Rainy Day Funds October 30, 2014. NTA Session I CounterCyclical Fiscal Policies for States and...

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Rainy Day Funds October 30, 2014

Transcript of Rainy Day Funds October 30, 2014. NTA Session I CounterCyclical Fiscal Policies for States and...

Page 1: Rainy Day Funds October 30, 2014. NTA Session I CounterCyclical Fiscal Policies for States and Localities.

Rainy Day FundsOctober 30, 2014

Page 2: Rainy Day Funds October 30, 2014. NTA Session I CounterCyclical Fiscal Policies for States and Localities.

NTA Session ICounterCyclical Fiscal Policies for States and

Localities

Page 3: Rainy Day Funds October 30, 2014. NTA Session I CounterCyclical Fiscal Policies for States and Localities.

NTA Session IIVolatility in States: Are Rainy Day Funds Up to the

Task?

Page 4: Rainy Day Funds October 30, 2014. NTA Session I CounterCyclical Fiscal Policies for States and Localities.

Current Utah Proposal

• Budget grows at the long run rate rather than forecasted revenues

• Surplus years accrue into a rainy day fund• Deficit years are financed by the previous surpluses

accumulated in the rainy day fund• Separates the debate of government size from tax policy

Page 5: Rainy Day Funds October 30, 2014. NTA Session I CounterCyclical Fiscal Policies for States and Localities.

Two Year State Budgeting Cycle

First Forecast

Budget Guidancefor Agencies

November

Second Forecast

Initial Budget

February

Third Forecast

November

Fourth Forecast

Supplementals

February

Balanced Budget

June 30

Budgeting Time Line

Page 6: Rainy Day Funds October 30, 2014. NTA Session I CounterCyclical Fiscal Policies for States and Localities.

Alternative Objectives

• Long term saving plan with expenditure smoothing

• Forecaster indemnity fund

Page 7: Rainy Day Funds October 30, 2014. NTA Session I CounterCyclical Fiscal Policies for States and Localities.

Revenue and Expenditure Smoothing

First Forecast

Budget Guidancefor Agencies

November

Second Forecast

Initial Budget

February

Third Forecast

November

Fourth Forecast

Supplementals

February

Balanced Budget

June 30

Budgeting Time Line

Page 8: Rainy Day Funds October 30, 2014. NTA Session I CounterCyclical Fiscal Policies for States and Localities.

Cycle and Trend

Page 9: Rainy Day Funds October 30, 2014. NTA Session I CounterCyclical Fiscal Policies for States and Localities.

Unobserved Components ModelsHodrick-Prescott

1

22

1 11 2t

T T

t t t t t ts

t t

Min y s s s s s

The l values gives the relative importance of smoothing and controls the degree of smoothness. The larger values for l give more smoothness.

Hodrick and Prescott suggest the following values for l.

100 Annual data

1,600 Quarterly data

14,400 Monthly data

Page 10: Rainy Day Funds October 30, 2014. NTA Session I CounterCyclical Fiscal Policies for States and Localities.

Cyclical Component of Total State Tax Revenue

Page 11: Rainy Day Funds October 30, 2014. NTA Session I CounterCyclical Fiscal Policies for States and Localities.

Proposed Saving Plan Won’t Work for Tax Revenue

Page 12: Rainy Day Funds October 30, 2014. NTA Session I CounterCyclical Fiscal Policies for States and Localities.

Coincident Indicators

• Nonagricultural employment• Unemployment rate• Average hours worked in manufacturing• Real wage and salary disbursements

Page 13: Rainy Day Funds October 30, 2014. NTA Session I CounterCyclical Fiscal Policies for States and Localities.

Would Budgeting Plan Work for US Economy?

Page 14: Rainy Day Funds October 30, 2014. NTA Session I CounterCyclical Fiscal Policies for States and Localities.

Rainy Day Funds would need an initial endowment.

Page 15: Rainy Day Funds October 30, 2014. NTA Session I CounterCyclical Fiscal Policies for States and Localities.

Probability Distributions of State Growth Rates

• Absolute• Location: Mean and median• Scale: Standard deviation and interquartile range• Symmetry: Skewness• Outliers: Kurtosis

• Relative• Inherent Growth Rate• Cyclical Growth Volatility• Systematic and Unsystematic Risk• Standard Error of Regression

• Dynamic• Growth• Volatility

• Switching Regression• Probability of Staying in Expansion• Probability of Staying in Recession

Page 16: Rainy Day Funds October 30, 2014. NTA Session I CounterCyclical Fiscal Policies for States and Localities.

Mean Growth RateState Economy 1992-2013

Page 17: Rainy Day Funds October 30, 2014. NTA Session I CounterCyclical Fiscal Policies for States and Localities.

Standard Deviation of Growth RateState Economy 1992-2013

Page 18: Rainy Day Funds October 30, 2014. NTA Session I CounterCyclical Fiscal Policies for States and Localities.

Equity Market Growth and Risk

it i i mt tr r

Page 19: Rainy Day Funds October 30, 2014. NTA Session I CounterCyclical Fiscal Policies for States and Localities.

State Growth and Volatility Relative to US

, , ,i t i i us t i tr r

Page 20: Rainy Day Funds October 30, 2014. NTA Session I CounterCyclical Fiscal Policies for States and Localities.

Systematic Risk (R-Squared)State Economy 1992-2013

Page 21: Rainy Day Funds October 30, 2014. NTA Session I CounterCyclical Fiscal Policies for States and Localities.

Nonsystematic Growth Rate (Alpha)State Economy 1992-2013

Page 22: Rainy Day Funds October 30, 2014. NTA Session I CounterCyclical Fiscal Policies for States and Localities.

Systematic Volatility (Beta)State Economy 1992-2013

Page 23: Rainy Day Funds October 30, 2014. NTA Session I CounterCyclical Fiscal Policies for States and Localities.

Adaptive Expectations (Exponential Smoothing)

New Information Observation

Measurement Equation

Transition Equation

New Information+

Estimate of Level+

Estimate of Slope

Revisionof

Level and Slope

Page 24: Rainy Day Funds October 30, 2014. NTA Session I CounterCyclical Fiscal Policies for States and Localities.

Adaptive Expectations Growth RateState Economy 1992-2013

Page 25: Rainy Day Funds October 30, 2014. NTA Session I CounterCyclical Fiscal Policies for States and Localities.

Adaptive Expectations Forecasting Error

State Economy 1992-2013

Page 26: Rainy Day Funds October 30, 2014. NTA Session I CounterCyclical Fiscal Policies for States and Localities.

Switching Regression

The switching model assumes that there is a different regression model associated with each regime. We assume that we have regressors then the conditional mean of is given by

𝜇𝑡 (𝑚)=𝑋 ′𝑡 𝛽𝑚+𝑍 ′

𝑡𝛾

where are vectors of coefficients. The coefficients associated with are regime invariant.

Page 27: Rainy Day Funds October 30, 2014. NTA Session I CounterCyclical Fiscal Policies for States and Localities.

Transition Probabilities

FutureExpansion Recession

Current Expansion 0.904 0.096Recession 0.245 0.755

Page 28: Rainy Day Funds October 30, 2014. NTA Session I CounterCyclical Fiscal Policies for States and Localities.

Ability to Replicate the Business Cycle

Page 29: Rainy Day Funds October 30, 2014. NTA Session I CounterCyclical Fiscal Policies for States and Localities.

Revenue and Expenditure Smoothing

First Forecast

Budget Guidancefor Agencies

November

Second Forecast

Initial Budget

February

Third Forecast

November

Fourth Forecast

Supplementals

February

Balanced Budget

June 30

Budgeting Time Line

Page 30: Rainy Day Funds October 30, 2014. NTA Session I CounterCyclical Fiscal Policies for States and Localities.

State Tax Revenue During an Expansion

Out[5]=

min

max

c

Page 31: Rainy Day Funds October 30, 2014. NTA Session I CounterCyclical Fiscal Policies for States and Localities.

Expenditures and the Budget

Out[10]=

min

max

c

Page 32: Rainy Day Funds October 30, 2014. NTA Session I CounterCyclical Fiscal Policies for States and Localities.

State Tax Revenues

Page 33: Rainy Day Funds October 30, 2014. NTA Session I CounterCyclical Fiscal Policies for States and Localities.

State Expenditures

Page 34: Rainy Day Funds October 30, 2014. NTA Session I CounterCyclical Fiscal Policies for States and Localities.

Surpluses and Deficits

0.5 0.5

Billions of Dollars

Page 35: Rainy Day Funds October 30, 2014. NTA Session I CounterCyclical Fiscal Policies for States and Localities.

Rainy Day Fund

0.5 0.0 0.5

Surplus Defic it Probability Distribution