as this requirement is really a functionof the appointment process; only the “elective”aspect shall be supplanted by the appointmentof OICs. In this regard, RA No. 10153significantly seeks to address concerns arisingfrom the appointments by providing, underSections 3, 4 and 5 of the assailed law, concreteterms in the Appointment of OIC, the Mannerand Procedure of Appointing OICs, and theirQualifications. Based on these considerations, we hold that RANo. 10153 – viewed in its proper context – is alaw that is not violative of the Constitution(specifically, its autonomy provisions), and onethat is reasonable as wel l under thecircumstances. VI. VI. VI. VI. VI. Other Constitutional ConcernsOther Constitutional ConcernsOther Constitutional ConcernsOther Constitutional ConcernsOther Constitutional Concerns

Outside of the above concerns, it has

been argued during the oral arguments that

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upholding the constitutionality of RA No.10153 would set a dangerous precedent ofgiving the President the power to cancelelections anywhere in the country, thusallowing him to replace elective officials withOICs.

This claim apparently misunderstandsthat an across-the-board cancellation ofelections is a matter for Congress, not for thePresident, to address. It is a power that fallswithin the powers of Congress in the exerciseof its legislative powers. Even Congress, asdiscussed above, is limited in what it canlegis lat ively undertake with respect toelections.

If RA No. 10153 cancelled the regular

August 2011 elections, it was for a very specificand limited purpose – the synchronization ofelections. It was a temporary means to alasting end – the synchronization of elections.Thus, RA No. 10153 and the support that theCourt gives this legislation are likewise clearand specific, and cannot be transferred orapplied to any other cause for the cancellationof elections. Any other localized cancellation ofelections and call for special elections can occuronly in accordance with the power alreadydelegated by Congress to the COMELEC, asabove discussed.

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Given that the incumbent ARMM electiveofficials cannot continue to act in a holdovercapacity upon the expiration of their terms,and this Court cannot compel the COMELECto conduct special elections, the Court now hasto deal with the dilemma of a vacuum ingovernance in the ARMM.

To emphasize the dire situation a vacuumbrings, it should not be forgotten that a periodof 21 months – or close to 2 years – intervenesfrom the time that the incumbent ARMMelective officials’ terms expired and the timethe new ARMM elective officials begin theirterms in 2013. As the lessons ofour Mindanao history – past and current –teach us, many developments, some of themcritical and adverse, can transpire in thecountry’s Muslim areas in this span of time inthe way they transpired in the past.[78] Thus,it would be reckless to assume that the presenceof an acting ARMM Governor, an acting Vice-Governor and a fully functioning RegionalLegislative Assembly can be done away witheven temporari ly. To our mind, theappointment of OICs under the presentcircumstances is an absolute necessity.

Significantly, the grant to the Presidentof the power to appoint OICs to undertake the

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functions of the elective members of theRegional Legislative Assembly is neither novelnor innovative. We hark back to our earlierpronouncement in Menzon v. Petilla, etc., etal.:[79]

It may be noted that under

Commonwealth Act No. 588 andthe Revised Administrative Codeof 1987, the President isempowered to make temporaryappointments in certain publicoffices, in case of any vacancy thatmay occur. Albeit both laws dealAlbeit both laws dealAlbeit both laws dealAlbeit both laws dealAlbeit both laws dealonly with the f i l l ing o fonly with the f i l l ing o fonly with the f i l l ing o fonly with the f i l l ing o fonly with the f i l l ing o fvacancies in appoint ivevacancies in appoint ivevacancies in appoint ivevacancies in appoint ivevacancies in appoint ivepos i t ions . Howeverpos i t ions . Howeverpos i t ions . Howeverpos i t ions . Howeverpos i t ions . However, in the, in the, in the, in the, in theabsence o f any contraryabsence o f any contraryabsence o f any contraryabsence o f any contraryabsence o f any contraryprovis ion in the Localprovis ion in the Localprovis ion in the Localprovis ion in the Localprovis ion in the LocalGovernment Code and in theGovernment Code and in theGovernment Code and in theGovernment Code and in theGovernment Code and in thebest interest of public service,best interest of public service,best interest of public service,best interest of public service,best interest of public service,we see no cogent reason whywe see no cogent reason whywe see no cogent reason whywe see no cogent reason whywe see no cogent reason whythe procedure thus outlined bythe procedure thus outlined bythe procedure thus outlined bythe procedure thus outlined bythe procedure thus outlined bythe two laws may not bethe two laws may not bethe two laws may not bethe two laws may not bethe two laws may not bes imi lar ly appl ied in thes imi lar ly appl ied in thes imi lar ly appl ied in thes imi lar ly appl ied in thes imi lar ly appl ied in thepresent casepresent casepresent casepresent casepresent case. The respondentscontend that the provincial boardis the correct appointing power.This argument has no merit. Asbetween the President who has

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supervis ion over localgovernments as provided by lawand the members of the board whoare junior to the vice-governor, wehave no problem ruling in favor ofthe President , unti l the lawprovides otherwise.

A vacancy creates an

anomalous situation and finds noapprobation under the law for itdeprives the constituents of theirr ight o f representat ion andgovernance in their own localgovernment.

In a republican form of government, themajority rules through their chosen few, and ifone of them is incapacitated or absent, etc., themanagement of governmental affairs is, to thatextent, may be hampered. NecessarilyNecessarilyNecessarilyNecessarilyNecessarily, there, there, there, there, therewill be a consequent delay in the deliverywill be a consequent delay in the deliverywill be a consequent delay in the deliverywill be a consequent delay in the deliverywill be a consequent delay in the deliveryof basic services to the people of Leyte ifof basic services to the people of Leyte ifof basic services to the people of Leyte ifof basic services to the people of Leyte ifof basic services to the people of Leyte ifthe Governor or the Vthe Governor or the Vthe Governor or the Vthe Governor or the Vthe Governor or the Vice -Governor isi ce -Governor isi ce -Governor isi ce -Governor isi ce -Governor ismissingmissingmissingmissingmissing.[80](Emphasis ours.)

As in Menzon, leaving the positions ofARMM Governor, Vice Governor, and membersof the Regional Legislative Assembly vacantfor 21 months, or almost 2 years, would clearly

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cause disruptions and delays in the delivery ofbasic services to the people, in the propermanagement of the affairs of the regionalgovernment, and in responding to criticaldevelopments that may arise. When viewed inthis context, allowing the President in theexercise of his constitutionally-recognizedappointment power to appoint OICs is, in ourjudgment, a reasonable measure to take.

B. B. B. B. B. Autonomy in the Autonomy in the Autonomy in the Autonomy in the Autonomy in the ARMMARMMARMMARMMARMM

I t is further argued that whi lesynchronization may be constitutionallymandated, it cannot be used to defeat or toimpede the autonomy that the Constitutiongranted to the ARMM. Phrased in this manner,one would presume that there exists a conflictbetween two recognized Constitut ionalmandates – synchronization and regionalautonomy – such that it is necessary to chooseone over the other.

We find this to be an erroneous approachthat violates a basic principle in constitutionalconstruction – ut magis valeat quam pereat:that the Constitution is to be interpreted as awhole,[81] and one mandate should not be givenimportance over the other except where theprimacy of one over the other is clear.[82] We

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refer to the Court’s declaration in Ang-Angcov. Castillo, et al.,[83]thus:

A provis ion of the

const itut ion should not beconstrued in isolation from therest. Rather, the constitution mustbe interpreted as a whole, anda p p a r e n t l y , c o n f l i c t i n gc o n f l i c t i n gc o n f l i c t i n gc o n f l i c t i n gc o n f l i c t i n gprovisions should be reconciledprovisions should be reconciledprovisions should be reconciledprovisions should be reconciledprovisions should be reconciledand harmonized in a mannerand harmonized in a mannerand harmonized in a mannerand harmonized in a mannerand harmonized in a mannerthat may g ive to a l l o f themthat may g ive to a l l o f themthat may g ive to a l l o f themthat may g ive to a l l o f themthat may g ive to a l l o f themfull force and effect.full force and effect.full force and effect.full force and effect.full force and effect.[Emphasissupplied.]

Synchronization is an interest that is as

const itut ional ly entrenched as regionalautonomy. They are interests that this Courtshould reconcile and give effect to, in the waythat Congress did in RA No. 10153 whichprovides the measure to transit to synchronizedregional elections with the least disturbance onthe interests that must berespected. Particularly, regional autonomywill be respected instead of being sidelined, asthe law does not in any way alter, change ormodify its governing features, except in a verytemporary manner and only as necessitated bythe attendant circumstances.

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Elsewhere, it has also been argued thatthe ARMM elect ions should not besynchronized with the national and localelections in order to maintain the autonomy ofthe ARMM and insulate its own electoralprocesses from the rough and tumble ofnationwide and local elections. This argumentleaves us far from convinced of its merits.

As heretofore mentioned and discussed,while autonomous regions are granted politicalautonomy, the framers of the Constitutionnever equated autonomy with independence.The ARMM as a regional entity thus continuesto operate within the larger framework of theState and is still subject to the national policiesset by the national government, save only forthose speci f ic areas reserved by theConstitut ion for regional autonomousdetermination. As ref lected during theconstitutional deliberations of the provisionson autonomous regions:

Mr. Bennagen. xxx We donot see here a complete separationfrom the central government, butrather an ef f ic ient workingrelat ionship between theautonomous region and thecentral government. We see this as

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an effective partnership, not aseparation.

Mr. Romulo. Therefore , complete

autonomy is not really thought of as completeindependence.

Mr. Ople. WWWWWe define it as a measure ofe define it as a measure ofe define it as a measure ofe define it as a measure ofe define it as a measure ofse l f -government within the largerse l f -government within the largerse l f -government within the largerse l f -government within the largerse l f -government within the largerpol i t i ca l f ramework o f thepol i t i ca l f ramework o f thepol i t i ca l f ramework o f thepol i t i ca l f ramework o f thepol i t i ca l f ramework o f thenationnationnationnationnation.[84] [Emphasis supplied.]

This exchange of course is fully and

expressly reflected in the above-quoted Section17, Article X of the Constitution, and by theexpress reservation under Section 1 of thesame Article that autonomy shall be ”withinthe framework of this Constitution and thenational sovereignty as well as the territorialintegrity of the Republic of the Philippines.”

Interestingly, the framers of the Constitutioninitially proposed to remove Section 17 ofArticle X, believing it to be unnecessary inlight of the enumeration of powers granted toautonomous regions in Section 20, Article X ofthe Constitution. Upon further reflection, theframers decided to reinstate the provision inorder to “make it clear, once and for all, thatthese are the limits of the powers of the

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autonomous government. Those notThose notThose notThose notThose notenumerated are actually to be exercisedenumerated are actually to be exercisedenumerated are actually to be exercisedenumerated are actually to be exercisedenumerated are actually to be exercisedby the national governmentby the national governmentby the national governmentby the national governmentby the national government[.]”[85] Of noteis the Court’s pronouncement in Pimentel, Jr.v. Hon. Aguirre[86] which we quote:

Under the Philippine concept oflocal autonomy, the nationalgovernment has not completelyrelinquished all its powers over localgovernments, including autonomousregions. Only administrative powersover local affairs are delegated topolitical subdivisions. The purpose ofthe delegation is to make governancemore directly responsive and effectiveat the local levels. In turn, economic,political and social development at thesmaller political units are expected topropel social and economic growth anddevelopment. But to enable theBut to enable theBut to enable theBut to enable theBut to enable thecountry to develop as a whole, thecountry to develop as a whole, thecountry to develop as a whole, thecountry to develop as a whole, thecountry to develop as a whole, theprograms and pol ic ies e f fectedprograms and pol ic ies e f fectedprograms and pol ic ies e f fectedprograms and pol ic ies e f fectedprograms and pol ic ies e f fectedlocal ly must be integrated andlocal ly must be integrated andlocal ly must be integrated andlocal ly must be integrated andlocal ly must be integrated andcoordinated towards a commoncoordinated towards a commoncoordinated towards a commoncoordinated towards a commoncoordinated towards a commonnational goal. Thus, policy-settingnational goal. Thus, policy-settingnational goal. Thus, policy-settingnational goal. Thus, policy-settingnational goal. Thus, policy-settingfor the entire country still l ies infor the entire country still l ies infor the entire country still l ies infor the entire country still l ies infor the entire country still l ies inthe Pres ident andthe Pres ident andthe Pres ident andthe Pres ident andthe Pres ident andCongress. Congress. Congress. Congress. Congress. [Emphasis ours.]

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In other words, the autonomy granted tothe ARMM cannot be invoked to defeat nationalpol ic ies and concerns. Since thesynchronization of elections is not just aregional concern but a national one, theARMM is subject to it; the regional autonomygranted to the ARMM cannot be used toexempt the region from having to act inaccordance with a national policy mandated byno less than the Constitution. ConclusionConclusionConclusionConclusionConclusion

Congress acted within its powers andpursuant to a constitutional mandate – thesynchronization of national and local elections– when it enacted RA No. 10153. This Courtcannot question the manner by which Congressundertook this task; the Judiciary does not andcannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justiceor expediency of legislation.[87] As judges, wecan only interpret and apply the law and,despite our doubts about its wisdom, cannotrepeal or amend it.[88]

Nor can the Court presume to dictate the

means by which Congress should address whatis essentially a legislative problem. It is notwithin the Court’s power to enlarge or abridgelaws; otherwise, the Court will be guilty of

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usurping the exclusive prerogative ofCongress.[89] The petitioners, in asking thisCourt to compel COMELEC to hold specialelections despite its lack of authority to do so,are essentially asking us to venture into therealm of judicial legislation, which is abhorrentto one of the most basic principles of arepublican and democratic government – theseparation of powers.

The petitioners allege, too, that we shouldact because Congress acted with grave abuseof discretion in enacting RA No. 10153. Graveabuse of discretion is such capricious andwhimsical exercise of judgment that is patentand gross as to amount to an evasion of apositive duty or to a virtual refusal to performa duty enjoined by law or to act at all incontemplation of the law as where the power isexercised in an arbitrary and despotic mannerby reason of passion and hostility.[90]

We find that Congress, in passing RA No.10153, acted strictly within its constitutionalmandate. Given an array of choices, it actedwithin due constitutional bounds and withmarked reasonableness in l ight o f thenecessary adjustments that synchronizationdemands. Congress, therefore, cannot beaccused of any evasion of a positive duty or of

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a refusal to perform its duty. We thus find noreason to accord merit to the petitioners’ claimsof grave abuse of discretion.

On the general claim that RA No. 10153is unconstitutional, we can only reiterate theestablished rule that every statute is presumedvalid.[91] Congress, thus, has in its favor thepresumption of constitutionality of its acts, andthe party challenging the validity of a statutehas the onerous task of rebutt ing thispresumption.[92] Any reasonable doubt aboutthe validity of the law should be resolved infavor of its constitutionality.[93] As this Courtdeclared in Garcia v. Executive Secretary:[94]

The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling

on constitutional questions and to presumethat the acts of the political departments areval id in the absence of a c lear andunmistakable showing to the contrary. Todoubt is to sustain. This presumption is basedon the doctrine of separation of powers whichenjoins upon each department a becomingrespect for the acts of the other departments. The theory is that as the jo int act o fas the jo int act o fas the jo int act o fas the jo int act o fas the jo int act o fCongress and the Pres ident o fCongress and the Pres ident o fCongress and the Pres ident o fCongress and the Pres ident o fCongress and the Pres ident o fthe Philippines, a law has been carefullythe Philippines, a law has been carefullythe Philippines, a law has been carefullythe Philippines, a law has been carefullythe Philippines, a law has been carefullystudied and determined to be instudied and determined to be instudied and determined to be instudied and determined to be instudied and determined to be inaccordance with the fundamental lawaccordance with the fundamental lawaccordance with the fundamental lawaccordance with the fundamental lawaccordance with the fundamental law

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before it was finally enactedbefore it was finally enactedbefore it was finally enactedbefore it was finally enactedbefore it was finally enacted.[95] [Emphasisours.]

Given the failure of the petitioners torebut the presumption of constitutionality infavor of RA No. 10153, we must support andconfirm its validity.

WHEREFOREWHEREFOREWHEREFOREWHEREFOREWHEREFORE, premises considered,we DISMISSDISMISSDISMISSDISMISSDISMISS the consol idated pet i t ionsassailing the validity of RA No. 10153 for lackof merit, and UPHOLDUPHOLDUPHOLDUPHOLDUPHOLD the constitutionalityof this law. We likewise LIFTLIFTLIFTLIFTLIFT the temporaryrestraining order we issued in our Resolutionof September 13, 2011. No costs.

SO ORDERED.SO ORDERED.SO ORDERED.SO ORDERED.SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION ARTURO D. BRION ARTURO D. BRION ARTURO D. BRION ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:WE CONCUR:WE CONCUR:WE CONCUR:WE CONCUR:

I join the dissent of J. VI join the dissent of J. VI join the dissent of J. VI join the dissent of J. VI join the dissent of J. Velasco with respect to theelasco with respect to theelasco with respect to theelasco with respect to theelasco with respect to the

appointment of the OIC Governor and vote to holdappointment of the OIC Governor and vote to holdappointment of the OIC Governor and vote to holdappointment of the OIC Governor and vote to holdappointment of the OIC Governor and vote to hold

the law as unconstitutionalthe law as unconstitutionalthe law as unconstitutionalthe law as unconstitutionalthe law as unconstitutional

RENARENARENARENARENATO. CORONATO. CORONATO. CORONATO. CORONATO. CORONA

Chief Justice

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See Dissenting OpinionSee Dissenting OpinionSee Dissenting OpinionSee Dissenting OpinionSee Dissenting Opinion

ANTONIO TANTONIO TANTONIO TANTONIO TANTONIO T. CARPIO. CARPIO. CARPIO. CARPIO. CARPIO

Associate Justice

I join the dissent of J. Carpio but disagree on theI join the dissent of J. Carpio but disagree on theI join the dissent of J. Carpio but disagree on theI join the dissent of J. Carpio but disagree on theI join the dissent of J. Carpio but disagree on the

power of the Pres. to appointpower of the Pres. to appointpower of the Pres. to appointpower of the Pres. to appointpower of the Pres. to appoint

OIC-Governor of OIC-Governor of OIC-Governor of OIC-Governor of OIC-Governor of ARMMARMMARMMARMMARMM

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

I join the dissent of Justice VI join the dissent of Justice VI join the dissent of Justice VI join the dissent of Justice VI join the dissent of Justice Velascoelascoelascoelascoelasco

TERESITTERESITTERESITTERESITTERESITAAAAA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALDIOSDADO M. PERALDIOSDADO M. PERALDIOSDADO M. PERALDIOSDADO M. PERALTTTTTAAAAA

Associate JusticeLUCAS PLUCAS PLUCAS PLUCAS PLUCAS P. BERSAMIN. BERSAMIN. BERSAMIN. BERSAMIN. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLOMARIANO C. DEL CASTILLOMARIANO C. DEL CASTILLOMARIANO C. DEL CASTILLOMARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

I join the dissent of J. VI join the dissent of J. VI join the dissent of J. VI join the dissent of J. VI join the dissent of J. Velascoelascoelascoelascoelasco

ROBERTO ROBERTO ROBERTO ROBERTO ROBERTO A. A. A. A. A. ABADABADABADABADABAD

Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

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I join the dissent of J. CarpioI join the dissent of J. CarpioI join the dissent of J. CarpioI join the dissent of J. CarpioI join the dissent of J. Carpio

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZJOSE PORTUGAL PEREZJOSE PORTUGAL PEREZJOSE PORTUGAL PEREZJOSE PORTUGAL PEREZAssociate Justice

JOSE CAJOSE CAJOSE CAJOSE CAJOSE CATRAL MENDOZATRAL MENDOZATRAL MENDOZATRAL MENDOZATRAL MENDOZAAssociate Justice

I join the dissent of J. CarpioI join the dissent of J. CarpioI join the dissent of J. CarpioI join the dissent of J. CarpioI join the dissent of J. Carpio

MARIAMARIAMARIAMARIAMARIA LOURDES P LOURDES P LOURDES P LOURDES P LOURDES P. . . . . A. SERENOA. SERENOA. SERENOA. SERENOA. SERENOAssociate Justice

JOSE CAJOSE CAJOSE CAJOSE CAJOSE CATRAL MENDOZATRAL MENDOZATRAL MENDOZATRAL MENDOZATRAL MENDOZAAssociate Justice

I join the dissent of J. Carpio I join the dissent of J. Carpio I join the dissent of J. Carpio I join the dissent of J. Carpio I join the dissent of J. Carpio

MARIAMARIAMARIAMARIAMARIA LOURDES P LOURDES P LOURDES P LOURDES P LOURDES P. . . . . A. SERENOA. SERENOA. SERENOA. SERENOA. SERENOAssociate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYESBIENVENIDO L. REYESBIENVENIDO L. REYESBIENVENIDO L. REYESBIENVENIDO L. REYESAssociate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABEESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABEESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABEESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABEESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABEAssociate Justice

C E R T I F I C C E R T I F I C C E R T I F I C C E R T I F I C C E R T I F I C AAAAA T I O N T I O N T I O N T I O N T I O N Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had beenreached in consultation before the case was assigned to thwriter

of the opinion of the Court.

RENARENARENARENARENATO C. CORONATO C. CORONATO C. CORONATO C. CORONATO C. CORONA Chief Justice

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[1] Entitled “An act fixing the date of the plebiscite for the

approval of the amendments to Republic Act No. 6734 and

setting the date of the regular elections for elective officials

of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao on the last

Monday of November 2001, amending for the purpose

Republic Act No. 9054, entitled “An Act to Strengthen and

Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in

Muslim Mindanao, amending for the purpose Republic Act

No. 6734, entitled ‘An Act Providing for the Autonomous

Region in Muslim Mindanao,’ as amended,” and for other

purposes.[2] Entitled ”An Act amending fixing the Date or Regular

elections for Elective Officials of the Autonomous Region in

Muslim Mindanao pursuant to Republic Act No. 9054,

entitled “An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act

for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, amending

for the purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled ‘An Act

Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in

Muslim Mindanao, as amended”[3] Filed by petitioners Datu Michael Abas Kida, in his

personal capacity, and in representation of Maguindanao

Federation of Autonomous Irrigators Association, Inc., Hadji

Muhmina Usman, John Anthony L. Lim, Jamilon T. Odin,

Asrin Timbol Jaiyari, Mujib M. Kalang, Alih Al-Saidi J.

Sapi-e, Kessar Damsie Abdil, and Bassam Aluh Saupi.[4] Petition for Prohibition with Very Urgent Prayer for the

Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or

Temporary Restraining Order dated April 11, 2011 was

filed against Sixto Brillantes, as Chairperson of COMELEC,

to challenge the effectivity of RA No. 9333 for not having

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been submitted to a plebiscite. Since RA No. 9333 is

inoperative, any other law seeking to amend it is also null

and void.[5] With Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining

Order and/or Writs of Preliminary Prohibitive and

Mandatory Injunction dated June 30, 2011.[6] With Extremely Urgent Application for the Issuance of a

Status Quo Order and Writ of Preliminary Mandatory

Injunction dated July 1, 2011.[7] With Prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining

Order dated July 12, 2011.[8] With Injunction and Preliminary Injunction with prayer

for temporary restraining order dated July 11, 2011.[9] With Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and the

Issuance of Writs of Preliminary Injunction, Both

Prohibitory and Mandatory dated July 1, 2011.[10] Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress

under this Constitution shall be held on the secondsecondsecondsecondsecond

Monday of MayMonday of MayMonday of MayMonday of MayMonday of May, 1987, 1987, 1987, 1987, 1987.

The first local elections shall be held on a date to be

determined by the President, which may be simultaneous

with the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall

include the election of all Members of the city or municipal

councils in the Metropolitan Manila area.

Section 2. The SenatorsSenatorsSenatorsSenatorsSenators, Members of the House ofMembers of the House ofMembers of the House ofMembers of the House ofMembers of the House of

RepresentativesRepresentativesRepresentativesRepresentativesRepresentatives, and the local officialslocal officialslocal officialslocal officialslocal officials first elected

under this Constitution shall serve until noon of Juneshall serve until noon of Juneshall serve until noon of Juneshall serve until noon of Juneshall serve until noon of June

30, 1992.30, 1992.30, 1992.30, 1992.30, 1992.

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[211]

Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the first

twelve obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve

for six years and the remaining twelve for three years.remaining twelve for three years.remaining twelve for three years.remaining twelve for three years.remaining twelve for three years.

xxx

Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President

and Vice President elected in the February 7, 1986 election

is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, for purposes of synchronization of elections, for purposes of synchronization of elections, for purposes of synchronization of elections, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby

extended to noon of June 30, 1992.

The first regular elections for President and Vice-President

under this Constitution shall be held on the secondsecondsecondsecondsecond

Monday of MayMonday of MayMonday of MayMonday of MayMonday of May, 1992, 1992, 1992, 1992, 1992. [emphasis ours][11] To illustrate, while Section 8, Article X of the Constitution

fixes the term of office of elective local officials at three years,

under the above-quoted provisions, the terms of the

incumbent local officials who were elected in January 1988,

which should have expired on February 2, 1991, were fixed

to expire at noon of June 30, 1992. In the same vein, the

terms of the incumbent President and Vice President who

were elected in February 1986 were extended to noon of June

30, 1992. On the other hand, in order to synchronize the

elections of the Senators, who have six-year terms, the twelve

Senators who obtained the lowest votes during the 1992

elections were made to serve only half the time of their terms.[12] Joaquin Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the

Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary (1996 ed.), p.

1199, citing Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol.

V, p. 429-4.

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[13] MR. MAAMBONG. For purposes of identification, I will

now read a section which we will temporarily indicate as

Section 14. It reads: “THE SENATORS, MEMBERS OF THE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE LOCAL

OFFICIALS ELECTED IN THE FIRST ELECTION SHALL

SERVE FOR FIVE YEARS, TO EXPIRE AT NOON OF

JUNE 1992.”

This was presented by Commissioner Davide, so may we

ask that Commissioner Davide be recognized.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). Commissioner

Davide is recognized.

MR. DAVIDE. Before going to the proposed amendment, I

would only state that in view of the action taken by the

Commission on Section 2 earlier, I am formulating a new

proposal. It will read as follows: “THE SENATORS,

MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

AND THE LOCAL OFFICIALS FIRST ELECTED UNDER

THIS CONSTITUTION SHALL SERVE

UNTIL NOON OF JUNE 30, 1992.”

I proposed this because of the proposed section of the Article

on Transitory Provisions giving a term to the incumbent

President and Vice-President until 1992. Necessarily then,

since the term provided by the Commission for Members of

the Lower House and for local officials is three years, if

there will be an election in 1987, the next election for said

officers will be in 1990, and it would be very close to 1992.

We could never attain, subsequently, any synchronization

of election which is once every three years.

So under my proposal we will be able to begin actualSo under my proposal we will be able to begin actualSo under my proposal we will be able to begin actualSo under my proposal we will be able to begin actualSo under my proposal we will be able to begin actual

synchronization in 1992, synchronization in 1992, synchronization in 1992, synchronization in 1992, synchronization in 1992, and consequently, we should

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not have a local election or an election for Members of the

Lower House in 1990 for them to be able to complete their

term of three years each. And if we also stagger the Senate,

upon the first election it will result in an election in 1993

for the Senate alone, and there will be an election for 12

Senators in 1990. But for the remaining 12 who will be

elected in 1987, if their term is for six years, their election

will be in 1993. So, consequently we will have elections in

1990, in 1992 and in 1993. The later election will be limited

to only 12 Senators and of course to local officials and the

Members of the Lower House. But, definitely, thereafter we

can never have an election once every three years, therefore

defeating the very purpose of the Commission when we

adopted the term of six years for the President and another

six years for the Senators with the possibility of staggering

with 12 to serve for six years and 12 for three years insofar

as the first Senators are concerned. And so my proposalAnd so my proposalAnd so my proposalAnd so my proposalAnd so my proposal

is the only way to effect the f irst synchronizedis the only way to effect the f irst synchronizedis the only way to effect the f irst synchronizedis the only way to effect the f irst synchronizedis the only way to effect the f irst synchronized

election which would mean, necessarilyelection which would mean, necessarilyelection which would mean, necessarilyelection which would mean, necessarilyelection which would mean, necessarily, a bonus of, a bonus of, a bonus of, a bonus of, a bonus of

two years to the Members of the Lower House andtwo years to the Members of the Lower House andtwo years to the Members of the Lower House andtwo years to the Members of the Lower House andtwo years to the Members of the Lower House and

a bonus of two years to the local elective officials.a bonus of two years to the local elective officials.a bonus of two years to the local elective officials.a bonus of two years to the local elective officials.a bonus of two years to the local elective officials.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). What does the

committee say?

MR. DE CASTRO. Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). Commissioner

de Castro is recognized.

MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.

During the discussion on the legislative and the

synchronization of elections, I was the one who proposed

that in order to synchronize the elections every three years,

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which the body approved — the first national and local

officials to be elected in 1987 shall continue in office for five

years, the same thing the Honorable Davide is now

proposing. That means they will all serve until 1992,

assuming that the term of the President will be for six

years and continue beginning in 1986. So from 1992, we

will again have national, local and presidential

elections.This time, in 1992, the President shall haveThis time, in 1992, the President shall haveThis time, in 1992, the President shall haveThis time, in 1992, the President shall haveThis time, in 1992, the President shall have

a term until 1998 and the first twelve Senatorsa term until 1998 and the first twelve Senatorsa term until 1998 and the first twelve Senatorsa term until 1998 and the first twelve Senatorsa term until 1998 and the first twelve Senators

will serve until 1998, while the next 12 shall servewill serve until 1998, while the next 12 shall servewill serve until 1998, while the next 12 shall servewill serve until 1998, while the next 12 shall servewill serve until 1998, while the next 12 shall serve

until 1995, and then the local officials elected inuntil 1995, and then the local officials elected inuntil 1995, and then the local officials elected inuntil 1995, and then the local officials elected inuntil 1995, and then the local officials elected in

1992 will serve until 1995. From then on, we shall1992 will serve until 1995. From then on, we shall1992 will serve until 1995. From then on, we shall1992 will serve until 1995. From then on, we shall1992 will serve until 1995. From then on, we shall

have an election every three years.have an election every three years.have an election every three years.have an election every three years.have an election every three years.

So, I will say that the proposition of Commissioner Davide

is in order, if we have to synchronize our elections every

three years which was already approved by the body.

Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. GUINGONA. What will be synchronized, therefore, is

the election of the incumbent President and Vice-President

in 1992.

MR. DAVIDE. Yes.

MR. GUINGONA. Not the reverse. Will the committee not

synchronize the election of the Senators and local officials

with the election of the President?

MR. DAVIDE. It works both ways, Mr. Presiding Officer.

The attempt here is on the assumption that the provision

of the Transitory Provisions on the term of the incumbent

President and Vice-President would really end in 1992.

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[215]

MR. GUINGONA. Yes.

MR. DAVIDE. In other words, there will be a singleIn other words, there will be a singleIn other words, there will be a singleIn other words, there will be a singleIn other words, there will be a single

election in 1992 for all, from the President up toelection in 1992 for all, from the President up toelection in 1992 for all, from the President up toelection in 1992 for all, from the President up toelection in 1992 for all, from the President up to

the municipal officials. [emphasis ours] (V Recordthe municipal officials. [emphasis ours] (V Recordthe municipal officials. [emphasis ours] (V Recordthe municipal officials. [emphasis ours] (V Recordthe municipal officials. [emphasis ours] (V Record

of the Constitutional Commission, pp. 429-431;of the Constitutional Commission, pp. 429-431;of the Constitutional Commission, pp. 429-431;of the Constitutional Commission, pp. 429-431;of the Constitutional Commission, pp. 429-431;

October 3, 1986)October 3, 1986)October 3, 1986)October 3, 1986)October 3, 1986)[14] G.R. Nos. 100318, 100308, 100417 and 100420, July 30,

1991, 199 SCRA 750, 758.[15] J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,

G.R. No. 21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413; Ordillo

v. Commission on Elections, 192 SCRA 100 (1990).[16] 271 SCRA 633, 668 (1997); Occena v. Commission on

Elections, G.R. No. 52265, January 28, 1980, 95 SCRA 755.[17] Webster ’s Third New International Dictionary

Unabridged, p.1327 (1993).[18] Section 26(2) No bill passed by either House shall become

a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days,

and printed copies thereof in its final form have been

distributed to its Members three days before its passage,

except when the President certifies to the necessity of its

immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or

emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment

thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken

immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in

the Journal.[19] G. R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994, 235 SCRA

630. [20] A copy of the letter that the President wrote to Honorable

Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. as Speaker of the House of

Representatives dated March 4, 2011 is reproduced below:

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OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

of the Philippines

Malacañang

14 March 2011

HON. FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR.

Speaker

House of Representatives

Quezon City

Dear Speaker Belmonte:

Pursuant to the provisions of Article VI, Section 26 (2) of

the 1987 Constitution, I hereby certify to the necessity of

the immediate enactment of House Bill No. 4146, entitled:

“AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE SYNCHRONIZATION OF

THE ELECTIONS AND THE TERM OF OFFICE OF THE

ELECTIVE OFFICIALS OF THE AUTONOMOUS REGION

IN MUSLIM MINDANAO (ARMM) WITH THOSE OF THE

NATIONAL AND OTHER LOCAL OFFICIALS,

AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NO.

9333, ENTITLED ‘AN ACT FIXING THE DATE FOR

REGULAR ELECTIONS FOR ELECTIVE OFFICIALS OF

THE AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO’,

AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES”

to address the urgent need to protect and strengthen

ARMM’s autonomy by synchronizing its elections with the

regular elections of national and other local officials, to

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ensure that the on-going peace talks in the region will not

be hindered, and to provide a mechanism to institutionalize

electoral reforms in the interim, all for the development,

peace and security of the region.

Best wishes.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III

cc: HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE

Senate President

Philippine Senate

Pasay City

Taken from: http://www.congress.gov.ph/download/congrec/

15th/1st/15C_1RS-64b-031611.pdf. Last accessed

on September 26, 2011.[21] See Gutierrez v. House of Representatives, G.R. No.

193459, February 15, 2011.[22] Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455,

October 30, 1995.[23] Tolentino, id., citing 1 J. G. Sutherland, Statutes and

Statutory Construction §10.04, p. 282 (1972).[24] Section 7, Article XIX of RA No. 6734 states: “The first

regular elections of the Regional Governor, Vice-Governor

and Members of the Regional Assembly under this Organic

Act shall be held not earlier than sixty (60) days or later

than ninety (90) days after the ratification of this Act. The

Commission on Elections shall promulgate such rules and

regulations as may be necessary for the conduct of said

election.”

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[25] Entitled “An Act Providing for the Date of Regular

Elections for Regional Governor, Regional Vice-Governor and

Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly for the

Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao and for other

purposes,” which fixed the date of the ARMM elections on

the second Monday after the Muslim month of Ramadhan.[26] Entitled “An Act Changing the Date of Elections for the

Elective Officials of the Autonomous Region for Muslim

Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Section One of Republic

Act Numbered Seventy-Six Hundred and Forty-Seven

Entitled ‘An Act Providing for the Date of the Regular

Elections for Regional Governor, Regional Vice-Governor and

Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly for the

Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao and for other

purposes”, which changed the date of the ARMM elections

to the second Monday of March, 1993 and every three (3)

years thereafter.[27] Entitled “An Act Providing for the Date of the Regular

Elections of Regional Governor, Regional Vice-Governor and

Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly of the

Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Further

Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 7647 entitled

‘An Act Providing for the Date of Regular Elections for

Regional Governor, Regional Vice-Governor and Members of

the Regional Legislative Assembly for the Autonomous

Region in Muslim Mindanao and for other purposes,’ As

Amended, and for other purposes”, which moved the regional

elections to the second Monday of September and every three

(3) years thereafter.

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[219]

[28] Entitled “An Act Resetting the Regular Elections for the

Elective Officials of the Autonomous Region in Muslim

Mindanao Provided for Under Republic Act No. 8746 and for

other purposes”, which reset the regional elections, scheduled

on September 13, 1999, to the second Monday of September

2000.[29] Entitled “An Act Resetting the Regular Elections for

Elective Officials of the Autonomous Region in Muslim

Mindanao to the Second Monday of September 2001,

Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 8953”,

which reset the May 2001 elections in ARMM to September

2001.[30] Entitled “An Act Fixing the Date of the Plebiscite for the

Approval of the Amendments to Republic Act No. 6734 and

setting the date of the regular elections for elective officials

of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao on the Last

Monday of November 2001, Amending for the Purpose

Republic Act No. 9054, Entitled “An Act to Strengthen and

Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in

Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act

No. 6734, Entitled ‘An Act Providing for the Autonomous

Region in Muslim Mindanao,’ as amended,” and For Other

Purposes.”[31] Entitled ”An Act Fixing the Date of Regular Elections

for Elective Officials of the Autonomous Region in Muslim

Mindanao Pursuant to Republic Act no. 9054, Entitled “An

Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the

Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the

Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, Entitled ‘An Act Providing

for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim

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Mindanao’, as Amended,” which rescheduled the ARMM

regional elections scheduled for the last Monday of November

2004 to “the second Monday of August 2005.”[32] Section 1. Consistent with the provisions of the

Constitution, this Organic Act may be reamended or revised

by the Congress of the Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds

(2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and of

the Senate voting separately.[33] G.R. No. 127383, August 18, 2005, 467 SCRA 280.[34] Id. at 295-297, citing Duarte v. Dade, 32 Phil. 36

(1915); LEWIS SOUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY

CONSTRUCTION, Vol. 1, Section 244, pp. 456-457. [35] This has been established by the following exchange

during the Constitutional Commission debates:

FR. BERNAS. So, the questions I have raised so far with

respect to this organic act are: What segment of the

population will participate in the plebiscite? In what capacity

would the legislature be acting when it passes this? Will it

be a constituent assembly or merely a legislative body? What

is the nature, therefore, of this organic act in relation to

ordinary statutes and the Constitution? Finally, if we are

going to amend this organic act, what process will be

followed?

MR. NOLLEDO. May I answer that, please, in the light of

what is now appearing in our report.

First, only the people who are residing in the units

composing the region should be allowed to participate in

the plebiscite. Second, the organic act has the character of

a charter passed by Congress, not as a constituent assembly,

but as an ordinary legislature and, therefore, the organic

act will still be subject to amendments in the ordinary

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[221]

legislative process as now constituted, unless the Gentleman

has another purpose.

FR. BERNAS. But with plebiscite again. [EmphasisBut with plebiscite again. [EmphasisBut with plebiscite again. [EmphasisBut with plebiscite again. [EmphasisBut with plebiscite again. [Emphasis

ours.] ;ours.] ;ours.] ;ours.] ;ours.] ;

III Record of the Constitutional Commission, pp.182-

183; August 11, 1986.[36] Section 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject

to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws,

the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for

legislative powers over:

(1) Administrative organization;

(2) Creation of sources of revenues;

(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;

(4) Personal, family, and property relations;

(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;

(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;

(7) Educational policies;

(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage;

and

(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the

promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region.[37] See discussions at pp. 14-15.[38] Section 7. Terms of Office of Elective Regional Officials. –

(1) Terms of Office. The terms of office of the Regional

Governor, Regional Vice Governor and members of the

Regional Assembly shall be for a period of three (3) years,

which shall begin at noon on the 30th day of September next

following the day of the election and shall end at noon of

the same date three (3) years thereafter. The incumbentThe incumbentThe incumbentThe incumbentThe incumbent

elective officials of the autonomous region shallelective officials of the autonomous region shallelective officials of the autonomous region shallelective officials of the autonomous region shallelective officials of the autonomous region shall

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continue in effect until their successors are electedcontinue in effect until their successors are electedcontinue in effect until their successors are electedcontinue in effect until their successors are electedcontinue in effect until their successors are elected

and qualified. [emphasis ours]and qualified. [emphasis ours]and qualified. [emphasis ours]and qualified. [emphasis ours]and qualified. [emphasis ours][39] Fernando, The Philippine Constitution, pp. 175-176

(1974).[40] Id. at 177; citing the concurring opinion of Justice Jose

P. Laurel in Schneckenburger v. Moran, 63 Phil. 249, 266

(1936).[41] Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, 212 (1946).[42]Ople v. Torres, et al., 354 Phil. 948 (1998); see concurring

opinion of Justice Jose P. Laurel in Schneckenburger v.

Moran, supra note 40, at 266.[43] State ex rel. Green v. Collison, 39 Del 245, cited in

Defensor-Santiago, Constitutional Law, Vol. 1 (2000 ed.)[44] Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in

Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of

provinces, cities and municipalities, and geographical areas

sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural

heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant

characteristics within the framework of thiswithin the framework of thiswithin the framework of thiswithin the framework of thiswithin the framework of this

Constitution and the national sovereignty as wellConstitution and the national sovereignty as wellConstitution and the national sovereignty as wellConstitution and the national sovereignty as wellConstitution and the national sovereignty as well

as the territorial integrity of the Republic of theas the territorial integrity of the Republic of theas the territorial integrity of the Republic of theas the territorial integrity of the Republic of theas the territorial integrity of the Republic of the

Philippines.Philippines.Philippines.Philippines.Philippines.[45] An empire within an empire.[46] Bernas, Joaquin, Constitutional Structure and Powers

of Government Notes and Cases Part I, 2005 ed., p. 1249.[47] Such as the addition of sectoral representatives in the

House of Representatives (paragraph 2, Section 5, of Article

VI of the Constitution), and the validation of the power of

the Presidential Commission on Good Government to issue

sequestration, freeze orders, and the provisional takeover

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[223]

orders of ill-gotten business enterprises, embodied in Section

26 of the Transitory Provisions.[48] RA No. 9495 which created the Province of Quezon del

Sur Province was rejected by the voters of Quezon Province

in the plebiscite of November 13, 2008.[49] RA No. 9355.[50] Section 50, RA No. 9355 and Section 52 of RA No. 9495.[51] Section 462, RA No. 7160.[52] Supra note 14.[53] In Mutuc v. Commission on Elections [146 Phil. 798

(1970)] the Court held that, ”””””The three departments

of government in the discharge of the functions with which

it is [sic] entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience

to [the Constitution’s] commands. Whatever limits it

imposes must be observed.” 146 Phil. 798 (1970).[54] In J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure

Administration [No. L-21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA

413, 423], the Court, speaking through former Chief Justice

Enrique, stated: As the Constitution is not primarily a

lawyer’s document, it being essential for the rule of law to

obtain that it should ever be present in the people’s

consciousness, its language as much as possible should be

understood in the sense they have in common use. What it

says according to the text of the provision to be construed

compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to

alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the

people mean what they say. Thus these are cases where the

need for construction is reduced to a minimum.[55] Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. La Trinidad Water

District, G.R. No. 166471, March 22, 2011.

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[224] Autonomy and Peace Review

[56] Pimentel v. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, October 13,

2005, citing Bernas, Joaquin, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A

COMMENTARY (1996 ed.) 768.[57] 481 Phil. 661 (2004).[58] G.R. No. 161984, February 21, 2007, 516 SCRA 403.[59] G.R. No. 152295, July 9, 2011.[60] Section 7. Terms of Office of Elective Regional Officials.

– (1) Terms of Office. The terms of office of the Regional

Governor, Regional Vice Governor, and members of the

Regional Legislative Assembly shall be for a period of three

(3) years, which shall begin at noon on the 30th day of

September next following the day of the election and shall

end at noon of the same date three (3) years thereafter. TheTheTheTheThe

incumbent elective officials of the autonomous regionincumbent elective officials of the autonomous regionincumbent elective officials of the autonomous regionincumbent elective officials of the autonomous regionincumbent elective officials of the autonomous region

shall continue in effect until their successors areshall continue in effect until their successors areshall continue in effect until their successors areshall continue in effect until their successors areshall continue in effect until their successors are

elected and qualified.elected and qualified.elected and qualified.elected and qualified.elected and qualified. [61] Guekeko v. Santos, 76 Phil. 237 (1946).[62]Lozano v. Nograles, G.R. 187883, June 16, 2009, 589

SCRA 356.[63] Ututalum v. Commission on Elections, No. L-

25349, December 3, 1965, 15 SCRA 465.[64] See CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 1.[65] See CONSTITUTION, Article IX (C), Section 2(1).[66] Balagtas Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. v. Court of

Appeals, G.R. No. 159268, October 27, 2006, 505 SCRA 654,

663, citing Lapid v. CA, G.R. No. 142261, June 29, 2000,

334 SCRA 738, quoting Morales v. Subido, G.R. No. 29658,

November 29, 1968, 26 SCRA 150.[67] CONSTITUTION, Article X, Section 8.

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[225]

[68] Article XVIII, Section 2. The Senators, Members of the

House of Representatives, and the local officials first elected

under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30,

1992.

Of the Senators elected in the elections in 1992, the first

twelve obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for

six years and the remaining twelve for three years.[69] Article XVIII, Section 5. The six-year term of the

incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the

February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization

of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.

The first regular elections for the President and Vice-

President under this Constitution shall be held on the second

Monday of May, 1992.[70] Cruz, Carlo. The Law of Public Officers, 2007 edition,

p. 285, citing Mechem, Section 387.[71] Ponencia, p. 21.[72] See Topacio Nueno v. Angeles, 76 Phil. 12, 21-22

(1946); Alba, etc. v. Evangelista, etc., et al., 100 Phil. 683,

694 (1957); Aparri v. Court of Appeals, No. L-30057, January

31, 1984, 127 SCRA 231.[73] Hon. Luis Mario M. General, Commissioner, National

Police Commission v. Hon. Alejandro S. Urro, et al., G.R.

No. 191560, March 29, 2011, citing Sarmiento III v. Mison,

No. L-79974, December 17, 1987, 156 SCRA 549.[74] Sarmiento III v. Mison, supra.[75] If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it

must be given its literal meaning and applied without

attempted interpretation. De Jesus v. Commission on Audit,

451 Phil. 812 (2003).

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[76] Supra notes 47 and 48.[77] Supra note 50.[78] The after-effects of the Maguindanao massacre where

the Ampatuans stand charged, the insurrection by the MILF

and its various factions, and the on-going peace negotiations,

among others, are immediately past and present events that

the nation has to vigilant about.[79] 274 Phil. 523 (1991).[80] Id. at 532.[81] Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No.

191618, November 23, 2010, 635 SCRA 783.[82] As noted under footnote 37.[83] 118 Phil. 1468 (1963).[84]Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. III, August

11, 1986, p. 179.

[85] Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. III, p.

560.[86] 391 Phil. 84, 102 (2000).[87] Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936).[88] Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Santos, 343 Phil.

411, 427 (1997) citing Pangilinan v. Maglaya, 225 SCRA 511

(1993).[89] Manotok IV v. Heirs of Homer L. Barque, G.R. Nos.

162335 and 162605, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 468, 581.[90] Ligeralde v. Patalinghug, G.R. No. 168796, , , , , April 15,

2010, 618 SCRA 315.[91] Heirs of Juancho Ardona, etc., et al. v. Hon. Reyes, etc.,

et al., 210 Phil. 187, 207 (1983); Peralta v. Commission on

Elections, Nos. L-47771, L-47803, L-47816, L-47767, L-

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47791 and L-47827, March 11, 1978, 82 SCRA 30; Ermita-

Malate Hotel & Motel Operations Association, Inc. v. City

Mayor of Manila, No. L-24693, July 31, 1967, 20 SCRA 849.[92] See Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 290

(2001); Heirs of Juancho Ardona, etc., et al. v. Hon.

Reyes, etc., et al., supra; Peralta v. Commission on

Elections, supra.[93] Heirs of Juancho Ardona, etc., et al. v. Hon. Reyes, etc.,

et al., supra; Peralta v. Commission on Elections, supra.[94] G.R. No. 100883, December 2, 1991, 204 SCRA 516.[95] Id. at 523.

Supreme Court Decision on the Constitutionality ofRepublic Act 10153