a. Rawls

Rawls burst into prominence in 1958 with the publication of his game-

changing paper, “Justice as Fairness.”  Though it was not his first important

publication, it revived the social contract theory that had been languishing

in the wake of Hume’s critique and its denigration by utilitarians and

pragmatists, though it was a Kantian version of it that Rawls advocated. 

This led to a greatly developed book version, A Theory of Justice, published

in 1971, arguably the most important book of American philosophy

published in the second half of the last century.  Rawls makes it clear that

his theory, which he calls “justice as fairness,” assumes a Kantian view of

persons as “free and equal,” morally autonomous, rational agents, who are

not necessarily egoists.  He also makes it clear early on that he means to

present his theory as a preferable alternative to that of utilitarians.  He asks

us to imagine persons in a hypothetical “initial situation” which he calls “the

original position” (corresponding to the “state of nature” or “natural

condition” of Hobbes, but clearly not presented as any sort of historical or

pre-historical fact).  This is strikingly characterized by what Rawls calls “the

veil of ignorance,” a device designed to minimize the influence of selfish

bias in attempting to determine what would be just.  If you must decide on

what sort of society you could commit yourself to accepting as a permanent

member and were not allowed to factor in specific knowledge about yourself

—such as your gender, race, ethnic identity, level of intelligence, physical

strength, quickness and stamina, and so forth—then you would presumably

exercise the rational choice to make the society as fair for everyone as

possible, lest you find yourself at the bottom of that society for the rest of

your life.  In such a “purely hypothetical” situation, Rawls believes that we

would rationally adopt two basic principles of justice for our society:  “the

first requires equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties, while the

second holds that social and economic inequalities, for example inequalities

of wealth and authority, are just only if they result in compensating benefits

for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of

society.”  Here we see Rawls conceiving of justice, the primary social virtue,

as requiring equal basic liberties for all citizens and a presumption of

equality even regarding socio-economic goods.  He emphasizes the point

that these principles rule out as unjust the utilitarian justification of

disadvantages for some on account of greater advantages for others, since

that would be rationally unacceptable to one operating under the veil of

ignorance.  Like Kant, Rawls is opposed to the teleological or

consequentialist gambit of defining the right (including the just) in terms of

“maximizing the good”; he rather, like Kant, the deontologist, is committed

to a “priority of the right over the good.”  Justice is not reducible to utility

or pragmatic desirability.  We should notice that the first principle of

justice, which requires maximum equality of rights and duties for all

members of society, is prior in “serial or lexical order” to the second, which

specifies how socio-economic inequalities can be justified (Theory, pp. 12-

26, 31, 42-43).  Again, this is anti-utilitarian, in that no increase in socio-

economic benefits for anyone can ever justify anything less than maximum

equality of rights and duties for all.  Thus, for example, if enslaving a few

members of society generated vastly more benefits for the majority than

liabilities for them, such a bargain would be categorically ruled out as

unjust.

Rawls proceeds to develop his articulation of these two principles of justice

more carefully.  He reformulates the first one in terms of maximum equal

liberty, writing that “each person is to have an equal right to the most

extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.”  The

basic liberties intended concern such civil rights as are protected in our

Constitution—free speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of conscience, the

right to private property, the rights to vote and hold public office, freedom

from arbitrary arrest and seizure, etc.  The lexical priority of this first

principle requires that it be categorical in that the only justification for

limiting any basic liberties would be to enhance other basic liberties; for

example, it might be just to limit free access of the press to a sensational

legal proceeding in order to protect the right of the accused to a fair trial.  

Rawls restates his second principle to maintain that “social and economic

inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably

expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and

offices open to all.”  Thus socio-economic inequalities can be justified, but

only if both conditions are met.  The first condition (a) is “the difference

principle” and takes seriously the idea that every socio-economic difference

separating one member of society from others must be beneficial to all,

including the person ranked lowest.  The second condition is one of “fair

equality of opportunity,” in that socio-economic advantages must be

connected to positions to which all members of society could have access. 

For example, the office of the presidency has attached to it greater social

prestige and income than is available to most of us.  Is that just?  It can be,

assuming that all of us, as citizens, could achieve that office with its

compensations and that even those of us at or near the bottom of the socio-

economic scale benefit from intelligent, talented people accepting the

awesome responsibilities of that office.  Just as the first principle must be

lexically prior to the second, Rawls also maintains that “fair opportunity is

prior to the difference principle.”  Thus, if we have to choose between equal

opportunity for all and socio-economically benefiting “the least advantaged”

members of society, the former has priority over the latter.  Most of us

today might be readily sympathetic to the first principle and the equal

opportunity condition, while finding the difference principle to be

objectionably egalitarian, to the point of threatening incentives to

contribute more than is required.  Rawls does consider a “mixed

conception” of justice that most of us would regard as more attractive

“arising when the principle of average utility constrained by a certain social

minimum is substituted for the difference principle, everything else

remaining unchanged.”  But there would be a problem of fairly agreeing on

that acceptable social minimum, and it would change with shifting

contingent circumstances.  It is curious that his own theory of “justice as

fairness” gets attacked by socialists such as Nielsen (whom we shall

consider) for sacrificing equality for the sake of liberty and by libertarians

such as Nozick (whom we shall also consider) for giving up too much liberty

for the sake of equality.  Rawls briefly suggests that his theory of justice as

fairness might be applied to international relations, in general, and to just

war theory, in particular (ibid., pp. 60-65, 75, 83, 302-303, 316, 378).

Rawls applies his theory of justice to the domestic issue of civil

disobedience.  No society is perfectly just.  A generally or “nearly just

society” can have unjust laws, in which case its citizens may or may not

have a duty to comply with them, depending on how severely unjust they

are.  If the severity of the injustice is not great, then respect for democratic

majority rule might morally dictate compliance.  Otherwise, citizens can feel

a moral obligation to engage in civil disobedience, which Rawls defines as

“a public, nonviolent, conscientious yet political act contrary to law usually

done with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of the

government.”  Certain conditions must be met in order that an act of civil

disobedience be justified:  (1) it should normally address violations of equal

civil liberties (the first principle of justice) and/or of “fair equality of

opportunity” (the second part of the second principle), with violations of the

difference principle (the first part of the second principle) being murkier

and, thus, harder to justify; (2) the act of civil disobedience should come

only after appeals to the political majority have been reasonably tried and

failed; (3) it must seem likely to accomplish more good than harm for the

social order.  Yet, even if all three of these conditions seem to be met and

the disobedient action seems right, there remains the practical question of

whether it would be “wise or prudent,” under the circumstances, to engage

in the act of civil disobedience.  Ultimately, every individual must decide for

himself or herself whether such action is morally and prudentially justifiable

or not as reasonably and responsibly as possible.  The acts of civil

disobedience of Martin Luther King (to whom Rawls refers in a footnote)

seem to have met all the conditions, to have been done in the name of

justice, and to have been morally justified (ibid., pp. 350-357, 363-367, 372-

376, 389-390, 364n).

Rawls’s second book was Political Liberalism.  Here he works out how a just

political conception might develop a workable “overlapping consensus”

despite the challenges to social union posed by a pluralism of “reasonable

comprehensive doctrines.”  This, of course, calls for some explanation.  A

just society must protect basic liberties equally for all of its members,

including freedom of thought and its necessary condition, freedom of

expression.  But, in a free society that protects these basic liberties, a

pluralism of views and values is likely to develop, such that people can

seriously disagree about matters they hold dear.  They will develop their

own “comprehensive doctrines,” or systems of beliefs that may govern all

significant aspects of their lives.  These may be religious (like Christianity)

or philosophical (like Kantianism) or moral (like utilitarian).  Yet a variety of

potentially conflicting comprehensive doctrines may be such that all are

reasonable.  In such a case, social unity requires respect for and tolerance

of other sets of beliefs.  It would be unjust deliberately to suppress

reasonable comprehensive doctrines merely because they are different from

our own.  The problem of political liberalism nowadays is how we can

establish “a stable and just society whose free and equal citizens are deeply

divided by conflicting and even incommensurable religious, philosophical,

and moral doctrines.”  What is needed is a shared “political conception of

justice” that is neutral regarding competing comprehensive doctrines.  This

could allow for “an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive

doctrines,” such that tolerance and mutual respect are operative even

among those committed to incompatible views and values, so long as they

are reasonable (Liberalism, pp. 291-292, 340-342, 145, xviii, 13, 152n., 59-

60, 133, 154-155, 144, 134).  Thus, for example, a Christian Kantian and an

atheistic utilitarian, while sincerely disagreeing on many ethical principles,

philosophical ideas, and religious beliefs, can unite in mutually accepting,

for instance, the American Constitution as properly binding on all of us

equally.  This agreement will enable them mutually to participate in social

cooperation, the terms of which are fair and reciprocal and which can

contribute to the reasonable good of the entire society.

Near the end of his life, Rawls published The Law of Peoples, in which he

tried to apply his theory of justice to international relations.  Given that not

all societies act justly and that societies have a right to defend themselves

against aggressive violent force, there can be a right to go to war (jus ad

bellum).  Yet even then, not all is fair in war, and rules of just warfare (jus in

bello) should be observed:  (1) the goal must be a “just and lasting peace”;

(2) it must be waged in defense of freedom and security from aggression;

(3) reasonable attempts must be made not to attack innocent non-

combatants; (4) the human rights of enemies (for example, against being

tortured) must be respected; (5) attempts should be made to establish

peaceful relations; and (6) practical tactics must always remain within the

parameters of moral principles.  After hostilities have ceased, just

conquerors must treat their conquered former enemies with respect—not,

for example, enslaving them or denying them civil liberties.  Rawls adds a

very controversial “supreme emergency exemption” in relation to the third

rule—when a relatively just society’s very survival is in desperate peril, its

attacking enemy civilian populations, as by bombing cities, can be

justifiable.  More generally, Rawls applies his theory of justice to

international relations, generating eight rules regarding how the people of

other societies must be treated.  While we do not have time to explore them

all here, the last one is sufficiently provocative to be worth our considering: 

“Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable

conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social

regime.”  This, of course, goes beyond not exploiting, cheating,

manipulating, deceiving, and interfering with others to a positive duty of

trying to help them, at the cost of time, money, and other resources.  Justice

demands that we try to assist what Rawls calls “burdened societies,” so that

doing so is not morally supererogatory.  What is most interesting here is

what Rawls refuses to say.  While different peoples, internationally

speaking, might be imagined in an original position under the veil of

ignorance, and Rawls would favor encouraging equal liberties and

opportunities for all, he refuses to apply the difference principle globally in

such a way as to indicate that justice requires a massive redistribution of

wealth from richer to poorer societies (Peoples, pp. 94-96, 98-99, 37, 106,

114-117).

From a critical perspective, Rawls’s theory of civil disobedience is excellent,

as are his theory of political liberalism and his version of the just war

theory, except for that “supreme emergency exemption,” which

uncharacteristically tries to make right a function of teleological good.  His

views on international aid seem so well worked out that, ironically, they call

into question part of his general theory of justice itself.  It does not seem

plausible that the difference principle should apply intrasocietally but not

internationally.  The problem may be with the difference principle itself.  It

is not at all clear that rational agents in a hypothetical original position

would adopt such an egalitarian principle.  The veil of ignorance leading to

this controversial principle can itself be questioned as artificial and

unrealistic; one might object that, far from being methodologically neutral,

it sets up a bias (towards, for example, being risk-aversive) that renders

Rawls’s own favored principles of justice almost a foregone conclusion. 

Indeed, the “mixed conception” that Rawls himself considers and rejects

seems more plausible and more universally applicable—keeping the first

principle and the second part of the second but replacing the difference

principle with one of average utility, constrained by some social minimum,

adjustable with changing circumstances.  Thus we could satisfactorily

specify the requirements of an essentially Kantian conception of justice, as

requiring respect for the dignity of all persons as free and equal, rational

moral agents.  While less egalitarian than what Rawls offers, it might prove

an attractive alternative.  To what extent should liberty be constrained by

equality in a just society?  This is a central issue that divides him from many

post-Rawlsians, to a few of whom we now briefly turn.

b. Post-RawlsRawls’s monumental work on justice theory revitalized political philosophy

in the United States and other English-speaking countries.  In this final

subsection, we shall briefly survey some of the most important recent

attempts to provide preferable alternatives to Rawls’s conception of justice. 

They will represent six different approaches.  We shall consider, in

succession, (1) the libertarian approach of Robert Nozick, (2) the socialistic

one of Kai Nielsen, (3) the communitarian one of Michael Sandel, (4) the

globalist one of Thomas Pogge, (5) the feminist one of Martha Nussbaum,

and (6) the rights-based one of Michael Boylan.  As this is merely a quick

survey, we shall not delve much into the details of their theories (limiting

ourselves to a single work by each) or explore their applications or do much

in the way of a critique of them.  But the point will be to get a sense of

several recent approaches to developing views of justice in the wake of

Rawls.

(1)    Nozick

Nozick (a departmental colleague of Rawls at Harvard) was one of the first

and remains one of the most famous critics of Rawls’s liberal theory of

justice.  Both are fundamentally committed to individual liberty.  But as a

libertarian, Nozick is opposed to compromising individual liberty in order to

promote socio-economic equality and advocates a “minimal state” as the

only sort that can be socially just.  In Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974),

especially in its famous chapter on “Distributive Justice,” while praising

Rawls’s first book as the most important “work in political and moral

philosophy” since that of Mill, Nozick  argues for what he calls an

“entitlement conception of justice” in terms of three principles of just

holdings.  First, anyone who justly acquires any holding is rightly entitled to

keep and use it.  Second, anyone who acquires any holding by means of a

just transfer of property is rightly entitled to keep and use it.  It is only

through some combination of these two approaches that anyone is rightly

entitled to any holding.  But some people acquire holdings unjustly—e.g., by

theft or fraud or force—so that there are illegitimate holdings.  So, third,

justice can require the rectification of unjust past acquisitions.  These three

principles of just holdings—“the principle of acquisition of holdings, the

principle of transfer of holdings, and the principle of rectification of the

violations of the first two principles”—constitute the core of Nozick’s

libertarian entitlement theory of justice.  People should be entitled to use

their own property as they see fit, so long as they are entitled to it.  On this

view, any pattern of distribution, such as Rawls’s difference principle, that

would force people to give up any holdings to which they are entitled in

order to give it to someone else (i.e., a redistribution of wealth) is unjust. 

Thus, for Nozick, any state, such as ours or one Rawls would favor, that is

“more extensive” than a minimal state and redistributes wealth by taxing

those who are relatively well off to benefit the disadvantaged necessarily

“violates people’s rights” (State, pp. 149, 183, 230, 150-153, 230-231, 149).

(2)    Nielsen

Nielsen, as a socialist (against both Rawls and Nozick) considers equality to

be a more fundamental ideal than individual liberty; this is more in keeping

with Marxism than with the liberal/libertarian tradition that has largely

stemmed from Locke.  (Whereas capitalism supports the ownership and

control of the means of producing and distribution material goods by

private capital or wealth, socialism holds that they should be owned and

controlled by society as a whole.)  If Nozick accuses Rawls of going too far

in requiring a redistribution of wealth, Nielsen criticizes him for favoring

individual liberty at the expense of social equality.  In direct contrast to

Rawls’s two liberal principles of justice, in “Radical Egalitarian Justice: 

Justice as Equality,” Nielsen proposes his own two socialistic principles

constituting the core of his “egalitarian conception of justice.”  In his first

principle, he calls for “equal basic liberties and opportunities” (rather than

for merely “equal basic liberties”), including the opportunities “for

meaningful work, for self-determination, and political participation,” which

he considers important to promote “equal moral autonomy and equal self-

respect.”  Also (unlike Rawls) he does not claim any lexical priority for

either principle over the other.  His sharper departure from Rawls can be

found in his second principle, which is to replace the difference principle

that allegedly justified socio-economic inequality.  After specifying a few

qualifications, it calls for “the income and wealth” of society “to be so

divided that each person will have a right to an equal share” and for the

burdens of society “also to be equally shared, subject, of course, to

limitations by differing abilities and differing situations.”  He argues that his

own second principle would better promote “equal self-respect and equal

moral autonomy” among the members of society.  Thus we might eliminate

social stratification and class exploitation, in accordance with the ideals of

Marxist humanism (“Equality,” pp. 209, 211-213, 222-225).

(3)    Sandel

Sandel, as a communitarian, argues (against Rawls and Nozick) that the

well-being of a community takes precedence over individual liberty and

(against Nielsen) over the socio-economic welfare of its members.  While

acknowledging that Rawls is not so “narrowly individualistic” as to rule out

the value of building social community, in Liberalism and the Limits of

Justice, he maintains that the individualism of persons in the original

position is such that “a sense of community” is not a basic “constituent of

their identify as such,” so that community is bound to remain secondary and

derivative in the Rawlsian theory.  To deny that community values help

constitute one’s personal identity is to render impossible any preexisting

interpersonal good from which a sense of right can be derived.  Thus, for

Sandel, Rawls’s myopic theory of human nature gives him no basis for any

pre-political natural rights.  So his conception of justice based on this

impoverished view must fail to reflect “the shared self-understandings” of

who they are as members of community that must undergird the basic

structure of political society.  Through the interpersonal relationships of

community, we establish “more or less enduring attachments and

commitments” that help define who we are, as well as the values that will

help characterize our sense of justice as a common good that cannot be

properly understood by individuals detached from community.  Thus justice

must determine what is right as serving the goods we embrace in a social

context—“as members of this family or community or nation or people, as

bearers of this history, as sons and daughters of that revolution, as citizens

of this republic” rather than as abstract individuals (Limits, pp. 66, 60-65,

87, 150, 172-174, 179, 183, 179).

(4)    Pogge

Pogge develops a globalist interpretation of justice as fairness that, in a

sense, is more consistent than Rawls’s own.  More specifically, it not only

accepts the difference principle but wants to apply it on an international

level as well as nationally.  In “An Egalitarian Law of Peoples,” Pogge

observes that Rawls means his theory of justice to be relatively

“egalitarian.”  And, as applied intranationally, so it is.  But, as applied

internationally, it is not.  As he says, there is a disconnect “between Rawls’s

conception of domestic and of global justice.”  (We should note that, like

Sandel’s critique, which we just considered, Pogge’s is not a complete

theory of justice, but more a modification of Rawls’s own.)  While Rawls

does believe that well-off societies have a duty to assist burdened societies,

he rejects the idea of a global application of his difference principle.  What

Pogge is proposing is a global egalitarian principle of distributive justice. 

He thinks that this will address socio-economic equalities that are to the

detriment of the world’s worst-off persons.  What he proposes is “a global

resources tax, or GRT.”  This means that, although each of the peoples of

our planet “owns and fully controls all resources within its national

territory,” it will be taxed on all of the resources it extracts.  If it uses those

extracted resources itself, it must pay the tax itself.  If it sells some to other

societies, presumably at least part of the tax burden will be borne by buyers

in the form of higher sales prices.  “The GRT is then a tax on consumption”

of our planet’s resources.  Corporations extracting resources (such as oil

companies and coal mining companies) would pay their taxes to their

governments which, in turn, would be responsible for transferring funds to

disadvantaged societies to help the global poor.  Such payments should be

regarded as “a matter of entitlement rather than charity,” an obligation of

international justice.  If the governments of the poorer states were honest,

they could disburse the funds; if they were corrupt, then transfers could go

through United Nations agencies and/or nongovernmental organizations.  At

any rate, they should be channeled toward societies in which they could

improve the lot of the poor and disadvantaged.  (Of course, less well-off

societies would be free to refuse such funds, if they so chose.)  But, one

might wonder, would well-off societies only be motivated to pay their fair

share by benevolence, a sense of justice, and possible shame at being

exposed for not doing so?  No, there could be international sanctions: 

“Once the agency facilitating the flow of GRT payments reports that a

country has not met its obligations under the scheme, all other countries

are required to impose duties on imports from, and perhaps also similar

levies on exports to, this country to raise funds equivalent to its GRT

obligations plus the cost of these enforcement measures.”  Pogge believes

that well-off societies should recognize that his more egalitarian model of

international relations is also more just than Rawls’s law of peoples

(“Egalitarian,” pp. 195-196, 210, 199-202, 205, 219, 224).

(5)    Nussbaum

Nussbaum, like Pogge (and unlike Nozick and Nielsen), does not so much

reject Rawls’s liberal conception of justice as extend its explicit application. 

In Sex and Social Justice, she argues for a feminist interpretation of justice,

using what she calls a “capabilities approach” that connects with “the

tradition of Kantian liberalism,” nowadays represented by Rawls, tapping

into their “notions of dignity and liberty,” as a foundation for discussing the

demands of justice regarding “women’s equality and women’s human

rights.”  The feminism she embraces has five key dimensions:  (1) an

internationalism, such that it is not limited to any one particular culture; (2)

a humanism, such as affirms a basic equal worth in all human beings and

promotes justice for all; (3) a commitment to liberalism as the perspective

that best protects and promotes the “basic human capacities for choice and

reasoning” that render all humans as having an equal worth; (4) a

sensitivity to the cultural shaping of our preferences and desires; and (5) a

concern for sympathetic understanding between the sexes.  She expresses

an appreciation for the primary goods at the core of Rawls’s theory, while

asserting that his analysis does not go far enough.  She offers her own list of

ten “central human functional capabilities” that must be respected by a just

society:  (1) life of a normal, natural duration; (2) bodily health and

integrity, including adequate nourishment and shelter; (3) bodily integrity

regarding, for example, freedom of movement and security against assault;

(4) freedom to exercise one’s senses, imagination, and thought as one

pleases, which includes freedom of expression; (5) freedom to form

emotional attachments to persons and things, which includes freedom of

association; (6) the development and exercise of practical reason, the

capacity to form one’s own conception of the good and to try to plan one’s

own life, which includes the protection of freedom of conscience; (7)

freedom of affiliation on equal terms with others, which involves provisions

of nondiscrimination; (8) concern for and possible relationships with

animals, plants, and the world of nature; (9) the freedom to play, to seek

amusement, and to enjoy recreational activities; and (10) some control over

one’s own political environment, including the right to vote, and one’s

material environment, including the rights to seek meaningful work and to

hold property.  All of these capabilities are essential to our functioning as

flourishing human beings and should be assured for all citizens of a just

society.  But, historically, women have been and still are short-changed with

respect to them and should be guaranteed their protection in the name of

justice (Sex, pp. 24, 6-14, 34, 40-42).

(6)    Boylan

Boylan has recently presented “a ‘rights-based’ deontological approach

based upon the necessary conditions for human action.”  In A Just Society,

he observes that human goods are more or less deeply “embedded” as

conditions of human action, leading to a hierarchy that can be set forth. 

There are two levels of basic goods.  The most deeply embedded of these,

such as food, clothing, shelter, protection from physical harm, are

absolutely necessary for any meaningful human action.  The second level of

basic goods comprises (less) deeply embedded ones, such as basic

knowledge and skills such as are imparted by education, social structures

that allow us to trust one another, basic assurance that we will not be

exploited, and the protection of basic human rights.  Next, there are three

levels of secondary goods.  The most embedded of these are life enhancing,

if not necessary for any meaningful action, such as respect, equal

opportunity, and the capacity to form and follow one’s own plan of life and

to participate actively and equally in community, characterized by shared

values.  A second level of secondary goods comprises those that are useful

for human action, such as having and being able to use property, being able

to benefit from one’s own labor, and being able to pursue goods typically

owned by most of one’s fellow citizens.  The third level of secondary goods

comprises those that are least embedded as conditions of meaningful action

but still desirable as luxuries, such as being able to seek pleasant objectives

that most of one’s fellow citizens cannot expect to achieve and being able to

compete for somewhat more than others in one’s society.  The more deeply

embedded goods are as conditions of meaningful human action, the more

right to them people have.  Boylan follows Kant and Rawls in holding an

ultimate moral imperative is that individual human agents and their rights

must be respected.  This is a matter of justice, distributive justice involving

a fair distribution of social goods and services and retributive justice

involving proper ways for society to treat those who violate the rules.  A just

society has a duty to provide basic goods equally to all of its members, if it

can do so.  But things get more complicated with regards to secondary

goods.  A just society will try to provide the first level of secondary goods,

those that are life enhancing, equally to all its members.  Yet this becomes

more problematic with the second and third levels of secondary goods—

those that are useful and luxurious—as the conditions for meaningful human

action have already been satisfied by more deeply embedded ones.  The

need that people have to derive rewards for their work commensurate with

their achievement would seem to militate against any guarantee of equal

shares in these, even if society could provide them, although comparable

achievement should be comparably rewarded.  Finally, in the area of

retributive justice, we may briefly consider three scenarios.  First, when one

person takes a tangible good from another person, justice requires that the

perpetrator return to the victim some tangible good(s) of comparable worth,

plus compensation proportionate to the harm done the victim by the loss. 

Second, when one person takes an intangible good from another person,

justice requires that the perpetrator give the victim some tangible good as

adequate compensation for the pain and suffering caused by the loss.  And,

third, when one person injures another person through the deprivation of a

valued good that negatively affects society, society can justly incarcerate

the perpetrator for a period of time proportionate to the loss (Society, pp. x,

53-54, 56-58, 131, 138, 143-144, 164-167, 174-175, 181, 183).

In conclusion, we might observe that, in this rights-based alternative, as in

the previous five (the libertarian, the socialistic, the communitarian, the

globalist, and the feminist) we have considered, there is an attempt to

interpret justice as requiring respect for the dignity of all persons as free

and equal, rational moral agents.  This historical survey has tracked the

progressive development of this Kantian idea as becoming increasingly

prominent in Western theories of justice.