Rawls and the Capabilities Approach

7/30/2019 Rawls and the Capabilities Approach

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Jay Carlson

Rawls and the Capabilities Approach: a Response to Sen and Nussbaum

One prominent research program in contemporary political philosophy is the

capabilities approach. Proponents of this program see the central index for evaluating the

justice of a political or social arrangement is how well it develops individual citizens

capacities to realize the ends that they have reason to value. Prominent capability

approach advocates like Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum see the development of this

approach as a very fruitful way of answering political philosophy questions in a way that

other approaches are not. In particular, Sen and Nussbaum see the capabilities approach

as distinct from alternatives that evaluate a social arrangement in terms of how it provides

all-purpose means to its citizens, the most prominent advocate being John Rawls. Sen

and Nussbaum claim that Rawls focus on primary goods themselves ignores the facts

about how people are able to use those means to achieve their conception of the good. As

such it is insufficient to properly evaluate the justice of arrangements. In this paper, I

hope to show why it is unclear that the Rawlsian resource-approach is inadequate for

developing the capabilities approach, and that the distance Sen and Nussbaum claim to be

from Rawls is minimal.

Amartya Sen claims that political philosophies concerned about questions of

social justice have to define what kind of information is relevant for evaluating particular

social arrangements. It is generally admitted that societies should strive for some level of

equality among its citizens, but which kind of equality is usually where the disagreement

begins. In his 1979 Tanner Lecture Equality of What? he surveys several possible

kinds of information that political philosophers have used to make these evaluations.

One approach measures an arrangement by how well off the individuals are within it,


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with the evaluation being measured in terms of an homogenous unit known like

happiness, satisfaction, or utility. The ideal on this approach is to maximize the amount

of utility within the society. This goal of maximized utility is famously ambiguous, as

one could attempt to maximize the utility of several different areas of society. Just to

give two examples, one could strive to maximize the total sum of utility in an entire

society or maximize the mean utility of a member in society (Sen 1979, 200). How one

would go about making a principled choice between these two utilitarian alternatives is a

perplexing question for utilitarian theorists. But even if one puts aside the issue of how

to decide which utilitarian index is appropriate to use, questions remain for all of them.

One of the most well known criticisms of utilitarian metrics is the problem of the

distribution of utility among individuals (Sen 1979, 202). A society with either high total

utility or high mean utility might still have outliers on the lower bound whose abject

misery happens to be counterbalanced by the utility that other people enjoy. If doing

something for those lower boundary cases does not increase ones index of utility, then it

is not something to be done.

Sen notes that some utilitarians like R.M. Hare and J.C. Harsanyi deny that their

approach has this inegalitarian distribution problem. Much the opposite, they claim that

if one starts with an egalitarian principlelike equal weight should be given to equal

interests orequally urgent needs should receive equal treatmentthen one is lead to

adopt a utilitarian conclusion (Sen 1979, 199). Sens response is that Harsanyi and Hare

both assume two very tendentious claims. First, they assume that interpersonal utility

comparisons are readily reducible to a single monolithic unit like utility. So, for

example, the utility that Jane gets from picking apples should in principle be


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commensurable with the utility that Jack gets from studying philosophy. But it is not at

all clear that the utility these individuals get from their respective goods is reducible to a

single unit of utility such that we can easily compare, say, one hour of apple-picking and

one hour of philosophizing. Egalitarian utilitarians must also assume that the welfare

functions of the individuals in question are equal, such that they are capable of being

satisfied with the same amount of the respective things they value (Sen 1979, 201). But it

is implausible to think so: Jane might be easy to please, but Jack not so much. But if

there are different welfare functions in the case of Jack and Jane, then more resources

would have to be given to Jack to bring him up to the same level of utility that Jane has.

Thus, aiming for an equality of utility seems to require that we give more resources to

one group than another.

It is difficult, then, given the pluralism both of the things that could be valued and

the functions by which individuals value them, to think that measuring how utility

individuals in a society have is a viable project (Sen 1979, 202). A second problem with

measuring the justice of a society by the utility its individuals have is that it is focusing

solely on the utility outcome that is produced. This is problematic, Sen thinks, because it

might elide the fact that two people who achieve an equal level of utility might have

started out from very unequal starting points, where one person had to overcome

tremendous obstacles to get to that level of utility, while the other had to show little effort

at all. Sen thus concludes that evaluating a society by the utility it gives individuals

would hide the fact that the process by which that equal level of utility is achieved is far

from equal (Sen 2009, 236). Such consequences of focusing on utility seem hard to

square with the general thrust of egalitarianism.


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Sen then considers a second approach, one that measures justice not in terms of

equal utility but rather by the citizens having equal means to pursue whatever reasonable

good they might want. This approach, most prominently developed by John Rawls,

evaluates justice of a society by how well it provides access to a stock of entities, what

Rawls calls primary social goods that any rational person would need to pursue the sort

of life they choose. Rawls claims that this collection of meanswhich include not only

basic liberties and rights, but also access to educational and vocational opportunities

(Rawls 1999, 54)provide the resources that any reasonable individual would need to

pursue their own conception of the good life. These goods are all-purpose in the sense

that they would facilitate anypersons opportunity to pursue their conception of the good,

regardless of the specific content of that conception. For example, having access to

adequate levels of education gives a person a chance to become literate, which in turn

facilitates whatever vocational or educational path they happen to choose from there.

Likewise, religious liberty facilitates the opportunities of the religious devotee and the

secular person to pursue their respective conceptions of the good. Voting and political

rights allow one to participate in political and legislative endeavors.

Sen thinks Rawls approach has several virtues to it. In contrast with utilitarian

approach, Rawls metric is a heterogeneous collection of entities, with no presumption

that one item in the collection is directly commensurable with the others. In evaluating

means rather than utility outcomes, Rawls is emphasizing that the equality of procedures

and the opportunities that a society provides are in fact more important than the outcomes

of those procedures being equal (Sen 2009, 64). Sen also notes that the value in the list


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of primary goods that Rawls presents highlights the importance of giving people the

opportunity to do what they would like with their own lives (Sen 2009, 64).

Having given some praises to Rawls account of justice in terms of equality of

primary goods, Sen ultimately finds it insufficient. Sen takes Rawls to say that primary

goods are the embodiment of advantage (Sen 1979, 216), that to have a sufficient

amount of primary goods is constitutive of what social advantage is. Rawls measures

peoples opportunities, Sen claims, by the means that they possess that can facilitate their

achieving their ends (Sen 2009, 66). Apersons expectations of the life they can expect

seems to be simply in terms of the primary goods that are made available (Rawls 1999,

79). As Rawls says inJustice as Fairness: A Restatement, the mission of the institutions

of the basic structure of society is to put in the hands of citizenssufficient productive

means for them to be fully cooperating member of society on a footing of equality

(Rawls 2001, 140).

On this understanding, if two people have an equal amount of primary goods at

their disposal, then they have equal amount of advantage and equal prospects for

achieving their conception of the good. Now Rawls acknowledges that of course these

two citizens are almost certainly notequally advantaged in the most comprehensive

sense. There are certainly factors which Rawls calls primary natural goodstheir talents,

health, intelligencewhich are not equally distributed among society. An individual

who is in good health or has socially desirable talent has an advantage over another

person who does suffer from a disease or lacks any socially desirable talent. Rawls

points out that these sorts of natural goods fall outside the direct control of the basic

structure (Rawls 1999, 54). But Rawls maintains that even two people with unequal


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natural goods are equally advantaged at least with regard to what society can make

available to them in the form of primary goods like rights, liberties, and opportunities.

But Sen wants to point out that if one is concerned about fair equality of

opportunity, as Rawls clearly is, then one cannot neglect the fact that lacking natural

goods can negatively influence what an individual is capable of achieving, even if

provided their fair, equal share of primary social goods. Sen notes that the relationships

between resources like primary social goods and the opportunity for flourishing those

goods normally facilitate are contingent on several factors, contingencies which Rawls

focus on primary goods alone seems to ignore (Sen 2009, 255). First, as mentioned

above there are personal disparities in characteristics like age, gender, and health status

that require some people to need more resources to achieve the same level of opportunity

as others. Nutritional requirements vary significantly by age, as do medical concerns

generally. Supplementing Sens case against Rawls, Nussbaum notes that pregnant

women need more resources than the average non-pregnant person (Nussbaum 1999,

401). Second, there are heterogeneous physical environments where some people have to

divert some of their scarce resources to fend off the destruction of natural disasters and

inclement weather patterns. Third, there are heterogeneous social conditions that affect

peoples ability to convert primary goods into a flourishing life. This can include being

subject to violence or destruction of property, having inadequate access to healthcare

facilities or educational opportunities. Social arrangements can also aggravate personal

heterogeneities like gender. For example, Nussbaum notes that women often have to

overcome obstacles inherent to male-dominated hierarchies to which men are usually not

subject. Traditional familial structures, for example, are often set up to advance the


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interests of males but not females in those groups. Finally, there are relational disparities:

one can be poor in ones society, even if one is wealthy in more absolute terms. Even if

one lives in a place with plenty of wealth and opportunity theoretically available, it often

costs more to acquire an adequate level of social functioning and opportunity there.

These relative deprivations can significantly affect ones capacities for being able to lead

a flourishing existence (Sen 2009, 256). For Sen and Nussbaum, these factors put

significant distance between primary social goods as Rawls has outlined and the

opportunity for a good life that they are supposed to make possible. Even if someone is

given her fair share of primary social goods, her situation might make it such that she is

still in a disadvantaged state. Sen and Nussbaum conclude from these cases that the

amount of primary social goods themselves cannot be the single metric by which we

measure the justice of a society.

Sen and Nussbaum conclude that an adequate account of justice should focus not

so much on the primary goods themselves, but on peoples real opportunities: their

capabilities of converting means into whatever they have reason to value (Sen 2009,

371). This requires acknowledgment that peoples needs and converting capabilities vary

greatly (Sen 2009, 232), and that socially disadvantaged people require more resources to

overcome the obstacles inherent to their situation. In contrast to the utilitarians question,

How well off are people in this society? and the Rawlsian question, How much

resources does this society provide its citizens? the central question that Sen and

Nussbaum want to answer is What are people in this society able to do and be?

(Nussbaum 1999, 404).


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Nussbaum and Sen each give distinctive ways of fleshing out what must obtain to

facilitate the full capabilities1

of individuals in a society. Nussbaum, drawing from

historical work in Aristotle and Karl Marx, gives a very robust account of what a person

needs in order to be fully capable of living a full-flourishing human existence. This list

includes, among other things, not only the capability to be free from handicapping

diseases, violence and oppression from others, but also the opportunity to develop ones

emotional, intellectual, and artistic capacities and to be able to develop relationships with

others, including those of other species (Nussbaum 1999, 411). Contrasted with

Rawlsian primary goods, this list of capabilities are not just instruments toward some

other end, but have value in themselves as well (Nussbaum 1999, 407).

Sen, on the other hand, is less concerned with producing a hard and fast list of

which capabilities need to be developed by a society. A more foreground concern for Sen

is dealing with the sort of capability-inhibiting handicaps mentioned earlier that leave

many individuals incapable of pursuing anything approaching a good life. These sorts of

handicaps include not only physical and psychological handicaps, but also various

incapacitations that poverty brings. This latter concern with poverty is not just with

raising the income of those in financial poverty, but also with setting the development of

political and economic institutions that prevent citizens from being subject to

incapacitating2

forces. For instance, Sen is famous for his claim that famines have never

1 Nussbaum notes that the capabilities approach is not committed to developing

every human capability, such as the capability to be cruel toward others. Rather, the

set of capabilities that Nussbaum think should be developed are ones that are

valuable from an ethical standpoint in a way that, e.g. capacity to harm others,

would not qualify (Nussbaum 1999, 44).2 While the word incapacitate and its cognates usually connotes full prevention of

normal functioning, I will use it in a less comprehensive sense to describe any factor


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taken place in a democratic country with a free press, as free press are able to report when

disasters happen and elected officials have an incentive to provide for potential voting

citizens (Sen 2009, 349). Providing political rights is thus an essential part of a society

giving its citizen the ability to exercise their full capacity as human beings. He points to

how democratic movements in India have mitigated problems of hunger and sectarian

violence as evidence for his claim that institutions that incentivize adequately competent

governing provides a protective power over citizens from various sorts of incapacitating

forces (Sen 2009, 353-4).

These above suggestions notwithstanding, Sen does not think that the capabilities

approach is committed to any specifically detailed policies (Sen 2009, 232).

Furthermore, he wants to leave how these questions are to be decided to the exercise of

argument and public reason3, rather than present some theoretical, abstract list (Sen 2009,

242-3). Nussbaum, it should be noted, agrees that how capabilities are to be specifically

addressed should not be decided by fiat, as though her list of ten capabilities were

delivered on stone tablets. Instead, the constellation of capacities should be shaped

according to public discussion and ultimately established by some kind of overlapping

consensus consisting of individuals with a plurality of comprehensive views about the

world (Nussbaum 1999, 408). Note that Nussbaum claims that her list of capabilities is a

free standing moral idea and thus not necessarily tied to any metaphysical or

teleological point of view (Nussbaum 1999, 414). This point presumably is to avoid the

Rawlsian objection that the capabilities approach as she has presented it is a

that limits the capabilities of an individual. It is effectively a synonym for

handicap.3 This would, of course, require the necessary structures and information

distributions to facilitate an adequate discourse.


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comprehensive doctrine that could not be reasonably accepted in the kind of discourse

that she and Sen suggest should shape it. Interestingly enough, Nussbaum thinks that the

core of this list is, mutatis mutandis, translatable into various religious and philosophical

understandings of human nature (Nussbaum 1999, 409) and thus capable of producing

widespread consent on its content.

The issue of needing an overlapping consensus relates to the general

heterogeneous nature of the capacities in question. Like Rawls primary goods, the

capability indices Sen and Nussbaum are developing are not homogenous entities like

utility or gross domestic product that makes of one kind of thing readily comparable with

another. Sen insists that the capabilities he is addressing are not readily commensurable

with each other such that we could easily compare trade-offs among them. As a result,

the ways of shaping these capabilitiesand balancing them where they conflictis not

going to be a straight-forward accounting of which one generates more of a stipulated

unit, but rather which ones are more important (Sen 2009, 241). Questions about

importance can only be reasonably adjudicated in giving arguments for why some

capacity matters such that it should be developed in a particular way.

How might Rawls respond to the charges that Sen and Nussbaum level against

him? InPolitical Liberalism,Rawls addresses Sens objection that he ignores the fact

that people have a wide range of capabilities that affects how they can use primary goods.

Rawls outlines four different kinds of variations4

that arise among individuals: variations

4 Rawls denies that he has assumed people to have equal capacities in the sort of

way in which Sen is interested; rather, for the purposes of establishing what fair

terms of cooperation would be, he as assumed at least some shared minimum level

of capacities such that they can participate in these cooperations (Rawls 2005, 183).

Rawls is not assuming, therefore, that no handicaps exist among individuals in


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of moral and intellectual capacity, physical abilities, conceptions of the good, and tastes

or preferences (Rawls 2005, 184). All of these variations, Rawls claims, can be

accommodated within his framework. Forthe purposes of discussing Sens criticisms of

capabilities, we can focus specifically on the first two categories of variations. Rawls

agrees that unequal distribution of natural goods like intellectual and physical capabilities

is not something that can be distributed by the basic structure of a society.

But though the basic structure cannot directly control the distribution of natural

goods, they can still influence it (Rawls 1999, 54). The basic structure can do this by

securing what Rawls calls the background conditions for justice. The background

conditions of justice are those conditions that ensure that the fair equality of opportunity

established at the beginning of a period is maintained over time (Rawls 2001, 52). Rawls

is under no delusion that even a basic structure constituted by a perfectly just system of

rules set up according to perfect principles of justice and fully complied with would

necessarily be stable over time in securing equality of opportunity. Suppose that one

started with an exactly equal distribution of primary goods, including things like

educational opportunities (Rawls 1999, 243). As individual citizens are free to pursue

their life as they choose, goods like income and wealth will naturally accumulate in some

areas of society. If left untended, this would threaten the equality of opportunity that the

characterized the initial situation, as some people would have more primary goods like

wealth at their disposal than others. To correct for these inequalities, Rawls claims that

society; he is only presuming for the purposes at hand that there are no handicaps

that prevent one from relatively normal functioning in society. While it is an

interesting question about how to deal with those with such severe handicaps that

they cannot participate in society, that is the simply not the question Rawls is

considering at the moment.


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there will need to be periodic recalibrations and transfers to preserve and reestablish that

equality of opportunity from the initial sequence.

Rawls general claim is that people lacking income would be periodically

compensated by the basic structure in order to provide fair equality of opportunity (Rawls

2005, 184). It seems plausible that a similar recalibration story can be told about

inequalities that result from handicaps as well. On this account, the basic structure could

ensure that a handicap of an intellectual or physical nature does not determinatively limit

that citizens capabilities for living a reasonably good life. For example, special

education teachers or tutors could provide intellectually challenged individuals with some

of the resources that could help them realize some of their potential that their condition

currently hinders. InA RestatementRawls points out that natural goods like intelligence

and talents are not fixed assets but require social conditions for them to arise and be

maintained (Rawls 2001, 57). Equally intellectual handicaps are not fixed liabilities

either, as they are seemingly correctable given some adequate social structures and

conditions. It seems, then, that Rawls account of background justiceproviding, among

others, the primary social good of adequate educational opportunities is a suitable

framework for addressing the sort of intellectual and moral handicaps that could limit a

persons capabilities and life prospects.

The basic structure would presumably also deal with the issues of physical and

psychological handicaps in a similar way, as the basic structure plausibly includes

provisions for adequate healthcare that would provide individuals with the resources to

control their conditions. (Rawls 2005, 184). But Sen and Nussbaum are correct to point

out that capacity limitations from handicaps are not fully addressed just by providing


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adequate medical treatment. Handicapped people might have mobility trouble or social

problems in school. Pregnant women might have risk losing their job to stay with their

child in its early months. Providing for equality of fair opportunity would require in

addition to adequate healthcare that one mitigate these sorts of extra-medical limitations

that physical and psychological handicaps bring. Elevators and wheelchair ramps might

be required to facilitate those with mobility problems. Maternity leave and childcare

might be required for women after giving birth to facilitate them resuming their normal

occupational endeavors. Resource and special education teachers might facilitate

children with learning disabilities. It seems plausible that the sort of limitations

handicaps place on people are tractably dealt within the scope of what the basic structure

providing fair equality of opportunity.

Discussion of how Rawls accommodates these handicaps raises the issue of the

scope of the basic structure. InPolitical Liberalism, Rawls notes that the basic structure,

and its operative principles of justice, extend to the coercive institutions of society but do

not apply to the internal operations of private associations (Rawls 2005, 468). Nussbaum

and other feminist critics of Rawls have pointed out that women face limited

opportunities within traditionally patriarchal social situations. One example of such a

situation is the nuclear family, where women are usually considered to be responsible for

the majority of the domestic tasks and as a result have little opportunity to pursue other

activities outside of their domestic life. This is to say nothing of the literal and

metaphorical incapacitations women face from the physical and psychological abuse

endemic to said situations. If Rawls is correct that the basic structure does not extend to


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the individual associations like the family, then Rawls framework is helpless to provide

fair equality of opportunity to women in these sorts of situations.

Rawls response to the feminist critique notes that while the basic structure does

not address the internaloperations of private associations, it does place constraints on

what burdens can be placed on individuals within those associations. The fact that each

member of an association is a citizen entails that they are due all the rights and liberties

due to them qua citizen (Rawls 2005, 469). Included in these rights that the basic

structure guarantees are a right to integrity of person, which includes freedom from

psychological and physical oppression, and freedom of association (Rawls 1999, 53). In

other words, women qua citizens have the right to not be subject to abuse of any kind,

and should have the ability to freely exit if they no longer comply with the terms of the

association. Anyone who is subjecting a woman to opportunity-limiting responsibilities

that she is not willing to agree to herself therefore violates the rights guaranteed her

through the basic structure, a violation that would require intervention and prevention.

On the grounds of the rights, the basic structure still seems to have the resources to

extend opportunity and freedom from capability hindrances that Nussbaum and other

feminists have noted.

As noted earlier, the basic structure has the mechanism of the transfer branch that

periodically corrects inequalities that interfere with the fair equality of opportunity of the

society going forward. And it seems plausible that correction for handicaps could very

well be accommodated as one kind of recalibration. But part of Sen's concern with a

Rawlsian means-focused basic structure seems to come down to why handicaps should

have to wait to be corrected. As Sen sees Rawls, while certain capability-relevant factors


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like income distribution are accounted for in the very initial constitutional stage of setting

up of the basic structure, other equally incapacitating factors like handicaps only get

addressed through the legislative stageonce the basic structure is set up. Sen thinks it is

problematic that the basic structure does not already include at the constitutional stage the

information about how people are able to convert primary goods into a good

life. Incapacitating handicaps should not have to wait around to get sorted out, but

should be addressed at the same time that things like income distribution are addressed.

But how significant is this problem if handicaps will be addressed in the legislative stage?

If we have reason to think that the various kinds of handicaps will be addressed in the

execution of the basic structureas I have endeavored to show that we do abovewhy is

it problematic that they are not addressed initially?

Part of the reason why I am less concerned about various handicaps being

addressed later in the sequence of the basic structure is I think there is an explanation as

to why handicaps are not addressed sooner. The situation of the constitutional stage is

such that the constitution is constructed with only a very minimal amount of information

coming through the veil of ignorance. It is only once the constitution is settled and the

veil of ignorance is lifted that the full scope of all the social facts becomes available

(Rawls 1999, 174). It seems that the limitation of opportunities that certain handicaps

place on people is a least partly a function of some of these social facts. For instance, if

one were in a society that had neither the architectural concept of stair nor any mutli-

story buildings, then the need for wheelchair ramps and elevators is obviated. Similarly,

if one is in a society where the father takes care of the child soon after birth, then the need


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for maternity leave and childcare noted above is likewise dissolved.5

It would seem

difficult for agents to make any sort of provision about opportunity limiting handicaps

like these without knowledge of these facts that the veil of ignorance has temporarily

denied them. But if what I have outlined in this paper is correct, then the basic structure

that Rawls thinks is constitutionally enshrined in the constitutional stage already has the

sufficient materials to accommodate the variety of incapacitating conditions that might

affect citizens prospects and opportunities.

In conclusion, I am left wondering how distinctive6Sen and Nussbaums

proposed alternative of justice is from the Rawlsian framework. Sen qualifies his break

with Rawls by noting that Rawls is concerned with people having real opportunity to

actualize their conception of the good life (Sen 2009, 64). While Sen obviously agrees

with this, he thinks that Rawls answer to that question ultimately will not secure real

opportunity in many cases. As a result, though, Sen sees the move from primary goods to

capabilities as not a foundational departure from a Rawlsian program, but only an

adjustment of the strategy by which the goal of fair opportunity is achieved (Sen 2009,

66). What I have argued in this paper is that we have reason to think that the

5 In this case, it might well be thatpaternityleave would become necessary, but that

necessity might also be contingent on some other social facts about that society.6 I think part of the reason Sen and those sympathetic with him see some departure

from Rawls is that Rawls is to varying degrees engaged in the enterprise of ideal

theory, i.e. explicating what the ideal of justice is. Sen has no time for the ideal

theorizing project: striving to depict in exact detail the features of an idealized

conception of justice is neither necessary nor sufficient for what Sen thinks is thereal task of political philosophy, namely making comparative evaluations about the

opportunities that respective actually realizable political arrangements afford its

citizens (Sen 2009, 96). If we strip away the idealizing within Rawls, however, and

reorient it toward doing the sort of comparative evaluations that Sen and Nussbaum

want political philosophers to do, the break between the capabilities approach and

Rawls seems minimal.


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readjustment of Rawls philosophy that the capabilities approach is supposed to offer is

already present in Rawls account. As Rawls notes inRestatement, the capabilities that

citizens have in virtue of being free and equal personsand the rights and liberty thereby

entailedare what enable us to be fully cooperating members of society (Rawls 2001,

169).

Works Cited

Nussbaum, Martha C. "In defense of universal values."Idaho L. Rev. 36 (1999): 380-

443.

Rawls, John. Theory of Justice. Revised edition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,

1999.

---. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Ed. Erin Kelly. Cambridge: HarvardUniversity Press, 2001.

---. Political Liberalism. Expanded Edition. New York: Columbia University Press,2005.

Sen, Amartya. Equality of what?Liberty, Equality, and Law: Selected Tanner Lectures

on Moral Philosophy. Ed. John Rawls & Sterling M. McMurrin. Salt Lake City:University of Utah Press, 1979. 197-220.

---. The Idea of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009.

Rawls and the Capabilities Approach

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