3rd International Conference

on Public Policy (ICPP3)

June 28-30, 2017 – Singapore

Panel T06P01

Public Sector Innovation: Organizational and Institutional Trends in the Post-New Public Management Era

Change Agents in Modern East Asian Innovation Bureaucracies

Author

Erkki Karo

Ragnar Nurkse School of innovation and Governance, Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia; erkki.karo@ttu.ee

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ChangeAgentsinModernEastAsianInnovationBureaucracies

Firstroughdraftofworkinprogress.Pleasedonotquoteordistributewithoutpermission.

AbstractInthispaperweareinterestedinhowtheprocessesofjustifying,draftingandimplementingsocietalchallengesorientedSTIpoliciesareco-evolvingintwoEastAsianeconomies–JapanandTaiwan–giventheirspecificpolitico-economiclegaciesandcontexts.Weidentifythreekey challenges regarding the design of such STI policies and use these as an analyticalframework for our analysis. We show that especially since the GFC, both Japanese andTaiwanesenationalstrategieshaveintroducedSTIpolicyjustificationsanddirectionsbasedonthedefinitionofspecificsocietalchallenges/needs.Yet,thesejustificationsarenotfullyaccepted by all politico-administrative actors and have beenbrought to the arena duringspecificchanceeventsorwindowsofopportunities.Asaresult,andasopposedtoWesterntrends,theinstitutionaldesignstoimplementthenewpolicydirectionsseemtoleadtowardsfurthercentralizationofkeySTIpolicyfunctions.Whileweseerathersimilardevelopmentstoglobaltrendsonthelevelofpolicyideas/rhetoricandthedesignofspecificinstruments,analternativeformofgovernanceseemstobeemerginginEastAsiathatisinfluencedbythepolitico-administrativeelitecentredlegaciesof‘developmentalist’policy-making.Keywords:innovationpolicy,publicmanagement,changeagents,EastAsia

1. IntroductionEspeciallysincethe2008GlobalFinancialCrisis(GFC),‘grand’and‘societal’challengeshavetaken a central stage in both policy and academic debates on how to pursue science,technologyandinnovation(STI),whatistheappropriateroleforthestateandpublicpoliciesand how tackling these challenges could become integral part of general economicdevelopment strategies (see Fagerberg et al. 2013; Hicks 2016; Mazzucato 2013; 2016;Ulnicane2016).Astheseconceptshavebeenintroducedtothepolicyarenaonlyrecentlyandthrough fragmented initiativesof single individuals (globally recognized scholars, businessleaders)andpublicandprivateorganizations(seeHicks2016)withtheirownagendas,theexact framingand institutionalizationof theseconcepts isonlyemerging. Inrelatedpolicydebates, there have been arguments that classic Apollo and Manhattan type ‘missionoriented’STIprograms,oreven‘newdeals’,areneededfortacklingcomplexchallengesintheareasfromhealthandsocialwelfaretolow-carbonenergytransitionsandenvironmentalsustainability.Yet,ithasbeenalsorecognisedthatmodernchallengesmaybefundamentallydifferentfrompost-WWIIpublicsectordrivenmissions.Modernchallengesareconsideredtobe explicitly ‘boundary-spanning’ as they tackle interdisciplinary real-life problems thatrequireinternational,cross-organizationalandcross-sectoral(public-private)collaborationinSTIfunding,developmentanddiffusion.(Arundeletal.2011;Forayetal.2012;Moweryetal.2010; Ulnicane 2016) Thus, they may also require new STI policy logics and governancearrangements.

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Some STI scholars argue that itmay be insufficient to rely on classicmarket and systemfailuresbasedpolicies, institutionsandinstruments. Solutionstomanysocietalchallengesrequire triggering and diffusing innovations in so called ‘legacy sectors’ with establishedparadigms and entrenched interests regarding production, consumption, regulation,governance(BonvillanandWeiss2015).Asaresult,STIscholarsaredevelopingnewSTIpolicyframeworks from ‘transformative change’ approach (Weber and Rohracher 2012) to‘entrepreneurialstate’andrevisedversionsofthe‘developmentalstate’(Block2008BlockandKeller2011;Mazzucato2013;2016;KimandThurbon2015).Aspolicyanalyticaltools,theseframeworkstrytooperationalizebothideationalaspects(justification,legitimizationofgovernment role and policies) and institutional elements (policy and instrument design,implementationandfeedbackandevaluationsystems)neededforeffectivefunctioningofnew types of STI policies. There seems to be a growing consensus in the literature thatmodern challengesmay require policy and governance approaches that balance betweendirection giving role of the state and maintenance of spaces for more bottom-up andexperimentalsearch.Further,participatoryfeedbackarenasmaybeneededfordefiningandlegitimizingspecificchallengesandmissions.Foractualpolicyimplementation,changeagents–organizationswithdynamiccapabilities–maybeneededthatdevelop,testandimplementnovelandoftenexperimentalpolicyinstrumentsandmixesfittheboundary-spanningnatureofthechallenges.Importantly, as concepts such as grandand societal challenges that aredevelopedby STIelites, they tend to have global rhetorical appeal. Regardless of economic and politicaldifferences,countries fromdifferentregionstendtoconsciouslybenchmarkeachother intermsof thecontentandgovernanceofSTIpolicies.Though,mostof the time the focus,rhetoricandcontentofpoliciesseemstobemoreimportantandeasilytransferrablethansystems of governance. This creates complex co-evolutionary but often punctuatedinteractionsbetweenlocalideationalandinstitutionallegaciesandnewideasandinstitutionsintroducedtothesepolicyarenas(KaroandKattel2016a).Forexample,theSouthKorean‘greengrowth’initiativeadoptedmuchoftheideationalandrhetoricaltoolboxofgrandandsocietalchallenges,but in its institutionalapproach,the‘greengrowth’policieshavebeenarguablypursuedthroughthelogicoftheEastAsian‘developmentalism’,or‘developmentalenvironmentalism’, that still prioritizes economic development concerns over other socialgoalsandmaintainsstate-centricapproachtoSTIgovernance(seeKimandThurbon2015;Han2015;Seongetal.2016).In this paper we are interested in how the processes of justifying (ideational approach),drafting and implementing (institutional designs) challenges oriented STI policies are co-evolving two East Asian economies – Japan and Taiwan – given their specific politico-economic legaciesandcontexts.For thisanalysis,wehaveworkedthroughexistingpolicydocumentsandsecondaryliterature(policystrategies,organizationalandpolicyreports,andacademic research) and conducted interviews with local policy makers and experts tocorroboratethefactsandourinterpretationsoftheco-evolutionofpoliciesandinstitutionaldesigns.11Weare intheprocessofcarryingoutexpert interviews(insomecases informaldiscussions)withpastandcurrentpolicymakersandexpertsfromkeyministriesandorganizationofJapaneseandTaiwaneseSTIsystems(ministriesofeconomy,educationandscience,high-levelcoordinationbodies).

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InthenextsectionwewillprovideabriefreviewofrecentconceptualadvancesregardingtheideationalandinstitutionalapproachestosocietalchallengesbasedSTIpolicies.WeidentifythreekeychallengesregardingthedesignofsuchSTIpoliciesandusetheseasananalyticalframeworkforourempiricalstudy.WeshowthatespeciallysincetheGFC,bothJapaneseandTaiwanesenationalstrategieshavestartedtointroduceSTIpolicyjustificationsandprioritiesbasedonthedefinitionofspecificsocietalchallenges/needs.Bynow,JapaneseSTIpoliciesarebeingframedthroughtheconceptofSociety5.0,orsupersmartsociety,andTaiwaneseSTIpolicydocumentshaverecentlyreferredtotheconceptoflow-carbonintelligentsociety.BothoftheseemergentconceptsreflectthelogicofprioritizingSTIandsupportingpublicandprivate STI activities in a way that balances between the goals of sustaining/increasingeconomicgrowthwhilealso improvementofsocialandenvironmental livingconditionsofpeople.Yet,asopposedtoWesternapproaches,theinstitutionaldesignstoimplementtheseideasseemtolead,asalsointhecaseofSouthKorea,towardsfurthercentralizationofkeySTIpolicyfunctions(throughstrengtheningtheroleoftheCabinetOfficeanditsCouncilforScience,TechnologyandInnovation,CSTI,inJapan;creationoftheMinistryofScienceandTechnology,MOST,andBoardof ScienceandTechnology,BOST,of theExecutiveYuan inTaiwan). At the same time, thedesignof policy instruments seems to again bebasedonsimilarprinciplesasintheWest(especiallyUS).Thus,whileseerathersimilardevelopmentson the level of policy ideas/rhetoric and instruments, an alternative form of governanceseemstobeemergingthatisinfluencedbythepolitico-administrativeelitecentredlegaciesof‘developmentalist’policy-making.Inthediscussion,wesummarizethemainelementsofthisformofgovernanceanddiscussitspotentialstrengthsandlimitations.

2. Ideational and institutional frameworks to tackle grand and societal challengesthroughSTIpolices

2.1. Keygovernancechallenges

Onthebroadestlevel,STIpoliciesfocusingonsocietalchallengescouldbeplacedintothebroader theoretical and conceptual frameworks of ‘socio-technical transitions’ (Geels andSchot 2007), or more specifically ‘sustainability transitions’ (Markard et al. 2012). Theseapproaches seek to understand socio-technical transformations towards e.g. low-carbonenergysystemsthroughmulti-levelframeworkscombiningpublic,privateandsocialactivitiesonthelevelsofniches,regimesandsocio-technicallandscapes.Thepredominantstreamofthisresearchseemstorecognizethatneitherevolutionarynormission-orientedtransitionscanbemanagedthroughtraditionalcommandandcontroltypemechanismsandinstitutionsthat are usually at the centre of public policy efforts. Rather, system coordination, ortransition management, through open-ended and ‘co-productive’ networks and reflexivegovernancemechanismsmaybemoresuccessful.(LoorbachandRotmans2006;Vosetal.2009;RoggeandReichardt2016)Yet,asarguedbyAngelandRock(2009)suchco-productiveandbottom-upprocessesdriveninstitutionalframeworksmaybecontextspecificandsuitafewWesternEuropesystems,ifat all, while most other countries strive to tackle societal challenges by only graduallyreformingtheirexistinggovernanceandpolicyapproaches.Thus,somescholars–whofollowthe lineof ‘transition’ research, but focuson socio-technical transformations and societalchallengesstrategicallydefined,prioritizedandtackledbygovernmentsunder–havetriedto

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complement market and system failures based ‘structural’ STI policies ‘which focus onoptimizingthestructureofinnovationsystemsandtheirabilitytogeneratenewknowledgeandtechnology’with‘“transformation-orientedinnovationpolicies”whichstrategicallyfocusonthetransformationofwholesystemsofinnovation,productionandconsumption’,(Weberand Rohracher 2012: 1037-1038) through ‘comprehensive system innovations, i.e. novelconfigurationsofactors,institutionsandpractices’(Ibid.:1037).Thus,WeberandRoharcher(2012) have introduced the concept of directionality failure together with demandarticulation, policy coordination and reflexivity failures to operationalize the specificconditionswhenthestatecanalsoplayanexplicitdirectiongivingandcoordinativerole.Mazzucato(2013;2016;alsoBlockandKeller2011)hasarguedthatbroaderapplicationofthetheoryorconceptofthe‘entrepreneurialstate’maybeafeasiblepathwayforjustifyingandlegitimizingpolicyprioritiesthatfocusoncurrenteconomicandsocietalchallenges.Theentrepreneurialstateapproachseekstodevelopjustifications(mostlybasedonhistoricalandcomparative lessons)andgovernanceframeworksfortheroleofthestate increatingandshaping markets, or giving direction to predominantly market-forces driven STIdevelopments.Thisfocusmakesthedebatesonmodernsocietalchallengescomplementarytothedebatesonpost-WWIImission-orientedpolicies(seeForayetal.2012;Moweryetal.2010)andtherecentworkonthechallengesofinnovationintheUS‘legacysectors’(BonvillanandWeiss 2015).Mazzucato (2016) has argued that the direction giving approach to STIrequiresnotonly ideationalchange,butalsodevelopmentnovelorganizationalandpolicycapacities (for experimentation, learning, self-discovery), dynamic evaluation frameworksandsymbioticpublic-privatepartnerships.

There seem to be at least three key governance challenges regarding the design andimplementationofchallenge/missionorientedpolicies:

1. Howtodefineandlegitimizespecificchallengesthatwouldincentivizedifferentpublicsectororganizationsandalsoacademicandprivateactors towork towards sharedgoals?

2. How to implement challenge oriented policies andmaintain a sustainable balancebetween direction giving role of the state and spaces for more bottom-up andexperimentalsearch?

3. How to create dynamic feedback arenas and evaluation practices to sustain theevolutionary,dynamicandboundary-crossingnatureofsearchprocessesoftacklingsocietalchallenges?

Regarding the first challenge, there seems tobea commonunderstanding that STIpolicylogicsorjustificationmayhavetogobeyondtraditionalmarketorsystemfailuresdrivenSTIpolicyrationalesthatfocusonimprovinggeneralframeworkconditionforfirm-andindustry-level search and selection processes. While exact terminology of challenges, mission,directions,prioritiesetcisnotyetsystemized,accordingtoMazzucatoandPenna(2016:100-101),abilitytosetexactfocusesforSTIpolicyeffortsmattersgreatlyforconceptualizingtheexactroleofdifferentactorsanddefiningappropriategovernancemechanisms:

Missionsarenotthesameassocietalchallenges;missionsdefinewaystoaddressasocietalchallengeandrequiremanydifferentsectorstointeractinnewways.Indeed,

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moregranulardefinitionoftechnologicalmissionstoaddressthesocietalchallenge,forinstance,facilitatetheestablishmentofintermediategoalsanddeliverables,andprocessesofmonitoringandaccountability.Whenamission is toobroadlydefinedand represents the societal challengeat large,governancecanbecome faulty,andthereisariskofbeingcapturedbyvestedintereststhatareableto‘bend’themissionintheirfavor.

Well defined challenges/missions should ideally help to improve the prioritization of STIpoliciesaswell asnudgeprivateactors towards searchandself-discovery in complexanduncertainareasintowhichprivateactorsalonewouldnotbewillingtoenterandinvest.Oneofthecrucialdebatesbetweendifferentstrandsofthinkingfocusesonhowsuchdefinitionsand consensuses should be achieved. Given the boundary-spanning nature of modernchallengesandneedforbroaderdiffusionofSTIoutputsforactualtransformativeimpacts,some advocate for participatory governance mechanisms to create shared and collectivevisionsandconsensus.Othersseemtoagreethatsuchvisionswouldemergethroughlesscollectiveandmoreconflictualandcontestedprocesses.(Foroverviewofdebates,seeWeberandRohracher2012:1040-1041)Thus,thestatecouldtriggerandcoordinatesuchcollectiveactions through its visionary goal setting and demand articulation either by politico-administrativeorbroaderelites(includingalsobusinessandacademia).

Regardingthesecondchallenge,differentapproachesseemtoalsoagreethattraditionaltop-downand stabilityorientedbureaucraciesneed todevelopmoredynamic capabilities forlearning,experimentation. Itmaybe ratherdifficult tomaintain suchcapabilities in singleorganizations or organizations based on similar routines (Karo and Kattel 2016a). Thus,different challenge andmissionoriented approaches seem tohighlight the critical roleofchange agents tasked with developing and implementing novel and often experimentalorganizational solutions and policy instruments and policy mixes. Existing research ofWesternexperiences regarding suchexperimentation andpolicy innovationhasproposeddifferenttypesofchangeagents:charismaticpolicyentrepreneurs(LinkandLink2015),smallperipheralandflexibleagenciesthatareinsulatedfrombothpoliticalinterestsandresources(BreznitzandOrnston2013);mission-oriented,flexibleandpoliticallywell-connectedtoandprotectedagencies,suchasDARPA(BonvillianandWeiss2015).Thetaskoftheseagenciesistotrigger(technological,political,policyorother)changesbydeveloping,experimentingwithand/ordemonstratingnovelsolutions.Giventhecomplexitiesofboundary-crossingandSTIrelatedchallenges,theyshouldatthesametimebebothchange-andmission-oriented(asopposedtogenericchangeagencies),i.e.focusingontriggeringchangesinspecificcomplexfieldwhereuniquecapabilitiesareneeded.Regarding the third challenge, there seem to be common arguments that next to moreparticipatorygovernanceandfeedbackarenas(thatcouldbeeitherkeyavenuesforcommonvisionsetting,definitionofchallengesetc,orcomplementarylegitimationtools),alsopolicyevaluation systems should become less principal-agent type (ex ante formulation ofperformancegoals).Instead,evaluationpracticesshouldfollowprinciplessimilartothelogicof ‘experimental governance’ (common visions to be adopted and adjusted by differentstakeholdersandsubsequentlyevaluatedthroughopen-endedpeer-reviewlikeapproachesfocusingbothonprocessesandoutcomes;e.g.SabelandZeitlin2010),ormimichigh-riskapproachesfoundintheprivatesector,suchas‘portfolioapproach’(Mazzucato2016).

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2.2. ContextualdifferencesIt is fairly obvious that the politico-economic and politico-administrative differences andlegacieswillinfluencetheoverallapplicabilityandeaseofdevelopingsuchsolutionstothesegovernancechallenges.Itislikelythatwhiletherearegloballyemergingcommonnarrativesandconsensusesregardingsomeaspectsofsocietalchallenges,actualpolicyapproachesandinstitutional designs remainmore distinct as domestic political, policy and administrativelegaciescontinuetoinfluencepolicymakingprocesses(KaroandKattel2016a).For example, the US-based STI policy debates have been for a long time stuck in theideological state-market confrontation. This has led to the emergence of the ‘hidden’decentralized andnetworks developmental state (Block 2008; Block andKeller 2011). Yetsuch approach may not suffice for innovations in more complex and entrenched legacysectors (Bonvillan andWeiss 2015) and for tackling boundary-spanning challenges (Hicks2016).WhileObamaadministrationplacedgrandandsocietalchallengesasoneofthecorepillars ofUS STI policies already in late 2000s and tried to pursue these through existinggovernancedesign, ithasrecentlyalsoproposedtodevelopnewpolicytoolkitsforpublicsectorinnovationandmorebottom-upandparticipatoryapproachestofindotherpathwaysforlegitimizingpoliciesandforco-producinganddiffusingsolutionstochallenges(innovationlabs,socialinnovationetc)(seeNECandOSTP2015).TheEU’sSTIprogramHorizon2020hastaken societal challenges as oneof its corepriorities andhasdefined these challenges inratheropenendedway.Thus,itreliesonreliesonexpertbasedconsultationstodefineannualprojects and ideas to be implemented. Yet, the evaluationmetrics seem to still focus onindicatorsinheritedfromthelinearandsupply-focusedSTIpolicyera(publications,patents)(Ulnicane2016).Basedonthebroadmappingofchallenge-orientedpolicyinitiatives(inclimatechangeandenergy,andhealthyagingrelatedchallengesandstrategies),Leijtenetal.(2012:7)distinguishthreebroadpolicystrategiestowardstacklingsocietalchallenges:

• Policymainstreaming:‘tryingtobuildthegrandchallengeintoregularpolicymakingandimplementationisatendencywhichcanbefoundalmosteverywhere’;

• Jumpingtoscienceand/ortechnology: ‘whereinEuropethechallengeistranslatedintoajumpto(fundamental)scientificchallenges,wefindintheUSAastrongerfocusonjumpingtotechnologiesandcreatinglongertermindustrialopportunities’;

• Comprehensivetransitionapproach:‘buildingonastrongtraditionofnationalprioritysetting,severalAsiancountriessucceedintakingacomprehensiveapproachinwhichscientific research, technology development, industrial innovation and socialorganisationarebeingalignedforasystemictransitiontowardsgreengrowth,greenindustryandgreenemployment’.2

WhileLeijtenetal.(2012)linkthesestrategieswithnationalapproaches,wecanconjecturethatdifferencesintheintroduction(bywhomandwhen)andoperationalizationofgrandandsocietalchallengesmayalsodifferwithincountriesacrossdifferentSTIpolicyorganizations.2Though,thisassumptionthatEastAsianeconomies(theyexplicitlydiscussSouthKoreaandTaiwan)areableto build more systemic approaches seems to be somewhat contradicted by the discussions of thedevelopmentalistinterpretationofenergyandenvironmentalchallenges(seebelow).

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Suzuki(2008)hasconceptualizedtheseas‘policylogics’pursuedbydifferentSTIactors,i.e.organizations may follow one or many (also conflicting) logics from science, technology,commercialization,tofinance,nationalprestige,autonomyetc.Whilethesecanbereflectedon the ideational level (priorities and their justification), they are also likely to influencespecificorganizationalroutinesoftheSTIpolicyorganizationsintermsofplanning,staffing,coordination,networkbuildingetc(KaroandKattel2016a,b).InthecaseofEastAsia,severalanalyses(AngelandRock2009;Dent2012;KimandThurbon2015; Liou 2010; Seong et al. 2016) have noted that especially energy and environmentrelatedsocio-economicchallenges,whichhavebeenacuteinEastAsiasinceatleastthehighgrowthindustrializationperiodandthe1970soilcrises(i.e.transformationtowardsdomestic,lowcarbonand renewableenergysourcesandsystems), tend tobe ‘framed’bypolitico-administrativeelitesofespeciallymoredevelopedcountries(JapanandtheEastAsianTigers)within the specific traditionof EastAsian ‘developmentalism’ (Thurbon2014).3While thepolitical elites may rhetorically refer to global ‘sustainable development’ narratives, theactual policies are designed and implemented by traditional (or re-strengthened)developmental(state)bureaucracies, i.e.ministriesoragenciesforeconomicdevelopmentand industrialization policy. These bureaucracies may be in turn supported by high-levelcoordination bodies presided by top politicians and also embedded in specificdevelopmentalistpublic-privatenetworksintegratingselectednon-stateactors(mainlykeyfirmsandindustries) intopolicymakingandimplementationnetworks(Dent2012). Inthiscontextandwhilethesustainabledevelopmentrhetoricoftenseeminglyentailsnewburdenson firms and industries (through environmental regulations, taxes etc), the East Asiandevelopmentalistpoliciesareinsteadoftenframedinamercantilistindustrialorinnovationpolicy logicthat firstlysupports local technologicalcapabilitiesdevelopmenttocreateanddominatenewlocalandglobalmarkets(KimandThurbon2015).Ontheotherhand,thegrowingliberalizationandopeningupoftheEastAsianeconomiessince the 1980s (including gradual acceptance ofWTO rules) and the evolution of theseeconomies from technology importers and emulators to indigenous innovators andtechnology creators has already raised debates on whether and how the politico-administrative elite dominated institutional frameworks are able to support innovation-relatedactivitiesinmoreuncertainandcomplexhigh-techfields;andwhethertheyareableto transform into new and more networked and co-governed forms through social andinstitutionalinnovations(seeChu2016;Thurbon2014;Fields2012;Wong2011).Whilethesequestionshavebeenposedinthecontextofsupportingmarket-basedfirmandindustry-ledinnovation processes, they are relevant also for the societal challenges as the lattermayrequirebothbasic technology creation and innovation aswell as broader socio-economicchanges(i.e.inconsumerawarenessandbehaviour,changingfocusfromshort-termfinancialwellbeingtolong-termqualityoflifeetc).In thenext section,wewill analysehow theprocessesof justifying (ideationalapproach),drafting and implementing (institutional designs) challenges oriented STI policies are co-evolving two East Asian economies – Japan and Taiwan – given their specific politico-

3 Idea‘that strategic state intervention into themarket can facilitate industrial transformationandeconomicgrowthmoregenerally’(Wong2004:348).

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economiclegaciesandcontexts.Wewillfocusonourthreegovernancechallengesidentifiedwhiletakingintoaccounttheorganizationallevelissuesregardingtheco-evolutionofpolicylogicsandorganizationalroutines.

3. TacklingsocietalchallengesthroughSTIpoliciesinJapanandTaiwan

3.1. ThedomesticlegaciesofSTIpoliciesBoth Japan and Taiwan have shifted (frommid- to late 1980s onwards) from traditionalindustrial policy driven development strategies towards strategies were growingliberalizationhasbeencomplementedwithexplicitSTIpoliciessupportingandcoordinatingR&Dinfirmsandacademia.Thisshifthasalsomeantthatnexttothetraditionaleconomicpolicybureaucracies(ministriesforeconomicaffairs),otheractors(ministriesforscienceandtechnology,governmentlevelcoordinatingbodies)havebecomeincreasinglyimportantandvisible. Since mid-1990s, there have been several attempts to transform the relativelyfragmented STI systems to build more coherent approaches for the new STI baseddevelopment strategies. In Japan, the key change were the adoption of the Science andTechnology Basic Law in Japan (1995) that introduced the systems of STI policy planningthroughthe5-yearScienceandTechnologyBasicPlans. InTaiwan, the1999FundamentalScienceandTechnologyAct inTaiwanformalizedtheroleofthestateinSTIandcoherentnational strategic planning organized around the 4-yearNational Science and TechnologyDevelopmentPlan.Inbothcountries,thesestrategiesandplansaredraftedandcoordinatednotbytraditionaldevelopmentalstateeconomicpolicybureaucracies,butbynewhigh-levelpolicycoordinatingactorsandexistingscienceandtechnologypolicybureaucracies.Thus,theimplementationofthesepoliciesrequirescoordinationbetweendifferentactorswithownspecificlegaciesandroutines,orpolicylogics.Japanhadinheritedfromthepriorstagesofindustrialdevelopmentarelativelyfragmentedandbureaucracy-ledSTIsystemwheredifferentministriescreatedownpolicy ‘logics’ (seeSuzuki 2008) and arenas (of agencies, research performing organizations and feedbacknetworks):

- MinistryofInternationalTradeandIndustry(MITI)anditsSTIfundingagencies(NEDO)and research institutes (AIST) have been predominantly followed the logic ofcommerce,i.e.promotingspecificfieldforpredominantlyindustrialcompetitivenessandcommercialization; though, in thecaseofenergy technologies,oneof thekeylogics was also autonomy (from import dependence) to be achieved throughdevelopmentofnewenergy technologies (alternative sources,better conservationetc;seeWatanabe1995);4

- ScienceandTechnologyAgency(STA)underthePrimeMinistertriedtocoordinateoverall STI policies and supported (through JST and own research institutes) ‘big’science(i.e.nuclearandspaceresearch)basedonthelogicoftechnology(tocreatenationaltechnologicalcapabilitiesasthegoal);

4Sawai(2009),WatanabeandHonda(1991),Watanabe(1995)showmorenuancedco-evolutionarypatternsbetweenMITI’spolicyfocusesandbroaderpolitico-economiccontextwherebyMITIhassoughttocomplementprivate sector focuses regarding STI (i.e. dependent on firms technological and financial capabilities andpriorities,eitherfocusingonbasic,ormoreappliedresearch).

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- MinistryofEducation,togetherwithJSPSandpublicuniversitiesunderitsjurisdiction,followedthelogicofscience(topursuescienceasinherentlypublicgoodinaclassicalbottom-upandopensearchmanner);

- Theoverallpolicycoordinationandlegitimationwasdominatedbytherelativelycloseand corporatist ‘council approach’ whereby different core bureaucratic actors(ministries,cabinetof thePrimeMinister)establisheddifferentpolicycoordinationandadvisorycouncilwhobringingtogetherselectedmembersfrompolitics,business,academicandmedia(Schwartz1998).

The 1990s and early 2000s saw several attempts to overturn this relatively closed andbureaucracy-ledpolicymakingsystem,ofwhichthe2001administrativereformsweremostprofoundandrelevantforSTI. In2001,MITIwasformallyreformedintoMETI(MinistryofEconomy,TradeandIndustry;takingoveralsothetasksoftheEconomicPlanningAgency),STAwasmergedwiththeMinistryofEducationtoformtheMinistryofEducation,Culture,Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT; the major funder of public R&D from this pointonwards).Mostpublicresearchinstitutes(in2001;includingMETI’sAIST)anduniversities(in2004)wereturnedintoindependentagencies.Inaddition,twoSTIrelatedhigh-levelcouncilswereestablishedunderthePrimeMinister:Council forEconomicandFiscalPolicy(settingoveralltargetsforthenationalbudgetaryprocess)andCouncilforScienceandTechnologyPolicy(CSTP;beforeactingasadvisoryCouncilforScienceandTechnology)totaketheroleof‘controltower’forS&Tpolicythroughconstantmonitoringandcoordinationofprioritiesandactivities of different actors. According to Suzuki (2008: 17), CSTP should have been the‘forum for the setting of national priorities for science and technology policy in order tostrengthen industrial competitivenessand thenational industrialbase. Inotherwords, theestablishmentofCSTPwasdrivenbytheincreasingimportanceofthelogicofcommerceinallkindsoftechnologies,whichmeantthatMETIandCSTPsharethesamepolicylogic’.Atthesame time, Stenberg and Nagano (2009) argue that given that the first Science andTechnologyBasicPlanswerepreparedbySTA(andalsogiventhatCSTPanditsofficewerestaffed through secondments from STA/MEXT), the change of logics from science andtechnologytocommercializationhasbeenrelativelygradual.InthecaseofTaiwan,thefollowingkeylegacyaspectsshouldbementioned:

- Thedevelopmentorientedeconomicbureaucracy– gradually concentratingwithinand underMOEA – pursued the logic commerce (for industrialization, creation ofexportcapabilities)byrelyingonitsownnetworkofresearchinstitutes(i.e.ITRIandsimilarorganizations)(seeGreene2008;Breznitz2007)andotherparastatalagenciesfortechnologytesting,certification,exportmarketingetc(Hsieh2016)5;

- Intheorganizationofsciencefundingandsupport,threeactors–NationalScienceCouncil (NCS) under the Executive Yuan, Academia Sinica under the Office of thePresident,MinistryofEducation–haveallsoughttosupportscienceandtechnologydevelopment. In developing their specific policy logics, they have been largelydependentonthebottom-upnatureandself-organizationofscience,i.e.whileNSChasbeenovertimetaskedwithbothfundingpublicresearchinuniversitiesandother

5 Chu (2016) has argued that since the liberalization and democratization, much of this developmentalbureaucracyhasbeeninfluencedbythenewneoliberalagenda.

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organizations and promoting and coordinating nationwide S&T development(includingdecisionsonnationalS&Tpolicies,S&Tresourceintegrationandallocationguidelines, major S&T projects, important S&T laws and regulations), it has beenlargelydependentontheinputprovidedbyacademics(especiallyfromtheAcademiaSinicanetwork)workinginitsdifferentdecision-makingbodiesandoffices;

- But,since1970s,this logicofsciencewascounterbalancedbyhigher levelpolitico-administrative and collegiate style of policy planning and coordination, e.g. cross-ministerialtheAppliedTechnologyResearchandDevelopmentTeamwasestablishedin1976; in1979theScienceandTechnologyAdvisoryGroupwasestablishedasanadditionalmission-oriented body to steer S&T development programs, review theapplied technology researchdevelopmentpolicy andprovide recommendations toNSCandthePremierregardingSTIpoliciesand;in1989thesebodiedweremergedintoSTAG(seeYearbookofScienceandTechnologyTaiwanROC2012);

- Inaddition,theregularNationalScienceandTechnologyConferencesinitiatedin1978(heldinevery4years;in1990s,theapproachwasintroducedalsotospecificpolicydomains such as energy) have functioned broader coordinating and legitimizingplatformswherenationalstrategicplansandprioritiesareproposedanddeliberatedandconsensusonprioritiesissoughtfor.Overall,suchinstitutionsaidedtoguidethepredominant logic of science funding towards industrial application and focus ontechnologyandcommerce.6

Given the gradual shift towards STI based development during the 1990s and 2000s, thegovernmentintroducedin1998-1999severalreformstoimprovethetop-downcoordinationandplanningofSTIpolicies.In1998,regularScienceandTechnologyMeetings/ConferencesoftheExecutiveYuanwereestablished(conveyingevery3months,chairedbythepremier,attendedbynationalS&TadvisorsandheadsofSTIrelatedministries);theregulationofSTAGwaschangedtoallowhiringprestigiousforeignanddomesticscientistandS&Tadvisors;therules for the cross-ministerial and mission-oriented National Science and TechnologyProgramswereintroduced.The1999FundamentalScienceandTechnologyActformalizedthesystemwherebythe4-yearNationalScienceandTechnologyDevelopmentPlanisdraftedbasedontheresultsofregularNationalScienceandTechnologyConferences.Thediscussionsof theseConferencesarestructured throughbothbottom-up ‘issueselection’ (solicitationandonlinepublicationofideasfrombroadsetofstakeholderstobediscussed,negotiatedand voted at the Conference) and top-down ‘policy piloting’ – government initiatives aresummed-up in theWhite Paper on Science and Technology. TheWhite Paper has 4 yeartimeframe and is adopted halfway (2 years) into the National Science and TechnologyDevelopmentPlan.Inthischanginginstitutionalcontext,inbothcountries(onJapan,seeStenbergandNagano2009),thefirstnationalSTIpolicystrategiespaidsomelipservicetosocietalchallenges,butmostfocusofthestrategieswasonreinforcingthebasicframeworkconditionsofinnovationsystems(fromhumancapitaldevelopmenttospurringuniversity-industrycollaborationandincreasing general and public funding for STI) and improvement of the central, top-downplanningandcoordinationofSTIpolicies.6AsarguedbyGreene(2008:68):'academicresearchhadbeenredefined,asearlyas1959,asscientificresearch,andscientificresearchby1964-1965,wasbeingfurtherdefinedasacombinationofbasicandappliedresearch,pursuitofwhichcouldandshouldbejustifiedintermsofnationalneeds'.

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3.2. IdeationalframingofchallengeorientedSTIpolicesinJapanandTaiwan

AftertheGFCandgiventhedifficultiesofsustainingprevious levelseconomicgrowthandmaintainingpublic STI funding (seeGraph1and27), aswell chanceevents (e.g. the2011EarthquakeinJapan),bothJapanandTaiwanstartedtointroducemodernsocietalchallengesorientedSTIpolicyrhetoricandjustificationsintotheirkeypolicydocuments.Inbothcases,thischangehasbeentakingplacethroughdifferentpolitical‘windowsofopportunities’.Graph1

Source:OECDMSTI.Graph2

7Inbothcases,thegovernmentshavefounditratherdifficulttolegitimizeincreasedinvestmentsintoSTI.InJapan,thegovernmenthassetsincethefirstBasicPlanboldgoalstosignificantlyincreasingpublicinvestmentintoSTI(currentlytoincreaseinvestmentsto1%ofGDP),buthasfallenshortofstatedgoalsduringthe2nd,3rdand4thPlan.InTaiwan,thegovernmentemphasizedforseveralyearstheoverallgoalof3%ofGDPinvestedintoR&D,butevenastheoverallinvestmentshavealmostreachedthelevel,thegovernmentsitselfhasfacedsignificantchallenges in increasingthepublicSTIcommitments,especiallyasSTIandeconomicdevelopmenthavenotbeen(untilrecently)importanttopicsinpoliticalcompetition(Chu2016;Rosieretal.2016).

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Source:OECDMSTI.In Japan, four interrelated stages of framing the societal challenges approach can bedistinguished:

- ThefirstattempttosubstantiallyframesuchpoliciesemergedduringthefirsttermofPrime Minister Abe (2006-2007) who complemented the Third Science andTechnologyBasicPlanwith theLong-termStrategicGuidelines ‘Innovation25’ thatframedthreemainchallengesforthenext20years:agingandpopulationdeclineinJapan; explosive advancement of globalization, knowledge- and information-basedsociety; threats to sustainability of earth. It emphasized the ‘social context’ ofinnovation (how innovationscansolve theproblems/challengesofpeople in Japanandglobally)andtheneedtoshiftfrom‘industrialpromotion’and‘government-led’type policies towards ‘infrastructure creating’ type policies that support throughderegulation and conscious experimentation the ambitions and creativity ofentrepreneurialactors.

- The Fourth Science and Technology Basic Plan (2011-2015) was adopted by thegovernment ledbytheDemocraticPartyof Japan(2009-2012). Itseconomicpolicyprogram (New Growth Strategy 2010) was based on the rhetoric of shifting from‘public works based’ development (1960-1980s) and ‘market-fundamentalistproductivity orientation’ towards ‘achieving economic growth by turning theproblems faced by the economy and society into opportunities for creating newdemand and employment’. Also the Fourth Science and Technology Basic Planpresenteda‘crisis’narrativeregardingbothglobalissues(resourcesscarcity,politicalandeconomic instability)andJapanspecific issues(aging,decliningpopulationandbirthrate, economic stagnation) even before the 2011 Earthquake postponed andchanged the adoption of the strategy. The Plan also attempted to shift STIprioritizationtowardsmoreexplicitproblem-solvingapproach.Thekeypolicyfocuswas placed on (sustainable) growth oriented strategy in two areas of Japanesestrengths –green innovation (developing low carbon energy sources, green socialinfrastructure and improving efficiency of energy resources) and life innovation(medical and nursing care, health services) – by integrating previously prioritized

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technology domains (environment, energy, medical care, nursing care, andhealth) and policy logics (solving societal challengeswhile sustaining internationaleconomic competitiveness and creating futuremarkets and jobs).8While theNewGrowth Strategy (2010) of the government operationalized these goals through‘market-oriented’ performance indicators (global market shares and job creationopportunities; also the goal of reducingworldwide greenhouse gas emissionswasmeasured in terms of emissions reduction created by Japanese private sectortechnology),theactualfourthPlanremainedlessclearonthisissueallowingdifferentactorstointerpretthelogicandjustificationsbasedontheirownlogics.

- Thechangeofgovernmentafterthe2012electionsandreturnofPrimeMinisterAberesultedintherevisionsofmosteconomicpoliciesunder‘Abenomics’andthegrowthorientedJapanRevitalizationStrategy‘JapanisBack’(2013).ThisplanisbasedontwofocusesforeconomiccompetitivenessandSTI.TheIndustrialRevitalizationPlanseeksto inducestructuralreforms(inuniversities,regulatoryenvironmentfor innovationetc)tocreateopportunitiesforexistingindustriestofindnewgrowthpathsandtopursue‘all-Japan-efforts’innewSTI‘frontiers’.TheStrategicMarketCreationPlanisbasedonthelogicofcreatingnewdomesticandglobalmarketsbytacklingcurrentsocial issues (i.e. energy constraints, health and medical care, next generationinfrastructure, revitalization of regions).With the adoption of the ComprehensiveStrategyonScience,TechnologyandInnovationin2013and2014,thegovernmentintroducedsimilarrevisedSTIvisions(until2030andbasedontheideasofInnovation25)intotheSTIpolicydiscourse.

- TheFifthScienceandTechnologyBasicPlan2016-2020hasingeneralcontinuedtheideasproposedbyInnovation25andAbenomics.ToframetheoverallapproachtoSTI, the Plan proposes a new concept – super-smart society, or society 5.0 – thatreflectsanattempttoshiftfromtechnologyandeconomicdevelopmentdrivenSTIthinkingtowardsbroadersociety-andhuman-centricapproach.Whiletheconceptisconsciouslyproposedinanopen-endedwayandstillabstractlydefined,theconcretepolicyactionsofthroughPlanarespecifiedthroughprioritiesthatcouldbeconsideredas technologyorientedmissions to coordinate thedevelopmentofdifferent socio-technicalsystemsrelatedtoSociety5.0.9

InTaiwan,sincethelate2000s,thereseemstobearathersimilarrhetoricalshifttakingplaceintheSTIpolicyfocusonlogics.The‘sustainabledevelopment’and‘qualityoflife’priorities,emphasized in STI rhetoric since the first industrial development and STI related policydocuments from1960sonwards,have takenaclearer formandmorecentral stage inSTI

8 The Great East Japan Earthquake lead to the revision of the strategy with recovery from the disastersoperationalizedasaseparateessentialchallenge.9In2015,thefollowingsystemswereselectedaspriorityareas:optimizingtheenergyvaluechain,buildingaglobalenvironmentinformationplatform,maintenanceandupgradeofanefficientandeffectiveinfrastructure,attainingaresilientsocietyagainstnaturaldisasters,IntelligentTransportSystems,newmanufacturingsystems,integrated material development systems, and promoting integrated community care systems, hospitalitysystems, smart food chain systems, and smart production systems. The concept of Society 5.0 requires theconsolidation of key technologies (cybersecurity, IoT system architecture, big data analytics, AI, devicetechnology,networktechnology,edgecomputing)andsupportforfundamentaltechnologiesthatcancreatefuturevalueandwhereJapanhasglobaledge(robotics,sensortechnology,actuatortechnology,biotechnology,humaninterfacetechnology,material/nanotechnology,light/quantumtechnology)

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policy discourse, as well as in overall political competition between parties. This shiftcoincidedwiththereturnofKMTtogovernmentin2009(afterbeinginoppositionsince2002)andthesevereimpactoftheGFConTaiwan’sdevelopmentmodel(seeRosieretal.2016).In2011,thegovernmentProposed‘GoldenDecadeNationalVision’ (formallyalso integratedinto the National Development Plan of 2013-2016) where a new perspective towardseconomic,socialandenvironmentalgoalswasproposed(e.g.tochangethegrowthmodelfromefficiencytoopennessandinnovation;proposaltosubstitutetheindicatorofGDPwithGNH–GrossNationalHappiness). In termsof actual STI policies andplans,we can seeagradualemergenceofthesocietalchallengesconceptualizationthroughtwoperiods(atleastuntilthenewgovernmentwasformedin2016):

- TheNationalScienceandTechnologyDevelopmentPlan2009-2012andWhitePaperonScienceandTechnology2011-2015recognizedthatitwillbeincreasinglydifficultto maintain prior rates of economic growth. Further, the unbalanced economic,environmentalandsocietalimpactsofpriordevelopmenterasrequirerethinkingofthe economic development oriented STI strategies and to shift from ‘technology-oriented’to‘needs-oriented’modelinSTIdevelopment.The2011WhitePaper,whiletakingandexplicit crisisnarrative10,proposedavision that: ‘Taiwanwillbecomeaglobal leader ingreenenergytechnologyandintelligent livingby2020’ (priorPlansand White Papers had proposed the vision to achieve the level of technologicaldevelopmentequaltodevelopednationsby2010or2015).Throughbothdocumentsit was argued that such needs based approach should be based on ‘innovation-oriented’asopposed‘efficiency-oriented’discoveriesinwhichTaiwaneseSTIsystemhadexcelledsincethe1970s;andthatthiswouldrequireashiftfromthebottom-updriventomoretop-downandcoordinatedSTIpolicymakingandplanningtoprovidespacesforflexibilityandthe interdisciplinaryblendingoftechnologies.NationalSTIpriorities were operationalized as long list of priority domains, including bothtechnological domain where Taiwan could success in global competition (e.g.computersandsoftware,telecommunicationssystemsetc)aswellasdomainsthatcouldledtosolutionstoemergingenvironmentalandqualityoflifeissues(e.g.controlof epidemics, research and monitoring of natural disasters, prevention ofenvironmentalpollutionetc).

- GiventhedifficultiesofexitingtheimpactsoftheGFC,securingfundingforSTIandoveralldebatableperformanceoftheSTIsystem,theNationalScienceandTechnologyDevelopmentPlan2013-2016Plan(p.22)raisedmorefundamentalquestions‘overthe significance of a balanced development of and the link between technology,economy and society’ and recognized that ‘If economic growth could no longerguaranteetosecurehappiness,thedistributionofresourcesshouldstrikeabalancebetweensocialwelfareandeconomicdevelopment’.TheSTIvisionproposedinthesubsequentWhitePaperonScienceandTechnology2015-2018furtherdepartsfrom

10The2011WhitePaperemphasizedbothglobalcrises(‘globalrecessiontriggeredbyAmericansubprimeloancrisis, the outbreak of new types of flu, environmental changes caused by overdevelopment, exhaustion ofresources,andecologicalimbalance’)aswellasTaiwan’sownchallenges(‘Alackofnaturalresources,shortagesofhabitableland,afragilenaturalenvironment,disputesconcerningtheprecedenceofeconomicdevelopmentandsafelivingconditions,theeffectofgrowingcross-Straitrelationsindustrialdevelopmentstructure,theagingof society, and trend toward smaller families’) forwhich social- transformations-inducingSTI solutionswereenvisioned.

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thegrowth-focusednarrativebyproposingthevisionof‘usingintelligenttechnologyto create a prosperous society and achieve sustainable growth’ and introduces aconceptof‘low-carbonintelligentsociety’.Whiletheconceptisnotdefinedingreatdetail,itisusedasanumbrellatermforthestrategicactivitiesaimedatestablishingTaiwanasglobal leader ingreentechnology;or, to transformTaiwan ‘fromenergyimporting country into a clean energy technology exporting country’ through thedevelopment of green technology solutions and the distribution and consumptionenvironments(fromsafetyanddisasterpreventionnetworkstoandlow-carbonurbanenvironments)(seeWhitePaperonScienceandTechnology2015-2018:166-170).

Insum, inbothcasesthegenericSTIpoliciesfocusingon improvingframeworkconditions(humancapitaldevelopment,IPprotectionsystems,fundingofentrepreneurship,academia-industry links) are being complemented by new attempts to provide some substantivedirectionandmissionstoSTIpolicy.Thesedirectionsattempttoincreasinglybridgedomesticsocio-economic development needs and export-oriented economic development goals. InJapan, we can witness a somewhat more systemic and thorough shift which could bedescribed as a shift from the developmentalist ideational framework towards modernentrepreneurialstateandmissionorientedlogicwherebyeconomicgrowthanddevelopmentandsocietalchallengesare increasinglyoperationalizedastwosidesofthesamecoinandfocus of policies is on triggering private sector led technological developmentswithin anoveralldirection(towardssociety5.0)proposedbythegovernment.InthecaseofTaiwan,theoverallapproachandevolutionseemsrathersimilarandmanyprioritiesandconceptsemergeinapatternthatfollowsJapan,buttheprocessofconstructingthenewSTIpolicylogicismorerecentandstillemerging.Inbothcases,animportantaspectisthatthechangesinpolicyrhetoricalandprioritieshavebeenproposedandbroughttothepolicydiscourseduringsignificantchangeevents(changesofgovernment,intheaftermathoflargenaturaldisasters).Atthesametime,asweshowbelow,theimplementationofthesenewstrategicdirectionsdependsontheactionsofdifferentactorsfromsciencetoeconomicbureaucraciesandbeyond.GiventhelegaciesofthedevelopmentalstateandtheimpactoftheGFC,theindustrial and economic development concerns (vs desired attempts to balance betweeneconomic and social/environmental goals) seem to still dominate in the actual policyimplementationphase.

3.3. GovernanceofmodernSTIpoliciesinJapanandTaiwanInJapan,theemergenceofthechallenge/missionorientedSTIpolicylogicshasoverlappedwithseveraldevelopmentsinthegovernancesystems.Sincethe2001administrativereform,theCSTPhasbeenexpectedtocarryouttheroleofcoordinatingnationalSTIpolicies.Butthistaskwasinitiallymadedifficultbyseverallegaciesofthepriorsystem:eachministrywasstilltasked with own strategic planning and priority setting and negotiated individually withMinistryofFinanceoveractualbudgets.Thus,CSTPstoolboxwasrathersoft:itcouldmostlyreact toproposalsand ideas,buthad limitedtools for initiatingnewpolicydirectionsandinitiatives.

StenbergandNagano(2009)claimthatsincetheInnovation25andalsoinfluencedbythepracticaldifficultofincreasingfundinginareaswereJapanwasmakingfastscientificprogress(iPSresearchbreakthroughsin2007),globaloilandfoodpricefluctuations,GFC(especially

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USstimuluspackageandinvestmentsintoenvironmentandenergySTI),theCabinetOfficeand CSTP tried to take itself the role of a dynamic ‘change agent’ in STI processes. CSTPintroducedTopPriorityPolicy Issuesasanadditional layerofprioritization11andusedtheSpecialCoordinationFund(about1%oftotaland10%ofcompetitiveSTIfunding)toinitiatecross-ministerial coordination projects. In 2008, it also initiated the TransformativeTechnologiesPlanlisting23technologiesthatcouldeitherrevitalizeexistingindustriesandcreatenewindustriesandmarkets(insomecasealsosocialimpacts).Thegovernmentalsoused themore flexibleprocessesof supplementarybudgetdrafting (i.e. in2009STI fundsfromsupplementarybudgetequalled38%ofannualSTIbudgets)toinitiatemoreproactiveanddynamicprogramsandinitiatives(i.e.TransformativeTechnologiesFund)withsomealsobasedontheDARPA-like12principal investigator (PI) focused instruments (i.e. theFundingProgramforWorld-LeadingInnovativeR&DonScienceandTechnology)andmoreproactive‘allJapanefforts’toorganizeprioritySTIprojectstobesupportedbymoreflexibleregulatoryenvironment (i.e. CEFP initiated ‘Super-Special Consortia’ for prioritized STI in medicalresearch).Overall,thepoliticalleadershipbecamemoreactivelyinvolvedinthecoordinationandplanningprocesses.13Whilesomethese initiativeswererelativelyshort-lived–as thegovernmentchangesin2010andrefocusedsomeoftheinitiatives–,theybecamecoreSTIgovernanceideasof‘Abenomics’andnewSTIpolicyapproachdevelopedsince.

SincetheonsetofAbenomics,CSTIhasbeenconsciouslydevelopedintothe‘headquarters’ofJapaneseSTIpolicies.In2014,itwasequippedwiththeScienceandTechnologyBudgetingReviewCommittee throughwhich the tasks and role of CSTI has in theory becomemoreproactive(especiallybycoordinatingcross-ministerialprioritiesbeforethesearesubmittedtotheMinistryofFinance)thanthepriorreviewandassessmentofbottom-upproposals.Yet,the lack of sufficient organizational capacities in CSTI for monitoring and analysis of thepoliciesandproposalsofdifferentorganizationshas led tobothoutsideand self-criticismregarding the effectiveness of this coordination instrument. 14 Further, several expertsclaimedthatgiventheweakcapacitiesoftheCSTI, it isnot fullyclearwho isthedefacto‘leader’ofJapaneseSTIpolicydevelopments.

Inaddition,CSTIhasintroducedimportantattemptstodirectlyimplementitsstrategiesandactnotonlyas‘changeagent’onthelevelofpolicydirectionandjustifications,butalsoinactualSTIfundingandimplementation.Throughitsownbudget(ca4%ofSTIfunding),ithasinitiatedtheso-calledNationalEmphasisPrograms–StrategicInnovationProgram(SIP)andImpulsing Paradigm Change through Disruptive Technologies Program (ImPACT) – thatcontinuetheinitiativesintroducedinlate2000s:SIPcontinuesthetop-downcross-ministerialcoordinationinitiativesoftheCSTP(fundedbytheSpecialCoordinationFund)andImPACT11Transformativetechnologies,lowcarbontechnologies,S&Tdiplomacy,regionalempowermentthroughS&T,Pioneeringprojectsforacceleratingsocialreturn.12Though,somelocalexpertsarguedthatthisso-calledDARPAapproachofselectingandsupportingPIswasinfactoriginallydevelopedandusedalsobyJSTbeforethe2001administrativereforms.13StenbergandNagano(2009:84)reportthatregardingtheselectionofthePIsfortheFIRSTprogramm,PrimeMinisterAsoclaimedthat‘Iwillmakefinaldecsisionsmyselfwhenitcomestochoosingthecentralresearchersandresearchthemes’.14 In addition, the Cabinet Office has tried to centrally coordinated other policy initiatives (e.g. creation ofhealthcare policy and R&D headquarters based on the UD NIH model, deliberation of New Low CarbonTechnologyPlan),butalsointhesecasestherehasbeencriticismoflimitedpolicyandadministrativecapabilitiesandoverallfragmentationofSTIrelatedactivitiesundertheCabinetOffice.

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carries forward the ideasof theFIRSTprogram.Bothplacecore focuson theselectionofcapable projectmanagers/leaders (PIs)who are given extensive autonomy to design andimplementconcreteactionsthroughteamselection,R&Dstrategiesetc.SIPprogramseekstoimplementactivitiesinnationalpriorityissueagreedbytheCSTI(e.g.regardingenergy,infrastructure development; see the Strategic Innovation Program 2016 for the list ofactivities)andthroughcomprehensivecoordinationofSTIfunding,regulatoryreformsandmarketsupportbetweendifferentministriestospeed-uptheprocessesofinnovation(fromproblemsandchallengestoexitsintermsofsolutionsandindustrialapplications).ImPACTprogram has been justified in terms of emulating the successful DARPA approach andconsciousinvestmentinthe‘high-riskhigh-impact’topicswithfocusfrombasicresearchtocommercially viable ‘exits’ (see Comprehensive Strategy for Science, Technology andInnovation2014;ImPACT2016).

Compared to the Western mission-oriented approaches, an important difference of theJapaneseapproachisthatundertheCSTI,theseprogramsandprojectsarepotentiallyundermuch stronger scrutiny (by public and other bureaucratic actors especially Ministry ofFinance),whichisquiteoppositetothe‘hidden’and‘protected’changeagentsapproachoftheUS. Thismight create future problems regarding the evaluation and accountability ofthese high risk and experimental investments. Further, while there would be strongargumentstoapplytheportfolioapproachtosuchinitiativeslikeSIPandespeciallyImPACT,inrealitythishasnotbeenthecase.Theperformanceoftheseprogramswillbestillevaluatedon the level of individual projects. Themain goal for ImPACT fundedprojectswill be thefinancialviabilityoftheprojectsaftertheterminationofImPACTfundingwhileSIPhassetgoalofactualshowcasingofsomeoftheresultduringthe2020TokyoOlympics.Thus,whilethe selection of project leaders and research topics has been rather flexible andentrepreneurial state like, the actual process of project implementation is much morebureaucraticallyregulatedandmonitored.Forbothprograms,themaintool formanagingrisksseemsto‘insource’legitimacyfromtheactiverolehighlevelbusinessrepresentativesinthe advisory and governing programs of these projects supported by regular (monthly)oversightoftheprojectactivitiesundertheCSTI.15

ThescopeofthetasksofCSTI–draftingandevaluatingS&TPlans,coordinatingSTIbudgets,implementingprogramsindiversesetsofdomains–makeitlookmorelikeagenericministrythanmission-orientedchangeagentthatseekstoinitiatechangesinspecificpolicy/challengeareas.Inaddition,CSTIreliesontheagenciesofMETI(NEDO)andMEXT(JSPS,JST)foractualprojectmanagementandimplementation.Inotherwords,CSTImightbeequippedwithsomedynamiccapabilitiestoinitiatechange,butitlacksordinarycapabilitiesforactualSTIpolicyimplementation. Thus, STI strategies have also started to pay increasing focus on theorganization routines and capabilities of STI funding agencies. For example, both JST andNEDOwererecently(2015)designatedasnationalR&DagenciestoallowthemtodevelopR&Dspecificorganizationalroutines(longertimeframesforperformanceandaccountabilityetc).Atthesametime,undertheguidanceoftheirrespectiveministries,theseagencieshavebeendeveloping theirown strategiesandorganizational routines. Forexample,METI andNEDOhavepursuedtheirownapproachthroughdevelopingstrategictechnologyroadmapsand related technology management approaches, which look much more incremental15Inaddition,the2014strategyproposed2020TokyoOlympicsasashowcasebenchmarkformanyinitiatives.

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innovationandcommercializationoriented that theCSTI ‘high-riskhigh return’ logics (seeYasunagaetal.2009)aswellandsocietalchallengesrelatedexperimentationlogics.NEDOofficialsclaimthatwhenmanagingandimplementingSIPprojects,NEDOstillfollowsitsownmanagerialapproach(exceptforevaluationandreportingwhichisbasedonCSTIguidelines),thoughprojectmanagershavestronginfluenceoverthedirectionoftheproject.

Overall,theevolutionofthepolicyideasandattemptstoframechallenges/missionsnexttogenericframeworkconditionsimprovingSTIpoliciesseemtostillbeinfluencedbythepolicyandadministrativelegaciesoftheSTIsystem.ItwascommonlyarguedbymanyMEXTandCSTI related experts that these attempts to bridge scientific research and economicdevelopment policies under common umbrella have had little effect on METI who hasenjoyeditsownfinancialindependence(i.e.energyspecialaccount)aswellaspoliticallinkstotheCabinetindependentofCSTI.IthasbeenrecognizedthatMETIstillfocusesonitslogicof commercialization and instead of the Society 5.0 it prefers to frame policies throughnarrower and economic development oriented concepts of Industry 4.0 or 4thindustrialization.Inotherwords,METIsupportsthesocietalchallengespolicylogicwhenitservesitscommercializationandindustrializationgoals.Atthesametime,ittherecentpolicyandinstrumentlevelinitiativesofCSTIseemtohavemoreimpactonMEXTwhoseexistingroleandtasksseemtobechallengedbyCSTI.WhileCSTIseemstobuildtheentrepreneurialstatelogicbasedapproachtosocietalchallenges(focusonhighriskprojects,steeringfirmsandindustriestotacklesocio-economicissues),MEXTpolicynetworksseemtobebuildingmore science-driven logics andmore bottom-up transitionmanagement type approaches(e.g. see the methodology and proposals by the Centre of Research and DevelopmentStrategyofJST).InTaiwan,theemergingpolicyrhetoricofneeds-basedandinnovation-orientedSTIpolicieshas been paralleled by rather similar tendencies to centralize STI policy design andimplementationwhilealsotryingtofindwaystosupportexperimentalSTIinitiatives.In2012,thegovernmentformedanewhigh-levelcoordinatingbody–BoardofScienceandTechnology(BOST)oftheExecutiveYuan–thatispresidedbytheExecutiveYuanpremierand includes heads of key agencies, members of industry, academia and researchorganizations. The tasks of BOST include: reviewing country’s S&T policies; allocatingcountry’s S&T resources; reviewing and supervising major S&T development programs;coordinating, integrating and promoting interagency S&Tmatters; organizing and holdingmajorS&Tstrategicplanningconferences.Inprinciple,BOSTinstitutionalizespriormorefluidpolicycoordinationactivities(throughSTAG,NSCinitiativesetc)andelevatestohigherstatustasksformerlycarriesoutbytheNSC.ItissupportedbytheExecutiveYuantaskforceOfficeofScienceandTechnology.Thus, in its roleandstructure, it isquitesimilar to theCSTI inJapan.Yet, itwasarguedby localexperts thatasa relativelyyoungbodypresidedby thepremier,itsroleandtasks(androledivisionswithotheractors)areratherfluidanddependon the policy priorities of the premier and government in specific times. Further, its STI-relatedtasksareinfluencedbytheNationalDevelopmentCouncil(NDC)alsocreatedin2012(basedontheCouncilofEconomicPlanningandDevelopment)asasortof‘mini-cabinet’todebate new policy initiatives proposed by the ministries (especially regarding social andinfrastructureinvestments;while‘pure’STIproposalsaredebatedbyBOST)beforethesearedecidedbytheExecutiveYuanandinitiatenewindustriesandinitiatives.Inprinciple,NDC’s

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DepartmentofIndustrialDevelopmentseekstofosternationalscaleindustrialpolicieswitha focus on technological development, special industrial development, improvement ofemploymentrate,GDPgrowth,regionaldevelopment.Thus,asarguedbylocalexperts,whileBOSTfocusesonindustrieswithexistingpotential,NDCdeliberatesalsowiderprospectiveindustries,suchasIoT,andinthesecases,theroleoftheNDCistobeinchargeofoverallplanning,reviewofotherministries,creationofacommonplatformfordiscussions,budgetcoordinationespeciallyregardingbigspendingoninfrastructure.LocalexpertsalsoarguethattheroleofNDChasbecomemorecentralafterthe2016electionswithnational industrialprioritiesandframeworksproposedbyNDC.In2014,MinistryofScienceandTechnology(MOST)wasestablishedbasedonNSC,butwithadditional roles and competencies (new departments) regarding foresight and innovationpolicy as well as academia-university collaboration. Formally, the tasks ofMOST include:formulationofcounty’sS&Tpolicies;drafting,coordinationandassessmentofgovernmentS&TdevelopmentprogramsandreviewoftheS&Tbudget;promotionofbasicandappliedS&Tresearch16;promotionofmajorS&TR&Dprogramsandsupportforacademicresearch;drafting,promotionandmanagementofforward-lookingindustrialtechnologyR&Dpoliciesandtechnologyassessment;developmentofscienceparks;managementofNationalScienceandTechnologyDevelopmentFund.Inotherwords,thecreationofMOSThas,ontheonehand,raisedthepoliticalvisibilityanddebatesoverSTIstrategiesandpolicies(NSCwasundertheExecutiveYuan,butasministry,MOSThastobeaccountablealsototheLegislativeYuan)and,on theotherhand, increased theexpectationson the strategicpriority setting inSTIpoliciesandthespeedandscopeofacademia-industrytechnologytransfer.Overall,thenewgovernance system has become relatively mainstream spearheaded by political levelcoordinatinginstitutions(governmentmeetings,BOST,NDC)andbasedontwokeyministries(MOSTandMOEA17).Yet,therehavebeentworatheruniqueelementsinthesystem.First,theseorganizationsstillrelyonandcontinuecreatingnewhigh-leveladvisoryboards.Before the administrative reorganizations, STAGwas themain advisory group functioningthrough ad hoc and annual meetings. With the creation of BOST, such advisory andcoordinating role became more institutionalized and systemic. In addition, in 2012, NSCinitiated a new Science and Technology Development Advisory Conference which hasproposednewapproachestomainpolicytasksofMOST(i.e.toadoptDARPAapproach inmission-orientedprojectsetc)(seeWhitePaperonScienceandTechnology2015-2018:26-27). Also in 2012, the government introduced the National Industrial DevelopmentConference.Inadditiontothesegenericconference,alsodomainspecificmeetingsarestill

16The2011WhitePaperenvisionedthedivisionofSTIfundingsothatMOSTfinancesmostbasicandappliedresearchwhilewhileotherotherS&T-relatedagenciesfundS&Tdevelopmentandindustrialization.Further,itjustified the creation of MOST in terms of increasing economic impact of STI: ‘It is hoped that the neworganizationalsystemwilleffectivelyjoinup-,mid-,anddownstreamS&Tdevelopmentactivities,givestrongerrootstohightechindustries,andboostindustry'saddedvaluebylettingR&Dresultsguideimprovementstotheindustrystructure.Inthefuture,theunificationofservicesandpowersattheExecutiveYuanScienceandTechnologyMeeting,MinistryofScienceandTechnology,andotherrelevantagencieswillaccelerateinnovativeR&D, enable the effective allocation of S&T resources, and realize the vision of using S&T development tostrengthennationalcompetitiveness’.17Inrecentyears,MOSThasfundedabout40%ofSTI,MOEAabout28-30%,theallocationtoAcademiaSinicahave equalled about 12%of all government STI funding andMinistry ofHealth andWelfare andCouncil ofAgriculturehavecoveredabout4%orless(seeWhitePaperonScienceandTechnology2015-2018:30-31).

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usedtodraftpoliciesandstrategies(e.g.since1998NationalEnergyConferencehasbeenheldregularly;since2002annualStrategyReviewBoardMeetingsforScienceandTechnologyareheld).Especiallynationallevelconferences(generalscienceandtechnologyconference,national energy conference) have introduced more open-ended participatory modes ofpolicy-making (web-based solicitation of ideas, which are pre-assessed before publicdeliberationsforfeasibilitybytheexperts)andinclusionofcivilsocietyorganizationsamongconferencemembers(importantly,theseconferencesareaskedtocomeupwithunanimousconclusionsthatwouldideallyguidepoliciesandstrategies).Second,anevenmorenoteworthyelementoftheTaiwanesesystemisthelackofSTIfundingagencies under the respectiveministries (such as NEDO, JST, JSPS in Japan) as the 1999FundamentalScienceandTechnologyActdidnotforeseesuchbodies.Rather,theministriesare still in direct interactions with STI performers: in the case of MoEA, its differentdepartmentsandbureausarecloselylinkedtopublicresearchorganizationssuchasITRI;inthe case of MOST, similar role is fulfilled by NarLabs, but it also funds predominantlyuniversities(undertheMinistryofEducation)andAcademiaSinica(undertheOfficeofthePresident).Whileinthecaseofbottom-upfundingofresearchorganization,thelackofsuchspecializedagencieswasnotseenasaproblem,inthecaseofdualtasksofbottom-upandtop-down funding of STI, it may bemore difficult to combine these tasks into the sameorganizationalstructureandroutinesoftheministry.Insuchgovernancesystem,onecan’talsotalkaboutspecializedmission-orientedchangeagents,atleastintheWesternsense,thattriggerchangesinspecificchallengeareas(especiallyastheSTItasksandrolesofuniversitiesandpublic researchorganizationsare ineachcaseof supporting technologydevelopmentdividedbasedonthetechnologyreadinesslevelanalysisandsimilarapproachesthatdividetheSTIsupplyanddiffusiontasksratherlinearly).Theroleof‘changeagents’isstillcarriedoutbyoldandestablishedSTIperformers–suchasIndustrialDevelopmentBureauoftheMOEA,ITRIandotherparastatalagencies.Yet,aswasarguedbyITRIofficials,indraftingtheirresearch strategies and programs (in the area of green energy18), ITRI follows MOEA’sguidance,whitepapers(e.g.EnergyIndustryWhitePaper)andstrategiesasopposedtothenationalSTIPlansandstrategies.Whilethesedocumentsemphasizetheneedtocombineenergy, economic and environmental concerns (so called win-win-win logic), it is alsorecognized that specific strategic planning tools (technology readiness assessment tool,technological roadmaps etc) are more geared towards incremental and efficiency drivenpoliciesratherthansupportinghigh-riskandtransformativeinnovationorientedpoliciesandrethinking socio-technical development patters as prioritized in the overall STI rhetoric.Therefore,thecoordinationofthestrategiesandmissionsofdifferentactorsandtranslationofnewpolicygoalsintoconcreteactionsisstilldependentonhigh-levelpolicycoordinationacrossministriesandmediatedbytop-levelcivilservantsandpoliticians.While on the level of policy-making, we witness increasing political and administrativecentralization of STI policies (through BOST, MOST, NDC and other bodies created byExecutive Yuan), on the level of policy instruments designed and implemented by theseactors,weseealsosomeemergentelementsoftherisk-takingandexperimentalapproachregardingbothmarket-supportingandchallenges-orientedactivities. Since2012,different18Alternativeenergy,energyconservationandrelatedactivitieshavebeenimportantpolicyfocusofMOEAsincelate 1960s (initially under Energy PolicyDeliberationGroups and since 1979under the Energy Commission;becameBureauofEnergyin2004.

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organizationshavetriedto introducenewpolicy instrumentsthatconsciouslyadoptmoreflexibleorganizationalprinciples(fromselectiontomanagementandperformanceindicators)tofostercross-sectoralcollaborationinhigh-riskandfutureorienteddomains.NSCandMOEAjointly launchedthePIONEERGrantsforFrontierTechnologiesDevelopmentbyAcademia-Industry Cooperation to undertakehigh risk R&D in forward-looking technologies and tosupport firms through IP protection, human capital development etc.19 Other similarinstruments include Academic-Industry Technological Alliance Projects to set-up coretechnological R&D laboratories (in 2013 75 project were funded) and Applied ResearchIncubation Projects to fund forward-looking, original and early research that is productorientedandwithapplicationpotential.(SeeWhitePaperonScienceandTechnology2015-2018:110-114).Onamoreindividuallevel,NSCinitiated100PersonPioneeringTrialProgramtosupportnon-conventionalandhigh-riskandexploratoryresearchideas(theplanforesaw2-yearprojectwithannualfundingof1millionTWDtobeevaluatedafter1yearwithatleasthalfoftheprojecttoberejectedforfurtherfunding).TheFreeExcellenceAcademicResearchTrial Program was designed to high-risk and forward-looking strategies and capabilitiesbuildingontheorganizationallevel.(SeeIbid.122-123)WhilemostnationalS&TPrograms–thatwerethekeynationalprioritysettingandpolicycoordination tools throughout the 2000s – have been closed down, the only continuingNationalEnergyProgram–NEP–wassignificantlyrevisedafterthefirstperiodendedin2013.WhilethefirstphaseofNEP–organizedundertheNSC–wasorganizedinarelativelybottom-upmanner and following the logic of science (and it was largely managed by universityscientistthemselves),theNEP-IIisco-financedbyMOST,MOEAandindustryandunderthecloser supervision of MOEA (the PI is the current vice-minister of MOEA). Also, the‘outsourcing’approach(opencallsforprojectideas)hasbeensubstitutedwithmoretargetedandmission-basedapproach(thegeneralanddomainleadersplanR&Dprioritiesandselectteams to fulfill these projects) and provided with clearer phase-out mechanism andperformancetargets.(SeeWhitePaperonScienceandTechnology2015-2018:97-100)Theprojects are selected, coordinated andmanaged based on the technology-readiness levelassessmentwhereby the basic research level activities are carried out in universities andfinancedbyMOST,butmorematuretechnologiesandactivities(fromconceptstoproducttesting)aregraduallymoved topublic researchorganizationsuchas ITRI tobeeventuallyspunouttoindustry.Overall,theProgramhasbecomelesssciencedrivenandmorestateandbureaucracy-ledandcontrolled.Atthesametime,MOEAofficialstilladmitthatthereisagapbetweenMOSTandMOEAasMOEAfocusesonprojectswith2-5yeartimeframeswhilemostofNEP-IIprojectsfocusontechnologiesthatwillbeusablein10-20years.Andwhilethefocushasbeenplacedoncommercialization,it isforeseenthatMOEAandITRIneedtotaketheleadinthelatter.Further,giventheprioritiesofthenewgovernmenttoshifttonuclearfreeandlowcarbonenergysystemby2025(underthepreviousgovernmenttheseweretreated

19 In2013,2projects includingTSMCandChinaSteelCorporationhadbeeninitiatedbasedonthelogicthatcorporatepartnersformulateresearchquestions,organizesateamwithapplicantuniversitytojointlypursueforward-lookingR&D.Itisexpectedthatthecorporateallianceco-financedatleast80millionTWDoftheProject(40%researchrelated)whilethegovernment(MOST,MOEA)contributeuptp400millionTWDannuallyforupto3projectintotal.

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ascomplementary focuses),mostofexistingpolicyprioritiesandcoordinationmechanismarecurrentlyrevisedunderevenhigher-leveloversight.20FormostSTIprojects inTaiwan,rathersimilar ‘tables’ofperformance indicatortablesarecompiled (e.g. covering publications, defended MA and PhD theses, patents, technologytransfers,industrialinvestments,newcompanies,jobs,inthecaseofenergyprojectssomespecifictargets:awards,CO2reduction,environmentalimpact).Butasarguedbylocalpolicyexperts,dependingonthecontext,thesametablemaybeused,butitisread‘differently’(i.e.some indicators matter more than others). Further, these indicators have been used asadditional information source andnot definitive tool for policy evaluation,which is oftenbasedoncollectivedecision-makingprinciplesonprogramorinstitutionlevel(asopposedtosingleprojectlevel).Atthesametime,severallocalexpertsalsoarguedthattheelevationofthe NSC to the ministry level has increased parliamentary oversight of STI activities andincreased the focus and political scrutiny based on few cherry picked key performanceindicatorsasopposedtomoresystemicevaluationsanddiscussions.

4. DiscussionInthecontextofthegrowingemphasisonchallenges-,needs-based,orproblem-orientedSTIpolicies,wecanseebothinJapanandTaiwanattemptstointroducesimilarpolicylogicsbymixing the specific developmentalist legacies of bureaucracy-led STI policy-making andmodernmission-orientedandentrepreneurialstatelogicsregardingtheroleofthestateinSTI:stateisseenincreasinglyasapro-activeandentrepreneurialactorleadingfirmstonewemergingindustriesandmarketsthroughtargeted,experimentalandhighriskapproachestoSTIfundingandgovernance.WhiletheglobalresearchonsocietalchallengesandSTIwouldleadonetoexpecteithermorehiddenandspecializedchangeagentsand/orco-productiveandparticipatorypolicyapproacheswheresocialactorsareincludedinthepolicyprocesses,weseemtowitnessthecontinuedimpactofthedevelopmenalistlegacies:thestatetendstocentralize suchhigh risk anduncertain activities in high-level policymakingbodieswhereclose-knitpolitico-administrativenetworksdominateoverotherfeedbacksources.At the same time, these high-level bodies – CSTI in Japan and BOST/MOST in Taiwan –currentlylackdirectaccessto‘changeagents’whowouldbespecializedinspecificchallengeareasandequippedwithnecessarydynamiccapabilitiestotriggersystemicsocio-technicalchangesneededtotackletheboundary-spanningandcomplexchallengesine.g.healthcaresystems and environmental/energy sustainability. Rather, they have to rely on policycoordinationandcollaborationwithotherministries–especiallyMETIandMOEA–andtheirrespectiveSTIfundingandimplementingagencies.Yet,theseorganizationsseemtobemoreembedded in their traditional organizational routines and policy logics of commerce orindustrialdevelopment.BothinJapanandTaiwan,itwasrecognizedbydifferentexpertsthatthenewnarrativesconstructedthroughnationalSTIplanshavehadlimited impactonthepolicyarenasunderrespectiveministriesofeconomy.Asaresult,theJapaneseCSTI,whiletryingtoactasanewhigh-levelchangeagentsteeringthedirectionoftheSTIdiscourseandpolicies,hasalsotriedtocentralizedmanytasksofSTIpoliciesintothehighest-levelpolitical20 In2016,thenewgovernmentset-upanewExecutiveYuanlevelEnergyandCarbonReductionOfficethatreporttothepremiertofurtherimprovethetop-downcoordinationofrenewableenergypolicies(pursuedbyMOST,MOEA,EnvironmentalProtectionAgency).

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institution (Cabinet Office). While this may provide authoritative capacities to steer andcoordinatestrategiesand instrumentsofdifferentministries– though it seems to requiremuchhigherorganizationalcapabilitiesthanassumessofar–thatmayspillovertoresearchfunding and implementing agencies, it creates opposite threats of simplistic public andpoliticalcriticismof‘high-riskhigh-return’investmentsandpolicyexperimentation,bothofwhichareboundtoleadtosignificantandexpensivefailures.InthecaseofTaiwan,theroleofexecutive leadershipand itschanges inrecentdecadeseemtomattermoreforoverallpolicyshiftsthantheattemptsofBOST/MOSTtoinfluencetheoveralldirectionofthesystem.Existingliteratureonboundary-spanningsocietalchallengesseemstoindicatethattacklingsuch challengesmay require eithermore participatory approaches to governance and bymoresystemicapproachtopolicyevaluationandfeedback.Regardingtheseaspects,itseemsthattheTaiwaneseSTIpolicysystemmayhave–throughthemoreopen-endedsystemofconferencesandcommitteesaswellasrecenttrendstoconsciouslyincludeNGOsandcivilsocietyorganizationsinsuchbodies–moreopen-endedmechanismforparticipationinSTIpolicies than more corporatist Japanese system where politico-administrative elite hastraditionally collaboratedwithmore select groupsof industrial stakeholders.At the sametime,theimportanceofchanceeventsandpowerchangesasthetriggersforchangesinSTIpolicy discourse implies that these bottom-up processes may introduce new ideas andexpectations,but the top-downpolitical choicesandprioritiesmay stillmattermore. ThedevelopmentofportfolioapproachormoreparticipatorymechanismstopolicyevaluationcouldbesofarunusedsolutionsthatbothcountriesshouldconsiderinordertofocuspolicyevaluationsandaccountabilityonmoresystematicviewofSTIpolicies,especiallygiventhenatureofthehigh-riskandhighreturnandexperimentalapproachestoSTIpolicydesignandimplementationIn sum,whilewe see rather similar developments to global trends on the level of policyideas/rhetoric and the design of specific instruments, an alternative form of governanceseems to be emerging and evolving in East Asia that is influenced by the politico-administrativeelitecentredlegaciesof‘developmentalist’policy-makingandprioritysetting.Acknowledgements:ResearchforthispaperhasbeensupportedbytheJSPSKakenhiGrantNo15F15760andEstonianResearchCouncilgrantIUT19-13.ReferencesAcademicsourcesAngel,D.andRock,M.T.(2009)‘EnvironmentalrationalitiesandthedevelopmentalstateinEastAsia:Prospectsforasustainabilitytransition’,TechnologicalForecastingandSocialChange,229-240.Arundel,A.,Kanerva,M.andKemp,R.(2011)AnalysisofInnovationDriversandBarriersinSupportofBetterPolicies,InnoGripsAnalysis.Block,F.L.(2008)‘SwimmingAgainsttheCurrent:TheRiseofaHiddenDevelopmentalStateintheUnitesStates’,Politics&Society,36(2),169-206.

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