Rawls's Law of PeoplesAuthor(s): Charles R. BeitzSource: Ethics, Vol. 110, No. 4 (Jul., 2000), pp. 669-696Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2672766Accessed: 16/06/2009 17:29Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available athttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unlessyou have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and youmay use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained athttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucpress.Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission.JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with thescholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform thatpromotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Ethics.http://www.jstor.orgSYMPOSIUMONJOHNRAWLS'S LAW OFPEOPLES Rawls's Law of Peoples* CharlesR. Beitz TheLawofPeoples is JohnRawls'smostcomprehensiveandsystematic statementofhisinternationalthought.1Itisaremarkableandunusual essay. Thenormativescopeis surprisinglybroadfora workofthislength, embracingsubjectsfromthemoralityofwartotheinternationaldistri- butionofresourcestotheethicsofstatesmanship.Thetheoryaimstobe continuouswiththepoliticaltheoryofa liberal,democraticpoliticalcul- ture-indeed,toillustratethatsuchatheoryisincompletewithoutan articulateunderstandingofthesociety'sinternationalresponsibilities. Rawls'sviewisconsistentwiththemostrevolutionarydevelopmentsin internationallawinthetwentiethcentury-thelimitationofwartopur- posesofself-defenseandthesubordinationofnationalsovereigntyto internationalstandardsofpoliticallegitimacyembodiedinthedoctrine ofhumanrights,ofwhichheprovidesanoriginalandprovocativeinter- pretation.Theviewissituatedintheintellectualcontextofmodern Anglo-Americaninternationalthought,aspiringtooccupythemiddle groundbetweentheskepticismoftheso-calledrealistsandapolitically inertutopianism.Thetoneismorepersonal,andRawls'sconceptionof ourhistoricalsituationismademoreexplicit,thaninhisearlierworks. Togetherwithhispaper,"TheIdeaofPublicReasonRevisited"(repub- lishedinthesamevolume),2The Lawof Peoples represents,ashewrites, "theculminationofmyreflectionsonhowreasonablecitizensand peoplesmightlivetogetherpeacefullyina justworld"(p.vi).Forallof thesereasons,thisessayranksamongRawls'smostimportantworksin * I am grateful toJoshuaCohenand Thomas Pogge,and to an audienceat Columbia University, for commentson an earlier draft of this article. 1. JohnRawls, TheLaw of Peoples(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999) (henceforth,LP). All page referencesin the text are to LP Rawls'smonographis a revision and expansionof his1993 lectureof the same title, first publishedin On Human Rights:The OxfordAmnestyLectures,1993, ed. StephenShute and Susan Hurley (New York:Basic, 1993), pp. 41-82.Thechangesare substantial and readers shouldbe warned that the lecture is no substitute for the monograph. 2.First publishedasJohnRawls, "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited," Universityof ChicagoLaw Review64(1997):765-807. Ethics 110(July 2000):669 -696 C2000by TheUniversity ofChicago.Allrightsreserved.0014-1704/2000/11004-0001 $02.00 669 670EthicsJuly 2000 political theory and amongthe really constructive contributionsto inter- nationalthoughtof our time. Althoughit is written with clarity and economy,TheLaw of Peoplesis noteasily accessible.Many ofthecentralideas-forexample,thoseof publicreason,politicalliberalism,"stability fortherightreasons," and philosophyas reconciliationto our social world-havespecial meanings inRawls's larger theory, withoutwhichtheirsignificanceheremay not be fully appreciated. Moreover, the very idea of a "law of peoples"is itself unusual: it is a philosophicalconceptionthat doesnotcorrespondpre- cisely with any familiar intuitive idea.3 Finally, given its scope,the mono- graphmakeslargedemandsonitsreaders-weareaskedtoaccepta gooddeal without extendedargument,as if the coherenceof the whole, and its consistency with political liberalism, should be persuasive in itself. So it seems best to proceedin stages. I will beginby describingtheaims and structure of the theory, leaving aside many of its complexities.Then I will take up some central aspects in greater detail, concentratingonthe differencesbetweenRawls's theoryandcosmopolitantheoriesofinter- nationalrelations,towhichtheLaw ofPeoplesconstitutesapowerful challenge. THE AIMS AND STRUCTURE OF THE THEORY The Law of Peoplessets fortha liberal theory of foreignpolicy: it seeks to articulate the fundamentalpurposesthat shouldguidetheforeignpoli- cies of liberal democraticsocieties.Rawls'sapproach is to frame an ideal conceptionof internationalrelations and thento work backward to prin- ciples for the nonidealworld. Herefers to the idealconceptionas a "re- alistic utopia" which"extends what are ordinarily thoughtto bethe lim- itsofpracticablepoliticalpossibility and,insodoing,reconcilesusto ourpoliticalandsocialcondition"(p.11) .4Themajorpartsofthetheory are a set ofprinciplesofforeignpolicy("theLaw ofPeoples")forthe members of an idealized"Society of Peoples"; an outlineof their justifi- cation,extendingthe"originalposition"familiarfromRawls's earlier work totheinternationalrealm; andinferencesfortheconductoffor- eignpolicy by liberal societiesinthenonidealworld. Importantamong theseare constraints onthe uses and conductof war and a requirement to assist in the developmentof societies burdenedby unfavorable natural and historical conditions.Throughout,thereis an emphasis ontherole played by legal,political,andsocial institutionsinshapingthepatterns 3.It is not,e.g.,an interpretationof the jus gentium,as I explainbelow. 4.Theideal is meantto berealistic in a senseinspired by Rousseau: it takes "men as they are and laws as they mightbe" LP, p.13(quotingJean-Jacques Rousseau,Of the Social Contract,openingparagraph). That is, it aims to describe a social world that we can reason- ably hopecouldcomeinto existenceas a result of choicesopento us or our successors, one consistent with the facts of humannature and social life as we know them. BeitzRawls'sLaw of Peoples671 of beliefand action that distinguish cultures from oneanother and influ- encethequality of life within them. TherelationshipoftheLaw ofPeoplestothepoliticaltheory pro- posedin Rawls'searlier works needsto be understoodcarefully. Thecon- tent of the Law of Peoplesresembles(thoughadds significantly to) what, in ATheoryofJustice, was called"the law ofnations." 5However, thepo- litical theory whoseextensionis presentedinthis monographis that set forthinPolitical Liberalismandvariousmostlysubsequentarticles,not foundin A TheoryofJustice.6 Thetwo books represent distinct philosophi- cal projects. A TheoryofJusticeaims to advance a conceptionof social jus- ticethat couldbeacceptedas a reasonablebasis forsocialcooperation amongpersons whoshare certain basic beliefsor"comprehensivedoc- trines" about ethical life and individual good.PoliticalLiberalism,by con- trast, proceedsfroma recognitionthat this assumptionis unrealisticin modernliberal societies-indeed,that it is a predictable outcomeof the exerciseofhumanreasonin freeinstitutionsthat multiplecomprehen- sive doctrineswill arise, eachembodyingdifferentandpossibly incom- patibleconceptionsofindividual good.Rawls calls this"the fact ofrea- sonable pluralism" and writes that it "limits what is practicably possible" (pp.11-12).On the view taken in PoliticalLiberalism,the central problem fora liberal politicaltheory-aproblemnotconfrontedin ATheoryof Justice-isto explainwhat politicalinstitutions wouldhave to belike in ordertoelicitthewillingcooperationofreasonablepersonsgiventhis permanentfact, rootedas it is in humannature itself. Rawls conceivesof the fundamentalproblemof internationalpoliti- caltheoryas analogoustothis.Thus,heassumesthatsomedegreeof culturalpluralismisapermanentfactoflifeamongsocietiesasitis amongindividualsinafreesocietyandthatthisdiversity willexpress itself in a variety of political forms. Just as there might beseveral reason- ablebutincompatiblecomprehensiveconceptionsofindividualgood coexistingindomesticsociety, so,ininternationalsociety, theremight beseveral reasonablebut incompatibleconceptionsofthe way that do- mestic political society should be organized. Not all of these will conform toliberalstandards ofsocial justice;yet,as Rawls believes,itisat least conceivablethat there couldbe nonliberalforms of political society that are sufficiently decentto justify usinacceptingthemas "equal partici- pating members in goodstanding of the Society of Peoples"(p. 59). 5.JohnRawls, ATheoryof Justice (rev.ed.;Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999),p. 331. 6.JohnRawls, Political Liberalism(rev.papered.;NewYork: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1996). The new introductionto this editionis valuable in describing the relationship betweenATheory ofjustice and PoliticalLiberalismas Rawls understandsit. Also see,inpar- ticular, Rawls, "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited," in LP, pp.129-80.Hereafter, refer- encesto this work will be to its appearance in LP 672EthicsJuly 2000 Theproblemofinternationalpoliticaltheoryis thatthenormsof internationalconductarising fromthesevarious politicalculturesmay notcoincide.Thepossibility ofapeacefulinternationallife,inwhich liberalsocietiescanflourish,dependsuponfindingabasisonwhich reasonableanddecentpeoplescancooperatewillingly giventheinter- nationalanalogof the fact of reasonable pluralism.7 TheLaw ofPeoplesisthesolutiontothisproblem.Itconsistsof eightprinciples: 1.Peoplesarefreeandindependent,andtheirfreedomandin- dependenceare to berespectedby otherpeoples. 2.Peoplesare to observe treaties and undertakings. 3.Peoplesare equalandare parties totheagreementsthat bind them. 4.Peoplesare to observe a duty of non-intervention. 5.Peopleshavetherightofself-defensebutnorighttoinstigate war for reasons otherthan self-defense. 6.Peoplesare to honorhumanrights. 7.Peoplesare to observe certain specifiedrestrictions inthecon- duct of war. 8.Peopleshave a duty to assist other peoplesliving under unfavor- able conditionsthat prevent their having ajustor decentpoliti- cal and social regime.(P. 37) ReadersofATheoryof Justice willrecognizethatprinciples1-5and7 recapitulate"the law of nations" as it was presentedthere.8 Of particular noteistheproscriptionofwarexceptinself-defense(principle5), thoughit shouldbe addedthat Rawls holds war might also be justifiable, inextremecases,indefenseofhumanrights(pp.93-94,n.6).The dutiestohonorhumanrights(principle6)andtoassist peoplesinun- favorable conditions(principle 8)are new. The first of these significantly limits the powers of sovereignty, and the secondcalls for what in practice wouldlikely bean ambitioussystem ofinternationaldevelopmentassis- tance financedby transfers from the rich countries. Theseadditions con- stitute substantial changes from A TheoryofJusticeand result in a consid- erably moreprogressive view.9 7.Theideaofa"people"isnottransparent,thoughformostpurposesitcanbe interpretedas referringto a society with a commonpoliticalcultureorganizedas a state. I discuss somecomplexitiesbelow. 8.Rawls,A Theory ofjustice, sec. 58. 9.Rawls notesthatthelist ofprinciplesis incompleteinat leasttwo importantre- spects. First, therightstoindependenceandself-determinationholdonly withincertain limits-roughly,onlytotheextentthathonoringtheserights advances(orat least does not impair) respect for the humanrights of individuals. Second,there would be a needfor additional principlesto regulate organizedinternationalcollaboration-e.g.,standards of fair trade-and"provisions for ensuringthat inall reasonableliberal(and decent)socie- ties people'sbasic needswill be met" (LP, p. 38).Thelatter is plainly a significant require- ment;Rawls doesnotsay howitwouldbeimplemented.Onprinciplesforcooperative organizations, seethe important remarks at pp. 42-43and p. 115. BeitzRawls'sLaw of Peoples673 The Law of Peoples forms the basic charter of the Society of Peoples. It is composedoftheliberal andnonliberalbut decentpeoples,which, together,Rawls referstoas"well-ordered societies."Theinstitutional structure of the Society of Peoplesdoes not includean internationalana- logofthestate-thereisno"world government"orsuperstate-but rather a network of cooperativeorganizations concernedwith matters of security, finance,andtrade.Thisconceptionofanidealinternational orderreflectsRawls's acceptanceoftwo Kantian ideas.Thefirst isthe beliefthata worldgovernment,consideredas a unifiedglobalregime withitsownsystems oflaw andlaw enforcement,"wouldeitherbea globaldespotismorelsewouldruleoverafragileempiretornby fre- quentcivil strife as variousregionsandpeoplestriedtogaintheirpo- liticalfreedomandautonomy"(p.36).10 Thesecondistheideaofa "pacific federation" ofrepublicanstates. Following Kant, Rawls believes that liberal democratic(and, apparently, decentnonliberal)societies are unlikely to go to war with each other and will develop,over time, increas- ingly densenetworks ofpeacefulcollaboration."So,assumingthat the Society ofPeopleswereto grow to includean increasingportionofthe world's societies,a worldgovernment,whichwouldbeundesirablein any case, wouldalso beunnecessary as a mechanismfor keepingorder. Thehypothesisofdemocraticpeaceplays acentralroleinexplaining whythedefenseandextensionofthesocietyofliberalanddecent peoplesshouldbethefundamentalgoalofliberal foreignpolicy. Thestructure oftheargumentfortheeightprinciplesisparallel tothat oftheargumentRawls hasgivenforprinciplesofsocial justice inthedomesticcase.Heimaginesaninternational"original position" inwhichallreasonablepeoplesarerepresented.Heemphasizesthat peoples,notpersons,are theunits ofrepresentationandthat thecrite- rionoffairness fortheLaw ofPeoplesisthatitsprinciplesshouldbe acceptable from the points of view of reasonablepeoples.12 Theinterests 10.CompareImmanuelKant, PerpetualPeace:A PhilosophicalSketch(1795),in Kant's Political Writings,ed.Hans Reiss and trans. H. B. Nisbet(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970),pp.102-4.Kant shiftedhis view fromthepositiontaken, with someambiva- lence,in the essay "On the CommonSaying: 'This May Be True in Theory, But It Does Not Apply in Practice'"(1793).There,hecalls uponstates "to enterintoa cosmopolitanconsti- tution," in Reiss, ed., p. 90(emphasis in original). 11.Rawls considersthehypothesisofa"democraticpeace"andtheevidencein its behalfat somelength;see LP, pp.44-54,andthesourcescitedthere,particularly Mi- chaelW. Doyle,Waysof Warand Peace (New York: Norton,1997),pp.277-84.It mightbe notedthatthereisdisagreementabouttheplausibility ofthehypothesisandaboutthe politicalmechanismusually supposedto explainit. For example, JoanneGowa concludes that"a democraticpeacedoesnotexistinthepre-1914 world, andit cannotbeextrapo- lated to the post-ColdWar era." See Ballots and Bullets:TheElusiveDemocraticPeace(Prince- ton, N.J.:PrincetonUniversity Press, 1999),p.113. 12.Rawlswrites: "We view peoplesas conceivingof themselves as free and equal peoples intheSociety of Peoples(accordingtothepoliticalconceptionofthat society)" LP, p. 34 (emphasis in original). 674EthicsJuly 2000 of individual personsare taken intoaccountonly indirectly, as they may beserved by advancing the legitimateinterests of their societies. In fact, there are two (international)original positions: the first rep- resentstheperspectiveofliberaldemocraticpeoples,andthesecond, that of decentnonliberalones.Rawls considerstheLaw of Peoplesfrom eachperspective.However,incontrasttotheprocedurefordomestic society, in neithercase is therea comparisonofthe principlesproposed fortheLaw of Peopleswith any alternatives. Theargumentconsists, in- stead,ofthenoncomparativeclaimthatthepartiesineachoriginal position,situatedbehinda veilofignoranceandgivenanappropriate understandingoftheirsocieties'fundamentalinterests,wouldfindit reasonabletoendorsetheprinciplesas a basisofforeignpolicy.13 Thedistinctionbetweenliberal democraticanddecentbutnonlib- eral peoplesis fundamentaltothetheory andrequires an explanation. As notedearlier, Rawls believesthat somedegreeofcultural diversity is inevitable andthat this will bereflectedina diversity ofpoliticalforms, some of which may be incompatiblewith liberal principles but still satisfy conditionsthatjustify their recognitionas cooperatingmembers of inter- nationalsociety.Thedistinctionbetweenliberalanddecentsocieties modelsthis diversity. Theconditionsdefininga liberal peoplewill notbesurprising. Its basicstructureincludesaconstitutionalregimethatrespectscertain familiar basic rights andlibertiesequally forall its citizens; itgivesthe protectionoftheserightsandlibertiespriority overtheclaimsofthe social goodandofperfectionistvalues; and it assures forall citizensac- cess to theprimary goodsneededto make productiveuseofthesefree- doms(p.14).14 Thecategory of decentpeoplesis broader than this; indeed,liberal societiesthemselves satisfy Rawls'scriteria for any decentsociety(p. 63). Butthesecriteriacanalsobesatisfiedby variousnonliberalsocieties. A decentpeoplesatisfies two conditions.First, thesociety doesnothave aggressive aims in foreignpolicy and respects the independenceof other societies.Second,thesocietyhasa"commongoodconceptionof jus- tice,"inwhicheachperson's interestsaretakenintoaccount(though notnecessarily onan equalbasis)inpublicdecisionsandbasic human rights(includingsubsistencerights)are securedforall; all personsare treatedas subjects oflegalrights andduties; and judgesandotheroffi- cials acceptand apply thecommongoodconceptionof justiceincarry- ingouttheirpublicresponsibilities(pp.64-67).Rawls describesone kind of decentsociety insomedetail. This is theideaofa "decenthier- archical people"whoseinstitutionshave thestructure of a "decentcon- 13.Rawls observes that the subject of debate in the international original position (s) is notthe choiceof principles but their interpretation(ibid., p. 42). 14.Compare "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited," in LP, p. 141. BeitzRawls's Lawof Peoples675 sultationhierarchy."Suchsocietiesare"associationist"inform,regard- ingtheirpeopleasmembersofvariousprimarysocialgroups,eachof whichisrepresentedina"consultationhierarchy"(p.64).15Rawlsbe- lievesthatthenotionofa decenthierarchicalsocietyisconsistentwitha plausibleinterpretationofIslamicpoliticalideasandillustratesthiswith ahypotheticalexampleofa decentIslamicsocietyhecalls"Kazanistan" (pp.75-78). WhyshouldtheLaw ofPeoplesbeconsideredintwosteps,first from theperspectiveofliberalsocietiesandthenfromthatofdecentnon- liberalones?Partoftheansweristhatliberalanddecentpeopleshave differentfundamentalinterestswhichtheybringtobearontheappraisal ofprinciplesforforeignpolicy.Thesedifferencesreflectthedifferences intheirpoliticalcultures:eachtypeofpeopleisfundamentallyinter- estedinsecuringinternationalconditionsinwhichtheirculturesand institutionscanflourish.Theyareinterested,moreover,ina"proper self-respectofthemselvesasapeople,restingontheircommonaware- nessoftheirtrialsduringtheirhistoryandoftheirculturewithits accom- plishments."Therefore,theyinsist"onreceivingfromotherpeoplesa properrespectandrecognitionoftheirequality"(pp.34-35).They wouldwanttobeassuredthatacceptanceofanyparticularinternational principleswouldbecompatiblewiththeirself-respectas a people. Thiscannotbethewholestory,however.Inthedomesticcase,the veilofignorancescreensthechoiceofprinciplesfrominfluencebythe variableelementsinindividualconceptionsofthegood.Whyshould thechoiceofinternationalprinciplesbetreateddifferently?Ibelieve theansweristhatthetwocasesarenotfullyanalogous.Inthedomestic case,theobjectistochooseprinciplesofjusticeforinstitutionsthatwill includeandapplytoeveryone.Intheinternationalcase,bycontrast, theobjectisnotpreciselytochooseprinciplesforinternationalinstitu- tions.RecallthattheLawofPeoplesisabodyofprinciplesforthefor- eignrelationsofliberaldemocraticsocieties:itisanextensionofliberal politicalmoralitytoforeignpolicy.Offhand,thereisnoreasontothink thatnonliberalsocieties,whetherdecentornot,wouldtakeanyinterest init.ThemotivationforconsideringtheLawofPeoplesfromanonlib- eralpointofviewisareflectionoftherequirementofreciprocitythat Rawls believesis intrinsictoliberalismitself:wewishtoactonprinciples whicharenotonlyreasonabletousbutwhichwebelieveitwouldbe reasonabletoexpectthoseaffectedby ouractionsalsotoaccept(p.58). Understoodthisway, Rawls'sconceptionofadecent,nonliberalsociety, andtheclaimthatacceptanceoftheLaw ofPeopleswouldbereasonable fromitspointofview,ispartofanargumentthattheLawofPeoplesis justifiableforliberalsocietiesthemselves.Theideaofadecentnonlib- 15.Oneexampleofaconsultationhierarchyistheformofsocietydescribedby Hegel;see LP, pp.72-73and p.73,n.13. 676EthicsJuly 2000 eral societythereforedescribes what, froma liberal perspective,should be regarded as the limit of internationaltoleration. Rawls also describes other kinds of societies-"outlawstates," which donotadheretotheLaw ofPeoples,and"burdenedsocieties,"whose historical,economic,andcultural conditionsmake it difficult forthem tobecomewell-orderedontheirown(pp.6-7).Theseheregardsas outsidetheSociety ofPeoples:they wouldnotexist inthefully realized ideal but poseproblems of foreignpolicy in the nonidealworld. In keep- ingwiththefundamentalaimofenlargingtheSocietyofPeoples,the guidingobjectivesofliberalforeignpolicyshouldbe,first,todefend liberalsocietiesagainsttheaggressionofoutlaw states, andsecond,to assist burdenedsocietiesto developliberal or decentinstitutions."Non- idealtheory" containsprinciplescorrespondingto bothobjectives: laws ofwar, whichdirectandlimittheuseofforcetoattain politicalends, andaduty ofassistance, whichrequireswell-orderedsocietiestosup- port theeconomicand politicaldevelopmentof burdenedsocieties,up to the point wherethey are able to sustain just or decentinstitutions for themselves. Incontrasttothesituationofliberalanddecentsocieties,outlaw states andburdenedsocietiesarenotrepresentedintheinternational originalposition;thereis noeffortto justify theLaw ofPeoplestorep- resentatives of either kind of society. TheLaw of Peoplesis thereforenot to beconfusedwith the jus gentium:it is nota body of principlesuniver- sally acceptedby states, nor is it intendednecessarily to constitutea rea- sonablebasis forthecooperation(orforthatmatterthepeacefulco- existence)of all existing states. Onemight wonder if the exclusionof somesocieties from the scope of justificationis objectionable.Recall that theLaw ofPeoplesis an ex- tensionof liberal politicalmorality, supplying a doctrineof foreignpol- icy for liberal states. In thedoctrineoftheLaw of Peoples,thequestion ofjustificationis, so to speak, a creature of the liberal society in which it isposed,andtheadequacyofany reply isgovernedbythecriteria of reasonablenessacceptedwithinthat society. If theideaof a decentsoci- ety is successfulindefiningtheouterlimits ofreasonabletolerationin internationalaffairs, thentheomissionofoutlaw states fromrepresen- tation intheinternationaloriginalpositionshouldnotbesurprising; it is simply a reflectionof the fact that the liberal notionof reciprocity does notrequire us to show that our principleswould beacceptabletothose holdingfundamentally unreasonablepointsof view. I note,finally, that theLaw of Peoplesaccords great significanceto institutionsasdeterminantsofthematerialandsocialconditionsof human life. Rawls writes: "The great evils of humanhistory-unjustwar andoppression,religiouspersecutionandthedenialofliberty ofcon- science,starvationandpoverty,nottomentiongenocideandmass murder-followfrompoliticalinjustice....Oncethegravestformsof BeitzRawls'sLaw of Peoples677 politicalinjusticeareeliminated...thesegreatevilswilleventually disappear"(pp.6-7).Thesestatementsarenottautologies.Theyex- press theconvictionthat whenhumanbeings grow up in reasonably just socialandpoliticalinstitutions,theycometoaffirm theirinstitutions' basic principles,andthis affirmation serves to regulateandstabilize the institutionsthemselvesandthepoliticalandsociallifetheyorganize. Rawls treats it as an openquestion-albeitoneto beanswered affirma- tively in the course of the monograph-whethersuch institutions can be imaginedand, if so, whetherthey are compatible with the facts of human nature and social life. An institutional schemesatisfying these conditions wouldbea"realistic utopia":"realistic" becauseitcouldpossibly exist and"utopian" becauseit "joins reasonablenessand justicewithcondi- tions enablingcitizens to realize their fundamentalinterests"(p. 7). As any summary must, this omits a gooddeal-forexample,Rawls's accountofthebasisofthelaws ofwar andthepossiblycontroversial interpretationsof noncombatantimmunity and extremeemergency; the provocative historical digressions concerningmatters such as thesignifi- canceof the Holocaust,the justifiability ofthe bombingofGerman and Japanese cities in World War II, and the motivation of the religious wars; andtheperceptiveandmovingobservationsontheresponsibilitiesof thestatesman. Rawls's remarks onthesesubjects are illuminating,andI regret that I must leave themaside. Instead, I shall concentrateona themethat liesclosertotheheart of Rawls'senterprise. Thetheory set forth in TheLaw of Peoplesis the most sophisticated interpretation yet producedof a branch of the liberal inter- nationalist tradition that might, for want of a better term, be called social liberalism.Views ofthis kind conceiveofthe internationalcommunityas a society of(domestic-level)societies characterized by a division of labor: domesticsocietiesareresponsibleforthewell-beingoftheirpeople, whiletheinternationalcommunityis responsiblefor maintainingback- groundconditionsinwhichdecentdomesticsocietiescanflourish.So- cial liberalism holdsthat principlesfor internationalrelationsare to be justifiedby consideringthefundamentalinterestsofthosesocietiesto which the principlesapply. Themostprominentalternative interpretationoftheinternation- alisttraditioniscosmopolitanliberalism.Althoughitisconsistentwitha conceptionoftheworldasasocietyofdomesticsocieties,thecosmo- politan view, incontrast tosocial liberalism, accords nomoral privilege todomesticsocieties.At thedeepestlevel,cosmopolitanliberalismre- gardsthesocialworldascomposedofpersons,notcollectivitieslike societiesor peoples,and insists that principlesfor therelations of socie- ties shouldbebasedona considerationofthefundamentalinterests of persons. TheLaw of Peoplesaims to show that the view I have calledsocial lib- eralism canbeconstructedinsucha way as tobemoreattractive than 678EthicsJuly 2000 alternativecosmopolitantheories.Rawls's strategy istopresssociallib- eralismtowarditsmostprogressiveexpressionandthentoask what morecouldreasonably berequired.If successful,thisapproachwould disarmcosmopolitanliberalismofitscriticalthrust byshowingthata view withmoreconservativepremisesconvergeswithitatthelevelof policy. Of course,we cannotknow theextentoftheconvergenceuntil we haveacosmopolitantheorycomparableindetailtoThe Law of Peoples. Nevertheless,Isuspectthenormativedifferencesmay bemoresignifi- cantthanRawls suggests,especiallyregardingthecontentofthedoc- trine ofhumanrights andthereachandrequirementsofinternational distributive justice.Such divergenceswouldnotbesurprising in light of themaintheoreticalcontrastbetweentheviews-thetendencyofthe Law of Peoplesto conceiveof domesticsocietiesas moral agents in their own right, with interestsoftheir own anda corporatecapacity for exer- cisingresponsibilityovertime.Intheremainderofthisarticle,Ishall consider this conceptionin greater detail and thenturn to the dilemmas that arise from it in connectionwith humanrights and internationaldis- tributivejustice. THE PRIMACYOF PEOPLES Rawls's theory accords a central placetotheideaofa"people."This is true intwo differentrespects. First, internationalsociety is conceivedas a Society ofPeoples,with eachpeopleserving as a unitofpoliticaland legalorganization,havingreasonablyautonomouscontrolofitseco- nomiclife,and functioningas themechanismby whichtheinterestsof individual persons are representedin internationalsociety. This is a kind ofsociologicalprimacy. Second,peoplesare also ethically primary: it is peoples,not persons, which are representedin the internationaloriginal position,andit is theinterestsofpeoplesconsideredas collectiveenti- ties, notthoseofindividual persons,that determinethechoiceofprin- ciples for the internationalconductof states. Thereare several questions.What arethedistinguishingelements ofapeople-how,forexample,isapeopletobedistinguishedfrom amerecollectionofpersonswhooccupyacontiguousterritory? Why relyonthisidearatherthanthemorefamiliarideasofstate,society, or nationto describetheelementsof world society? Finally, forthepur- posesof justifyingprinciplesofinternationalconduct,why conceiveof worldsocietyas aseriesofcollectiveentitiesatall? Thatis, why think of world society as a society of peoplesrather than persons? First, what is a people?Rawls writes that liberal peopleshavethree basic features: "a reasonablyjustconstitutionaldemocraticgovernment; ...citizens unitedby what Mill called'commonsympathies'; and, finally, a moral nature. Thefirst is institutional,thesecondis cultural, andthe thirdrequiresafirmattachmenttoapolitical(moral)conceptionof BeitzRawls's Lawof Peoples679 rightandjustice"(pp.23-24). The meaning ofthefirstofthesefeatures isclearenough.Astothesecond,Rawlsassociateshimselfwiththecon- ceptionofnationalityinRepresentative Government, whereMillwritesthat agroupofpeopleconstituteanationiftheyhavea"feelingofnation- ality"thatmakes"themcooperatewitheachothermorewillinglythan withotherpeople,desiretobeunderthesamegovernment,anddesire thatitshouldbegovernmentbythemselves,oraportionofthemselves, exclusively."16Finally,as inthecaseofindividuals,a peoplehasa "moral nature"whenitschoicesabouthowtoactareconstrainedbyconsidera- tionsofreasonablenessembeddedinitspublicpoliticalculture.All threeofthesefeatures,as presented,applyspecificallytoliberalpeoples, butRawlsplainlybelievesthateachhasaparallelfordecentnonliberal peoples. Theideaofapeopleispartofanidealconceptionofthesocial worldandnotsimplya redescriptionofa familiarphenomenon.Forex- ample,eventhoughapeoplehaselementsofstatehood-forexample, aconstitutionalgovernmentempoweredtorepresentanddefenditsin- terestsintheinternationalcommunity-notallstatescountaspeoples. Statesquastatesareconcernedwiththeadvancementoftheirrational interests,whereaspeopleshaveamoralnaturethatlimitsthepursuitof theseinterests.Forpeoples,asformoralpersons,thereasonablecon- strainstherational.Peoples,therefore,alsodifferfromstatesinnot claimingthetraditionalpowersofsovereignty.Unlikethemodernstate, asRawlsunderstandsit,peoplesdonotassertarighttousewarasan instrumentofpoliticsexceptinself-defense,andtheydonotasserta rightofautonomyintheconductoftheirinternalaffairs.Instead,they holdthemselvesaccountabletouniversalminimumstandardsforthede- centtreatmentofindividualsandsubscribetointernationalmechanisms withthecapacitytoassistpeoples-andinextremecasestocompel them-torespectthesestandards. Similarly,notallsocietiescountaspeoples.Peoplesaresocieties witha distinctiveformofsocialunityexpressedintheirindividualmem- bers'"commonsympathies"andinthe"moralnature"ofthecollective entity.Intheconventionalview,nationhoodhasanecessaryhistorical andculturaldimension:a nation'sunityisthoughttobebasedona com- monlanguageandhistory,ethnicorracialuniformity,probablyacom- monreligion,andsoforth.17ForRawls,however,theoriginandmecha- nismofapeople'scommonsympathiesareunimportant-agroupof personscanbea"people"evenifthemembershavediverseethnic originsandculturalbackgroundsprovidedthattheysubscribe,andrec- ognizethattheysubscribe,tosomecommonpatternofpoliticalandso- 16. JohnStuartMill,Considerationson RepresentativeGovernment(1862),chap.16, quotedin LP, p. 23, n.17. 17.Thereis a gooddiscussioninDavid Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995),chap. 2. 680EthicsJuly2000 cialvalues (p. 24).Moreover,notjustanyconsensusonpoliticaland socialvalueswillsuffice;asocietyconstitutesapeopleonlyifitsshared valuesareconsistentwitha just(ordecent)constitutionandwiththe conceptofa moralnatureanditsexpectationsofreciprocity. Rawlswritesasifhebelievesthatsomeexistingsocieties-perhaps theconstitutionaldemocracies-comeclosetosatisfyingthisdescrip- tion.Theremightbedisputeaboutthis:onemightwonder,forexample, whethertherequisitecommonsympathiesandmoralnaturecanbe foundinculturallydiversesocietieslikethoseoftheUnitedStatesor Belgium,tosay nothingofIndiaorthePhilippines.Thisthoughtmight leadtotheobjectionthattheideaofa peopleromanticizesthenational communityby relyingoncounterfactualassumptionsaboutthekindand degreeofunitytobefoundincontemporarynation-states.18Theobjec- tion,however,fallswideofthemark.Theideaofapeopleispartofan idealconceptionoftheworld.Rawlsneednotmaintainthatmany(or evenany)actualstatesfullysatisfythecriteriaforbeinga peopleinorder tomaintainthatitwouldbedesirabletomoveinthedirectionofthe ideal.Theappropriatequestionabouttheideaofa peopleis whetherit representsasufficientlydesirableformofhumansocialorganizationto serveasthebasicconstituentelementofworldsociety,notwhetherit servesas a realisticproxyforanyactuallyexistingstates. Itisonething,however,toholdthataglobalSocietyofPeoples wouldbeadesirablegoalofpoliticalandsocialchangeandanotherto holdthatinternationalpoliticaltheoryshouldbeginwithpeoples-that is,thatprinciplesofinternationalconductshouldbefoundedonconsid- erationsaboutthelegitimateinterestsofpeoplesratherthanpersons. Whyproceedinthisway?Itisnotenoughtosaythattheanalogywith justiceat thedomesticlevelrequiresustotakepeoplesforpersonsinthe internationalcase;iftherearesubstantiveethicalreasonstobeginwith individuals,somuchtheworseforthedomesticanalogy.Itisalsonot enoughtoreplythatbeginningwithpersonsimportsanunattractive conceptionofworldsocietyas a collectionofunrelated("deracinated") individuals;justastheliberaltheoryofthestatemakesroomforsec- ondaryassociations,sotoo,atheoryofinternationalrelationscould makeroomforintermediateunitswithoutholdingthattheyortheirin- terestsareinanywayultimateortakeprecedenceovertheinterestsof individuals.'9 Atsomepoints,Rawlsseemstosuggestthatthedecisiontoregard 18.David Luban made a similar objectionto the just-war theory of Michael Walzer in "The Romanceof the Nation-State," Philosophy&PublicAffairs 9(1980):392-97. 19.Thus,thenotionthat wemustchoosebetweenaccordingdomesticsocietiesa specialmoral status andregardingthe world as anaggregationof"deracinated menand women" is a red herring. Thephrase is from Michael Walzer's criticism of utilitarian views aboutimmigrationpolicyin SpheresofJustice (New York: Basic, 1982),p.39,quotedin LP, p. 39, n. 48. BeitzRawls's Lawof Peoples681 peoplesratherthanindividualsasethicallyprimaryispragmatic-com- pelled,forexample,byconsiderationsofpoliticalrealism(e.g.,pp.17, 83).Healsoarguesthatacosmopolitanapproachwouldnecessarilybe lesstolerantofthediversityofpoliticaltraditionsandcultures:it would produceatheorythat"simplyassumesthatonlyaliberaldemocratic societycanbeacceptable"whenitmaybethatcertainkindsofnon- liberalsocietieswouldbesufficientlysensitivetoindividualhumanrights tobeacceptableas well(pp.82-83;cf.p.60). However,neitherargumentis persuasive.Thefirstis a nonsequitur: considerationsofpoliticalrealismhavetodowithconstraintsimposed by thestatusquoonprospectsforchange,andthustheypertaintoques- tionsaboutinstitutionaldesignandreformratherthantothoseabout standardsofmoralappraisal.Thereisnoinconsistencyinholdingboth thattheultimateappealinquestionsofinternationaljusticeistothe interestsofindividualpersonsandthat,forpolitical(andperhapsother) reasons,wemustregardadecentralizedworldorderasheretostayand workforreformswithinits basicstructure. Thedifficultywiththeappealtoconsiderationsoftolerationisthat itproducesacircularargument.Recallthatthequestionis whetherso- cietiesorpeoplesshouldberegardedas havingindependentethicalsig- nificanceofasortthatwouldjustifyallowingtheirfundamentalcorpo- rateinterests,ratherthanthefundamentalinterestsoftheirmembers consideredas individuals,todeterminethechoiceofprinciplesofinter- nationalconduct.Thisisdifferentfrom,andmorebasicthan,theques- tionofwhetherortowhatextentinternationalinstitutionsandthefor- eignpoliciesofliberalstatesshouldtoleratenonliberalcultures.Rawls's appealtoconsiderationsoftolerationseemstoinvokeagenerouspre- theoreticalresponsetothesecondquestionasawayofansweringthe first.Butthisdeprivestheinternationaloriginalpositionofthecapacity tolendanyindependentweighttotheargumentfortolerationofnon- liberalcultures.If therearereasonsfortoleration,as nodoubtthereare, itwouldseembettertoarticulatethemwithinatheoryratherthanto presupposethem. Ifthiswereallthatcouldbesaidfortheprimacyofpeoples,one mightfeelthatthecasehadnotbeenmade.Soitisimportantthat thereisafurther-andamorecomplex-reasonfortakingpeoplesas primary. Asnotedearlier,Rawlsdoesnotbelieveit wouldbedesirabletoes- tablisha worldgovernmentwithpowersanalogoustothoseofthestate. Butifthereisnottobea worldgovernment,thentheremustbesome alternativeworldpoliticalstructureinwhichthefunctionsofgovern- mentaremoreorlessdecentralized.Rawlsholdsthatthisalternative structurerequiresterritorialsubunitswiththepoliticalcapacitytotake andcarryoutauthoritativedecisions:"Intheabsenceofaworld-state, theremust beboundariesofsomekind"(p.39;emphasisinoriginal.) 682EthicsJuly 2000 Why must? Toexplain,Rawls draws theanalogytoproperty: "As I seeitthepointoftheinstitutionofpropertyisthat,unlessadefinite agentis givenresponsibility formaintainingan asset andbears theloss for notdoingso,that asset tendstodeteriorate.Inthis case theasset is thepeople'sterritory andits capacity tosupportthemin perpetuity;and theagentis thepeoplethemselvesas politically organized"(p.39[em- phasisinoriginal]) .20Tocarry outthistask withoutresorttoauthori- tarian means, a governmentwill require the capacity to enlist its people's willingsupport.Political cultureis critical. Liberal societiesdependon a complexcombinationofinstitutionalloyalty, fellowfeeling,andalle- giancetorecognizablysharedpoliticalprinciplestomotivatesupport andsacrifice fortheirinstitutions.Indeed,withoutthenurturanceofa commonculture,itishardtoimaginehowthesemotivationalforces couldbesustainedandthushowliberalinstitutionscouldbestable. Peoplemust, therefore,beencouragedto seethemselvesas sharing in a commonenterprise,totake prideintheirsociety's identity andaccom- plishments,andto acceptthemutual responsibilitiesof membershipin a cooperativescheme.Soitmay bethat a peopleshouldbetreatedas having specialethicalsignificancebecauseits flourishingas a peopleis essentialtoits capacity tomanageits human,material, andcultural re- sources and, thus, to sustain its institutions, for the benefitof present and future members. Thisargumentisconsistentwithonereasonforholdingthatthe distributive requirementsoftheLaw of Peoplesshouldbeless demand- ing than principlesof justicefor domesticsociety. In that context,Rawls refers to "a psychological principlethat social learning of moral attitudes supportingpoliticalinstitutionsworks mosteffectivelythroughsociety- wide shared institutionsand practices"(p.112, n.44).21Thethoughtis that we cannot realistically expectpeopleto be motivated to make signifi- cant sacrifices for the benefitof others whenthese"others" are not seen as fellow members of the same enterprise. Just as considerationsof affin- ity might explain why international justiceshoulddemandless than jus- tice within domesticsociety, so they mightseemto explainwhy thesuc- cess ofdomesticsocietiesovertimeshouldbeseenas anindependent desideratumtobebuiltintointernationalpoliticaltheoryat thefoun- dational level. 20.OnefunctionoftheLaw ofPeoplesistofixthis responsibilityin"thepeople themselves" and to establish incentives to carry it out: " [Peoples]are to recognizethat they cannotmake up for their irresponsibility incaring for their landand its natural resources by conquestin war or by migrating into other people'sterritory without their consent"(LIi p.39).Rawls observes ina footnotethat this "remark impliesthat a peoplehas at least a qualified right to limit immigration"(ibid.,p. 39, n.48).How, exactly, wouldsuch a right be justified? Theremark inthetext suggests that it would follow from somesort of entitle- mentto reap the benefitsof past decisionsto conserveand invest rather than to consume. 21.Rawls adds: "In a realistic utopiathis psychologicalprinciplesets limits to what can sensibly be proposedas the contentof the Law of Peoples"(ibid., p.112, n. 44). BeitzRawls's Lawof Peoples683 Inresponse,twoobservations.First,asbefore,wemustdistinguish betweenquestionsaboutjustificationandthoseaboutinstitutionalde- sign.Evenifweagreeaboutthestate'ssignificanceasamechanismfor theefficientmanagementofresourcesovertimeandtheresultingneed toelicitpeoples'willingsupport,itdoesnotfollowthatdomesticsocie- tieshaveanethicalstatusseparatefromthatoftheirmemberstakensev- erally.Allthatfollowsisthatdomesticsocieties,oratleastsocietiesofa certainlimitedscaleandinternalcomposition,areadvantageousconstit- uentelementsofglobalsociety.Second-andthisis surelythemoreim- portantpoint-wemustapplyanunderstandingofpeople'smotiva- tionalcapacitiesandlimitationsattheappropriatelevelofabstraction. Itisacommonplacethatthesizeofthecircleofaffinityishistorically variableandthat,underfavorableinstitutionalandculturalcircum- stances,therangeofsympatheticconcerncanextendwellbeyondthose withwhompeopleshareany particularascriptivecharacteristics(as Rawls himselfobserves[p.113]).Themodernmulticulturalstatewouldbein- conceivableifthiswerenottrue.Butifmotivationalcapacitiesarevari- ableandsubjecttochangewiththedevelopmentofinstitutionsandcul- tures,thenitgetsthingsbackwardtoassumeanyparticularlimitations onthesecapacitiesinthestructureofapoliticaltheory.Thisis whatoc- curs,perhapsnonobviously,whentheprimacyofpeoplesis builtintothe originalposition.Alternatively,atheorycouldtreatmotivationalcon- straintsas variablestowhichatheoryshouldbesensitiveinitsapplica- tiontothenonidealworld.Butonthatapproach,therationaleforbegin- ningwithpeopleswoulddisappear. THEDOCTRINEOFHUMANRIGHTS TheLaw ofPeoplesincludesanunconventionalconceptionofthephilo- sophicalbasisandpoliticalroleofthedoctrineofhumanrights.This conceptionisrelated,ontheonehand,tothecritiqueofsovereignty, becausehumanrightssetlimitstothelegitimateauthorityofdomestic governmentsovertheirownpeople;andontheotherhand,toRawls's defenseofpluralismininternationalaffairs,becauseasociety'sadher- encetohumanrights,evenintheabsenceofliberaldemocraticinstitu- tions,issupposedtobesufficienttoshieldit fromexternalinterference aimedat bringingaboutdomesticreform. ToclarifyRawls'sview,Icommentfirstonthecontentofhuman rightswithintheLawofPeoples,thenontheroletheyareexpectedto playininternationalpoliticallife.Ineachcase,I notehowRawls'sinter- pretationofhumanrightsdiffersfromtheconventionalview.ThenI considersomedifficulties. Rawlsholdsthathumanrightsare"a specialclassofurgentrights" whoseviolationis"equallycondemnedbybothreasonableliberal peoplesanddecenthierarchicalpeoples"(p.79).Theserightsinclude rightstolife(importantlyincluding"themeansofsubsistence")and 684EthicsJuly2000 personalliberty(includingliberty,thoughnotequalliberty,ofcon- science),topersonalproperty,andtoequaltreatmentunderlaw. These rightsRawlsregardsasessentialtoany"commongoodideaof justice" and,therefore,not"peculiarlyliberalorspecialtotheWesterntradi- tion"(p.65). i Thelistomitsseveralrightsidentifiedinthe1948UniversalDecla- rationofHumanRights(UDHR)andthevariouscovenants,whichto- getherdefinethescopeofinternationallyrecognizedhumanrights. Amongthoseomittedarerightstofreedomofexpressionandassocia- tion(UDHR,arts.19and20)andtherightsofdemocraticpoliticalpar- ticipation(UDHR,art.21).22Roughlyspeaking,theserightsdistinguish liberaldemocraticsocietiesfromothers,including"decenthierarchical societies"as Rawlsunderstandsthem.Heobservesina footnotethat,in contrastto"humanrightsproper,"theseandcertainotherrightsofthe declaration"seemmoreaptlydescribedas statingliberalaspirations"or "appeartopresupposespecifickindsofinstitutions"(p.80,n.23). TherelativeausterityofRawls'slistreflectstherolethathuman rightsaretoplayinthepoliticallifeoftheSocietyofPeoples.Respect forhumanrightsis,sotospeak,partofthepriceofadmissiontointer- nationalsocietyanddefinesthethresholdoftolerationbyliberaland decentpeoples.It is a necessary(thoughnotsufficient)conditionofthe decencyofasociety'sinstitutionsandis"sufficienttoexcludejustified andforcefulinterventionbyotherpeoples"(p.80).Importantly,Rawls writesthatthe"political(moral)force"ofhumanrights"extendstoall societies,andtheyarebindingonallpeoplesandsocieties,including outlawstates"(pp.80-81).Butit doesnotappearthathumanrights,in thisview,aretoplaythebroadpoliticalroleenvisionedintheconven- tionalunderstanding-forexample,asbasesofclaimsbyindividuals againsttheirowngovernmentsorasgroundsofpoliticalactionbythe variousnongovernmentalorganizationsthatcomposeinternationalcivil society.InRawls's view,humanrightsarea specialclassofrightsintended forthelimitedpurposeofdemarcatingtheboundaryofacceptableplu- ralismininternationalsocietyasthisshouldbeunderstoodinthefor- eignpolicyofliberalstates.InkeepingwiththeconceptionoftheLaw ofPeoples,theyareinterpretedasneutralamongtherivalreasonable viewsofpoliticallegitimacy.23 Twomainquestionsariseaboutthisinterpretationofhumanrights: whywouldtheliberalanddecentpeoplesbe justifiedinestablishingad- herencetohumanrightsasathresholdofmembershipininternational 22.For the1948 Universal Declaration of HumanRights, see BasicDocumentsin Inter- nationalLaw, ed. Ian Brownlie (4th ed.; Oxford: Clarendon,1995),pp. 255-61. 23.ThisaspectofhumanrightsisemphasizedinThomasM.Scanlon,"Human Rights as a Neutral Concern,"in Human Rights and U.S. ForeignPolicy, ed.Peter G. Brown andDouglasMacLean(Lexington,Mass.: Lexington,1979),pp.83-92,towhichRawls refers. BeitzRawls's Lawof Peoples685 society?And,isthelistofhumanrightsasRawlsconstructsittoonar- row-thatis,consideredasaminimalstandardofinternationallegiti- macy,doesthisinterpretationofhumanrightsdemandtoolittle?The firstquestionconcernsthe justificationofthedoctrineofhumanrights, andthesecond,itsscope.Asitturnsout,theanswertothesecondques- tiondependsontheanswertothefirst. InRawls'sview,thepracticalimportoftheclaimthatthereisa humanrighttosomething-say,topersonalliberty-isthatinterven- tionbyoutsiders,byadmonition,diplomaticpressure,economicsanc- tions,andpossiblybyforce,mightbejustifiedwhenagovernmentper- sistentlyviolatestheright.Anaccountofthejustificationofhuman rightsshouldthereforeexplainwhyaviolationwouldwarrantinter- ventiontobringaboutreform.Incontrasttotheconventionalview, andperhapssurprisingly,Rawlsdoesnotholdthatreformintervention wouldbejustifiedbythegoodthatwouldbedoneforthosewhose rightsareinjeopardy.Instead,hearguesthatinterventionwouldbe justifiedbyconsiderationsofinternationalstability:liberalanddecent peoplesdonottoleratestatesthatviolatehumanrights("outlawstates") becausesuchstates"areaggressiveanddangerous;allpeoplesaresafer andmoresecureifsuchstateschange,orareforcedtochange,their ways.Otherwise,theydeeplyaffecttheinternationalclimateofpower andviolence"(p.81). Onemightdisputetheempiricalpremiseofthisargument:itis not hardtothinkofregimeswhichareoppressivedomesticallybutwhose internationalconductisnot"aggressiveanddangerous."(Evenifitis truestatisticallythatdomesticallyoppressivestatesaremorelikelytobe- haveaggressivelyinforeignaffairsthanliberalstates,astatisticalregu- laritywouldnotbesufficienttojustifyinterventioninanyparticular case.)Thisseemstomeanontrivialpoint.Moreimportantly,whatever mightbesaidaboutintervention,itisclearthatthestrategicinterestin internationalstabilitydoesnotbearonthemoralstatusofhumanrights. Forexample,thereasonwhypeoplehavehumanrightsnottobetor- tureddoesnotseemtobethatregimesthattorturearedangerousto otherregimes:althoughthelatterfact(ifitisa fact)mightjustifyinter- vention,itdoesnotimplyanythingaboutthemoralsituationofthe tortured. Rawlsalsosuggestsotherreasonstocarewhetherasociety'sinstitu- tionsrespecthumanrights.Oneis thathumanrightsrepresenta reason- ablecommonstandardoflegitimacyequallyacceptabletobothliberal anddecentnonliberalpeoples,asillustratedbythefactthattheLawof Peoples,requiringrespectforhumanrights,wouldbeendorsedinboth stagesoftheinternationaloriginalposition(p.60).But,ofcourse,this doesnotprovideanindependentjustificationforhumanrights:the internationaloriginalpositionincludesonlyjustanddecentsocieties, which,bydefinition,respecthumanrights,soanypointofviewthat 686EthicsJuly 2000 woulddisagreeabouttheirimportancehasbeenexcludedfromthe outset. Nowthisis nota problemforthe justordecentpeoplesthemselves. Ifsuchasociety'sgovernmentengagedinapatternofviolationsofits citizens'humanrights,therewouldbenophilosophicaldifficultyin holdingthatremedialinterventioninsomeformbyothermembersof theSocietyofPeopleswouldbe justified.Thismuchisalegitimatecon- clusionfromtheargumentintheinternationaloriginalposition.How- ever,thisargumentdoesnotobviouslyproveanythingaboutthejustifi- cationofinterventioninsocietiesnotrepresentedintheinternational originalposition.(Indeed,howcouldit beotherwise?)Theexclusionof outlaw(andother)societiesfromtheinternationaloriginalposition meansthatnoargumentforhumanrights,madefromthepointofview oftheoriginalposition,couldestablishthathumanrightshavethekind ofuniversalitythatisusuallypresumed.Wewanttosaythatpeopleare entitledtobetreatedincertainways(partly)invirtueoftheircharacter- isticsashumanbeingsandindependentlyofconsiderationsthatmight beparticulartotheirowninstitutionsandpoliticalcultures.Butthese areessentiallycosmopolitanconsiderations,andtheydonotregisterin aninternationaloriginalpositioninwhichtheunitofrepresentationis peoplesratherthanpersonsandagreementonprinciplesismotivated bytheircorporateinterestsassocialunitsratherthantheinterestsof theirmembersas individuals. Settingtheoriginalpositionaside,Rawlsarguesthatweare,infact, preparedtoacknowledgenonliberalsocietiesasequalparticipantsin internationalpoliticallifeprovidedthattheyare"decent"-meaning, interalia,thattheirinstitutionsatleastrespecttheirpeoples'human rights.Hepointsoutthat"thereis nodefinitionofdecency"fromwhich thecriteriaofdecencycanbededuced;instead,westipulatea definition andconsiderwhetheritisacceptablegiventhephilosophicaluseto whichtheideaisput."Thereaderhasto judge,"hewrites,"whethera decentpeople...is tobetoleratedandaccepted"(p.67).Rawls believes thatmostreaders(atleastliberalones)willagreethatitshould.Butif weask what justifiestheiragreement,thereplyissimplythatthisseems right-thatis,whenwereflectonthematter,wefindthatwearepre- paredtorecognizecertainnonliberalsocietiesnotonlyasnonthreaten- ingtoourinterestsbutalsoasdeservingourrespect,provided(among otherthings)thattheyrespectRawls's(limited)list ofhumanrights.The difficultywiththisargumentisnotthatitis wrongbutthatitis weak:if therearereasonswhyinstitutionsshouldbeheldtohumanrightsasa minimumstandardoflegitimacy,weshouldbeabletosay whattheyare. Theappealto judgmentis especiallyproblematicwhenweconsider thesecondquestionI distinguishedearlier-whetherthedoctrineofhu- manrightsintheLawofPeoplesdemandstoolittle.Recallthatonthis BeitzRawls'sLaw of Peoples687 view there is nohumanright to democratic government.24And although thereis a right to freedomof conscience,thereis noequalright to reli- giouspractice; a decentsociety may privilegeonefaithover others,for example,by maintaininga state church.Rawls's critics have argued that by endorsinga limitedrange of humanrights, theLaw ofPeoplesis ex- cessively deferentialto societies with discriminatory or undemocraticin- stitutions.25Inreply tothis criticism, theappealtopretheoretical judg- ment will notbemuchhelp,for whethersuch political forms shouldbe recognizedas acceptable,or only coped with as an unfortunatenecessity, is precisely what is in dispute. Thereare someother replies that might be made to the critics. One is toinvokethe valueof"mutual respectamongpeoples";Rawls writes that to have contemptfor othersocieties"can only cause damage," not only by provokingpoliticalconflictbutalso by undermininga people's self-respect (p. 62). Anotheris to invoke the domesticanalogy in connec- tion with toleration: if we are preparedto tolerate a range of beliefsand ways oflifeindomesticsociety, onemightask, why notalsotoleratea range of ways of social life in internationalsociety? Withoutexploringtheserepliesontheirmerits,thepointtonote is that their effectis to shift attentionaway fromthequestion,what are humanrights, to the different question,what are appropriate principles fortheinternationalconductofstates? Ibelievethisissignificantbe- causeitunderscoresthedependenceofRawls's interpretationofthe contentof thedoctrineof humanrights onthe details of his view about itsroleininternationalaffairs. Thelatterisconsiderablyrestrictedin relationtocontemporarypractice.Unlessoneintendstoreplacethe conventionalconceptionofhumanrights with a technicalideaora re- formingdefinition,onemustrecognizethathumanrightsservenot onlyas minimumconditionsforinternationalrecognition,butalso,as thedeclaration's preambleputsit,"as acommonstandard ofachieve- ment"for theguidanceof"every individual andorganofsociety." Hu- manrightsfunctionasstandardsofconductforgovernmentsandin thepoliciesof various internationalinstitutionsand developmentagen- cies,assharedgoalsofpoliticalreformamonginternationalnongov- ernmentalorganizations(theelementsofanemergentglobalcivil so- 24.Thereis, however, a weaker requirement-whetherRawls would call it a human right is notclear fromthetext-thatall decentinstitutions shouldallow "different voices to beheard" in policy making, sothat thoseresponsiblefor politicaldecisionswill bein a positionto take everyone's interests into account(LPIp. 72). 25.For example,Fernando R. Thson,"The Rawlsian Theoryof InternationalLaw," Ethicsand InternationalAffairs9 (1995):79-99.1 notealso the view that a right to democratic (and not simply "associationist") institutions has emergedin international law. See Thomas Franck, "The Emerging Right to DemocraticGovernance," AmericanJournalof International Law 86(1992):46-91,Fairness inInternationalLaw and Institutions (Oxford:Clarendon, 1995),chap. 4. 688EthicsJuly2000 ciety),andasfocalpointsfordomesticsocialmovementsinnondemo- craticsocieties.26AlthoughIcannotargueithere,Ibelievethataless restrictedunderstandingofthepoliticalroleofhumanrightswould suggestadifferentviewoftheirjustificationand,mostlikely,amore expansiveinterpretationoftheircontent.(Itisafurtherquestion,of course,whethersucha viewcanbedefended.) DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE ANDTHEDUTYOF ASSISTANCE CertainlythemostdramaticdifferencebetweentheLawofPeoplesand theinternationaldoctrineinATheory ofJustice istherecognitionofthe arrayofconditions,bothmaterialandcultural,thatcanobstructthe growthofasociety'scapacitytosatisfyitspeople'sbasicneeds.Societies "burdenedbyunfavorableconditions...lackthepoliticalandcultural traditions,thehumancapitalandknow-how,and,often,thematerial andtechnologicalresourcesneededtobewell-ordered"(p.106).The LawofPeoplesestablishes,asalong-termgoalofliberalforeignpolicy, theelevationofburdenedsocietiestoapointat whichtheycansustain liberalordecentinstitutionsforthemselves.Liberalsocietieshavea duty toassistburdenedsocietiesintheirdevelopment. Rawlsemphasizesthatthedutyofassistanceisnotanobliquere- quirementofinternationaldistributivejustice.For onething,thedutyof assistancehasa"target"or"cut-offpoint"afterwhichaidmaycease- namely,thepointat whicha societyhasthewherewithaltobecomewell- ordered.Itdoesnotmandatetheestablishmentofinternationalinstitu- tionswithacontinuouscapacitytoregulateinequalities,aswemight imaginedistributivejusticedoeswithindomesticsociety.Inthisrespect, thedutyofassistanceismorelikea justsavingsprinciple,requiringa societytosaveonlytothepointwhereit cansupportjustinstitutionsand a decentlifeforitspeople.27Anotherpointofcontrastisthatthedutyof assistancedoesnotimposeanydirectconstraintontheinternaldistri- butionofincomeandwealthina societyreceivingassistance.Theinter- naldistributionisregulatedbyasociety'slocalconceptionofjustice, which,by hypothesis,inanyliberalordecentsociety,imposesa material minimumrequiringatleastthesatisfactionofitspeople'shumanrights andbasicneeds.Becausethedutyofassistanceaimstohelpburdened societiesbecomejustordecent,itmightbesaidtoincorporatethema- terialminimumby reference;beyondthis,thedutyis agonisticaboutthe extentofallowableinequalitywithina society. Asinthecaseofhumanrights,onecanregardthedutyofassistance fromtwodifferentperspectives,asking,first,whyweshouldacceptany 26.Ontheimportanceofnongovernmentalorganizations(NGOs)as agentsofre- form,seethecasestudiesinThomasRisse, StephenC. Ropp,andKathryn Sikkink, eds., ThePowerof Human Rights:InternationalNormsand DomesticChange(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 27.Theanalogy is Rawls's (LP, p. 107). BeitzRawls's Lawof Peoples689 dutyatall,andsecond,whetherthedutyas Rawlsformulatesitrequires enough.Iwillconcentrateonthesecondquestion.Inoteinpassing, however,thatthefirstquestionisnoteasytoanswerwithinthecon- straintsimposedbyRawls'stheory.Hedoesnotofferanyargumentfor thedutyofassistanceanalogoustotheargumentforadistributiveprin- cipleindomesticsociety-thereisnosuggestion,forexample,thatthe internationaldistributionofnaturalresourcesisunfairorthatthecir- cumstancesofanindividual'sbirth(e.g.,whethershewasbornintoa richora poorsociety)areinanyethicallysignificantsensearbitrary.The forceofthedutyofassistanceseemstoarise,instead,fromtheimpor- tanceforliberalsocietiesofenlargingtheSocietyofPeoplestoinclude, eventually,allthesocietiesoftheworld.Forexample,ontheanalogyof theargumentagainsttoleratingoutlawstates,it mightbearguedthatthe chancesofpeacewouldbegreaterina worldinwhichallsocietieshad beenliftedoutofburdeningconditions.However,if theinferenceis that burdenedsocietiesareathreattothesecurityofliberaldemocracies, thentheargumentisimplausible;whateverthethreatposedbyoutlaw states,burdenedsocietiesarefarlessdangerous.Wecanimaginemore plausibleargumentsfora dutyofassistance,buttheseappealtoconcepts ofdistributivejusticethatRawls wishestoavoid. Letmeturntothequestionwhetherthedutyofassistancerequires enough-thatis,whetheritembracesthefullrangeofglobaldistribu- tiveresponsibilitiesitisreasonabletoexpectliberalstatestobringto bearintheirforeignpolicies.Becausetheyendorsea principleofglobal distributivejusticeinsomeform,cosmopolitanviewswouldholdthatit doesnot.Rawlsisatsomepainstoexplainwhysuchviewsshouldbe rejected.Iwouldliketoconsiderbrieflythreeofthereasonsheoffers foracceptingthedutyofassistanceinpreferencetoanymorecompre- hensiveglobalprincipleofdistributivejustice. First,Rawls believesthatthemostimportantdeterminantsofa soci- ety'seconomiccondition,andhenceofitscapacitytosupportadecent lifeforitsmembers,lieinitspoliticalculture,religiousandmoraltradi- tions,andthecharacterofitspeople.28Heconjectures"thatthereisno societyanywhereintheworld-exceptformarginalcases-withre- sourcessoscarcethatitcouldnot,wereitreasonablyandrationallyor- ganizedandgoverned,becomewell-ordered"(p.108).If thisis true,and if wegrantforthemomentthatthepropergoalofinternationalaction istohelpsocietiestobecomewell-ordered,thenanyglobalprincipleof distributivejusticewhoserequirementsextendbeyondthoseoftheduty ofassistancewouldbesuperfluousandanytransfersbeyondthosere- quiredbythisdutywouldbesupererogatory.Thedutyofassistance,in otherwords,isthemostonecanreasonablyask. 28.Inthisandthefollowingparagraphs, I revise andextendsomeremarks inmy "Social and CosmopolitanLiberalism," InternationalAffairs75(1999):524-25. 690EthicsJuly2000 Twoobservationsinresponse.First, as anempiricalmatter,theques- tionofthesourcesofeconomicbackwardnessishardlysettled.These sourcescanbedividedintoseveralcategories-forexample,naturalre- sourceendowments(includingtheadvantagesordisadvantagesofgeo- graphicallocation),technologyandhumancapital,politicalandeco- nomicculture,andpositionintheinternationalpoliticaleconomy.The relativeimportanceofthesefactorsisasubjectofdisputeatthegeneral level,andit certainlyvariesfromonesocietytoanother.29Moreover,it is notevenclearthatthequestionisintelligibleasitarisesforcontempo- rarydevelopingsocietieswhichareenmeshedintheglobaldivisionof labor:asociety'sintegrationintotheworldeconomy,reflectedinits traderelations,dependenceonforeigncapitalmarkets,andvulner- abilitytothepoliciesofinternationalfinancialinstitutions,canhave deepandlastingconsequencesforthedomesticeconomicandpolitical structure.Underthesecircumstances,it maynotevenbepossibletodis- tinguishbetweendomesticandinternationalinfluencesonasociety's economiccondition. Havingsaidthis,itisimportanttoobservethatthepointdoesnot turnontheoutcomeofanempiricaldispute.Forsupposethattheem- piricalconjectureweretocomeouttrue.It wouldnotnecessarilyfollow thatthereisnooccasionforconsiderationsofinternationaldistributive justicetoplayaroleinforeignpolicy-onlythattheirrolewouldbe different,andprobablymorecomplex,thanwhatmightbesupposedon a naiveviewofthefacts.Inthisrespect,theinternationalsituationseems tomenotverydifferentfromthedomestic.Withinasociety,itisnaive andpossiblyfalsetothinkthatthemosteffectivemeansofimproving thesituationoftheworst-offistoengageinacontinuingprocessofin- cometransfersfromrichtopoor;otherstrategies-suchasasystemof wealthtaxationcombinedwithaggressivemeasurestoensureequality ofeducationalandeconomicopportunity-maybemoresuccessful. (This,ofcourse,isRawls'sownviewabouteconomicinequalityinlib- eralsocieties,expressedinhisendorsementofMeade'sconceptionof "property-owningdemocracy.") 30 Yetthecomplexityofthepoliciesre- quiredtocarryoutaprincipleofdistributivejustice,aswellasthe potentialforerrorarisingfromnaivebeliefsabouttheprospectsof 29.Rawls relies on David Landes, The Wealthand PovertyofNations (New York:Norton, 1998),citing it in LI, p. 117, n. 51. Landes is influencedparticularly by the economichistory of Europe and the contrasting experienceof the oil states. But case studies of contemporary developingsocietiesare less sanguineabout the relative unimportanceof a country's inter- nationaltradeandfinancialrelations.See,e.g.,StephenHaggardandSylvia Maxfield, "ThePoliticalEconomyofFinancialInternationalizationintheDevelopingWorld," in Internationalizationand DomesticPolitics,ed.Robert 0.Keohaneand HelenV. Milner (Cam- bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996),pp.209-39. 30.Rawls,A Theory ofJustice, sec. 43. Rawls citesJ. E. Meade, Efficiency,Equalityand the Ownershipof Property(London: Allen& Unwin,1964),pp.11-26. BeitzRawls's Lawof Peoples691 simpleredistribution,donotargueagainsttheprincipleitself.The questiongoes,instead,tomattersofimplementation.Thesameseems trueintheinternationalcase. Asecondargumentforthedutyofassistanceisthata cosmopolitan distributiveprinciplewouldunfairlyburdensocietieswhichhavebeen responsibleintheconductoftheireconomicaffairsandbenefitthose whichhavenot.Rawlsproposesathoughtexperiment.Imaginetwolib- eralordecentsocietiesatthesamelevelofwealthandofsimilarsize. SocietyAdecidestoindustrializeandtoincreasetherateofsaving;soci- etyBdoesnot.Somedecadeslater,societyAistwiceas wealthyassoci- etyB.Rawlsbelievesthatanycosmopolitanprinciplewouldrequirea flowofresourcesfromA toB, a consequenceheregardsas unacceptable. Hedoesnotsaywhy,butpresumablythereasonisthatjustordecent societieshavepoliticalfeaturesinvirtueofwhichtheycanlegitimately betreatedasresponsibleagentsandheldaccountablefortheresultsof theirowndecisions.Onthisassumption,torequiresocietyAtobearthe costsofsocietyB'schoicenottoindustrializeandsavewouldbeunfair tosocietyA(p.117).31 As described,thecaseis highlyidealized.Bothsocietiesareassumed tosatisfy criteriaofjusticeordecencythroughouttheperiodinquestion. Relatedtothis,ofcourse,wemustassumethat,as a consequenceoftheir institutionsbeingjustordecent,themembersofbothsocietiescanbe treatedasiftheyortheirrepresentativesunderstandthelikelyconse- quencesoftheeconomicpolicychoicesoftheirgovernmentsat leastwell enoughtoexpresstheirdisagreementif theywouldpreferdifferentpoli- cies.It is a furtherassumption,alsounstated,thatbothsocietiesarerea- sonablyautonomouspolitically,inthattheirdecisionsabouteconomic policyarenotprejudicedbysuchfactorsasexcessivedependenceon internationalcapitalmarketsoraneedtoconformtopolicyconditions laiddownby internationalorforeigndevelopmentinstitutions. Needlesstosay,thesearedemandingconditions-sufficientlyso thatweshouldbewareofanytemptationtoapplywhateverintuitionsthe caseevokestothecircumstancesofcontemporarypoorsocieties.With this,I suspectRawls wouldagree.Soletussuppose,arguendo,thatthere couldbea casemeetingalloftheseidealconditions.Doesthepossibility ofsucha caseargueagainsta globalprincipleofdistributivejustice? Ibelieveitdoesnot.Mostlikely,one'sinitialjudgmentaboutthe casedependsonananalogywithindividualmorality,wherewetypically believethatsocietyhasnoobligationtoholdpeopleharmlessfromthe adverseconsequencesoftheirowninformed,uncoercedchoices.Soci- ety'sresponsibilityistomaintainjustbackgroundconditionsinwhich 31.CompareJames M. Buchanan,"A Two-CountryParable," injustice in Immigration, ed. Warren F. Schwartz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995),pp. 63-66. 692EthicsJuly 2000 individualscandecidehowtoconducttheirlives,andindividualsare responsiblefor living with the results. Buttheimplicitanalogyisfaulty. Intheindividualcase,anydis- advantageaccruestothesamepersonwhosechoicesbroughtit about. This cannotbesaid in thecase of a society, where,as a result ofchanges in populationover thelongperiods of time during which economicand socialpolicieshaveeffect,many orevenmostofthoseto whomdisad- vantagesaccruewouldbemoreaccuratelydescribedastheinnocent victims ofthepast choicesofothersrather thanas theauthors ofthose choicesthemselves. It seems no less unfair to imposethe costs of the bad choicesofprevious generationsonsuccessormembersoftheirown so- cietiesthanonoutsiders-especiallyoutsiderswho,by hypothesis,en- joyahighermaterialstandard(onceagain,throughnofaultoftheir own)thantheunfortunatemembersofthesocietywhichwasimpru- dently governed. Theremay, ofcourse,beotherreasonstorequiresocietiesto bear the costs of choicesmadeby earlier generations.For example,it may be desirable to have incentives for societiesto encouragesavings and invest- ment,andmaintainingtheseincentivesmay requiredonoragenciesto denyor restrict aid. But this is a case forinstrumental judgment,nota matter of justice,and the possibility that access to aid might be restricted forthesereasonsdoesnotembarrass thecaseforaninternationaldis- tributive principle. A third argument for the duty of assistance is that our main reasons forconcernaboutdistributive inequalityindomesticsociety apply ina differentway intheinternationalcase.Weseektoreducedistributive inequality withindomesticsocietyfora variety ofreasons.Rawls men- tionsthree:torelieveabsolutepoverty sothatpeoplecanlivedecent lives, to mitigatethestigmatization andsenseof inferiority oftenassoci- ated with differencesin wealth,andtosecurefair conditionsfordemo- craticpolitics.Hearguesthataninternationalsocietyfollowingthe Law of Peoples,includingtheduty ofassistance, wouldsatisfy theinter- nationalanalogs of theseconcerns.Thus,the concernto relieve poverty wouldbesatisfied by ensuringthat eachsociety canbecomejustor de- cent(and thereforeable to satisfy its people'sbasic needs);theconcern tomitigatestigmatization,by enablingeachpeopletodecideforitself "the significanceandimportanceofthe wealth ofits own society;" and theconcernforfair politicalconditions,by guaranteeingtheindepen- denceofeachsociety"and its equality inrelationtoothers"(pp.114- 15).No further measures to reduceor to regulate internationalinequal- ity would be necessary. To someextent,this argumentdependsoncontroversial detailsof Rawls's constructionoftheinternationaloriginalposition.Supposewe ask, forexample,why theparties intheinternationaloriginalposition wouldsettleforaprincipleguaranteeinganabsoluteminimumwhile BeitzRawls's Lawof Peoples693 imposingnorestrictionsonthedistributionaboveit,whereastheirop- positenumbersinthedomesticcaseimposesomedegreeofdistributive constraintinordertobringthepositionoftheworst-offgroupabovethe absoluteminimumlevel.32Theansweristhatthepartiestotheinter- nationaloriginalpositionaremotivatedbyaconcerntoadvancethe (corporate)interestoftheirpeopleinobtainingmaterialconditions adequateforjustordecentinstitutions,andforthispurposeattaining amaterialminimumisessential,whereas(onRawls'sassumptions)nei- therincrementsabovetheminimumnordifferencesinaveragewealth amongsocietiesinwhichtheminimumissatisfiedareofmuchimpor- tance.Onewouldreachadifferentresultiftheinternationaloriginal positionwereconstructeddifferently-forexample,by allowingthepar- tiestobelievethattheirsocialinstitutionswoulddobetter(bemore stable,enabletheirpeopletolivemorefulfillinglives,etc.)withhigher averagelevelsofwealth,orbyreplacingrepresentativesofsocietieswith representativesofindividualswhoseconcernistoadvancetheirvarious conceptionsofthegood.33Inotherwords,theargumentaboutthemoral significanceofinternationaldistributiveinequalitydependsnotonlyon ananalysisoftherangeofreasonsforconcernaboutinequalityatthe domesticlevelbutalsoonadoptionofadistinctivepointofviewforas- sessingthesignificanceofthesereasonsastheymightariseintheinter- nationalrealm. Evenif weacceptRawls'sconstructionoftheinternationaloriginal position,thedifferencesbetweenthedomesticandinternationalcon- textsmaynotbeassharpashisanalysissuggests.Forexample,itisnot obviousthatthestigmaofrelativedeprivationislessinsidiouswhenthe rangeofreferenceextendsbeyondasociety'sownboundaries.34Andit doesnotseemmorelikelyininternationalthanindomesticsocietythat actorswithsignificantlydifferentdistributiveshareswouldenjoyfairly valuedpoliticallibertiesina politicalstructurethatoffersthemnomore thantheformalequalityofsymmetricalvotingrules.(Why, forexample, 32.For example,inthe versionofthetheory presentedin Rawls, A Theory ofJustice, the parties opt to maximize the positionof the worst-off group. 33.Theargumentsinfavor ofanegalitarian internationalprinciple,intheframe- work of an internationaloriginal position,are exploredin illuminating detail in Thomas W. Pogge,"An Egalitarian Law of Peoples," Philosophy&PublicAffairs 23(1994):195-224. 34.Rawls writes that feelingsofinferiority basedoncross-border comparisons"are unjustified. . . whentheduty of assistance is fulfilled,and eachpeoplehas its own liberal or decentgovernment,"fortheneachpeoplehas thecapacity toadjust theamountand distributionofits own wealth (LP, p.114[theorderofthephrases has beenreversed]). However, for reasons discussed earlier, I believeit is unrealistic to think that societieshave autonomouscontrolovertheamountanddistributionoftheir wealth.Resourceendow- ments,patterns ofinternationalinvestment,andthedegreeofrelianceoninternational trade are independentlysignificant.If this is right,thenfeelingsofinferiority that might arise ina relatively poorersociety withdecentinstitutionscannotsimply bedismissed as unjustified. 694EthicsJuly2000 assumethatrichandpoorcountrieswouldexerciseequalactualinflu- enceininternationalfinancialinstitutionssimplybecausetheycastequal votes?)Thesereflectionssuggestthatourreasonsforconcernaboutdo- mesticdistributiveinequalitymayapplywithgreaterforceintheinter- nationalcasethanit firstappears. I havereviewedthreeofRawls's argumentsforthedutyofassistance inpreferencetoacosmopolitanprincipleofinternationaldistributive justiceandexplainedwhytheseargumentsseemtomeunpersuasive. Ofcourse,itdoesnotfollowthatacosmopolitanprincipleshouldbe accepted-theaffirmativecaseisstilltobemade.However,Ibelieve thesereflectionsillustratetheinstabilityofatheoryrestingonasharp distinctionbetweenthedomesticandtheinternationalrealms.Asinthe caseofhumanrights,theattemptto justifyinternationaldistributivere- quirementsintermsoftheinterestsofpeoplesratherthanpersons seemstoleaveethicallysignificantconsiderationsoutofaccountandto encouragedistortionsinourperceptionofthecharacterofinternational society. Thesecommentspertainmainlytothefoundationsofinternational politicaltheory,nottoitsimplicationsforpoliticstoday.Inthatregard, themostimportantobservationisthattheLawofPeoples,withitsduty ofassistance,imposesasignificantinternationaldistributiverequire- mentinthenonidealworld-thoughitmayrequirelessthanthemost plausiblecosmopolitantheory,italmostcertainlyrequiressubstantially moreofthewealthycountriesthantheydonoworarelikelytodointhe nearfuture.Inthissense,thetheoryishighlyprogressive.Asapractical matter,themajorremainingquestionis howwealthystatesthatweremo- tivatedtodosomightbestactonthedutyofassistance.Rawls'sobserva- tionsaboutthisquestionarenoteworthy-especiallytheemphasison measurestoimprovethelegalandeconomicstatusofwomeninbur- denedsocietiesandtheirpotentialtorelievepopulationpressuresand improvestandardsofliving(pp.106-12).Aboutthesematters,heis surelycorrect. CONCLUSION RawlsframesthedifferencebetweentheLawofPeoplesandcosmopoli- tan justicewithgreatclarityina verysimplecase.Imaginetwosocieties, eachsatisfyingprinciplesofliberaljustice,ina worldthatcompliesfully withtheLawofPeoples.Theworst-offrepresentativepersoninthefirst societyisworseoffinabsolutetermsthantheworst-offpersoninthe secondsociety.AccordingtotheLaw ofPeoples,onceweareassuredthat eachsociety'sinstitutionsarejust,thereisnothingfurthertobesaid. Accordingtothecosmopolitanview(oranywayaplausibleinterpreta- tionofit),theresidualinequalityisaninjustice,oratleastmightbeso undercertainconditions-forexample,ifitwereproducedbyaspects oftheglobalbasicstructureandif therewerea feasiblestrategyavailable BeitzRawls's Lawof Peoples695 toimprovethepositionofthegloballyworse-offperson-andtherefore requiresremediation.Thisdifferencereflectsthedifferenceintheulti- mateconcernsoftheLaw ofPeoplesandofthecosmopolitanview.Rawls observes,"Thefinalpoliticalendofsociety,"accordingtotheLawof Peoples,"istobecomefullyjustandstablefortherightreasons... [whereas]theultimateconcernofthecosmopolitanviewisthewell- beingofindividuals"(p.119).35 Thisseemstomeexactlyright.Thequestionis whichorientationto thefundamentalaimsofpoliticallifeoneshouldembrace-thatwhich regardstheflourishingofdomesticsocietyas theultimatepoliticalvalue orthatwhichjudgestheimportanceofanysuchaccomplishmentbyits consequencesforindividuals.Thereisnosimplewaytomakethis choice:itrequiresthepatientconstructionandcriticalassessmentofal- ternativeidealmodelsofglobalpoliticallife.Thus,althoughIhaveex- presseddoubtsaboutthefoundationsofRawls'sviewandtwoofits normativedimensions,theforceofthesedoubtsisnotclear.Forwedo notyethaveacosmopolitantheory,workedoutinsimilardetailtothe LawofPeoples,towhichitcanbecompared.Amongotherthings,the LawofPeoplesconstitutesachallengetocosmopolitantheoriststopro- ducesucha view. Thisis nomereabstractchallengefor,indescribingthemotivation oftheLawofPeoples,Rawlshasalsodescribedthemostdifficultdi- lemmafacingcosmopolitantheorists.RecallthattheLawofPeoples takesitforgrantedthatsomedegreeofdiversityinconceptionsofthe socialgoodis a permanentfactofinternationallife.Initstwo-levelstruc- ture,theLawofPeoplescapitalizesonthisfact.Butitisnotclearthata cosmopolitantheorycanaccommodatetoitatall.36 Cosmopolitantheo- riesarecommittedtojustifyingandassessingsocialarrangementsby theirconsequencesforindividuals.Theyarealsopresumablycommitted tosomeconceptionoftolerationamongindividualsinsociety,acon- ceptionwhich,giventhestructureofcosmopolitanism,mustsomehow extendtotheinternationalrealm.Nowthereisnogeneralreasonto believethatthesetwocommitmentswillneverconflict,andwhenthey do,cosmopolitanismmustmakeachoice:eitheritcanmodifythecom- mitmenttoanindividualisticdoctrineofpoliticaljustification,oritcan limittheinternationalreachoftheprincipleoftoleration.Howacos- mopolitantheoryresolvesthisdilemma-assomehowit must-willhave muchtodowiththeplausibilityofthetheoryinthecomparisonwiththe LawofPeoples.Tohavemadethischallengeunavoidable,andtohave framedit soclearly,isoneofthemainachievementsofRawls's work. The Lawof Peoples isadifferentandlargerkindofachievementas well.Inthismonograph,Rawlsevokesavividandappealingidealof 35.Theillustrative case is described in LP on p.120. 36.I am grateful toJoshuaCohenfor emphasizing this to me. 696EthicsJuly2000 internationallifethatappearstobeconsistentwiththefactsofhuman natureandsociallifeasweunderstandthemandwhoseattainment wouldbeunambiguouslydesirable.Inthissense,itisindeeda"realistic utopia"-aconceptionofthesocialworldthat"extendswhatareordi- narilythoughtofas thelimitsofpracticalpoliticalpossibility"(p.6).The significanceofthisachievementcanonlybeunderstoodagainstthe backgroundoftheskepticaltraditionininternationalthoughtwithits denialthattheactorsininternationalpoliticswouldorcouldbemoti- vatedintheirforeignpoliciesbyconsiderationsofprincipleas opposed tothoseofself-interest.Thisisthetraditionoften,ifsometimesinaccu- rately,associatedwithThucydidesandMachiavelli.Rawlsstandswith Kantinadifferenttradition,andtheargumentofThe Lawof Peoples is alsoanargumentagainsttheskepticismoftheself-designatedrealists. Theargumentproceeds,notbyexhibitingthephilosophicalerrorsof theskeptics,butbybringingforwardasubstantivevisionandshowing whythisvisionis bothattainableandworthyofoursupport. Rawlsrecognizes,ofcourse,thatalthoughrealisticutopiamightex- ist,wehavenoassurancethatit willexist.Yethispositionisnotthatthe LawofPeoplesrepresentsamerelytheoreticalpossibility:itisrathera possibility"thatconnectswiththedeeptendenciesandinclinationsof thesocialworld"(p.128).This,hebelieves,shouldbeenoughtorec- oncileustoourimperfectsocialcircumstances:"Byshowinghowthe socialworldmayrealizethefeaturesofarealisticutopia,politicalphi- losophyprovidesalong-termgoalofpoliticalendeavor,andinworking towardit givesmeaningtowhatwecandotoday"(p.128). Nodoubttherewillbedisagreementaboutthepoliticalaspectof thisview-forexample,aboutthelikelihoodandcharacteristicsofco- operationamongtheliberaldemocraciesandaboutthestrategyandtac- ticsoftheirefforts(andthoseofinternationalorganizations)topromote respectforhumanrightselsewhere.Thesematterslieattheboundary betweenpoliticalphilosophyandthepolicydisciplines,andthereisno questionthatthecomparativeadvantagelieswiththelatter.Butthiskind ofdisagreementishardlytoberegretted;indeed,it wouldbeonemore achievementofThe Lawof Peoples ifit weretostimulateconstructivedis- puteamongstudentsandpractitionersofforeignpolicyaboutthemeans ofaccomplishingthetheory'sadmirableaims.