Raising the Stakes on Syria:

The U.S. Policy Debate and Regional Dynamics Wednesday, September 18, 2013

Washington, D.C.

Moderator:

Marwan Muasher,

Vice President for Studies,

Carnegie Endowment

Speakers:

Nasser alKidwa,

Deputy to Arab League Special Envoy to Syria Lakhdar Brahimi

(Via Video-Conference from Geneva, Switzerland);

Paul Salem,

Director,

Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, Lebanon;

Karim Sadjadpour,

Senior Associate,

Carnegie Endowment;

Andrew Weiss,

Vice President for Studies,

Carnegie Endowment

Transcript by Federal News Service

Washington, D.C.

[00:00:08] MARWAN MUASHER: OK, good morning and welcome to the Carnegie Endowment, and welcome to another

event on Syria. Of course, the recent weeks have witnessed many developments regarding the Syrian crisis, the chemical attack

issue, the Russian-U.S. agreement, the U.N. report regarding these chemical issues and the ongoing discussions currently at the U.N. to come up with a resolution on these chemical weapons. And this morning, we would like to examine the regional dynamics regarding the issue, as well as the U.S. policy debate, and the future regarding not just a chemical attack issue, but more broadly, the Syrian crisis in its entirety.

We’re very fortunate and very privileged to have with us today a panel of true experts on the different angles and

countries regarding this issue. We have with us from Geneva His Excellency Ambassador Nasser al-Kidwa. Ambassador Kidwa, of course, is well-known to all of you. He currently is the deputy to U.N. and Arab League Special Envoy on Syria, Lakhdar Brahimi. He also served as the Palestinian authority foreign minister, 2005-2006, and he also served, of course, for a long time at the U.N. as the Palestinian ambassador to the U.N. And as such, he is really truly uniquely placed to inform us about the U.N. angle, the U.N. debates and the U.N. report regarding chemical weapons.

Also joining us from Beirut is Paul Salem. Paul is the director of our center in Beirut, and Paul has been very active

in following the Syrian issue from the region for a very long time. In Washington, we have Andrew Weiss, who is the Carnegie Endowment vice president for studies and – where he

oversees research in Washington and Moscow on Russia and Eurasia, who will handle for us the U.S. policy debate regarding the – and the Russian – and the Russian angle, as well.

[00:02:49] And of course, Karim, also, Sadjadpour, our expert on Iran, Karim would also bring us up to date about the Iranian

position, particularly in light of the recent developments on Syria. So with that, I would first like to give the floor to Ambassador Kidwa. I will ask each speaker to maybe give us

opening remarks of five minutes each in response to questions that I will pose. And then we will open it up to debate. So Ambassador Kidwa, first of all, thank you very much for agreeing to join us. Everyone’s eyes are focused on the

U.N., both in terms of the chemical attack report that was just released two days ago by the U.N. and in terms of the ongoing discussions currently now on a U.N. resolution regarding these chemical attacks. I would like to ask you about this, but also ask you whether there are any other negotiations or discussions at the U.N. between Russia and the United States, or through the offices – your offices – the offices of Lakhdar Brahimi.

Are there any also discussions aimed at restarting a political process that would aim to deal more broadly with the other issues on the table, or are you for now limiting the discussions to the chemical weapons issue?

The floor is yours. [00:04:35] NASSER AL-KIDWA: Thank you very much, Mr. Marwan. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you

also for the nice introduction and for the opportunity for me to participate in this important debate on Syria, which I believe represents one of the most dangerous – (inaudible) – that represents serious (and fierce ?) threat – (inaudible) – and security. I’ll try to answer the question you raise, but if you bear with me just a minute or two to go back a little bit to try to put things in perspective.

Now, as we all know, in Syria, bloodshed, destruction and human suffering have continued for the last 2 ½ years.

Nevertheless, the situation has become much more (complicated ?) with the increased sectarian nature of the violence, increased presence and influence of the jihadist groups and the increased regional dimension in both – in both ways.

And with this, of course, short political solution, also continues the United States as much as I understand it, the

United States’ position is one recognizing that there is no military solution. Furthermore, the United States and Russia remain committed to Geneva communique of June, 2012, the communique, with its language, I might say, even with its vague language, that can accommodate political changes and practical changes on the ground, remains in my mind very relevant, even today.

Now, last July, one of your points, Marwan – last July, we – that is, the office of the Joint Special Representative to

Syria – worked with the Russian Federation and the United States to prepare for Geneva II conference that is aimed at implementing the Geneva communique that I just referred to. Some important preparations, actually, have taken place and the three parties felt that we are – (audio break) – closer to the possibility of actually convening the conference.

Then, as we all know came the horrible 21st – (audio break) – chemical attack in Ghota, and with the very important

danger imposed by the use of chemical weapons, and the horrific images of the victims, the United States administration felt the need to react, the need to wage a military strike in order, as they put it, to deter the regime and degrade its capabilities.

[00:07:32] That was a position dealing basically with the chemical issues, and not with the whole situation in Syria, in spite of

the fact that it would – (audio break) – would have – (inaudible) – left a very fundamental and important impact on that situation.

Then – and probably suddenly, although we later understood that there was some discussion between the U.S. and the Russians – then the Russian idea to put the Syrian chemical weapons under international control and to destroy to the Syrian program, that was followed by the – (Syria’s accession ?) to the Convention on Chemical – (audio break).

[00:08:23] Now, the United States and the Russian Federation, as we all know, actually reached a framework agreement for the

elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons on 14th of September. Basically, the two – (inaudible) – agreed to work together within the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to expedite the process that is enshrined within the convention for the destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons, and also, to work with the Security Council to adopt a resolution that reinforces the decisions taken by the executive council (of OPCW ?).

In our – in our mind, this was a positive development, a very important development that averted the military strike

and actually opened the way for potential military solution of the chemical weapons issue, and maybe of the overall political situation in Syria. There has been some important discussion in the – in the – in these – there has been important discussion in relation to the implementation of the Russian-American agreement; the most important part of which is the discussion that’s taking place now in the Security Council, and all heard through the media about some important differences, not to say disagreements, on the exact language to be used of the – of the resolution, and specifically with regard to the issue of Chapter – Chapter 7.

Some P-5 members are demanding the next resolution, the one that’s being discussed now, to be adopted under

Chapter – under Chapter 7. Others, namely the Russians, maybe don’t want any reference to Chapter 7 at all. I guess – although it’s a bit dangerous to – (audio break) – in a situation like this – I guess that language that is very similar to the language that exists in the framework, the Russia-America framework agreement, will be used as part of the resolution itself, meaning that strong language will be found.

[00:11:08] However, when it comes to Chapter 7, it’s – probably the resolution, the draft resolution, will say – (audio break).

If there is no compliance during the implementation, then the council will adopt the necessary measures and Chapter 7. So in other words, it might be probably the next step in this regard.

Now, the question of course in addition to the implementation of the framework agreement is how, if at all

possible, to link this development, this important development, to the overall political context and to actually try to expedite the Geneva – Geneva process. And in this regard indeed, on the 13th of September there has been a trilateral meeting held in Geneva between the Americans, the Russians and the OJSR (ph) to further discuss the preparations for Geneva.

And the important talks took place with regard to convening the meeting next October. Whether this will be the

case it remains to be seen. I personally expect some rough situation, given the importance of the chemical weapons issue

and the – some – (audio break) – incidents that took place there. This probably will leave some impact on the possibility of how fast the concerned parties could move. So we’ll try our best to have this event in October. If not, then probably a few weeks – a few weeks after but hopefully not that – not much longer than that.

[00:13:03] Now, as Marwan said, two days ago the report of the U.N. mission to investigate allegations of chemical weapons in

Syria was presented to both the Security Council and the General Assembly. The report concludes clearly that chemical weapons were used on 21st of August on, as the report says, quote, unquote, “relatively large scale.” It also provides clear and convincing evidence that surface-to-surface rockets containing nerve gas sarin were used.

Now, overwhelming majority of people argue that with the scope of the use of the chemical weapons with the

delivery system that were used, with even the direction of the two rockets that were examined by the investigators, there is a convincing evidence that the attack took place or was perpetuated by the official troops, by the – by the regime.

Now, what impact this report will have is not completely clear. Again, I guess maybe not a huge impact at this stage

– and the emphasis here on “impact at this stage.” Later on I believe that the international community will come back to this report and demand certain important things, including of course, first and foremost, the outcome on – (audio break). Whether this is going to be the issue now, again, I think priority will be given to the overall implementation of the framework agreement and the actual – the actual destruction of the Syrian chemical weapon program.

[00:15:13] By that I think I have already used my – my five minutes. Thank you very much. Thank you all. MR. MUASHER: Ambassador alKidwa, thank you so much for this presentation. If I can have just a brief follow-

up question, you know, you’ve been, of course, talking to both the opposition and the regime in Damascus. What, in your view, are the prospects of both these groups, the opposition and the regime, going to Geneva at this stage, and have the prospects been aided or impeded by the chemical weapons issue?

MR. ALKIDWA: Well, conventional wisdom – conventional wisdom has it that a ban on the chemical weapons

should facilitate further – further work and further progress on the political – political track. That is fairly logical – logical thinking.

However, because of the fact that there has been some people that they’re very unhappy maybe with the framework

agreement on the chemical – chemical weapons, and because of the fact that most probably that framework agreement will be put to implementation, then we might have some – some slight difficulties with the schedule, the guideline on how and when to move with the steps in terms of the conference in Geneva.

Now, your bigger question – (audio break) – the government and the opposition will be willing to participate in the conference, I believe that they might. I believe that they would. However, I think the importance of positions of regional player as well as international players in this context acquire more importance than similar importance in other – in other conflicts.

In other words, I would be very interested to know the degree of the cooperation that countries such as Saudi

Arabia, Turkey and, on the other hand, Iran and the Russian Federation would – would be ready to provide or to give to the – to the process. This is – this will be extremely – extremely important, regional as well as international positions of the concerned – concerned parties. This is not to negate the importance of the local players, both the government and the opposition, but it is just to emphasize the unusual importance of positions of regional and international players.

[00:18:29] MR. MUASHER: Thank you very much. Well, perhaps with your last comments that gives us a chance to ask Paul

about these regional reactions. What, Paul, do you think the reaction of regional countries such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar and others are? But

I also would like to ask you about – to make maybe a few comments about what is the reaction of Arab public opinion, not just the government’s, to the Russian-U.S. agreement, and whether you think the aversion of war, at least at this stage, has been seen positively or negatively, not just by Arab governments but also by Arab public opinion?

PAUL SALEM: Well, sir, it’s been all that anybody has been talking about over the last few days. First of all, the

perception of – and how people are reading how – whether this is – you know, strengthens the Syrian regime, weakens it, how it impacts the opposition, how it impacts the conflict in Syria in general, and then how the different regional players are reacting to it and what perception there is of the superpower – you know, who won, who lost, who is more powerful – first of all, there’s no doubt that in the short term it certainly buys the Syrian regime time. It averted a major strike.

[00:19:52] They’re certainly better off without a U.S. strike than they would have been with a U.S. – with a U.S. strike. And

the loss of the chemical weapons in the short term does not impact the war internally that much, although it might have long-term consequences. So short term there’s a sense that the opposition, which was looking forward to a major strike by the U.S. that would change the internal balance of power dramatically and would engage less in the Syrian conflict, the fact that that is not happening certainly makes the regime look more secure in the short term, and that is a major bullet.

It’s not lost on people that President Assad now is, in a sense, somewhat legitimated internationally because he is

now a partner to the implementation of a very important chemical weapons agreement that will take him at least through the middle of 2014 and likely delay – so at least through the rest of 2014. In a sense he has been given a legitimation even by the U.S. and others who were just, you know, talking about he should leave just a few months ago.

The – (audio break) – Syrian regime, like Hezbollah, for example, have been painting this sort of – (audio break).

Of course that’s expected. They were painted as such. But their version of events is that Syria, with the backing of Iran, Russia and Hezbollah, made it very clear to the U.S. that a U.S. strike would have major strategic and military consequences.

Their – (inaudible) – twist on events is that the U.S. was looking for way to back out of the confrontation and that

the Russians came up with this deal sort of to find an exit for the U.S. So in their media, their public opinion, that’s how – (audio break) – that this was sort of a victory for their axis and that the concession, they’re painting it as not – as not an important one.

Strategically, however, the loss of Syria’s chemical weapons is a major strategic loss for Syria, if indeed, you know,

they end up really giving them up. This has been a major pillar of Syria’s strategic deterrence against Israel and, you know, behind Israel, potentially the U.S. Many people that I’ve talked to here in Lebanon, even members of the opposition, are enraged that Assad would give up a sort of a strategic asset of Syria just to save himself, in a way like many Iranians view the nuclear program as a national – a national issue that – (audio break) – of that in Syria.

[00:22:41] It’s also – (audio break) – some people that the last Arab dictators to give up chemical weapons or WMDs, like

Gaddafi in Libya in 2003 and to some degree Saddam Hussein, ended up not protected but removed from power in the long run. So I would say short term the regime looks secure – long term, perhaps more fragile or more vulnerable in the long term.

The opposition, you’d have to talk about two oppositions: the Free Syrian Army and the jihadist groups. The

jihadist groups feared – I mean, of course they would have been happy with – (audio break) – the Assad regime, but they – they were preparing for the U.S. to strike them as well. And they certainly considered that if the U.S. were to engage in Syria, the U.S. would be going after them as well.

So for the jihadist groups, they might also be breathing a sigh of relief that the U.S. is not getting engaged. They

can continue the struggle on their own terms without the U.S. becoming influential in Syria. So the big news is really the Free Syrian Army, I would say, was very upset, feels betrayed and abandoned.

[00:23:53] In the region it’s no secret that Turkey and the Gulf Cooperation Councils expected and wanted, and still want, you

know, a major – they wanted a major military strike. They wanted serious engagement. They want to go all out for regime change and they think that needs to be done militarily. Certainly they’re very unhappy with the American climb-down, as they see it. They don’t see the chemical weapons issue as, yes, it’s significant but it’s not at all something that will resolve the Syrian crisis in any shape or form.

They also fear that now that the president has taken care of this sort of red line that he talked about and that this

could go on for years, he – (audio break) – a way to engage seriously in the Syrian conflict. They’re clearly very upset and very unhappy. In the region I would say it’s only Lebanon and Jordan who sighed a sigh of relief that there would not be another massive wave of refugees and more destabilization in their countries, which are already suffering considerably.

In terms of the perception of where this puts U.S. and Russia in the Middle East, I would say that it’s a diplomatic

victory for Russia. Certainly President Obama does not appear, you know, powerful or in a strong – (audio break) – persona or leadership, but that the U.S. threat, even without going through with it, led to, you know, Syria and its Russian ally convincing Syria to give up its strategic weapons still indicates to many people that Russian cannot counterbalance.

[00:25:40] The U.S. strategic influence is still very dominant militarily, even if its president currently is very hesitant and there’s

a perception that it’s not clear that he knows what he’s doing. But it’s still not lost on people that when the U.S. sort of rattled its sabers, at the end of the day they couldn’t come up with anything better than convincing its client to give up its weapons, not a very reassuring strategic position for Russia’s, you know, strategic presence in the region but definitely sort of a diplomatic – you know, Putin is seen as very deft and very impressive, although Russia, as a strategic power, not – (audio break) – to what the U.S. can still wield in the region.

And I’ll stop there. MR. MUASHER: Thank you very much, Paul. That brings us to the U.S. debate – Andrew – and the Russian position as well. How, in your view, has the U.S.

handled it? Some people predict – or look at this as a victory, maybe a small one, for President Obama. Others see this as resulting in a weakened presidency, in a weakened image of the U.S. around the region. So what are your views?

[00:25:50] ANDREW WEISS: Thank you, Marwan. And thank you all for coming today. I think it’s hard to overstate the cumulative corrosive impact that this crisis has had on U.S.-Russian relations.

While I won’t try to sit here and defend what Russia has been doing in Syria, I’m also, I’d say, very uncomfortable with an administration strategy which has, over time I think, allowed this conflict to become a contest of wills between Washington and Moscow and created a bilateral issue, when in fact this is much more a regional and complex sectarian conflict on the ground.

I think over time U.S. policy has suffered from a mis-portrayal seriatim of what Russia’s role is. If we divide it into phases, at the beginning of the conflict in 2011 up to the G-8 meeting at Camp David in May 2012, there has been this expectation that Russia might magically play the role of facilitating a political settlement in the conflict similar to what Saudi Arabia did in Yemen.

And that hope I think was dashed in the end by a conversation the president had with then-prime minister – oh,

then – yes, then-Prime Minister Medvedev at Camp David in May 2012. Throughout that period I think Russia played along on the diplomatic track while in fact it believed that Assad could actually shoot his way out of a very grinding and bloody civil war.

[00:28:13] Over the course of the summer 2012, U.S. policy shifted rather dramatically to portraying Russia as a primary

enabler and military supplier to the Assad regime, while maybe downplaying the role that Iran was playing. So you have the big showdown over the attack helicopters, shipment in the summer of 2012, and then you had a series of double vetoes by Russia and China in the Security Council.

And I would argue that during the U.S. political campaign season the U.S. had an interest in playing up the Russian

and Chinese role on the Security Council as a way of saying, oh, we would be doing more but for these obstinate and obstructionist tactics by the Russians and the Chinese. And I think that sort of image that the road to military action or some form of Western – U.S.-led Western involvement in the crisis was thwarted by what was going on in New York I think was very convenient for the administration.

After August 21st, I think the rhetoric and the view of what Russia was doing again shifted rather dramatically and

there was all this rhetoric about how Russia was Assad’s main patron; that, you know, Russia was a – was in fact – had a sort of client relationship with Assad; we didn’t want to go back to the Security Council because the Russians had, you know, systematically blocked the effectiveness of the Security Council, you know, when in fact I think some of the reluctance was that we were going to lose more votes than we’d had in the previous showdowns that led to these three double vetoes.

[00:29:45] And then dramatically of course everyone knows what happened on the margins of the G-20 meeting in St.

Petersburg and then the – the announcement of this possible U.S.-Russian initiative. I think I give Secretary Kerry a lion’s share of the credit here for not engaging in a lot of the trash-talking and the disparaging of the Russian role but to trying to maintain channels, trying to demonstrate that his long-standing relationship with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov could produce results.

I think if you look at the second element of this, which is what is Russia actually want, I don’t the U.S. has done itself any favors – in the political debate, it’s not done itself any favors by misportraying what Russia wants. We’ve seen a lot of loose talk about a new Cold War, a competition by proxy, Russia’s desire for a warm-water port, this, you know, sense that Russia is the main military backer for Assad.

[00:30:36] I think what – if you look at what Russia really wants, what Putin really wants here, there are three elements. First is

they don’t want to see a repeat of this Libya precedent, where the U.N. Security Council basically uses humanitarian concerns to justify some form of military intervention led either by the U.S. or by its Arab partners. There’s deep anxiety in Moscow about the unfolding Sunni-Shia clash that’s – that we see on the ground in Syria and a fear that if the Sunni monarchies get the upper hand, that either of that will lead to increased pressure on Iran, or it could lead to a sort of set of initiatives by the Sunni monarchies to finance insurgencies and radical Islam, either along Russia’s periphery or inside Russia itself.

And then finally, I think there’s a real lack of confidence in the U.S. ability to manage the crisis. And so the sense

that the U.S. can deal with Assad’s removal, that it can deal with the consequences from Syria’s emergence as a fractured or failed society, that that will either create a new ungoverned area similar to what we’ve had in Pakistan, which would emanate instability and create shockwaves across the region and into Russia itself – there is just no confidence in Moscow in Washington’s ability to manage that.

[00:31:50] So, you know, I think, at the end, what we’ve seen here – you know, Paul and our colleague from Geneva both

illustrated this – is a sense that the U.S. is uncertain of what it wants, that there is great reluctance in White House, I think understandable, and I would share that reluctance, to get more directly involved. All of that has created a strategic vacuum and a lot of running room for the Russians to portray themselves as really big players here.

The question is, is what do the Russians do now that they have that role? I think we’ve seen a desire by the

Russians to play the role of Syria’s lawyer, advocate, most recently in what’s going on in the discussions in New York on a possible UNSCR under Chapter VII. But what I think folks haven’t focused on as much, what I think we really need to look at, are what are the limits of Russian influence over Assad. There’s a real sense here that the Russians have, you know, the ability to deliver Assad. I’m not so sure about that. There’s a lot of history over the past decade in which the Assad regime, even before it faced this existential crisis, basically was able to wave away Russian requests and Russian influence. So again, it’s a very fluid situation, but I would be very cautious about just how much of what the Russians claim they’re able to deliver they can actually deliver.

MR. MUASHER: Thank you very much, Andrew. And that’s brings us to Iran, Karim. Has Iran’s calculus changed as a result of this latest agreement regarding their own nuclear issue? Some people think that they are now more likely to pursue their nuclear program; others, less likely. How would you see that?

KARIM SADJADPOUR: I’m – four broad points with regards to the question. The first is that I haven’t seen any signs, any tangible signs that Iran is preparing to abandon Assad. Iran has two

pretty clear interests in Syria. One is to maintain a long-standing alliance – this is arguably their only long-standing alliance since the 1979 revolution – and it’s to preserve a corridor to Hezbollah. And I think if Iran was confident that it could preserve its interest in Syria if Assad were to fall, they would have cut him loose a long time ago. But I think they’re certainly not confident about that, and for that reason, I would argue there is no signs they’re preparing to abandon Assad.

[00:34:05] And on the contrary, there are some tangible signs that they’ve doubled down on Assad, whether it’s setting up

Shiite militia training camps on the borders with Iran-Iraq including Iraqi Shiites, statements from the head of the Revolutionary Guards Quds Force, Qassem Suleimani, proclaiming to support Syria to the end. So I think Iran’s role is really one of the fundamental challenges in a diplomatic solution because if one side of a conflict sees it as a zero-sum game, it’s very difficult to meet halfway in a zero-sum game.

With regards – this is the second point – with regards to the – whether or not U.S. policy toward Syria has a bearing

on Iran’s nuclear ambitions, there is kind of two arguments which have been made. The first argument is that U.S. inaction in Syria will embolden Iran to move forward with their nuclear ambitions because they no longer take the United States seriously. The second argument is to counter that, to say that on the contrary, U.S. action, U.S. military action in Syria will compel Iran to pursue a nuclear deterrent.

[00:35:33] My sense is that U.S. action or inaction in Syria won’t really have a strong bearing on Iran’s nuclear ambitions. If

we were having this conversation two months ago, three months ago, I would have said that Iran’s nuclear ambitions are to pursue in a very deliberate fashion nuclear weapons capability to kind of get up to the point where they’re a screwdriver turned away from having a nuclear weapon but not yet turning that screw. And I think that will remain the case whether the U.S. chooses to bomb Syria or not bomb Syria. I will see Iran continuing to pursue a nuclear weapons capability in a very deliberate fashion. So I don’t see the strong linkage between the two.

The third point I’d make is that there have been many op-eds written over the last months and weeks about the

need to engage Iran over Syria in order to find a diplomatic resolution in Syria. And I certainly don’t oppose those efforts, but I would say that Iran’s role in Syria is not organic in the same way that Iran’s role in Afghanistan or Iran’s role in Iraq has been. You know, these are two countries, Iraq and Afghanistan, in which Iran shares enormous borders, there has been

centuries of trade, and Iran truly does have an organic influence in Afghanistan and Iraq, and it will for decades and centuries to come.

[00:37:17] I don’t think that’s the case in Syria. There are no – there is no border between Iran and Syria. It’s not an organic

alliance between two nations but it’s really a – what I describe as a tactical-come-strategic partnership between two authoritarian regimes. But between the societies, despite the fact that Iran has spent billions of dollars since 1979 subsidizing Iranians’ travel to Syria, and I think the Syrian regime likewise has tried to foster warm feelings among Syrians for Iran – but, you know, it’s just kind of this arranged marriage in which the two partners, I would argue, the two societies never really fell in love. And, you know, I think that goes back to the previous point that that’s why, in a way, Iran has really doubled and tripled down on Assad, because if they felt confident that they were going to preserve a strong role in Syria when Assad falls, I think they would’ve – they would’ve cut him loose long ago.

The last point I’ll make is with regards to U.S.-Iran relations, particularly the potential for some type of a nuclear

détente. You know, I argued earlier I don’t see any tangible signs that Iran is preparing to abandon Assad. But I would say that there are several data points to suggest that Iran is preparing itself, preparing its public for a process which could lead to a nuclear compromise. And, you know, I’ve never been terribly optimistic about these things, so I think, you know, there’s been several statements from people who matter. You know, I don’t follow kind of what reformist intellectuals opine about in Tehran about the nuclear issue, about Syria, but when Ayatollah Khamenei, as he did yesterday, told a group of revolutionary guardsmen that Iran needed to show, quote-unquote, heroic flexibility, that’s pretty significant. And there’s a lot of other signs from President Rouhani and others to show that, again, it’s not that they’re going to give up their nuclear ambitions next week at the U.N. General Assembly, but they are floating a lot of trial balloons, and they seem to be preparing themselves for a process.

And the last thing I’d say about that is that, you know, what’s interesting is that we went a period of two months

from the very worst of the Islamic Republic to the very best of the Islamic Republic. Iran’s current foreign minister, Javad Zarif, was formerly Iran’s ambassador to the United Nations, I would argue is Iran’s most sophisticated and effective diplomat in the history of the Islamic Revolution, in the last 35 years. I haven’t met a single Iranian official I would say is more sophisticated or understanding of the world and particularly of the United States than Zarif.

[00:40:19] And I think this creates a conundrum. It’s somewhat of a double-edged sword for the United States and

particularly for Israel because on one hand, Iran is now easier to engage, but on the other hand, it’s going to be more difficult to isolate. The person I would argue who deserves most credit for this robust international sanctions regime is Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. And, you know, now that he’s gone, it’s going to be difficult to maintain this robust international coalition, especially, you know, as Andrew was arguing, the fraying ties between Washington and Moscow as well. So I’ll stop there.

MR. MUASHER: Thank you so much, Karim. That’s very insightful. So you’ve just heard a rich variety of views from experts following the different perspectives regarding this crisis.

I’m not going to monopolize this conversation, so let me go straight to the question-and-answer session. We have a lot of people. Again, if you can identify yourself, and we’ll take three or four questions at a time.

Sir. [00:41:29] Q: (Name inaudible.) I’m a consultant for the World Bank. However far away it may be and however

hypothetical, can one start to imagine what a political settlement in Syria – (audio interference) – one day look like? To my uninformed thinking, (words ?) like cantons – (inaudible) – some kind of system which give the different communities a good deal of autonomy over their own affairs, but imagining how forces would be controlled at local and national levels is well beyond, (I think ?).

MR. MUASHER: Yes, sir. Q: Mohamed Younis from the Gallup Organization. I just want to get the view of some of the panelists on the

realistic nature of pursuing decommissioning a WMD program in the middle of a civil war. How realistic is that to actually happen or succeed to some degree? And if it doesn’t succeed, what would the U.S.’ position and others sort of – what would be their next move at that point?

MR. MUASHER: Yes, Mona. Q: Mona Yacoubian from the Stimson Center. This question is for both Andrew and Karim. And I’d be curious

as to your views on the issue of chemical weapons use and how that may or may not have informed, Andrew, in your case, Russia’s position, potential shift. And Karim, in your case, there is this speculation that Iran’s abhorrence of chemical weapons use because of its own experience in the Iran-Iraq war may in fact shape its views on what to do with Syria. Thanks.

[00:43:27] MR. MUASHER: Yes, sir, in the back. Q: Good morning. My name is Mazhar Saman (ph). My question is to Mr. Paul Salem. Yesterday Mr. Ali Haidar,

who is the minister of national reconciliation in Syria, claimed that the agreement between the U.S. and Russia is a great victory for Syria. Is that the sense exist in the region as you sense it? Thank you.

MR. MUASHER: Ambassador al-Kidwa, do you want to start with what a political settlement might look like, since

you worked on it and have been working on it for quite some time? MR. AL-KIDWA: Well, of course, it’s a very difficult question to answer. However, let me – let me be – if I heard

the question correctly, there was a reference or subquestion about the possibilities of federalism or cantons or (anything ?) of that sort. If (it ?) was part of the question as I heard it, then – (audio interference) – would be that it’s very difficult to achieve something like that through a political solution. We might end up with – (audio interference) – of it as it did exist in the past. We – and that would mean maybe at some point informal cantons, separate regions, separate areas – (audio interference) – state of war among each other or maybe in a bit more peaceful arrangement or relationship. That might be – that might be the case. It might happen.

[00:45:22] However, for the political – (audio interference) – itself to – (audio interference) – orderly fashion through

agreement under the (parliament ?) to this kind of decentralized system – frankly, I have my doubt about that. Now, one has to take into consideration the Kurds – the Kurdish claim – insistence on some kind of special

arrangements, maybe autonomy, maybe a little bit more or a little bit less. That has – (audio interference) – but this is a special case. I don’t think that we can (totally ?) apply the same on other communities or other possible regions.

The political solution in general will, as I indicate in my introduction – I believe – (audio interference) – from the

Geneva communiqué, with all its ambiguous nature. The crux of the matter is the political transition, and central to this is the formation of a government, an agreed-upon government with full – (inaudible) – powers that is all powers that the state – that they – (audio interference) – has.

This was – as far as the partners who participated in first Geneva were able to agree upon when it come to the

status of President Bashar al-Assad. This means that the president is not going to keep enjoying any powers because of the fact that all powers will go to this transitional governing body, the transitional government that would be reached by mutual – by mutual (understanding ?).

[00:47:20] The overall idea is to keep the institutions of the state in return for a complete and comprehensive political change

leading to a true democratic Syria that has a place for all its citizens with equal – with equal rights for everybody. It’s very difficult to achieve. I understand that. But I think that this political framework is the only possible – realistically possible framework that – (audio interference) – regional and international can agree upon. Thank you.

MR. MUASHER: Paul?

MR. SALEM: Yes, I mean, I would certainly agree with what Ambassador al-Kidwa has said. But my perspective is

not so much to focus on the – (audio interference) – or eventual resolution that might happen, but more on, you know, the reality that might be the case for many years to come. I mean, as I said in a meeting in D.C. a few months ago, I mean, Geneva II is great, but perhaps we’ll need a Geneva (VI ?), a (Geneva VII ?) to finally reach the end of this conflict.

[00:48:38] Unfortunately, I really see no serious (willingness ?) neither among the regime nor among the opposition factions in

the positions they (currently ?) hold, particularly after all this intense violence has taken place. I would wish for a resolution soon, but I think it’s in terms of many – (audio interference) – rather than months.

What – and a focus (that has to ?) be part of international and regional attention is more on conflict de-escalation,

on management, focus on (cease-fires ?), focus on humanitarian relief, to figure out how 23 million Syrians are going to live through a situation which will remain in crisis without resolution probably for many years to come. That, in my mind, should be one of the major focuses of Geneva II and certainly is something that perhaps we can have some successes on even if we don’t reach a (settlement ?).

At the end of the day, Syria certainly will have to be a – you know, if there ever is agreement years down the road, it

will certainly have to be somewhat decentralized, have to be power sharing with different arrangements. But that really takes leaders that are willing to do it. That means leaders that are exhausted enough make major compromises, leaders that have enough of a power base to commit, a power base – oppositions that are unified – (inaudible) – their base with them. None of those conditions, to my mind, are present today.

On the other question, since I have the floor, that was raised by Mr. Saman (sp) as to is the regime in Syria

projecting this as a victory – yes, in terms of propaganda, not surprisingly. You know, pretty much everything they try to paint as a victory. And so does Hezbollah. But – and the perception in the region is that Syria and Russia have cleverly avoided a major blow and have entangled the U.S. in a long process, through which it’s probably going to – (inaudible) – again in the near term so that – (inaudible).

It’s also not lost on people that Syria had to give up something quite significant. And thus Syria is, yes, weaker

today than it was a month ago, but not at all as weak as it would have been had the U.S. gone ahead and – (inaudible). [00:51:07] MR. MUASHER: Karim. MR. SADJADPOUR: Three points. About the prospects for a political solution, with – at least with regards to

Iran, former senior Iranian official, a very close aide to Rouhani said to me not long ago that we need to, quote, unquote,

“find a Syrian Karzai” which would be, you know, essentially someone who belongs to the Sunni demographic majority and is palatable to various international actors, including the United States and Iran.

I would just say two things. One, the Karzai model hasn’t exactly worked out fantastically in Afghanistan. And

second, I just can’t imagine a scenario whereby a Sunni Arab would succeed Assad in Syria and want to maintain an alliance with Iran and continue to allow Iran to use Syrian territory to arm and finance Hezbollah. I don’t see that within the realm of possibilities. And again, that’s why this conflict has proven to be so intractable.

[00:52:25] There was a question – a very good question about the prospects for decommissioning chemical weapons in civil

war. I have no expertise on this, but I would just point you to a very interesting interview which Angela Kane, who’s the head of U.N.’s disarmament, did with National Public Radio yesterday. And she said, essentially, that’s never been done before. There’s no precedent of that happening. So it’s something which is going to be incredibly difficult. She didn’t say impossible, but it’s a very tall order.

And then last, on the issue of chemical weapons and how Iran may or has responded to this given that they

themselves suffered a chemical weapons attack from Saddam Hussein. I would argue that the way they’ve morally reconciled this is to blame the rebels for the chemical attack. There was only one data point – only one suggestion from former President Rafsanjani speaking off the cuff saying that Syrians had suffered a chemical attack at the hands of their government. Two days later he rescinded that and he claimed that it was actually the rebels and it was outside powers who were responsible for that.

[00:53:43] You know, now that Iran has opened up slightly there are more of these kind of folks around the government who

are allowed to come to D.C. One was – is actually in town right now, someone very close to Rouhani. Said it’s the belief of not only kind of the Revolutionary Guards but also even the more moderate Rouhani factions that it was the rebels who used chemical weapons not the regime, which is essentially, if I’m not mistaken, Andrew, the Russian position as well. So I think that’s how they’ve managed to morally reconcile that fact.

MR. MUASHER: Andrew. MR. WEISS: So back to Ms. Alda’s (sp) question about the – what role did the possible use by the regime of

chemical weapons have in catalyzing Russian behavior, I’d say that – you know, first and foremost everyone’s focused on the question of why is Russia being more Syrian than Syrians and somehow, you know, suggesting that all this can be traced back to the rebels?

I think we have to remember that what the Russians have been about here is forestalling U.S. military action and avoiding creating any juridical basis in the U.N. Security Council or elsewhere that would give the U.S. and others license to act militarily. That creates, I think, an intellectual trap for the Russians where they can’t come out and now change their position that, oh , I guess you’re right; the regime was responsible. And we see in the text of the Kerry-Lavrov agreement from this weekend no ability of the Russians to ascribe responsibility for the attack to the regime, and I think that’s going to be a big stumbling block in New York as people hammer out the resolution.

At the same time, the Russians do, as a former superpower, feel a sense of responsibility when it comes to enforcing

proliferation norms, and I think it’s really an underexplored element of what happened in the past 10 days to look at the kind of dialogue that the U.S. and Russians have been conducting in secret. That began back in Spring of 2012; I think the kickoff was a visit by then national security staff senior director and special assistant to the president, Gary Seymour, to start a dialogue with the Russians about CW contingencies. Kerry has alluded to these secret discussions in a couple of instances in public, but I think it’s a good thing to remember the channels were going somewhat actively. I wouldn’t overstate their effectiveness, given how the Russians view sharing sensitive information and given the Russian reluctance that would have been a cudgel for the U.S. to put pressure on Assad over the past 18 months.

[00:56:19] But if you look even in the text of the agreement – I think it’s in Annex B of the agreement, there’s a reference to

this very unusual term: a universal matrix that was developed by U.S.-Russian experts on Syria’s CW arsenal. So again, there’s been a – there’s been a platform, and I think Kerry was very creative in trying to tap into this basis of work. Right now, you know, will we see that level of trust and cooperation help us, in the middle of a war zone, to develop a workable plan?

I think much of the burden is going to fall on the United States and on the Western powers to do – you know, do

the hard work and to build the capability to implement what is a very ambitious timeline for destruction of the Syrian arsenal. And, you know, I think this is going to be a process that is going to be so heavily fraught, so in-the-spotlight, so subject to reversals and, sort of, “Perils of Pauline” dynamics that I think it’s going to be – it’s going to be a very painful and halting process to watch. And, you know, anyone who watched what happened after the Gulf War in terms of how Saddam Hussein cheated and retreated and blocked and hampered the role of the inspectors, you know, shouldn’t be naïve about Assad’s strategy here, which is going to be extremely confrontational and non-cooperative.

So, you know, it comes back to my original point: we need to test how much influence Russia actually has over

Assad. My sense is it’s limited, and we should be prepared for this process to be filled with lots of heartbreak and lots of – lots of limited and halting steps.

MR. MUASHER: OK. Second one, please. [00:58:00]

Q: Hi. I haven’t heard anybody say anything about Israel yet. And I know Netanyahu is supposed to be coming

September 30th here, and what kind of influence is he going to have on this? MR. MUASHER: OK. Yes. Rami in the back. [00:58:20] Q: Thank you. My name is Rami Al-Kharabsheh from the Embassy of Jordan. I have a couple of questions

regarding the regional impact of the Syrian crisis. First one is, what kind of scenarios are we to expect with the different scenarios on the table for treating the Syrian situation regarding the refugees? If a certain scenario is adopted regarding treating the Syrian issue, what is the impact on the Syrian refugees for the near future and the far future?

The second question is about – we have a very important point (discussing ?) the Russian and the Iranian influence

on this issue, but how do you view the Russian-Iranian interaction in this field and the priorities of the two parties? How do they interact and where do they cross? Thank you?

MR. MUASHER: Yes. Please. The woman here please. Q: Hi. Martha Wexler from NPR. I just wanted to follow up with Mr. Weiss on the Russian insistence, again, this

morning, that it was the rebels who carried out this chemical weapons attack, and how big an obstacle that will be for working out a resolution. I mean, it’s looking like it could be really a stumbling block here.

[00:59:38] MR. MUASHER: Yeah. One more. Yes. Q: Jesse Thomas (sp), currently unaffiliated. This is also for Mr. Weiss. I was intrigued by Mr. Putin’s op-ed in the

New York Times last week. I just wanted to hear your opinion on the unprecedented method of the EU’s – also the content he had in the op-ed. Do you think that this shows a political desperation in Russia or maybe confidence in their views? I just want to hear your opinion.

MR. MUASHER: OK. Who wants to take the first shot? (Cross talk.) MR. WEISS: OK, OK. So on the Russian-Iranian interaction, I think there’s a really interesting question about

what kind of division of labor was established and how it was established. I don’t think any of this was going to be public, but you know, as anybody who read Monday’s Wall Street Journal front page article about the extent of Iranian training of

Shia militiamen in this camp outside of Tehran and the footage that came out also earlier this week showing Iranian military personnel or intelligence personnel engaged in leading troops into battle.

[01:00:51] You know, clearly the Iranians played the – and Hezbollah played the lion’s share – have formed the lion’s share of

putting boots on the grounds and helping turn the tide militarily. At the same time, Russia seems to have played the role, and an increasing spotlight folks may not have focused on is the letter that I think it’s three or four Senators published on Friday – Kelly Ayotte, Ralph Blumenthal – I can’t remember who the other two were – so it’s three Republicans and one Democrat – about Russian apparent financial support for the regime. And so Russia seems to have provided a kind of conduit for the Syrian Central Bank and others to have access to the international financial system. I wouldn’t overstate the significance of this given that there aren’t international sanctions in place against the regime, but it’s provided a bit of an escape route from the EU and U.S. unilateral sanctions packages, and I think, you know, it would be very interesting to see how Congress puts pressure on the administration to try to sanction some of the Russian banks, which often are very politically connected and very important state-owned banks to do more – the administration, I think, is going to have a very tough time fending off those requests.

On the question about assigning blame and the debate in the Security Council, I think we’re going to end up, you

know, basically back where we were in the Geneva agreement, where the administration has to fudge if it wants – if it wants Russian approval for a new resolution that codifies the Geneva agreement, and it will have to basically accede to the view that use happened, but without assigning blame, because again, there’s no independent and impartial document that the Security Council representatives can point to – the report that came out this week doesn’t actually finger the regime, and so I think it’ll be very hard for anyone to take it on the U.S. say-so, least of all the Russians. So I think we’re basically stuck on a – in a formulation which was hammered out in Geneva. I don’t – I can’t see the Russians going beyond that.

[01:02:47] And then, on the op-ed, I think, you know, the Russian view, which was delivered, I’d say, with a tin ear in terms of

the political sensitivities here – and also, I’d say, frankly, in a way that really missed the opportunity – at a time when the world really wanted to hear what Putin thought, you know, he basically tried to trash the United States, talked about U.S. exceptionalism – all these things that hit a nerve here – you know, the Russians, I think, are relishing their role in the spotlight but aren’t realizing, again, just how bad the image problem is. And they missed an opportunity, and this is the classic Churchill formulation of how the Russians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity – but here was this chance to really show that Putin is a peacemaker, and Putin, you know, sees a bigger unifying purpose here, but instead, it descended into a lot of finger-pointing and trash-talking.

I don’t think there’s anything unprecedented. You know, American presidents have used similar op-eds to go over the heads of the Russian interlocutors to reach a mass audience in Russia; Putin himself has done that in the United States as well. So – but again, what was, you know, amazing to me is, here was this amazing platform and moment for Putin to

really shine and to show that, you know, Russia wants some, you know, sort of more, you know, desirable world in which, you know, there are all these things that various people from various political – parts of – from various parts of the political spectrum could all sign onto, and he just wasn’t able to execute that.

[01:04:04] MR. MUASHER: Ambassador Al-Kidwa, you’ve been involved in negotiations with Israel, and we have not talked

about the Israeli angle. What, in your view, would that be? How does Netanyahu look at the Syrian crisis? Is it aiding or impeding, you know, Israel’s position?

And also, to Paul, you know, you’re the recipient of one of the largest number of refugees that have come out of

the Syrian crisis – your country. I mean, very important question: Is the refugee situation sustainable, and if the war goes on, you know, what are countries like Lebanon and Jordan to do with this very large number of refugees? So maybe we start with Nasser.

[01:04:52] MR. AL-KIDWA: All right, I was hoping to skip this one, but anyway. (Laughter.) No – I MR. MUASHER: That’s why you have the moderator here to – (laughter) – MR. AL-KIDWA: No, I believe that (Laughter.) MR. ALKIDWA: No, I believe that – – (audio break) – would feel satisfied with the actual accomplishment of the

destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons and thus would (be satisfied ?) with the (implementation ?) of framework agreement and seeing the results in this regard. That would be a very important milestone that – of the balance of power, if you wish, or power of (horror?) or whatever you want to call it.

[01:05:40] However, at the same time, I feel that the Israelis would want to make sure that this not going have an impact on

potential military strike against Iran if – (audio break) – at a later – at a later – (audio break) – I of course took note of what Karim said and I think he was right in terms of no (impact ?) on the Iranian position itself, but this is maybe not the only point. (There’s another ?) point, which – what kind of impact this – all this might have on the American decisions in the context of – to do later on with – (audio break) – this kind of maybe even ambivalent feeling (and ambivalent ?) position that are being expressed by different Israeli – by different Israeli officials.

(On the issue ?) of the cooperation with – (inaudible) – I just simply would say that yes, that – (audio break) – opinion there is very close – (audio break) – even coordination of position in terms of – (audio break) – (the less ?) I also believe that national interest and strategies are not – are not the same, of course – (audio break) – sometimes in an important way. We have seen the manifestation of that in terms of the Russian (idea ?) and the framework agreement with the United States on the chemical – (audio break) – I don’t think that the Iranians necessarily are very happy with the – with the whole thing.

[01:07:31] On the issue of the Russian (insistence ?) on who’s to blame, actually I don’t find this kind of discussion – (audio

break) – on the perpetrator of the (chemical attack ?) – (audio break) – useful at this – at this stage. And I also agree with the point of view that – (audio break) – we will – we will – we will witness the implementation of the framework agreement and the – (audio break) – Security Council resolution would reflect that framework agreement.

Thank you. MR. MUASHER: Paul?

MR. SALEM: Yeah. Well, the refugee issue obviously is a very – (audio break) – one for countries in the region,

particularly Lebanon and Jordan, also the Kurdish region in Iraq, and less so in Turkey and Iraq proper. The numbers are huge. Already 2 million Syrians have already left Syria, many hundreds and thousands more

expected to leave in the years – in the months to come. (Inaudible) – one-quarter of the population of Lebanon is now Syrians, either refugees – official refugees or

6(00,000), 700,000 Syrians who are in the country, not registered refugees. The risks are enormous – (audio break) – already burden on the economy – on the infrastructure both in Lebanon

and Jordan – is an enormous burden to keep up with the needs of this – of this population. The international community and the regional community, yes, has provided support – (audio break) – certainly not to the level that is needed. The rich Gulf countries certainly have not provided the aid that they could have provided to address this issue.

In terms of scenarios, I mean, most people that I talk to here in the region really do not at all expect (a resolution ?)

of the Syrian crisis any time soon. And hence, you know, the options that they look at – either that the current numbers will stay or they will get much larger. Those are sort of the two realistic scenarios.

[01:09:39]

That’s why, I mean, I mention the urgent need to de-escalate the Syrian conflict; that it’s – if it’s not going to be resolved, there are ways to de-escalate it – (audio break) – to allow people to go back to – (audio break) – villages in various parts of Syria, (have ?) their homes rebuilt, their lives rebuilt, local economies, even if the country remains divided – (audio break) – without an overall resolution.

The Lebanese civil war – (audio break) – it took – (audio break) – years to come to an end, but for most of those

years – (audio break) – fairly de-escalated. People went about their lives. The local economies adjusted. There was not a (massive ?) refugee outflow from the country.

[01:10:22] This has not yet happened – (audio break) – and I don’t see any – (audio break) – regional emphasis on de-

escalation. It’s – (audio break) – will bomb them or will try resolve it. Neither the bombing is going to resolve it – (audio break) – attempt at getting Assad to sit down with Jabhat al-Nusra and the Free Syrian Army tomorrow – (audio break) – resolution. In the meantime – (audio break) – dead, 9 million, 10 million displaced. This is not a tolerable – (audio break).

The risk to Lebanon – (audio break) – particular is very high. Jordan has more of a central government. It – (audio

break) – establish camps where – (audio break) – can keep more of an eye on things. Lebanon has not established any camps. The Syrian refugees – 700,000 registered refugees are in every town and village – (audio break). So far nobody from the regional players has chosen to mobilize or – (audio break) – but if any player anywhere, including – (audio break) – to seriously take the fight Hezbollah in Lebanon and to use these – some of these young men, Lebanon certainly would probably not be able to handle that and perhaps implode. I think the risks are very high. Attention to de-escalation must be part of the international approach.

MR. MUASHER: OK. Any of you like to – [01:11:43] MR. SALEM: Well, I’ll just set – a couple quick things. I think Nasser’s point about Israel in response to your

question was – it was a really important one; that for Israel, I think, you know, which is constantly focused on Iran and Iran’s nuclear ambitions, what’s been most significant about the last several weeks if they’ve – they’ve seen the U.S. reluctant to take military action, and you know, what impact this has on their thinking about the fact that they may have to – they may be on their own with regards to Iran’s nuclear ambitions is, to me, yet unclear. But I think that’s certainly something which has quite frankly upset them, because they feel like, you know, they can’t – they are not confident that if faced with a binary choice, which – I don’t think we’ll actually get to that binary choice, either, you know, Iran acquiring a bomb or Iran being bombed, but I think Israel is sensing that the U.S. is going to be reluctant to act.

But it does show how convoluted the Middle East is when, you know, Israel’s two key adversaries, Iran and Hezbollah – you know, you would think that if Assad falls, if that’s bad for Iran and it’s bad for Hezbollah, then it’s good for Israel. But they seem to be, you know, hedging their bets whether or not that’s good for them.

And I’d just say one thing about the Russia-Iran relationship, which, I would argue, is one of the most anomalous

relationships in international affairs today, because it’s again not based on a natural alliance between two countries. It’s basically based – it’s premised on this mutual competition and in some cases contempt they have vis-à-vis the United States.

[01:13:36] Henry Kissinger once said about U.S.-Iran relations – he said there are few nations in the world with whom the

United States has more common interests and less reason to quarrel than Iran. From Iran’s perspective, I would turn that quote on its head with regards to Russia. There are few nations in the world with whom Iran has less common interests and more reason to quarrel than Russia. Russia’s probably the most hated country in Iran at a popular level. But I think what’s sustaining their friendship or their alliance at the moment, again, is this – is this mutual competition and, in the case of Iran, perhaps, contempt for America.

But it’s – we’re going to look back on this, you know, decades from now and say that this was really an aberration.

It wasn’t a natural alliance. [01:14:24] MR. MUASHER: All right. Let’s take one last round. Please. Q: Thank you. Rebecca deGuzman, U.S. Special Operations Command. A question came up about Israel. Let’s

focus on Israel for a moment. How about Turkey? Given the importance of the panel has placed on regional and international actors, how – what is the U.S. – is it clear what the U.S. would like to see from Turkey and what will – what will shape the policy there?

MR. MUASHER: OK. Jaysla (ph)? Q: Hi. My question is directed at Paul. And could you – my question is, what’s the actual situation on the ground

in Syria, the balance of power between the government and rebel forces, and as well as within the rebel forces, the balance of power between the – (inaudible) – force and – (inaudible) – forces. Thank you.

MODERATOR: One more over there. Q: Hi. Anne Halle of Middle East and North Africa Consultants Association. My question is for anyone,

regarding the Arab League, and what should the role be in this crisis and what has it been so far?

MR. MUASHER: OK. Yes, sir. Q: Ryan McCann (sp). I just wanted to know, what sources of information are folks using to gauge the evolving

attitude of Syrian citizens on the ground? MR. MUASHER: OK, we’ll start with Paul. MR. SALEM: Well, the situation in Syria I will try to summarize as follows: The regime – (audio break) – the

capital – (audio break) – and the west of the country largely. The opposition forces hold the north and the east and parts of the southwest – (audio break) – in terms of geography and more or less in terms of population. The capital itself is contested, so there are neighborhoods in the capital where obviously the regime is mostly dominant, but neighborhoods which are completely controlled by various rebel forces.

[01:17:03] In rebel – in the rebel-held areas it’s very – there are obviously almost a thousand different – (audio break) – and

militias of different sizes. Roughly it’s about half and half in terms of radical jihadist groups, which have become very significant and hold a number of towns and regions in Northeastern Syria, and other groups loosely under the umbrella of the more moderate, less radical, and in some cases – (audio break) – internationalist, Free Syrian Army.

So hence there is a – (audio break) – geographic division of course, and then there’s the – sorry – the obviously

Kurdish areas in Qamishli and the northeast, which are held by Kurdish groups supported by – (audio break) – Kurdish groups in the KRG in Northern Iraq. So that’s sort of that.

The rebel forces, as I said, are not at all one group, unlike the regime where, you know, the regime is the regime and

its areas. There’s state institutions and – (audio break). The rebel-held areas are very, very chaotic, very insecure, both – (audio break) – repressive and erratic behavior by some jihadi groups who are imposing sort of Taliban-style Shariah rule on the inhabitants, which are rather aghast at this form of – of radical Islam that it was never part of their life; or sort of mafia-style militia behavior by the Free Syrian Army groups who, you know, use their power – abuse their power in various ways. In – (audio break) – areas are pounded by – (audio break) – and artillery, so they’re also not secure in terms of being rebel-held areas.

[01:19:01] The balance – there is, in a sense – (audio break) – only in the rough sense that the regime no longer can realistically

imagine winning. In other words – (audio break) – I think is pretty much out of the question, even in their mind. And at the time being, the rebels really have no realistic expectation of winning anytime soon. Particularly there now is a deep split between the jihadists and the – (audio break) – jihadi forces.

So I would say that’s roughly the situation. The jihadis get – (audio break) – and arms from private networks in the

Gulf and the Islamic world. The Free Syrian Army hoped and expected to get a lot of support from the region and from the West, and it really has not to any significant degree. And I would say it’s the weakest group today inside Syria.

Syrian citizens, that’s a very good question and it is – there is no, you know, reliable way to really gauge it.

Obviously we all try to do our best, following all kinds of sources. Some if it is social media. Some of it is reaching as many people as we can. But I would summarize the situation that – you know, if anything, the overwhelming feeling of Syrian citizens now is despair rather than, you know – (audio break) – support the opposition and they will win and we will have a better Syria – (audio break) – the regime. They will win and we will have better Syria.

[01:20:42] There is sinking feeling among most Syrians I talked to – (audio break) – pro-regime, pro-opposition, or may have –

(audio break) – that effectively there is no winner to this fight, and deep, deep despair that they have – they have effectively lost Syria as they knew it, as a society, as an economy, as a state, and they realize there is no quick end in sight.

If I could make a comment about the Arab League, because we didn’t mention Egypt in all of this. It’s quite clear

that the Gulf Cooperation Council was very influential, and I think that’s one of the – (audio break). I think it is very – (audio break) – to the Assad regime. You know – (inaudible) – does it where government in Egypt – military government – (audio break) – of that opinion is not in favor of – not in favor of a U.S. strike, not in favor of weakening the Assad regime so much that Islamists will gain the upper hand.

So you find – (audio break) – in the Arab League sort of put the brakes on a decision that might have come out in

support for a strike at the end of the day did not – (audio break) – like the case of Libya. MR. MUASHER: Ambassador alKidwa, perhaps you would like to comment on the Arab League issue. [01:22:04] MR. ALKIDWA: Yes, cautiously nevertheless. But before that I just want very quickly to say that with regard to

the discussion of finding political solutions versus Syria’s de-escalation with the situation as a necessary period before you will reach a political settlement – (audio break) – I think it would be extremely difficult to achieve serious de-escalation of the situation separate from Syria’s political solution or at least the first few steps in this regard.

And this is, for several reasons, the most important, which is what Paul mentioned about the strength and the

presence of the extremists and jihadists and all kinds of things. We are talking about thousands of people. This is only one of the reasons why, in my opinion, it would be – it would be very difficult. But, you know, this is only a point of view and it’s obviously – there is – it doesn’t enjoy – doesn’t enjoy consensus.

With regard to the Arab – with regard to the Arab League, the league actually started – started very well with this –

with this conflict. It tried to do something with the beginning of the conflict. It took initiatives. It even – (audio break) – Syria with the aim of helping to achieve a ceasefire. It connected with the United Nations in the form of joint – (audio break) – Kofi Annan, joint special envoy, and then later on Lakhdar Brahimi, and it kept following very closely.

[01:24:11] At some point maybe there was over-enthusiasm and certain steps were taken, including the statement of the

representative of the government, of the regime, and out of particular preference here – political preference but only to maintain the necessary dialogue and channel – (audio break) – this started a situation leading to the Arab League being considered as a – clearly a party to the conflict.

Recently there were attempts to maybe inject some balance in the – (audio break) – including statements taken or

made by the secretary general of the Arab League, welcoming Russian-American efforts, including welcoming most recent framework agreement between the two on the chemical weapons. Obviously everybody is happy. Not all members of the league are happy with the statements, but I personally think that this is the – this is the right approach.

MR. MUASHER: Thank you. Karim, perhaps you would like to comment on Turkey. MR. SADJADPOUR: Sure. I would argue that both within Syria and the broader Middle East there’s kind of three competing paradigms for

power and influence in the region. You have resistance Islam, led by Iran. You have sectarian Sunni Islam, led by Saudi Arabia. And you have what I would describe as modern Islam, led by turkey. And, you know, these kind of battles are taking place throughout the region, but in particular I think you see these trends in Syria.

[01:26:10] So, you know, I know that Erdogan’s Turkey is not a perfect place, but from the vantage point of the United States

I don’t think we have a better friend or ally in Syria than Turkey. They’ve been accused of acquiescing or even abetting various jihadist forces, but I think the bottom line is that if we, in the next, you know, four or five years, had the equivalent of a Syrian Erdogan come to power, that would be the best-case scenario.

I mean, I was reading an interview with someone from Hamas a few days ago, who was talking about how the

rebels in Syria were just too radical and intolerant. This was, you know, someone from Hamas talking about the Syrian rebels. So I think that, you know, from my vantage point, a greater Turkish role in Syria, a greater Turkish influence in

Syria is something that is positive. And we have to realistic about what is achievable in Syria and who are the forces we have to work with.

MR. MUASHER: Last words, Andrew. No words? MR. WEISS: No words. MR. MUASHER: All right. Well, we are right on time. So thank you very much. Please join me in thanking the

panel for an excellent discussion. (Applause.) MR. ALKIDWA: Thank you. MR. MUASHER: Ambassador alKidwa, Paul, thank you very much for joining us. MR. SALEM: Thank you much. Bye-bye. (END)