Raising Global Climate Ambition

8/11/2019 Raising Global Climate Ambition

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Raising Global Climate Ambition9 Pragmatic Steps for World Leaders

to Deliver the Low-Carbon Economy

By Nigel Purvis September 2014


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Raising GlobalClimate Ambition9 Pragmatic Steps for World Leaders

to Deliver the Low-Carbon Economy

By Nigel Purvis September 2014


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1 Introduction and summary

3 A new political moment

9 Time for leadership

11 A blueprint of policy recommendations for leaders

31 Conclusion

33 Endnotes

Contents


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Introduction and summary | www.americanprogress.

Introduction and summary

In 2015, he inernaional communiy will se a new rajecory or global climae

cooperaion over he nex decade. Presidens and prime minisers will mee

several imes in he coming monhs a summis in New York, Paris, and elsewhere

o share heir respecive domesic climae acion plans and shape a new global cli-

mae agreemen. Science dicaes ha naions pursue urgen and ambiious acion.

However, he poliics o climae acion, boh a home and abroad, remain chal-

lenging or many world leaders. In an effor o raise climae ambiionor howhard naions are working o promoe climae soluionshis repor idenifies nine

pragmaic and poliically easible measures ha are available o world leaders o

creae a low-carbon economy.

Forunaely, jus a handul o reasonable emissions-miigaion acions and poli-

cies implemened inernaionally beween now and 2030 would pu he world

ully on a pah oward climae proecion using exising echnologies and wihou

meaningully reducing economic growh. Success in adoping hese policies will

depend primarily on domesic poliics, bu sensible inernaional cooperaion has

an imporan role o play oo. Because inernaional cooperaion akes ime and

builds incremenally, naions mus char a new course wihou delay. o sar mov-

ing in he righ direcion a he global level, world leaders should ake he ollow-

ing pragmaic seps by he end o 2015:

1. Se a specific year by which global greenhouse gas emissions will sar o decline.

2. Rerame climae acion as essenial or near-erm prosperiy, including by

building climae-relaed arges ino new global developmen goals or 2030.

3. Announce inernaionally ambiious, uncondiional, and unilaeral domesic

emissions-reducion goals or 2025 or 2030.4. Commi o measurable goals or sharedinernaional emissions cus and

climae financing.

5. Value carbon in all major economies by 2020.


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2 Center for American Progress | Raising Global Climate Ambition

6. Commi o global goals or ores proecion and susainable ores managemen,

including eliminaing deoresaion rom global commodiy rade by 2020.

7. Amend he Monreal Proocol o phase down he producion o super-polluing

hydrofluorocarbons, or HFCs.

8. Se concree, ambiious energy-efficiency goals hrough 2030 or power plans,

vehicles, buildings, and appliances.9. Conclude a srong new global climae agreemen by he end o 2015.

Te remainder o his repor explains he imporance and poliical easibiliy o

hese nine recommendaions.


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A new political moment | www.americanprogress.

A new political moment

Climae change has reurned o he inernaional sage afer several years in he

poliical wilderness, having been pushed ou o he limeligh mainly by he pro-

longed global financial crisis and weak employmen in he developed world. Over

he nex 18 monhs, world leaders will have numerous high-profile opporuniies

o shape climae acion and o deermine how ambiiously he world responds.

Opportunities for global leadership

World leaders will gaher in New York Ciy on Sepember 23 or a rare climae

summi organized by U.N. Secreary-General Ban Ki-moon. Hundreds o presi-

dens and prime minisers are expeced o atend. Tis high-level U.N. climae

gahering will mark he firs ime since 2009s Copenhagen climae alks

which were only parially successulha world leaders wi ll devoe subsanial

ime o global climae acion.1

More imporanly, many world leaders plan o unveil new domesic climae acion

plans in early 2015 or he period beyond 2020.2aken ogeher, hese naional

plans will deermine he worlds overall climae ambiion hrough 2025 or 2030.

Tey are also likely o be codified in a new global climae agreemen or he pos-

2020 period, which is discussed below. For his reason alone, he nex ew monhs

represen he mos imporan period in climae poliics o dae. By his ime nex

year, he world will have largely chosen a climae rajecory or he nex decade.

While subsequen poliical and scienific developmens may revise ha rajecory

somewha, pas experience suggess ha dramaic deparures rom wha naions

will announce over he nex 18 monhs are unlikely.3Once naions se a course,

ineria will se in. Similar o a peroleum superanker ha akes ages o urn, lead-ers need o pick a direcion now o have an impac in he nex decade.


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Also, naions have agreed o conclude a new global climae agreemen by

December 2015 o replace he conroversial 1997 Kyoo Proocol, which expires

in 2020. Te Kyoo Proocol requires greenhouse gas emissions reducions rom

mos indusrialized naionsbu no he Unied Saes, as he Bush adminisra-

ion rejeced he reay. I also does no require any new emissions-abaemen

acions rom major emerging economies, including Brazil, China, and India.4

Heads o governmen are expeced o play a major role in shaping he new global

climae pac, jus as hey did in crafing he 2009 Copenhagen Accordhe ou-

come o U.N. climae negoiaions in Denmark ha creaed he poliical rame-

work or inernaional climae cooperaion hrough 2020.5

On a parallel poliical rack, world leaders will gaher a he Unied Naions in

Sepember 2015 o finalize a new se o inernaional developmen and povery-

alleviaion goals or 2030. Tese goals could include imporan climae-relaed

quaniaive arges o accelerae and expand energy efficiency, renewable energy,

ores and ocean conservaion, and disaser-risk reducion. Te new 2030 iner-naional developmen goalswhich may come o be known as he Susainable

Developmen Goals, or SDGsare expeced o apply o all naions and o

become he organizing ideas or global economic cooperaion o alleviae global

povery over he nex 15 years.6

Te SDGs will replace he so-called Millennium Developmen Goals, or MDGs,

ha expire in 2015. Te MDGs, launched in 2000, sough o cu global povery

by hal, reduce child moraliy, provide universal primary educaion, and achieve

several oher world-changing oucomes.7While implemenaion o he MDGs has

been uneven, many o he goals, including he overarching povery-reducion aim,

are on rack globally.8Noneheless, i unchecked, climae change risks unraveling

decades o progress agains povery, hunger, and economic insecuriy.9

In beween hese mulilaeral summis, world leaders will have numerous oppor-

uniies o narrow differences on climae change in oher leader-level poliical

orums, including meeings o he G-20; he G-7; he Asia-Pacific Economic

Cooperaion, or APEC; and during ransalanic summis. Tese smaller orums

bring ogeher leaders rom major economies ha represen he majoriy o he

worlds greenhouse gas emissions. For insance, he G-20 counries are respon-sible or approximaely 80 percen o global greenhouse gas emissions.10Focusing

on climae wihin hese mulilaeral leader engagemens can have a remendous

impac and help speed progress on climae change a he global level. Depending


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on economic and securiy condiions a he ime, he 2015 G-20 summi in

urkey could ocus heavily on climae change, as was he case wih he las G-20

meeing beore a major global climae negoiaionhe 2009 G-20 summi in

Pitsburgh, Pennsylvania.11All o hese upcoming mulilaeral meeings are prime

opporuniies or world leaders o ake acion on climae change.

Latest climate science foretells a troubled future

Te reurn o climae change o he op ranks o inernaional poliics ollows on

he heels o he release o several major global scienific assessmens ha have

sharpened our undersanding o he impacs o and soluions o climae change.

We now know ha climae change is absoluely real: Scieniss agree he evidence

is simply unequivocal.12Virually no scienis doubs ha he Earhs amosphere

is warming. Also, our undersanding ha humans are a primary cause o climae

change has grown significanly sronger over he pas five years. Tose acs arenow jus as srong and clear as he evidence ha cigaretes killin scienific erms,

boh have a 95 percen cerainy.13

Moreover, scieniss now agree ha he adverse effecs o climae change are

already being el across he globe, are more severe han previously anicipaed,

and will inensiy grealy in he years ahead. Tis is rue no only a he global

level bu also in rich counries such as he Unied Saes.14From flooding,

droughs, and severe sorms o sea-level rise, ocean acidificaion, and human

migraion, every region and counry is already being affeced and will suffer

more in he years o come.15Te long-erm healh, economic, securiy, and social

impacs o climae change, hough sill somewha difficul o predic wih preci-

sion, are expeced o be major and pervasive.

Tese effecs mean ha climae change is no a radiional environmenal concern;

raher, i is an economic and humaniarian crisis. And i is no jus scieniss who

hold hese views. Te Whie House Council o Economic Advisers warns ha one

addiional degree o global warming could reduce economic growh by abou 1 per-

cen o global gross domesic producor GDPor abou $150 billion.16Boh he

U.S. Deparmen o Deense and he Council on Foreign Relaions describe climaechange as a hrea muliplier ha magnifies exising securiy risks.17U.S. inelligence

agencies consider climae change one o he bigges orces currenly reshaping he

world.18Te World Bank warns ha climae change could reverse all recen gains he

world has made agains povery.19As a resul, climae change will have wide-reaching

implicaions or all aspecs o sociey i we do no ake acion now.


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Average global emperaures have already increased around 0.85 degrees Celsius

rom preindusrial levels, and wihou addiional acion, a urher increase o more

han 2 degrees Celsius appears likely, wih mos o his occurring by 2100.20Te

inernaional communiy has agreed in principle o ake acion o limi global

warming o no more han 2 degrees Celsius, or 3.6 degrees Fahrenhei, by he

end o he cenury.21

Many scieniss believe ha warming beyond his level couldprove dangerous or even caasrophic. However, even his level o warming may

prove dangerous, and more-ambiious global goals seem poliically ineasible.22

Naions are responding individually, bu hey are doing so inadequaely. Alhough

he number o counries ha have come orward wih meaningul naional climae

plans has doubled in he pas decade, he emissions-miigaion measures ha

naions have pledged o daeeven i ully implemenedwould amoun o less

han hal he acion needed o keep he 2 degrees Celsius goal wihin sigh.23In ac,

as a consequence o populaion and economic growh, global emissions are sill ris-

ing more han 20 years afer he world adoped he firs global climae reay.24

FIGURE 1

Global carbon dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel consumption

Sources: Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, "Global Fossil-Fuel CO2 Emissions," available at http://cdiac.ornl.gov/trends/emis/tre_-glob_2010.html# (last accessed July 2014); Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, "Fossil-Fuel CO2 Emissions," available at http://cdiac.or-

nl.gov/trends/emis/meth_reg.html (last accessed July 2014); Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, "Global, Regional, and National

Fossil-Fuel CO2 Emissions," available at http://cdiac.ornl.gov/trends/emis/overview.html (last accessed July 2014).

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

35,000

Great Depression

End of World War II

First oil price shock

Second oil price shock

Dissolution of the Soviet Union

Global Economic Downturn

1890

1900

1910

1920

1940

1950

1960

2000

1930

1970

1980

1990

2010


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While ully eliminaing climae polluion will ake many decades, we mus ac

urgenly. Te laes research indicaes ha global climae polluion mus peak and

begin o decline very soonperhaps around 2025o sand a likely chance o

meeing he global goal o limiing warming o 2 degrees Celsius.25

Public policy matters

From one perspecive, limiing climae change is a echnological problem. We

need smarer, cheaper, and beter energy echnologies and land-use pracices o

replace odays high-carbon uels, inrasrucure, power plans, acories, buildings,

and arms. However, innovaion usually responds o demands rom governmen,

business, or consumers. Consequenly, supporive public policy is needed o help

spur he echnological advances ha will solve climae change problems.

From anoher perspecive, climae change is primarily a financial challenge.Currenly, he world spends abou $1 billion per daya oal o $360 billion in

2011on climae-smar invesmens.26Geting on he pahway o limi warming

o 2 degrees Celsius will require more han doubling his annual climae spending

by 2020 and ripling i by 2030.27

Saed his way, he challenge seems dauning, bu hese figures are misleading

in wo ways. Firs, an addiional $360 billion per year o proec he climae

is no a large figure in he conex o he global economy. o mee socieal

demands, humaniy spends roughly $6 rillion on he inrasrucure ha deer-

mines energy consumpionincluding ciies, acories, power plans, build-

ings, and vehicles.28Te global energy bill or oil, elecriciy, and naural gas

amouns o anoher $5 rillion per year. Wih global GDP a abou $60 ril lion,

hese inrasrucure and energy expenses accoun or almos 20 percen o he

global economy.29Each year, he world spends approximaely $3.6 rillion on

agriculure, managed oress, and naural resources, accouning or an addiional

6 percen o he global economy.30In oher words, he sum needed o finance

climae soluions represens less han 1 percen o he global economy and only

a ew percenage poins o he energy and land-use secors ha are mos respon-

sible or climae emissions.


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Second, he oal amoun o invesmen vasly oversaes is own cos. Because

fighing climae change would reduce oher cosshrough enhanced efficiency

and reduced healh impacs, or examplehe ne cos o climae invesmens

o sociey would acually be small or, poenially, even negaiveor pro-growh.

Tis is discussed below.

Abou one-hird o climae financemoney spen o reduce emissions or o

adap o climae change in all counriescomes rom public sources, wih he

remainder coming rom he privae secor.31While hree-quarers o climae

finance says wihin naional borders, he bulk o he remaining one-quarer o

public climae finance ha is spen inernaionally ravels o major emerging

economies hrough a variey o naional, bilaeral, and mulilaeral insiuions,

such as he World Bank, he Asian Developmen Bank, and he Overseas Privae

Invesmen Corporaion.32Boh a home and abroad, governmens are alloca-

ing an increasing share o public money o beter leverage privae invesmen.

Furher increases in public finance are required o mobilize privae invesmena scale, bu governmens ace fiscal limis and are unlikely o close he climae

invesmen gap simply by allocaing more revenue rom heir general reasuries.

However, oher governmen policies ha do no empy governmen coffers

rom echnology and energy-efficiency sandards o carbon markes and axes

are available o help fill he financing gap.

A is core, hereore, climae change is a policy problem, no a resource problem.

Te ask o acceleraing clean energy innovaion and closing he climae finance

gap alls o governmens via an inelligen mix o public spending, environmenal

regulaion, ax incenives, and he oher ools o he policy world. Te world could

ge luckyprivae innovaion could solve he climae crisis wihou srong public

policies. Bu smar governmen policies are a ar more probable pah o success,

paricularly since ime is running ou and success depends on securing a sep

change in climae ambiion now. Wihou public policy drivers, i is unlikely ha

privae finance will be sufficien o adequaely assis developing counries o adap

o he devasaion ha is already being wrough by climae change.


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Time for leadership | www.americanprogress.

Time for leadership

Jus a handul o affordable climae policies implemened widely hrough 2030

would make an enormous difference; hese policies range rom adoping beter

energy-efficiency sandards or vehicles and eliminaing ossil-uel subsidies o

shuting down inefficien coal plans and invesing in renewable energy. Moreover,

naions could underake hese policies using only exising echnologies and wihou

significanly reducing economic growh. Wha governmens need o do o comba

climae change beween now and 2030 is abundanly clear and readily achievable.

We live, however, in a poliical worldone where a chasm ofen exiss beween

wha policymakers should do and wha hey eel hey can do. Ineres-group

poliics, ideology, insiuional barriers, and oher real-world obsacles requenly

ge in he way o good policy, paricularly when i comes o climae change.

Poliically and psychologically, climae change is a nighmarish problem. Te

hrea is invisible, complex, slow moving, inergeneraional, and difficul o

isolae. Success depends on harnessing collecive acion o massively resrucure

virually all aspecs o global economic lie.

In some counries, such as he Unied Saes, climae change hreaens srongly held

belies ha some people hold abou religion, humaniy, and naure, as well as biases

agains governmen regulaion, inernaional organizaions, axes, and consrains

on personal reedom. Te corrosive influence o money in poliics and he abiliy

o special ineress o block changes o he saus quo are also complicaing acors.

Climae acion requires poliically difficul inernaional cooperaion in an age o

srong naionalism, fierce economic compeiion, and weak global insiuions.

Heads o governmen canno sweep away hese poliical, socieal, and insiu-

ional consrains overnigh. While some climae soluions are poliically hardero underake han ohers, none are easy, or naions would have aken hose seps

already. All o he main policy soluions o climae change have he poenial o

creae winners and losers boh wihin and beween naional economies. Well-

financed ineres groups ha srongly oppose climae acion are using all he levers


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o power availableincluding financial conribuions o poliical campaigns and

disinormaion campaignso mainain he saus quo.33Tese are ormidable

obsacles o climae acion. Ye world leaders mus lead, and hey mus do so now.

As ormer U.S. Secreary o Sae Henry Kissinger said, Te ask o a leader is o

ge his [or her] people rom where hey are o where hey have no been.34

Leadership on climae change is mos essenial a he naional and local levels.

Mos o he poenial policy soluions o climae change depend primarily on

domesic implemenaion. As a consequence, leaders need o remain ocused on

delivering domesic acion as heir op climae prioriy. Neverheless, inernaional

cooperaion and coordinaion o climae policies is a useul secondary sraegy.

Inernaional effors can accelerae progress by aligning economic incenives

across counries; ensuring a level playing field or inernaional compeiion;

avoiding inernaional carbon leakage; avoiding he poinless shifing o emis-

sions rom one counry o anoher o evade climae regulaions; and creaing

useul global norms and sandards or oher naions o ollow. Te combinaion oupcoming high-profile, mulilaeral summis and he increasing scienific consen-

sus on climae change make he period o ime beween now and he end o 2015

a key poliical momen or global climae acion.


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A blueprint of policy recommendations for leaders | www.americanprogress.o

A blueprint of policy

recommendations for leaders

aking ino accoun boh poliical limiaions and he primacy o domesic acion,

wha can leaders do inernaionally a his key poliical momen o raise global cli-

mae ambiion hrough 2030? Te answer, perhaps surprisingly, is quie a lo. Nine

challenging bu poliically easible acions ha world leaders can ake ogeher by

he end o 2015 are spelled ou below.

Set a specific year by which globalgreenhouse gas emissions will begin to decline

Despie 25 years o global climae diplomacy, naions have ye o ariculae a

shared vision o how hey hope o miigae carbon emissions in he near erm. Te

inernaional communiy has no agreed on concree, measurable global objecives

o guide acion and creae accounabiliy. Alhough i will no be easy, leaders can

fill his void. o undersand wha is possible a he presen ime, one mus look a

he poliical hisory o he ongoing effor o define global climae goals.

Te inernaional communiy agreed o work ogeher o avoid dangerous anhro-

pogenic climae change in 1992, wihou defining in scienific or economic erms

wha ha phrase mean.35Tis absrac sandard serves as he saring poin or

inernaional effors o comba climae change. For more han a decade, naions

made virually no urher progress. Ten, G-8 leaders agreed in 2009 on a global

goal o reducing global emissions by a leas 50 percen by 2050 and, as par o

his, reducing emissions rom developed naions by 80 percen by ha dae.36

Major emerging economiesparicularly India, China, and Brazilreused o go

along wih hese goals because hose naions eared ha he 2050 emissions goals

would consrain heir economic growh.


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Afer he G-8 ailed o reach a global consensus on miigaion goals or 2050,

he inernaional communiy agreed in 2010 o limi warming o no more han 2

degrees Celsius, or 3.6 degrees Fahrenhei.37Te 2 degrees Celsius arge has many

shorcomings. Firs, scieniss are no sure wha level o emissions would rigger

a more han 2 degrees Celsius rise in global emperaure. Second, he goal leaves

open a wide range o opions or when naions should reduce emissions. Teycould cu emissions seadily or backload reducions in laer decades; boh are heo-

reically possible pahways o saying wihin he 2 degrees Celsius hreshold. As

naions delay, o course, he risk o overshooing 2 degrees Celsius increases, and

he coss o achieving he arge will rise. Tird, and perhaps mos problemaically,

he end-o-cenury 2 degrees Celsius goal provides virually no near-erm poliical

accounabiliy, absen inerim goals. odays world leaders will no be alive in 2100

or even decades beore ha, le alone sill in office and subjec o public pressure.

Te geopoliics associaed wih orging a new near- or medium-erm global

emissions goal remain raugh. Unil now, many, i no mos, major economieshave preerred he flexibiliy and lack o accounabiliy inheren in no having an

agreed-upon global emissions arge. Developing counries, paricularly India,

have insised on a per-capia allocaion o any agreed-upon global carbon budge.38

In conras, developed naions have avored allocaions based on he capaciy o

naions o reduce emissions cos effecively. Tese differences remain oo grea o

bridge a his ime, which is why leaders are unlikely o se an annual emissions goal

or 2050 or a global emissions budge ha covers many years, such as 2020 o 2030.

o agree on eiher o hese would require working ou each counrys share o he

emissions pie, and ha remains oo hard or leaders o grapple wih a his ime.

Insead, leaders should ry or somehing less lofy bu sill helpul. Tey should,

or example, define 2025 as he year when global emissions should peak and begin

o decline, wihou rying o define eiher he oal global emissions in ha year

or he rae o decline aferward. Acceping a volunary, nonbinding global peak

year would require neiher divvying up naional carbon budges nor orging a

global consensus a his ime on how as or or how long emissions in developing

naions should grow. Naions would no even need o decide a wha level global

emissions should peak, giving hem flexibiliy in he near erm. Even so, a peak

year would help inorm uure poliical decisions, provide a modicum o globalpoliical accounabiliy in he years ahead, and send a signal oday o business

abou a growing global commimen o climae acion.

An emissions goalrefers to

annual emissions in a future

year, such as 2050.

In contrast, an emissions

budgetdescribes cumula-

tive emissions over a specific

period, such as between 2020

and 2030.


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Reaching agreemen on a reasonable peak year may prove easier han veeran climae

expers hink. Reporedly, China has already concluded ha is consumpion o coal

will peak as early as 2020,39and in he conex o Chinas emerging five-year eco-

nomic plan, i may be preparing o pick a year when is naional emissions will begin

o decline. Brazils emissions are already declininga leas or nowas a conse-

quence o massive reducions in deoresaion.40

Emissions in he Unied Saes,Europe, and many oher indusrialized naions are also on he decline.41Emissions

reducions in all hese naions would provide headroom or emissions o coninue

growing in poorer developing naions, including India, even afer a new global peak-

emissions year. Te mah works. While some naions are heading in he wrong direc-

ion, enough naions will be heading in he righ direcion. Soon, we will be able o

say ha on he whole, humaniy has urned hings around, albei laer han is ideal.

Capuring his economic realiy in a new global poliical pledge o have global

emissions begin o decline by a specific year would help leaders communicae

his good news o he general public, as well as provide a yardsick or measuringuure progress and holding uure policymakers accounable.

Reframe climate action as essential for near-term prosperity

Mos leaders are good a explaining hings o heir people. Tey creae wha

policy wonks call poliical narraivessraighorward argumens or sories ha

ciizens can undersand and suppor. In many ways, creaing hese narraives may

be he mos imporan hing leaders do. Te prevailing poliical narraive around

climae acion is enirely wrongboh subsanively and poliicallyand leaders

need o use upcoming global gaherings o fix ha problem.

For decades, global climae negoiaions have been dominaed by he idea ha

climae policies and soluions will be painully expensive. Climae negoiaions

were needed o al locae burdens and responsibiliies. Forward-leaning govern-

mens described climae acion as an insurance policy ha would prove a wise

invesmen in he long run. Climae acion will reduce economic growh now,

hey said, bu i will guard agains severe and poenially caasrophic effecs

laer. Scieniss were unable o describe precisely where, how, or when heseeffecs would occur. Sacrifice now, and one day youll be glad you did, prob-

ably was a miserable campaign slogan.


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en years ago, he case or climae acion became clearer, bu he evidence was

sill no overwhelming or nonexpers. Leading economiss demonsraed ha he

coss o inacion would likely exceed he coss o climae acion by a significan

acor.42Progressive poliicians described climae acion as necessary and afford-

able, bu his promise o long-erm gain proved ineffecive a mobilizing wide-

spread suppor in many naions.

oday, afer more han a decade o acual experience wih boh climae policies and

he real effecs o climae change, he economic case or climae acion has become

overwhelming. Simply pu, mos o he hings ha naions, companies, and consum-

ers need o do o conron climae change over he nex 10 o 15 years are in heir

own shor-erm economic sel-ineres. Smar climae policy is smar economic

policy. Many sensible measures o ackle global warming now produce immediae

economic and social dividends; ohers are exremely low cos. Even hrough 2100,

well-designed climae policies would only reduce global economic growh a mere

0.06 percen per year.43As economis Paul Krugman has said, his amouns o arivial rounding error.44I virually decarbonizing he enire global economy by he

end o he cenury coss nex o nohing, i makes sense ha in is early yearswhen

policymakers can harves low-hanging rui, such as improving energy efficiency,

and ocus on he policies ha produce many benefis ouside o climae changecli-

mae acion promoes economic growh and is hus beter han ree.

Te conclusion ha early climae acion hrough 2030 is likely o accelerae

economic growh holds up upon closer examinaion. Energy-efficiency measures

more han pay or hemselves, while ofen improving energy securiy and public

healh. Wind, solar, and oher renewable energy prices have umbled and are he

mos economically sensible choice in many siuaions. Tis is why renewable

energy was responsible or 99 percen o all new energy producion in he Unied

Saes or several monhs in 2013 and 2014.45Germany leads Europe in economic

growh46and, a he same ime, has he mos ambiious clean energy policies.47

Nordic counries reduced ossil-uel emissions by 9 percen beween 1990 and

2011 and increased gross domesic produc by 55 percen over he same period.48

In regions wih cheap naural gas, replacing diry coal-fired power plans increases

profis, cus healh care coss, and saves lives. Even carbon axes and carbon

markes spur innovaion and creae revenue o inves in climae innovaion andadapaion.49Mehane-capure regulaions could cos sociey nex o nohing and

would barely den he profis o major oil and gas companies.50Alernaives o

hydrofluorocarbons are already cos compeiive, and heir prices will decline ur-

her as demand increases.51In shor, sensible climae policy oday is pro-growh: I

promoes susainable developmen here and now, no jus in he long run.


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World leaders need o work ogeher o replace he old climae narraive o sacri-

fice, burden, and uncerainy wih a new narraive o opporuniy and prosperiy.

Leaders will have ample opporuniy o ge his righ in he monhs ahead. 52A

he global level, one place o sar would be in he pos-2015 global ramework

or inernaional developmen, he Susainable Developmen Goals. Te SDGs

are inended o pain a picure o he world we wan in 2030. Since we nowundersand ha climae change and global povery are closely conneced, climae

acionalhough no necessarily labeled as suchmus be included in all aspecs

o he SDGs. Te SDGs should include concree arges o double energy-effi-

ciency improvemens, double vehicle efficiency, double renewable power produc-

ion, end deoresaion, phase down HFCs, and cu in hal deahs and economic

losses rom disasers, coasal weland loss, and ood wase.53Achieving hese goals

would promoe global prosperiy, increase energy securiy, proec he climae,

and help eliminae exreme povery. Increasing he efficiency o coal-fired power

plans, or example, can reduce coss or manuacurers and consumers while also

saving lives by reducing air polluion.54Te climae benefis are imporan buneed no be he primary poliical driver.

No everyhing ha he world needs o do o solve climae change will produce

immediae economic benefis, bu a grea deal o wha is needed by 2030 would,

and world leaders mus communicae ha orceully.

Announce ambitious domestic emissions-

mitigation goals for 2025 or 2030

As explained above, naions have agreed o ariculae inernaionally in 2015

heir conribuions o global climae acion or he period afer 2020. Mos major

economies will announce heir climae arges or plans early in he new year, and

all major economies are expeced o comply by years end. Leaders mus ensure

hese inernaional pledges are as ambiious as possible while remaining realisic

and achievable a home.

Because he inernaional communiy has already concededa he urging o

he Unied Saes, China, India, and oher major economiesha each naionalone mus decide is pos-2020 emissions-miigaion plan raher han negoiae

i inernaionally, here remains litle or world leaders o do collecively on hese

pos-2020 plans oher han give each oher he confidence o ac boldly. Each

leader mus muser he poliical will needed o deend a home he new, srong

naional-level climae measures pledged inernaionally.


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Te European Commission has already proposed o is member saes ha he

European Union reduce emissions by 40 percen by 2030 enirely hrough domesic

acion.55European leaders are expeced o approve his goal soon, poenially afer

some negoiaion over relaed economic policies o saisy coal saes in Easern

Europe, mos noably Poland. Te Obama adminisraion will probably make is

move afer he miderm elecions in November. Is recenly proposed regulaionson exising power plans sugges ha he Obama adminisraion will have a serious

pos-2020 plan o offer he inernaional communiy. China is also working ou he

deails o is pos-2020 plan, which may include domesic policies or carbon axes

and carbon markes. China will likely come orward wih a relaively ambiious mix

o policies in order o avoid becoming he global villain on climae.

Commit to measurable goals for sharedinternational

emissions cuts and climate financing

While many naions are finally saring o abae heir own greenhouse gas

emissions, he inernaional communiy has ye o ge serious abou reducing

emissions a scale hrough inernaional parnerships among and beween govern-

mens. Fixing his problem would make a huge conribuion o increasing climae

ambiion. However, doing so is poliically difficul due o he mismach beween

climae responsibiliy and geography.

Mos o he financial, echnological, and governance capaciy o reduce emis-

sions remains in wealhy, developed naions. Ye by some esimaes, only abou

20 percen o he emissions cus required globally hrough 2030 can be accom-

plished in he developed world, and his ype o climae acion would require

more han 30 percen o oal miigaion invesmen.56Mos o he lowes-cos

miigaion opporuniies reside in he developing world. Tese counries no

only have he poenial o reduce emissions rom deoresaion bu also o build

climae-smar power plans, roads, and ciies as hey develop. Making new,

green energy and agriculural invesmens in hese naions would be ar cheaper

han rerofiting he already-buil indusrial economies o developed naions.

Developing counries, o course, have ewer resources, inerior echnology, and

weaker governmens han mos developed naions.

While all major emerging economies mus ake responsibiliy or abaing some

porion o heir climae polluion wihou inernaional financial assisance, major

emerging naions such as China and India will no agree o finance more han

heir air share o polluion conrol simply because heir coss are lower han ours.


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Leaders in developed naions, including in he Unied Saes,

who ail o undersand his geopoliical realiy will commi he

world o unnecessarily high climae coss, inadequae climae

acion, or boh. Increasing climae ambiion, hereore, will

require figuring ou by 2020 how o make new inernaional

parnerships beween developed and developing naions worka scale by 2030. By he end o 2015, world leaders need o ake

a major sep oward overcoming he mismach beween climae

responsibiliy and geography.

Poliically, naions remain ar apar a he global level on how

hese sors o inernaional parnerships beween developed and

developing counries should be srucured and financed. While

some counries have had success wih bilaeral Norh-Souh rela-

ionships, such as Norways emissions-reducion parnerships,

no many counries have Norways oil wealh and budge sur-pluses. Consequenly, Norways preerence or sraigh budgeary

oulays may no work in many oher naions. Developing naions

and emerging economies are demanding some ype o eco-

nomic incenive or doing more han heir air share. Meanwhile,

developed naions are looking a heir ee, no quie sure wha o

offer beyond heir exising oreign aid. Bridging hese differences

compleely may prove oo difficul in he nex year or wo, even

or world leaders. Insead, naions should srive o agree on wo

specific proposiions by he end o 2015.

Firs, naions should se measureable goals regarding he scale

o emissions reducions and climae adapaion sough hrough

all orms o inernaional parnerships combined during he

period beween 2020 and 2030. For example, hey could agree

o halve he gap beween wha science reveals is needed o

avoid dangerous climae effecs and wha naions inend o

do by 2030. For accounabiliy and clariy, his goal could be

ranslaed in gigaonsor billions o onso carbon dioxide

needed rom inernaional climae acion parnerships amongdeveloped and developing naions.

Norway has led the way in forging North-So

emissions-reduction partnerships. It has en

into major bilateral agreements with both B

and Indonesia to lower emissions in the for

sector. Norway has pledged to help these n

cover the low cost of emissions mitigation,

only if those nations actually meet agreed-u

emissions-reduction targets.

With Norways help, Brazil has succeeded m

ly, netting a 75 percent reduction in Amazo

deforestation.57Its partnership with Norwa

not the onlyor even the primaryfactorzils success, but the international results-ba

financial incentive played a politically impo

role in galvanizing its action. Now, Brazil is

Norways money to lock in the environmen

and development gains in the Amazon reg

by funding low-carbon development projec

Norway pays$5 per ton of carbon dioxide,

is a tiny fraction of what it would cost it to r

emissions by the same amount at home.59

In Indonesia, emissions reductions are takinger to realize through this type of results-b

international partnership, which is not surp

given the nations rampant forest corruptio

the systematic reforms needed in its land-te

system. Yet the promise of international fun

has triggered more forest and land reforms

Indonesia than at any previous point in the

20 years.60Since Indonesia has not yet deliv

ered emissions mitigation, Norway has not

to paythat is the ingenious nature of a tr

results-based partnership.

Norways emissions-reduction partnerships


24/44


As par o his effor, naions could also agree on wha sors o emissions-reducion

acions should coun oward his goalpresumably, only acions ha are above

and beyond he miigaion ha developing naions should finance hemselves. One

measure o his sel-financed conribuion migh be he uncondiional emissions-

miigaion commimens ha developing naions included in heir exising pre-

2020 naional climae plans, as well as similarly uncondiional emissions-reducionpledges in he soon-o-come pos-2020 naional acion plans. A clear, inernaion-

ally agreed-upon goal or addiional emissions limis in developing naions beyond

hese sel-financed measures would help he inernaional communiy hink clearly

abou he scale o cooperaion needed hrough bilaeral and mulilaeral climae

acion parnerships, invesmen unds, and policy mechanisms.

Second, afer seting a clear goal or joinly financed inernaional emissions

reducions, naions should come orward wih heir own sel-deermined

conribuions o achieving his shared goal. Te European Union, or example,

could pledge o conclude inernaional parnerships wih developing naionsha would reduce an addiional one or wo gigaons o carbon dioxide per

year. Europe would have he flexibiliy o implemen his poliical commimen

hrough whaever combinaion o policies work bes or i. I migh, or example,

choose o achieve a porion o his goal hrough European carbon markes.

Some EU naions also may choose o ollow Norways example by creaing

resuls-based bilaeral agreemens wih developing naions, boh in he ores

secor and oherwise. Some counries may wish o conribue o a mulilaeral

miigaion und, such as he new Green Climae Fund. Tis decenralized bu

coordinaed inernaional approach could raise ambiion and provide flexibi liy

or each counry o do wha i can wihou requiring every counry o join every

effor or creaing incenives or naions o block progress in areas where hey

canno ake acion hemselves.

Moreover, naions could adap heir approaches over ime. For example, he iner-

naional communiy is currenly working o develop a marke-based approach or

reducing emissions rom inernaional aviaion.61Naions migh decide in a ew

years o use a porion o he revenue rom ha new sysem o finance addiional

inernaional miigaion in developing naions. When he ime is righ, hey could

also reorm and augmen exising inernaional developmen insiuions, suchas he World Bank, o provide he resources needed o make sure ha all inerna-

ionally financed energy projecs are climae riendly. Reorming he World Bank

would ake years and would require addiional capial conribuions rom donor

naions in he years ahead.


25/44


While designing he righ approach could ake years o figure ou, leaders should

ge he ball rolling now. Te firs sep should be o socialize he poliical norm

ha all major economies should come orward wih boh heir domesic emis-

sions-reducion conribuions and heir inernaional miigaion and adapaion

conribuions by he end o 2015. No major economy, paricularly no advanced

indusrial economy, should be considered a climae leader wihou ambiiousdomesic and

inernaional climae acion plans. Developing naions, or heir

par, need o disinguish clearly beween wha acions hey will ake unilaerally

and hose ha will require inernaional financial suppor. By srucuring heir

climae pledges his way, developing naions could incenivize developed naions

o muser new financial resources in a global resuls-based ramework.

Value carbon in all major economies by 2020

Economiss generally agree ha carbon markes and carbon axesdifferen burelaed mehods o making carbon polluers pay or he harm hey causerepre-

sen by ar he mos economically efficien climae policies. By he end o 2015,

almos 3 billion peoplerepresening roughly hal o global GDPwill live in

places ha se a value on carbon.62However, more counries need o adop hese

policies, and carbon prices everywhere need o be higher.

Despie growing suppor or carbon-valuaion policies, heads o governmen are

highly unlikely o commi on he world sage o major new carbon-pricing poli-

cies beore he end o 2015. Decisions o value carbon represen a major change

in fiscal policy, and ew heads o governmen will decide his a he global level

wihou securing domesic suppor in advance. Many counries, such as Japan and

Ausralia, are moving away rom carbon pricing.63Even when naions or regions

do adop domesic carbon-valuaion policies, hey end o do so on heir own

poliical erms raher han collecively a he global level. Tis is cerainly rue or

carbon markes, or example.64Poliically, naions wish o se he rules o he road

o ensure ha carbon prices are no oo high or oo low.

Tere is also he quesion o inernaional equiy. Developing naions argue

vehemenly, perhaps wih good reason, ha carbon values in wealhy naionsshould be ar higher han hose in poor naions. Tey noe ha mos people in

India, or example, canno afford o pay as much as ciizens in Europe o proec

he global environmen. Wheher differenial carbon prices make sense eco-

nomically is beside he poin poliically. For hese reasons, he idea ha world

leaders migh agree a he global level now o adop a common approach o

carbon axes or carbon markes seems poliically naive.


26/44


Country Region City Start year Sector

Canada

Quebec 2013 Electricity and Industry

Ontario To be determined

Manitoba To be determined

British Columbia To be determined

United StatesCalifornia 2013 Electricity and Industry

Regional greenhouse gas initiative 2009 Electricity

Mexico To be determined

Chile To be determined

Brazil To be determined

Switzerland 2008 Electricity and industry

European Economic Area 2005 Electricity, industry, and aviation

Ukraine To be determined

Kazakhstan 2013 Electricity and industry

Korea 2015 Electricity and industry

China

National trading system

Guangdong 2013 Vary by pilot scheme

Hubei 2013 Vary by pilot scheme

Beijing 2013 Vary by pilot scheme

Tianjin 2013 Vary by pilot scheme

Shanghai 2013 Vary by pilot scheme

Chongqing 2013 Vary by pilot scheme

Shenzhen 2013 Vary by pilot scheme

JapanTokyo 2010 Commercial buildings and industry

Saitama 2011 Commercial buildings and industry

New Zealand 2008Electricity, industry, waste, forestry, transport fuels,

and domestic aviation

Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and International Energy Agency, Current and proposed emissions trading schemes, available at http://visual.ly/current-and-proposed-emissions-trading-schemes (last accessed July 2014).

FIGURE 2

Current and proposed emissions trading schemes


27/44


In place

Implementation scheduled

Under consideration


28/44


Ye here remains room or opimism on carbon pricing. Carbon valuaion is

spreading around he world and will soon cover roughly hal o he global econ-

omy, as noed in Figure 2.Whereas he European Union had he only large-scale

naional marke a decade ago, naional or regional carbon markes are now ak-

ing roo in Chile, Kazakhsan, Mexico, Souh Korea, and Vienam, as well as in

major economic regions in Brazil; he Canadian provinces o Qubec, Onario,Manioba, and Briish Columbia; China; and Caliornia and he norheasern

region o he Unied Saes. Carbon axes are also spreading. Tey are currenly

in place in Denmark, he Neherlands, Finland, Japan, Sweden, Norway, New

Zealand, Swizerland, Cosa Rica, and Souh Arica, as well as in Rio de Janeiro.

China could have a naional carbon ax in place afer 2015.

Many, i no mos, serious poliical and business leaders around he world

suppor reasonable carbon values. As ar back as 2005, he heads o 24 o

he worlds larges global companiesacing hrough he World Economic

Forumcalled on governmens o adop carbon polices.65Many similar sae-mens rom oher business groups have ollowed since.66By he end o 2014,

more han 100 major companies and 50 naional and local governmens are

likely o issue a join call or global carbon pricing.67

Broadening and deepening commimens o carbon valuaion is essenial o cli-

mae success, and leaders should find common ground on carbon valuaion when

hey gaher over he nex ew monhs. World leadersor some criical mass o

hemcould agree, or example, o a nonbinding poliical saemen ha:

1. Noes wih saisacion ha carbon-valuaion policies are aking roo around

he world

2. Commis heir naions o increase carbon-valuaion policies in specific ways

over ime

3. Encourages all major economies o implemen naional carbon-valuaion poli-

cies by no laer han 2020

4. Creaes a join ask orce wihin he Inernaional Moneary Fund, or IMF, and

he World Bank or sharing bes pracices on carbon-valuaion policies

Invesors and companies would see such a saemen as addiional evidence hacarbon axes and markes are here o say and will grow over ime. A saemen o

his sor would also avoid several pialls. Naions would reain oal conrol over

how o value carbon, including a wha price. Tey would no all have o commi

o he same policies. Addiionally, he saemen would no require naions o

coordinae, harmonize, or link heir carbon policies inernaionally a his sage.


29/44


Te poliical significance and hus easibiliy o such a saemen depends almos

enirely on he views o he worlds wo larges climae polluers: China and he

Unied Saes. When hese naions agree on new climae principles, heir approach

usually akes roo across he globe.68Perhaps surprisingly, China and he Unied

Saes migh agree o a carbon-valuaion saemen by he end o 2015.

China is already moving ahead wih carbon policies a boh he naional and

local levels and has announced ha i migh implemen a naional carbon ax in

he near uure.69China currenly has he larges inernaionally acing carbon

marke in he developing world, which has provided more han 50 percen o he

carbon asses sold o Europe and oher developed naions since 2005.70Building

on his inernaional success, China has launched a variey o local domesic

carbon-marke programs, wih he goal o piloing a naional carbon-emissions-

rading sysem laer. Chinas domesic carbon markes already covers around

100 million people, making hem a genuine and serious preparaion or he new

naional program o come.71Te proposed world leaders saemen on carbonpricing would be ully consisen wih exising Chinese policy. Admitedly, China

someimes opposes inernaional climae declaraions or geopoliical or ideo-

logical reasonseven when hey are consisen wih Chinas domesic plansso

one should no assume Chinas consen. Ye a carbon-valuaion saemen a he

global level migh appeal o China as a way o showcase is climae leadership

inernaionally wihou requiring new domesic policies.

Securing U.S. suppor would be more challenging bu migh sill prove easible.

Te Unied Saes has adoped neiher a naional carbon ax nor a naional carbon

marke and is unlikely o do so beore Presiden Barack Obama leaves office,

given opposiion in he Republican-conrolled House o Represenaives. While

Caliornia and he norheasern saes have regional carbon markes, he Unied

Saes would no commi inernaionally o carbon policies on ha basis alone

pas experience confirms ha he Unied Saes would need o show implemena-

ion capaciy a he naional level.

Ye some ederal policies already value carbon a he naional level. Te Obama

adminisraion has calculaed a social cos o carbon and uses his figure when

making adminisraive and regulaory decisions.72

In oher words, he social cos ocarbon is already included in he laes round o decisions on U.S. polluion conrols

promulgaed by he Obama adminisraion. Plus, proposed U.S. regulaions ha

limi climae polluion rom new power plans and orhcoming sandards o reduce

emissions rom exising power plans creae wha economiss call an implied value,

or shadow price, or carbon.73Oher naions could consider hese shadow prices


30/44


as examples o carbon valuaion. Also, Presiden Obama has consisenly called on

Congress o adop a comprehensive naional climae law ha creaes an explici price

or carbon. Saing ha all major economies should value carbon by 2020 would be

ully consisen wih he presidens exising policies. For all hese reasons, geting

he Obama adminisraion on board may no be an insurmounable obsacle.

Any effors o secure U.S. paricipaion in a pro-carbon-valuaion leaders saemen

should ake ino accoun he upcoming U.S. miderm elecions in November. Te

adminisraion will no ake any inernaional posiion on climae change ha could

harm Democraic Pary candidaes or public office when conrol o he U.S. Senae

seems o be a sake, as i does his year. Ye a nonbinding inernaional pledge ha

merely resaes exising U.S. policy would be highly unlikely o become a poliical

piaa domesically i i were crafed careully. Republicans who oppose climae

acion will campaign agains new Environmenal Proecion Agency, or EPA,

carbon regulaions, no inernaional communiqus, because voers undersand

he poenial impac o regulaions more han hose o diplomacy. Ye i he Obamaadminisraion insiss, a leaders saemen ha avors carbon valuaion could come

afer he miderm elecion in lae 2014 or 2015.

Any U.S.-China agreemen on carbon valuaion would no ranslae immediaely

ino a global consensus. Some oher naions, such as India or even Brazil, migh

no suppor a leaders communiqu calling or domesic carbon-valuaion policies.

Bu India has a new governmen under Prime Miniser Narendra Modi, and his

adminisraion has ye o pu orh a new climae policy. Addiionally, Brazil has

naional elecions soon, and climae acion is quie popular wih voers.74Even i

oher major emerging economies may no join a U.S.-China agreemen on carbon

valuaion, dozens o oher naions in Europe, Asia, and he Americasincluding

Mexicowould do so given heir exising policies.

Create global forest goals backed by strong economic incentives

Foress play a vial role in saeguarding he Earhs climae by naurally sequeser-

ing carbon. More han 1.6 billion people also depend on oress or heir ood,

waer, homes, radiional culures, and livelihoods.75

Ye an average o 13 millionhecares o ores disappear each yearan area he size o Greece or Cosa Rica.

Agriculural developmenprimarily he producion o commodiies such as soy,

palm, bee, and paperaccouns or roughly hal o global deoresaion.76


31/44


Reducing deoresaion and resoring degraded oress represen he larges,

mos cos-effecive climae soluions available over he nex wo decades. In ac,

he mos recen esimaes sugges ha haling deoresaion, resoring degraded

oress, and reducing unnecessary emissions rom agriculure would provide 40

percen o he emissions reducions he world needs by 2030.77Brazil has already

proven he meris o his sraegy by reducing deoresaion emissions rom isAmazon region by more han 75 percen in he pas decade, while a he same

ime increasing regional agriculural producion and rural incomes.78

Ending ropical deoresaion, much o which is illegal under domesic law in devel-

oping naions bu coninues because o corrupion or weak governance,79would

have many oher benefis, including fighing corrupion; sewarding naural resource

wealh; mainaining reshwaer resources; saeguarding hydrological paterns or

drinking waer and agriculure; proecing ores-dwelling communiies, culures,

and radiional livelihoods; and conserving priceless ecosysems and wildlie. In

coasal areas, mangrove oress and welands buffer communiies rom sorm surgesand absorb floodwaers, filer polluion rom waerways, and provide nursery habia

or fish and shellfish species, in addiion o soring remarkable quaniies o carbon.80

Moreover, resoring los or degraded coasal and inland oress is he only large-scale

and cos-effecive echnology available o ake carbon ou o he amosphere. Te

poenial or ores resoraion on a planeary scale is enormous, and given he muli-

ude o benefis, leaders need o commi o angible benchmarks or progress.

Because more han hal o global deoresaion comes rom rade in jus our

commodiiessoy, palm, bee, and paper81eliminaing deoresaion rom

business supply chains is key o success. Forunaely, major consumer-goods

companies, commodiy raders and producers, and banks are leading he way.

Te Consumer Goods Forum, or CGFa global coaliion o 400 consumer-

acing companies wih combined annual sales in excess o 2.5 rillion euros ha

works across 40 counrieshas pledged o eliminae deoresaion rom is sup-

ply chains by 2020.82Unilever, Kelloggs, and Nesl are among he consumer

companies leading his effor wih company-specific pledges. Commodiy rad-

ers, producers, and banks are responding o heir corporae cusomers. Wilmar

Inernaionalhe worlds larges rader in palm oil, he commodiy mos asso-

ciaed wih deoresaion in Indonesia and Souheas Asiahas sopped buyingcommodiies grown on recenly deoresed land.83Banks such as BNP Paribas

and Barclays are creaing financial insrumens o incenivize deoresaion-ree

commodiy invesmens and rade.84


32/44


Governmen leaders need o build on his momenum rom he privae secor. In

2013, he inernaional communiy finalized in global climae alks he accoun-

ing rules or reducing emissions rom oress. Wha he world needs now is he

poliical will o address deoresaion. World leaders should finalize ambiious

ores goals and creae srong financial incenives hrough climae and rade policy.

Specifically, leaders should agree o:

Eliminae deoresaion and ores degradaion rom he producion and rade o

agriculural commodiies by 2020 in parnership wih consumer-goods compa-

nies and ohers in he privae secor Resore 300 million hecares o environmenally degraded oress and land-

scapes by 203085 Include ambiious ores arges in new global SDGs by 2015 Creae srong, large-scale economic incenives o reduce deoresaion and

increase ores resoraion, including hrough a new global climae agreemen,

by he end o 2015

Amend the Montreal Protocol to phase down HFCs

Naions need o agree o phase down he producion and consumpion o

HFCshighly poen greenhouse gases used in residenial and mobile rerig-

eraion, commercial and residenial air condiioning, and some ypes o oam

insulaion. Rapidly phasing down HFCs would reduce global warming by as much

as 0.5 degrees Celsius by he end o he cenury. In addiion, an HFC phasedown

would caalyze significan cos-saving energy-efficiency gains in air-condiioning

and rerigeraion sysems, in he range o 30 percen o 60 percen, as well as sig-

nificanly reduce carbon dioxide emissions rom hose sources.86

Leaders should insis on compleing an amendmen o he Monreal Proocola

global agreemen concluded in he lae 1980s o phase ou he producion and use

o ozone-depleing chemicalsby he end o 2015 o ensure he rapid phase-

down o HFCs. Virually all naions agree on he need o phase down HFCs. Te

G-20, or example, agreed o ha goal in 2013, ollowing bilaeral agreemens o

cooperae on HFCs beween he Unied Saes and China and, laer, he UniedSaes and India.87Unorunaely, ha agreemen has ye o ranslae ino a global

consensus on using he Monreal Proocol as he means or acion.


33/44


Te Monreal Proocol is perhaps he mos successul global environmenal agree-

men o dae and he only U.N. reay ha enjoys universal raificaion. No only

have naions worked ogeher o almos ully repair he Earhs ozone layer a low

cos, bu he climae benefis o eliminaing hose chemicals also exceed he resuls

achieved during he firs phaserom 2008 o 2012o he Kyoo Proocol by

fiveold.88

One o he keys o he Monreal Proocols success is a companion undha enables developed naions o help poorer naions cover he coss o swich-

ing o saer chemicals. Wihou his suppor, developing naions would no have

agreed o or implemened he chemical regulaions in he Monreal Proocol.

o a degree, he HFC problem is a side effec o he Monreal Proocols success.

Global use o HFCs skyrockeed when hey became he preerred alernaive

o more harmul ozone-depleing subsances ha were phased ou hrough he

Monreal Proocol. Swiching o HFCs was desirable a he ime since he original

chemicals were ar worse and since compleely climae-sae alernaives did no

exis or were no affordable. oday, ar more climae-riendly and affordable aler-naives do exis. Using he Monreal Proocol now o finish he ransiion rom

harmul subsances o sae alernaives makes remendous sense.

A broad inernaional consensus exiss or amending he Monreal Proocol

o phase down HFCs. More han 25 counries plus he European Union have

endorsed his approach explicily, and many ohers are prepared o go along.89

Among major naions, India has been he mos adamanly opposed o using he

Monreal Proocol o conclude he near-erm phasedown o HFCs. India cies a

mix o reasonable economic and unreasonable ideological objecions.90World

leaders need o work wih Indian Prime Miniser Modi o assemble an economic

package ha helps India conclude a srong agreemen on he phasedown. Tis

plan needs o include poliical assurances and join venures o convince India

ha i will be able o manuacure and use HFC alernaives affordably, as well as

echnical assisance and financial suppor under he Monreal Proocol financ-

ing arm. Ideally, Prime Miniser Modi would agree o a Monreal Proocol HFC

amendmen laer his year, poenially a Secreary-General Bans climae summi

in Sepember. I no, he nex opporuniy would be a he annual meeing o he

Monreal Proocol in November. Leaders need o make sure ha progress on an

HFC phasedown under he Monreal Proocol occurs as soon as possible and haa concluded HFC phasedown amendmen is enaced no laer han 2015.


34/44


Set ambitious energy-efficiency goals through 2030

Nearly hal o he emissions reducions needed rom he global energy secor in

he nex decade could come rom energy-efficiency mandaes ha would acually

accelerae economic growh and produce oher social benefis, such as reducing

local air polluion.91

Regulaions ha require more-efficien vehicles,92

buildings,lighing, and appliances, or example, would save consumers billions o dollars

while lowering climae polluion.93Tese regulaions and sandards are primarily

adoped and implemened by naions a a naional or regional level, bu leaders

can help speed he adopion o srong energy-efficiency mandaes and echnolo-

gies by seting global goals or progress.

In he power secor, U.N. Secreary-General Ban has led his effor hrough his

Susainable Energy or All iniiaive, which aims o double energy-efficiency

improvemens globally by 2030, among oher imporan goals.94Te Global Fuel

Economy Iniiaive, a parnership beween he Unied Naions, he InernaionalEnergy Agency, and civil sociey, has advanced he objecive o doubling global

uel economy in new vehicles by 2030.95World leaders need o embrace and

elevae hese goals by making hem a ormal par o he global developmen rame-

work ha naions inend o conclude in 2015.

Foreign and finance minisers rom he Unied Saes and China promised in July

o move orward on new vehicle-efficiency sandards or passenger vehicles and

rucks in heir respecive counries.96Agreemens such as hese underscore he

poenial or agreemen and acion. Creaing a global consensus o accelerae vehi-

cle efficiency would involve seting benchmarks or coordinaed domesic acion

and increasing and aligning inernaional assisance o promoe energy-efficiency

policies, all o which would send a srong signal o he privae secor abou uure

demand or energy-efficien producs.

Conclude a strong new global climate agreement

Finally, he world needs a srong new global climae agreemen. Te exising

agreemenshe U.N. Framework Convenion on Climae Change and he KyooProocolare anachronisic, a leas as inerpreed. Tey divide he world ino

developed and developing counries based on he world ha exised in 1992, wih

he expecaions or acion alling almos solely on developed naions even hough

developing naions now emi 60 percen o climae polluion.97


35/44


Exising climae agreemens also do no creae enough ransparency abou he

policies ha naions inend o pursue a home o mee heir inernaional pledges.

Only developed naions are required o disclose relevan inormaion ully and

o paricipae in inernaional consulaions abou he adequacy or effeciveness

o heir acions, and no naions are required o demonsrae in real ime ha hey

have a credible mix o policies in place o mee heir saed pledges.

Leaders have he chance o fix hese shorcomings a he final negoiaing session or

he anicipaed new U.N. climae agreemen, which will ake place in Paris, France,

in lae 2015. Te Paris agreemen should require all naions o pu orward ambi-

ious bu achievable naional climae plans and all major economies o adop mea-

surable climae goals backed by domesic policies ha are legally binding. Trough

his new agreemen, naions should agree o paricipae in echnical and poliical

discussions abou he adequacy and equiy o heir pledges, as well as he overall

effeciveness o heir climae acion plans. A srong and sensible climae agreemen

would considerably improve inernaional ransparency, rus, and accounabiliy.

Bu even a srong new climae agreemen along hese lines mus no become a

subsiue or eiher domesic acion or he oher global orms o inernaional

climae cooperaion idenified previously. In he shor run, a new climae agree-

men will no convince China, he Unied Saes, and oher major economies o

miigae emissions aser. Tey will have decided on heir climae policies hrough

2030 well in advance o Paris. Domesic poliics will exer a ar sronger pull on

ha decision han any inernaional agreemen. A new climae agreemen would

no convince he U.S. Congress, or example, o adop a comprehensive climae

law. Nor would a new global climae agreemen creae srong global insiuions

capable o orcing naions o honor climae pledges once hey are made. As in

oher areas o inernaional relaions, he making and breaking o inernaional

commimens will remain a largely poliical quesion even when hose pledges are

par o a global agreemen governed by inernaional law.

However, here may be a way orward, as naions have ye o deermine wheher he

new Paris agreemen will be legally binding under inernaional law. Naions could

make he procedural elemens o he new climae agreemensuch as he obliga-

ion o file repors and paricipae in inernaional consulaionslegally binding,while leaving he subsanive elemensincluding he all-imporan emissions-

miigaion pledgesnonbinding a he inernaional level bu wih assurances hey

would be binding under domesic law. Tis approach would bridge he difference

beween Europe on one handwhich avors a srong inernaionally legally binding


36/44


agreemen in he mold o he Kyoo Proocol, in which all miigaion arges were

firm obligaions under inernaional law or he naions ha had hemand major

emerging economies on he oher handwhich suppor inernaionally legally

binding obligaions or developed naions bu no or hemselves. Under his com-

promise, European naions and climae advocaes could celebrae an inernaional

agreemen ha has many inernaionally legally binding elemens, while China,India, Brazil, and oher emerging economies could ake comor in he ac ha heir

miigaion pledges are no legally binding under inernaional law. Te compromise

migh also sui he Obama adminisraion, which insiss ha he Unied Saes will

only accep inernaionally legally binding obligaions ha apply o China and India

oo. Tis plan would mainain he symmery he Unied Saes insiss upon wihou

necessarily causing major emerging economies o balk.

Moreover, a new climae agreemen wih procedural obligaions and nonbinding

subsanive pledges would probably no require congressional approval as a mater

o U.S. law because he presiden could implemen he agreemen under his exis-ing legal auhoriy.98Presiden Obama would no need o designae he agreemen

as a reay, which would require he advice and consen o he Senae. I he had

o seek approval rom he Senae, he migh ail o secure he wo-hirds superma-

joriy required by he U.S. Consiuion or reaies, given he parisan divide on

climae change. Oher naions are likely o see meri in an approach ha allows

he Unied Saes o join he new climae agreemen, since he U.S. rejecion o he

Kyoo Proocol a decade ago severely hampered is success. Perhaps ha ac alone

makes his sor o compromise quie sensible.

Te alernaive migh be an agreemen ha has no inernaionally legally binding

elemens and insead merely poliical pledges. Te Unied Saes has brough his

opion o he atenion o oher counries wihou endorsing i. 99Ta oucome,

hough accepable o major emerging economies and probably o he Unied

Saes, would be hard or vulnerable naions, European climae leaders, and non-

governmenal advocaes o somach. For his reason, he compromise presened

abovea binding process wih nonbinding subsanceprovides a way orward i

China and Indiaand hereore also he Unied Saesare unorunaely unwill-

ing o be bound inernaionally by heir own emissions-miigaion plans.


37/44

Conclusion | www.americanprogress.o

Conclusion

World leaders will soon se a new course or global climae acion. I is clear wha

he world needs o accomplish on climae change prior o 2030 and which policies

are required or success. Implemening hese policies, hough poliically challeng-

ing, would no only place he world on a pah o keep global emperaure increases

below 2degrees Celsius, bu i would also simulaneously promoe economic

growh, enhance energy securiy, improve public healh, proec he worlds or-

ess, and bring abou many oher benefis.

Mos o wha world leaders need o deliver globally on climae change by 2030 will

require domesic poliical will and domesic policy, bu pragmaic global coop-

eraion can play a helpul role as well. A he global level, leaders should use he

numerous summis and conerences ha lie beore hem in lae 2014 hrough 2015

o creae condiions or success a home. Alhough hey canno sweep aside he

very real poliical consrains hey ace, numerous opporuniies or progress exis.

I is ime or world leaders o live up o heir iles. Te nine concree policy rec-

ommendaions presened in his repor offer an ambiious ye poliically realisic

pah orward or inernaional climae cooperaion now. By ollowing hrough on

hese suggesions, world leaders can make pracical down paymens oward he

policies naions need o achieve low-carbon economic growh and a secure, pros-

perous, and jus uure or generaions o come.


38/44


About the author

Nigel Purvisis he ounder, presiden, and CEO o Climae Advisers, a

Washingon, D.C.-based consulancy specializing in U.S. climae change policy,

inernaional climae change cooperaion, global carbon markes, and climae-

relaed ores conservaion.

Purvis direced U.S. environmenal diplomacy in he William J. Clinon and

George W. Bush adminisraions, mos recenly as depuy assisan secreary o

sae or oceans, environmen, and science. In ha capaciy, he shaped U.S. oreign

policy relaing o climae change, biodiversiy conservaion, oress, oxic sub-

sances, ozone depleion, and environmenal aspecs o inernaional rade..

Acknowledgements

Tanks o Andreas Dahl-Jrgensen and Cecilia Springer a Climae Advisers;

Cahleen Kelly, Rebecca Lefon, and Greg Doson a he Cener or American

Progress; and Assaad Razzouk or heir conribuions o his repor. Te Cener

or American Progress hanks he Nordic Council o Minisers or is suppor o

our educaion programs and his repor. Te views and opinions expressed in

his repor are hose o he auhor and do no necessarily reflec he posiion o

he Nordic Council o Minisers. Te Cener or American Progress and Climae

Advisers produce independen research and policy ideas driven by soluions ha

we believe will creae a more equiable and jus world.


39/44

Endnotes | www.americanprogress.o

Endnotes

1 Nigel Purvis and Andrew Stevenson, Rethinking Cli-mate Diplomacy (Washington: German Marshall Fundof the United States, 2010), available athttp://www.gmfus.org/brusselsforum/2010/docs/BF2010-Paper-Purvis-Stevenson.pdf.

2 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Re-port of the Conference of the Parties on its nineteenthsession, held in Warsaw from 11 to 23 November2013 (2014), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2013/cop19/eng/10a01.pdf.

3 In 1997, developed nations agreed to targets that mostnations implemented through 2012 under the KyotoProtocol. Similarly, in 2009, many nations made politicalpledges to reduce emissions through 2020, and mostnations have not revised those targets.

4 United Nations, Kyoto Protocol to the United NationsFramework Convention on Climate Change (1998),available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf.

5 Purvis and Stevenson, Rethinking Climate Diplomacy.

6 Molly Elgin-Cossart, Cathleen Kelly, and Abigail Jones,Reducing Poverty Through Climate Action (Washing-ton: Center for American Progress and Climate Advisers,2014), available athttp://americanprogress.org/issues/green/report/2014/05/08/89255/reducing-poverty-through-climate-action/.

7 United Nations, United Nations Millennium Develop-ment Goals: Background, available athttp://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/bkgd.shtml(last accessedAugust 2014).

8 United Nations, Millennium Development Goals: 2014Progress Chart, July 2014, available at http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Resources/Static/Products/Prog-ress2014/Progress_E.pdf.

9 Ibid.

10 Jeff Tollefson and Natasha Gilbert, Earth summit: Rioreport card, Nature486 (7401) (2012): 2023,availableathttp://www.nature.com/news/earth-summit-rio-report-card-1.10764.

11 Department of the Treasury, Leaders Statement: ThePittsburgh Summit, September 24 25 2009 (2009),available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/g7-g20/Documents/pittsburgh_sum-mit_leaders_statement_250909.pdf.

12 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change WorkingGroup I, Climate Change 2013: The Physical ScienceBasis (2013).

13 Seth Borenstein, What 95% Certainty of WarmingMeans to Scientists, The Big Story, September 24, 2013,available at http://bigstory.ap.org/article/what-95-cer-tainty-warming-means-scientists.

14 National Climate Assessment and DevelopmentAdvisory Committee, Climate Change Impacts in theUnited States: Third National Climate Assessment(2014).

15 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change WorkingGroup II, Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation,and Vulnerability (2014), available athttp://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/.

16 Council of Economic Advisers, The Cost of DelayingAction to Stem Climate Change(Executive Office of thePresident, 2014), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/the_cost_of_delaying_ac-tion_to_stem_climate_change.pdf.

17 CNA Corporation, National Security and the Threat ofClimate Change (2007), available athttp://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/news/FlipBooks/Climate%20Change%20web/flipviewerxpress.html; Joshua W. Bus-by, Climate Change and National Security: An Agendafor Action (Washington: Council on Foreign Relations,2007), available athttp://www.cfr.org/climate-change/climate-change-national-security/p14862.

18 National Intelligence Council, National IntelligenceAssessment on the National Security Implications ofGlobal Climate Change to 2030 (2008).

19 World Bank, Turn Down the Heat: Climate Extremes,Regional Impacts, and the Case for Resilience (2013),available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/06/14/000445729_20130614145941/Rendered/PDF/784240WP0Full00D0CONF0to0June19090L.pdf.

20 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change WorkingGroup I, Climate Change 2013: The Physical ScienceBasis.

21 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Deci-sion 1/CP.16 The Cancun Agreements: Outcome ofthe work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-termCooperative Action under the Convention (2010).

22 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change WorkingGroup II, Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation,and Vulnerability; National Climate Assessment andDevelopment Advisory Committee, Climate ChangeImpacts in the United States.

23 U.N. Environment Programme, The Emissions GapReport 2013: A UNEP Synthesis Report (2013).

24 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, KyotoProtocol data, available athttps://unfccc.int/ghg_data/kp_data_unfccc/items/4357.php (last accessed May2014).

25 Thomas F. Stocker and others, Technical Summary. InIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change WorkingGroup I, Climate Change 2013: The Physical ScienceBasis (2013), Figure TS.19, available at http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_TS_FINAL.pdf.

26 Barbara Buchner and others, Global Landscape of Cli-mate Finance 2013 (San Francisco, CA: Climate PolicyInitiative, 2013), available at http://climatepolicyinitia-tive.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/The-Global-Landscape-of-Climate-Finance-2013.pdf.

27 International Energy Agency, Energy Technology

Perspectives 2012 (2012), available at http://www.iea.org/etp/etp2012/.

28 Hal Harvey and Laura Segafredo, Policies that Work:How to Build a Low Emissions Economy (San Francisco,CA: ClimateWorks Foundation, 2011), available athttp://www.climateworks.org/imo/media/doc/Poli-cies%20That%20Work_Overview%20Report.pdf.

29 Ibid.
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Raising Global Climate Ambition

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