Radiofrequency Use and Management: Impacts From the World .../67531/metadc39487/m2/1/high_res… ·...

Radiofrequency Use and Management:Impacts From the World Administrative

Radio Conference of 1979

January 1982

NTIS order #PB82-177536

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 82-600502

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents,U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402

Foreword

This study responds to a request from the Senate Committee on Commerce,Science, and Transportation to evaluate the impacts on the United States of keydecisions taken at the general World Administrative Radio Conference(WARC-79) and to consider options for preparation and participation in futureinternational telecommunication conferences. It reflects congressional concernfor the adequacy of existing machinery and procedures for U.S. policymakingand preparation for such conferences.

WARC-79 and related international conferences and meetings demonstratethat contention for access to the radio spectrum and its important collateral ele-ment, the geostationary orbit for communication satellites, presents new andurgent challenges to vital U.S. national interests. The growing differencesamong nations over the use of the radio spectrum and related satellite orbit ca-pacity are reflected in the Final Acts of WARC-79 which will be submitted to theU.S. Senate in January 1982, for advice and consent to ratification.

Given the complexities of spectrum management in a changing world envi-ronment and the increased importance of telecommunications to both developedand developing nations, it is unlikely that traditional U.S. approaches to theseissues will be sufficient to protect vital U.S. interests in the future. Problems re-quire strategies not yet developed or tested.

OTA acknowledges with thanks and appreciation the advice and counsel ofthe panel members, contractors, other agencies of Government, and individualparticipants who helped bring the study to completion.

JOHN H. GIBBONSDirector

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Radiofrequency Use and Management: Impacts From theWorld Administrative Radio Conference of 1979Advisory Panel

Thomas E. Nelson, ChairmanFormer Director, Office of International Telecommunications Policy, Department of State

Ambassador Jacob BeamHead of the U.S. Delegation to the 1973

Plenipotentiary Conference of theInternational Telecommunication Union

Nolan BowieFormer Executive DirectorCitizens’ Communications Center

Paul DemblingFormer General CounselNational Aeronautics and Space

Administration

John M. EgerFormer Acting DirectorOffice of Telecommunication Policy

James C. FletcherFormer AdministratorNational Aeronautics and Space

Administration

Walter R. HinchmanFormer ChiefCommon Carrier BureauFederal Communications Commission

Harvey J. LevinProfessor, Department of EconomicsHofstra University

Edgar T. MartinFormer Engineering ManagerBroadcasting ServiceU.S. Information Agency

Ithiel De Sola PoolProfessor, Department of Political ScienceMassachusetts Institute of Technology

Raymond E. SpenceFormer Chief EngineerFederal Communications Commission

M. Jon VondracekDirector of CommunicationsCenter for Strategic and International

StudiesGeorgetown University

Grover M. YowellRear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired)Former ManagerNavy Space Project of Naval Electronic

Systems Command

NOTE:: The Advisory Panel provided advice and comment throughout the assessment, but the members do not necessarilyapprove, disapprove, or endorse the report for which OTA assumes full responsibility.

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Radiofrequency Use and Management: Impacts From theWorld Administrative Ratio Conference of 1979Project Staff

John Andelin,Science, Information,

Assistant Director, OTAand Natural Resources Division

Stephen E. Doyle* and Sam Hale,** Program ManagerCommunication and Information Technologies Program

Raymond B. Crowell, Project Director

Administrative Staff

Jeanette Contee Liz Emanuel Shirley Gayheart

Contractors

J. D. Barnla Kappa Systems Inc.Philip S. Cook John J. KelleherFuture Systems Inc. Susan StockerWilliam Hatfield Telecommunications Systems

OTA Publishing Staff

John C. Holmes, Publishing Officer

John Bergling Kathie S. Boss Debra M. Datcher Joe Henson

*Program Manager until March 1981.** program Manager after March 1981.

AcknowledgmentsMany individuals have assisted in various aspects of this study, each making a valuable contribu-

tion to the information and analyses assembled and presented here. Participation does not necessarilyreflect agreement with the entire report or any particular aspect of the report. Contributors include:

Contractor Support

Linda Bower Jack W. Herbstreit Leonard R. Raish Robert TomkinsJ. Russell Burke Heather E. Hudson John Rheinhardt H. E. WepplerRonald S. Eward Michael Jeruchim Reinhard StammingerRichard Gould Nicholas Marzella John A. SteinGeorge Hagn Harley Radin Michael Stoil

Reviewers

Leo Buss Stephen J. Lukasik Arthur I.. FreemanGeorge Codding Carl Matthews Jonathan GunterWilliam J. Cook Richard Parlow Wendell HarrisRobert L. Cutts Samuel E. Probst Edward R. JacobsArlan K, van Doom A. R. Rasmussen Donald JanskyLou Feldner Anthony M. Rutkowski David Leive

Agencies Providing Information and Reviews

Congressional Research Service, Federal Communications National TelecommunicationsLibrary of Congress Commission and Information

Department of Defense National Aeronautics and AdministrationDepartment of State Space Administration U.S. General Accounting Office

Richard E. ShrumDavid P. M. StrubaWilliam R. TorakCharles K. Watt

Participants in the OTA Survey

Perry G. AckermanWilliam AdamsAllen AndersonDexter AndersonLucian L. ArnoneEarl S. BarbelyJerome D. BarnlaRichard BarthGeorge BartlettJacob BeanMartin W. BercoviciJohn Paul BerryRobert S. BlackHerbert T. BlakerWilliam BermanNolan BowieLewis BradleyAnne BranscombDan BrennerRussell BurkeLeo BussPaul E. CarrollAnna L. CaseWilliam CookeAnthony M. CorradoCullen M. CrainRobert L. CuttsSatyendranath DasWilfred DeanThijs DeHaasWillis D. DeHartIthiel de Sola PoolWilson DizardCharles Dorian

A. James EbelJohn M. EgerHarry A. FeiglesonCharles D. FerrisMilford R. FinkArthur L. FreemanL. S. GallemoreHenry GellerJohn GilsenanE. Merle GluntAbilio GomezRobert E. GreenquisitWendell HarrisMervin L. HarrisonWilliam HatfieldJack W. HerbstreitRoger HerbstrittWalter R. HinchmanEarl J. HollimanDavid HonigGordon HuffcuttMarion Hayes HullCharles L. HutchinsonKaryl A. IrionEugene JacksonEdward JacobsGeorge JacobsDonald JanskyMichael C. JeruchimRaymond JohnsonHarold KassensWayne KayJohn J. KelleherJohn W. Kiebler

Harold KimballEmmett Jay KitchenAlex C. LatkerRobert E. LeeStanley LeinwollMaury LisannRay LivesayLloyd G. LudwigStephen J. LukasikWilliam A. LutherJames B. McElroyJames C. McKinneyNeal McNaughtonGeorge MansurRichard B. MarstenEdgar T. MartinSidney MetzgerJohn E. MillerRobert P. MooreSharon NelsonThomas E. NelsonJohn O’BoyleGeneral James D. O’ConnellJames E. ogleLawrence PalmerVernon PankoninEdwin ParkerRichard ParlowPaul PhillipsNeal PikeJames B. PottsWilbur PritchardSamuel E. ProbstJoseph P. Rawley

Alvin ReinerGlen RobinsonJohn T. RobinsonAnthony RutkowskiPeter SawitzKalmann SchaeferJohn SerafinRichard ShrumHillyer SmithNeil M. SmithRaymond E. SpenceRonald F. StoweDavid P. M. StrubaWilliam R. TorakRobert TompkinsPhillip G. TremperCalvin G. TuggleThomas TyczArlan K. van DoomR. J. Van WinegartenF. W. VoegeConstantine WarvarivJames C. WarwickWalter E. WeaverHans WeissH. Edward WepplerHoward A. WhiteClay T. WhiteheadHarold WigrenFrancis K. WilliamsElizabeth L. YoungAdmiral Grover M. Yowell

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Contents

Chapter Page

1. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

2. The Changing Requirements, Influences, and Motivations AmongNations for Use of the Radiofrequency Spectrum. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

3. Domestic and International Management of the Radiofrequency Spectrum 37

4. WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

5. Alternative Structures, Procedures, and Strategies . . . . . . . . . ...........107

6. Findings, Conclusions, and Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...129Acronyms, Abbreviations, and Glossary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...147

Selected Bibliography. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...............157

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Chapter 1

Summary

Contents

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Background of Study. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Principal Findings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

General Observations and Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

U.S. Policymaking Structure and Processes for Spectrum Managementand International Strategies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Need for High-Level Government Policy Coordination andAccountability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Need for New Strategies To Address Spectrum and Related SatelliteOrbit Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Impacts of WARC-79. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Improving U.S. Spectrum Management and Preparation forInternational Telecommunications Conferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

U.S. Strategies for Dealing With International Spectrum Issues and ITU. .Withdrawal From IT.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Revised ITU Voting Formula . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Increased Regionalization of ITU. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Better Coordination and Planning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Common-User System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .“A Priori" Allotment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

U.S. Options Regarding the Final Acts of WARC-79. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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6

6

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9

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14151516171819

20

Chapter 1

Summary

Background of StudyThe Final Acts of the General World Ad-

ministrative Radio Conference (WARC-79)are to be submitted to the U.S. Senate for ad-vice and consent to ratification. Issues vitalto U.S. interests in continued efficient use ofthe radiofrequency spectrum—including sat-ellites operating in geostationary or-bit–were addressed at WARC-79 and will beaddressed at future, more specific confer-ences of the International Telecommunica-tion Union (ITU).

The Senate Committee on Commerce, Sci-ence, and Transportation requested that theOffice of Technology Assessment (OTA) de-termine the impacts on the United States ofdecisions negotiated at the general WorldAdministrative Radio Conference (WARC-79), and consider options for preparation andparticipation in future international telecom-munication conferences. The request reflectscongressional concern for the adequacy ofexisting machinery and procedures for U.S.telecommunication policymaking and prep-aration for international telecommunicationconferences. It also reflects an awareness ofthe vital and growing role that telecommuni-cation plays in our society and our depend-ence on the radiofrequency spectrum.

The purpose of this study was to examineWARC-79 in a comprehensive way–describ-ing U.S. preparations and involvement, andthe impact of the conference. However, noattempt was made to examine all issues andaspects of WARC-79, but rather to focus oncertain important ones and analyze theirconsequences for the United States. Thestudy considered alternative structures, pro-cedures, and strategies to improve frequencyspectrum planning and management to as-sure the United States of continued satisfac-tion of its commercial, Government, and na-tional security requirements for frequency

spectrum and geostationary satellite orbitlocations.

WARC-79 was convened by ITU in an ef-fort to reach global agreement on the revisedinternational arrangements necessary for ef-ficient and interference-free use of the radio-frequency spectrum. The Final Acts of theconference will constitute the “radio regula-tions, Geneva, 1979” and enter into force onJanuary 1, 1982 for those countries thathave formally adopted the Final Acts. The1959 Radio Regulations, as partially revisedby subsequent specialized administrative ra-dio conferences, will be superseded. WARC-79 was of special importance because of thebroad scope of its agenda, which includedmost of the major arrangements relating toradio, and because it was the first general ad-ministrative radio conference since 1959 andtherefore included many developing coun-tries that had won their independence in theintervening two decades.

The telecommunication systems of theUnited States are the most sophisticated, ef-ficient, and all-encompassing in the world.These systems are a vital element of our eco-nomic strength and security; they are an es-sential part of our culture. Other nations,recognizing the key role that telecommunica-tions play in national and international af-fairs, are constantly striving to gain accessto telecommunication technology. Highly in-dustrialized nations seek to surpass theUnited States in technological inventivenessand in the practical exploitation of the manytelecommunication subsystems that makeup a modern “information society. ”

As a leader in communication technology,the United States has been able to devel-op domestic telecommunication systems inlarge measure apart from the activities ofother countries. At the international level,

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4 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

the United States has played a leading rolein shaping an essentially benign and passivemechanism within ITU for allocating radiospectrum to certain specified purposes, andassuring spectrum users the right to operatefree from harmful interference by others.

This international regime, which has suc-ceeded in avoiding chaos in the use of radio-frequencies, is coming under considerablestress as the result of sharply increased de-mand for communication services and result-ing congestion in economically attractiveparts of the radio spectrum. WARC-79 andrelated international conferences and meet-ings demonstrate conclusively that conten-tion for access to the radio spectrum and itsimportant collateral element, the geostation-ary orbit for communication satellites, pre-sents new and urgent challenges to vital U.S.national interests. The growing differencesamong nations over the use of the radio spec-trum and related satellite orbit capacity arereflected in the Final Acts of WARC-79.

Given the complexities of spectrum man-agement in a changing world environmentand the increased importance of telecommu-nication to both developed and developingnations, it is highly unlikely that traditionalU.S. approaches to these issues will be suffi-

PrincipalThe most significant findings of the OTA

study are the following:

1.

2.

There is an urgent need for higher levelattention to Government policy coordi-nation and accountability for interna-tional telecommunication issues gener-ally and for spectrum management is-sues and international negotiations spe-cifically.Streamlined processes, coordinatedGovernment policies, and sufficient re-sources on a continuing basis are essen-tial to effective and timely preparationfor the several major international con-

cient to protect U.S. vital interests in thefuture.

From the U.S. standpoint, the results ofWARC-79 are mixed. The proceedings of anadministrative conference of ITU are gener-ally geared toward arriving at decisions andadopting provisions that are acceptable toall nations with certain exceptions identified;an ITU member country is entitled to take areservation indicating that it will not bebound by specific unacceptable decisions ofthe conference. Therefore, finding a usefulway to measure success and to evaluate acountry’s relative standing following an ad-ministrative conference is not easy. Compar-ing specific U.S. proposals submitted in ad-vance to the conference with the language ofthe Final Acts of the conference is not astraight-forward exercise. While such a com-parison is important, it does not reflect theunderlying reasons and motives for par-ticular decisions, the problems encountered,or any apparent trends important in evaluat-ing results of an administrative radio confer-ence. It is important to understand the inter-vening events that underlie decisions, com-promises, reservations, and postponements;not only to evaluate the results of WARC-79,but to prepare for the many future confer-ences important to U.S. interests.

Findingsferences of ITU now scheduled to occurover the next 7 years.

3. New U.S. approaches are necessary toaddress radio spectrum and related sat-ellite orbit issues in a changing world en-vironment. Solutions to satellite orbitallocation and spectrum reallocation is-sues as envisioned by the Third Worldnations require strategies not yet devel-oped or tested.

4. WARC-79 resulted in the loss of someU.S. flexibility in certain key spectrumareas—particularly those affecting na-tional defense—and enhanced opportu-nities in many other areas.

Ch. 1—Summary ● 5

5.

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Operating costs will increase for certain tive costs will need to rise to adequatelyradio services; interference protection implement WARC-79 decisions and pre-will become less certain; and administra- pare for future radio conferences.

General Observations and TrendsThe world environment for telecom-

munications has changed significantly in re-cent years; two-thirds of the 155 member na-tions of ITU can be classified as developingor Third World countries. There were 65 na-tions and seven groups of colonies present atthe 1947 Atlantic City Conference, 80 na-tions and five groups of colonies at the 1959WARC, and 142 nations (no colonies) atWARC-79.

● There are basic differences between theUnited States and Third World countriesover the principles that should govern theallocation and use of the radio spectrum andrelated satellite orbit capacity. There is in-creasing need to identify and assess optionsto reconcile the sometimes sharply divergentgoals of developing and developed countries.

• Third World countries are increasinglyable to influence and shape internationalcommunication policies in internationalforums.

● The United States must maintain itstechnological leadership and expand its in-fluence if future actions in a “one-nation,one-vote” forum like ITU are to be favorableto U.S. positions.

● There has been a gradual shift towardrecognizing the legitimacy of nontechnicalfactors such as political and cultural inter-

ests and values in ITU deliberations. Inother international forums, Third Worldcountries here raised related issues underconcepts of the New World economic orderand New World information order.

● U.S. requirements for access to the fre-quency spectrum and geostationary satelliteorbit locations are expanding with the explo-sive growth in telecommunication/informa-tion technology, the growing use of satel-lites, and the increasing dependence on radioand satellites for military and national secur-ity purposes.

● The disparity between nations in theirability to use the spectrum is growing; thisleads to growing disagreement over the allo-cation and use of specific frequency bandsfor specific services.

• Spectrum decisions arrived at as a re-sult of voting within ITU, as opposed to thecommonly practiced consensus approach,will tend to be increasingly adverse to theUnited States.

● International telecommunication devel-opment is entering a phase in which regionaland domestic needs and policies will predom-inate, as opposed to more general global fa-cilities expansion. The thrust will be on in-traregional communications and the devel-opment or enhancement of interregionalcommunication routes.


U.S. Policymaking Structure and Processes forSpectrum Management and

International StrategiesNeed for High-Level Government

Policy Coordination andAccountability

● The responsibility for spectrum man-agement and policymaking is divided amongseveral Federal agencies with coordinationconducted on a structured, but often infor-mal basis without clear responsibility and ac-countability for policy at a high level ofGovernment.

● The United States does not have a con-sistent and coordinated national telecom-munication policy because of a lack of ap-preciation and concern at the top levels ofGovernment and industry, a lack of high-level policy coordination for internationaltelecommunication negotiations, and a fail-ure to assign sufficient importance to inter-national telecommunication matters, includ-ing spectrum management and the State De-partment’s role in international negotia-tions.

● The United States is not adequatelyequipped to provide comprehensive assess-ments required to effectively plan for thefuture use of the radio spectrum, to forecastfuture requirements, to assess the costs andbenefits of shifts to new technology, or toevaluate alternative strategies to deal withinternational issues regarding allocation anduse of the radio spectrum and geostationaryorbit.

● Within the U.S. telecommunications in-dustry there has been significant growth andchange over the past 15 years that have pro-duced more competing domestic interestswith conflicting demands for spectrum use.

• The U.S. permanent spectrum manage-ment analytical mechanisms are not ade-quately equipped to review and verify all thestated requirements of Government and

nongovernment spectrum users and to ad-just needs consistent with national policyobjectives. The United States lacks an effec-tive ongoing means of collecting data and de-veloping and adjusting guidelines to eval-uate the merits of one spectrum use over anyother.

● The State Department’s InternationalCommunications Policy Office is not at ahigh enough level in the Department’s orga-nization to prepare adequately for all the im-portant upcoming international conferencesof ITU and make its influence felt in the up-per echelons of Government and industry.

● Experts warn that lack of high-level con-cern has led to a shortage of trained and ex-perienced spectrum management personnelto replace those retiring from Federal Gov-ernment service; there has been insufficientattention to the need for personnel with sup-plementary diplomatic, language, negotiat-ing, economic, and legal skills.

● The rather general wording of ExecutiveOrder No. 12046 establishing the NationalTelecommunications and Information Ad-ministration (NTIA) leaves it ambiguous asto how far NTIA can go in its coordinatingrole with respect to U.S. international tele-communications policy, particularly whenthat mandate risks encroachment on thegeneral regulatory responsibilities of theFederal Communications Commission.

● The schedule of 10 major internationalconferences over the next 7 years to considera number of issues vital to U.S. interests un-derscores our concern that the United Statesreform its policymaking mechanisms andstreamline the cumbersome and time-con-suming procedures for developing U.S. pro-posals for international telecommunicationconferences.


• A mechanism is needed for collectingand evaluating information on the perceivedneeds of other nations for spectrum andorbit resources; their receptivity to intrare-gional and/or common-user systems, andother factors.

Need for New Strategies ToAddress Spectrum and Related

Satellite Orbit Issues

● There are critical years ahead for ITU.For the most part, communication activitieshave been conducted by telecommunicationexperts and international diplomacy hasavoided debate on ideology and politicallymotivated objectives. The trend towardsbasing decisions on factors other than eco-nomic and technical matters, and demon-strated need is challenging ITU to providemechanisms for resolving differences amongnations without a further shift toward thepolemical norms common to internationalpolitical debate.

• ITU is a political organization that per-forms both political and technical functions.However, while there is a primarily technicalfocus for most ITU activities, there has beena gradual shift toward recognizing the legiti-macy of nontechnical factors, such as polit-ical and cultural interests and values. TheUnited States must recognize this shift anddevelop strategies to use its technologymore broadly as a tool for resolving interna-tional issues that are not subject to technicalsolutions.

• The success of ITU has been due in largemeasure to the willingness of its members toadhere voluntarily to commonly arrived atagreements and regulations. The inherentflexibility in ITU processes has also en-hanced its effectiveness. Reservations andfootnotes offer escape for individual coun-tries from disagreeable decisions of the ma-jority. However, excessive use of these ex-

ceptions by a sufficient number of coun-tries—or by a few large users—serves toreduce the value of the agreements and regu-lations for all users. Almost 500 footnotes tothe International Table of Frequency Alloca-tions, and 83 protocol reservations taken atWARC-79, reflect increasing difficulty inreaching consensus.

● Many of the nontechnical issues raisedin ITU—like those concerning reallocation ofspectrum and guaranteed access to the geo-stationary satellite orbit—are among themany issues raised by Third World countriesin other international forums under the prin-ciples propounded by the New World eco-nomic order and New World informationorder.

● The administrative regulations of ITUserve the desirable objective—without theuse of sanctions for noncompliance—ofavoiding the interference, incompatibilities,and chaos that would ensue if these or sim-ular regulations were not followed.

• Developing countries will continue toseek changes in the existing mechanism forvesting rights in the use of frequencies andaccess to the geostationary orbit. They seeka shift away from the current notificationand coordination procedure on a “first-come,first-served” basis, toward a negotiated plandeveloped on an a priori basis.

● Third World countries are likely toresist drastic changes in ITU rules and pro-cedures that operate on the principle of "one-nation, one-vote” and that provide themwith increasing influence and power. Theywill continue to seek technical assistancefrom the developed countries while pursuingITU policies favorable to their own interests.

. Third World countries will continue toadvocate changes in rules and proceduresthat help guarantee their access to the spec-trum and geostationary satellite orbit. Theydo not wish to rely on the “good efforts, ”

8 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrate Radio Conference of 1979

promises, and technical ability of the devel-oped countries to “engineer-in” future sys-tems on a case-by-case basis, as needed.

● ITU administrative radio conferencesattempt to produce results that all nationscan accept. Reservations, footnotes, andother means to reduce negative conse-quences allow each nation to more or lessview the results as favorable. This approachsupports the perception of having all win-ners and no losers. However, because ofgrowing differences among nations theseprocedures are beginning to produce dilutedand cumbersome results that may render ex-isting mechanisms to regulate use of spec-trum less and less meaningful.

• Because of competing interests andgrowing differences over use of the spectrumthere will be winners and losers in the fu-ture as a result of the ITU decisionmakingprocess.

● WARC-79 showed the increasing influ-ence of the Third World as a political force inITU. The struggle for influence between thedeveloped and developing nations will con-tinue at future ITU conferences. At the pres-ent time, the developing countries derivetheir power from their collective numbers;the developed countries from their technicalcompetence, know-how, and leadership. Theinfluence of the developing countries canmost effectively be exploited in ITU legisla-tive forums; the developed nations’ throughITU technical administrative organs.

● The preeminence of U. S technologicalleadership and technical ability served theUnited States well in international spectrumnegotiations when decisions were primarilybased on technical matters, but more andmore U.S. problems with other countries in-volving the radio spectrum are influenced bypolitical and economic considerations.

● The developed countries are expandingtheir use of spectrum to higher frequencybands as lower, more economical, bands be-come congested. They rely on technology toprovide solutions to problems of accommo-

dating new demands in the future. It isbecoming increasingly difficult for the devel-oping countries to accept the propositionthat they will have access to spectrum on aninterference-free basis at some future date astheir needs materialize. The outlook is thatthe radiofrequency spectrum and the geosta-tionary orbit will become more congested inthe lower, more economic and desirable fre-quency bands even though use of frequen-cies by one country does not necessarilypreempt those same frequencies from use byother countries.

● Certain U.S. spectrum requirements(e.g., for military radars) are not of interestto the majority of other countries. The diffi-culty that faces the United States in seekingto convince a majority of the 154 other ITUmember countries to adopt regulations thataccommodate U.S. radars in conflict withother possible uses by other countries is realand was demonstrated at WARC-79.

. Frequencies and satellite locations allo-cated to individual nations are not vested in-definitely under current ITU procedures,and changes in operating parameters requirerecoordination and registration. This createsuncertainty for present satellite system op-erators. The risks may increase that spec-trum and orbit will not be available to pro-vide for continuity of service from the pres-ent to the next generation of satellites. More-over, this problem is not overcome by theadoption of a negotiated rigid a priori allot-ment plan to assure future access, since sucha plan would tend to freeze technology andaccommodate only those new or second gen-eration satellites that fit the original tech-nical scheme.

● The growing lack of agreement amongnations over which specific frequency bandsshould be allocated for which specific ITUradio service classification (e.g., radioloca-tion, fixed-satellite, broadcasting) stronglysuggests that mechanisms other than serv-ice classifications should be examined.

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—

. The voluminous, complex, and detailedprovisions of the international radio regula-


tions are becoming more burdensome andless meaningful to individual users.

The Impacts of WARC-79The specific consequence of WARC-79

decisions on U.S. interests regarding par-ticular services can best be treated in termsof how the conference dealt with specifictechnical issues created by some significanttrends in telecommunications. These trendsinclude the following:

● The increasing demand for high frequen-cy (HF) spectrum by the more developedcountries to meet maritime and interna-tional broadcasting needs conflicts withthe desires of the less developed coun-tries to use HF for inexpensive domesticcommunications. The reduction in theuse of HF (3 to 30 MHz) by internationalfixed point-to-point operations assatellite and cable use expands is notsufficient to offset this increasing de-mand.

● The rapid growth in very high frequency(VHF) (30 to 300 MHz) and ultrahighfrequency (UHF) (300 to 3000 MHz)land-mobile operations in the face ofcontinuing vital U.S. military require-ments, and the heavy use of these bandsfor TV broadcasting, now necessitatesgreater sharing of frequencies, e.g., byradiolocation-sharing with radionaviga-tion and with other services, and byland-mobile sharing with TV broad-casting.

● There has been rapid growth of both do-mestic and international fixed satelliterequirements in the super high fre-quency (SHF) (3 to 30 GHz) spectrumcoupled with growth in microwave radiorelay, space research, and Earth-explor-ation satellite services, and the con-tinuing need to protect important radio-astronomy operations. These require-ments are being pressured by new de-mands to accommodate mobile, naviga-

tion, and broadcasting satellites (andtheir feeder links) in increasinglycrowded orbits. Most of these satellitespectrum uses have military as well ascivil applications. In addition, there isthe continuing use of the SHF spectrumfor terrestrial systems.

The actions of WARC-79 with respect tothese operational trends, and the technicalissues they raised, either closely reflectedU.S. proposals or were acceptable to theUnited States with certain important excep-tions. However, this judgment hardly doesjustice to the overall results of WARC-79,particularly the future implications to theUnited States. The long-term trends may berunning against the United States in thesense that more problems without apparentsolutions are foreseen. The United Statesfinds itself increasingly in a defensive mode,trying to minimize losses rather than seek-ing significant changes to improve its long-term posture.

For example, at the same time that signifi-cant amounts of spectrum were added to theallocations for the fixed-satellite service(FSS), generally consistent with U.S. objec-tives, the conference also adopted a resolu-tion that calls for a space planning confer-ence to plan space services using the geosta-tionary satellite orbit that was not con-sistent with U.S. objectives. The technicalrules that affect the design and operation,and hence the cost, of satellite systems werein general agreement with U.S. positions,but the ability to implement new technol-ogies and offer new services via satellite inthe future depend in part on the decisions tobe made at the space planning conferences in1985 and 1987 and the broadcasting satelliteconference scheduled for June 1983, to plan


broadcasting satellite service (BSS) in region2 (the Americas) in the 12-GHz band.

There is a significant difference betweenthe approach advocated by the UnitedStates for using the geostationary satelliteorbit and any rigid a priori allotment andplanning approach that may be advocatedby some developing nations. The UnitedStates, as well as many other countries, hasconsistently favored a flexible approach thatassigns orbit locations and satellite frequen-cies on a case-by-case basis, often referred toas “first-come first-served. ” The U.S. ap-proach seeks to accommodate needs as re-quired and relies, at least in part, on techno-logical advancements and good engineeringpractices to “engineer-in” the next satelliteand accommodate all users. Such an ap-proach is consistent with existing practiceunder ITU procedures for the notification,coordination, and assignment of radiofre-quencies generally.

Many developing countries, on the otherhand, see a detailed negotiated plan that as-signs specific frequency channels and orbitalpositions to each country under a rigid apriori allotment plan as a means to guar-antee them future access. This approachdoes not depend upon advances in technol-ogy or new engineering techniques to assureaccommodation of newcomers, but neitherdoes it provide for technological improve-ments that might accommodate growing re-quirements. The developed countries alreadyhave the economic and technological meansof launching and utilizing domestic satellitesystems; most developing countries do not,even though many do make use of joint-usersystems like the International Telecommuni-cations Satellite Organization (INTELSAT)global satellite system. The developing na-tions are concerned that as the “later com-ers” to ITU (hence later served) there will belittle or no way to accommodate their domes-tic requirements.

Both a posteriori (the case-by-case ap-proach usually relying on a notice and rec-ordation procedure) and a priori (the collec-

tive subdivision approach usually relying ona negotiated plan) have won past acceptanceat conferences of ITU. Over the last 75 yearsone or the other approach has been advo-cated and used by nearly all nations to allo-cate spectrum, both internally and interna-tionally. On a domestic level, the a posterioriapproach is often coupled with an adjudica-tion procedure for deciding among com-peting applicants, as is the case in theUnited States. On the international level, ad-judication is almost impossible because ofsovereignty claims. Most nations have beenunwilling to allow an international body todetermine whether they can or cannot use aradio channel or satellite position. Wherechannels become limited, the recourse in therecent past has been to adopt an a priorimethod. However, for the allocation of radiobands and services, like FSS, which are af-fected by rapidly changing technology, orwhich are fraught with political controversy,a priori methods tend to promote too ri-gid technical specifications or exaggeratedclaims for channels. Much of the controversyat WARC-79, and likely to emerge at futureconferences, arises from the question of theappropriate administrative arrangements todetermine rights to the use of frequenciesfree from harmful interference.

Several countries made planning proposalsat WARC-79, ranging in scope from plan-ning all space services in all frequency bandsallocated to space services, to planning onlyFSS in bands newly allocated to that servicebelow 10 GHz. However, it is clear that FSSwas the main target of these proposals. De-veloping a plan of this nature is an enormousundertaking and would not have been pos-sible at WARC-79; however, acceptance ofthe principle of “planning” was a major goalof the developing countries.

The U.S. delegation worked to prevent anydecision to convene a “planning” conference.When it became clear that such a conferencewould be approved, the United States ar-gued successfully to keep the terms of ref-erence rather broad. The first session of

“WARC on the Use of the GeostationarySatellite Orbit and the Planning of SpaceServices Utilizing It,” scheduled for July1985, will consider which services and whichfrequency bands to “plan.” Further, themeaning of “plan” will be decided, and willnot necessarily be a rigid “a priori” type.The operative thought in determining thetype of planning is to provide “in practiceequitable access’ to the geostationary orbit.The second session of the conference, sched-uled for September 1987, will meet to enactthe decisions of the first.

It has been the official position of theUnited States, shared by a number of othercountries, that a rigid a priori plan for FSS isbad planning and bad engineering; that it islikely to inhibit technological innovation,result in inefficient use of the orbit and spec-trum, and have a major adverse impact onU.S. telecommunication systems. Thus, theUnited States faces a significant challengeover the next few years to develop compel-ling arguments against a rigid a priori ap-proach and to carry that message convinc-ingly to all parts of the world well beforethese conferences convene; or to find alter-natives acceptable to all parties. Some possi-ble alternatives are considered in the reportand summarized below.

The adoption of the space planning con-ference resolution is a vigorous reminderthat the effective management of orbit andspectrum utilization on both a worldwideand a regional basis is a continuing processthat is becoming increasingly more difficultand complex. The achievement of U.S. objec-tives at ITU conferences is no longer a mat-ter of reaching painstaking agreement ontechnical solutions to problems of frequencycoordination and multiple usage of spec-trum. It will also require sophisticated,political negotiations; imaginative, innova-tive approaches; and long, hard bargaining.

No immediate changes in operations usingthe radio spectrum or geostationary satelliteorbit are required in the United States as aresult of WARC-79. However, there arelonger range impacts that require prompt at-

tention: increased operating costs, reducedoperating flexibility, uncertainty surround-ing important pending issues, and the needfor thorough preparations to address issuesat future conferences.

There is no immediate cost impact im-posed by WARC-79 regarding nationalsecurity systems, largely because of the fre-quency flexibility of existing U.S. equip-ment, the success of the U.S. delegation atWARC, and reservations taken by theUnited States to counter adverse conferencedecisions. However, there will be futureundetermined costs associated with fre-quency management, the development andprocurement of more sophisticated equip-ment, compatibility studies, and coordina-tion to prevent interference with competingusers of the spectrum.

Department of Defense (DOD) interestswere impacted by losses of exclusivity forradiolocation (radar) operations and by in-creased sharing with other services in manyof the radiolocation bands. For example,demands that radar operations be discon-tinued in certain bands to accommodate ex-panded FSS operations led to considerableacrimony, which was only eased by a non-binding U.S. commitment in a formaldeclaration to try to accommodate FSS inthose bands. The status of radiolocation wasretained but the pressure from competingfixed-satellite interests will certainly con-tinue.

As an indication of concern for security in-terests, the United States took a reservationindicating that this country, in the operationof radars in certain bands, will not guaranteeprotection to, nor coordination with, otherradio services. The action was necessary be-cause so many countries took footnotes stat-ing their intention to operate fixed andmobile radio stations in bands hitherto usedexclusively by radars. Radars are designedto operate in the presence of interference,either purposeful or accidental. The degreeto which these counterinterference tech-niques will have to be improved and used de-pends on how extensively other countries in-

12 ● Radiofequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

troduce fixed and mobile services in thesebands.

U.S. objectives for the fixed-satellite serv-ice and the mobile-satellite service (MSS),including DOD airborne, shipborne, andground-transportable Earth station sys-tems, were achieved in large measure. Signif-icant amounts of spectrum were added toallocations of the FSS and no operational oreconomic dislocations were imposed on anyexisting FSS system. No major burden ap-pears to be placed on the U.S. Governmentor private operating entities in complyingwith the decisions of WARC-79 regardingFSS. However, the differences between theUnited States and many developing coun-tries over approaches to use of the geosta-tionary satellite orbit, to be resolved byfuture conferences, leaves the impact on FSSuncertain.

The U.S. objective to maintain the statusquo for MSS in the 235- to 399.9-MHz bandused for U.S. Naval Fleet satellite com-munications was partially achieved; how-ever, coordination provisions (article N13A)were added which included a condition thatstations in MSS not cause harmful in-terference to those of other services oper-ating, or planned to be operated, in accord-ance with the table of allocations. TheUnited States found this condition unaccept-able, and together with most of its NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliesentered a formal reservation in the final pro-tocol.

While WARC-79 largely eliminated fre-quency-sharing between FSS and BSS in the

Americas, the latter must now share fre-quencies with the terrestrial fixed service, in-cluding private microwave systems widelyused in the United States. This sharing couldresult in interference to BSS Earth stationreceivers operating in the same area as fixedstation transmitters. The private microwaveusers are concerned that sharing with direct-broadcasting satellites is not feasible andthat they may be forced to vacate the band.This concern is reinforced by footnote 37870of the Final Acts of WARC-79 that placesterrestrial services on a noninterferencebasis to BSS operating in accordance with aplan to be prepared at the 1983 region 2broadcasting satellite conference. How thisconflict will be resolved within the UnitedStates is a current matter before the FCC.

A U.S. objective at WARC-79 was to gainmore frequency allocations for HF broad-casting (e.g., the Voice of America). Thiscould only be done at the expense of thefixed service and was therefore opposed bymany developing countries that use HF,shortwave radio for internal domestic com-munications. The HF broadcasting alloca-tions were increased conditioned on the suc-cessful outcome of a specialized HF broad-casting conference to be held in the mid-1980’s to “plan” for more efficient andequitable use of the broadcasting bands.While the conference agenda will be rela-tively broad and open, it was apparent atWARC-79 that the United States and the de-veloping countries have significant differ-ences as to the type of planning to be under-taken.

Improving U.S. Spectrum Management andPreparation for International

Telecommunication ConferencesConsistent with the findings of past study ment and participation in international tel-

commissions and task forces going back to excommunication conferences is inadequate.1950, this study finds that the present U.S. Primarily, the problems stem from the ab-Government structure for spectrum manage- sence of high-level Government attention to

effective policy development and coordina-tion on a consistent and continuing basiswith centralized accountability.

At least four options are available to theCongress in addressing this issue: 1) main-tain the status quo and make no changes;2) maintain the present structure, but raisethe level of attention and accountabilitywithin the responsible agencies; 3) establisha mechanism—such as a task force of high-level Government officials—to develop, ex-amine, and make recommendations on struc-tural and procedural improvements, or;4) establish a permanent board, council, orinteragency committee of high-level Govern-ment officials to be responsible and account-able for international telecommunication pol-icy coordination and the preparations for in-ternational conferences.

Certain shortcomings in spectrum man-agement could be corrected without any fun-damental change in the structure of FCC orNTIA. Assigning spectrum management ahigher priority, particularly within FCC, andusing resources more efficiently would makea significant difference. For example, FCCcould improve its data base for spectrummanagement with the help of its own com-puter and spectrum experts.

The validation of spectrum requirements,and the apportioning of spectrum betweenGovernment and nongovernment users,Needs closer scrutiny. A mechanism usinganalytical tools to help evaluate needs andassess priorities among competing users ofthe spectrum would provide decisionmakerswith basic information and data for use inestablishing policies and reviewing require-ments. While Federal spectrum require-ments are reviewed by the InterdepartmentRadio Advisory Committee and its Spec-trum Planning Subcommittee, this functionneeds to be strengthened and broadened toeffectively consider longer range impacts.Economic techniques (e.g., auctions, lot-teries, spectrum fees, resale of frequencyassignments, etc.) should be considered, atleast on an experimental basis, to provideguidance on the consequences of different


spectrum allocation decisions and the in-troduction of newer technology. Theseshould include techniques for evaluating therelative economic viability of alternativeradio uses, as well as radio v. nonradio com-munication systems. Experience with eco-nomic techniques could be gained by limitedapplication to certain selected services andfrequency bands.

There have been problems in the timelyformation of U.S. delegations for ITU confer-ences arising from the need for the early in-clusion of experts from industry and othernongovernment organizations. Preparationsfor international telecommunications con-ferences could be improved by replacing thead hoc approach with an ongoing conferencepreparatory structure with a focal point forhigh-level responsibility and accountabilityand involving all the concerned Governmentand nongovernment telecommunication in-terests. These problems could be addressedand the effectiveness of U.S. participation ininternational telecommunications meetingsimproved by the following additional steps:

1.

2.

3.

Industry and other nongovernment del-egates could again be permitted to par-ticipate fully as U.S. representatives atinternational telecommunication confer-ences and take any assignments on thedelegation for which their skills and ex-perience qualify them. Legislation to ac-complish this passed both Houses of the96th Congress. However, the legislationto which it was added was vetoed by thePresident for reasons unrelated to theexemption.Consideration could be given to findingmeans to comply with due process re-quirements under the AdministrativeProcedures Act and still name industryand other nongovernment representa-tives to delegations on a timely basis.Guidelines and implementing mechan-isms could be established for naming thechairman and individual members ofU.S. delegations. The qualifications re-quired, the distribution of skills needed,and type of representation desired could


be determined at an early stage of con- in the preparatory effort. Whatever spe-ference preparation. Individuals chosen cial Government assistance is requiredto serve on the delegation could be se- to assure particular representationlected from the best candidates avail- could be made available in the earlyable, especially those who participated stages of conference preparations.

U.S. Strategies for Dealing With InternationalSpectrum Issues and ITU

U.S. participation in ITU faces new anddifficult challenges. Having started in 1865as a relatively noncontroversial organizationof 20 nations concerned with the interoper-ability of their telegraph systems, ITU hasevolved into a tendencious assembly of 155nations that look to ITU to solve fundamen-tal issues of resource allocation increasinglyvital to economic growth and development.

The ITU structure, which was well suitedto the analysis of interference between radiocommunication systems, and to achieving aconsensus on noncontroversial mattersamong a small number of broader issues, issorely tested by the demands of numerouscountries exhibiting the widest possiblerange of technical, economic, cultural, andpolitical backgrounds. An organization thathas traditionally been concerned with tech-nical and operating standards for radioequipment and administrative mechanismsthat give a country the right to operate radiostations free from harmful interference fromothers is being asked to satisfy the demandsof developing countries for “guaranteed ac-cess” to an equitable share of the radio spec-trum and satellite locations that many ofthem have no immediate capacity to use.

It is increasingly questionable whetherU.S. negotiating skills and technological pro-ficiency can secure essential U.S. goals andobjectives in a forum that employs a “one-nation, one-vote” decisionmaking formulaand in which the United States and the otherindustrial countries are greatly outnum-bered by the less industrialized membercountries.

From a strategic standpoint, the UnitedStates has a wide range of options. At oneextreme, the United States could concludethat the drawbacks of continued participa-tion in ITU outweigh the benefits, and with-draw from the organization or decline to par-ticipate in its deliberations. At the other ex-treme, the United States could decide toavoid controversy within ITU and simplyyield to other nations on controversial mat-ters. Between these extremes are a numberof alternatives. One that requires no struc-tural or procedural changes in ITU would bebetter coordination of U.S. views and objec-tives with other nations in advance of ITUmeetings, and better U.S. planning based onimproved understanding of other nations’views.

Another strategic option would be for theUnited States to seek to remove the mostcontroversial issues from the ITU forum andattempt to solve them in other ways. A cur-rent example would be to respond to thedemands of developing countries for “guar-anteed access” to radio spectrum and satel-lite locations by developing the institutionalarrangements to ensure domestic communi-cation services to qualifying nations. Thiscould be a common-user satellite systemeither building upon the present INTELSATstructure or creating a separate system fordomestic services.

From a -structural standpoint, assumingthat ITU can be changed, a number of op-tions may be available. The United Statescould seek to revise the voting formula ofITU to one more fair to the United States,


perhaps by giving added voting weight tothose countries that contribute most heavilyto the United Nations budget. A more mod-est proposal would be to increase the numberof ITU regions beyond the present three sothat regional issues could be dealt with by asmaller number of countries most directlyconcerned.

Withdrawal From ITU

Would withdrawing from ITU guaranteethe United States unhindered use of thespectrum allocation or frequency assign-ments the United States needs? Probablynot. ITU members rely on the organizationto avoid interference from the radio signalsof others and to achieve interoperability ofcertain mutually used systems, such as ra-dionavigation. The assignment of a par-ticular frequency is of little value if othersfeel free to use it for purposes that cause in-terference. There are no effective interna-tional sanctions to force compliance withITU decisions. Therefore, the United Statesrelies, as do all nations, on the voluntaryagreement and cooperation of other nationsto refrain from interfering with its use of thespectrum.

For applications that are vulnerable to in-terference, U.S. preemption of spectrum (i.e.,use what we wish to use) would be ineffectivebecause any nation that chose to interfere,whether for a valid need or by intentionaljamming, could greatly reduce the value tothe United States of the preempted spec-trum. Any preemption for uses that wereinvulnerable to interference (e.g., high-powerradar systems with electronic countermeas-ure capacity) would likely result in retalia-tion by other nations in areas where theUnited States is vulnerable.

It is conceivable that the United Statescould abandon ITU and establish a morecongenial grouping of developed countries asa forum for coordination to avoid radio in-terference, and simply ignore other coun-tries. Coordination and information ex-change would become less certain, but still

fairly effective. However, it is likely thatITU would disintegrate if the principal de-veloped countries abandoned it. Overall, thelack of a central spectrum allocation and co-ordination authority with global participa-tion would probably lead to a more frag-mented use of the spectrum, with fewer com-mon worldwide channels, less standard-ization, and possible difficulties with inter-operability of certain common systems, anda general increase in interference problemsbetween services.

Revised ITU Voting Formula

As an option less drastic than withdrawalfrom ITU, the United States might join withother industrial nations to force a revision ofthe ITU’s “one-nation, one-vote” decision-making formula toward one that would re-flect the dominance of these nations in theactual use of the spectrum. If successful,this option would greatly reduce the abilityof the Third World nations to block or forcechanges in U.S. positions.

A revised voting formula might reduce thecontention over spectrum allocation mattersat ITU; make ITU more efficient; help tomake spectrum use more efficient by pre-cluding the adoption of unworkable alloca-tion schemes; and be no less fair than thevoting practices used in a number of otherinternational bodies that benefit ThirdWorld nations without being controlled bythem. The stimulus for concurrence of ThirdWorld nations with such a proposal would bethe possibility that, were it rejected, the de-veloped countries might withdraw from ITUand render it essentially irrelevant.

The reaction of Third World nations is dif-ficult to predict, but it seems most likelythat they would bitterly resist any reversalof their recent successful trend toward fullerparticipation and refuse to make any conces-sion on ITU voting formulas. From a generalforeign policy standpoint, it is important toconsider how much support the UnitedStates might obtain from other developedcountries, many of which do not feel the

16 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference Of 1979. . . — —

spectrum problems as acutely as the UnitedStates. The United States must also con-sider whether it wishes to take an assertivepolicy stance toward ITU apart from a gen-erally more assertive stance toward ThirdWorld nations.

It may not be necessary that the proposedchange in voting arrangements apply to allITU spectrum decisions, but just to thoseallocations that might qualify as major mat-ters. The latter case is equivalent to estab-lishing a new, separate forum with revisedvoting arrangements and routing major mat-ters to that forum rather than to ITU.

Objectively, it would seem that the in-terests of the developing countries lie withthe continued existence of ITU and with con-tinued technical and economic aid from thedeveloped countries. If this choice wereclearly and convincingly drawn, the ThirdWorld nations would probably come to rea-lize that these benefits outweigh such hypo-thetical advantages as satellite orbital slotsthat many do not have the capability to use.Whether they would ultimately decide thematter on objective grounds is difficult topredict. In any event, it appears unlikelythat a change in voting within ITU is possi-ble under the present structure.

Increased Regionalization of ITU

At present, ITU divides the world intothree geographic regions and many issuesthat can be treated separately and effective-ly in a single region are considered in thisway. (Region 1 covers Europe, the U. S. S. R.,Turkey, Mongolia, and Africa. Region 2 cov-ers North, Central, and South Americas, theCaribbean, and Greenland. Region 3 coversSouth Asia, Australia, New Zealand, and thePacific.) Regional administrative radio con-ferences are scheduled on a variety of spe-cific issues, allowing WARCs to “spinoff”certain controversial matters. One optionwould be to extend this process of region-alization on a geographic basis to smallersubregions, and/or on an issue basis to in-clude only those nations directly affected by

the particular issue. The purpose would be toreduce the number of nations debating orvoting on issues that do not affect themdirectly, thus reducing unnecessary conten-tion.

WARC-79 was attended by 142 nations.Approximately 1,670 delegates and advisorsmet for 11 weeks and considered nearly17,000 proposals (more than 900 from theUnited States), and held more than 900 meet-ings. Surely any approach that might helplimit further WARCs to more modest pro-portions would be worthy of study. More im-portantly, when nations vote on issues thatdo not directly affect them the opportunitiesto trade votes at no cost to themselves, butwhich help others to sustain confrontations.Large meetings also tend to encourage blocvoting, which has already begun to emergeat ITU. Thus, subdividing ITU into smallerunits, either on the basis of geographic sub-regions or on the basis of particular issues,would divide the Third World bloc intosmaller, less dominant groups.

Decentralized decisionmaking does notguarantee that the U.S. position will prevail.Being outvoted by 10 to 1 is no more satisfy-ing than being outvoted by 154 to 1. How-ever, it is easier to bargain in detail with 10nations than 154, and if a quid pro quo mustbe offered, the total cost is likely to be lower.

The mechanics and economics of increas-ing substantially the number of conferencesis also important to consider. The limitedU.S. professional staff available to preparefor and attend spectrum conferences is al-ready stretched thin, and if the UnitedStates does not wish simply to skip manyof the meetings— a risky proposition—thisstaff would need to be considerably aug-mented. The developing countries would findit even more difficult to prepare for a heavyschedule of meetings.

Increased decentralization of ITU could, inprinciple, lead to greater fragmentation inthe use of the spectrum, with the same bandsbeing used for different purposes in differentregions to a much greater extent than is now

Ch. 1—Summary ● 1 7

the case. While this may be acceptable in theshort run, the long-term implications areworthy of study. If, for example, a new serv-ice were proposed that would be global incharacter, obtaining the necessary globalspectrum allocation might require changesin the allocations to many different servicesin many different locales. At the least, itmight be necessary to create an institution-alized system for coordinating decentralizeddecisions.

Better Coordination and Planning

As a relatively conciliatory approach, theUnited States could mount a major effort todevelop long-term plans for spectrum usethat would take into account the spectrumrequirements of developing nations, to aidthem in understanding the realistic optionsavailable to meet their short- and long-termneeds, to offer such technical and economicassistance as might be needed to enablethem to participate actively in the planningprocess, and to seek their concurrence withfair, objective, and realistic proposals.

To a significant extent, the confrontationsinitiated by Third World nations in ITU arebased on suspicion and mistrust of devel-oped countries. Perhaps this is based on alack of understanding of the true potential oftechnology to create the spectrum resourcesthey will need in the future. But many ThirdWorld nations also question whether theywill be able to take advantage of that tech-nology and they question the good faith ofthe developed countries to share the benefitsof advanced technology.

The fact remains that there is adequatespectrum for all nations at the present andthat technology will very likely expand theeffective utility of the available spectrum tosatisfy future needs. The problem for theUnited States is to convince other nations,particularly the developing countries, thatspectrum and orbit capacity will be availableand that their needs for service can be satis-fied. Technical assistance can be very usefulin this regard, and economic assistance canhelp make the benefits of technology a real-

ity. Creating a role for the developing coun-tries in cooperative planning efforts is likelyto make them more receptive to the positionsand plans that are forthcoming.

Long-range planning of spectrum utiliza-tion is presently inadequate and not easilyaccomplished in an area where technologicalrate of change is rapid and in a competitivesystem like that in the United States wherepolicy makers are more likely to be respond-ing to problems than to be developing long-range plans. However, better long-rangeplanning for telecommunication services andspectrum needs is clearly necessary to copeeffectively with the ITU allocation process.Developing and sharing planning techniquesand data with other countries would notmake a new planning process vastly moredifficult or costly, and might make it morereliable in the long run.

It is also necessary to know the extent towhich developing countries’ positions atITU are based on their own vital interestsrather than on misunderstandings and pol-itics; it is unlikely that they would com-promise vital interests for the sake of com-ity. A cooperative planning process wouldtend to expose true interests and clarify thenegotiations.

As a practical matter, the majority of thedeveloping countries cannot now make useof advanced communications technologywithout technical and economic assistancefrom technologically advanced countries. Ifthe majority of nations were to vote to adoptrules that limit or preclude the use of ad-vanced technology to which they do not haveindependent access, communication capabil-ity would suffer and costs would increase inthe long term for all users. Thus, the cost ofassisting other countries in using advancedtechnology must be balanced against thecost to the United States of not being ableto take full advantage of such technologyourselves. This equation deserves close anal-ysis.

Cooperative planning has worked in thepast; the United States was a leader in coop-


erative planning for INTELSAT and the In-ternational Maritime Satellite Organization(INMARSAT). The exact mechanism for co-operative planning is an important and com-plex matter, made more difficult by dividedresponsibility in the United States for com-munications policy in general and spectrumplanning in particular. However, it should bepossible to graft onto the existing structurea sufficiently comprehensive mechanismwith high-level responsibility to assure effec-tive long-range planning and to foster coop-eration with other nations.

As an alternative, ITU could be investedwith a planning staff to undertake long-range coordination, analysis, and planning.Such a “neutral” planning expertise mightbe less likely to be mistrusted by ThirdWorld nations, and perhaps more capable ofdefusing potential disagreements. Naturally,the United States would participate in theprocess and perhaps may more easily influ-ence a planning process in which the meas-ure of power is technical expertise, ratherthan influence an ITU conference in whichthe measure of power is votes. The UnitedStates has consistently opposed any in-crease in the power of ITU, particularly, ef-forts to expand the planning role of the In-ternational Frequency Registration Board.

A broader, more extensive, and more con-ciliatory approach to international spectrumplanning would be required under this optionand could have a real chance of success,given some major changes in the U.S. ap-proach. In the long run it could be the leastexpensive and most effective option avail-able to this country.

Common-User System

As an alternative to contention for sat-ellite slots on the geostationary orbit, theUnited States and other developed countriescould enter into a joint venture with develop-ing countries to construct, launch, and oper-ate a common satellite system to meet do-mestic needs for telecommunication and/orbroadcast services. The developed nations

would provide the private capital and tech-nological resources necessary to constructand launch the system, and would operateand manage it in conjunction with otherusing nations. All nations in the joint ven-ture would have the option of purchasing ashare of the common enterprise, up to theiractual percentage of use of the system, andsharing proportionately in any profits. Suchan arrangement would be similar to that gov-erning the INTELSAT global satellite sys-tem used for international telecommuni-cations. High-capacity satellite systemsemploying technology to make a common-user system economic and operationally at-tractive to developing countries for domesticservices could be part of the existingINTELSAT structure or a separate struc-ture established for this purpose.

Many developing nations are concernedthat the satellite orbit locations are being oc-cupied rapidly on a “first-come, first-served”basis, and that by the time they are in a posi-tion to use satellite systems there will be nodesirable orbit locations left for them. Itseems clear that the requirements of devel-oping countries will be for satellite serviceand not for satellite orbit locations that theymay not be able to use. This option wouldprovide service without allocating dedicatedorbit locations for individual users.

Moreover, the cost of developing andlaunching a dedicated satellite system isvery high, well beyond the capability of mostdeveloping countries for the foreseeablefuture. This option could provide satelliteservice well in advance of the time thesecountries could afford their own systems,and much more cheaply. No large initialcapital investment would be required fromuser nations, and there would be little risk.

While this policy option does not addressthe full range of problems before ITU, it doesoffer the prospect of relieving the pressureon a particularly important and contentiousissue. If low cost and technically attractivedomestic satellite capacity is made availablethrough an international organization thataccommodates the sovereignty interests of

Ch. 1—Summary ● 1 9

each country, many developing countriescould come to see access to orbital slots andsatellite frequencies as a side issue withavailability of service being the main objec-tive. Increasing adoption of the INTELSAT-type alternative would free up orbital slotsfor those major developing countries thatcontinue to desire their own separate domes-tic systems whether for political reasons, orbecause requirements justified such a sys-tem economically.

A common-user system need not requireany Government funding by the UnitedStates. Sufficient capital and technical re-sources exist in the private sector in theUnited States, and within Europe andJapan, to construct such a system as a com-mercial venture with expectations of futuremarkets for follow-on equipment and serv-ices. Alternatively, such systems could con-ceivably be initiated with World Bank loanguarantees.

“A Priori” Allotment

The United States could agree to par-ticipate with other nations in the develop-ment of a long-range plan for the utilizationof satellite orbit locations to serve partici-pating nations’ domestic communications re-quirements. This plan would assure that or-bital slots would be available for the use ofall nations when needed. In exchange for thisagreement, the developed nations would like-ly insist that the plan be based on sound op-erating principles and be updated regularlyto take account of the latest, most efficienttechnology available.

A priori allotment of satellite orbit slotshas been a cause celebre among developingcountries. At WARC-79, a resolution wasadopted to consider this issue at a two-partspace planning WARC in the mid-1980’s.The United States has opposed a priori allot-ment plans for satellite service as wastefuland inhibiting to technological advance-ment. Although this option goes a long waytoward accommodating the position of thedeveloping countries, it maintains a substan-

tial degree of flexibility important to theUnited States, including the key qualifica-tion of a requirement for regular technolog-ical updating that would help to avoid theworst consequences associated with rigid al-lotment schemes.

As far as the United States is concerned,certain types of a priori allotment planswould not be as objectionable as others.Plans based on sound engineering and opera-tional parameters might be workable inter-nationally, at least on a regional basis. In-deed, U.S. domestic satellite operations arebased more or less on an a priori approach.In the long run the United States may haveenough satellite capacity, made possible byadvanced technology, to meet domesticneeds even if the orbit and system availableto the United States is reduced. In the shortrun, the United States already has substan-tial numbers of operational satellites withadditional satellite systems planned for oper-ations in the near future.

In addition to the possible advantagesthat may result from improvements in tech-nology, there are two factors that may helpreduce the impact of a priori allotment planson the United States. One is advanced tech-nology, including cellular satellite technol-ogy, already on the drawing boards, whichwill permit the construction of a large, wide-band satellite that can provide very large ca-pacity from a single orbit slot. The other fac-tor is the particular geography of region 2(North and South America). From the stand-point of using the geostationary satelliteorbit, region 2 is naturally divided into twoparts–those nations located in the NorthernHemisphere and those in the Southern Hem-isphere. A second geographic factor thatserves to separate the hemispheres is the dis-placement in longitude of the nations in theNorthern and Southern Hemispheres. Also,those nations closer to the Equator enjoy thewidest possible visibility of the orbit andhave the greatest flexibility in positioningsatellites. Moreover, the North AmericanContinent consists of three countries withvery large land areas that made the use of

20 ● Radio frequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

advanced technology using shaped-beam an-tennas attractive.

Although an a priori plan is implied in theapproach, it could be implemented withoutthe adverse limitations of a rigid a priori plansuch as adopted at the 1977 WARC. If thisapproach is possible, then an a priori allot-ment to one country would not include usingthe same allotment for others if certaintechnical and operational guidelines werefollowed.

There may even be some benefits to theUnited States from adopting an a priori al-lotment plan. At present, there is consider-able uncertainty about the outcome of the1983 Region 2 Broadcasting Satellite Ad-ministrative Radio Conference and the spaceplanning conferences in the mid-1980’s. If adecision is postponed, the uncertainty wouldcontinue. A situation would then be perpet-uated in which any existing domestic satel-lite orbit slot may be withdrawn in the fu-ture. Moreover, no satellite system designercould plan the logical evolution of a proposedsystem with confidence that the required ad-

ditional allotments would be available. Thiswould force designers to plan their systemson the basis of short-term recovery of invest-ment.

It is also important to examine the tacticalaspects of agreeing to an a priori allotmentpolicy. By participating in the developmentof a plan, the United States would be ina position to influence the type of p l a nadopted and possibly gain concessions onother issues of importance to the UnitedStates.

In short, the linkages and tradeoffs amongthese and other possible approaches tofuture use of the geostationary satellite orbitcast each U.S. policy option in a differentlight. Careful review in each case is neededfor sound policy formulation. Rather than re-jecting a priori allotments as inherentlywasteful, it may be in the U.S. interest to ex-amine the practical effects, to examine thepossibility of a quid pro quo, and if the resultlooks acceptable, to-work withing countries to implement the

the develop-plan.

U.S. Options Regarding the FinalActs of WARC-79

As the largest and most technically ad-vanced user of the radio spectrum on aworldwide basis, the United States ap-proached WARC-79 with the greatest stakein reaching agreement on a new table of fre-quency allocations and a revised set of re-lated technical and administrative regula-tions.

While the Department of State has indi-cated official U.S. satisfaction with the out-come of WARC-79, the United States ulti-mately took six reservations in the final pro-tocol to the Final Acts of WARC-79, helpingto bring the overall total to 83. Two of the sixwere directed at political issues, but the re-maining four were directed at decisions that

could have a direct impact on U.S. telecom-munications operations.

The Final Acts of WARC-79 will ultimate-ly come before the U.S. Senate to be consid-ered for ratification as a treaty. There areseveral options available:

1. The United States can ratify the FinalActs without delay. Completing the rati-fication process prior to January 1, 1982when the 1979 radio regulations enterinto force will indicate to other nationsour goodwill and determination to abideby our international obligations. TheFinal Acts constitute the “radio regula-tions, Geneva, 1979, ” which replace the

Ch. 1—Summary ● 21— . — —

2.

3.

4.

1959 regulations as partially revised bythe administrative radio conferencesheld in 1963, 1966, 1971, 1974, and 1978.The Final Acts also incorporate the pro-visions of the 1977 broadcast satelliteWARC as modified by WARC-79.The United States can ratify the FinalActs with conditions, thereby under-scoring and making explicit the reserva-tions taken at Geneva. In particular, theUnited States could reiterate the rea-sons for taking reservations in the pro-tocol to the Final Acts to emphasizeU.S. concern regarding the issue raised.The United States can ratify the FinalActs with additional reservations thateither state U.S. refusal to acquiesce toparticular decisions taken at WARC-79,beyond those cited in earlier U.S. pro-tocol statements, or set forth U.S. policywith respect to future actions by ITU orspecific implementation of the WARC-79 Final Acts. While it is not uncommonfor the U.S. Senate to attach conditionsto a resolution of ratification of a bilat-eral international agreement, which theother party can readily accept or rejectthrough its own ratification processes,attaching conditions to a multilateralagreement raises difficulties.The United States can ratify the FinalActs in part, specifically withholding

5.

6.

ratification of those provisions (whichwould have to be listed in precise detail)where the United States chooses to re-main bound by the provisions of exist-ing regulations previously ratified(which would also have to be listed inprecise detail).The United States can withhold ratifica-tion of the Final Acts pending the out-come of several important internationalconferences dealing with telecommuni-cations issues. This would deny FCCand the current administration any legalbasis for implementing decisions takenat WARC-79, many of which werestrongly advocated by the UnitedStates and fought for by the U.S. delega-tion and which are scheduled for imple-mentation by other ITU members onJanuary 1, 1982. The most immediate in-ternational telecommunications confer-ence of great importance to the UnitedStates is the September 1982 plenipo-tentiary. The actions taken at this con-ference to revise the ITU convention willbe basic to all future conferences of ITU.The United States can reject the FinalActs of WARC-79 in their entirety andannounce that we intend to abide bythe preexisting radio regulations, asamended. The consequences would besimilar to those cited above.

Chapter 2

The Changing Requirements,Influences, and Motivations

Among Nations for Use of theRadiofrequency Spectrum

Contents

Page

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Can the United States Disregard the Motivations of Other Nations? . . . . . . 27

How Dependent is the United States on the Radiofrequency SpectrumIncluding Use of the Geostationary Satellite Orbit?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

How Different From Other Countries is the United States in Its Needand Use of the Radio Spectrum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Why Is It Necessary To Coordinate Radiofrequency Use Internationally?. 30

How Is the Radiofrequency Spectrum Managed in the United States?. . . . . 31

How Is the Radiofrequency Spectrum Managed Internationally? . . . . . . . . . 32

Issues Addressed in the OTA Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

TheChapter 2

Changing Requirements,Influences, and Motivations

Among Nations for Use of theRadio frequency Spectrum

IntroductionBy any measure, the 1979 World Adminis-

trative Radio Conference (WARC-79) was acomplex international event. The facts aredeceptively simple. For 11 weeks in theautumn of 1979, between September 27 andDecember 5, the nations of the world met atGeneva as a legislative organ of the Interna-tional Telecommunication Union (ITU), aspecialized agency of the United Nations(U.N.). The conference produced a 984-pagedocument–the Final Acts of WARC-79–which sets forth regulations, resolutions,and recommendations for radio communica-tion worldwide. For most nations of theworld, those Final Acts will represent a mul-tilateral treaty and a basic source of publicinternational law. The U.S. Senate must giveits advice and consent to ratification beforethe United States becomes a party to thetreaty.

These simple facts, however, do not beginto explain why hundreds of thousands ofstaff-hours, millions of dollars, and tens ofmillions of pages were expended in prepara-tion for, and conduct of, this conference.They also do not explain why so many tele-communication specialists and policy makersaround the world have focused on and ana-lyzed this conference and the events sur-rounding it. The purpose of this report is toexamine WARC-79 in a comprehensiveway—describing U.S. preparations and in-volvement, and the impact of the conference.However, no attempt was made to examineall issues and aspects of WARC-79, but

rather to focus on certain important resultsand analyze their consequences for theUnited States.

WARC-79 was held to reach global agree-ment concerning the international arrange-ments necessary for efficient and interfer-ence-free use of the radio spectrum. ITUbrings nations together almost continuouslyat meetings and conferences necessary forcoordinating the use of all telecommunica-tions (conveying information by wire, radio,fiberoptic, etc.). WARC-79 was special be-cause of the broad scope of its agenda, whichincluded most of the major arrangements re-lating to use of the radio spectrum. These ar-rangements are of two major types: 1) tech-nical and operational standards; and 2) ad-ministrative mechanisms that give membercountries the right to operate particularradio stations free from harmful interferencefrom others. Governments around the worldhave their own national arrangements forthis, and devise necessary international ar-rangements through ITU. This activity isoften referred to as “spectrum manage-ment.

The first function, relating to technicaland operational standards, consists of estab-lishing specifications concerning the wayradio equipment should perform, the way itshould be operated (particularly in emergen-cy situations), and which portion of the spec-trum should be reserved for particular kindsof radio uses. This last function is usually ac-complished by defining certain kinds of radio

25

—

26 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979.—

“services’ such as broadcasting, mobile,radiolocation, etc., and setting forth a “tableof allocations” indicating which frequencybands are reserved for particular services.Both in the United States, and in ITU, muchwork usually surrounds the preparation ofthe table of allocations. Indeed, much of thework at WARC-79 was devoted to this task.

The second major management function,determining rights in operating radio sta-tions is not always easily accomplished toeveryone’s satisfaction. Whether domesti-cally or internationally, when radio channelsbecome limited, and the possibility of sta-tions interfering with each other on the samefrequency becomes likely, some kind of ad-ministrative arrangement must be estab-lished for deciding which country has theright to operate a radio facility free fromharmful interference in a given geographicalarea. In the domestic situation, a govern-ment agency simply devises and enforcesmethods of doing this. On the internationallevel, the matter is more complicated be-cause every nation regards itself as abso-lutely sovereign, unwilling to be governed bythe dictates of any other nation or an inter-national organization. As a practical matter,however, the desire to maintain interference-free radio communication has led most na-tions to follow arrangements fashioned atconferences of ITU.

The role of communications within a coun-try depends on its political system, the stateof economic development, access to technol-ogy, and the nature of its society. No twocountries are exactly the same and the use ofcommunication varies greatly among thecountries of the world. On a broad basis,distinctions are generally made among threegroups: the more highly developed industrialdemocracies; the varying stages of develop-ment in the East bloc countries; and the de-veloping countries of the Third World. Whilethese distinctions are significant, there arealso many important differences within eachof these broad categories.

The United States, for example, is uniquein many ways. While most countries haveplaced the ownership and operations of tele-communication systems in government orpublic hands, the United States supportsprivate ownership and commercial opera-tions. Government ownership and operationof communication systems are reserved forthose cases where commercial systems areeither not available, or inappropriate, as inthe case of some military operations. Evenso, a large part of U.S. military communica-tions are handled by commercial systems.The United States is dedicated to the princi-ple of free enterprise with private and publicaccess to the radio spectrum.

The differences between the Western na-tions and the East bloc countries have beenreflected in world forums like the United Na-tions for many years. However, the mostbasic change in the distribution of influencein the world has been the emergence of over ahundred developing nations since WorldWar II. Even more significant is that thesenations are increasingly organized aroundtheir common plight of underdevelopmentand they have exercised increasing influenceand power in international arenas wherevotes are cast on the basis of “one-nation,one-vote. ” This does not mean that there issolidarity among Third World countries onall communication and radiofrequency spec-trum matters. On the contrary, there aremany and varied differences among suchdiverse nations as India and Indonesia,Nigeria and Tanzania, or Brazil and Cuba.Nevertheless, on matters of broad principleand approaches to the use of world resourcesand management of the radio spectrum andthe geostationary satellite orbit, the focus ofworld politics has shifted towards the ThirdWorld. There are many questions and issuessurrounding the Third World call for redis-tribution of the world’s resources, for tech-nology transfer, and for changes in the wayworld news and other information is dissem-inated. The United States is dedicated to theprinciples of free flow of information and

Ch. 2—The Changing Requirements, Influences, and Motivations Among Nations ● 27

freedom to express ideas.* In many coun-tries the media are government controlled orfinanced and alternative sources of privatecapital are limited. These and other issuesare encompassed under the general titles of

*While the United States is dedicated to the principles offree flow of information and freedom to express ideas, itshould be noted that both in practice and in theory these prin-ciples are not absolute. For example, information is not free;

Can the Unitedthe Motivations

The United States, like all other nations ofthe world, can ill afford to have its vital com-munications disrupted by interference fromradio transmissions of other countries. Con-sequently, it must be aware of other nations’motivations for frequency utilization andcooperate within reasonable limits. There isan underlying incentive among all nations toavoid interference to their individual domes-tic operations; to communicate among oneanother using international facilities on aninterference-free basis; and to cooperate gen-erally to minimize differences in the alloca-tion and use of frequencies. There are alsomany diverse interests and each countryseeks to maximize its own position in the

“New World economic order” and “NewWorld information order” now under debatein world institutions like the U.N. Educa-tional, Scientific, and Cultural Organization(UNESCO).—. —first amencinwn~ rlght~ ha~e restrictions, and there is noright to access to media other than the limited rights u riderthe Fairness I)octrine’s equal time pro~isions and right torepl~’ LO persona I attacks.

States Disregardof Other Nations?

give and take of international compromise.The complexities have multiplied and effortsto cooperate and achieve a measure of uni-formity among nations in their use of theradio spectrum and geostationary satelliteorbit have become more difficult. This is notunexpected given the increasing reliance ofboth the developed and developing worlds onuse of the radio spectrum and geostationarysatellite orbit; the growing disparity amongnations over particular needs and existinginvestments in various parts of the spec-trum; and the philosophical differences be-coming more evident with the growing influ-ence of the Third World.

How Dependent is the United States on theRadiofrequency Spectrum Including Use of the

Geostationary Satellite Orbit?The United States and other highly devel-

oped countries like Canada, Japan, and thoseof Western Europe are moving from the in-dustrial age to the information age. Thismeans that a large and increasing share ofthe gross national product (GNP) of thesecountries arises from information-relatedservices as opposed to agricultural and man-ufacturing activities. The GNP of the UnitedStates is approaching $3 trillion. Almost halfof all U.S. economic activity is a result of thecollection, organization, analysis, and dis-

semination of information and information-related services. Much of this is now handledvia microwave radio relay or domestic sat-ellites. Thus, the United States has an ever-increasing dependence on the radiofrequen-cy spectrum and the geostationary orbit.

Since the 1940’s, the United States hasbeen the acknowledged world leader in thetelecommunication field. Supporting tech-nologies range from transistors, semicon-ductors, and chip technology to microproc-


essors; and from microwave and coaxialcable to satellite and fiberoptic. The produc-tivity of the U.S. telecommunication indus-try has grown more than twice as fast as pro-ductivity for the U.S. economy overall since1950. The result has been that within a sin-gle generation the communication and infor-mation industry has become one of the mostproductive and vital in the world. Current es-timates place the market for world telecom-munication, electronic, and computer equip-ment and services at $250 billion per year.The United States has a 45-percent share ofthis market that is growing at an annual ratebetween 10 to 15 percent. Worldwide reve-nues from telecommunication services aloneexceeded $170 billion in 1980.

Advances in technology have revolution-ized the supply of telecommunication equip-ment and services. The economic and socialstructure of the United States is tied directlyto the availability of the radio spectrum andthe geostationary satellite orbit to supportthe high growth telecommunication/informa-tion industry. U.S. defense systems, vital toour national security and that of our allies,depend on the radio spectrum and satelliteorbit availability. Defense operations aremaking increased use of both space and ter-restrial systems that use the radio spectrumand every element of the defense structuremust continue to have timely and flexible ac-cess to the radio spectrum to carry out itsmission for national security.

The number and variety of users and serv-ices continue to expand in an informationsociety. The commercial, private, public, andgovernment telecommunication users allcompete for use of the radio spectrum. Otherindustries like transportation, entertain-ment, banking, trade, and the news mediaplace increasing demands on telecommunica-tion services. Airplanes don’t fly, TV pro-grams aren’t aired, financial transactionscease, orders go undelivered, and importantworld events go unreported without moderncommunications. Growth in traditional andnew telecommunication services has creatednew demands for spectrum/orbit availabil-

ity. For example, before 1965 and the launchof the first commercial communications sat-ellite (Early Bird) there was no demand forsatellite frequencies and concerns over park-ing slots on the geostationary orbit werenonexistent. Today, close to 100 communica-tion satellite systems, with several satelliteseach, are in operation or in the planningstage. The issues over use of the geosta-tionary satellite orbit are growing more in-tense and the potential consequences are far--reaching both nationally and internationally.Four U.S. domestic satellite systems areoperational and three additional systems arebeing planned. Some 25 U.S. commercialsatellites providing a range of domestic com-munication services from basic telephone cir-cuits to direct-to-home entertainment maybe operating within the next 5 years. Inter-national decisions about use of the spec-trum/orbit will have great bearing on thefuture of commercial satellite service and onU.S. military satellite systems.

At the same time that new services ex-pand, the traditional uses of the spectrumlike AM, FM, and TV broadcasting grow.Almost 70 percent of the national telephonenetwork (circuit miles) is composed of radiorelay systems using microwave frequenciesto carry long-distance communications.Business, industrial, public, and individualusage of radiofrequencies range from taxisand CB radios to oil pipeline management,and search and rescue operations.

The Federal Government is by far theheaviest single user of the radio spectrumand the Department of Defense (DOD) usesmore spectrum than any other agency. Thisincludes early warning defense systems ofground and airborne radars, Navy fleet com-mand and communication systems, air navi-gational aids, enemy detection and locationdevices, and modern electronic weapons thatuse communications as an integral part oftheir operations. DOD has also producedmuch of the new technology that has led tobroader uses of the radio spectrum.

Some additional examples of Governmentuse of the radio spectrum help illustrate the


reliance that a developed nation, like theUnited States, places on interference-freeoperation of the radio spectrum. The FederalAviation Administration provides naviga-tional and air traffic control service to com-mercial, civil, and Government aircraft rep-resenting about 35 million flights a year. TheDepartment of Justice is a major user ofradio for law enforcement, crime prevention,

and detection activities. The NationalWeather Service operates weather radars,balloon stations, and meteorological satel-lites for forecasting land and sea weather.Without access to the radio spectrum therecould be no space exploration program andthe National Aeronautics and Space Ad-ministration (NASA) would have no reasonto exist.

How Different From Other Countries is theUnited States in Its Need and Use

of the Radio Spectrum?The United States and other developed

countries with sophisticated communicationinfrastructures focus much attention ontheir need to apply new technology, offer avariety of advanced services, and supportmilitary and other Government functionsand services. Generally these objectives gofar beyond a basic need to communicate.They involve the complexities of satisfyingthe competing and often conflicting require-ments that come from a host of business,social, political, national, and institutionalobjectives.

The developing world, on the other hand, ismuch more preoccupied with the need to es-tablish a basic capability, gain self-relianceand control over their own communciations,and harness the powers of communciationsfor educational, social, and economic devel-opment. These differences in the stage ofdevelopment and basic needs are reflected indisputes over specific frequency spectrumallocations as well as disagreements overfundamental principles that govern alloca-tion and use of this unique resource. For in-stance, many developing nations took astrong position at WARC-79 to allocate highfrequency (HF) radio bands (HF radio) forfixed services that they need in order todevelop basic domestic telephone and otherservices. While not reliable, HF radio isrelatively inexpensive and easy to establish.

The United States uses microwave frequen-cies domestically and has replaced most ofits HF radio with more reliable satellite andsubmarine cable circuits for internationaltelephone and other services. Therefore, theU.S. position at WARC-79 was to use HFradiofrequencies for international broadcast-ing, mobile services, and other growing serv-ices important to the United States, but notthe services of comparable interest to manyof the developing countries. It should benoted however, that developing countriesare taking an increasing interest in interna-tional broadcasting and exercised a key rolein decisions affecting this service in the HFradio bands.

A current and particularly important issuethat serves to illustrate a difference in basicprinciple between the United States and theThird World concerns the geostationary sat-ellite orbit. The Third World countries haveexpressed concern that the developed coun-tries may proceed to launch satellites untilthe capacity of the orbit is used-up before thedeveloping countries are able to use it. Toprotect against this eventuality, the ThirdWorld advocates a principle of distributionof orbit locations among nations under an apriori allotment approach. They believe suchan approach would guarantee them futureaccess since it would allocate orbit locationson a preplanned, negotiated basis. The


United States, on the other hand, has im-mediate needs and regards such an a prioriallotment as wasteful and undesirable. Un-der the present ITU approach, the UnitedStates as well as other nations, can take ac-count of the advances in technology and op-erating techniques to “engineer-in” the nextsatellite and fulfill requirements as neces-sary on an “as-needed” basis.

The differences among countries regardingthe radio spectrum cover a broad range. Con-flicts occur between nations no matter whatthe stage of development simply because na-tions are not uniform in their present use orfuture plans for this resource. Unlike mostother nations, the United States places greatemphasis on personal communication andprivate use of the spectrum (e.g., CB radiosand mobile radio for private use, large num-ber of amateur radio operators, etc.). TheUnited States has global military commit-ments with diverse military spectrum re-quirements, a large concentration of scien-tific uses of spectrum including spaceresearch and radioastronomy. The UnitedStates is also a major exporter of telecom-munication equipment.

Under international regulations, countriesneed not coordinate frequency use unlessthere is a potential of interference withanother country. In other words, those do-mestic radio operations that do not send sig-nals across national boundaries that couldcause interference are not of internationalconcern. A TV broadcast station in the mid-dle of the United States does not requirecoordination with any other country. How-ever, a TV broadcast station close to theU.S.-Canadian border requires coordinationbecause its signal crosses into Canada. This

geographical proximity of two countriesgives rise to many potential conflicts that re-quire resolution. The United States andCanada and the United States and Mexicohave a continuing need to coordinate use ofthe radio spectrum.

There is considerable flexibility in the in-ternational radio regulations for countries touse the radio spectrum independently for dif-ferent services. However, there are mitigat-ing factors, like the need to coordinate use atborder areas between countries that arguefor uniformity in use. This doesn’t mean thatthe coordinating problems go away, but onlythat they become more manageable. Otherfactors like producing, selling, and operatingradio equipment in different world marketsprovide incentives for uniform and some-times nonuniform technical and operatingstandards. Certainly there must be a certainmeasure of uniformity or international com-munications could not occur between coun-tries. Indeed, many services are global innature requiring international agreement forspectrum allocation and protection againstinterference. Such services include aero-nautical, maritime, and satellite services. Anairplane making flights internationally mustbe able to navigate and communicate as itflies in different parts of the world. The In-ternational Telecommunication Satellite Or-ganization (INTELSAT) global satellite sys-tem with 106 member countries is an exam-ple of an international common-user systemthat requires uniform radio spectrum alloca-tions. Thus, the necessity to reach agree-ments and coordinate spectrum use amongnations goes far beyond the basic need toavoid radio interference.

Why Is It Necessary To CoordinateRadiofrequency Use Internationally?

Electromagnetic radio waves behave dif- Many factors determine the behavior of par-ferently depending on the particular part of ticular frequencies. Whether or not interfer-the spectrum or frequency range being used. ence will occur depends on many factors in


addition to the particular frequencies used.The transmitter power, type of receiver, andgeographical separation between receivers,and type of terrain over which the signaltravels are examples. The Earth’s atmos-phere has different effects on different partsof the radio spectrum. Different layers of theionosphere reflect or absorb radio energy dif-ferently depending on the frequencies used,time of day, time of year, and period of thesunspot cycle. Frequencies lower in the spec-trum tend to travel or propagate along theground and follow the curvature of theEarth. This so-called “groundwave” be-comes less important as the frequency rangeincreases and the “skywave” or reflectionsfrom the ionosphere become more important.To achieve effective communications, onemust choose frequencies from the bandwhose propagation characteristics are bestsuited for the intended use.

Using today’s technology, most of theworld’s radio communication systems oper-ate at frequencies between 10 kHz and 40GHz (between 10,000 and 40 billion cyclesper second). Over this range of frequencies,some 40 different radio services are inter-nationally allocated certain segments or“bands of frequencies” within which tooperate. For example, AM radio broadcaststations operate in the so-called medium fre-quency (MF) part of the spectrum (300 kHzto about 3 MHz) and are allocated the band535 to 1,605 kHz. An individual AM stationlocated in the United States is assigned aspecific center frequency and a 10-kHz band-width by the Federal Communications Com-mission (FCC). Since the geographical area ofcoverage of an AM station is determined in

part by the power of the transmitter, FCClimits the amount of power stations can use.Different classes of AM stations are author-ized different power limits and thus have dif-ferent coverage areas. Through such domes-tic regulatory decisions, FCC can increase ordecrease the number of station assignmentsavailable in the United States independentof international decisions. However, interna-tional decisons bear directly on domesticissues in several ways. For example,WARC-79 decided to increase the amount ofradio spectrum available for AM broad-casting by extending the frequency range to1,705 kHz. While the United States had pro-posed to expand allocations to the broad-casting service, the conference results werenot the same as the U.S. proposal. In anyevent, new AM radio receivers will need to bemanufactured to receive this extended rangeof frequencies, and the future result will bemore AM radio stations. Recently, the issueof reducing the channel spacing used by AMstations from 10- to 9-kHz spacing has beena subject of attention both within the UnitedStates and internationally. It appears thatthe U.S. position will be to maintain the10-kHz channel spacing.

There are many examples to illustrate thecomplexities of spectrum management andpolicymaking regarding use of the radiospectrum. Almost any decision regardingradio spectrum and satellite orbit availabil-ity has many and varied consequences with-in the United States and internationally.Chapter 4 of this report discusses some ofthe major decisions negotiated at WARC-79and their possible consequences for theUnited States.

How Is the Radiofrequency Spectrum Managedin the United States?

Government policymaking and spectrum government telecommunications. This in-management responsibilities are divided. eludes spectrum management and the licens-Congress enacted the Communications Act ing of radio facilities except those operatedof 1934, which created the FCC and gave it by the Federal Government. The 1934 actresponsibility and authority to regulate non- gave the President responsibility and au-

—.

32 • Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

thority over spectrum management mattersand operation of radio facilities of the Fed-eral Government—both civil and military.The management of Government use of thespectrum has been delegated by the Presi-dent to the National Telecommunicationsand Information Administration (NTIA) inthe Department of Commerce, aided by theInterdepartment Radio Advisory Commit-tee (IRAC). IRAC consists of representa-tives of the major Government agenciesmaking use of the spectrum and includes aliaison representative from FCC.

The Department of State, consistent withits responsibilities for U.S. foreign policy,performs a central role in U.S. preparationsfor and participation at international con-ferences concerning the radiofrequency spec-trum. The Department of State heads U.S.delegations that negotiate with foreign gov-ernments at conferences called by ITU.Other bilateral or multilateral dealings withforeign countries about spectrum manage-ment matters come under the general prov-ince of the State Department.

Congress has both general and specificoversight responsibilities for these agenciesand their conduct of spectrum management.Moreover, the U.S. Senate must give adviceand consent to ratification before the Presi-dent can sign international agreements thatbind the United States in a treaty with othernations. The Final Acts of WARC-79 willform the international radio regulations that

have treaty status and thus require Senateaction.

The Federal Government is responsiblefor, and engaged in, many activities underthe broad term of spectrum management.The Government function of evaluatingneeds and sorting priorities for access to theradio spectrum among the many competingand often conflicting interests within theUnited States is a complex process. The ex-panding telecommunication industry addsmore and more participants and, to a lesserextent, public interest and single interestgroups are entering the spectrum manage-ment process.

The radio spectrum is allocated, opera-tional rules are set, and specific frequencyassignments are made by two Federal agen-cies—NTIA and FCC. NTIA does it for theexecutive branch of the Federal Governmentand FCC does it for the private sector andfor the State and local governments. Deal-ings with foreign countries about the radiospectrum, including negotiation at interna-tional conferences, are the responsibility ofthe Government. In addition to their role asspectrum manager, the agencies of the ex-ecutive branch use more radio spectrumthan any other single user. They have accessto almost half of the radio spectrum allo-cated in the United States. Most of the allo-cated spectrum is available to both FederalGovernment and private and nongovern-ment users on a shared basis.

How Is the Radiofrequency Spectrum ManagedInternationally?

The primary world forum for internationalcooperation and coordination for use of tele-communications of all kinds is ITU with 155member nations. ITU acts as the world’sclearinghouse for telecommunication mat-ters, and members of the Union undertake atreaty relationship for use of the radiofre-quency spectrum as a party to the Interna-

tional Telecommunication Convention andto the radio regulations.

ITU is one of several specialized agenciesof the U.N. However, ITU long predates theU.N. itself. ITU, which was founded in 1865,joined with the International Radiotele-graph Convention signatories in 1932 tobecome ITU.

Ch. 2— The Changing Requirements, Influences, and Motivations Among Nations ● 33

ITU does not have a permanent constitu-tion, but rather operates under the Interna-tional Telecommunication Convention thatis revised periodically at ITU plenipoten-tiary conferences. While basic to every func-tion of the Union, the convention is relative-ly brief. Details delineating ITU’s activitiesand the responsibilities of membership arespelled out in four other documents knownas the administrative regulations: the tele-graph regulations, the telephone regulations,the radio regulations, and the additional ra-dio regulations–each of which enjoys treatystatus in its own right (the United States isnot a party to the additional radio regula-tions that were ultimately suppressed byWARC-79 and will pass into history on Jan-uary 1, 1982). WARC-79 was convened to re-vise the radio regulations. Although severalworld and regional specialized radio confer-ences were held in the interim, the last con-ference to consider the full range of radioregulations was held in 1959.

In the world arena, ITU is the focal pointfor spectrum management. Its role in tele-communications, however, is much broader

Issues Addressed.The OTA study examines broad aspects of

spectrum management within the UnitedStates and internationally. The present Gov-ernment structure and decisionmaking proc-esses for spectrum management are re-viewed. Possible changes and improvementsto existing processes are discussed and alter-native policymaking mechanisms are pre-sented in the study.

A review of the WARC-79 conference andthe major decisions taken are addressed in

than spectrum matters and includes tech-nical standards, operating practices, ac-counting and rate issues, as well as mattersrelating to wire communications. Just asITU’s influence is broader than spectrumconsideration, so are international influenceson spectrum issues broader than ITU. In-deed, there are no less than a dozen interna-tional organizations concerned with telecom-munication/information matters and theyimpact directly and indirectly on the issuesof spectrum management, as illustratedlater in this report. Such organizations in-clude the Universal Postal Union; the WorldIntellectual Property Organization; the In-tergovernmental Maritime Consultative Or-ganization; the International Civil AviationOrganization; INTELSAT: the Intergovern-mental Bureau for Informatics; the InterAmerican Telecommunication Conference;the Organization for Economic Cooperationand Development; the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization; and other groups of the U.N.family, particularly UNESCO and the U.N.Committee on the Peaceful Uses of OuterSpace with its Working Group on DirectBroadcasting Satellites.

in the OTA Studyterms of possible consequences for theUnited States. The present and future rolesof ITU are considered with a range of alter-native approaches for future U.S. participa-tion in ITU. The study discusses alternativestrategies for dealing with current andfuture issues that will be raised at severalimportant conferences within the next fewyears.

Chapter 3

Domestic and InternationalManagement of the

Radiofrequency Spectrum

Contents

PageThe Structure of Spectrum Management for the United States. . . . . . . . . . . 37

The Role of NTIA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

The Role of the FCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

The Department of State’s Role. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

The Public Role. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Past Critiques of U.S. Telecommunication Policymaking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Prospects for the Future. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

International Management of the Spectrum – the ITU.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

ITU Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Political Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

The Future of ITU. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

The Changing ITU Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Other International Organizations Involved in Telecommunications . . . . . . 54

U.S. Preparations for WARC-79 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

TABLE

Table No. Pagel. U.S. Delegates to WARC-79 by Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure No. Pagel. Federal Communications Commission Structure-August 1981 . . . . . . . . 392. Actors Involved in FCC Rulemaking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 413. 0rganizational Chart of ITU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Chapter 3

Domestic and InternationalManagement of the

Radio frequency Spectrum

From the earliest practical utilization ofradio for ship-to-shore and ship-to-ship com-munications in the early 1900’s it was appar-ent that international agreements were re-quired to coordinate use of the electromag-netic spectrum and avoid interference. Forfull and effective use of radio communica-tions there had to be common standards forequipment design and mutually consistentoperating techniques. Most of all, there hadto be agreement on ways to achieve inter-ference-free, compatible use of the radio-frequency spectrum by radio systems whoseradiated energy may overlap in various

other characteristics of electromagneticradiation.

Without such agreements radio communi-cations would be chaotic. Mutual interfer-ence would make radio reception so unreli-able as to be virtually useless. The history ofspectrum management has been marked byincreasingly complex mechanisms for the ra-tional and economical exploitation of in-creasingly congested channels of communi-cation. The success of these arrangements isa tribute to man’s commonsense and inge-nuity.

dimensions of space, time, frequency,

The Structure offor the

and

Spectrum ManagementUnited States

Telecommunication is an essential elementin the economic and social life of the UnitedStates and a vital factor in the effective func-tioning of virtually every department andagency of the Federal Government. Yet, de-spite the nationwide and worldwide impor-tance of rapid, reliable, responsive telecom-munications, the United States does nothave a centralized means to oversee and co-ordinate national policy decisions.

There is no single U.S. Government orga-nization responsible for overall frequencymanagement, policies, and processes. In-stead, there are several governmental orga-nizations having key roles and responsibili-ties with the National Telecommunicationsand Information Administration (NTIA), theFederal Communications Commission (FCC),and the Department of State being the prin-

cipal agencies. The procedures followed areboth formal and informal, and there are anincreasing number of diverse constituencies.

Spectrum management in the UnitedStates, including the development of policy,is divided, depending on whether the spec-trum user is a Government or nongovern-ment entity. The Communications Act of1934 assigns to the President the respon-sibility for management of the electromag-netic spectrum used by agencies and depart-ments of the Federal Government. FCC is re-sponsible for managing all nonfederal gov-ernment use.

It is the status of the user, not the frequen-cies employed or the particular category ofservice, that determines whether the Presi-dent (or his agent) or FCC has jurisdiction.

37

—


For example, spectrum use by the Depart-ment of Defense (DOD) and the individualmilitary services is under the jurisdiction ofthe President, while spectrum use by com-mon carriers such as AT&T and the Com-

munications Satellite (COMSAT), by Stateand local governments, and by citizens andamateur radio operators, is the responsibil-ity of FCC.

The Role of NTIAUnder Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1977

and Executive Order No. 12046, of March26, 1978, President Carter transferred hisauthority to assign frequencies to the Secre-tary of Commerce, who further delegated itto the Assistant Secretary of Commerce forCommunications and Information (who isalso the Administrator of NTIA).

Assisting the Administrator of NTIA is anadvisory body called the InterdepartmentRadio Advisory Committee (IRAC). IRAChas been in continuous existence since 1922,having been established even earlier thanthe Federal Radio Commission, which pre-ceded the present FCC. It has performedessentially the same functions for the past59 years, although the organization andstructure of the executive branch, and the of-fice, or department, or administration inwhich IRAC has been housed have beenchanged many times.

IRAC is made up of representatives of 20Federal agencies and departments. FCC par-

ticipates through a liaison representative ap-pointed by FCC. The functions of IRAC in-clude assisting NTIA in the development ofthe national table of frequency allocations,the assignment of frequencies to stationsowned and operated by the U.S. Govern-ment, and in the development and carryingout of basic policies, procedures, programs,and technical matters pertaining to the man-agement and employment of the radiofre-quency spectrum.

IRAC has a secretariat that provides gen-eral support to all committee activities and avariety of specialized subcommittees and adhoc or special working groups to deal withparticular matters, such as frequency as-signments, international notification, andpreparations for international conferences.The subcommittees are concerned with ongo-ing activities whereas ad hoc groups dealwith specific-term subject matter.

The Role of the FCCAs noted earlier, FCC, which is an inde-

pendent Federal agency reporting directly toCongress, is charged with regulating inter-state and foreign communications by meansof radio, wire, and cable. This charter encom-passes both economic regulation and themanagement and licensing of users of theradio spectrum.

The seven commissioners of FCC are ap-pointed by the President with the advice and

consent of the Senate. They supervise allFCC activities, with delegation of respon-sibilities to boards and committees of com-missioners, individual commissioners, andstaff units. The commissioners are aided bya staff of some 2,000 regular employees,about a fourth of whom are engaged in fieldoperations (see fig. 1).

There are five operating bureaus, reflect-ing the functional basis of FCC: broadcast,

Ch. 3—Domestic and International Management of the Radiofrequency Spectrum ● 39

I

■

,<., . .-.

0W3

—

40 . Radiofrequency Use and Management Irnpacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

cable television, common carrier, field opera-tions, and private radio. In addition, thereare six staff offices, including the Office ofScience and Technology (OST), which is thefocal point within the Commission for Spec-trum Management, and the Office of Plansand Policy (OPP).

Broad policy questions, having some spec-trum management or frequency allocationaspects (e.g., the use and status of the ultra-high frequency (UHF) portion of the spec-trum or the investigation of interim provi-sions for broadcasting satellites, often re-ferred to as direct broadcasting satellites)have been the subject of studies by OPP.

The primary focus for domestic spectrummanagement at FCC is in the spectrum man-agement division within OST. This division,which is responsible for, among other things,the National Table of Frequency Allocations,obtains the views of the public (and cor-porate representatives) through publicationof notices of inquiry (NOIS), advisory com-

mittees, and from the bureaus responsiblefor the several radio services. The table isamended after coordination with IRACwhere necessary and issuance of notices ofproposed rulemaking (NPRMs) (see fig. 2).

Once a frequency band has been allocatedto a particular radio service, the bureau re-sponsible for that service will develop rulesfor its use on the basis of information gath-ered through NOIs, NPRMs, and other FCCprocedures.

Spectrum management matters before in-ternational organizations (for example, pro-posals of the United States for changes toITU radio regulations) are the responsibilityof OST. This office works closely with theoperating bureaus and other offices in FCCconcerned with spectrum management mat-ters. Moreover, the FCC liaison represent-ative to IRAC is from OST. FCC’s views andpolicies regarding its responsibilities for theprivate sector use of the spectrum are re-flected within IRAC by this representative.

The Department of State’s RoleIt can be seen that policy for international

telecommunication, including the orderlyuse of the radiofrequency spectrum, cannotbe considered the exclusive concern of anysingle executive department or agency of theFederal Government. Nevertheless, telecom-munications negotiations and agreements,both bilateral and multilateral, remain an im-portant part of the foreign relations of theUnited States and therefore fall within thejurisdiction and responsibility of the StateDepartment.

The Department of State, with recommen-dations from NTIA, FCC, and others, namesdelegations to international telecommunica-tion meetings, whether sponsored by inter-national organizations, such as the Interna-tional Telecommunications Union (ITU) (andits permanent bodies, the International

Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR), theInternational Telegraph and Telephone Con-sultative Committee (CCITT), and the Inter-national Frequency Registration Board(IFRB), or by regional bodies, such as theInter-American Telecommunications Confer-ence (CITEL) of the Organization of Amer-ican States. The State Department can des-ignate another agency or commission to rep-resent the United States at a particularmeeting or for a specified purpose. Thus, forexample, FCC has been designated as the or-ganization that transmits notifications andadvance publication information required bythe radio regulations to IFRB of ITU. Simi-larly, the Commission conducts bilateralmeetings with Canada regarding nongovern-ment frequency use near the border, andDOD participates directly in the communica-tions negotiations of the North Atlantic


Figure 2.—Actors Involved in FCC RulemakingY“- 4

‘ “h

ExecutivePublic Congress JudicialBranch Branch

.

Opinionand OrderDenyingPetition(MO&O)

Noticeof

Inquiry(NOI)

I Comments I

Reportand OrderAdoptingChange

(Editorialchanges only)

r 1I I Additional I

Report andOrders

Petition forReconsideration 4 I

MemorandumOpinion and Order

SOURCE FCC Communicator. September 1975

Treaty Organization (NATO) and its sub-ordinate bodies, such as the Allied RadioFrequency Agency.

Typically, U.S. delegations to internation-al meetings in general, and ITU and its bod-ies in particular, have included individualsfrom Government agencies, and nongovern-ment organizations. As in the case of other

specialized, highly technical internationalconferences and negotiations (meteorology,world health, agriculture, etc. ) the State De-partment looks to other Government agen-cies, private sector organizations and com-panies, and individuals having knowledge ofeach field. In the case of internationaltelecommunications, the State Departmentrelies heavily on FCC, NTIA, and the na-

42 . Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

tional committees for CCIR and CCITT, as ministration (NASA), and the Department ofwell as on individual agencies such as DOD, Transportation, as well as experts from thethe National Aeronautics and Space Ad- private sectors.

The Public RoleThe Department of State may establish an

advisory committee for specific conferences,as it did in the case of WARC-79. The public,including representatives of industrialgroups and organizations, participate as in-dividual members of such a State Depart-ment body. The public, industry, and privateinterests may participate in the decision-making process by filing comments andviews with FCC through its public NOIS andNPRMs and in Government/industry advi-sory committees set up by FCC prior tomany of the individual conferences. Thispublic process to decide spectrum issues forthe nonfederal government use of the spec-trum is in contrast to the NTIA/IRAC non-public process to decide Federal use of thespectrum. Finally, individuals from industri-

al, scientific, research, manufacturing, andpublic interest organizations may be ap-pointed to the U.S. delegations to suchmeetings.

U.S. international communication policymust reflect a coordinated balance of foreignand domestic policy considerations. More-over, effective negotiations in the telecom-munications field, including spectrum coor-dination, requires a combination of U.S. pol-icymaking authority embodying essentialfeatures not easily combined. For example,there must be cooperation among mission-oriented Federal departments and agencies,extensive public and congressional participa-tion, continuity over the years, and an over-all sense of direction and purpose.

Past Critiques of U.S. TelecommunicationPolicymaking

These elements have not always been suc-cessfully brought together. A Communica-tion Policy Board reporting to PresidentHarry S Truman in 1951 identified five spe-cific issues as being basic to the Nation’stelecommunication problems. These were:

1. How shall the United States formulatepolicies and plans for guidance in reconcil-ing the conflicting interests and needs ofGovernment and private users of the spec-trum space–that is, for guidance in mak-ing the best use of its share of the totalspectrum?

2. How shall the United States meet the re-current problem of managing its total tele-communications resources to meet thechanging demands of national security?

3. How shall the United States develop a na-tional policy and position for dealing withother nations in seeking international tele-communications agreements?

4. How shall the United States develop pol-icies and plans to foster the soundness andvigor of its telecommunications agree-ments?

5. How shall the United States Governmentstrengthen its organization to cope withthe four issues stated above?

The policy board report emphasized spec-trum usage, national security, and the main-tenance of a sound industry as key subjectsto be borne in mind when considering theissues quoted above. With regard to “inter-


national agreements, ” the same reportstated:*

Just as the United States has no clear pol-icy for dividing its share of spectrum space,so it has lacked satisfactory means of deter-mining policy as a basis for negotiationswith other nations for the world division ofthe spectrum. The United States, in prepar-ing positions for international negotiations,has in effect asked Federal and otherclaimants to state their needs, and thenpresented the total as the United States re-quirement. In those portions of the spectrumwhere these totals have been small enoughto fit within the world complement, ourdelegations to conferences have had a negoti-able position. In some cases, however, thetotal stated requirements have exceeded notmerely those which could reasonably be putforward as the proper United States share,but have actually exceeded the total phys-ical content of the bands. Furthermore, thereis no permanent mechanism by which thestated requirements of the United Statesusers could be adjusted with equity and safe-ty. The imperative need for means of makingsuch adjustments hardly requires elabora-tion.

Sixteen years later in 1967, President Lyn-don B. Johnson sent a message to Congressadvising that a “Task Force on Communica-tion Policy” was being established to ex-amine a number of major questions in thecommunications policy area. While most ofthe thrust of the task force was aimed at theuse of satellite and space technology, it wasapparent that the problems identified in1951 by President’s Truman’s Policy Boardremained unresolved.

In chapter 9 of its report–entitled “TheRoles of the Federal Government in Tele-communications, the task force stated:**

A. Traditionally, government has viewedtelecommunications primarily as amission-support function, rather than a

*See Telecommunications—A Program For Progress, areport by the President’s Communications Policy Board,dated March 1951, Irvin Stewart, Chairman.

**See Final Report of the President ‘S Task Force On c’om-

murzications Policy, Dec. 7, 1968.

focus for public policy. The result hasbeen that policy has evolved as a patch-work of limited, largely ad hoc responsesto specific issues, rather than a cohesiveframework for planning. Governmentorganization for the formulation and im-plementation of communications policiesreflects this evolution.—

—

—

Early government involvement in tele-communications often involved ad hocresponses to individual problems asthey appeared.The framework established by theCommunications Act of 1934, althoughcombining the broadcasting and com-mon carrier regulatory functions, re-mains limited in scope.The post World War I I period has beencharacterized by the growth of commu-nications activities and a series of nar-rowly focused studies and limited orga-nizational changes.

B. The patchwork nature of the presentstructure is not conducive to optimumperformance of the telecommunicationsactivities and requirements of the FederalGovernment.—

—

—

—

Existing organizational arrangementsmake effective spectrum managementdifficult.The absence of a central focus possess-ing the requisite technological and eco-nomic skills makes more difficult thedevelopment of a sound and forward-looking international telecommuni-cations policy.The policy coordination necessitatedby the plethora of government telecom-munications roles is inadequately per-formed by a multiplicity of commit-tees.Recent events have underscored thelack of an effective government capa-bility for long-range telecommunica-tions policy planning.

Thus, the 1968 report reiterates the issuesraised earlier by President Truman’s Com-munications Policy Board, and the reitera-tion is particularly applicable in the areas ofGovernment organization and spectrummanagement. In January 1980, the U.S.Senate Committee on Commerce, Science,and Transportation requested the Chairmanof the Office of Technology Assessment


Board to address the following two ques-tions:*

(1) In view of the original United States posi-tions, what will be the probable impact ofthe decisions made at WARC-79 on theU. S.? How should the U.S. adjust itspreparation and participation in future in-ternational telecommunications confer-ences in order to more effectively ac-complish its objective?

(2) Should the United States modify itsallocations procedures and tables in orderto respond to the WARC-79 decisions?What are the major U.S. spectrum needslikely to be during the next twenty yearsand how will they be accommodated?

The request reflects a continued concernfor the existing machinery and proceduresfor U.S. telecommunications policymakingand preparation for international telecom-munications conferences. Similar expres-sions of concern in the past did lead to struc-tural changes but with little apparent result.President Eisenhower eliminated the officeof the “Telecommunications Advisor to thePresident” and replaced it with an “Assist-ant Director for Telecommunications” in theOffice of the Director of Defense Mobiliza-tion. The duties assigned were focused ontelecommunications policies and standards

——*See joint letter signed by Senators Cannon, Packwood,Hollings, Goldwater, and Schmitt to the Hon. Morris K.Udall, Chairman, Office of Technology Assessment, datedFeb. 11, 1980.

for the executive branch and the President’sresponsibilities for spectrum management.

Over the years, the job of “Assistant Di-rector for Telecommunications Manage-ment” became, in 1970, the Director of theOffice of Telecommunications Policy andthen, in 1978, the entire telecommunicationsfunction was transferred out of the Execu-tive Office of the President to the Depart-ment of Commerce (DOC) where the presentNTIA is now located.

In the final analysis, one may concludethat, despite its worrisome deficiencies, theU.S. telecommunications policymaking andmanagement machinery has worked. Howwell, and how efficiently, are matters of dis-pute. The good results rest on the fact thatover the years highly dedicated, competent,career personnel made the system work.Since spectrum is the common denominatorin all uses of radio, coordination has beenessential for the various radio services tofunction in a compatible manner. It is thiscoordination, which over the years hasbecome a very specialized and sophisticatedfunction, that frequently bears directly onthe policy decisions. The United States hasbeen extremely fortunate in that, in the past,it has been able to send to international con-ferences representatives who were experi-enced and competent to deal with what havebeen essentially technical rather than politi-cal and economic matters.

Prospects for the FutureBut today, more than ever, telecommuni-

cations encompasses far more than justspectrum management, and U.S. policy for-mulation in advance of international negotia-tions involves more than just those issuesforced by the need for frequency coordina-tion. The existing U.S. structure is inade-quate in that the permanent, ongoing spec-trum management mechanisms are not ade-quately equipped to review all stated re-quirements of Government and nongovern-

ment spectrum users and objectively verifyand adjust needs consistent with nationalpolicy objectives. There is no ongoing effec-tive means of collecting data and developingguidelines to judge the merits of one spec-trum use over any other.

In an international negotiating environ-ment that has become increasingly political,U.S. spectrum management specialists havebeen called on to anticipate U.S. telecom-


munications requirements far into the futurewithout adequate long-range analysis. Theabsence of such a strategic, long-term plan-ning approach reflects the absence of con-cern for telecommunications issues at thehighest levels of Government and hampersthe effectiveness of U.S. negotiators.

Lack of high-level concern has also led to ashortage of trained and experienced engi-neering personnel to replace those retiringfrom Federal Government service. Nor hasthere been sufficient awareness of the needfor personnel with supplementary economic,legal, and diplomatic skills, as well as foreignlanguage proficiency.

The three principal players in conductingtelecommunication negotiations are the De-partment of State, DOC (through NTIA),and FCC. Thus, within the executive branchthere is a built-in fragmentation of telecom-munications policy. The Department ofState is clearly the focal point for the con-duct of foreign relations but its Office of In-ternational Communications Policy is lightlymanned and well down in the State Depart-ment’s organizational structure. It is not in astrong position to make its influence felt inthe upper echelons of Government and in-dustry.

Under Executive Order No. 12046, NTIAis assigned functions that include develop-ing and setting forth, in coordination withthe Secretary of State and other interestedagencies, plans and programs that relate tointernational telecommunications. From apractical standpoint, NTIA lacks sufficientresources and “clout” to fully carry out itsmandate effectively. Moreover, the rathergeneral wording of the Executive orderleaves it ambiguous as to how far NTIA cango in its coordinating role, particularly whenthat mandate risks encroachment on thegeneral regulatory responsibilities of FCC.

In his testimony before the Subcommitteeon International Operations of the HouseForeign Affairs Committee on July 31, 1980,Glenn O. Robinson, who was chairman of theU.S. delegation to the 1979 WARC, said he

did not regard the fragmentation of U.S. pol-icymaking to be a matter of great signifi-cance in preparing for future WARCs. Yet hewent on to say:

Of course, it is necessary to have somelocus of final decision making; there must besome place, where in Truman’s words, the“buck stops.” So far as international policyis concerned the answer seems reasonablyclear: the Secretary of State speaking for thePresident has, and must retain, the ultimateresponsibility.

The State Department’s role extends be-yond mere final review and approval of inter-national policy positions. It also has a role toplay in shaping policy positions—to ensurethat international policy concerns are prop-erly integrated into the policy making proc-ess from its inception and not merely layeredon top of it at the point of final decision.

An important element of future prepara-tion will be developing appropriate linkageswith other elements of international commu-nications policy. Obviously radio spectrumuse and management does not stand apartfrom other aspects of international commu-nications and communications policy. De-spite the highly specialized technical charac-ter of radio spectrum management whichsets it apart from, say, U.N. or UNESCOdebates over free-versus-balanced-flow of in-formation or development assistance pro-grams, the issues are often related.

As a first step some permanent mecha-nism for intra-Departmental and interagen-cy coordination is appropriate. Such a mech-anism was developed in 1978 as a first at-tempt to bring together some of the majorstrands of international communicationspolicy. Thereafter coordination was pursuedmore or less informally as part of theWARC-79 preparations. For the future, how-ever, policy review and development oughtnot to be dominated by some specific majorevent such as WARC. The “big event” isprobably of diminishing importance in inter-national diplomacy. The process of continu-ing negotiations through a series of confer-ences has become predominant in almost allaspects of international affairs, including in-ternational communications policy. Itfollows that too great an emphasis on single

46 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference Of 1979

events, such as future WARCs, as a focalpoint for policy coordination could lead to adistorted perspective on policy issues andobjectives.

As to what organizational structure mightbe needed to carry out the future role of coor-dinating international communications pol-icy I have no specific recommendations. I donot think a large new office is required tohandle the task, but the responsibility mustbe clearly recognized and given stature com-mensurate with its high importance.

Thus, the expressions of concern over thelack of permanent mechanisms for coor-dinating U.S. international communicationpolicy persist to the present time. The pres-ent structure is not adequate to develop tele-communication policies, to effect long-rangeplanning, and assure the achievement ofU.S. goals.

International Management of the Spectrum –the ITU

ITU is the principal international institu-tion for achieving agreement and coopera-tion among nations on the use of telecommu-nications. It is a unique organization thathas managed to bring the merits of technicalcollaboration to a level where participatinggovernments feel a vested interest in theagreements reached.

Adherence to ITU agreements is volun-tary and cannot be enforced by higher au-thority. There are no sanctions to compel anITU member to abide by ITU rules. How-ever, membership in ITU entails a treatyobligation to conform to the collective deci-sions of its members. Its activities might bedescribed by systems analysts as a nonzeroor positive-sum game in which there are nowinners or losers and where all the partici-pants benefit. The mechanisms of ITU aredesigned to achieve the maximum utilizationof the electromagnetic spectrum by thewidest range of users, and to avoid a situa-tion where one user is accommodated at theexpense of another.

ITU was created in 1932 by the merger oftwo existing groups-the International Tele-graph Union (founded in 1865) and the Inter-national Radiotelegraph Convention signa-tories. It has grown in breadth and scopeover the years—surviving two world wars

and the unprecedented diversification ofcommunications technology.

An international agreement-making andrulemaking organization whose members ad-here to many varied legal systems, it hasavoided legal doctrine. Its fundamental gov-erning principles are contained in the ITUConvention, a constitution first adopted in1932 that remains subject to periodic revi-sion. According to this convention the pur-poses of ITU are:

1.

2.

3.

to maintain and extend international co-operation for the improvement and ra-tional use of telecommunications of allkinds;to promote the development of technicalfacilities and their most efficient opera-tion with a view to improving the effi-ciency of telecommunications services,increasing their usefulness and makingthem, so far as possible, generallyavailable to the public; andto harmonize the actions of nations inthe attainment of those ends.

The activities of ITU are organized for theattainment of specific objectives, the mostimportant of which are:

• allocation, registration, and coordinatedutilization of the radiofrequency spec-


●

trum to avoid harmful interference be- ●

tween radio stations of different coun-tries;planned development of telecommuni-cations facilities, particularly those us-ing space techniques. Creating, develop- ●

ing, and improving telecommunicationequipment and networks in developingcountries;

promoting collaboration in setting tele-communication rates as low as possible,while maintaining efficiency of servicesand independent financial administra-tion; andconducting studies, collecting and pub-lishing public information, adopting res-olutions, and formulating regulations onmatters relating to telecommunications.

ITU StructureThe ITU structure combines conferences,

or policymaking bodies, and permanentorgans. The plenipotentiary conference isthe supreme body of ITU. It consists of thedelegations of member countries meetingevery 5 to 9 years to formulate generalpolicies, establish budget guidelines, electmembers and top officials, and concludeagreements between the ITU and other in-ternational organizations. Only the plenipo-tentiary conference can amend or revise theITU Convention. The next such conferenceis scheduled for September 1982 in Nairobi,Kenya (see fig. 3).

Administrative conferences are convenedto consider specific telecommunication mat-ters as the need arises. They may be eitherworldwide or regional in scope and participa-tion. (ITU divides the world into three re-gions—region 1 covers Europe, the U. S. S. R.,Turkey, Mongolia, and Africa; region 2covers North, Central, and South Americas,the Caribbean and Greenland; region 3covers South Asia, Australia, New Zealand,and the Pacific. ) Conference agendas mayconcern all radio communications servicesand all frequency bands or may be restrictedto a particular band and one or more serv-ices. Among the administrative conferencesheld in the 1970’s were those dealing withspace, maritime and aeronautical radio com-munications, satellite broadcasting, andWARC-79. The Final Acts of such confer-ences become treaties following ratificationby ITU members.

In the intervals between plenipotentiaryconferences, the administrative council actson behalf of the entire membership in formu-lating policy and overseeing the work ofITU. First instituted in 1947 with 18 mem-bers (ITU then had 73 member states and anannual budget of 4 million Swiss francs), thecouncil now has 36 members. (ITU hasgrown to 155 members and has a budget of67 million Swiss francs, or approximately$31 million). Meeting each spring in Geneva,the council approves the annual budget,determines the size and grading of the staff,sets salaries and allowances, and determinesthe schedule of conferences and meetingsand their agendas. It has become a forum fordiscussion of certain political issues such asthe question of South Africa, Rhodesia, thePortuguese colonies in Africa, and the Mid-dle East.

The council has also contended with theissue of the languages to be provided in in-terpretation and document translation atconferences. Interpretation and translationare provided in French, English, and Span-ish, plus Chinese and Russian for all officialdocumentation. In addition, there is inter-pretation in Arabic at plenipotentiary andadministrative conferences.

The general secretariat has grown in sizeand responsibilities over recent years. Since1965, the Secretary General of ITU has beenchosen from among candidates from devel-oping countries. The present Secretary Gen-


Figure 3.—Organizational Chart of ITU

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v

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Secretariatb

SOURCE International Telecommunication Union

eral, Mohammed Mili of Tunisia, assisted byhis deputy, Richard Butler of Australia,coordinates and supervises the day-to-dayactivities of ITU. He employs a multina-tional general secretariat staff to supportthe other permanent organs of XTU–IFRBand the two technical committees: CCIR andCCITT. The secretariat includes a technicalcooperation department that assists devel-oping countries, using funds provided bythe United Nations Development Program(UNDP). (The current members of IFRB arefrom the U.S.S.R, Canada, Morocco, Japan,and the United Kingdom.)

Unlike other international organizations inwhich sole executive direction resides in a

I1

I

secretary general, there is a diffusion of au-thority among ITU’s permanent organsleading to what is sometimes described asITU’s “Federal structure. ” No one elementof ITU’s secretariat has overall responsibil-ity for the operation of ITU. The SecretaryGeneral cannot dictate the registration offrequencies by IFRB nor does he have tech-nical responsibilities for the activities ofthe International Consultative Committees(CCIs). Also, IFRB cannot dictate the tech-nical findings of CCIs. Nevertheless, the Sec-retary General, IFRB, and CCIs are requiredto work together to meet the needs of themembers. This sharing of executive powerhas given rise to certain conflicts andrivalries.

Ch. 3—Domestic and International Management of the Radiofrequency Spectrum “ 49

Led by five officials elected by the plenipo-tentiary conference, IFRB records the date,purpose, and technical characteristics of fre-quency assignments by member countrieswith a view to achieving international recog-nition. IFRB also records orbital positionsassigned to geostationary satellites. It ex-amines each frequency notification receivedfor conformity with the international radioregulations and for the possibility of harmfulinterference. If the examination is favorable,the frequency assignment is entered in themaster register; if not, it is returned to thenotifying country with suggestions regard-ing a solution to the difficulty. Through ref-erence to the master register and the board’sweekly circulars, operators worldwide haveaccess to a listing of all registered frequencyassignments.

CCIR, which is currently headed by anAmerican, and CCITT, whose director isFrench, are ITU’s best known permanentorgans. All member countries and certainprivate operating companies, scientific andindustrial organizations can participate intheir work. The ITU Convention prescribesthe duties of CCIR as the study of technicaland operating questions relating to radiocommunications and the issuing of recom-mendations. The CCITT members are tostudy and make recommendations regardingtechnical, operating, and tariff questionsrelated to telegraphy and telephony.

The work of CCIs is conducted by a num-ber of study groups whose members includeexperts in each of the specialized areas of in-terest to the study groups. The product ofthese study groups is the basis for standardsand specifications that are generally ac-cepted by all administrations and users.

PoliticalAt various times, member nations of ITU

and signatories to the convention have beenexcluded from ITU conferences for political

In practice, CCIs have studied, issued re-ports on, and made recommendations con-cerning communication systems operationsand advanced technologies as they havebeen developed. The member nations of ITUlook to CCIs for information and guidance onthe use of these techniques and their reportsand recommendations are respected and gen-erally accepted by member nations in theplanning, design, and operation of telecom-munication systems.

The responsibilities of ITU to lend assist-ance to developing countries and to studytheir special problems is a challenge to anorganization whose principal purpose isagreement-making. The rationale is simpleenough. For agreement-making to be effec-tive, all participants must be in a position toparticipate and cooperate. The less devel-oped countries need help in extending theirtelecommunications services and in develop-ing appropriate administrative and technicalskills. Thus, technical assistance promotesbetter global communications generally.

The challenge to ITU lies in extending thisassistance without overtaxing its limited re-sources. The extraordinary growth of tele-communication technologies and serviceshas already strained ITU’s capacity to pro-duce effective international agreements on atimely basis. Furthermore, ITU must com-pete with other organizations for the serv-ices of telecommunications specialists that itwould like to assign to assist developingcountries. The costs of ITU’s administrationof UNDP aid programs must be met by con-tributions from developed countries thatmay prefer to see ITU concentrate on itsagreement-making functions.

Issuesreasons. For example, this happened toSpain in 1947, and Rhodesia, South Africa,and Portugal were excluded from a 1973 con-


ference. There have also been occasionswhen efforts to exclude nations have failedto win approval of the membership.

In other instances, the structure of ITUhas been flexible and pragmatic enough toassign country codes for worldwide automat-ic telephone dialing to nations that, at thetime, were not members of ITU (e.g., EastGermany, the Peoples Republic of China).

Unfortunately, ITU is not always success-ful at agreement-making. For example, inthe postwar years three incompatible stand-ards for color TV broadcasting were adoptedin several parts of the world to the obviousdetriment of international coordination andstandardization. As a result, European TVset manufacturers must provide parallel cir-cuitry to accommodate the different stand-ards and international program exchange isseriously burdened by the conversion ofstandards at switching points.

A similar problem developed in the searchfor a standardized digital transmission sys-

tem. European countries were able to select asingle system from among almost 20 com-peting designs but North American inter-ests, committed financially to a different de-sign, were unwilling or unable to be accom-modating enough to find a compromise sin-gle standard.

Overall, the achievements of ITU are im-pressive considering its inherent weaknessesand the complexity of its structures and pro-cedures. Modern states are clearly unwillingto cede substantial power to any internation-al organization. Yet, ITU has managed tomaintain order in an environment that couldeasily have been chaotic. The growing needsfor maritime and aeronautical communica-tions have been met. Efficient internationaltelegraph and telephone service would havebeen difficult without ITU or similar organi-zations. Despite the strong economic in-terests of national equipment suppliers,there was sufficient collaboration withinCCITT to accomplish the shift from oper-ator-assisted international phone service toautomatic dialing, routing, and switching.

The Future of ITUWhether ITU can continue to function ef-

fectively in the future is another question.The influx of “new” nations to membershipin ITU in recent years has brought a dif-ferent set of values and concerns to the orga-nization. The new members have brought aheightened demand for programs of aid andtechnical assistance to developing nations.They have fostered regionalism and, mostimportant, they have increasingly demandedequitable access and usage of spectrum andorbital slots for geosynchronous satellites.

The needs of these developing nations areoften at odds with those of the developedworld. For example, industrialized countriesneed considerable amounts of radio spec-trum to support sophisticated worldwide ra-dionavigation and radiolocation systemsconsidered vital to their national security

and safe international aircountries have limited“radar” systems. By theis contention between the

travel. Developingneed for these

same token, theredeveloped and less

developed countries over the use of high fre-quency (HF) bands. The developing coun-tries depend on HF for domestic point-to-point communication in large measurewhereas the developed countries are morelikely to use the same frequencies forinternational broadcasting, mobile, andother services.

The principal issue of contention has beenthe so-called “first-come, first-served” prin-ciple used by ITU member countries to regis-ter radiofrequency assignments. Basically,“first-come, first-served” has meant thatwhoever develops a use for a given frequencyfirst and notifies IFRB of this intended use

Ch. 3—Domestic and International Management of the Radio frequency Spectrum . 51

has established a claim to protection fromharmful interference. This has meant thatthe bulk of the frequency assignments havebeen assigned to the developed countries.Moreover, some of those assignments, par-ticularly those used for HF fixed (point-to-point) services, have been abandoned by thedeveloped countries in favor of microwaveand satellite systems but, it is charged, havenot been given up for reassignment. (Itshould be pointed out that to a large degreethe radio spectrum is reusable. This meansthat a frequency assignment made to onecountry does not necessarily preclude its useby another country.)

The developing countries, therefore, fearthat when they are finally prepared to useradio services not needed at their presentstage of development, the spectrum spacewill no longer be available. They have trans-lated this fear into a demand for “equitableand/or guaranteed access” to the frequencyspectrum. The developed countries have re-sponded by insisting that the fears of the de-veloping nations are groundless, that newtechnology will free up certain frequencieswhile allowing other frequencies to be sharedby a greater number of stations and services.However, frequency-sharing usually re-quires more sophisticated and expensiveequipment and increases the need and com-plexity of coordination to avoid interference.Most developing countries lack trainedengineers sufficiently competent in fre-quency management to carry out compli-cated coordination procedures and also lackthe required sophisticated and expensiveequipment to avoid interference.

“Equitable access” also refers to commu-nications satellites and the newer membersof ITU frequently cite the 1967 U.N. Treatyon Outer Space that recognized the commoninterest of all nations, regardless of thedegree of their economic or scientificdevelopment, in the uses of outer space andin the “nonappropriation” of outer space byany one nation. While each state has theright to the free and peaceful utilization ofspace, the treaty is viewed as implying a cor-

responding obligation of nations to availthemselves of these uses without prejudiceto the interests of other nations.

Claims of the developing nations to “equi-table access” were further underscored byResolution No. Spa 2-1, adopted by the 1971WARC (and included in the Final Acts ofWARC-79), dealing with space telecommuni-cations, which states:

. . . considering that all countries have equalrights in the use of both the radio frequen-cies allocated to various space radio commu-nication services and the geostationary sat-ellite orbit for these services;. . . taking into account that the radio fre-quency spectrum and the geostationary sat-ellite orbit are limited natural resources andshould be most effectively and economicallyused;. . . having in mind that the use of the allo-cated frequency bands and fixed positions inthe geostationary satellite orbit by individ-ual countries or groups of countries can startat various dates depending on the require-ments and readiness of technical facilities ofcountries;

1.

2.

3.

ResolvesThat the registration with the ITU of fre-quency assignments for space radio com-munication services and their use shouldnot provide any permanent priority forany individual country or groups of coun-tries and should not create an obstacle tothe establishment of space systems byother countries;That, accordingly, a country or a group ofcountries having registered the ITU fre-quencies for their space radio communica-tion services should take all practicablemeasures to realize the possibility of theuse of new space systems by other coun-tries or groups of countries so desiring;That the provisions contained in Para-graphs 1 and 2 of this resolution should betaken into account by the administrationsand the permanent organs of the Union.

This 1971 position was reinforced at ITU’sMalaga-Torremolinos Plenipotentiary Con-ference in 1973 that amended the ITU Con-vention to include article 33, which reads:


In using frequency bands for space radio cally so that countries or groups of countriesservices members shall bear in mind that ra- may have equitable access to both in confor-dio frequencies and the geostationary satel- mity with the provisions of the radio regula-lite orbit are limited natural resources, that tions according to their needs and the tech-they must be used efficiently and economi- nical facilities at their disposal.

The Changing ITU EnvironmentIt is clear that the developing countries

have also succeeded in establishing a re-source management philosophy designed toprotect their interests. Although ITU mayremain a viable institution, there have beensome subtle and important changes in the in-stitutional framework under which the tech-nical functions and work of ITU are carriedout. Moreover, WARC-79 clearly showed thepower of the Third World as a political forcein ITU. Although the collective objectives ofthe developing countries were limited, theywere generally achieved.

The struggle for power between the devel-oped and the less developed nations must beexpected to continue at future ITU confer-ences. In the most basic sense, the devel-oping countries derive power from their col-lective numbers via the “one-nation, one-vote” principle. The developed countries de-rive their power from their technical compe-tence, know-how, and leadership. The devel-oping countries’ power can most easily andusefully be exploited in the ITU legislativeforums; the developed nations’ through thetechnical administrative organs.

The developed country strength lies in thepermanent organs of ITU and the delegationof authority and work efforts within thatstructure. Control, in the sense of inclusionor exclusion of issues and agenda items, andin the handling of budgetary matters, ismost easily exercised here. It is natural forthe developing countries to seek to changethese administrative organs to advance theirown interests and objectives. The 1982 pleni-potentiary meeting could well see a further-ing of this effort.

The success of ITU, as noted earlier, hasbeen due in large measure to the willingnessof its members to adhere voluntarily to com-monly arrived at agreements and regula-tions. There is no compulsion to comply, ex-cept common usage, custom, and a perceivedstake in international order. The inherentflexibility granted ITU members has alsoenhanced its effectiveness. Subject to a voteof disapproval by fellow members, any na-tion may serve notice through a footnotethat it intends to allocate a particular fre-quency to some usage beyond that specifiedby other countries, or to specify a usage asprimary or secondary. A member countrymay also take a reservation indicating that itcannot protect a particular spectrum alloca-tion approved by an ITU conference.

The common desire of most countries tominimize the number of footnotes and excep-tions to the international table of allocationswas not realized at WARC-79. Eighty-threestatements, representing reservations, wereincluded in the final protocol of theWARC-79 Final Acts. The United Statestook six reservations. The remaining 77statements, some of which bear the names ofseveral countries (up to 20, in one case), canbe grouped in three categories: general reser-vations, political reservations, and specificreservations.

Thirty-five reservations were “general” inthat they were intended to reserve a govern-ment’s right to take whatever steps it con-sidered necessary to protect its radio com-munication services should other ITU mem-bers fail to observe the radio regulations.Other reservations were “political” in that

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they related to territorial disputes or sover-eignty claims that had little impact, if any,on the ITU or on spectrum use for radio com-munication purposes.

The remaining reservations of other coun-tries were addressed to specific issues, prin-cipally the allocation of HF bands among thebroadcasting, fixed, and mobile services.Some dealt with localized problems associ-ated with UHF band use.

It would be going too far to say that thetaking of numerous reservations at WARC-79 signaled a sharp decline in ITU effective-ness. But it should be noted that the reserva-tions, when coupled with the widespread useof footnotes to denote unwillingness to pro-tect a particular frequency allocation in aparticular locale, resulted in degrading of thetable of allocations and thus makes futurecoordination more difficult.

Throughout the 1970’s, repeated effortswere made both within and outside ITU toassess the competing demands being madeon the radio spectrum. In addition to thevarious CCIR study groups that addressedthe growing requirements of different serv-ices, there was a CCIR plenary assembly inKyoto, Japan and the CCIR interim workingparty (4/1) in Tokyo; both met in 1978, thelatter being directed primarily toward fixedsatellite service considerations. In October/November 1978, the WARC special prepara-tory meeting (SPM) was held in Geneva.

Among some Third World countries therewas a feeling that SPM was dominated bythe developed countries because of its tech-nical nature, and therefore was to be treatedwith some suspicion. It was natural, then,that other preparatory meetings should takeplace outside the framework of these tradi-tional ITU entities. One of these was a May1979 gathering of the nonalined movement(NAM) in Yaounde. Two specific resolutionsproduced at this gathering called for a futuresatellite planning conference and specifiedworking arrangements for WARC-79. Thevice-chairman of this meeting was Dr. M. K.

Rao of India, the country selected to coor-dinate satellite issues for NAM.

The NAM Yaounde meeting was a clear in-dication that these countries will be prepar-ing for future conferences on a collectivebasis, seeking to make the most of their blocvoting strength.

There were only a few collective objectivessought by the Third World at WARC-79:

control of the selection of the conferencechairman;a large allocation of HF frequencies tothe fixed service;satellite planning and HF broadcastingplanning conferences;a bar to the encroachment of land mobileand other services into frequenciesreserved for broadcasting at UHF inregion 1; andcontinued technical assistance.

These goals were generally achieved withthe exception of the first; after a week ofdisagreement, the conference had to settlefor a compromise chairman from Argentinawho was not a candidate of either the devel-oped or less developed nations. Overall,WARC-79 did demonstrate the increasing in-fluence of the Third World in ITU.

The results of the OTA-sponsored survey*shows that 74 percent of the U.S. delegates toWARC-79 and 67 percent of the nondele-gates responding to the survey believe thatthe relative influence of the Third Worldcountries at ITU conferences has increased

*The OTA-sonsored survey consisted of a questionnaireof 51 questions mailed to 169 individuals involved directly orindirectly with preparations for WARC-79, and/or with imple-mentation of the results of WARC-79. A total of 110 ques-tionnaires were completed and returned: 55 from U.S. dele-gates to WARC-79: 29 from nondelegate Government person-nel; 18 from nondelegate members of the advisory committeeto the U.S. delegation; 26 from nondelegate industry person-nel; and 41 from nondelegate individuals in the private sector.In addition, 20 in-depth face-to-face interviews were con-ducted with 13 Government officials and 7 industry officials.The results of the survey and an analysis of the answers andinformation received through the survey and interviews arepresented in the report prepared by Kappa Systems, Inc.,under contract to OTA. The report can be found in app. A tothis report.


greatly over the past 5 years. Another 23percent of those responding believe there hasbeen only a slight increase in the influence ofthe Third World countries. During the sametime, 51 percent of the U.S. delegates and 59percent of the nondelegates surveyed believethere has been some decrease in U.S. influ-ence, though only 12 percent and 18 percentof the delegates and nondelegates, respec-tively, saw this as a major decrease. Lookingahead, the respondents see U.S. influencefrom now through 1985 remaining about thesame (39 percent) or slightly decreasing (45percent). Some increase in U.S. influence isforeseen by some respondents (14 percent),while a major decrease is foreseen by only asmall number (2 percent).

The interests that guide many of the lessdeveloped countries in their approach to in-

ternational telecommunications issues are ik

quite different, and often hostile, to those ofPF

the United States. As traditional advocates iof the free flow of information, the United iStates is opposed to prior censorship of either television or radio broadcasts. There-fore, the United States rejects the idea thatany country should obtain prior consent be-fore broadcasting a radio or TV signal toanother country. The issue has not beenraised for HF radio broadcasting because somany countries engage in internationalbroadcasting. The added impact of televi-sion, however, has kept the issue of priorconsent at the forefront of debate on interna-tional communications within the U.N. Edu-cational, Scientific, and Cultural Organiza-tion (UNESCO) and the U.N. Committee onthe Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS).

Other International Organizations Involvedin Telecommunications

U.S. national interests in telecommunica-tions are interwoven with a broad range ofspecialized international organizations. Inaddition to ITU, they include, UNESCO, theU. N., the World Intellectual Property Orga-nization (WIPO), the Universal Postal Union(UPU), the Intergovernmental Bureau of In-formatics, the Intergovernmental MaritimeConsultative Organization (IMCO), the In-ternational Civil Aviation Organization(ICAO), CITEL, and the Organization forEconomic Cooperation and Development(OECD).

UNESCO’s jurisdiction is extremely broadand the organization has taken an active in-terest in communications through the adop-tion of resolutions, by publishing studies,and by sponsoring and attending specializedseminars and conferences. It has partici-pated at ITU conferences in an observerstatus, for example, in an effort to promoteshortwave broadcasting as a means of

furthering international peace and under-standing.

More recently, UNESCO has become in-volved in studying the potential uses ofdirect broadcasting satellites and hasadopted a set of norms regarding their use.Within the past few years, UNESCO’s Inter-national Commission for the Study of Com-munication Problems (commonly known asthe MacBride Commission because of itschairman Sean MacBride) has focused atten-tion on the so-called “New World informa-tion order” and Third World complaintsabout the imbalance in news flowing in andout of less developed countries and the needto develop a communications infrastructurein the Third World.

U.N. involvement in communicationsissues has surfaced most prominently withinCOPUOS and the Working Group on DirectBroadcasting Satellites. COPUOS and its

Ch. 3—Domestic and International Management of the Radiofrequency Spectrum • 55

subcommittees on legal, scientific, and tech-nical matters have been significant forumsfor the discussion of guidelines to govern theuse of the geostationary orbit for radio com-munication. A conference on the peacefuluses of outer space is scheduled for 1982 andwill consider and discuss means to resolvesuch issues as whether there need be priorconsent obtained before one nation uses sat-ellites in space to broadcast a signal whichextends beyond its own borders into othercountries. The United States opposes priorconsent in principle. It is technically impos-sible to avoid some “spillover” when broad-casting to one’s own country via space satel-lite. If prior consent were to be strictly en-forced, it would be impossible for the UnitedStates to develop a domestic system fordirect broadcasting by satellite without theprior consent of its neighbors (e.g., Cuba).

Increasingly, the United States finds itselfat odds with Third World and other coun-tries that seek to impose restrictions on theflow of information across national frontiersand on the information-gathering activitiesof journalists. The “New World informationorder” being demanded by many less devel-oped nations within UNESCO appears tomany in the United States to be adverse tocommercial information gathering and dis-semination that is not under tight govern-ment control.

WIPO administers a number of interna-tional conventions intended to protect the in-tellectual property rights of the authors ofinformation that is stored, disseminated, ordisplayed through electronic systems. In re-cent years, WIPO and UNESCO have joint-ly sponsored working groups to study satel-lite program distribution, cable TV, and na-tional copyright and patent legislation fordeveloping countries.

UPU was established in 1874 and is thesecond oldest existing international organi-zation. It has become embroiled in communi-cations issues because of the rapid evolutionof electronic information and communication

systems, including “electronic mail.” UPU isalso involved in the controversial issue of thesubsidization of costly mail delivery systemsthrough high tariffs on electronic communi-cation systems. This cross-subsidization,which is common among countries that haveintegrated government administration ofpostal, telephone, and telegraph systems,has impacted severely on transnational cor-porations heavily dependent on internationalcommunications.

The Intergovernmental Bureau for Infor-matics is a Rome-based organization, outsidethe U. N., which holds periodic conferences toconsider broad policy and legal questions re-lated to transborder data flows and relatedelectronic information issues. It is influentialamong developing countries and its resolu-tions have wide impact.

IMCO has several components that con-sider telecommunications issues relating tomaritime navigation and ICAO does thesame with respect to air navigation. Themost important regional organization inwhich the United States deals with commu-nications matters is CITEL which seeks re-gional agreements and develops a consensuson common positions for Western Hemi-sphere countries prior to meetings of ITU.OECD, though largely oriented towardEurope, seeks to harmonize the differingviews of all industrialized countries on suchcontroversial communications issues as con-trol of transborder data flows.

U.S. representation to these organizationscomes from many levels of Government,both within and outside the Department ofState. Within the department, two bureausplay major roles in the determination of in-ternational communications policy: the Bu-reau of International Organization Affairsand the Bureau of Economic and BusinessAffairs. Other State Department compo-nents that play ancillary roles are the UnderSecretary for Security Assistance, Scienceand Technology, the policy planning staff,and the Legal Advisor’s Office.

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For 30 years there has been mounting con-cern in the United States over Governmentprocedures for developing telecommunica-tions negotiations. The absence of central-ized management and policy coordinationhas frequently been noted and it would ap-pear that the United States was fortunate topreserve its essential interests up to andthrough WARC-79. The question remains—will the procedures, mechanisms, and proc-esses that gave a margin of success in thepast continue to work in the future?

The United States spent approximately 5years formulating the proposals and position

papers for WARC-79. Some 800 people wereinvolved in one way or another. It is esti-mated that the State Department alonespent about $1 million in preparing forWARC-79 and this amount does not includethe expenses of other Government agenciesinvolved, nor of private industry organiza-tions. By its very nature, this was a complexand time-consuming process. With the largenumber of international telecommunicationsconferences and meetings scheduled for the1980’s and 1990’s, it is clear that a more ex-peditious procedure for the preparation, co-ordination, and adoption of U.S. proposalsand positions is needed.

U.S. Preparations for WARC=79The 20-year period between the previous

general World Administrative Radio Confer-ence in 1959 and WARC-79 was one of vastchange. The number of nations belonging toITU almost doubled–from 87 to 155. Therewere tremendous advances in telecommuni-cation technology, including the devel-opment of satellite communications. World-wide demands for improved communicationshad greatly increased. As an added incentiveto convene a general WARC, it was widelyrecognized that inconsistencies had devel-oped in the general regulations having ap-plication to more than one of the individualradio services. The fact that a number ofspecialized radio conferences had been heldsince 1959 resulting in decisions not entirelyconsistent with each other also suggestedthe need for a comprehensive conference.

The United States expected WARC-79 totake place in a contentious atmosphere. Therising economic aspirations of the develop-ing countries, coupled with their perceivedrequirements for a fair share of the radiospectrum and the geostationary satelliteorbit made confrontation appear inevitable.

The decision of ITU in 1973 to follow U.N.General Assembly precedent and grant ob-server status to the Palestine Liberation

Organization, and the rhetoric at the NAMconference in Havana immediately prior toWARC-79 generated further concern thattelecommunication and spectrum issueswere to be politicized.

As noted earlier, ITU, like the U.N. Gener-al Assembly, operates on the principle of“one-country, one-vote.” The United Statesand other, large developed countries have nomore voting power than Haiti or VaticanCity. However, in practice, ITU attempts toresolve technical issues and reach decisionsby consensus and reverts to voting onlywhen a consensus cannot be obtained. There-fore, the United States embarked on an earlyeffort to direct the focus of the conference tothe major technical issues and away from ex-traneous political matters.

U.S. preparatory work for WARC-79 pro-ceeded under the following broad guidelines:

Flexibility. —The primary goal was tomaintain flexibility to meet the futureneeds of users in telecommunicationmatters within the framework of the in-ternational radio regulations.Minimal change. –The preparatory ef-forts should result in proposals for onlythose changes to the radio regulations


that were absolutely required in order tomeet the needs of users.

● Defensible positions. —The proponentsof new requirements should be in a posi-tion to defend the required revisions ofthe radio regulations, including alloca-tions, using sound and fully developedtechnical arguments, including accurateand current listings in the master inter-national frequency list.

● Accommodate world needs. –The prepa-ratory work should take into accountthe proposals for changes to the radioregulations advanced by other nationsand should resist only those that mightimpede our national flexibility to an un-acceptable degree.

. Point of no retreat. — Where it was ap-parent that proposed U.S. changes tothe radio regulations, including mod-ified, allocations, are likely to be op-posed, the preparatory work must devel-op, in advance of the conference, finalfall-back positions.

U.S. preparations involved broad partici-pation by Government agencies, the tele-communication industry, and the public.There was active U.S. participation in plan-ning sessions held under the auspices of suchinternational organizations as CCIR, as wellas in multilateral forums such as NATO, theConference of European Post and Telecom-munication Administrations, and CITEL.

Within the United States, FCC, as thebody responsible for the regulation of non-government uses of the radiofrequency spec-trum, established docket 20271 as early asJanuary 1975 to develop the nongovernmentU.S. proposals for the conference. NTIA,through IRAC established Ad Hoc Commit-tee 144 to develop the proposals of theUnited States affecting Government usersof spectrum. IRAC also participated in AdHoc Committee 144. Eventually, FCC issuednine NOIs that drew comments from manysegments of the telecommunication industryand the public. Through this process FCCdeveloped and adopted the proposals for

commercial, private, and non-federal govern-ment use of the spectrum.

Ad Hoc Committee 144 of IRAC had rep-resentation from all Federal agencies with amajor interest in radio communications andspectrum use. It was responsible for develop-ing recommended U.S. proposals for WARC-79 concerning Government use of the spec-trum. Both FCC and NTIA staff expertswere involved in commenting on the propos-als of other administrations and developingposition papers for the delegation to the con-ference, including compromise or fall-backpositions.

Recommended U.S. proposals adopted byFCC (nongovernment) and NTIA (Govern-ment) were fully coordinated and submittedto the Department of State which was itselfaware of the proposals as they were beingdeveloped through participation in FCC andNTIA processes. Therefore, the State De-partment was knowledgeable about largeareas of agreement as they were reached, aswell as the fewer areas of disagreement. Al-most all the differences concerning the pro-posals to be made by the United States weresuccessfully resolved between FCC andNTIA. Only one issue (proposed allocationsfor international broadcasting in the HFbands) was carried to the President throughthe National Security Council.

Industry proposals and views or those ofnongovernment service suppliers or orga-nizations are treated within the FCC mech-anism. FCC, barring appeals to the courts,has the final responsibility and authority forregulating the nongovernment use of thespectrum. Therefore, FCC develops non-government proposals under the open anddue process procedures of the Administra-tive Procedures Act. FCC must decideamong competing and often conflicting pro-posals advocated by various segments of thecommunication industry, other commercialusers, private and public users, as well asState and local government users.

84-591 0 - 82 - 5


Advance preparations for WARC-79 gotunderway at the State Department as earlyas 1975 when it began work on obtainingfunds for the delegation, the selection of thehead of delegation and of other members. In1977, the State Department sought informa-tion on the views of other governments andthe positions likely to be taken by them. Re-quests for information were cabled to U.S.embassies abroad but the results were notsatisfactory for several reasons. The UnitedStates has- only one telecommunication at-taché (based permanently in Geneva). Em-bassy personnel in many posts apparentlylacked the necessary expertise to discuss thesubject with responsible foreign officials andeffectively gather information. The report-ing task was rendered even more difficult bythe fact that many proposals of the ThirdWorld countries were not fully developed un-til shortly before the conference began.

In 1978, the State Department establisheda public advisory committee for WARC-79consisting of 38 members from industry andthe general public. Several public interestgroups, researchers, educators, and minorityinterests were represented. The purpose ofthe advisory committee was to advise theState Department and the head of theWARC delegation in all areas related to theconference and to help develop positions andnegotiating strategies. There was some criti-cism of the role of this advisory committeefrom both members and nonmembers. Someof its members felt that their views had littleor no impact.

Beginning in 1977, the State Departmentarranged for international consultation tocommunicate and explain the U.S. views andproposals as they were being developed forthe conference. Bilateral discussions wereheld in 48 countries by teams of U.S. expertsinvolved in the preparation process. In addi-tion, the United States participated in multi-lateral forums. Proposals of interest to theU.S. military were also described and coordi-nated through NATO and its Allied RadioFrequency Agency.

CCIR and other ITU activities also pro-vided an opportunity for the United Statesto discuss its views in international forums.CCIR held an SPM in 1978 to prepare a tech-nical base for the guidance of the conferenceand for administrations then preparing theirown proposals. ITU itself held three semi-nars (in Kenya, Panama, and Australia).These seminars were primarily for the bene-fit of the developing nations—to acquaintthem with the issues they would face in theconference and with the technologies thathad been developed most recently in theradio-telecommunication field.

In January 1978, Glenn O. Robinson, pro-fessor of law at the University of Virginiaand a former FCC commissioner, was namedhead of the U.S. delegation to WARC-79.Professor Robinson was given the rank ofAmbassador for the duration of the confer-ence. This limited appointment by the Presi-dent did not require Senate confirmation.This raised some concern about the generalquestion of the selection process for the headof U.S. delegations to international telecom-munication conferences. More specifically,there was concern expressed by several Sen-ators over U.S. preparedness for the confer-ence, especially focused on the question ofthe U.S. ability to counter effectively the ex-pected demands of the less developed coun-tries for a greater share of frequency alloca-tions and for changes in ITU procedures.The submission of Professor Robinson’sname for Senate confirmation as Ambassa-dor to the conference may have provided aneffective opportunity to explore those con-cerns.

Subsequent to Robinson’s designation, aninitial delegation of 20 representatives fromGovernment agencies was formed and even-tually the full delegation of 67 persons wasnamed. In addition, some 30 individualswere named to a U.S. technical supportgroup that worked first in Washington, D. C.,and later in Geneva.

Traditionally, U.S. delegations to telecom-munication conferences are made up largely

Ch. 3—Domestic and International Management of the Radiofrequency Spectrum • 59

of spectrum managers and technical expertsfrom Government agencies and industry.Theoretically, representation on the delega-tion should not be necessary to protect theparticular interests of an agency, industry,company, or other organizations or groupsbecause the delegation is committed to workfor the U.S. proposals adopted during thepreparatory process described above. Notonly are the U.S. proposals adopted and sub-mitted to ITU before a conference convenes(in this instance, by January 1979), but com-promise positions are likewise agreed towithin the United States before the con-ference.

However, during a conference—andWARC-79 was no exception—new compro-mises and new alternate proposals are oftenrequired when previously agreed U.S. pro-posals are not accepted by other administra-tions. At such times, the delegation, in con-sultation with higher echelons of Govern-ment in Washington, must develop and thenagree on the new positions. In such circum-stances, U.S. delegations almost without ex-ception strive for compromises that will wingeneral acceptance and that are as close aspossible to the original U.S. proposals andthoroughly consistent with U.S. goalsagreed to prior to the conference.

Proposals - to modify the internationaltable of allocations are based largely on therequirements or desires of individual coun-tries to operate particular radio services inparticular bands. Needs differ among coun-tries. Decisions are driven in many cases bysuch nontechnical arguments as economicand national importance of one service vis-a-vis another. On the other hand, allocationdecisions may be dictated by technical con-siderations, particularly those allocations in-volving the sharing of frequencies betweentwo or more services. The arguments sup-porting these latter allocations are based oncomplex technical factors: acceptable inter-ference levels and noise, power flux den-sities, antenna patterns, etc. For these allo-cations, the conclusions of the technical com-mittee of a conference on the feasibility of

and conditions for sharing often determinethe successful adoption of the proposed allo-cation. In such discussions, obviously, theparticipation of the technical experts on thedelegation is essential. Often such technicalexperts are not spectrum managers but workfor Government or nongovernment organiza-tions which operate communication facilitiesor other radio facilities. In the case of Gov-ernment agencies this includes NTIA,NASA, the Federal Aviation Administra-tion, DOD, FCC, and others. In the case ofnongovernment organizations, it includesemployees of companies that provide tele-communication systems and services, suchas AT&T and COMSAT, and equipmentmanufacturers such as Hughes Aircraft Co.and the Harris Corp. The role of these non-governmental experts is of great importanceto the work of the delegation.

Since 1959, an average of 33 percent of theU.S. delegations to the eight ITU confer-ences held during that period were engineersand scientists from nongovernment orga-nizations. For example, at the broadcastingsatellite WARC held in 1977, 41 percent ofthe U.S. delegation was nongovernment. TheU.S. delegation to the WARC-79 conferencewas predominately Government. Only 27percent of the delegates were nongovern-ment including 18 percent from the telecom-munication industry (see table 1).

Delegations from other developed coun-tries include spectrum managers from thegovernment ministries of telecommunication(often referred to as PTT’s; postal, telegraph,and telephone authority) and engineers, sci-entists, and technical experts involved withthe design, development, and operation oftelecommunication systems and other radioequipment. Unlike the structure in theUnited States, most other countries placethe operation of “commercial,” as well asgovernment, communication facilities in thehands of the government, or with an entityowned or controlled by the government.Therefore, the composition of foreign delega-tions is predominately government with


Table 1 .–U.S. Delegates to WARC-79 byOrganization

Organizational affiliationFederal Government:

FCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . .NTIA (and other Commerce Department)Department of Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Department of State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .NASA* ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .International Communications

Agency* * . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Department of Transportation. . . . . . . . .National Science Foundation , . . . . . . . .Office of Science and

Technology Policy (White House) . . . .Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Private Corporations:COMSAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .AT&T . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Hughes Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Motorola . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Rockwell International . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Satellite Business Systems. . . . . . . . . . .Western Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Industry associations , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .All other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Number ofdelegates

188664

221

148

3111111937

67

Percent ofdelegates

26.5%12996

331.5

1.5

7 1 . 5 %

4.5%1.51.51.51.51.51.5

13.5%4.5

10.5100 %

*Includes Systematics General Corp. representatives.**Includes Board of international Broadcasting.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment.

some representation from manufacturers ofcommunication equipment.

When it comes to a discussion of technicalissues, such as system design capabilitiesand sound operating practices, the expertson other delegations expect their proposalsto be discussed by similarly knowledgeableexperts from the United States. Over theyears, U.S. delegations to international tele-communication conferences have includedindustry and private sector experts involvedin the day-to-day operations of communica-tion systems. This is a natural result of theU.S. structure whereby the ownership, oper-ations, and management of commercial andprivate communication systems are func-tions performed by private enterprise sub-ject to Government regulation. U.S. telecom-munication companies, and not the U.S.Government, are responsible for negotia-tions with foreign entities for the construc-tion and operations of international telecom-munication facilities. These companies un-dertake the financial obligations and own the

U.S. share of the commonly operated inter-national facilities with foreign entities. Forexample, AT&T and the several U.S. interna-tional record carriers own and operate sub-marine cables between the United Statesand Europe under contractual agreementswith European telecommunication authori-ties. COMSAT owns and operates the U.S.share of the satellites operating in the globalInternational Telecommunications SatelliteOrganization (INTELSAT) system togetherwith 106 other countries.

The U.S. Government conducts negotia-tions on telecommunication matters of a for-eign policy nature including U.S. partici-pation in ITU conferences. In forming U.S.delegations to ITU conferences, the Govern-ment has looked to the U.S. operating com-panies and equipment manufacturers to pro-vide expertise not generally available withinthe Government. A delegation of Govern-ment and industry representatives reflectsthe split responsibility for telecommunica-tion activities in the United States. The in-clusion of industry experts on U.S. delega-tions was brought into question in 1978 as aresult of an apparent conflict of interest inan international conference dealing with anentirely different subject (the renegotiationof the international coffee agreement duringwhich representatives from coffee companiesparticipated as members of the U.S. delega-tion). Following that incident, the Depart-ment of State, acting on the advice of theDepartment of Justice, adopted new guide-lines based on the conflict of interest provi-sions of the U.S. Code (sees. 203, 205, 207,and 208 of title 18) that effectively limitedparticipation of nongovernment delegates tointernational conferences. Although theguidelines permitted nongovernment dele-gates to address technical points, they pre-vented such delegates from addressing pol-icy issues or serving as spokesperson forU.S. proposals.

These restrictions were first imposed dur-ing the highly technical 1978 SPM of CCIRin preparation for the WARC-79 conference.

Ch. 3—Domestic and International Management of the Radiofrequency Spectrum “ 61

An amendment to a State Department ap-propriation bill (Public Law 96-60) intro-duced by Sen. Harrison Schmitt, and passedby the 96th Congress, exempted WARC-79from these guidelines. However, the exemp-tion came only shortly before the conference,leaving the role of nongovernment delegatesuncertain until late in the preparatory effort.This may account, in part, for the low per-centage of industry delegates to WARC-79.

Legislation to exempt all internationaltelecommunication conferences from the re-strictions of the State Department guide-lines was enacted in the 96th Congress. How-ever, the legislation to which it was addedwas vetoed by the President (the reason forthe veto was unrelated to the exemption).The Senate again passed the exemption pro-vision, but the House did not consider themeasure before adjournment.

Another issue concerning the makeup ofU.S. delegations was highlighted in prepar-ing for WARC-79. In formulating proposalsfor nongovernment use of the spectrum,FCC must evaluate needs and sort argu-ments among competing commercial and pri-vate interests vying for spectrum alloca-tions. This process follows FCC guidelinesfor rulemaking under the AdministrativeProcedures Act. Basic issues about the fair-ness of this process were raised by the tim-ing of establishing the U.S. delegation.

The benefits derived from early creation ofa U.S. delegation to prepare for the confer-ence were recognized for WARC-79. How-ever, conflict of interest and violation of dueprocess were also recognized as possible con-sequences of naming industry representa-tives to the delegation before the FCC proc-ess of adopting U.S. proposals was complete.The concern was that individuals named tothe delegation would be in a position to advo-cate the proposals of their companies inFCC’s decisionmaking process better thanthose companies without representatives onthe delegation. Moreover, delegates werelikely to have access to information not gen-erally available to nondelegates, giving cre-

dence to the argument that those companieswith representatives on the delegation wouldhave an advantage in supporting positionsbefore FCC over those companies not repre-sented and who might be taking contrary orconflicting positions in the FCC process.

This problem was avoided by naming onlyGovernment representatives to the WARC-79 delegation during the time of the FCC de-liberations. Following adoption of proposalsand the conclusion of the FCC process, in-dustry and other nongovernment represent-atives were named to the delegation. Thismay also account, in part, for the relativelysmall number of industry representatives onthe delegation. Also, some industry andGovernment officials have argued that theaddition of industry experts to the delega-tion at such a late stage (spring of 1979)reduced their role and effectiveness.

An additional issue concerning the formu-lation of the delegation resulted from thereal or perceived need to include individualswith differing viewpoints, to add representa-tives from public and consumer interestgroups, and provide adequate participationby minorities and by women.

This, together with the pressures fromFederal agencies, various elements of indus-try, public, and special interest groups to berepresented on the delegation made theselection and functioning of the U.S. delega-tion a perplexing exercise open to criticism.On the one hand, these problems can be dis-missed as a reflection of the times and the in-creased importance of telecommunication inall sectors of society. The stakes are highand the need to be represented is perceivedto be important. On the other hand, the prob-lems may reflect the absence of a clear Gov-ernment policy regarding the selection andapproval of individuals to serve on delega-tions to telecommunication conferences.

Adding representatives to the delegationwith no apparent role other than to fulfillsome nonspecific requirement to include spe-cial interest, racial, or sexual representation


proved to be frustrating for all concernedwith no apparent benefits. There were fourdelegates funded by the Department ofState under the “Biden amendment.”* Atleast two of those delegates have stated pub-licly that their role was never defined nor didthey provide any substantive contributionto the deliberations of the delegation. Othermembers of the delegation were also appar-ently unsure of the role of the Biden amend-ment delegates. One of the Biden amend-ment delegates reported that other delega-tion members seemed to treat the Bidendelegates as though they had not earned theright to be on the delegation.

As stated above, the function of the U.S.delegation at international telecommunicationconferences is to seek agreement on U.S. pro-posals submitted to the conference. Theseproposals are developed under U.S. domesticprocedures and laws. Any shortcomings inthese procedures regarding participation ofconcerned and interested parties are unlikelyto be corrected by last minute measures toadd to or adjust the membership of U.S. del-egations. The process of preparing for inter-national conferences should include the natu-ral selection of the most qualified individualsto serve on U.S. delegations with the rangeof skills and disciplines required to negotiatethe U.S. proposals. Representation on U.S.delegations cannot overcome any perceiveddeficiency in U.S. domestic processes.

Clear guidelines for the type of representa-tion to be included are necessary and meas-ures to ensure that the right combination ofskills are represented by the individualsselected to serve on U.S. delegations areessential. That individuals with these skillswill be available when needed should not beleft to chance. Specific action to develop andtrain individuals and assure that U.S. dele-gations are equipped with these skills would

*According t.o a amendment sponsored by Senator JosephBiden, which became sec. 113 of Public Law 95-105, the StateDepartment is authorized to reimburse individuals or orga-nizations for their costs of participation in State Departmentactivities if such persons represent an unrepresented orunderrepresented interest in the proceedings and otherwisecould not afford to participate.

help alleviate the problems encountered inpreparing for WARC-79.

The OTA-sponsored survey on WARC-79preparations and impacts asked respondentsto list the four or five most important quali-fications an “ideal” member of a U.S. dele-gation to a WARC-type conference shouldhave. While no human being could meet all ofthe qualities listed by all of the respondents,a U.S. delegate who conformed to the mostfrequently repeated qualifications would re-quire the following attributes:

Personality● good communicator, adept at self-

●

●

●

●

expression;mature, “diplomatic” personality;international reputation in some field;willing to accept advice from technicalexperts;able to exert independence from parochi-al interests;willing to compromise; andwillingness and ability to work hard.

●

●

Experience:● negotiating experience, particularly at

ITU meetings;● spectrum management experience; and● operational experience in at least one

radio service.Knowledge:●

●

●

●

●

●

broad understanding of telecommunica-tions, including technical competenceand an understanding of the societal im-pacts of telecommunication technology;ability and understanding necessary tosupport and explain U.S. positions atthe conference;knowledge of present and planned spec-trum management requirements of U.S.users;knowledge of ITU history and proce-dures;a “feel” for international politics, or atleast a personal world view; andfluency in at least one foreign language,usually cited as French or Spanish.

Sensitivity:● sensitivity to Third World positions and

cultural differences;


● sensitivity to U.S. national security con-cerns; and

● sensitivity to users’ and consumers’needs, and the ability to relate theseneeds to spectrum allocations.

The results of the OTA-sponsored surveyalso show that a majority of the respondentschose “selection of the most effective delega-tion possible” as the number 1 goal of thepreparatory process from a list of 12 goals.However, less than half (48 percent) of therespondents felt that the process was mod-erately effective in achieving that goal.

Another 25 percent felt that the effective-ness of the process was low and another 12percent said it was totally ineffective inachieving that goal. Only 14 percent of therespondents rated the degree of effective-ness of the process high in achieving the goalof selecting the most effective delegationpossible.

Possible actions to address the problemsof industry participation and broader repre-sentation of interests and skills are dis-cussed in chapter 5 of this report.

Chapter 4

WARC-79 Overview,Actions, and Impacts

Contents

Page

The U. S. Role. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

How WARC-79 Differed From WARC-59. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

The Impacts of WARC-79. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

Key Conference Decisions and Their Consequences. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73The Fixed-Satellite Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73The Fixed Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77The Land-Mobile Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78The HF Broadcasting Service. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79National Security Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81Military-Related Issues and Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81Fixed Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84Resolutions, Recommendations, Reservations, and Declaration . . . . . . . . 99

The Impacts of WARC-77. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

LIST OF TABLES

Table No. Page

2. Service Arc of Geostationary Orbit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 743. Distribution of the HF Band Before WARC-79. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844. Distribution of the HF Band After WARC-79. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845. Summary of WARC Gains and Changes in Status on Fixed

Allocations Between 27.5 MHz and 15 GHz. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856. Summary of WARC Gains, Losses, and Changes in Status on Mobile

Allocations Between 27.5 MHz and 15 GHz. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867. Pre- and Post-WARC Radiolocation Allocations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898. Comparison of WARC Radiolocation Allocations and U.S. Proposed

Allocations Above 40 GHz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919. Summary of WARC Gains and Changes in Status on Fixed- and

Mobile-Satellite Allocations Above 27.5 MHz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

Chapter 4

WARC-79 Overview,Actions, and Impacts

From the point of view of a developingcountry burdened with poverty, illiteracy,and disease, access to modern telecommuni-cations is every bit as vital as it is to theUnited States. Conversely, whether the De-partment of Defense (DOD) can communi-cate with a missile submarine at sea or ahigh-flying jet bomber over Alaska is ofmuch less consequence to the leader of aThird World country than whether he cansend a simple radio message to a doctor orvillage administrator 100 miles outside hiscapital city.

The gap between the modern “informationsociety" —with its computers, microproces-sors, and multichannel satellite systems—and the developing nations struggling toharness basic, unsophisticated radio sys-tems to the task of economic development isgrowing wider. At today’s pace, a villager incentral Africa is likely to watch an Americanfilm on a community television set longbefore he has an opportunity to use a tele-phone.

The gap in priorities is equally wide. It isdifficult, for example, to persuade a repre-sentative of a developing country to give upcertain radiofrequencies that provide himwith a rudimentary telephone system inorder that the Voice of America can broad-cast more clearly. The task of persuasion ismade no easier by suggesting that a satelliteor a microwave system would provide the de-veloping country with better phone service

with more efficient use of the spectrumwhen, in fact, such systems may be too cost-ly for many developing countries.

When the technically advanced, industrialnations get together with Third World coun-tries to discuss telecommunications andspectrum management, their needs and pri-orities are so different that their negotiatinggoals and objectives are far apart. Viewedagainst this background, and the mountingfrustrations of the developing countries,U.S. delegates to the World AdministrativeRadio Conference (WARC-79) that convenedin Geneva in September 1979, had reason tobe wary. It was the first general administra-tive radio conference in 20 years and was un-questionably the largest and most signifi-cant intergovernmental meeting on radiocommunications in more than a decade.

There had been tremendous advances intelecommunications since the last WARC,held in 1959. Worldwide demand for im-proved communications had greatly in-creased, together with a sharp rise in the de-mand to use the radio spectrum. Inconsist-encies had developed in the general regula-tions having to do with more than one of theindividual radio services. A number of spe-cialized radio conferences had taken placesince 1959 resulting in decisions that wereinconsistent with one another, thus addingto the urgency of convening a general con-ference.

The U.S. RoleAs the largest and most technically ad- in reaching agreement on a new table of fre-

vanced user of the radio spectrum on a quency allocations and a revised set of re-worldwide basis, the United States ap- lated technical and administrative regula-proached WARC-79 with the greatest stake tions. At previous WARCs, the United

67

68 . Radio frequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

States had been a strong advocate of com-promise and had tried to set an example bynot taking reservations that would indicaterefusal to abide by a particular decision ofthe conference.

A determination to avoid needless contro-versy and to arrive at mutually acceptablecompromises continued to guide the U.S.delegation at Geneva in 1979. The goal of theUnited States was to ensure that whateverchanges were made in International Tele-communication Union (ITU) regulations gov-erning the allocation and use of radio spec-trum were made in light of current U.S. eco-nomic, social, and technical requirements.The United States would support incre-

mental change, but not wholesale shifts inspectrum allocations or in ITU procedures.Because of the rapid and frequently unfore-seen changes in communications technology,the United States was committed to the gen-eral principle of flexibility so that any deci-sions made at WARC-79 would permit fu-ture accommodation to new circumstances.

The United States was on record as sup-porting, in principle, changes in interna-tional spectrum allocations and related fre-quency management procedures that wouldaccommodate the needs of other nations,consistent with its own interests and withthe essential requirements and sound princi-ples of international spectrum utilization.

HowWARC-79 was

WARC-79 Differed From WARC-59vastly different from any

previous ITU administrative radio confer-ence, both in size and complexity. Member-ship in ITU stood at 154. Almost half the na-tions eligible to attend WARC-79 did noteven exist in 1959.

These new nations brought rising expecta-tions that increased demand for telecommu-nication services worldwide. New communi-cation technologies that made increasing useof different forms of telecommunicationshad come into being including satellites.Other techniques made it possible forradiofrequencies to carry more informationthan ever before. Coordination and avoid-ance of interference procedures were morehighly developed.

While the countries of the developed worldintroduced these improvements as a matterof choice, developing nations often could notafford to abandon less expensive and less so-phisticated equipment and procedures eventhough these were not technically efficient intheir use of spectrum. They had to be con-tent with older, less sophisticated telecom-munication systems while the industrializednations pursued new technologies and serv-

ices vital to their growing information econ-omies. * The developed countries, for exam-ple, could seriously consider shifting somebroadcasting services out of the radio spec-trum entirely and onto cable to make room inthe ultrahigh frequency (UHF) and very highfrequency (VHF) bands for new mobile serv-ices. Most Third World countries could notconceive of such a move.

WARC-79 differed from WARC-59 in thatdemands on the radio spectrum had signifi-cantly increased; more countries were mak-ing greater use of spectrum for a greater va-riety of purposes. Moreover, the conferencesessions, while still highly technical innature, were influenced to a greater extentthan in the past by political and economicconsiderations that can best be understoodwithin the context of a confrontationalNorth-South relationship and the so-called“New World economic order. ” This new rela-tionship is characterized by more sharplydefined demands of the less developed na-tions for a redistribution of the world’s

*lt should be recognized that technically inefficient uses ofspectrum may nonetheless be economically most efficient at aparticular stage of development for a developing country.

Ch. 4— WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts ● 69

wealth and resources, and for an end to whatthey regard as exploitation by the indus-trialized nations. It is also marked by agrowing awareness among developing coun-tries that in many international fora wherethe “one-nation, one-vote” principle prevailsthey enjoy an advantage in numbers.

There is a long history of international co-operation in radiofrequency matters, butthere were forces at work that made agree-ments difficult to reach at Geneva in 1979.The developing countries were guided by aset of general principles aimed at gainingpreferential treatment for themselves (e.g.,an Algerian proposal to give priority to de-veloping countries in the use of 70 percent ofthe high frequency (HF) fixed bands). Theydemanded guaranteed access to certain con-gested frequency bands and to the geosta-tionary satellite orbit. They refused toaccept the vital importance for national secu-rity and financial investment of some ad-vanced U.S. communications systems. More-over, there was an unwillingness on the partof many developing countries to accept pack-age deals in which a U.S. concession in onearea was linked to a developing country con-cession in another.

WARC-79 also differed in that there wererecognizable ideologies in spectrum mattersthat were associated with particular coun-tries or groups of countries. For example,those countries that already had extensivetelecommunication systems were most inter-ested in pursuing expensive efforts to getthe most out of spectrum and to identifythose frequencies that were not being fullyutilized. Countries that were still developingtheir telecommunication services were anx-ious to prevent the more sophisticated usersfrom preempting their potential use of largeportions of the radio spectrum and geosta-tionary satellite orbit space before they,themselves, could determine their own fu-ture needs.

This is not to say that there was unanimityamong the Third World nations. They dif-

fered sharply in their goals and interests.For example, Brazil was anxious to developits own satellite communications system anddisputed the claims of Colombia and otherequatorial nations to sovereignty over thespace above their territories where geosyn-chronous satellites could be parked.

Nor did the developed countries alwaysshare the same sense of priority. OtherNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)members gave only lukewarm support forcertain U.S. military requirements for spec-trum and the United States and Canada splitover some important issues.

The United States has found it necessaryin the past to take reservations and other ac-tions at ITU conferences to protect its inter-ests. The United States took a substantivereservation at the 1937 WARC, refused tosign the Final Acts of the 1950 Mexico CityWARC, and did not become a party to theadditional radio regulations. However, asnoted earlier, the United States has been astrong advocate of compromise and has forthe most part refrained from using the ac-cepted practice of taking a reservation on aparticular clause or section of the Final Actsof a conference to indicate that the provisionwould not be considered binding. The onlysubstantive reservation dealing with radiocommunication taken by the United Statesin recent years was at the 1974 maritimeWARC.

At WARC-79, the U.S. delegation found itnecessary to deviate from this policy of set-ting an example for resolving differenceswithin the conference. The United Statesultimately took six reservations, helping tobring the total to 83. Two of the six weredirected at political issues but the remainingfour have a direct impact on U.S. telecom-munication operations. In one of these, theUnited States rejected the terms of a foot-note to the ITU radio regulations that couldjeopardize the continuing use of U.S. mil-itary mobile satellite systems in the UHFband.


The Impacts of WARC-79Finding a meaningful way to measure suc-

cess and evaluate results of an administra-tive radio conference is not as simple as com-paring specific U.S. proposals submitted tothe conference with the Final Acts of theconference. While such a comparison is im-portant, it does not reflect the underlyingreasons and motives for particular decisions,the problems encountered, or any apparenttrends important in evaluating results of anadministrative radio conference. It is impor-tant to understand the intervening eventsthat underlie decisions, not only to evaluatethe results of WARC-79, but to prepare forthe many future conferences important toU.S. interests.

The specific consequences of WARC-79 de-cisions on U.S. interests regarding particularservices can best be treated in terms of howthe conference dealt with specific technicalissues created by some significant trends intelecommunications. These trends includethe

●

●

●

following:

A reduction in the use of HF (3 to 30MHz) by international fixed point-to-point operations as satellite and cableuse expands, coupled with the increas-ing demand for HF spectrum by themore developed countries to meet mari-time and international broadcastingneeds, conflicts with the desires of theless developed countries to use HF forinexpensive domestic communications.The rapid growth in VHF (30 to 300MHz) and UHF (300 to 3000 MHz) land-mobile operations in the face of con-tinuing vital military requirements andthe heavy use of these bands for TVbroadcasting now necessitates greatersharing of frequencies, for example, byradiolocation sharing with radionaviga-tion and with other services, and byland-mobile sharing with TV broad-casting.There has been rapid growth of both do-mestic and international fixed-satellite

requirements in the super high fre-quency (SHF) (3 to 30 GHz) spectrumcoupled with growth in microwave radiorelay, space research, and Earth-ex-ploration satellite services, and the con-tinuing need to protect important radio-astronomy operations.

These requirements are being pressuredby new demands to accommodate mobile,navigation, and broadcasting satellites (andtheir feeder links) in increasingly crowded or-bits. Most of these satellite spectrum useshave military as well as civil applications. Inaddition, there is the continuing use of theSHF spectrum for terrestrial systems.

The actions of WARC-79 with respect tothese operational trends and the technicalissues they raised either closely reflectedU.S. proposals or were acceptable to theUnited States with certain important excep-tions. However, this judgment hardly doesjustice to the overall results of WARC-79,particularly the future implications for theUnited States. The long-term trends may berunning against the United States in thesense that more problems without apparentsolutions are foreseen. The United Statesfinds itself increasingly in a defensive mode,trying to minimize losses rather than seek-ing significant changes to improve the long-term posture of the United States.

For example, significant amounts of spec-trum were added to the allocations for thefixed-satellite service (FSS) in general ac-cordance with U.S. objectives. The technicalrules that affect the design and operation,and hence the cost, of satellite systems weregenerally in agreement with U.S. positions.

Where U.S. desires were not precisely met,no significantly adverse repercussions re-sulted. No immediate or significant changesin the structure or operation of U.S. fixed-satellite telecommunication services willresult from conference decisions. No opera-tional or economic dislocation was imposed

Ch. 4—WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts • 71

on any existing FSS system, and no majorburden appears to be placed on the Gov-ernment, or private operating entities, inorder to comply with the decisions ofWARC-79 regarding FSS.

However, the conference also adopted aresolution that calls for a space planningconference to be held in two sessions to planspace services using the geostationary satel-lite orbit. The first session, to be held in1985, will define the type of planning and de-termine which services and which frequencybands should be planned. The second ses-sion, scheduled for 1987, will do the actualplanning. The space conference, as well asthe previously scheduled broadcasting satel-lite conference set for June 1983 to planbroadcasting satellite service in region 2 (theAmericas) in the 12-GHz band, are of vitalimportance and concern to the UnitedStates. The ability to implement new tech-nologies and offer new services via satellitein the years ahead depend in part on the deci-sions taken at these future conferences.

There is a significant difference betweenthe approach advocated by the UnitedStates for using the geostationary satelliteorbit and any rigid a priori allotment andplanning approach advocated primarily bysome developing nations. The United States,as well as other countries, has consistentlyfavored a flexible approach that assignsorbit locations and satellite frequencies on acase-by-case basis, often referred to as “first-come, first-served. ” The U.S. approach seeksto accommodate needs as required and relies,at least in part, on technological advance-ments and good engineering practices to“engineer in” the next satellite and accom-modate all users. Such an approach is con-sistent with existing practice under ITU pro-cedures for the notification, coordination,and assignment of radiofrequencies gen-erally.

Many developing countries, on the otherhand, see a negotiated plan that assigns spe-cific frequency channels and orbital posi-tions to each country under a rigid a priori al-

lotment plan as a means to guarantee futureaccess. This approach does not depend uponadvances in technology or new engineeringtechnologies to assure accommodation ofnewcomers, but neither does it provide fortechnological improvements that might benecessary to accommodate growing require-ments. The developed countries already havethe economic and technological means oflaunching and utilizing domestic satellitesystems; most developing countries do not,even though many do make use of joint usersystems like the International Telecommuni-cations Satellite Organization (INTELSAT)global satellite system. The developing na-tions are concerned that as “late comers”(hence later served) there will be little or noway to accommodate their domestic re-quirements.

Both a posteriori (the case-by-case ap-proach usually relying on a notice and recor-dation procedure) and a priori (the collectivesubdivision approach usually relying on a ne-gotiated plan) have won past acceptance atconferences of ITU. Over the last 75 yearsone or the other approach has been advo-cated and used by nearly all nations to allo-cate spectrum, both internally and interna-tionally. On a domestic level, the a posterioriapproach is often coupled with an adjudica-tion procedure for deciding among compet-ing applicants, as is the case in the UnitedStates. On the international level, adjudica-tion is almost impossible because of sov-ereignty claims. Most nations have been un-willing to allow an international body todetermine whether they can or cannot use aradio channel or satellite position. Wherechannels become limited, the recourse in therecent past has been to adopt an a priorimethod. However, for the allocation of radiobands and services like FSS, which are af-fected by rapidly changing technology, orwhich are fraught with political controversy,a priori methods tend to promote too rigidtechnical specifications or exaggeratedclaims for channels. Much of the controversyat WARC-79 and that likely to emerge atfuture conferences, arises from the question


of the appropriate administrative arrange-ments to determine rights to the use of fre-quencies free from harmful interference.

Several countries made planning proposalsat WARC-79, ranging in scope from plan-ning all services in all frequency bands toallocated space services, planning only FSSin bands newly allocated to that servicebelow 10 GHz. However, it is clear that FSSwas the main target of these proposals.Developing a plan of this nature is an enor-mous undertaking and would not have beenpossible at WARC-79; however, acceptanceof the principle of “planning” was a majorgoal of the developing countries.

The U. S. delegation worked to preventany decision to convene a “planning” confer-ence. When it became clear that such a con-ference would be approved, the UnitedStates argued successfully to keep the termsof reference rather broad. The first session ofthe “WARC on the Use of the GeostationarySatellite Orbit and the Planning of SpaceServices Utilizing It,” scheduled for July1985, will consider which services and whichfrequency bands to “plan.” Further, themeaning of “plan” will be decided, and willnot necessarily be a rigid “a priori” type.The operative thought in determining thetype of planning is to provide “in practiceequitable access” to the geostationary orbit.The second session of the conference, sched-uled for September 1987, will meet to enactthe decisions of the first.

It has been the official position of theUnited States, shared by a number of othercountries, that a rigid a priori plan for FSS isbad planning and bad engineering; that it islikely to inhibit technological innovation,result in inefficient use of the orbit and spec-trum and have a major adverse impact onU.S. telecommunication systems. Thus, theUnited States faces a significant challengeover the next few years to develop compel-ling arguments against a rigid a priori ap-

proach and to carry that message convinc-ingly to all parts of the world well beforethese conferences convene; or to find alterna-tives acceptable to all parties. Examples ofsuch alternatives are discussed in chapter 5.

The adoption of the space planning confer-ence resolution is a vigorous reminder thatthe effective management of orbit and spec-trum utilization on both a worldwide and aregional basis is a continuing process that isbecoming increasingly more difficult andcomplex. The achievement of U.S. objectivesat ITU conferences is no longer a matter ofreaching painstaking agreement on technicalsolutions to problems of coordination andmultiple usage of spectrum. It will requiresophisticated, political negotiations; im-aginative, innovative approaches; and long,hard bargaining.

Perhaps an acceptable compromise will befound regarding the satellite orbit planningissue prior to the 1983 region 2 conference.Nevertheless, the mechanism to develop andtest a possible solution before the meeting isnot now apparent, and the task of shaping acompromise during the meeting may provetoo difficult. While there is no certainty thatthe majority of the region 2 countries willfavor a rigid orbital and frequency allotmentplan like the one adopted for regions 1 and 3at WARC-77 for broadcasting satellite serv-ice (BSS), the United States must be pre-pared for such a prospect nevertheless. Ac-cording to the OTA survey cited in chapter3, only 8 percent of the respondents believethat a compromise between the UnitedStates and the Third World positions on apriori allotment is impossible; an additional15 percent believe that a compromise is pos-sible, but undesirable. A majority of the re-spondents, 68 percent, believe that a prac-tical compromise is possible and desirable,although relatively few have any specificconcept of the form such compromise couldtake. The remaining 9 percent expressed noopinion.

Ch. 4—WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts “ 73

Key Conference Decisions andTheir Consequences

The Fixed-Satellite Service

FSS is defined as “a radio communicationservice between Earth stations at specifiedfixed points when one or more satellites areused; in some cases this service includes sat-ellite-to-satellite links, which may also be ef-fected in the intersatellite service; FSS mayalso include feeder links for other space radiocommunications services.”

This definition fails to convey fully boththe diversity of applications that already ex-ist, and those that are expected to be accom-modated in FSS in the future. The emer-gence of the wide variety of applications forfixed-satellite service stems in a major wayfrom the properties of a natural phenomenonknown as the geostationary satellite orbit.This orbit is circular, some 165,000 miles incircumference, and in the plane of theEquator approximately 22,300 miles abovethe Earth’s surface. At this altitude, asatellite in orbit rotates about the Earth’saxis at the same rate as the Earth (one revo-lution per day) and appears to be stationarywhen viewed from a point on the Earth. Thisspecial characteristic of the geostationaryorbit allows an Earth station antenna topoint at a geostationary satellite without theneed for expensive antenna-tracking equip-ment. Earth stations in the intended cover-age area and a geostationary satellite arecontinuously visible to each other in contrastto a satellite in any other orbit. These uniquecharacteristics have caused the member na-tions of ITU to view the geostationary orbitas a “natural resource.” The ITU conventionrecognizes the geostationary satellite orbitas a limited natural resource.

With consideration only for avoidance ofphysical collisions between satellites, the

number of satellites that can be placed in thegeostationary orbit is nearly unlimited.However, the current ITU convention recog-nizes that satellites operating in a common-frequency band must be sufficiently sep-arated to avoid harmful interference. For ex-ample, U.S. communication satellites cur-rently operating in the 4- to 6-GHz frequencybands and serving the same or adjacent cov-erage areas are presently required by theFederal Communications Commission (FCC)to be separated by 4°. It is important to notethat the required separation between satel-lites operating in the same frequency bandcould be greatly reduced if the coverageareas are separated geographically. For ex-ample, satellites operating in FSS withproper antennas could be essentially colo-cated in the geostationary orbit when onesatellite serves the United States while thesecond satellite serves a South Americancountry.

A second limitation to the capacity of thegeostationary orbit occurs as a consequenceof geometric considerations. Only a portionof the geostationary orbit is visible from aparticular coverage area on Earth. To illus-trate, table 2 shows the portions of the geo-stationary orbit “available” to the variouscountries in region 2.

Sharing of the geostationary orbit in a par-ticular frequency band is principally a prob-lem of sharing between adjacent countries.For the United States, the sharing problemis largely with Canada and Mexico. The di-mensions and capacity of the geostationaryorbit available to the United States, assum-ing an appropriate international coordina-tion approach, is essentially independent ofthe use of the orbit by countries in regions 1

8 5 - 5 9 1 0 - 82 - 6


Table 2.—Service Arc of Geostationary Orbit

Visibility arc forminimum elevation

angle of 100World (degrees in westregion Coverage range longitude)

North Canada, including YukonAmerica and Northwest Territories

Canada, Vancouver toHalifax. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

USA, including Hawaii,Alaska, and Puerto Rico.

USA, CONUS only. . . . . . . .USA, CONUS and Hawaii. .

Latin Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .America Columbia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chile/Argentina. . . . . . . . . .Total regional coverage . . .Mexico/Caribbean . . . . . . .

114-116

61-128

133-13461-13491-1340-109

10-14310-13010-10946-143

SOURCE: Telecommunications Systems Inc.

or 3, or in South America. Conversely, theuse of the geostationary orbit by countries inNorth America should not significantly limitthe availability of the orbit for countries inthe other regions or in South America.Again, this assumes an appropriate interna-tional coordination approach.

In summary of the points made above, thecapacity of the geostationary orbit for a par-ticular country operating in a given fre-quency band is determined primarily by fourfactors. These are:

1. the dimensions of the available arcas determined by geometric considera-tions;

2. the characteristics of individual satel-lites at each orbital position;

3. the separation between satellites operat-ing in that band as required to avoidharmful interference; and

4. the number of adjacent countries plan-ning to operate in the same frequencyband.

The usable capacity of the geostationaryorbit available to a particular nation may beincreased under three of the limiting factorsenumerated above. First, the capacity ateach orbital position may be increasedthrough application of technology improve-ments. Frequency reuse, higher satellitepower, more efficient and higher gain anten-

nas, and lower noise receivers are examples.The required separation between satellites isa second category of improvement possiblethrough improvements in technology. Inter-ference-resistant modulation methods andimproved antenna sidelobe performance areexamples. In the third category, the dimen-sions of the available orbit arc may be ex-tended through the application of intersatel-lite links. As a first approximation, the avail-able arc may be increased by the latitude ex-tent of the service area. For the UnitedStates, the use of intersatellite links mightmore than double the available arc.

The ability of a country to make these im-provements depends on its own level of tech-nological advancement, ability to pay forsuch improvements, and the sociopoliticalneeds and trends within the country. Also,the extent to which a country can take ad-vantage of these improvements is deter-mined in part by the actions of other coun-tries. Again, appropriate international coor-dination and cooperation are required. Chap-ter 5 discusses alternative approaches for co-ordinating use of the geostationary satelliteorbit.

During the last decade many countrieshave taken advantage of the telecommunica-tion capabilities offered by the orbit/spec-trum resource. As a result there are manydomestic satellite systems in operation andbeing planned, as well as international sys-tems (e.g., INTELSAT) shared by manycountries throughout the world. These sys-tems support a variety of services, includingbroadcasting and maritime-mobile. The spe-cific functions rendered by these establishedservices, and those being planned or fore-seen, include:

●

●

●

Domestic and international point-to-point connections for trunk telephonyand television distribution.“Thin-route” telephony and instruc-tional television to remote areas.Data transmission and computer-to-computer communication.


● Facsimile, teletext, videotext (view-data), and electronic mail.

• Interoffice connections for teleconfer-encing, inventory control, and the like,for large organizations.

Central to the utility and the economic at-tractiveness of satellite systems is theiralmost unlimited “connectivity” or flexibil-ity; i.e., the possibility of mutually connect-ing a large number of Earth terminalsthrough a single satellite. Thus, many na-tions believe that many of their future tele-communication needs can be satisfied bygeostationary satellite systems, whetherwholly owned or jointly operated by regionalentities. This is true for both advanced anddeveloping countries but particularly the lat-ter who hope through the use of satellites toleapfrog many of the problems and much ofthe time and expense required to install con-ventional terrestrial communication sys-tems.

At WARC-79, the United States sought toexpand the allocations to FSS for both do-mestic and international use. There was aparticular need for frequencies below 10GHz and this requirement gave rise to con-siderable controversy throughout the con-ference. The United States was determinedto preserve the status of the radiolocationservice in the 3400- to 3600-MHz band, nowused by important military radar systems.The band has long been shared with FSS,and in order to facilitate use of FSS systems,particularly INTELSAT, some delegationsproposed to downgrade radar to secondarystatus. A compromise was ultimatelyworked out that restored primary status forradars subject to a footnote provisionurging, but not mandating, ITU members tophase out of the band and to take practicablesteps to protect FSS. The United States andseveral other countries formally declaredtheir intention to accommodate FSS when itis feasible to do so. (This topic is covered ingreater detail in a later section.) Allocationsto FSS were also made in the 4- and 6-GHzbands.

In other actions, WARC made additionaluplink allocations acceptable to the UnitedStates, including those at 6425 to 7175 MHzand 17.3 to 18.1 GHz. The former band wasallocated to provide the uplink for fixedsatellite service in the bands 3400 to 3700and 4500 to 4800 MHz. Both bands (6425 to7175 MHz and 19.3 to 18.1 GHz) wereneeded for feeder links to satellites in otherservices such as broadcasting and maritime-mobile satellites. Still other downlink fre-quencies were allocated to FSS in the band10.7 to 11.7 GHz as the United States hadproposed. These frequencies will also beused for the increasing requirements ofINTELSAT.

A major objective of the United Stateswas to resolve the difficult sharing situationin region 2 between FSS and BSS in the1000-MHZ bandwidth at 12 GHz. The confer-ence agreed with the U.S. proposal to sep-arate the two services by allocating the 12.1-to 12.7-GHz segment to the BSS and the11.7- to 12.3-GHz segment to the FSS. Al-though the frequency-sharing between thespace services was thus largely eliminated(12.1 to 12.3 GHz remains a shared band, butsharing may be completely eliminated by the1983 regional conference), BSS must nowshare with the terrestrial fixed service in-cluding private microwave systems widelyused in the United States. This sharing couldresult in interference to BSS Earth stationreceivers operating in the same area as pri-vate microwave fixed-station transmitters.The private microwave users are concernedthat sharing with direct-broadcasting satel-lites is not feasible and oppose sharing in the12-GHz band. The concern is that home re-ceivers for direct-broadcasting satelliteswould receive interference from terrestrialmicrowave transmitters. As a practical mat-ter, the microwave users anticipate theburden to resolve any resulting interferenceproblems will be placed on them. This con-cern is reinforced by footnote 3787D of theFinal Acts of WARC-79, which places terres-trial services on a noninterference basis toBSS operating in accordance with a plan to


be prepared at the 1983 region 2 broadcast-ing satellite conference. How this conflictwill be resolved within the United States is acurrent matter before FCC.

Existing FSS allocations at higher fre-quencies were maintained. In general, allU.S. objectives were met in the bands above40 GHz (to 275 GHz). These bands will beused in future years as advanced technologyis developed and as communication require-ments continue to grow.

Apart from the decision to convene a spaceWARC to “plan” use of the geostationaryorbit and related spectrum, WARC-79 willhave some longer range impacts on FSS. Forexample, new allocations to FSS are likely tomotivate system designers to exploit thesefrequencies, especially in the 4- to 6- and11- to 14-GHz bands where bandwidth wasmore than doubled. In order to take advan-tage of this increased capacity, a spacecraftpayload built on current technology wouldhave to double in size, weight, and power re-quirements. To keep these at a minimum wemay see renewed efforts at material develop-ment, to build, for example, lighter weightfilters, more efficient solar cells and space-qualified solid-state amplifiers. The avail-ability of the U.S. Space TransportationSystem (Shuttle) will have increasing impacton the capacity and costs of satellite sys-tems, particularly when the shuttle attainsfull capability to locate spacecraft in geosta-tionary orbit. The large bandwidth availablemay also create opportunities in trafficrouting flexibility not possible with smallerbandwidths. This may stimulate spacecraftswitching technology and the associatedsatellite-switch logic, as well as the develop-ment of shaped spot beams.

Generally speaking, the impact ofWARC-79 on the availability and cost ofFSS systems was favorable because sub-stantial increases were granted in the“lower” frequency bands where technologyis well developed and relatively economical.WARC also reaffirmed the FSS allocationsnear 20 and 30 GHz where the next genera-

tion of domestic communication satellites isnow under development. When this new gen-eration of satellite systems becomes opera-tional, in a decade or more, there are likely tobe lower costs and higher availability both innew types of services and in number of users,particularly those in remote areas.

U.S. operating practices for planning, allo-cating, managing, and using the spectrumallocated to FSS have not been altered as aresult of WARC-79 decisions. The expansionof allocations would seem to mitigate somepolicy conflicts that might have existedbefore. For example, the guiding U.S. policyfor commercial FSS systems has been to per-mit any financially and technically qualifiedentity to compete in the marketplace. Thedecision to allocate separate bands to FSSand BSS about 12 GHz serves to alleviate, atleast temporarily, a potential problem area.

The results of WARC-79, insofar as FSS isconcerned, do not impose any hardships onthe Government to comply with the de-mands contained in the Final Acts. Some ef-fort will be required to amend the existingdocumentation, manuals, and computer pro-grams to reflect the new regulations andmodifications to the old ones, but this is aone-time effort.

A related obligation concerns technical as-sistance to developing countries. WARC-79adopted a series of resolutions and recom-mendations that call on the industrializednations to give additional help to the ThirdWorld in telecommunciations. FSS is theservice that developing countries look to forsatisfying many of their needs. These resolu-tions and recommendations are basically inline with the U.S. approach to technicalassistance since they regard the United Na-tions Development Program (UNDP) as theprimary source of financing. They do not callfor the establishment of either mandatory orvoluntary funds for technical cooperation.But the question arises as to whether, and towhat extent, it is desirable or necessary, asan extension of U.S. foreign policy, to offerunilateral assistance to developing countries

Ch. 4—WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts ● 77

with a view to influencing their attitudes onFSS “planning” and other issues. The poten-tial benefits of using U.S. technology and ex-pertise to provide assistance and developcloser coordination and planning activitieswith developing countries are discussed inchapter 5.

The Fixed Service

The fixed service above 1 GHz supportscommunication systems that are more com-monly known as microwave, radio-relay sys-tems and widely used in the United Statesby common carriers, Government agencies,and business.

Substantial frequency allocations between1 and 40 GHz were made to the fixed serviceby the 1959 WARC. Those allocations (par-ticularly those between 1 and 15 GHz) havebeen used extensively and considerable ef-fort has been expended on the design ofradio-relay equipment and field engineeringmethods. As a result, the available alloca-tions have been used very efficiently. In-creasingly large volumes of communicationhave been squeezed into each radio channeland there has been careful planning of adja-cent systems to avoid excessive interference.

Because of the highly efficient use of exist-ing allocations, there were few proposals atWARC-79 for changes. Those changes thatwere adopted by the conference consistedmainly of attempts to aline the allocationsamong the three regions and, by means offootnotes, to accommodate the specificneeds of individual countries.

More significant for the fixed service werenew allocations made to the space servicesthat will permit additional use by those serv-ices, on a coequal basis, of bands already al-located to the fixed service. Such sharingwas first included, on a limited basis, in theallocation table of 1963 as a means of accom-modating the new concept of communicationsatellites. At that time technical criteriawere introduced to control the amount of in-terference each service might impose on theother.

Sharing is not without cost, but these pen-alties have been felt to be in the interest ofoverall efficient use of the spectrum by allservices in order to permit additional use ofthe frequency bands. There is a price paid inthe practical use of radio-relay systems inthe shared environment because of the needto shorten repeater spacings and to under-take complex route engineering to avoid in-terference to or from satellite Earth stations.This can result in the need to build more ex-pensive repeater sites or even the addition ofextra repeater stations to bypass a problem;it can also require a shift in frequency bandsor, in extreme cases, switching to cable forsome route segments.

With new provisions for sharing in addi-tional bands, and with additional types ofspace services, the pressure on radio relaysystem design will be increased. The con-ference recognized this as a complex problemand identified several aspects of sharing onwhich further consideration and refinementare needed and asked the InternationalRadio Consultative Committee (CCIR) to un-dertake appropriate studies.

The decisions of WARC-79 affecting theuse of microwave radio relay systems do notmandate any drastic reconsideration of U.S.practices in allocating and managing thespectrum. The principal new allocations arethose between 40 and 275 GHz, which openup a number of new, wide bands for the fixedservice that are shared with several otherservices. There will be decisions to be madeon whether any of these bands is to be lim-ited domestically to an individual service in-stead of being shared broadly as provided inthe international table, and whether anyshould be identified exclusively for U.S.Government or nongovernment use.

In order to simplify the administrativeprocess for certain countries which other-wise might need to coordinate with a numberof neighboring states, the radio regulationswere revised and simplified at the risk of cre-ating future interference problems. Thechanges were opposed by the United States,Canada, and others as counterproductive.


Potential policy conflicts involving thefixed service arise from WARC decisions onthe shared use of frequency bands withspace services. Such sharing requires accom-modation or even sacrifices on the part ofeach service. How much sharing will beallowed, and the degree to which one servicewill be affected in order to facilitate theother, become policy determinations that arelittle appreciated at present.

The most conspicuous case that will re-quire action in the near future is the treat-ment of the 12.1- to 12.7-GHz band. There,BSS will now share with private microwavesystems. The use of sensitive receiving in-stallations in BSS coupled with the necessityto locate them at any place within the servicearea of the satellite, essentially precludesradio-relay operation within the coveragearea of a broadcasting satellite on any radio-frequency channel to be used for satellitebroadcasting. Hence, the extent to whichchannels and areas are reserved for broad-casting, to the exclusion of private micro-wave systems, is under study in the UnitedStates and will be a major policy determina-tion.

Another area of potential conflict is thesharing of frequency bands by the mobile-satellite service (MSS) and FSS. MSS is a dif-ferent category of service than the discreteservices like maritime MSS or land MSS. Itwas developed primarily for military satellitecommunications use, wherein the Earth sta-tion may be located from time to time any-where within a defined area (and even oper-ated in moving vehicles such as aircraft andships), rather than being limited to a fixed,predetermined location. So far there hasbeen little practical experience of this type,but the idea that a small essential areaaround the radio-relay station would be pro-tected, while a large area would be reservedfor the convenience of the mobile-satelliteEarth station is a concept not fully under-stood or accepted. Because of these con-cerns, the conference made only very limitedallocations to MSS.

As noted earlier, the provisions for spacesystems to share frequency bands with thefixed service tend to complicate, make moreexpensive, and even inhibit the growth ofradio-relay systems, but in the past this hasnot resulted in the dislocation of existingservices or systems.

The new allocations for broadcasting satel-lites to share in the 12.2- to 12.7-GHz bandmay well cause dislocations to private micro-wave systems. Frequency sharing will bequite a different problem from that in other“shared” bands. In fact, licenses beingissued now for private microwave stationsbear a warning to the effect that continuedoperation is not assured.

Distribution of television by terrestrialradio-relay systems may also suffer disloca-tions, depending on the ultimate decisionson sharing conditions. The 6.425- to6.525-GHz band, which is the principal bandused by common carriers for service tobroadcasters and for closed-circuit uses suchas medical demonstrations and sportingevents, and the band 6.875 to 7.075 GHz,which is heavily used by the broadcasters,are now to be shared with satellites.

The Land-Mobile Service

For the past 20 years, land-mobile hasbeen one of the fastest growing radio serv-ices. Not only has use of land-mobile radiosystems increased for local governments,businesses and for other specialized uses,but land-mobile use as part of the terrestrialtelephone network has increased greatly.Further growth can be expected with the ad-vent of cellular public telephone systems andthe increase of private radio requirements.

The United States has already added land-mobile to portions of the UHF televisionband 470 to 890 MHz in the U.S. domestictable of allocations, an action permittedunder the ITU’s radio regulations, providedno interference is caused to stations of othercountries operating in those frequencies. The

Ch. 4— WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts

United States proposed at WARC-79 thatmost of the band 470 to 960 MHz be allo-cated to the land-mobile service, sharing on aprimary basis with broadcasting in the lowerpart, and with fixed and radiolocation serv-ices in the upper part. This would permiteach country in region 2 to determine whichof the internationally allocated primary serv-ices would be implemented in their ownareas.

WARC only partially accepted these pro-posals. The mobile service was added to thebands 806 to 902 MHz on a primary basis,but on a secondary basis in the bands 470 to512 MHz and 614 to 806 MHz. A footnoteraises mobile to primary status in the UnitedStates, with the provision that such use issubject to the coordination procedures of ar-ticle 14 of the radio regulations. The UnitedStates submitted a protocol statement re-jecting the article 14 procedure, however, therequirement for coordination, coupled withthe continued use of 470 to 512 MHz inCanada for broadcasting, and the use ofband 614 to 806 MHz in both Canada andMexico for the same purpose, makes our useof these bands for the mobile service prob-lematic. A similar situation prevails regard-ing U.S. proposals for the 902- to 960-MHzband where the United States, Canada, andMexico use the same segments for compet-ing services and where coordination inborder regions may be difficult.

The United States must determine itspolicies and means to follow through onthis declaration. There are no FSS Earth sta-tions currently operating in the 3.4- to3.6-GHz band. In its declaration, the UnitedStates agreed not to withhold support ifINTELSAT decided to undertake FSS inthat band. If such a decision was imple-mented, the United States would be understrong pressure to restrain radar operationsthat might interfere with international satel-lite operations.

● 79

The HF Broadcasting Service

In recent decades, growing numbers ofcountries have turned to HF (shortwave)broadcasting to carry news, entertainment,comment, and propaganda to audiences be-yond their own borders. The potential effec-tiveness of these broadcasts has been ham-pered by two factors: 1) the congestion of theshortwave frequency bands by more andmore stations with ever-higher transmitterpower, resulting in unintentional interfer-ence; and 2) jamming—the deliberate inter-ference with broadcast signals.

WARC-79 offered the first opportunitysince 1959 for the international communityto attempt to alleviate the present conges-tion in HF broadcasting and the UnitedStates went to the conference seeking a sub-stantial expansion of spectrum allocated tothis service. The United States did not winapproval for all its proposals but the overalloutcome was satisfactory from both thetechnical and political standpoints. As aresult of WARC-79, congestion and interfer-ence should be reduced considerably by theend of the 1980’s and reception of HF broad-casts should be clearer. For the UnitedStates, this will benefit the Voice of Amer-ica, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty(RFE/RL), the Armed Forces Radio and Tele-vision Service, and several private organiza-tions engaged in HF broadcasting.

To reduce interference and congestion, theconference agreed to an increase of 850 kHzin the HF broadcasting bands between 9 and21 MHz, including the creation of a new13-MHz band. This represents an overall in-crease of 33 percent in the allocation for HFbroadcasting. The United States had pro-posed a 46 percent increase, while the SovietUnion asked for no increase at all. The com-promise was the result of an initiative bynonalined countries and it was especiallywelcomed because the allocation will ulti-


mately become exclusive, although it re-mains shared until the fixed service opera-tions now using it can be reaccommodated.Despite appeals by the United States andother countries, proposals to expand the im-portant 6- and 7-MHz bands failed by verynarrow margins, largely because many devel-oping countries claimed a continued need forthese bands for other forms of communica-tion.

WARC-79 also agreed to convene a special-ized HF broadcasting conference in themid-1980’s to plan for the more efficient andequitable use of the broadcasting bands, andit tied the bringing into force of the new allo-cations to the effectiveness of this confer-ence. The United States initially opposedthis follow-on conference but switched tosupport the idea when it became apparentthat WARC was running behind scheduleand that U.S. interests might suffer substan-tial damage in the atmosphere of frustrationthat prevailed.

The United States achieved one goal bykeeping open the scope and character of thefollow-on conference; the agenda will be openand the meeting does not constitute an as-signment or allocation conference. Neverthe-less, there are potential problems with thisfollow-on conference. Political issues, such as“prior consent,” could prove troublesome.Also, as noted above, the increased alloca-tions to HF are dependent upon success inaccommodating the fixed services that wereousted from the spectrum given to interna-tional broadcasting. For this reason, theUnited States, together with the UnitedKingdom, Spain, Greece, Saudi Arabia, Cy-prus, Sri Lanka, and Zambia in a multina-tional protocol statement, reserved theright—in the absence of an adequate plan—to take the necessary steps to meet the needsof the HF broadcasting services. Similar in-dependent reservations were made by 17other countries. (Three host countriesfor RFE/RL transmitters–West Germany,Spain, and Portugal–were among those tak-ing reservations.)

In an effort to deal with the continuedproblem of deliberate jamming by the SovietUnion and other Communist bloc countries,the United States made the following proto-col statement at the conclusion of the con-ference:

Administration of the United States ofAmerica, calling attention to the fact thatsome of its broadcasting in the high fre-quency bands allocated to the broadcastingservice are subject to willful, harmful inter-ference by administrations that are signa-tory to these Final Acts, and that such in-terference is incompatible with the rationaland equitable use of these bands, declaresthat for as long as this interference exists, itreserves the right with respect to such in-terference to take necessary and appropriateactions to protect its broadcasting interests.In so doing, however, it intends to respectthe rights, to the extent practicable, of ad-ministrations operating in accordance withthese Final Acts.

Other smaller countries, like Iran, alsocomplained of Soviet jamming which, al-though not directed at them, interfered withtheir broadcasting. Neither the Soviet Unionnor any of the other Eastern bloc nationsthat currently jam U.S. broadcasts sub-mitted an official statement to answer theU.S. complaint.

U.S. delegation representatives who dealtwith HF broadcasting issues reported thatthe nonalined movement countries generallysupported or opposed U.S. positions onthe basis of their own interests and not forulterior political motives. Some of thestrongest opposition to U.S. proposals camefrom Latin America, especially on the issueof fixed services v. broadcasting. Brazil andCosta Rica proved to be more influentialthan Cuba in controlling the Latin Americandelegations.

The Soviet Union, which often operatesHF broadcasting stations “out of band,” i.e.,using frequencies allotted to some otherservice, did not request additional HFbroadcasting frequencies. However, this


may be explained by the fact that the SovietUnion entered a protocol statement in theFinal Acts of the 1959 General Administra-tive Radio Conference regarding HF fre-quency bands and thus the Soviet Uniondoes not consider their operations “out ofband.”

National Security Systems

This report deals at length with the conse-quences to U.S. national security of deci-sions reached at WARC-79. The extensivetreatment is not intended to disparage theimportance of WARC for other U.S. inter-ests. It arises, rather, from the peculiarnature of DOD communications require-ments and their broad-ranging use of satel-lites and radiofrequency spectrum.

The Final Acts of WARC-79 represent agenerally acceptable compromise that satis-fied most U.S. national security needs butwill require some significant changes in thecoming years. Greater numbers of differentoperations will have to make use of the samefrequency bands; systems will need greaterfrequency flexibility to cope with competingusers of the spectrum. The magnitude andcost of these changes cannot be known forsome time; they will be determined in part bythe manner in which the new radio regula-tions agreed on at WARC-79 are actually im-plemented worldwide.

Without being pessimistic, it should benoted that most of the major reservationsthat the U.S. delegation took at WARC-79involved national security considerations.This fact by itself justifies a thorough lookat the short- and long-term consequences forU.S. security of decisions reached at the con-ference.

Military systems must be prepared to op-erate anywhere in the world, and geograph-ical restrictions on some bands generate ad-ditional requirements for frequency flexibil-ity—sometimes demanding costly increaseddesign and operational complexity.

The problem of “universality” is partlysolvable through bilateral and multilateralagreements, but there is still a significantimpact on system planning and operation.Some military systems are fielded in a lessadvanced state of development than theircivil counterparts. As a result, they must beadjusted more. They are also used in fieldtests and exercises, and the frequency coor-dination is an important component of theplanning. Nevertheless, advanced technol-ogy developments can provide some solu-tions.

Military-Related Issues and ObjectivesThe security of the United States depends

on economic health as well as defense pos-ture. The following discussion, however,focuses on the major military-related issuesand objectives that were identified goinginto WARC-79:

● Radiolocation (radar)– Minimize encroachment of radar

bands, below 1000 MHz, especially inthe 400- and 800-MHz bands, and at3.4 and 5 GHz.

● Satellites (radionavigation)– Provide for NAVSTAR Global Posi-

tioning Satellite (GPS) at 1,227 and1,575 MHz.

● Satellites (communications)– Recognize and provide for MSS.– Obtain reasonable sharing criteria for

MSS.– Avoid any a priori plans that would

allocate or preposition geostationaryorbit spacing.

● High frequency (HF)— Insure adequate HF allocations for

non-line-of-sight (NLOS) nonsatellitestrategic communications, beyondline-of-sight (LOS) tactical communi-cations.

– Avoid regulatory limitations thatwould inhibit over-the-horizon (OTH)radars.

. Fixed and mobile (terrestrial)– Maintain status quo in the 4400- to


4900-MHz band, pertinent to NATOrequirements.

– Retain the 14.5- to 15.35-GHz bandsfor fixed and mobile systems per-tinent to NATO requirements, andminimize the growth of the spaceservices in these bands.

● Intelligence– Avoid any regulations that limit or

reduce flexibility of operation.

One part of the U.S. preparation strategywas to participate in and strengthen the In-ternational Radio Consultative Committee(CCIR) of ITU as a technical forum. Towardthat end, DOD participated actively in thework of CCIR study groups, the CCIR XIVPlenary held in Kyoto, Japan (June 1978),and in the CCIR special preparatory meeting(SPM) for WARC-79 held in Geneva in Oc-tober 1978. DOD prepared substantial docu-mentation for SPM in the following technicalareas:

● G P S● Mobile-satellite systems

— Sharing criteria– Coordination areas

● Radiolocation– Sharing— Signal characteristics

● Mobile sharing with fixed service (HFband)

● Spread-spectrum techniques● Techniques above 50 GHz.

The documents prepared for the CCIR ple-nary and SPM by DOD were in most casesadequate technically to support the DOD po-sitions at WARC; however, the decisions ul-timately taken at WARC-79 did not neces-sarily turn on technical data. It should berecognized that CCIR work is a continuingprogram and future active U.S. and DODparticipation is essential.

The results of WARC-79 are provided inthe Final Acts, and the overall results asthey pertain to the United States have beensummarized by Ambassador Robinson andthe members of the delegation. The nationalsecurity impacts have been considered in a

report to the Air Force, and DOD has pro-vided a national security assessment to theSenate that will consider the Final Acts forratification as a treaty. The DOD consensusis that with some exceptions, the WARC-79outcome did not degrade the national secu-rity of the United States. However, it is rec-ognized that costs must increase in the fu-ture. Some of the results and an estimate oftheir impact on national security were appar-ent immediately after the conference. For ex-ample, our national security posture was im-proved when the United States:

●

●

Obtained provisions in the allocation ta-ble that accommodate the NAVSTAR-GPS on a worldwide basis; andObtained provisions for the operation ofmobile-satellite terminals at 7 and 8GHz (although the specific frequencybands are not consistent with the cur-rent design and channelization plans forthe DSCS [Defense Satellite Communi-cations System] III).

While the United States as an entity min-imized its losses due to conference actions,DOD (as a major U.S. international user ofthe radio spectrum) did bear the brunt of theloss of flexibility for use of the spectrum(e.g., radiolocation). The United States tooksix reservations, four of which dealt directlyand one of which dealt peripherally with deci-sions that could adversely affect nationalsecurity.

It should be recognized that the total im-pact of WARC-79 will take some time toassess due to the interdependence with im-plementing actions of other nations, par-ticularly those with whom the United Statesis allied militarily.

Spectrum Availability forNational Security

Major national security questions are:“What portions of the radiofrequency spec-trum are available for DOD use, and whatwas the effect of WARC-79 allocation ac-tions on DOD’s capability to perform its mis-sion?” There is no simple, single answer to

Ch. 4—WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts “ 83

these questions. However, one method ofgaining some perspective is to examine thestatus of the major radio bands and servicesemployed by DOD in the revised table of al-locations developed by WARC-79 and com-pare it with the existing table. The bandsbelow 27.5 MHz and above 15 GHz aretreated on a band basis; whereas, between27.5 MHz and 15 GHz the changes aretreated on a service basis for the fixed, mo-bile, radiolocation and fixed-satellite and mo-bile-satellite services. All of these bands andservices are vital to U.S. national security.They are used: for example, for command,control, and intelligence systems; for radio-navigation; for military weapon systemsthat use radiosignals for guidance and tar-geting; for early warning and all forms ofcommunication. Moreover, they must oper-ate in all parts of the world under variousconditions of competing spectrum use.

Bands Below 4 MHzThe following changes were made in the

bands below 4 MHz:

• The radionavigation service in the verylow frequency (VLF) and low frequency(LF) bands was expanded. This was aU.S. proposal for protection of nongov-ernment and military operations.

● The medium frequency (M F) spectrumfor AM broadcasting was expanded to1605 to 1705 kHz.

● Fixed and mobile operations between 2and 4 MHz were maintained; however,footnotes and power limitations werespecified in an attempt to reduce inter-ference.

The HF Band (4 to 27.5 MHz)

The United States proposed to reduce allo-cations to the fixed service by 18 percent andreallocate these frequencies to the maritime-mobile, broadcasting, radio astronomy, ama-teur, and mobile (except aeronautical-mobile)services. While there was only a 14-percentreduction in HF spectrum available to DOD,the exclusive bands were reduced by over 65

percent. The shared use of bands by servicewas greatly increased. The conference madesignificant reallocations to maritime (includ-ing several new bands above 10 MHz) and tointernational broadcasting operations. Thisled, in part, to U.S. reservations. The aero-nautical-mobile service bands were notchanged. A detailed reaccommodation pro-cedure, whereby services displaced would beprovided for elsewhere in the spectrum, wasa part of the revised HF allocation agree-ment. The conference action lessened thenumber of assignments that may be af-fected. The time frame for completion of thechangeover as specified by the conferencefurther reduces the overall impact on DODand other HF users. The immediate pro-cedure is for each administration to reviewall the HF fixed service listings in the inter-national frequency list as furnished by theInternational Frequency Registration Board(IFRB). This review will:

●

●

●

Delete entries not required.Identify remainder by category, regularoperational use, standby, occasional useon a reserve basis.Determine hours of operation.

IFRB was to be advised by March 1981 ofthe administrations’ findings. Then, begin-ning in July 1984, administrations will be re-quired to effect the changeover from the oldassignment to a new assignment. For bandsabove 10 MHz the changeover will be com-pleted by July 1, 1989, and for bands below10 MHz by July 1, 1994. (Tables 3 and 4show the distribution of the HF band beforeand after WARC-79.)

The 20-, 30-, 40-GHz BandsIn the bands at 20, 30, and 40 GHz, vir-

tually all U.S. requirements for FSS andMSS were met, though in certain instancesthe sharing with other services as agreed bythe conference may not prove to be feasible.The MSS proposals in these bands were com-panion to MSS proposals in the 7- to8-GHz bands. The successes achieved willstrengthen military communications by sat-ellite.


Table 3.–Distribution of the HF Band (4000 to 27,500 kHz) Before WARC-79—

Exclusive Shared Total

Service kHz Percent kHz Percent kHz Percent

Fixed service. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10,157 43.2% 4,348 18.5% 14,505 61.7%Maritime mobile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,850 16.4 2,202 9.4 6,052 25.8Land mobile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — — 4,177 17.7 4,177 17.7Broadcasting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,350 10.0 300 1.3 2,650 11.3Aeronautical fixed and mobile . . . 1,795 7.6 50 0.2 1,845 7.8Amateur. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 3.8 – – 900 3.8Others . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 0.5 – – 116 0.5

SOURCE. H A. Feigleson, “High Frequency in the Future,” IEEE Trans. EMC, vol. 23, No. 3, August 1981, draft

Table 4.–Distribution of the HF Band (4000 to 27,500 kHz) After WARC-79

Exclusive Shared Total

Service kHz Percent kHz Percent kHz Percent

Fixed service. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,704Maritime mobile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,650Land mobile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . —Other mobile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . —Broadcasting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,930Aeronautical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,815Amateur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,300Others . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200

15.8%19.8——

12.57.75.50.8

8,191158

2,1206,442

250805066

34.9%0.69.0

27.40.10.30.20.2

11,8954,8082,1296,4423,1801,8951,350

266

50.7%20.5

9.027.412.68.05.71.0

SOURCE: H. A. Feigleson, “High Frequency in the Future,” IEEE Trans. EMC, vol. 23, No, 3, August 1981, draft.

Fixed Service

Table 5 is a summary of WARC-79 gainsand changes in status on fixed allocationsbetween 27.5 MHz and 15 GHz as reflectedin the allocation tables. Between 15 to 40GHz there were no changes to the fixed serv-ice allocation tables; and, above 40 GHz, thegains were extensive—virtually assuring fre-quency support for DOD fixed requirementsabove 40 GHz. The table does not showthose fixed bands that were unchanged, butdoes give a measure of the gains made by thefixed service. However, between 1 and 15GHz, the fixed service gains were made bysharing with the radiolocation and FSS.

Some gains in spectrum allocations for thefixed service are not in DOD’s best interests,though the results were expected at the con-ference. The 420- to 430-MHz and 440- to450-MHz bands contain important DOD ra-diolocation systems that are expected tohave a long lifetime. These systems will nowhave to share with the fixed service. The allo-

cation changes imposed by WARC will havea significant effect on the operation of thesesystems. The allocation of the fixed serviceon a primary basis to the 7250- to 7300- and7975- to 8025-MHz bands was also expected(but not welcomed) by DOD. DSCS operatesuplinks in the 7900- to 8400-MHz band anddownlinks in the 7250- to 7750-MHz band.Airborne satellite communication operationsare planned for the 7975- to 8025-MHz band,which was an exclusively allocated satelliteband in most of the world prior to WARC-79,although this “exclusivity” was alreadydiluted significantly by footnotes. Coordina-tion of airborne satellite operations in a bandwith existing fixed systems within theUnited States has been very difficult. Theproliferation of fixed communication sys-tems will exacerbate this problem.

The band 4400 to 4990 MHz, is in heavyuse by the military service for tactical com-munications, including tropospheric scatteroperations; and in NATO Europe it has beendesignated a military band. In 1963, a


Table 5.—Summary of WARC Gains and Changes in Status on Fixed AllocationsBetween 27.5 MHz and 15 GHz

Bandwidth MHz

Frequency band (nearest tenth) Change Prior major use(MHz or GHz) Region(s) Primary Secondary MHz of the band

27.5-28 MHz41.015-47

54-6868-72

74.6 -74.875.2 -75.4

76-88136-138146-148174-216220-225230-235420-430440-450470-512470-610614-890

1435-15251530-1535

1660.5-16702300-24503300-34003400-35004990-50005850-59257250-73007975-8025

10-10.45 GHz10.5-10.55 GHz14.3 -14.4 GHz

1122

2 and 32 and 3

2All3221

2 and 32 and 3

2322

1 and 3All

2 and 32

2 and 322

AllAll

1 and 32 and 31 and 3

0.56

0.20.2

2

55

1010

1408490

1.6150

10010755050

45050

100

144

122

42

42

192

107.9

100

+ 0.56

144

+ 0.2+ 0.212

+ 2+ 242

+ 55

+ 10+ 10+42

+ 140+ 276

9010

+ 9.5150

+ 100+ 100

+ 10+ 75+50+50

+ 450+50

+ 100

Met aidsBCBCBCAero navAero navBCSpace researchAMFX MO BCAM RLAero navRLRLBCBC and RnavBCMOSpace OPSMet aidsRLRLRL and FX satellitesRadio astronomyRLFX satelliteFX satelliteRLRLFX satellite and navsatellite

SOURCE Systematics General Corp., “The World Administrative Radio Conference 1979,” final report

U.S.S.R. proposal for the inclusion of FSS,Earth-to-space on a primary basis in theband 4400 to 4700 MHz was accepted aspart of a conference compromise among theUnited States, United Kingdom, and theUnion of Soviet Socialists Republics. To datethere is no known satellite use of this band;however, the INTELSAT intentions to usethis band became apparent at WARC-79.This desired use became coupled to negotia-tions related to the band 3400 to 3700 MHz.In order best to protect current knownoperations in the band, FSS was shifted to4500 to 4800 MHz (sharing with the fixedand mobile services), and its direction waschanged to space-to-Earth. The bands 4400to 4500 MHz and 4800 to 4990 MHz remainprimarily fixed and mobile, except that inthe subbands 4825 to 4835 MHz and 4950 to

4990 MHz the aeronautical-mobile service isexcluded.

Mobile ServiceThe summary of WARC-79 gains, losses,

and changes in status on mobile allocationsbetween 27.5 MHz and 15 GHz is given intable 6. As can be noted, the differences be-tween tables 5 and 6 are minor, and many ofthe comments concerning the fixed servicechanges apply to the mobile service. Whilethe mobile service has several reductions inthe status of the service, it suffered no lossof a band.

Radiolocation (Radar)In the United States, the radiolocation

service provides the spectrum support for


Table 6.—Summary of WARC Gains, Losses, and Changes in Status on MobileAllocations Between 27.5 MHz and 15 GHz

Frequency band Bandwidth MHz Change Prior major use(MHz or GHz) Region(s) Primary Secondary MHz of the band

27.5-28 MHz41.015-47

54-6868-72

74.6 -74.875.2 -75.4

76-88100-108136-138146-148174-216220-225230-235420-430440-450470-512470-610614-980862-960

1660.5-16702300-24503300-34003400-35003400-36004990-50005850-59257250-73007975-8025

10-10.45 GHz10.5-10.55 GHz11.7 -12.5 GHz11.7 -12.1 GHz14.3 -14.4 GHz

0.56

0.20.2

8

2

55

1010

14011098

1.6150

10755050

45050

100

144

12

2

42

42

236

7.9

100100200

800400

+ 0.5 Met aids6 BC

14 BC4 BC

+ 0.2 Aero nav+ 0.2 Aero nav12 BC

–8 BC+ 2 Space research+ 2 AM42 FX MO BC

+ 5 AM RL5 Aero nav

+ 10 RL+ 10 RL+42 BC

+ 140 BC and Rnav+ 346 BC FX RL+98 BC FX+9.5 Met aids150 RL

+ 100 RL+ 100 RL and FX satellites

200 FX and FX satellites+ 10 Radio astronomy+75 RL+50 FX satellite+50 FX satellite

+ 450 RL+50 RL800 FX BC and BC satellites400 FX FX satellite BC satellite

+ 100 FX satellite nav satellite

SOURCE Systematics General Corp., “The World Administrative Radio Conference 1979,” final report,

certain Government operations—principallymilitary radars. Frequency management forthis service, including assignments, coor-dination, etc., is under the jurisdiction of theNational Telecommunications and Informa-tion Administration (NTIA) but operationalresponsibility is with DOD and the FederalAviation Administration. As such, radioloca-tion proposals and associated positionpapers were generated in DOD with the aimsof national security in mind. It should benoted that radar systems for different pur-poses and with different technical character-istics and operational requirements are usedby many other telecommunication servicesand are administered by other agencies.Thus, radionavigation radars generally fallunder the operational purview of the Depart-

ment of Transportation, meteorologicalradars under the Department of Commerce,and Earth exploration satellite radars withthe National Aeronautics and Space Admin-istration. Nongovernment radar users areregulated by FCC.

It should be noted further that not all sys-tems in the radiolocation service are radarsystems. These other systems include highlyaccurate, position-fixing systems similar inprinciple to the Loran and Omega hyperbolicradionavigation systems. Used for survey-ing purposes such as offshore oil exploration,these systems are technically navigation de-vices but have been traditionally operated inthe radiolocation service, using its frequencyallocations and subject to its technical


standards. The existing allocation forradiolocation (and the proposals to retainthem) have a firm foundation in the technicalaspects of radio wave propagation and radarsystem missions.

During the preparation for WARC, prob-lems were foreseen in three major areas in-volving seven different bands. Problems inthe UHF band were deemed particularly im-portant because this is the frequency rangebest suited for the long-range, air-surveil-lance mission. Prior to WARC-79, a world-wide primary allocation existed for radiolo-cation in the band 430 to 440 MHz, while inregions 2 and 3 it extended from 420 to 450MHz. It was known that there would be in-tensive pressure for allocation of these bandsto the fixed and mobile services. The U.S.position, therefore, was to retain at least theexisting worldwide primary allocation andacquiesce to secondary status in the adjoin-ing bands, if necessary. WARC did, in fact,arrive at this result along with a reduction tosecondary status in the 890- to 942-MHzband. By country footnote, the UnitedStates retained a primary allocation for itselfin those bands where the status had been re-duced. It is the position of DOD that theradar system using these bands have suffi-cient flexibility to perform their mission. Allof the systems involved have some modes ofoperation that could create undesirable in-terference. However, the retention of pri-mary status in the United States will pro-vide sufficient training opportunities tomaintain operator proficiency in thesemodes. The WARC results fell reasonablywithin the U.S. fall-back position in thesebands until the fixed and mobile footnotesstarted mounting up. Unable to control theflood of countries participating in these foot-notes, the United States entered the reserva-tion contained in Protocol Statement No. 38.

Of the three bands noted as problem areasin the fixed-satellite and radar sharing area,only the 3.5-GHz band was a serious prob-lem. The 17.5-GHz band will require furtherstudy but raises no immediate hardships,and the anticipated problems at 5.5 GHz

never materialized. The U.S. proposal con-tained provisions to meet the well recognizedneed for additional bandwidth for FSS in thefrequency bands below 10 GHz. At the sametime, the United States was committed to re-taining spectrum support for major militaryradar systems in the 3.4- to 3.6-GHz band.Predictions of pressures to turn this bandover to FSS were indeed fulfilled at WARC.The intensive, and sometimes acrimonious,negotiations included at one time the sub-mission of a proposed footnote by the UnitedStates that would exclude FSS in the UnitedStates from operating in the 3.4- to 3.7-GHzband. The final result was a compromise; acompromise achieved by the removal of anymandatory requirement to stop radar opera-tions in the band. In addition to the alloca-tion status defined in the table of allocationsand the footnotes, a declaration was signedby several members of INTELSAT (theUnited States included) that says, in part,“they shall make reasonable effort to accom-modate FSS.” Thus the status of radioloca-tion was retained, but with the foreknowl-edge that the pressure from the fixed-satellite community, both internal and ex-ternal to the United States, would continue.

In the 17.3- to 17.7-GHz band, the second-ary status for radiolocation was part of theU.S. fallback position because of the verylimited current use of the band by radar sys-tems. By footnote, WARC-79 decreed thatthe band could be used for broadcast satel-lite uplinks, and this action was acceptableto the United States. With such usage, fur-ther study may show that radiolocation op-erations are possible with an acceptably lowprobability of interference.

The United States was well aware of thespectrum crowding occurring in the radio-navigation bands and had made several pro-posals to alleviate it. Proposals from othercountries sought to temper the problem bycombining radionavigation and radioloca-tion into a common service—radio-determi-nation—or by adding radionavigation as acoequal sharing partner with the radioloca-tion service. In addition to adopting some of


the U.S. proposals for beacons, transpondersand the like, WARC opted for making ra-dionavigation an equal partner. However,WARC came painfully close to defining aero-nautical and maritime radionavigation assafety services, an action that would have in-cluded these services in the regulation re-garding harmful interference to safety serv-ices. This action may be interpreted to givepreferential status to the radionavigationservice and bodes ill for the equality of thepartnership. The U.S. recognition of thisstate of affairs is contained in the reserva-tions taken in the affected bands in ProtocolNo. 38.

The radiolocation portion of the U.S. pro-posals to the WARC sought the followingfour major items:

1. retain radiolocation allocations in all ex-isting bands except 216 to 225 MHz;

2. provide adequate provision for radiolo-cation above 40 GHz;

3. include allocations for space radar; and4. provide worldwide primary allocations

for high-accuracy, position-fixing radio-location systems between 1615 and 3400kHz.

In a strictly literal sense, all four objectiveswere met. From a practical point of view,however, only items 2, 3, and 4 can beclaimed as truly successful. Concerning thefirst point, the existing radiolocation alloca-tions were indeed retained, but the additionof other services on a primary basis will havea significant effect on the design, develop-ment, performance and operations of radiolo-cation systems operating between 400 MHzand 40 GHz.

Item I.–Table 7 compares the status ofthe radiolocation allocations between the ex-isting radio regulations and those created bythe Final Acts of WARC-79, indicating inthe final column the changes that were madein the table of allocations. It is seen that thestatus of radiolocation was reduced in sixbands. In all of these bands, pre-WARC ne-gotiations had indicated that pressure for re-ductions was likely to be heavy. Consequent-

ly, fallback positions were prepared and,with one exception, adhered to duringWARC. The one exception was in the 890-to942-MHz band where radiolocation was re-duced to a secondary service in region 2.This reduction was mitigated by the addi-tion of footnote 3669A, which provides pri-mary status to this service in the UnitedStates. The footnote was weakened byCanada’s insistence on making the footnotesubject to the procedures of article N13A.This amendment was unacceptable to theUnited States and formed the basis for a por-tion of the bands covered by the reservationnoted in paragraph 4 of Protocol StatementNo. 38 (which deals with the larger band 890to 960 MHz). Thus, the objective of retainingradiolocation allocations has been met and,as such, continues to make available the fre-quencies required for the development andoperation of radiolocation systems in theUnited States.

Not apparent from table 7, however, is ahost of key decisions with respect to fourother services that will greatly affect theradiolocation service. These four services arethe fixed and mobile services (which will bediscussed as a pair), the radionavigationservices (including the aeronautical andmaritime radionavigation service), and FSS.

The decisions made for the fixed and mo-bile service involved inserting these servicesby footnote in virtually every radiolocationband (as well as in bands for other services)between 420 MHz and 36 GHz. The foot-notes are the so-called “country footnotes”in which each country claims band usage fora service that is in addition to or alternativeto the service stated in the table of alloca-tions itself. On the average, about 25 percentof the member nations of ITU are involved inthese footnotes; however, over 40 percent ofthe member countries are involved in theband 430 to 440 MHz. A precedent for thesecountry footnotes did exist in the previousradio regulations but the number of coun-tries involved was small, generally less than10 in a given band. These few exceptionswere quite manageable in terms of worldwide

Ch. 4— WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts • 89

Table 7.—Pre- and Post-WARC Radiolocation Allocations

Bandwidth - MHz

Frequency Primary Secondary

band Region Old New Old New Change

216-225 1 — — — NOCMHz 2 ‘9 – – 9 1 9

3 — — 9 7 - 2

t 420-450 1 10 10 20 20 NOCMHz 2 30 10 – 20 1 20

3 30 10 – 20t 890-942 1 — — 52 52 NOC

MHz 2 52 – – 52 l 523 — — 52 52 NOC

1215-1400 1 135 135 50 50 NOCMHz 2 135 135 50 50 NOC

3 135 135 50 50 NOC

2300-2500 1 — — 200 200 NOCMHz 2 200 200 – – NOC

3 200 200 – – NOC

2700-3400 1 300 300 400 400 NOCMHz 2 300 300 400 400 NOC

3 300 300 400 400 NOC

3400-3700 1 — — 200 200 NOCMHz 2 300 (200) + – 300 i 300

3 300 (200) + – 300 I 300

t 5250-5925 1 300 300 300 300 NOCMHz 2 375 300 300 375 1 75

3 300 300 375 375 NOC

t 8.5-10.0 1 1100 1100 400 400 NOCGHz 2 1100 1100 400 400 NOC

3 1100 1100 400 400 NOC

t 10.0-10.68 1 500 500 180 180 NOCGHz 2 550 550 130 130 NOC

3 550 550 130 130 NOC

t 13.4-14 1 600 600 – – NOCGHz 2 600 600 – – NOC

3 600 600 – – NOC

t 15.7 -17.7 1 2000 1600 — 400 ! 400GHz 2 2000 1600 – 400 i 400

3 2000 1600 — 400 1 400

24.05-24.25 1 200 200 – – NOCGHz 2 200 200 – – NOC

3 200 200 – – NOC

t 33.4-36 1 2600 2600 – – NOCGHz 2 2600 2600 – – NOC

3 2600 2600 – – NOC

t U S reservation— Lost bandwidth

i Status reduced+ See text

NOC No change

SOURCE Telecommunications Systems Inc.


operations. Now, however, the exceptionscan become extremely difficult with the ex-pected proliferation of the fixed and mobileservices. The difficulty will be particularlysevere for airborne radar operations becausethe large LOS distances these signals travelwhen aircraft are at high altitudes can causeinterference over large areas extending intoother countries.

Because of this incompatibility betweenthe fixed and mobile services on the onehand and radiolocation service on the other,the United States entered reservations tothe Final Acts in Protocol Statement No. 38for the frequency bands 430 to 440 MHz,5650 to 5850 MHz, 8500 to 8750 MHz,10,000 to 10,500 MHz (where the fixed andmobile services were added as a primaryservice in the table of allocations rather thanby footnote), 13.4 to 14 GHz, 15.7 to 17.3GHz, and 33.4 to 36 GHz. Fixed and mobilefootnotes were also included in the bands1215 to 1300 MHz and 3300 to 3400 MHz,but some mitigating circumstances pre-cluded the need for U.S. reservations.

In the band 1215 to 1300 MHz, one-thirdof the countries present in the fixed and mo-bile footnote are also represented in a radio-navigation footnote for the same frequencyband. It was felt that the fixed and mobileusage would not be so severe as to warrant aU.S. reservation. In the 3300- to 3400-MHzband a clause was inserted in the footnotethat negates the primary status of the fixedand mobile services in the regions around theMediterranean Sea. It was felt that this wassufficient to obviate a need for a reservationin this band.

A second key decision was made in connec-tion with the radionavigation services. Thedecision here was to add maritime radionavi-gation as a primary service in the radioloca-tion bands 8850 to 9000 MHz and 9200 to9300 MHz, and to add radionavigation as aprimary service in the band 9500 to 9800MHz.

The third key decision concerned FSS inthe band 3400 to 3700 MHz. The existing

radio regulations showed that the radioloca-tion and FSS would share this band equallyat least in regions 2 and 3. In the U.S. na-tional table of allocations, the band wasalloted to (and in use by) the radiolocationservice. Studies conducted in preparation forWARC showed that the specific systems be-ing used by these services could not sharethe band. On the basis of the radar systemusage, the U.S. position was to retain radio-location as a primary service with the provi-sion that a part of the band could be madeavailable to support fixed-satellite communi-cations.

This position was steadfastly maintainedthrough a protracted period of intense nego-tiations at WARC. The final result did, in-deed, reduce radiolocation to a secondaryservice in the table of allocations, but, byfootnote, primary status was restored in re-gions 2 and 3 over the band 3400 to 3600MHz. The footnote contains a directive foradministrations to take all practical steps toprotect FSS after 1985 along with a nonbind-ing plea for radiolocation systems to ceaseoperations by the same year. As part of thecompromise, a formal declaration was signedby the United States, Canada, the UnitedKingdom, the Netherlands, Australia, andBelgium vowing to make reasonable effort toaccommodate FSS in the band. The nationaltable of allocations, currently under develop-ment jointly by FCC and IRAC, will makelimited allowance for FSS in the band 3600to 3700 MHz with the remainder of the bandbeing retained in the radiolocation service.

In the FCC’s third notice of inquiry con-cerning implementation of the Final Acts ofWARC-79 (Docket 80-739), the FSS alloca-tions in the bands 3.7 to 3.7 GHz and 4.5 to4.8 GHz are proposed to be limited to inter-national satellite systems and excludes do-mestic satellite systems. According to thethird notice of inquiry, the expectation isthat no more than one Earth station on eachU.S. coast can be successfully coordinatedwith stations operating in the radiolocationservice.

Ch. 4—WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts . 91

Item 2.–WARC-79 presented the first op-portunity to allocate the frequency bandsabove 40 GHz to terrestrial services. TheU.S. radiolocation position in this frequencyrange was to obtain four primary bands andthree secondary bands primarily in the re-gions of reduced atmospheric absorption,the so-called “propagation windows. ”WARC allocated six primary bands and foursecondary bands. A comparison of the U.S.proposals with the WARC action is shown intable 8. It is clear that there is adequate fre-quency support for radiolocation system de-velopment in these bands.

Item 3.—Prior to WARC-79 there was noprovision for spaceborne radars in the radioregulations. The matter has been rectified bythe WARC-79 action of permitting space-borne radars in every radiolocation band be-tween 1 and 36 GHz as well as the band 78 to79 GHz. The U.S. proposal was to accommo-date space radars on a secondary basis in thebands below 14 GHz and on a primary basisabove 14 GHz regardless of the service thatwas employing the radar systems. The ac-tual wording in the WARC-79 footnotes pro-vides secondary status to space radioloca-tion systems in all the radiolocation bandsfrom 1 to 14 GHz and in the band 35.5 to35.6 GHz it has primary status. Radars usedin the Earth-exploration satellite servicehave primary status in the bands 35.5 to35.6 GHz and 78 to 79 GHz, with secondarystatus in all the radiolocation bands from 1to 24.25 GHz. Thus, the status of spaceborne

Table 8.—Comparison of WARC RadiolocationAllocations and U.S. Proposed Allocations

Above 40 GHz

Bands in U.S. proposal Bands allocated(G Hz) (GHz)

—76-81 Primary92-95 Primary95-101 Secondary

—142-150 Secondary165-170 Primary

221-229 Secondary

240-250 Primary

59-64 Primary76-81 Primary92-95 Primary95-101 Secondary

126-134 Primary134-142 Secondary144-149 primary

241-248 primary

SOURCE. Telecommunications Systems Inc.

radiolocation systems is considerably en-hanced from that which existed prior toWARC-79.

Item 4.–It was the U.S. objective to ob-tain more substantial frequency support forthe accurate position-fixing systems in theMF band. While WARC did not provide acommon, worldwide band for these nonradarradiolocation systems, it did provide pri-mary status over 30 kHz in region 1, 245kHz in region 2, and 193.5 kHz in region 3coupled with secondary status over 80 kHzin region 2 and 200 kHz in region 3.

ReservationsThe U.S. reservations on radiolocation

matters, noted above, were contained in theinitial set of reservations filed by various ad-ministrations in the Final Protocol of Decem-ber 3, 1979. About 20 of the 51 reservationssubmitted contained a statement by the sub-mitting government that it would take thesteps necessary to protect its interests in theevent of noncompliance with or reservationsto the Final Acts by other administrations.The following day, 32 additional reserva-tions were entered, 24 of which containedsimilar statements. Three of those twenty-four made specific mention of the U.S. Reser-vation No. 38.

The reservation by the United States con-tained in paragraph 4 of Protocol StatementNo. 38, relating to the 890-to 960-MHz bandwill, in all probability, cause a problem alongthe U.S. borders primarily relating to non-government operations. The issue will be-come one of the many topics for discussionand negotiation in the future U.S. bilateralmeetings on telecommunication matterswith Canada, Mexico, and other nearbycountries. The reservation merely placesthese countries on notice that the UnitedStates will coordinate its usage of the bandbut will not seek agreement prior to makingassignments. Although radar users mustprotect nongovernment operations in thisband, one reason agreements will not besought is that U.S. radiolocation usage in-


volves the newest long-range surveillanceradar in operation by the Navy, as well asanother Navy surveillance radar now in theadvanced development stage.

The reservations involving the bandswhere radionavigation was added as a pri-mary service along with radiolocation (8500to 9000, 9200 to 9300, and 9500 to 9800MHz) can, if not forestalled, result in long-term, worldwide problems. Radar usage bythe radiolocation service is extremely heavyin the radiolocation bands between 8500 and10,000 MHz. The addition of the radionavi-gation service and the multicountry fixedand mobile footnotes in this band have taken900 MHz of virtually exclusive radiolocationin the current radio regulations and addedone or more primary services over the entireband. Technical and administrative solu-tions must be sought if radiolocation is to re-tain its effectiveness. Some effective tech-nical solutions were proposed to the 1978CCIR special preparatory meeting by theUnited States and the United Kingdom.Study of the technical solutions to radioloca-tion-radionavigation sharing needs to be pur-sued in CCIR. A more immediate solution,albeit partial, could be found administra-tively.

The U.S. International Radio AdvisoryCommittee (IRAC) has shown no inclinationto add radionavigation to the national tableof allocations. IRAC might examine the mat-ter more thoroughly and develop a set ofrecommendations for use by the State De-partment in discussions with other coun-tries. The recommendations should proposean orderly introduction of radionavigationon an “as-needed” basis rather than throw-ing the bands open to any and all navigationuse. The intent would be to buy time for theintroduction of technical solutions. In theabsence of such a planned introduction, theradiolocation service may soon find itselfhaving a de facto secondary status becauseof the safety-of-life aspects of the radionav-igation service.

The insertion of multiple country fixedand mobile footnotes into the table of alloca-tions threatened chaos for many services.Through strenuous efforts by the UnitedStates, Brazil, and other countries, the situa-tion was eased for some “passive” services(Earth-exploration satellite, space research,and radio astronomy) and the meteorologicalaids service. Radiolocation did not fare aswell. Although many countries deploredthese footnotes as being counter to the de-velopment of a rational table of allocations,the United States was the only country toact on them. The action noted in paragraph 3of Protocol No. 38 indicated that the UnitedStates, in the operation of radiolocation sta-tions, will not guarantee protection to, norcoordination with, other services. The actionwas necessary because the existence of thefixed and mobile footnotes in every radiolo-cation band between 1 and 40 GHz jeopard-ized all radars operating to serve nationaldefense. Straightforward as it is with regardto the interference radars might cause toother services, the U.S. reservation containsthe implicit statement that the radars canoperate in the presence of interference fromfixed and mobile emitters. All radars aredesigned to be operated in the presence of in-terference, either purposeful or accidental.The degree to which these interference rejec-tion techniques will have to be improved andused depends on how extensively other coun-tries introduce fixed and mobile services inthese bands.

This implementation is not expected to oc-cur equally in all the bands to which the foot-notes have been added primarily due to eco-nomic considerations. However, early imple-mentation is expected in the bands around 1GHz and below where economical hardwarealready exists for fixed and mobile applica-tions.

The U.S. reservations in Protocol No. 38contain the only specific reference to the ra-diolocation service. Of the remaining proto-col statements, a few are political, many deal

Ch. 4—WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts • 93

with specific bands and services, and the ma-jority contain protective clauses indicatingthat the country or countries submitting theprotocol will take necessary action in theevent that other signatories abrogate theFinal Acts. Only three protocol statementsmention No. 38 and even in those cases theconcern seems to be more with the 6- and7-MHz bands than with radiolocation. Thai-land, in Protocol No. 60, notes that it willallocate the band 435 to 438 MHz to themobile, except aeronautical-mobile, serviceon a primary basis. Thus, while there is nospecific threat to the radiolocation service,the mechanism is in place for electronic andpolitical harassment should any countrydecide on this course of action.

Radar Spectrum Availabilityand Costs

The availability of spectrum for the radio-location service had been significantly in-creased below 200 MHz and above 40 GHzand has remained virtually intact betweenthese two frequencies. The principal benefitis that the new table of allocations (includingthe footnotes to the table) in the radio regula-tions continue to provide basic allocationsfor radiolocation service in all the currentlyused bands as well as some new bands.

Of equal importance is the retention in theUnited States of a primary status (by foot-note) for radiolocation in the bands 420 to430, 440 to 450, and 890 to 942 MHz. It is inthese bands, which were reduced to second-ary status in the table of allocations, that theUnited States has, and is developing, sophis-ticated surveillance radars. While theseradars have operational modes suitable forworldwide use in a secondary status, thefootnotes will provide the opportunity for ex-ercising all modes of operation at U.S. train-ing sites. The results of WARC have, there-fore, done little to reduce the spectrum avail-able for radar operations.

Adequacy of spectrum availability not-withstanding, the costs of radar develop-ment and operation must increase as a result

of WARC-79. The increased costs will be as-sociated with additional needs for opera-tional frequency flexibility, development,and procurement of hardware for interfer-ence-free operation while retaining existingperformance, and increased participation ininternational forums such as CCIR.

Frequency management is a continuingtask, occupying staff people at the headquar-ters and unit level. Internationally, frequen-cy managers ensure equitable allocations forvarious services as dictated by nationalneeds; at the national level, they allot theallocated frequencies as appropriate to na-tional usage; at the unit level, they assignfrequencies in accordance with the local con-ditions. At all levels there is the need to dealwith the incidence of interference. It is clearthat all of these functions as applied to theradiolocation service will increase becauseof the additional services added by WARC tothe radiolocation bands.

New coordinating activities must now takeplace between the radiolocation service andthe fixed, mobile, Earth-exploration satellite,space research, radio astronomy, aeronau-tical radionaviagation, maritime radionavi-gation, radionavigation, and FSS. These ac-tivities are expected to be particularly heavyas the allowed usage in the fixed, mobile, andradionavigation bands are implemented. Sig-nificant numbers of interference incidentsare also expected in these bands entailingthe development of techniques to eliminateor reduce this interference.

As noted earlier, all military radars are de-signed to operate in the presence of inten-tional (jamming) and unintentional (inter-ference) signals. Numerous electronic coun-ter-countermeasure (ECCM) techniques areincorporated into systems to reduce the ef-fects of unwanted electromagnetic emis-sions. However, ECCM is not a panacea forinterference problems. In this regard, a fewcomments on radars, ECCM, and interfer-ence are in order.

First, radar performance is measured interms of a clear radiofrequency environment

—


with no interference present. Most ECCMtechniques involve some performance degra-dation. For this reason, a particular ECCMshould be used only when it is needed. Ofcourse, when interference is present, ECCMwill improve system performance but willgenerally not bring it back to its clear envi-ronment performance. Second, ECCM tech-niques are largely signal-specific. Thus, aradar will have several techniques to be ableto continue to operate in a changing radiofre-quency environment. Not all techniques arecompatible so that use of one may precludethe use of another. When multiple tech-niques are used, the performance degrada-tion due to each is cumulative. And third,radar emissions, which generate interferenceinto other services, are seldom considered aspart of an ECCM package.

These factors when coupled with the ex-pected proliferation of radiolocation bandusage by other services means that radiolo-cation systems will spend more time withECCM circuits operating and, through theirradiofrequency emissions, be interferingwith more systems in other services. In theshort term, the need for extensive modifica-tions to existing systems is not anticipated.However, planning should begin now for nec-essary modifications to radars operating inthe frequency bands where the UnitedStates took a reservation. In the long term,development work on new and existing sys-tems will have to be increased to ensure mis-sion-fulfilling performance in the presence ofincreased interference. This additional devel-opment work should concentrate both onkeeping unwanted signals out of the receiverand on reducing the level and direction of un-necessary (“spurious”) emissions comingfrom the radar. This represents more thanjust an incremental increase in the ECCMbudget of radar development, since perform-ance in the presence of the “friendly” inter-ference should equate to the current per-formance in a clear environment. The in-crease may range from 5 to 15 percent de-pending on the type of radar and the prolif-eration of the other services in the radarbands.

The third cost increase derives from a needfor radar developers to expand their partici-pation in CCIR. This expansion is extremelyimportant in light of the many new sharingsituations created by WARC. Prior toWARC, CCIR participation was consideredrelatively unimportant by radiolocationusers since there was little sharing or in-teraction with other services. During prep-arations for WARC, it became apparent thatthe many exclusive bands employed by theradiolocation service would be reallocated orshared. Because of this likelihood, represen-tatives of the radiolocation service par-ticipated in the IRAC preparing for theWARC-79 AD Hoc 144 and CCIR studygroup activities, served as members of theSPM delegation, and were part of the U.S.delegation to WARC.

This representation should continue atCCIR in order to establish a sound and con-sistent technical background for radar topicsin the reports of CCIR plenary meetings (theCCIR Green Books). The absence of thistechnical basis may have been part of thereason that radiolocation received littlesupport at WARC-79. The representationshould consist of not only headquarters pol-icy personnel but also scientists and engi-neers from Government laboratories andfrom Government contractors. PerhapsCCIR participation should become a “lineitem” in the budget of every radar systemdevelopment. And CCIR should not be theonly involvement. Future ITU conferencesdealing with specific services and specificregions will continue to have an effect onradiolocation matters. It would be prudentto have radar expertise at these meetings aswell.

Fixed-Satellite andMobile-Satellite Services

Table 9 provides a summary of WARC-79gains and changes in status on fixed andmobile satellite allocations above 27.5 MHzas reflected in the allocation tables. The datain the bandwidth and change columns illus-trates that all the changes in the FSS and


Table 9.—Summary of WARC Gains and Changes in Status on Fixed- and Mobile.Satellite Allocations Above 27.5 MHz

Type of Frequency band Bandwidth MHz C h a n g e Prior major use

satellite (MHz or GHz) Region(s) Pr imary Secondary MHz of the band

608-614 MHz1544-15455850-59256425-707510.7-10.95 GHZ

11.2-11.4512.1 -12.3

12,75-13.2514.5 -14,817,3 -17.719.7 -20.2

27-27.529.5-30

30-3137.5 -39.539.5 -40.542.5 -43,543.5-4747.2 -50.250.4 -51.4

66-7171-7474-75.581-8495-1oo

134-142149-150152-164190-200202-217235-236238-241252-265

2All2

AllAllAll2

AllAllAllAll

2 and 3AllAllAllAllAllAllAllAllAllAllAllAllAllAllAllAllAllAllAllA l lAll

175

650250250200500300400

500

100020002000100035003000

5000300015003000500080001000

120002000015000

10003000

13000

M OM OFXFXFXFXFXFXFXFXM OFXM OFXFX

FX and MOFXM OFXM OM O

FX and MOFX

FX and MOM OM OFXFXM OFXFXFXM O

SOURCE Systematics General Corp., “The World Administrative Radio Conference 1979, ” final report, volS I and II

6 + 6+1

+ 75+ 650+ 250+ 250+ 200+ 500+ 300+ 400

500 + 500+ 500

500 + 500+ 1000+ 2000+ 2000+ 1000+ 3500+ 3000

1000 + 1000+ 5000+ 3000+ 1500+ 3000+ 5000+ 8000+ 1000

+ 12000+ 20000+ 15000

+ 1000+ 3000

+ 13000

BCAero mobile satelliteR LFX MOFX MOFX MOFX MO and BCFX MOFX MOR LFX satelliteFX and MOFX satelliteFX satelliteFX and MOFX and MOBC satelliteVar ious MO sate l l i tesNot a l locatedFX satelliteVar ious MO sate l l i tesNot a l locatedNot a l locatedNot a l locatedVarious MO satellitesRadio ast ronomyVar ious MO sate l l i tesNot a l locatedVar ious sate l l i tesNot a l locatedRadio ast ronomyRadio ast ronomyVar ious sate l l i tes

MSS allocations were positive and generallyprovided primary service status. The impres-sion that everything went well for FSS andMSS (and for DOD satellite interests) doesnot reflect the full implications of WARC-79decisions. There may be problems in satisfy-ing the DSCS requirements in the 7- to8-GHz band. DOD’s WARC-79 initial goalfor satellite operations was to increase thetwo partially exclusive 50-MHz FSS bandsto 125 MHz for both fixed-satellite andmobile-satellite communications, and to addmobile-satellite as a secondary service in thetwo 500-MHz FSS bands 7250 to 7750 MHzand 7900 to 8400 MHz. Footnote 3764B wasadded to the table of allocations that author-ized the bands 7250 to 7375 MHz (space-to-Earth) and 7900 to 8025 MHz (Earth-to-space) for use by MSS (subject to agreementobtained under the procedure set forth in ar-ticle N13A)—a major gain. An additional

footnote 3762B does not permit aircraft sta-tions to operate in the 8025- to 8400-MHzband in region 2. So, although the goal of 125MHz for up and downlinks for fixed-satelliteand mobile-satellite communications wasachieved, this meant that the partial ex-clusivity that existed for FSS was lost in thetwo 50-MHz bands (7250 to 7300 MHz and7975 to 8025 MHz). The DOD plans for useof ground-mobile forces (transportable) andairborne satellite terminals in the UnitedStates, NATO countries, and in selectedareas of the Pacific must take account of theWARC-79 decisions. Frequency support forthese types of DSCS operations will requirelong lead times to coordinate with host ad-ministrations.

The coordination requirements for mobile-satellite use in the 235- to 399.9-MHz bandhave become more complex due to WARC-

96 “ Radio frequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

79. Previously, under footnote 3618/308A,the use and development of this service wasonly subject to the agreement among the ad-ministrations concerned and those havingservices operating in accordance with thetable, which may be affected. Now the modi-fied 308A (3618) requires two conditions tobe fulfilled:

. Agreement must be obtained under theprocedure set forth in article N13A.– Under this article agreement among

administrations now becomes morecomplex due to increased data to befurnished–and adding IFRB to thecoordination process.

● Stations in MSS do not cause harmfulinterference to those of other servicesoperating (or planned to be operating) inaccordance with the table.

The United States and most NATO coun-tries took a reservation in the final protocolagainst this second provision on the basisthat this imposes a condition of noninterfer-ence that could lead to a request to cease op-eration of a previously coordinated satellitesystem in the case where an administration,despite having agreed to such a satellitesystem, puts into service (or merely plans)a system that might receive harmful inter-ference.

Costs Pertinent to National Security

Costs have been discussed earlier in thisreport. Summarized here are the cost im-pacts of WARC-79 from the standpoint ofnational security. There is no major immedi-ate cost impact of WARC-79 regarding na-tional security systems. No heavily usedequipment must be moved to another bandor phased out and no expensive retrofits arerequired to existing DOD equipment be-cause of WARC-79 actions. Three reasonsexplain this lack of immediate cost impact:

● frequency flexibility of existing U.S.equipment;

● success of the U.S. delegation atWARC-79; and

● reservations taken by the UnitedStates.

It should be emphasized that there will befuture costs resulting from the actions atWARC-79. The nature of these costs arevaried. The military, in particular, is affectedby the number of footnotes (about 500) to thetable of frequency allocations that make itimpossible in some cases to know whichcountries will use which frequency bands forwhich services. Attempting to design mili-tary systems and plan operations on a world-wide basis with such uncertainty will in-crease system costs and decrease opera-tional flexibility. This means, among otherthings, that system planners will need todesign military systems that have the flex-ibility to operate in several different fre-quency bands. The extent of the changes andthe magnitude of the costs associated withWARC-79 decisions will not become clear forsome time. Discussions between the UnitedStates and other countries–particularly ourNATO allies—about implementation planswill help clarify the future operating envi-ronment.

WARC-79 resulted in a large number of fu-ture conferences and DOD should activelyparticipate in the preparation for nationaland international meetings pertinent tothese conferences—including the activitiesof CCIR—to ensure that DOD spectrumneeds are accommodated and that our na-tional security interests are protected. DODshould also provide technically knowledge-able, experienced (and, to the extent possi-ble, multilingual) members to the U.S. dele-gations. Of the three world conferences andseven regional conferences recommended inthe Final Acts of WARC-79, the most impor-tant from a national security standpoint are:

●

●

World Administrative Radio Conferenceon the Geostationary Orbit and thePlanning of Space Services (1985 and1987); andWorld Administrative Conference forMobile Services (1983).

—-


Mobile services were popular with the de-veloping nations, and, with little regard forthe technical aspects of sharing between dif-ferent radio services, many additions weremade to the table of frequency allocations insupport of these services. The conferenceadded many provisions impacting radar andweapon system frequency bands, both forterrestrial and satellite operations.

The overall DOD impact of these and otherchanges related to sharing will be a greaterneed for U.S. planners, managers, equipmentsuppliers, and operational forces to be awareof frequency band limitations, and a need toensure better system development review tounderstand how U.S. systems can live withthose of other countries. These changes addup to one thing for DOD—increased costs.These include: costs associated with addi-tional needs for operational frequency man-agement; costs associated with the develop-ment and procurement of the more sophisti-cated equipment (e.g., increased tunability)needed to permit interference-free operationswith other services in the same band; andcosts associated with proving the system iscompatible, such as electromagnetic com-patibility (EMC) studies. And there will beincreased costs of coordination with ourallies. Other costs may become apparentover time (e.g., as the HF reaccommodationtakes effect in the coming years).

Summary of the National SecurityImpact of WARC-79

The major DOD-related issues and objec-tives were enumerated earlier. Here is a sum-mary of the major impacts on those issuesand objectives. Before beginning a more de-tailed summary, however, it should be reit-erated that in general the national securityinterests of the U.S. were not endangered byWARC-79 actions. Nevertheless, continuedactive participation by DOD in the planningand conduct of future discussions and con-ferences will be required to ensure thatfollow-on actions to WARC-79 do not jeop-ardize national security. This will requireadequate budget support.

Radiolocation (Radar) .-The service re-tained almost all of its allocations above 200MHz; the only actual reduction of allocationto the radiolocation service occurred in the216- to 230-MHz band in region 3. This oc-curred when 9 MHz of a secondary allocation(216 to 225 MHz) was reduced to 7 MHz (223to 230 MHz). When considering the magni-tude of spectrum allocated for radiolocationuse, this reduction of 2 MHz is minor. Con-sistent with the U.S. proposals, radiolo-cation was reduced to a secondary serv-ice—except that in region 2 (the Americas) itwill be on a primary basis until 1990 afterwhich no new stations are to be authorized.However, significant loss in radiolocationstatus resulted from WARC-79 in certain ra-diolocation bands below 20 GHz. This loss ofstatus plus the movement of other users intothe bands combined to force the UnitedStates to take a reservation (No. 38) affect-ing certain radiolocation bands.

Although there was little actual loss ofallocations, the provisions for radar wereprobably changed more by WARC-79 thanfor any other single radio operation. For ex-ample, in the band 3400 to 3600 MHz, thereare provisions for radar to operate world-wide, but radar users must afford somemeasure of protection to satellite and radiorelay operators. The United States operatesthe Airborne Warning and Control System(AWACS), the Navy’s AEGIS, and severalother systems of importance to DOD (e.g.,missiles, air traffic control, air surveillance,etc. ) in the band 2900 to 3700 MHz, and theiroperations may be affected through the needfor added planning coordination. If there isextensive implementation of satellite com-munications in this band below 3600 MHz,then the problems mentioned above wouldbe compounded–especially in Europe. Theradiolocation service lost some exclusivity inthe band 8500 to 10,000 MHz where DODoperates navigation, air search, fire controlradars, and various airborne systems. Whenfootnotes are considered, radiolocation effec-tively lost exclusivity over the whole band(8500 to 10,000 MHz). This could eventually


place constraints on radar operations and in-crease demands on system designers. Short-term relief is provided by Protocol State-ment No. 38, and intermediate term reliefcan be negotiated with U.S. allies throughbilateral and multilateral agreements out-side of the radio regulations. Nevertheless,radar as it currently operates will become in-creasingly unwelcome in many parts of theworld, and new design and operationalstrategies will be needed before the end ofthe century.

Radionavigation.–The U.S. objective ofproviding two bands (1215 to 1240 MHzand 1559 to 1610 MHz) for space-to-Earthnavigation signals to accommodate theNAVSTAR/GPS was achieved. NAVSTAR/GPS is the cornerstone of future DOD highaccuracy global navigation. It can also pro-vide for improved civil navigation.

Satellite Communications.—The U.S. ob-jective to maintain the status quo for MSSin the 235- to 399.9-MHz band used by theNaval Fleet Satellite Communication Sys-tem (FLTSATCOM) was partially achieved;however, coordination provisions (articleN13A) were added that included a conditionthat stations in MSS not cause harmful in-terference to those of other services operat-ing, or planned to be operated, in accordancewith the table of allocations. To forestall thepotential negative impact, the United Statesand most of its NATO allies, took a reserva-tion in the Final Protocol.

A major U.S. objective was achievedthrough the recognition of MSS. The bands7250 to 7750 MHz and 7900 to 8400 MHzhad been allocated to FSS (DSCS I, II, III,NATO SATCOM). Now, the MSS can oper-ate on a primary basis in the bands 7250 to7375 MHz and 7900 to 8025 MHz; however,there was a corollary loss of the partial ex-clusivity for FSS in two 50-MHz bands (7250to 7300 MHz and 7975 to 8025 MHz). Therewas a net gain for national security objec-tives through these changes, althoughdeployment of satellite systems withoutcausing interference to radio relay systems

in some areas will become increasingly dif-ficult.

All U.S. objectives were met in the 20-,30-,and 40-GHz bands that may be used by fu-ture generation military satellite systems(e.g., DSCSs), including provisions forcommodating MSS.

The United States sought to avoidpossible future loss of system design flexity and orbit locations associated wit

ac-

thebil- a

rigid a priori allocation plan for satellites inthe geostationary orbit. While no plan wasadopted at WARC-79, plans were made for afuture conference on space systems to beheld no later than 1985–with a follow-onconference about 18 months later. Thesespace conferences will probably result insome form of orbit spectrum planning thatcould inhibit technological development. Theimpact on all future DOD space systems ispotentially very large. Proper preparationfor these conferences is essential, includingadequate budget allocations.

High Frequency.–The U.S. objectives ofproviding for the increasing requirements ofinternational broadcasting (e.g., Radio FreeEurope, Voice of America, etc.) and maritimeoperations (while limiting the loss of HFspectrum for DOD operations) were met, al-though the United States took reservationsbelow 10 MHz for both of these services. Thenet reduction of only 14 percent in HF spec-trum available to DOD should not adverselyaffect U.S. strategic networks, which rely in-creasingly on satellites, and the availablespectrum should accommodate our tacticaland other HF national security require-ments.

Fixed and Mobile (Terrestrial) .-The U.S.objective of maintaining the status quo inthe important NATO band of 4400 to 4990-MHz was not met. The band is heavily usedby the military for tactical communications(primarily radio relay and troposcatter sys-tems). Although the present and past alloca-tions provided for FSS in this band, there isno known satellite system operating as such.


In order to provide some protection, thefixed-satellite was changed from uplink todownlink and shifted from 4400 to 4700MHz to 4500 to 4800 MHz, which is sharedwith fixed and mobile. (The aeronautical-mobile service is excluded from 4825 to 4836MHz and 4950 to 4990 MHz by footnote.)The band 14.5 to 15.35 MHz was also desig-nated by NATO as a primary military bandfor fixed and mobile services. WARC-79 in-cluded the FSS (Earth-to-space) in the band14.5 to 14.8 MHz shared equally with fixedand mobile. By footnote, FSS would be lim-ited to the broadcast feeder links and wouldbe reserved for countries outside Europe.The effect is that, if satellite service is in-stituted, the military systems would have tobe located and operated in a manner thatwould not cause interference. Analyses ofpotential interference might lead to the re-quirement for sharing sensitive militarytechnical data with civil administrations.The impact of these changes cannot be fullydetermined until after discussions with ourNATO allies.

Intelligence, –The impact of WARC-79 onU.S. intelligence systems is not discussed inthis report.

Reso lu t i ons , Recommendat i ons ,Reservations, and Declaration

Many of the important consequences ofWARC-79 derived from resolutions and rec-ommendations approved by the conferenceand from reservations and declarations byindividual countries indicating a refusal tobe bound by a particular decision of the con-ference or agreeing to undertake certain ac-tions in order to conform to a decision.

A total of 87 resolutions and 90 recommen-dations were adopted by WARC-79. Many ofthe resolutions referred certain topics forstudy by CCIR or proposed the convening ofworld or regional administrative radio con-ferences. In addition, the developing coun-tries introduced several resolutions seekingincreased assistance in the following areas:

technical cooperation in maritime tele-communications, especially by provid-ing technical advice and by assisting intraining personnel;technical cooperation in national radiopropagation studies in tropical areasdesigned to improve and develop thedeveloping countries’ radiocommunica-tions;development of national radio frequencymanagement within the developingcountries through such means as re-gional seminars and training;transfer of technology in telecommuni-cations for the purpose of developingservices and attaining social, economic,and cultural objectives of the develop-ing countries; anduse or role of telecommunications inrural development.

Those resolutions look to UNDP as theprimary source of funding. However, theUnited States will be expected to participatedirectly or indirectly in the areas described.Some decisions must be made how theUnited States should respond to requests forassistance.

Many of the resolutions and recommenda-tions relating to the CCIR study topics haveto do with such highly controversial subjectsas the use of the geostationary satellite orbitand the planning of space services utilizingit; the convening of a WARC for the plan-ning of the HF bands allocated to the broad-casting service; and, the convening of a re-gional administrative radio conference forthis detailed planning of the broadcasting-satellite service in the 12-GHz band and as-sociated feeder links in region 2.

About 2 dozen specialized world or region-al administrative radio conferences were pro-posed at WARC-79, many of which can af-fect U.S. interests. The conference recom-mended that three world conferences andseven regional conferences be held. (The rec-ommended conferences and their projecteddates are listed at the end of chapter 6.)


A reservation, as noted earlier, is a formalstatement, as part of a protocol, wherein anITU member indicates that it will not abideby a particular decision of a conference.These reservations are called protocol state-ments in the Final Acts of WARC-79 andthis time the United States took a total ofsix. (Reservations generally provide a meansby which countries can accept the majorityof decisions reached by a WARC withoutbeing bound by a particular decision.)

Two of the six were rebuttal statements inwhich: 1) the United States rejected a Cubancomplaint that U.S. use of radiofrequenciesat our Guantanamo Naval Base was an im-pediment to Cuba’s communication servicesand Cuban sovereignty; and 2) the UnitedStates joined with 22 other countries innoting that the claims of equatorial coun-tries to sovereignty over segments of thegeostationary orbit were not germane to thework of the conference. Such rebuttal state-ments are common in conferences such asWARC-79 to indicate that political rhetoricshould not be confused with internationalagreements.

A third U.S. reservation called attention tothe fact that our international broadcastingin the HF bands was being intentionallyjammed by other ITU members and re-served the right to take “necessary and ap-propriate action” to protect U.S. broadcast-ing interest. The statement was included pri-marily to put the jamming problem on therecord inasmuch as the subject was not men-tioned during the course of the conference,although Israel made a reference to jammingin its statement for the final protocol.

None of these three reservations will im-pact on telecommunications operations di-rectly; however, all three are likely to resur-face at future conferences.

The remaining three U.S. reservationsdealt directly with spectrum matters. In Pro-tocol No. 32, the United States participatedin a joint NATO statement rejecting theterms of a footnote affecting the operation ofMSS in the bands 235 to 322 MHz and 335.4

to 399.9 MHz. The NATO countries agreedthat they could meet the prescribed coor-dination procedures called for in the foot-note. However, they rejected an additionalprovision of this footnote imposing a condi-tion of noninterference. The concern wasthat this condition could lead to a request tocease operation of a previously coordinatedsatellite system when another country mere-ly planned a system that might receiveharmful interference from a MSS operatingin the band. A separate reservation ofCanada supported the U.S. view that futureor planned terrestrial systems should notjeopardize existing MSS.

In Protocol No. 36, the United Statesjoined the seven other countries in pro-testing the inadequate provision for HFbroadcasting–particularly at 6 and 7 MHz.Fourteen other countries individually tookreservations on this same matter. They allexpressed concern that the forthcoming HFbroadcasting conferences (1984 and 1986)will be hampered by the lack of adequate al-locations, and reserved the right to take thenecessary steps to meet the needs of theirHF broadcasting services.

The United States took a major reserva-tion in Protocol No. 38 that was submitted infive parts. The first two parts referred toProtocol Nos. 36 and 32. The third partstated that the United States could notguarantee protection to or coordination withother services that experienced interferencefrom radars operated on a primary basis in avariety of specified bands. The fourth partstated that the United States reserves theright to operate fixed, mobile, and radioloca-tion services in the bands 470 to 806 MHzand 890 to 960 MHz without the required co-ordination procedures specified in footnotespertaining to these bands. The United Statesagreed to coordinate its usage of such serv-ices with neighboring countries that are af-fected, but not with all the other countriesthat might, for no apparent good reason, re-quest coordination under article 14.

Part five of the reservation addresses thefailure of the conference to provide adequate


allocations for the maritime-mobile servicebelow 12 MHz. In this reservation, theUnited States indicated that allocations tothe mobile service below 10 MHz would beused to satisfy maritime mobile require-ments.

The U.S. reservations contained in Proto-col Statement 38 represent a conscious deci-sion to take whatever steps are necessary toprotect vital U.S. national interests. Theycannot be regarded simply as a failure by theU.S. delegation to get what it wanted atWARC-79. This is no more valid than listingthe hundreds of U.S. proposals that won ap-proval and thereby claiming overall success.

Foreign Reservations

The remaining 77 reservations, some ofwhich bear the names of several countries,can be grouped in three categories:

● general reservations;. political reservations; and● specific reservations.

Some 35 reservations can be categorizedas “general” in that they were merely state-ments of a country’s intent to do whatever isnecessary to protect its radio-communica-tion services should other ITU members failto observe the radio regulations or takeother detrimental measures.

Another 17 reservations are “political” inthat they relate to territorial disputes(United States and Cuba over Guantanamo;Great Britain and Argentina over the Falk-land Islands; Chile and Great Britain overthe Antarctic). two others relate to sov-ereignty claims to the geostationary orbit.

Finally, 28 reservations address specificissues. Of these, 19 are concerned with theallocation of HF among the broadcasting,fixed, and mobile services. The majority ofthese were entered by developing countriesand state that they may not be able to sat-isfy their fixed and mobile service require-ments with the reduced allocations and theyreserve the right to continue using thesefrequencies for those services. The large

number of reservations on this single subjectshows that the issue of HF allocations is farfrom settled. Continuing difficulties are like-ly, including actual interference with ex-isting services, the inability of some coun-tries to satisfy their requirements, and atroublesome time at future scheduled broad-casting conferences.

This leaves nine specific foreign reserva-tions on all other subjects. Of these nine,four deal with the UHF band. All are relatedto localized problems, none of which greatlyaffect the United States. The remaining fiveare as follows:

●

●

●

●

Belgium warned that it will use the band100 to 104 MHz for a new network ofbroadcasting stations. Since the band isnow, and has been, allocated for thisservice, the reservation addresses thequestion of allotments or assignmentsin a region 1 broadcasting plan, a sub-ject outside the agenda of WARC-79.Japan said in another statement that itwill continue to use the band 130 to526.5 kHz for aeronautical radio-bea-cons. If region 1 broadcast stations con-tinue to cause interference in the band190 to 285 kHz, Japan will reallocate toprotect itself.Nigeria claimed that the allocation of 14to 14.8 GHz for feeder links to broad-casting satellites is not acceptable. Thisreservation is apparently intended to in-dicate that 14.0 to 14.5 GHz will be usedfor INTELSAT satellite services in Ni-geria leaving only 300 MHz for feederlinks to broadcasting satellites. How-ever, sharing arrangements betweenthose services should help assure ade-quate spectrum for feeder links.In a joint reservation, France and Swit-zerland objected to high-power broad-cast stations below 5000 kHz and above41 MHz. Brazil expressed opposition toa WARC resolution establishing the pe-riod of validity of frequency assign-ments to satellites prior to the 1985 and1987 space planning conferences, argu-ing that the resolution would prevent

—

102 Ž Radio frequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

the planning conferences from decidingon other distributions of frequency andorbit allotments. However, the resolu-tion specifically stated that its applica-tion should not prejudge decisions of theplanning conferences.

. Finally, a Thailand reservation ex-tended its allocation to the mobile serv-ice (except aeronautical-mobile) to theentire band 430 to 440 MHz. The effectis minimal because of the many otherservices and countries already includedby footnotes.

Declaration

The United States signed a formal declara-tion of intent together with other countriesat the WARC-79 conference as part of the ef-fort to resolve the controversy surroundinguse of the band 3.4 to 3.7 GHz.

In ITU regions 2 and 3 (the Americas,Oceania, and Asia) this band is allocated onan equal basis to both the fixed satellite andradiolocation services. Based on studiesshowing that it is not feasible for these twoservices to share the same band, the UnitedStates has not implemented FSS, but hascarried on important military radar opera-tions in this band. Commercial satellite sys-tems—both the global INTELSAT systemand U.S. domestic systems—operate in theadjacent band 3.7 to 4.2 GHz. The U.S. pro-posal to the WARC-79 was to maintain thestatus quo and retain radiolocation as aprimary service in the 3.4 to 3.7 GHz band.While the United States was prepared tomake some provision for FSS to use a part ofthe band, other countries, particularly fromthe developing world, insisted that the entireband be made available to expand satelliteservice.

From the viewpoint of the satellite oper-ator, this proposal represents a logical andcost effective expansion into a band contigu-ous with existing operations. The problemfor the United States, of course, is that it haslarge investments in radar equipment that is

vital to national security and these radarswould interfere with satellite operations inthe same band.

Negotiations were intense and a com-promise was found late in the conference.The final result did, indeed, reduce radioloca-tion to a secondary service in the Interna-tional Table of Allocations. However, by afootnote to the table of allocations, primarystatus was restored to the radiolocationservice in regions 2 and 3 for the bands 3.4 to3.6 GHz. The footnote includes a directivefor ITU members to take all practical stepsto protect FSS after 1985 with a nonbindingappeal for radiolocation systems to cease op-erations by 1985. The compromise was madepossible by the removal of any mandatory re-quirement to cease radar operations in theband. As part of the compromise, a declara-tion was signed by the United States, Can-ada, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands,Australia, and Belgium vowing to make rea-sonable effort to accommodate FSS in theband.

The United States will determine how toimplement the intent of the declarationthrough its domestic processes. There are noFSS Earth stations currently operating inthe 3.4- to 3.7-GHz band. However, theUnited States agreed not to withhold sup-port if INTELSAT decided to undertakeFSS operations in that band. If such a deci-sion was made, the United States would beunder strong pressure to restrain radar oper-ations that might interfere with interna-tional satellite operations.

In the FCC’s third notice of inquiry con-cerning implementation of the Final Acts ofWARC-79 (General Docket 80-739) FCC pro-posed that only limited use be made of theFSS allocations in the 3.6- to 3.7-GHz and4.5- to 4.8-GHz bands. The FCC’s notice pro-poses a limitation on the use of these bandsto international satellite systems (specific-ally the INTELSAT global system) and ex-cludes domestic satellite systems. FCC ex-pects, according to its third notice of in-

Ch. 4—WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts c 103

quiry, that no more than oneon each coast of the United

Earth station successfully coordinated with stations oper-States can be ating in the radiolocation service.

The Impacts of WARC-77The 1977 World Administrative Radio

Conference for broadcasting satellites wasconvened to plan the use of the 11.7- to12.2-GHz band that had been allocated in1971 on a primary basis to the broadcastingsatellite service, the fixed service, broad-casting service, and (in region 2 only) FSS.The decisions reached at WARC-77 aresuperseded by the Final Acts of WARC-79,but the manner in which these decisionswere reached, and their longer term conse-quences, deserve some discussion.

Because the broadcasting satellite servicewas in an early stage of development, theUnited States produced elaborate technicalarguments in advance against the adoptionof a detailed geostationary orbit and channelallotment plan, believing that such a planwould waste orbit and spectrum and hindertechnological advances. The United Statesproposed instead that the conference ap-prove certain actions that would encourageplanning that was evolutionary and flexible,rather than detailed and restrictive, andwould make adequate provision for FSS inregion 2 (the Americas).

The conference ignored the U.S. technicalarguments and embraced the concept of de-tailed planning for two basic reasons:

● the majority of developing countrieswanted to be assured of guaranteed ac-cess to specific orbital slots and chan-nels and were convinced that a detaileda priori plan offered them that assur-ance; and

• a number of European countries be-lieved that the adoption of an a prioriplan would permit them to proceed withdevelopment of terrestrial services inthe 11.7- to 12.2-GHz band.

Neither of these two goals would havebeen helped by adoption of an evolutionaryplan that was subject to change. Moreover,the United States, Canada, and Brazil werethe only countries planning use of the bandfor FSS and therefore concerned with prob-lems of sharing between broadcasting satel-lites and FSS. Also, the United States andCanada had unilaterally ruled out primarydomestic use of the band for terrestrialservices.

The U.S. delegation made extensive ef-forts to find fallback positions, or supportingtechnical documentation, which, while en-compassing U.S. views, would meet the con-cerns of other countries. These efforts wereunsuccessful. The United States failed toforestall the adoption of a detailed plan forregions 1 and 3, but succeeded in putting offdetailed planning for BSS in region 2 until1983.

It can be argued that the United Statesprepared for the wrong conference in 1977.The delegation was thoroughly armed withtechnical arguments based on experimentaloperation of ATS-6 and CTS, satellites withbroadcasting capabilities. The United Statessent representatives to a series of regionalITU seminars and held bilateral discussionswith a number of countries, including WestGermany, Japan, the U. S. S. R., and theUnited Kingdom. Reports from these meet-ings made it clear that the U.S. position wasshared by very few countries and was morethan likely doomed to failure from the start.

Thus, in spite of a major U.S. effort, theprinciple of a “negotiated plan” for the spaceservices was established and fully acceptedby a large majority of ITU members atWARC-77, and the “planning” adopted was


detailed planning including specifications of proaches that will satisfy renewed demandsnational orbital positions, channel assign- for “guaranteed access” for all countries andments, service areas, and a variety of de- still permit the introduction of advancedtailed technical characteristics. There is no technology to increase the capacity of thereason to assume that this approach will not geostationary orbit and related spectrum tobe advocated for other space services, such meet increasing requirements.as FSS, in future conferences.

A major challenge for the United Stateswill be to develop alternate planning ap-

Chapter 5

Alternative Structures,Procedures, and Strategies

Contents

PageIntroduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

A More Restrictive Global Information Environment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

Renewed Focus on Regional Telecommunications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

A More Active and Stronger Government Presence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

U.S. Government Communications Policy and Structures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

U.S. Structure and Processes for Spectrum Management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

Possible procedural and Structural Improvements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111Procedural Improvements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111Structural Improvements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

U.S. Strategies for Dealing With International Spectrum Issues and ITU. . 114Policy Option No. l: Withdrawal From ITU. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116Policy Option No. 2: Revised ITU Voting Formula . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117Policy Option No.3: Increased Regionalization of ITU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118Policy Option No. 4: Better Coordination and Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119Policy Option No. 5: Common-User System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121Policy Option No.6: “A Priori" Allotment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure No. Page4. Displacement in Longitude for Countries in the Northern and

Southern Hemispheres. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245. Available Geostationary Arc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

Chapter 5

Alternative Structures,Procedures, and Strategies

Countriesgrowth of

Introductionplanning for the extension andtheir telecommunications net-

works and improvements in communicationsgenerally have to set out a reasonably long-term strategy since a number of very impor-tant factors (resources, investments, socio-political needs and trends, international rela-tions, technological possibilities and threats)must be considered concurrently.

Communications and information systemstechnology has reached the stage where con-cepts such as the “information-based socie-ty” are the subject of intense national andinternational discussion. High technologysystems of advanced computer-communica-tions including digital/switched facsimile,computer polling systems, packet switchingdata networks, distributed processor-con-trolled switching, and multiple-access satel-lite systems are appropriate to the needs ofboth developed and less developed countries.The use of such technology can greatly re-duce costs for important services; they canextend service to rural or remote points; theycan give these countries fast and convenientaccess to the best and most advanced infor-mation banks in the world. Many nations arebeginning to grasp these implications. As aresult, telecommunications is increasinglyviewed as a “tool for development” and as akey to greater information capacity andpower. This suggests that national commu-nication and telecommunication planningmust take account of broader considerationsthan were once considered necessary.

The telecommunication planner faces anew and potentially explosive situation. Thefacilities and services now being consideredcreate a new infrastructure—an electronic in-frastructure that makes possible and pro-

motes electronic information transfer thatwill have significant, often radical, effects onthe structures of cities, transportation,economics, education, banking, postal serv-ices, the nature and control of informationmedia, the privacy and security of citizens,as well as general lifestyles. Changing polit-ical, sociological, and economic needs or con-straints will, in turn, strongly influence therange, tariffs, and structure of the telecom-munications facilities and services. The fu-ture environment is considerably more un-certain than the present volatile scene. It isalso more political and characterized by agrowth in the “communications conscious-ness” of people.

There is growing recognition that elec-tronic and telecommunication technologiesand their application to new integratedsystems are an important source of economicstimulus. The importance of these technol-ogies in social and economic development,national security, cultural diffusion, and in-fluence over popular thinking combine tocreate a strong bias and argument for pro-moting and protecting national informationindustries and U.S. electronics manufactur-ing capability.

Information power is being increasinglyrecognized and used by the nations of theworld to increase and enhance their eco-nomic and political power. Telecommunica-tions is a key resource in the creation and ex-ploitation of information capacity andpower. As nations realize and appreciate thepivotal role and importance of informationand information power, telecommunicationpolicies will be viewed as strategic means forincreasing national sovereignties and reor-dering world affairs.

107


A More Restrictive GlobalInformation Environment

Information exchange between and amongnations is essential if nations of the world areto function as viable societies in a multi-polar, information interdependent world.The global flow of information is essential tothe sustenance of the current level and pat-tern of the world’s collective intelligence andeconomic production, development, andgrowth. The underlying principles of free-dom of information and freedom of expres-sion have given rise, in some countries, tothe doctrine of free flow of information. For30 years, the idea, given legitimacy at theUnited Nations, was that no barriers shouldprevent or distort the flow of informationamong nations. This doctrine is presentlyunder serious attack.

The absence of, or loss of confidence infreedom of information rights or privilegesin many of the Third World nations, as wellas the Communist countries, is a fundamen-tal threat to the global flow of information.In conjunction with the indirect barriers im-posed by other international informationissues and concerns, namely transborderdata flow, the potential regulation of infor-mation imports and exports (contained in na-tional policies for patents, advertising tech-nology transfers, direct investment, appro-priate technology, etc.), the protection of do-mestic electronics and information indus-

tries, and the global patterns of informationpower, the future suggests a much more re-strictive global information environment.

On the way to this new global informationinfrastructure, the United States and othernations will face a broad range of major prob-lems and issues including:

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

international technical operating stand-ards and procedures;privacy and other considerations affect-ing transborder data flows;international marketing rules;reconciliation of national differencesconcerning service availability and ac-cessibility, information availability andaccessibility, sociocultural variations,frequency assignments and manage-ment, national telecommunications andinformation policies;impacts on national sovereignty;influence and control of information onworld events, attitudes, and outcomes;andthe benefits of information imports v.the cost of information dependency.

Many of the developing countries are al-ready evidencing an awareness of the link-ages among these issues and of the interplayand interdependency that exists with radiospectrum matters.

Renewed Focus on RegionalTelecommunications

The 20 years ranging from about the mid- tablishment of international satellite com-1950’s to the mid-1970’s can be communication facilities and institutions (e.g.,sidered the global expansion phase in the de- INTELSAT). The thrust was towards inter-velopment of international telecommunica- continental connections and national accesstions. This was dominated by the initial lay- to the global satellite network. Dramatic de-ing of undersea telephone cables and the es- creases in international satellite communica-

Ch. 5—Alternative Structures, Procedures, and Strategies • 109

tion costs and a corresponding increase indemand reflected and characterized thisglobal expansion period.

We are presently in a phase in whichregional needs and policies will predominate.Nations will become more interested in spe-cific connectivity of external communicationroutes in support of national and regionalpolitical and economic goals and informationpolicies as contrasted with the more generalnature of global facilities expansion. Thethrust will be on intraregional communica-tions along with focused development orenhancement of specific interregional com-munication routes.

Corresponding to this shift in needs andopportunities will be a change in institu-tional influence. Regional bodies such as theEuropean Conference of Postal and Telecom-munications Administration (CEPT), theArab satellite consortium (ARABSAT), andentities that support regional policies ofpolitical and economic integration (such asthe Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN) will grow in influence relative tosuch bodies as the International Telecom-munication Union (ITU), which will be com-pelled to accommodate these pressures andmake strategic changes.

A More Active and StrongerGovernment Presence

Without doubt, governments around theworld will become increasingly involved inthe development, management, and controlof communications technologies, products,and applications. They will seek to utilizeand manipulate telecommunications, includ-ing frequency matters, in furtherance of na-tional and international goals.

In most of the world, telecommunicationservices are provided by a state-sanctioned

monopoly, that whether state owned or not,is likely to be a government or quasi-govern-ment institution. This is not the case in theUnited States and it is a factor that assumesadded importance as computer and commu-nications services continue to converge,eroding the boundaries between the privateand public sector in communication and in-formation goods and services.

U.S. Governmentand

Communications PolicyStructures

How is the United States likely to fare inthis new environment? While it can be ar-gued that the present structure of the U.S.Government and its policymaking processesin the telecommunication areas have pro-tected and sustained our vital national in-terests to date, the question is whether it willbe adequate for tomorrow. Since spectrumis the common denominator in all usesof radio, coordination is essential for the

various services to function in a compatiblemanner. It is this coordination, which hasover the years become a very specialized andsophisticated art, that frequently bearsdirectly on policy decisions. Much of theITU-sponsored negotiations relate to spec-trum use. Because of this, spectrum manage-ment in the United States has been scruti-nized many times, sometimes criticized, andsometimes praised, down through the years.


Starting at least 30 years ago there hasbeen concern over the effectiveness of thegovernment structure to cope with the inter-national aspects of telecommunications—particularly the negotiation of agreementswithin ITU and other United Nations (U. N.)organizations. Most of the international ne-gotiations have been motivated by technicalconsiderations, primarily radio spectrumissues, without the advantage of a clearlystated overall national telecommunicationpolicy.

The United States has done well in most ofthese negotiations but with each interna-tional conference the maneuvering room hasdecreased and thus the preparation and ac-tual negotiating have become more difficult.

As we go into the decade of the 1980’s, theinternational aspects of telecommunicationsare becoming more preeminent than ever. Nolonger can fundamental telecommunicationpolicy issues be avoided by relying on tech-nical agreements, motivated by technicalconsiderations, and negotiated on the pre-sumption that only technical issues needresolution. Unfortunately, the present Fed-eral Government structure, while respond-ing to the technical aspects of internationalcommunications negotiations, has not devel-oped a mechanism or procedure for devel-oping comprehensive policy.

There are three fundamental weaknesses

1. The lack of appreciation at the top deci-sion levels of the Federal Governmentand industry as to the vital role of tel-ecommunications in the internationaland domestic political, economic, andprivate affairs of the United States, andthe need for policy coordination.

2. There is a lack of centralized policy coor-

3

dination and guidance for internationaltelecommunication negotiations at ahigh enough level in the Federal Govern-ment to be effective.The State Department’s Office of In-ternational Communications Policy isneither staffed nor institutionally orga-nized to carry out effectively all of thefunctions involved in international tele-communications negotiations.

These structural weaknesses are a directreflection of the lack of clear U.S. policy fortelecommunication matters including spec-trum management issues. Moreover, theU.S. permanent spectrum managementmechanisms are not adequate to review allstated requirements of Government andnongovernment spectrum users objectivelyor to verify and adjust needs consistent withnational policy objectives. The UnitedStates also lacks an effective means of col-lecting data and developing guidelines tojudge the merits of one spectrum use overany other.

in the present structure:

U.S. StructureSpectrum

and ProcessesManagement

The planning and management of the spec- agency develops its requirements for spec-trum in the United States is handled by-theFederal Communications Commission (FCC)(as manager for nongovernment users) andby the National Telecommunications and In-formation Administration (NTIA) (as man- .ager for Federal Government agencies re-quiring spectrum for their radio-communi-cation systems). Each executive branch

trum and orbit use and-these are discussedand coordinated through the mechanisms ofthe Interdepartment Radio Advisory Com-mittee (IRAC) and its several subcommit-tees. The nongovernment requirements ofcommercial public and private users are de-veloped through the FCC notice of inquiry(NOI) process often with the aid of advisory

Ch. 5—Alternative Structures, Procedures, and Strategies “ 111

committees. NTIA and FCC coordinate toresolve differences and together with theState Department develop a single set ofU.S. proposals for ITU administrative radioconferences such as WARC-79.

NTIA and FCC must agree on the bandsthat are proposed for individual services andthis requires agreement on the eventual do-mestic allocation of each band: whether forGovernment use, nongovernment use, orshared use. The State Department serves asombudsman in resolving disagreements, ifany, over U.S. proposals to internationalradio conferences and the President acts asfinal artiber if the State Department cannotresolve the problem. Depending on the por-tion of the spectrum involved, shared useranges from about 20 percent for the regionbetween 100 and 1000 MHz to 100 percentfor the band 10 to 100 kHz. The working

level forum for the generation of Govern-ment proposals and coordination betweenthem and the nongovernment proposals isusually a special ad hoc committee of IRAC.Such ad hoc committees include participa-tion by FCC liaison representatives who pre-sent the nongovernment view.

Consensus between NTIA and FCC on thedivision of spectrum between Governmentand nongovernment users does not necessar-ily ensure the most efficient use of spectrum.Moreover, IRAC is an advisory committee toNTIA and it can recommend but cannotcompel spectrum-efficient design or tech-nology on large, powerful agencies like theDepartment of Defense (DOD). The powerand resources of NTIA to successfully chal-lenge spectrum decisions of such agenciesare limited.

Possible Procedural andStructural Improvements

Procedural Improvements

Improvements needed in the present pro-cedures for managing and planning Govern-ment and nongovernment use of the spec-trum include better means to provide ade-quately for:

●

●

●

●

validation of requirements, giving par-ticular attention to current spectrumusage, technology and developmenttrends, and sharing opportunities be-tween competing users of the spectrum;inclusion of spectrum and orbit efficienttechniques and technology in system de-sign of both Government and nongov-ernment systems;apportionment of frequency spectrumbetween Government and nongovern-ment services based on national prior-ities;effective planning for future spectrumand orbit needs;

● efficient and timely preparation for andparticipation in ITU conferences; and

● effective management of existing serv-ices and users on a continuing basis.

Some of these shortcomings could be cor-rected without any fundamental change inthe structure of FCC or NTIA. Assigningspectrum management a higher priority andusing resources more efficiently would helpimprove the present situation. For example,FCC should be able to improve its data basefor spectrum management with the help ofits own computer and spectrum experts. Theestablishment of deadlines for inclusion oflicensing information in FCC master filescan be accomplished by FCC action. A morefundamental procedural change would be toplace all incoming applications for licenses,construction permits, authorizations, etc., inFCC computer on receipt. In other words,FCC could institute an information and dataprocessing system approach to aid its spec-trum management activities.


The validation of spectrum requirements,and the apportioning of spectrum betweenGovernment and nongovernment users,should receive closer scrutiny. A mechanismusing analytical tools to evaluate needs andassess priorities among competing users ofthe spectrum would provide decisionmakerswith basic information and data for use inestablishing policies and reviewing require-ments. Federal spectrum requirements arereviewed by IRAC and its Spectrum Plan-ning Subcommittee, but this function needsto be strengthened and broadened to effec-tively consider longer range impacts. FCCneeds to be better equipped to assess futurespectrum requirements of the private sector,including the use of new technology.

Economic techniques (e.g., auctions, lot-teries, spectrum fees, resale of frequencyspectrum assignments, etc.) should be con-sidered, at least on an experimental basis, toprovide guidance on the consequences of dif-ferent spectrum allocation decisions and theintroduction of newer technology. Theseshould include techniques for evaluating therelative economic viability of alternativespectrum uses, as well as radio v. nonradiocommunication systems. The use of eco-nomic techniques in spectrum managementmight require legislative action. FCC,perhaps with the aid of a task force, otherGovernment agencies that have studied thequestion, industry groups, and private ex-perts, could select a few services for detailedanalysis of the prospects of using one ormore economic techniques. FCC could thenpresent its recommendations for the experi-mental application of a selected technique, ortechniques, to one or a limited number ofservices and frequency bands to Congressfor its information and action, if necessary.

Problems relating to forming a U.S.delegation for WARC-79 could be addressedand the effectiveness of U.S. participation ininternational meetings could be improved byseveral steps: 1) industry and other nongov-ernment delegates could again be permittedto participate fully as U.S. representativesat international telecommunication confer-

ences and take any assignments on the dele-gation for which their skills and experiencequalify them. Legislation to accomplish thispassed both Houses of the 96th Congress.However, the legislation to which it wasadded was vetoed by the President for rea-sons unrelated to the exemption. The meas-ure was again passed by the Senate and re-ported by the responsible House committee,but the House of Representatives did notconsider it before adjournment; 2) consid-eration could be given to finding means tocomply with due process requirements underthe Administrative Procedures Act and stillname industry and other nongovernmentrepresentatives to delegations on a timelybasis; and 3) establish guidelines with an im-plementing mechanism to name the chair-man and individual delegates to the U.S. del-egation. Qualifications required, distributionof various skills needed, and type ofrepresentation desired would be selectedfrom the best candidates available, especial-ly those who participated in the preparatoryeffort. If special Government support is nec-essary to assure certain representation, thenthat support should be available early in thepreparatory stages.

S t ruc tura l Improvements

Chapter 3 discussed the present structurewithin the Federal Government to performspectrum management and participate in in-ternational telecommunication conferences.Consistent with the findings of past commis-sions and task forces going back to 1950,this study also finds that structural im-provements are necessary. Primarily, theproblems stem from the absence of high-levelGovernment attention to effective policycoordination. Accountability for spectrummanagement issues and international nego-tiations is difficult to assign under the pres-ent structure.

Congress could consider ways to improvethe present structure or examine possiblechanges in the structure. A detailed analysisof alternatives is beyond the scope of thisstudy that concentrates on the results of

Ch. 5—Alternative Structures, Procedures, and Strategies ● 113

WARC-79. However, at least four optionsare available to Congress:

1.

2.

3.

4.

maintain the status quo and make nochanges;maintain the present structure, butraise the level of attention and account-ability within the responsible agencies;establish a mechanism—such as a taskforce of high-level Government offi-cials—to develop, examine, and makerecommendations on structural and pro-cedural improvements; orestablish a permanent board, council, orinteragency - committee of high-levelGovernment officials to be responsibleand accountable for international tele-communication policy coordination andthe preparations for international con-ferences.

Option 1: Status Quo.

The relatively low priority given to spec-trum management issues within the Govern-ment will likely continue under the statusquo as discussed in this report. This reflectsthe relative lack of appreciation and atten-tion at a high level of Government to tele-communications generally. Even with theunprecedented number of upcoming confer-ences of ITU and the direct importance ofthese conference decisions to the UnitedStates, the State Department, particularly,will find it difficult to raise the priority ofradio spectrum issues vis-a-vis other nontele-communication foreign policy issues. More-over, FCC is unlikely to assign a higher pri-ority to spectrum management in light ofother pressing regulatory policy issues.

Option 2: Raise the Level of AttentionWithin the Present Structure.

Congress could take steps through itsoversight activities to focus attention onways to improve coordination and developcoherent policies and strategies for interna-tional telecommunication matters generallyand spectrum issues in particular. Congresscould require special reports from responsi-ble agencies on steps taken to improve thestatus quo spectrum management through-

out the Government. Several possible pro-cedural measures were discussed earlier. Inaddition to those, it may be beneficial toestablish a more formal and continuing con-ference preparatory mechanism within theexisting structure of divided responsibilitiesamong several Government agencies. Thiswould replace the more “ad hoc” approachfollowed in the past. If such a mechanismwas not justified when ITU conferences wereheld at infrequent intervals, it appearsnecessary now when over a dozen confer-ences are scheduled over the next 7 or 8years. Complex issues of vital concern to theU.S. with direct consequences for both inter-national and domestic telecommunicationsare on the agendas of these meetings. Devel-oping and recommending skilled delegatesfor U.S. delegations could be made a part ofthis process. Formal training in negotiating,language, and diplomatic skills could also beincluded.

Option 3: Create a Task Force To Examineand Make Recommendations on StructuralChanges.

Congress could mandate that an in-teragency task force of high-level officialsfrom responsible Government agencies beestablished. This task force would examinealternative structural changes, assess thepros and cons of each, and report to thePresident with recommendations. The Presi-dent, in turn, could make a report to Con-gress with specific proposals where legisla-tion is required. Because of the divided re-sponsibilities and direct influences of severalGovernment agencies, the task force mightinclude representatives from the followingagencies: Department of Commerce—includ-ing NTIA, Department of State, FCC, DOD,Department of Justice, Office of Manage-ment and Budget, and possible repre-sentation from the Office of the U.S. TradeRepresentative.

Option 4: Establish a Permanent Board orOther Mechanism.

Congress could consider the establishmentof a permanent board, council, or inter-


agency committee to coordinate interna-tional telecommunication policy. Spectrummanagement issues and international negoti-ations would be key elements of the work ofthis body. Such a board could be chargedwith the continuing responsibility to: coor-dinate international telecommunication pol-icy; plan and direct strategies to achieve pol-icy objectives; assess the need for personneland other resources within the Governmentto conduct an effective international pro-gram including ways to use resources moreeffectively; - and prepare for internationalconferences and meetings.

Depending on the specific mandate forsuch a board, the present structure for spec-trum management within the Governmentwould be altered to a greater or lesser extent.For example, the present structure could beleft intact with the board providing the cen-tralized point of coordination. However, the

●

board could be made accountable for seeingthat policies and actions are coordinated andthat a coherent and effective program forU.S. international telecommunication mat-ters is maintained. As a part of its functions,the board would assure that the necessarylinkages are made among the various ele-ments within Government agencies, betweenagencies, between Government and indus-try, and among the international forums con-cerned with telecommunication matters.

Bills have been introduced in the Senateand House recently to establish a mechan-ism aimed at improving the U.S. posture forinternational telecommunication matters.Also, in recent years, other legislation hasbeen introduced that would alter the presentGovernment structure for telecommunica-tion matters. These and other approachescould be considered under options 2 and 3above.

U.S. Strategies for Dealing WithInternational Spectrum Issues and ITU

The United States may have reached acrossroads in its relationship with ITU. Hav-ing started in 1865 as a relatively noncon-troversial organization of 20 nations con-cerned mainly with the interconnection oftheir telegraph systems, ITU has evolvedinto a contentious assembly of 155 nationsthat look to the Union to solve fundamentalissues of allocation and regulation of radiospectrum resources.

The ITU structure, which was well suitedto the analysis of interference between radiocommunications systems, and to achievinga consensus on noncontroversial mattersamong a small number of broader issues, issorely tested by the demands of numerouscountries exhibiting the widest possiblerange of technical, economic, cultural, andpolitical backgrounds. Many of these issuesdid not originate at ITU, but have ended upthere, often argued by delegates unschooled

in the technical language that has been thesine qua non of ITU. Thus, the mechanismthat brought together highly trained engi-neers to consider abstruse issues of in-terference between sophisticated communi-cations systems is becoming a focal point forbroader policy issues with political postur-ings by delegates to further national andpolitical objectives. ITU structure, pro-cedures, and mechanisms have not changed,but the problems have changed enormously.The ITU must now develop greater flexibil-ity if it is to function effectively in a new anddynamic environment.

The radio spectrum is essential to the com-munications infrastructure of the UnitedStates, and it is not an easy matter for theUnited States to concede its vital national in-terests to satisfy the demands of many na-tions that repeatedly assert their “equalright” to the radio spectrum even though

Ch. 5—Alternative Structures, Procedures, and Strategies . 115

.

they have no immediate need or capability touse additional allotments for the foreseeablefuture. U.S. officials must ask themselveswhether this nation can continue to acceptthese same structures, procedures, andmechanisms in an important, essentially al-locative forum as are routinely tolerated inother situations that are more abstract orpolitical in nature, and less concerned withvital U.S. interests. Will U.S. negotiatingskills and technological proficiency enable usto achieve our essential goals and objectivesin a forum that employs a “one-nation, one-vote” decisionmaking formula and in whichthe United States and the other developedcountries are greatly outnumbered by theless developed member countries?

The answer is not readily apparent. Whatis apparent is that our technically orientedapproach that has served so well in nego-tiating the technical issues of the past two orthree decades, is simply not sufficient for thebroader issues of today. The United Statesmust make some policy decisions, reflectingchanges in U.S. strategy or in the structureor procedures of ITU, and then augment thescope and training of the responsible U.S.personnel consistent with those decisions.

The United States has essentially twoalternatives: it can seek various improve-ments in the present means for solving spec-trum allocation problems within ITU as it isnow constituted, or it can seek to alter theexisting structure, procedures, or mech-anisms of ITU itself. The policy options con-sidered here may be divided into two broadcategories, strategic and structural.

From the strategic standpoint, assumingno significant changes in ITU, the UnitedStates has a wide range of options. At oneextreme, the United States may concludethat the drawbacks of continued participa-tion in ITU outweigh the benefits, and with-draw from the organization or decline to par-ticipate in its deliberations. At the other ex-

treme, the United States could decide toyield to other nations on controversial mat-ters and play a passive role within ITU. Be-tween these extremes there are a number ofalternatives. One that requires no structuralor procedural changes in ITU would be aserious attempt at better coordination of ourviews and objectives with other nations inadvance of ITU meetings, and better U.S.planning based on improved understandingof other nations’ views.

Another strategic option that might helpto achieve U.S. objectives even if ITU re-mained essentially unchanged would be forthe United States to seek to remove con-troversial issues from the ITU forum and at-tempt to solve them in other ways. A currentexample would be to respond to the demandsof developing countries for “guaranteed ac-cess” to radio spectrum and satellite loca-tions by developing the institutional ar-rangements to ensure domestic communica-tion services to these nations. This could bea common-user system either building uponthe present INTELSAT structure or creat-ing a separate system for domestic services.Such a solution would offer each nation all ofthe satellite services or capability it couldrealistically use, without allocating to smallnations significant amounts of satellite spec-trum and orbit locations that might then re-main unused for the foreseeable future.

From the structural standpoint, assumingthat ITU can be changed, a number of op-tions are available. One relatively extremeexample would be to seek revision in thevoting formula of ITU to one that was moreadvantageous to the United States, perhapsby giving added voting weight to those coun-tries that contribute most heavily to theU.N. budget. A more modest option wouldbe to increase the number of ITU regionsbeyond the present three so that regionalissues could be dealt with by a smallernumber of countries most directly con-cerned.


Policy Option No. 1: WithdrawalFrom ITU

Would withdrawing from ITU guaranteethe United States unhindered use of thespectrum allocation or frequency assign-ments we need? Probably not. Member na-tions of ITU rely on the organization toavoid interference from the radio signals ofothers and to achieve interoperability of cer-tain mutually used systems. Avoidance of in-terference is the essence of spectrum alloca-tion or frequency assignment processes. Theassignment of a particular frequency is of lit-tle value if others feel free to use it for pur-poses that cause interference. There are noeffective sanctions to force compliance withITU decisions. Therefore, the United States,as do all nations, relies on the voluntaryagreement and cooperation of other nationsto refrain from interfering with its use of thespectrum.

Abrupt withdrawal from an ITU in whichthe United States was unable to have its ownway could well intensify the risk of interfer-ence. For applications that are vulnerable tointerference, it seems clear that preemptionof spectrum would be ineffective. Any nationthat chose to interfere, whether due to avalid need for the particular frequency bandor by intentional jamming, could greatlyreduce the value to the United States of thepreempted spectrum.

There are some important spectrum usesthat are relatively invulnerable to interfer-ence (e.g., high-power radar systems withelectronic countermeasures capability), butany preemption of spectrum by the UnitedStates would likely result in retaliation byother nations in areas where it was vulner-able. There might also be spill-over intononspectrum relationships with other na-tions, such as transborder data flow ortelecommunication equipment trade mat-ters. Extreme forms of retaliation, such asrefusal to interconnect telephone or telexsystems with the United States, would beunlikely since these services are probably as

much in the interest of many other nationsas in our own.

What would happen to the generallyfriendly process of coordination to avoidharmful interference? The bulk of our coor-dination takes place with the developedcountries that are fewer in number and withwhom the United States has fewer funda-mental differences than with the ThirdWorld nations that have recently begun chal-lenging and, in some cases, outvoting theUnited States. It is conceivable that theUnited States could abandon ITU and estab-lish a more congenial grouping of developedcountries as a forum for coordination toavoid interference, and simply ignore othercountries. Coordination and information ex-change would become less certain by theomission of the majority of nations, even iftheir spectrum use is relatively limited, butwould still be fairly effective. We could alsocontinue to coordinate with many of them in-formally, since that would also continue tobe in their interest. Eventually they mighteven seek to join the coordinating forum ofthe developed countries, although the termsof reference and voting basis might be muchdifferent from ITU.

It seems likely that ITU–or that part thatdeals with radio matters, as opposed to tele-phone and telegraph-would disintegrate ifthe principal developed countries abandonedit. A major mechanism for technical assist-ance to developing countries would disinte-grate with it, leading perhaps to negoti-ations for a new mechanism. Probably thesenegotiations would be conducted on a basisthat would more nearly reflect the relativetechnical and economic strengths of thevarious nations involved, rather than theITU’s “one-nation, one-vote” formula.

In the resulting “free-for-all” atmosphere,large nations and organizations would prob-ably get whatever spectrum they needed,subject only to coordination among them-selves. In the short run, smaller nationscould take whatever spectrum they wanted.


But in the long term, if the larger nations de-veloped technology and systems for theirown purposes, rather than for commonusage, the smaller nations could find spec-trum unavailable, or perhaps limited to thosefrequencies that are complicated and expen-sive to use.

Overall, the lack of a central spectrumallocation and coordination authority wouldprobably lead to a more fragmented use ofthe spectrum, with fewer common worldwidechannels, less standardization, and possibledifficulties with interoperability of certaincommon systems, and a general increase ininterference problems between services. Inshort, the result of spectrum preemption andwithdrawal from ITU would lead to a rela-tively less organized mechanism for spec-trum management having significant disad-vantages for both developed and develop-ing countries. Whether these disadvantageswould at some time be outweighed by thebenefits of increased access to frequencybands vitally needed by the United Stateswould depend on the specifics of those needsand the degree of conflict present in ITU atthat time.

The results of the OTA-sponsored surveyshow that a clear majority of the surveyrespondents would strongly oppose, or evenconsider U.S. withdrawal from ITU. Nearlytwo-thirds of the respondents strongly dis-agree with the suggestion that the UnitedStates view withdrawal from ITU as an op-tion even under hypothetical “worst case”conditions. And 18 percent of the respond-ents agreed or agreed strongly with the sug-gestion that the United States consider with-drawal from ITU.

Policy Option No. 2: Revised ITUVot ing Formula

As an option less drastic than withdrawalfrom ITU, the United States might join withother developed nations to force a revision ofthe ITU’s “one-nation, one-vote” decision-making formula toward one that would re-flect the dominance of the developed nations

in the actual use of the spectrum. If success-ful, this option would greatly reduce the abil-ity of the Third World nations to block orforce changes in U.S. positions.

One possible formula for revised voting isa combined weighting factor based on landarea and population. Another possibility isthe proportion of present use of telecommu-nications, or investment in telecommunica-tions, which would clearly favor the devel-oped countries in the short run. A third for-mula might be based on the relative propor-tion of overall contributions to the UnitedNations and its various specialized agencies.

There are numerous precedents for un-equal voting arrangements in internationalorganizations. In the INTELSAT board ofgovernors, voting is in proportion to invest-ment in the system (which is in turn propor-tional to utilization of the system), andvoting in the World Bank is in proportion tocontributions. There are, of course, a numberof agencies and conferences which adhere tothe “one-nation, one-vote” principle. Ex-amples are the United Nations EducationalScientific and Cultural Organization, the In-ternational Labor Organization, and the Lawof the Sea Conference. None of these is anoperational organization, and none is es-pecially well known for reaching accom-modations efficiently and expeditiously.

A revised voting formula might reduce thecontention over spectrum allocation mattersat ITU; make ITU more efficient; help tomake the use of the spectrum more efficientby precluding the adoption of unworkableallocation schemes; and be no less fair thanthe voting practices used in a number ofother international bodies that benefit ThirdWorld nations without being controlled bythem. The stimulus for concurrence of ThirdWorld nations with such a proposal would bethe possibility that, were it rejected, thedeveloped countries might withdraw fromITU and render it essentially irrelevant.

The reaction of Third World nations is dif-ficult to predict but it seems most likely thatthey would bitterly resist any reversal of


their recent successful trend toward asser-tiveness and refuse to make any concessionon ITU voting formulae. From a general for-eign policy standpoint, it is important toconsider how much support the UnitedStates might obtain from other developedcountries, many of which do not feel thespectrum problems as acutely as the UnitedStates. The United States must also con-sider whether it wishes to take an assertivepolicy toward ITU apart from a generallymore assertive stance toward Third Worldnations. Should spectrum and communica-tions policy be the “leading edge” of a newU.S. posture of asserting our interests vig-orously? This issue needs to be faced early,in the broadest possible forum, since theanswer will be one of the key factors in theselection of any policy option.

It can also be asked whether the proposedchange in voting arrangements should applyto all ITU spectrum decisions, or just tothose allocations that might qualify as majormatters. The latter case is equivalent to es-tablishing a new, separate forum with re-vised voting arrangements and routing themajor matters to that forum rather than toITU.

Objectively, it would seem that the in-terests of the developing countries lie withthe continued existence of ITU and with con-tinued technical and economic aid from thedeveloped countries. If this choice wereclearly and convincingly drawn, the ThirdWorld nations would probably come to real-ize that these benefits outweigh such hypo-thetical advantages as satellite orbital slotsthat they may never use. Whether theywould ultimately decide the matter on objec-tive grounds is difficult to predict. In anyevent, it seems unlikely that a change in thevoting formula within ITU will occur giventhe present structure of ITU.

Policy Option No. 3: IncreasedRegionalization of ITU

At present, ITU divides the world intothree geographic regions and many issues

that can be treated separately and effective-ly in a single region are considered in thisway. Regional administrative radio confer-ences are scheduled on a variety of specificissues, allowing the World AdministrativeRadio Conferences to “spinoff” certain con-troversial matters. One option would be toextend this process of regionalization on ageographic basis to smaller subregions,and/or on an issue basis to include only thosenations directly affected by the particularissue. The purpose would be to reduce thenumber of nations debating or voting on is-sues that do not affect them directly, thus re-ducing unnecessary contention.

WARC-79 was attended by 142 nations.Approximately 1,670 delegates and advisorsmet for 11 weeks (one week more than sched-uled), considered nearly 17,000 individualproposals (more than 900 from the UnitedStates), and held more than 900 meetings.Surely any approach that might help limitfurther WARCs to more modest proportionswould be worthy of study. More important-ly, when nations vote on issues that do notdirectly affect them, opportunities for trad-ing votes arise at no cost to themselves, butwhich help others to sustain confrontations.Large meetings also tend to encourage blocvoting, which has already begun to emergeat ITU. Thus, subdividing the ITU intosmaller units, either on the basis of geo-graphic subregions or on the basis of par-ticular issues, would divide the Third Worldbloc into smaller, less dominant groups.

There are numerous precedents for this.In addition to the three ITU spectrum re-gions, there are five International Telegraphand Telephone Consultative Committee re-gions, three ocean basin groups withinINTELSAT, and a North American Region-al Broadcasting Agreement, which coor-dinates broadcasting in the United States,Canada, and Mexico.

While a potentially useful approach, andone ITU has tried to some extent (e.g., theforthcoming WARCs on Mobile Services,high frequency planning, and the geosta-tionary satellite orbit), decentralization is

.


not applicable to all problems. Some servicescannot be considered separately from otherswith which they interfere. Frequency bandsin which signals propagate for many thou-sands of miles cannot be considered on aregional basis, and some issues (e.g., in-teroperability of aircraft communicationssystems) are fundamentally global in charac-ter. The key is to define a spectrum problemin a way which leaves significant numbers ofnations unaffected. For example, the ultra-high frequency TV and microwave fixed(radio relay) service, which use signals oflimited propagation range, might be treatedon a subregional basis.

Decentralized decisionmaking does not, ofcourse, guarantee that the U.S. position willprevail. Being outvoted by 10 to 1 is no moresatisfying than being outvoted by 153 to 1.However, it is easier to bargain in detail with10 nations than 153; and if a quid pro quomust be offered, the total cost is likely to belower.

The mechanics and economics of increas-ing substantially the number of conferencesis also important to consider. The limitedU.S. professional staff available to preparefor and attend spectrum conferences is al-ready stretched thin, and if the UnitedStates does not wish simply to skip many ofthe meetings (a very risky proposition) thisstaff would need to be augmented. The de-veloping countries would find it even moredifficult to prepare for a heavy schedule ofmeetings.

Developing countries tend to have veryfew professionals available to consider spec-trum matters; a few key people might decidespectrum policy for an entire country. Also,in some cases even the key individuals lacksufficient expertise to comprehend the needsand technical requirements of their owncountry, let alone understand and appreciatethe complex spectrum problems of theUnited States. Assuming that this effectoverbalances any possible advantage to theUnited States from keeping them in ignor-ance, it may be in our interest to assist these

nations in their planning and conferencepreparation.

One way to assist the Third World nationswould be on a regional basis. This could takethe form of providing special regional rap-porteurs; of educating and assisting keycountries, which would in turn assist othersor act on their behalf; or of establishing andsupporting a joint planning capability for agroup of nations in a region. Apart from theregional approach, we could assist certaincountry blocs in their planning and prepara-tion.

Increased decentralization of ITU could, inprinciple, lead to greater fragmentation inthe use of the spectrum, with the same bandbeing used for different purposes in differentregions to a much greater extent than is nowthe case. Advanced technologies may in-crease the opportunity for regions andsubregions to operate reasonably independ-ent of one another. While this may be accept-able in the short run, the long-term implica-tions are worthy of study. If, for example, anew service were proposed that would beglobal in character, obtaining the necessaryglobal spectrum allocation might requirechanges in the allocations to many differentservices in many different locales. At theleast, it might be necessary to create an in-stitutionalized system for coordinating de-centralized decisions.

Policy Option No. 4: BetterCoordination and Planning

As a relatively conciliatory approach, theUnited States could mount a major effort todevelop long-term plans for spectrum usethat would take into account the spectrumrequirements of developing nations, to aidthem in understanding the realistic optionsavailable to meet their short- and long-termneeds, to offer them such technical and eco-nomic assistance as might be needed to en-able them to participate actively in the plan-ning process, and to seek their concurrencewith fair, objective, and realistic proposals.

120 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administration Radio Conference of 1979

The acceptance at WARC-79 of U.S. pro-posals for new spectrum allocations devotedto remote-sensing activities offers supportfor the view that advance coordination and aconcerted effort to explain and justify re-quirements can have a significant impact oncountries that might otherwise be skepticalor indifferent. The delegation of Senegalcame to WARC-79 with specific instructionsto support U.S. remote-sensing proposals,thanks to a special effort by the NationalAeronautics and Space Administration(NASA), backed by the State Department, toenlist the help of U.S. embassies overseas inlobbying appropriate authorities in theirhost countries. A NASA slide presentation,with tape-recorded commentary in English,French, and Spanish drew appreciative au-diences from delegations at the conferenceitself. Of the some 50 remote-sensing pro-posals made by NASA for both passive- andactive-sensing programs, all were acceptedby the conference to a greater or lesserdegree and, contrary to expectations, therewas no opposition to U.S. proposals thatcould be traced to political motivations.

To a significant extent, the confrontationsinitiated by Third World nations in ITU arebased on suspicion and mistrust of devel-oped countries, perhaps based on a lack ofunderstanding of the true potential of tech-nology to create the spectrum resources theywill need in the future. But many ThirdWorld nations also question whether theywill be able to take advantage of that tech-nology and they question the good faith ofthe developed countries to share the benefitsof advanced technology.

The fact remains that there is adequatespectrum for all nations at the present andthat technology will very likely expand theeffective utility of the available spectrum tosatisfy future needs of all nations. The prob-lem for the United States is to convinceother nations, particularly the developingcountries that spectrum and orbit capacitywill be available and that their needs forservice can be satisfied. Technical assistancecan be very useful in this regard, and eco-

nomic assistance can help make the benefitsof technology a reality. Creating a role forthe developing countries in cooperative plan-ning efforts is likely to make them morereceptive to the positions and plans that areforthcoming, even though they benefit boththe developed nations and themselves.

Long-range planning of spectrum utiliza-tion is presently inadequate and not easilyaccomplished in an area where technologicalrate-of-change is rapid and in an open com-petitive system like that in the UnitedStates where policy makers are more likely tobe responding to problems than to be devel-oping long-range plans. However, betterlong-range planning for telecommunicationservice and spectrum needs is clearly neces-sary in order to cope effectively with theITU allocation process. Developing andsharing planning techniques and data withother countries would not make a new plan-ning process vastly more difficult or costly,and might make it more reliable in the longrun.

It is also necessary to know the extent towhich developing countries’ positions atITU are based on their own vital interestsrather than on misunderstandings and pol-itics; it is unlikely that they would com-promise vital interests for the sake of com-ity. A cooperative planning process wouldtend to expose true interests and clarify thenegotiations.

As a practical matter, the majority of thedeveloping countries cannot now make useof advanced communications technologywithout technical and economic assistancefrom technologically advanced countries. Ifthe majority of nations were to vote to adoptrules that limit or preclude the use of ad-vanced technology to which they do not haveindependent access, communications capa-bility suffer and costs increase in the longterm for all users. Thus, the cost of assistingother countries in using advanced technol-ogy must be balanced against the cost to theUnited States of not being able to take fulladvantage of such technology ourselves.This equation deserves close analysis.


It can also be argued that giving technicaland economic assistance to the Third Worldnations will simply provide them with thesophistication they need to challenge ourown positions more effectively in the future.While not invalid on its face, this argumentignores our ability to live in relative har-mony with dozens of highly developed na-tions, and to avoid excessive contention inspectrum allocation matters with some ofthese nations that are sworn enemies. Wehave more to lose from ignorance than fromtrue disagreement.

It is useful to recall what can happen in theabsence of cooperative planning. As prepara-tion for the 1977 Broadcast Satellite WARC,the United States developed comprehensivedata and explanations to show that a techno-logically based “first-come, first-served”, orevolutionary approach, would assure ade-quate access to the geostationary satelliteorbit for all nations. However, other nationswere intent on adopting a rigid a priori planand simply were not interested in the U.S.arguments. Most of the U.S. preparatorywork was of little value and the U.S. delega-tion was thus forced to develop alternativepositions on an ad hoc basis, during the con-ference.

This experience serves as a reminder thatit is no longer feasible to go to an ITU con-ference with a well-documented technicalsolution to a problem and expect other na-tions to embrace the U.S. position. A certaindegree of advance coordination is necessary,as a minimum, and probably was one of thereasons that the United States achieved cer-tain objectives at WARC-79. The prior coor-dination undertaken by NASA on U.S. re-mote-sensing proposals is a case in point.

Cooperative planning has worked in thepast; the United States was a leader incooperative planning for INTELSAT andINMARSAT. The exact mechanism for co-operative planning is an important and com-plex matter, compounded by divided respon-sibility in the United States for commu-nications policy in general and spectrum

planning in particular. It should be possible,however, to graft onto the existing structurea sufficiently comprehensive mechanismwith high-level Government responsibility toassure effective long-range planning and tofoster cooperation with other nations.

As an alternative, ITU could be investedwith a planning staff to undertake long-range coordination, analysis, and planning.Such a neutral planning expertise might beless likely to be mistrusted by Third Worldnations, and perhaps more capable of defus-ing potential disagreements. Naturally, theUnited States would participate in the proc-ess and perhaps could more easily influence aplanning process, in which the measure ofpower is technical expertise, rather than anITU conference, in which the measure ofpower is votes. The United States has con-sistently opposed any increase in the powerof the ITU, particularly efforts to expand theplanning role of the International FrequencyRegistration Board (IFRB).

A broader, more extensive, and more con-ciliatory approach to international spectrumplanning would be required under this optionand could have a real chance of working,given some major changes in the U.S. ap-proach. In the long run it could be the leastexpensive and most effective option avail-able to this country.

Policy Option No. 5: Common-User System

As an alternative to contention for geosta-tionary satellite orbit slots, the UnitedStates and other developed countries couldenter into a joint venture with developingcountries to construct, launch, and operate acommon satellite system to meet domesticneeds for telecommunication and/or broad-cast services. The developed nations wouldprovide the private capital and technologicalresources necessary to construct and launchthe system, and would operate and manageit in conjunction with other using nations.All nations in the joint venture would havethe option of purchasing a share of the com-

. .


mon enterprise, up to their actual percentageof use of the system, and sharing propor-tionately in any profits. Such an arrange-ment would be similar to that governing theINTELSAT global satellite system used forinternational telecommunication. High-capa-city satellite systems employing technologyto make a common-user system economicand operationally attractive to developingcountries for domestic services is needed tomake a common-user system for domesticservices viable. Such a system could be partof the existing INTELSAT structure or aseparate structure established for this pur-pose.

Many developing nations are concernedthat the satellite orbit locations are being oc-cupied rapidly on a “first-come, first-served”basis, and that by the time they are in a posi-tion to use satellite systems there will be nodesirable orbit locations left for them. Itseems clear that the requirements of devel-oping countries will be for satellite serviceand not for satellite orbit locations that theymay not be able to use. This option wouldprovide service without allocating dedicatedorbit locations for individual users.

Moreover, the cost of developing andlaunching a dedicated satellite system isvery high, well beyond the capability of mostdeveloping countries for the foreseeable fu-ture. This option could provide satellite serv-ice well in advance of the time these coun-tries could afford their own systems, andmuch more cheaply. No large initial capitalinvestment would be required from user na-tions, and there would be little risk. Thetechnical expertise required to use such asystem is far less than is needed to constructone.

This is not a new concept. The prec-edent for such an initiative is the globalINTELSAT satellite system. Today 106countries, the great majority of them devel-oping, share in the management and oper-ation of the satellites that have been opti-mized for international usage.

A further indication of INTELSAT’s suc-cess, and of the developing countries’ stakein the INTELSAT organization has beenthat organization’s evolution towards play-ing a larger role in provision of domesticsatellite services. In 1974, Algeria proposedto lease spare INTELSAT capacity for en-hancement of its domestic telecommunica-tion network. Since then a total of 20 coun-tries have leased capacity from INTELSATfor domestic services and an additional 15countries have expressed interest in leasingcapacity in the next 2 years. By mid-decade,the total number of clients could easily growto 50 countries.

INTELSAT has responded to this demandby committing itself to include planned do-mestic capacity, as opposed to relying solelyon preemptible, spare capacity, in futuregenerations of satellites and has also soughtto develop higher powered satellites to becompatible with the small ground stationsthat have proven to be the most economicalfor domestic services.

While this policy option does not addressthe full range of problems before ITU, it doesoffer the prospect of relieving the pressureon a particularly important and contentiousissue. If low cost and technically attractivedomestic satellite capacity is made availablethrough an international organization thataccommodates the sovereignty interests ofeach country, many developing countriescould come to see access to orbital slots andsatellite frequencies as a side issue withavailability of service being the main objec-tive. Adoption of the common-user systemalternative would free-up orbital slots forthose major developing countries that con-tinued to desire their own separate domesticsystems whether for political reasons, orbecause requirements justified such a sys-tem economically.

A common-user system need not requireany Government funding by the UnitedStates. Sufficient capital and technicalresources exist in the private sector in the

—


United States, and within Europe and Japanto construct such a system as a commercialventure with expectations of future marketsfor follow-on equipment and services. Alter-natively, such systems could conceivably beinitiated with World Bank loan guarantees.

In summary, to the extent that developingcountries can be persuaded to evaluate theirneeds for domestic satellite service apartfrom political considerations, they may cometo believe that a common-user system canserve many of these needs at an early dateand more cheaply than can dedicated sys-tems, which could be many years away.Whether operated by INTELSAT or by aseparate organization, whether financedwith public or private funds, such a common-user system could relieve the pressures nowcreating the international tensions over useof the geostationary satellite orbit. Andwhile not a precedent in any specific way fordealing with the broader range of ITU spec-trum problems, a successful common-usersystem might at least show that difficultproblems can in some cases be removed fromITU for separate treatment.

Policy Option No. 6: “A Priori”Allotment

The United States could agree to partici-pate with other nations in the developmentof a long-range plan for the utilization ofsatellite orbit locations to serve par-ticipating nations’ domestic communica-tions requirements. This plan would assurethat orbital slots would be available for theuse of all nations when needed. In exchangefor this agreement, the developed nationswould likely insist that the plan be basedupon sound operating principles and up-dated regularly to take account of the latest,most efficient technology available. Tech-nical planning assistance would be provided.

A priori allotment of satellite orbit slotshas been a cause celebre among developingcountries and at WARC-79 a resolution wasadopted to consider this issue at a two-partspace WARC in the mid-1980’s. The United

States and others have opposed a priori allot-ment plans for satellite service as wastefuland inhibiting to technological advance-ment, Although this option goes a long waytoward accommodating the position of thedeveloping countries, need not be adverse toU.S. interests. It maintains a substantialdegree of flexibility important to the UnitedStates including the key qualification of a re-quirement for regular technological updat-ing that would help to avoid the worse conse-quences associated with rigid allotmentschemes like the one adopted at WARC-77for regions 2 and 3.

As far as the United States is concerned,certain types of a priori allotment planswould not be as objectionable as others.Plans based on sound engineering and opera-tional parameters might be workable inter-nationally, at least on a regional basis. In-deed, U.S. domestic satellite operations arebased more or less on an a priori approach.In the long run, the United States may haveenough satellite capacity made possible byadvanced technology to meet domesticneeds even if the orbit and spectrum avail-able to U.S. satellites is reduced. In the shortrun, the United States already has substan-tial numbers of operational satellites withadditional satellite systems planned foroperations in the near future.

In addition to the possible advantagesthat may result from updates to presentlyunforeseen technology, there are two factorsthat may help reduce the impact of a prioriallotments on the United States. One is ad-vanced technology including cellular satel-lite technology, already on the drawingboards, which will permit the construction oflarge, wideband satellites that can providevery large capacity from a single orbit slot.The other factor is the particular geographyof region 2 (North and South America). Asfar as the geostationary orbit is concerned,region 2 is naturally divided into twoparts—those nations located in the NorthernHemisphere and those in the Southern Hem-isphere. A second geographic factor thatserves to separate the hemispheres is the dis-


placement in longitude of the nations in thetwo hemispheres (see figs. 4 and 5). More-over, those nations situated close to theEquator enjoy the widest possible visibilityof the geostationary satellite orbit fromwithin their borders and have the greatestflexibility in positioning satellites in thatorbit.

Limitations on the number of satellitesthat can be placed in the geostationary orbitis the fundamental factor that must be ad-dressed to arrive at a solution to equitableaccess for all nations in region 2. The capabil-ity of the geostationary satellite orbit is pri-marily limited by the need to separate satel-lites operating in the same frequency band.When serving the same or adjacent coverageareas are not in close proximity, the requiredseparation between satellites serving theseareas may be significantly reduced. For ex-ample, current U.S. requirements for separa-tion between satellites in the fixed-satelliteservice serving a common coverage area is 4to 5 degrees. However, a satellite serving theUnited States and another one serving aSouth American country, if properly de-signed, could be essentially colocatedwithout harmful interference.

Figure 4.— Displacement in Longitude for Countriesin the Northern and Southern Hemispheres

\ 1.

\ \ 1

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment

A plan could be devised to take advantageof the geographic and technological factorsdiscussed above, which would serve to iso-late the capacity of the geostationary sat-ellite orbit into subregional areas. Specif-ically, it is technically feasible and could beoperationally practical for the geostationaryorbit to be used by nations of North Americaessentially independent of the use of the or-bit to be used by nations of South America.Moreover, the North American Continentconsists of three countries with very largeland areas that make the use of advancedtechnology using shaped-beam antennas at-tractive. Except for some possible coordina-tion problems near the border areas, it maybe possible to reuse the entire orbital arc sep-arately for each of the three countries.

The implications of this approach and itslinkage to the policy options discussed aboveare as follows:

1. This solution will require both coordina-tion and planning by the member na-tions of region 2 (Policy Option No. 4).

2. This solution would essentially lead to asubdivision of region 2 into two parts(Policy Option No. 3).

3. The practical use of a common-user sys-tem would be enhanced by this approach(Policy Option No. 5).

Although an a priori plan is implied in theapproach, it could be implemented withoutthe adverse limitations of a rigid a priori plansuch as adopted at WARC-77. If this ap-proach is possible, then an a priori allotmentto one country would not preclude using thesame allotment for others if certain technicaland operational guidelines were followed.

There may even be some benefits to theUnited States from adopting an a priori al-lotment plan. At present, there is consider-able uncertainty about the outcome of the1983 Region 2 Broadcasting Satellite Ad-ministrative Radio Conference and theSpace Planning Conference in the mid-1980’s. If a decision is postponed, the uncer-tainty would continue. A situation wouldthen be perpetuated in which any existing


Figure 5.—Available Geostationary Arc

(Southern) Alaska North America(Southern) Greenland

(Southern) Canada

115 95 I Terr i tor ia l IUnited States (Continental 48 States) limits

I 1 I130 114 82 63 56 Visible arc above

Mexico 20° elevation

tI 1

163 157 147Central America

61 49 43

Guatemala {

Honduras !

El Salvador I

i

Costa Rica IPanama t

Caribbean Area

Bahamas Barbados It Dominican Republic

i

Grenada I

South America 10Venezuela I

C o l o m b i a

Guyana i

Surinam i

French Guiana i

1 Brazil112 1 I 1

I \I

Ecuador{

10 3 –2

Bolivia

Paraguay i

30 17 8

130 121 37

SOURCE J D. Barnia

—.


domestic satellite orbit slot may potentiallybe withdrawn in the future. Moreover, nosatellite system designer could plan the log-ical evolution of a proposed system with con-fidence that the required additional allot-ments would be available.

It is also important to examine the tacticalaspects of agreeing to an a priori allotmentpolicy. By participating in the developmentof a plan, the United States would be in a po-sition to influence the type of plan adoptedand possibly gain concessions on otherissues of importance to the United States.

In short, the linkages and tradeoffs amongthese and other possible approaches to fu-ture use of the geostationary satellite orbitcast each U.S. policy option in a differentlight. Careful review in each case is neededfor sound policy formulation. Rather than re-

jecting a priori allotments as inherentlywasteful, it may be in the U.S. interest to ex-amine the principle, to modify it to avoid itsworst aspects, to examine the practical ef-fects, to examine the possibility of a quid proquo, and if the result looks acceptable, towork with the developing countries to imple-ment the plan.

The results of the OTA-sponsored surveyshow that the majority (68 percent) of therespondents believe that a practical com-promise is possible and desirable betweenthe evolutionary approach and a rigid apriori plan for use of the geostationary orbit.Another 15 percent of the respondents thinkthat a compromise is possible but undesir-able from a U.S. standpoint. Only 8 percentof the respondents said that a practical com-promise is impossible.

Chapter 6

Findings, Conclusions,and Observations

Contents

PageIntroduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

Principal Findings of the OTA Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

General Observations and Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

U.S. Policymaking Structure and Processes for Spectrum Managementand International Strategies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

Need for High-Level Government Policy Coordination andAccountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

Need for New Strategies to Address Spectrum and Related SatelliteOrbit Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

Strategies to Address International Issues and Deal With ITU. . . . . . . . . . 136Strategic Approaches—Options. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136Structure of ITU—Options. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

Consequences of WARC-79. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138General Observations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138Major Decisions and Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

Options Regarding Ratification of the Final Acts of WARC-79. . . . . . . . . . . 141

Future Conferences and Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1421982 Plenipotentiary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142Space Planning Conference.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , ,. 142HF Broadcasting Conference. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1431983 Broadcasting Satellite Conference for Region 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143Other Conferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143

Chapter 6

Findings, Conclusions,and Observations

TheUnitedficient,

Introductiontelecommunication systems of theStates are the most sophisticated, ef-and all-encompassing in the world.

These systems are a vital element of our eco-nomic strength and security; they are an es-sential part of our culture. Other nations,recognizing the key role that telecommunic-ation plays in national and international af-fairs, are constantly striving to surpass theUnited States in technological inventivenessand in the practical exploitation of the manytelecommunication subsystems that makeup the modern “information society. ”

As a leader in technology, the UnitedStates has been able to proceed with its do-mestic telecommunication programs more orless independent of international concerns.The United States has played a major role inshaping what has been essentially a benignand passive international mechanism re-sponsive to the task of providing order to thekey element in 20th century communica-tions—the radiofrequency spectrum.

This international regime is coming underconsiderable stress as the result of sharplyincreased demand for new communicationservices and resulting congestion in keyparts of the radio spectrum. WARC-79 andrelated international conferences and meet-ings demonstrate conclusively that conten-tion for access to radio spectrum and its im-

oportant collateral element, the geostationaryrbit for space satellites, presents new and

urgent challenges to vital U.S. national in-terests.

Given the complexities of spectrum man-agement in a changing world environmentand the increased importance of telecommu-nication to both developed and developing

nations, it is highly unlikely that traditionalU.S. approaches to these issues will be suffi-cient to protect U.S. vital interests in thefuture. The growing differences amongnations over the use of the radio spectrumand related satellite orbit capacity arereflected in the Final Acts of WARC-79.

Overall, the results of WARC-79 aremixed. Generally, the proceedings of an ad-ministrative conference of the InternationalTelecommunication Union (ITU) are gearedtoward arriving at decisions and adoptingprovisions that are acceptable to all nations.It is expected that all nations will reportfavorable results with certain exceptionsidentified. Even then, a country is free totake a reservation and not be bound by spe-cific unacceptable results. Therefore, findinga useful way to measure success and eval-uate a country’s relative standing followingan administrative radio conference is noteasy. Comparing specific U.S. proposals sub-mitted to the conference with the Final Actsof the conference is not a straightforward ex-ercise. Too many events intervene to colorthe comparison between the preconferenceposition and the ultimate result on many im-portant issues. While such a comparison isimportant, it does not reflect the underlyingreasons and motives for particular decisions,the problems encountered or any apparenttrends important in evaluating results of anadministrative conference.

It is important to understand the interven-ing events that underlie decisions, not onlyto evaluate the results of WARC-79, but toprepare for the many future conferences ofconsequences for the United States. As ahighly developed user of spectrum and a

129


world leader in telecommunication tech- and much to lose in the international processnology, the United States has much to offer of establishing rules and regulations.

Principal Findings of the OTA StudyThe most significant findings of the study

are the following:

1.

2.

3.

●

There is an urgent need for higher levelattention to Government policy coor-dination and accountability for interna-tional telecommunication issues gener- 4.ally and for spectrum management is-sues and international negotiations spe-cifically.Streamlined processes, coordinatedGovernment policies and sufficient re- 5.sources on a continuing basis are essen-tial to effective and timely preparationfor the several major international con-ferences of ITU now scheduled to occurover the next 7 years.New U.S. approaches are necessary toaddress radio spectrum and related sat-

ellite orbit issues in a changing world en-vironment. Solutions to satellite orbit al-location and spectrum reallocationissues as envisioned by the Third Worldnations require strategies not yet devel-oped or tested.WARC-79 resulted in the loss of someU.S. flexibility in certain key spectrumareas—particularly those affecting na-tional defense—and enhanced opportu-nities in many other areas.Operating costs will increase for certainradio services; interference protectionwill become less certain; and administra-tive costs will need to rise to adequatelyimplement WARC-79 decisions and toprepare for future radio conferences.

General Observations and TrendsThe world environment for telecommu-

nications has changed significantly in recentyears; two-thirds of the 155 member nationsof ITU can be classified as developing orThird World countries.

● The United States must develop ap-proaches to use its technology and expandits influence if future actions in a “one-nation, one-vote” forum, like ITU, are to befavorable to U.S. positions.

● There has been a gradual shift towardrecognizing the legitimacy of nontechnicalfactors such as political and cultural inter-ests and values in ITU deliberations. Inother international forums, Third Worldcountries have raised related issues underconcepts of the New World economic orderand New World information order.

● There are basic differences between theUnited States and Third World countriesover the principles that should govern theallocation and use of radio spectrum and re-lated satellite orbit capacity. There is in-creasing need to identify and assess middlerange options to reconcile the sometimessharply divergent goals of developed and de-veloping countries.

● The disparity between nations in theirability to use the spectrum is growing; thisleads to growing disagreements over the al-location and use of specific frequency bandsfor specific services.

● Third World countries are increasinglyable to influence and shape internationalcommunication policies in internationalforums.

Ch. 6—Findings, Conclusions, and Observations . 131

● Spectrum decisions arrived at as aresult of voting within ITU, as opposed tothe commonly practiced consensus ap-proach, will tend to be increasingly adverseto the United States.

• U.S. requirements for access to the fre-quency spectrum and satellite orbit loca-tions are expanding with the explosivegrowth in telecommunication/informationtechnology, the growing use of satellites,and the increasing dependence on radio and

satellites for military and national securitypurposes.

● International telecommunication develop-ment is entering a phase in which regionaland domestic needs and policies will predom-inate, as opposed to more general global fa-cilities expansion. The thrust will be on in-traregional communications and the devel-opment or enhancement of interregionalcommunication routes.

U.S. Policymaking Structure and Processes forSpectrum Management and

International StrategiesNeed for High-Level Government

Policy Coordination andAccountability

● The responsibility y for spectrum man-agement and policymaking is divided amongseveral Federal agencies with coordinationconducted on a structured, but often infor-mal, basis without clear responsibility andaccountability for policy at a high level ofGovernment.

• The United States does not have a con-sistent and coordinated national telecommu-nication policy because of a lack of apprecia-tion and concern at the top levels of Govern-ment and industry, a lack of high-level policycoordination for international telecom-munication negotiations, and a failure toassign sufficient importance to internationaltelecommunication matters, including spec-trum management and the State Depart-ment’s role in international negotiations.

● The United States is not adequatelyequipped to provide comprehensive assess-ments required to effectively plan for thefuture use of the radio spectrum, to forecastfuture requirements, to assess the costs andbenefits of shifts to new technology, or toevaluate alternative strategies to deal with

international issues regarding allocation anduse of radio spectrum and the geostationarysatellite orbit.

● Within the U.S. telecommunication in-dustry there has been significant growth andchange over the past 15 years, which hasproduced more competing domestic interestswith conflicting demands for spectrum use.

● The United States’ permanent spectrummanagement mechanisms are not adequate-ly equipped to review and verify all thestated requirements of Government andnongovernment spectrum users and to ad-just needs consistent with national policyobjectives. The U.S. lacks an effective on-going means of collecting data, developingand adjusting guidelines to evaluate themerits of one spectrum use over any other.

● The State Department’s InternationalCommunications Policy Office is not at ahigh enough level in the Department’s orga-nizational structure to be in a position to pre-pare adequately for all the important up-coming conferences of ITU and make its in-fluence felt in the upper echelons of Govern-ment and industry.

● Lack of high-level concern has also ledto a shortage of trained and experienced


spectrum management personnel to replacethose retiring from Federal Governmentservice; there has been insufficient attentionto the need for personnel with supplement-ary diplomatic, language, negotiating, eco-nomic, and legal skills.

● The rather general wording of ExecutiveOrder 12046 establishing the National Tele-communications and Information Adminis-tration (NTIA) leaves it ambiguous as tohow far NTIA can go in its coordinating rolewith respect to U.S. international telecom-munications policy, particularly when thatmandate risks encroachment on the generalregulatory responsibilities of the FederalCommunications Commission (FCC).

● The schedule of 10 major internationalconferences over the next 7 years to considera number of issues vital to U.S. interests un-derscores the fact that the United Statesmust reform its policymaking mechanismsand streamline the cumbersome and time-consuming procedures for developing U.S.proposals for international telecommunica-tion conferences.

● A mechanism is needed for collectingand evaluating information on the perceivedneeds of other nations for spectrum andorbit resources; their receptivity to intrare-gional and/or common-user systems, andother factors.

Need for New Strategies toAddress Spectrum and Related

Satellite Orbit Issues

● There are critical years ahead for ITU.For the most part, the manner in which acti-vities have been conducted by telecommuni-cation experts and international diplomacyhas avoided debate on ideology and political-ly motivated objectives. The trend towardbasing decisions on factors other than eco-nomic and technical matters, and demon-strated need is challenging ITU to providemechanisms for resolving differences amongnations without a further shift toward the

polemical norms common to internationalpolitical debate.

● Third World countries are likely toresist drastic changes in ITU rules and pro-cedures that operate on the principle of “one-nation, one-vote” and that provide themwith increasing influence and power. Theywill continue to seek technical assistancefrom the developed countries while pursuingcompromises favorable to their own in-terests.

● The developed countries are expandingtheir use of spectrum to higher frequencybands as lower, more economical bands be-come congested. They rely on technology toprovide solutions to problems of accommo-dating new demands in the future. It is be-coming increasingly difficult for the develop-ing countries to accept the proposition thatthey will have access to spectrum on an in-terference-free basis at some future date astheir needs materialize. The outlook is thatthe radiofrequency spectrum and geostation-ary orbit will become more congested in thelower, more economical and desirable fre-quency bands even though use of frequen-cies by one country does not necessarily pre-empt those same frequencies from use byother countries. It seems increasingly clearthat the United States will need to explorenew strategies and policy options to recon-cile Third World interests with the objec-tives of the United States.

● WARC-79 showed the increasing in-fluence of the Third World as a political forcein ITU. The struggle for influence betweenthe developed and developing nations willcontinue at future ITU conferences. At thepresent time, the developing countriesderive their power from their collective num-bers; the developed countries from theirtechnical competence, knowhow, and leader-ship. The influence of the developing coun-tries can most effectively be exploited in theITU legislative forums; the developed na-tions through ITU technical administrativeorgans.

Ch. 6—Findings, Cone/us\ons, and Observations ● 133

● The success of ITU has been due in largemeasure to the willingness of its members toadhere voluntarily to commonly arrived atagreements and regulations. The inherentflexibility in the ITU processes has also en-hanced its effectiveness. Reservations andfootnotes offer escape for individual coun-tries from disagreeable decisions of the ma-jority. However, excessive use of these ex-ceptions by a sufficient number of coun-tries—or by a few large users—serves toreduce the value of the agreements and reg-ulations for all users.

● Existing ITU procedures that vestrights in the use of spectrum to countries onan “as needed, first-come, first-served basis”are viewed by developing countries as notserving their objectives and they now seekto alter those procedures.

● The growing lack of agreement amongnations over which specific frequency bandsshould be allocated for which specific radioservices (the International Table of Fre-quency Allocations) strongly suggests thatmechanisms other than service classifica-tions should be examined.

● ITU is a political organization that per-forms both political and technical functions.However, while there is a primarily technicalfocus for most ITU activities, there has beena gradual shift toward recognizing the legit-imacy of nontechnical factors, such as polit-ical and cultural interests and values. TheUnited States must recognize this shift anddevelop strategies to use its technologymore broadly as a tool for resolving thesebroader international issues that are not sub-ject to technical solution.

● Many of the nontechnical issues raisedin ITU—like those concerning reallocation ofspectrum and guaranteed access to the geo-stationary satellite orbit—are among themany issues raised by Third World countriesin other international forums under the prin-ciples propounded by the New World eco-nomic order and New World informationorder. Those countries seek to alter the age-old pattern and structure of trade, communi-

cation, and information flow by developingand using telecommunication infrastructurethemselves.

● Developing countries will continue toseek changes in the existing mechanism forvesting rights in the use of frequencies andaccess to the geostationary orbit. They seeka shift away from the current notificationand coordination procedure on a “first-come,first-served” basis, toward a negotiated plandeveloped on an a priori basis. This is ex-pected to reduce the uncertainties they fearin gaining access through the current ap-proach, albeit at the expense of a possible“freezing” of technology.

● The administrative regulations of ITUserve the desirable objective—without theuse of sanctions for noncompliance—ofavoiding the interference, incompatibilitiesand chaos that would ensue if these or sim-ilar regulations were not followed.

• The voluminous, complex, and detailedprovisions of the international radio regula-tions are becoming more burdensome for theworld and less meaningful to individualusers.

. Third World countries will continue toadvocate changes in rules, regulations, andprocedures that help guarantee their per-ceived right of access to the spectrum andgeostationary satellite orbit. They do notwish to rely on the “good efforts, promises,and technical ability of the developed coun-tries to “engineer-in” future systems on acase-by-case basis, as needed.

● ITU administrative radio conferencesseek to produce results that all nations canaccept. Reservations, footnotes and othermeans to reduce negative consequencesallow each nation to more or less view theresults as favorable. This approach supportsthe perception of having all winners and nolosers. However, because of growing dif-ferences among nations, these proceduresare beginning to produce diluted and cum-bersome results that may render existingmechanisms to regulate world spectrum useless and less meaningful.


● Because of competing interests andgrowing differences over use of the spectrumthere will be winners and losers in the futureas a result of the ITU decisionmakingprocess.

● The preeminence of U.S. technologicalleadership and technical ability served theUnited States well in international spectrumnegotiations when decisions were primarilybased on technical matters. But more andmore U.S. problems with other countries in-volving spectrum use are nontechnical.

● Certain U.S. requirements to use spec-trum, such as radars for military purposes,are not of interest to the majority of othercountries which prefer to have this samespectrum allocated to services they need ordesire. The difficulty that faces the UnitedStates in seeking to convince a majority ofthe 155 other ITU member countries toadopt regulations that accommodate U.S.radars that conflict with other possible usesby other countries is real and was demon-strated at WARC-79.

● Rights to frequencies and satellite loca-tions to individual nations are not vested in-definitely under current ITU procedures,and changes in operating parameters requirerecoordination and registration. This createsuncertainty for present satellite system op-erators. The risks may increase that spec-trum and orbit will not be available to pro-vide for continuity of service from the pres-ent to the next generation of satellites. More-over, this problem is not overcome by theadoption of a negotiated rigid a priori allot-ment plan to assure future access, since sucha plan would tend to freeze technology andaccommodate only those new or second gen-eration satellites that fit the original tech-nical scheme.

Options

Possible Structural ImprovementsThere are three fundamental weaknesses

in the present Federal Government policy-making structure:

1.

2.

3.

The lack of attention at the top decisionlevels of the Government and industryas to the vital role of telecommunica-tions in the international and domesticpolitical, economic, and private affairsof the United States and the need forpolicy coordination;There is a lack of high-level centralizedpolicy coordination and guidance for in-ternational telecommunication negotia-tions at a high enough level in the Gov-ernment to be effective.The State Department’s InternationalCommunications Policy Office is neitherstaffed nor institutionally organized tocarry out effectively all of the functionsinvolved in international telecommuni-cation negotiations.

Congress could consider ways to improvethe present structure or examine possiblechanges in the structure. A detailed analysisof alternative structures was beyond thescope of this study, which concentrates onthe results of WARC-79. However, at leastfour options are available to Congress:

1.

2.

3.

4.

maintain the status quo and make nochanges;maintain the present structure, butraise the level of attention and account-ability within the responsible agencies;establish a mechanism—such as a taskforce of high-level government offi-cials—to develop, examine, and makerecommendations on structural and pro-cedural improvements; orestablish a permanent board, council, orinteragency - committee of high-levelGovernment officials to be responsibleand accountable for international tele-communication policy coordination andthe preparations for international con-ferences.

Possible Procedural Improvements

● Improvements needed in the presentprocedures for managing and planning Gov-ernment and nongovernment use of the spec-trum include better means to provide ade-quately for:

Ch. 6—Findings, Conclusions, and Observations ● 135

— evaluation and validation of spectrumrequirements, giving particular atten-tion to current spectrum usage, technol-ogy and development trends, and shar-ing opportunities between competingusers of the spectrum;

— inclusion of spectrum and orbit efficienttechniques and technology in systemdesign of both Government and nongov-ernment systems;

— apportionment of frequency spectrumbetween Government and nongovern-ment services based on national priori-ties;

— effective planning for future spectrumand orbit needs;

— efficient and timely preparation for andparticipation in ITU conferences; and

— effective management of existing serv-ices and users on a continuing basis.

● Many of these shortcomings could becorrected without fundamental changes inthe Government structure.

The validation of spectrum requirements,and the apportioning of spectrum betweenGovernment and nongovernment users,needs closer scrutiny. An enhancement of ex-isting mechanisms using analytical tools tohelp evaluate needs and arrange prioritiesamong contentious users would provide bet-ter information for decisionmakers. Militaryrequirements are reviewed by the Interde-partment Radio Advisory Committee(IRAC) and its Spectrum Planning Subcom-mittee, but this function needs to bestrengthened and broadened to be more ef-fective in the future.

● Economic techniques should be con-sidered, at least on an experimental basis, toprovide guidance on the consequences of dif-ferent spectrum allocation decisions and theintroduction of newer technology. Theseshould include techniques for evaluating therelative economic viability of alternativespectrum uses, as well as radio v. nonradiocommunication systems.

● FCC, perhaps with the aid of a taskforce including other Government agencies

that have studied the question, industrygroups and private experts, should select afew services and frequency bands for de-tailed analysis of the prospects of using oneor more economic techniques. The Commis-sion could then present its recommendationsfor the experimental application of a selectedtechnique, or techniques, on one or a limitednumber of services and frequency bands tothe Congress for its information and action,if necessary.

● Problems relating to forming a U.S.delegation for WARC-79 could be addressedand the effectiveness of U.S. participation ininternational meetings could be improved byseveral steps:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

industry and other nongovernmentdelegates could again be permitted toparticipate fully as U.S. representativesat international telecommunication con-ferences and take any assignments onthe delegation for which their skills andexperience qualify them;consideration could be given to findingmeans to comply with due process re-quirements under the AdministrativeProcedure Act and still name industryand other nongovernment representa-tives to delegations on a timely basis;permanent guidelines to name the chair-man and individual delegates to the U.S.delegation could be established;qualifications required, distribution ofvarious skills needed, and type of repre-sentation desired could be determined atan early stage of preparation for confer-ences;individuals chosen to serve on U.S. dele-gations could be selected from the bestcandidates available, especially thosewho participated in the preparatory ef-fort; andany special Government support neces-sary to acquire particular representa-tion on the delegation could be availableearly in the preparatory stages.

● Preparations for international telecom-munication conferences could be improved


by replacing the ad hoc approach with an on-going conference preparatory structure witha focal point for high-level responsibility and

Strategies to Addressand Deal

The United States must make some policydecisions reflecting changes in U.S. strategyor in the structure or procedures of ITU, andthen augment the scope and training of theresponsible U.S. personnel consistent withthose decisions.

The United States has essentially two al-ternatives: 1) it can seek various improve-ments in the present means for solving spec-trum allocation problems within ITU as it isnow constituted; or 2) it can seek to alter theexisting structure, procedures, or mechan-isms of ITU itself. The policy options consid-ered here may be divided into two broad cat-egories, strategic and structural.

Strategic Approaches – Options

● From the strategic standpoint, assum-ing no significant changes in ITU, theUnited States has a wide range of options.At one extreme, the United States may con-clude that the drawbacks of continued par-ticipation in ITU outweigh the benefits, andwithdraw from the organization or decline toparticipate in its deliberations. At the otherextreme, the United States may decide toyield to other nations on controversial mat-ters, accept all decisions taken within ITU,and play a passive role in its deliberations.Between these extremes there are a numberof alternatives.

1 Seek to remove the most controversialissues from the ITU forum and attemptto solve them in other ways. A currentexample might be to respond to thedemands of developing countries for“guaranteed access” to radio spectrum

accountability involving all the concernedGovernment and nongovernment telecom-munication interests.

International IssuesWith ITU

2.

3.

4.

and satellite locations by developing theinstitutional arrangements to ensure do-mestic communication services to quali-fying nations. This could be a commonuser satellite system either buildingupon the present INTELSAT structureor creating a separate system for domes-tic services. Such a solution would offereach nation a role and stake in thesystem with satellite services or capabil-ity it could realistically use. This couldavoid the issue of allocating to small na-tions significant amounts of the radiospectrum and satellite orbit locationswhich might then remain unused for theforeseeable future.Develop a comprehensive program withnecessary resources to better coordinateU.S. views and objectives with other na-tions, in advance of ITU meetings, andadjust U.S. proposals based on im-proved understanding of other nations’views.Develop a range of options for “plan-ning” the use of the geostationary satel-lite orbit–between the evolutionary ap-proach advocated by the United Statesand any rigid a priori allotment planthat may be advocated by some develop-ing countries—and consider these op-tions informally with key countries priorto ITU conferences.Seek to raise the level of technical com-petency among ITU member states andraise the level and quality of communi-cations and information capabilities ac-cessible to them through educationaland technical assistance programs.


Structure of ITU – Options

● From the structural standpoint, assum-ing that ITU can be changed, a number ofoptions are available. One relatively extremeoption would be for the United States towithdraw from ITU. Another option wouldbe to seek to revise the voting formula ofITU to one more advantageous to the UnitedStates, perhaps by giving added votingweight to those countries that contributemost heavily to the U.N. budget. A moremodest option would be to increase thenumber of ITU regions beyond the presentthree so that regional issues could be dealtwith by a smaller number of countries mostdirectly concerned.

1. Withdrawal from ITU—Member nationsof ITU rely on the organization to avoidinterference from the radio signals ofothers and to achieve compatibility ofinterconnected telecommunication sys-tems. Avoidance of interference is theessence of spectrum allocation or fre-quency assignment processes of ITU.Withdrawal from ITU could well inten-sify the risk of interference. It seemsclear that preemption of radio spectrumby the United States would be ineffec-tive and that U.S. radio services wouldbe vulnerable to interference without re-course to the protections provided underthe international radio regulations. Anynation that chose to interfere, whetherdue to a valid need for a particular fre-quency band or by intentional jamming,could greatly reduce the value to theUnited States of the preempted spec-trum. Withdrawal from the ITU organi-zation would not eliminate the mutualdesirability for the United States andother countries to coordinate spectrumuse as well as other telecommunicationactivities now performed through ITU.

2.

3.

Revised ITU voting formula–As an op-tion less drastic than withdrawal fromITU, the United States might join withother developed nations to force a revi-sion of the ITU’s “one-nation, one-vote”decisionmaking formula toward onethat would reflect the dominance of thedeveloped nations in the actual use ofthe spectrum. If successful, this optionwould greatly reduce the ability of theThird World nations to block or forcechanges in U.S. positions. But those na-tions are likely to resist such revisionsvigorously and given their current vot-ing strength it is difficult to see how anyweighted voting scheme could be forcedin ITU short of amassing pressure inmany other areas.Increased regionalization of ITU–Atpresent, ITU divides the world intothree geographic regions and many is-sues that can be treated separately andeffectively in a single region are consid-ered in this way. Regional administra-tive radio conferences are scheduled ona variety of specific issues, allowingthe World Administrative Radio Confer-ences to “spinoff” certain controversialmatters (and incidentally, to delay theirconsideration). One option would be toextend this process of regionalization ona, geographic basis to smaller subre-gions, and/or an issue basis to includeonly those nations directly affected bythe particular issue. The purpose wouldbe to reduce the number of nationsvoting on issues that do not affect themdirectly, thus reducing unnecessary con-tention and possibly reducing costs andtime of reaching a multilateral agree-ment.


Consequences of WARC-79General Observations

● ITU administrative radio conferencesare difficult to rate in terms of success orfailure. The box score approach, which meas-ures proposals submitted against the confer-ence Final Acts, is inadequate and mislead-ing because it fails to take account of the im-portance and consequences of particular de-cisions. The underlying trends and the basesfor decisions and compromises, which haveimportant future consequences, are not cap-tured in the win, loss, and tie columns.

● WARCs are conducted and apply mech-anisms that allow each member-nation toperceive that most of its needs are met nomatter how unfortunate the results may befor the collective international community.

● In general and apart from any specificproposal or action, the members of the in-formed community responding to the OTA-sponsored survey perceived WARC-79 asproducing results that were either somewhatbetter than expected or about what was an-ticipated before the conference. However, ex-pectations may have been colored by thegrowing concern over possible confrontationwith the Third World that preceded WARC-79.

● The OTA-sponsored survey found thatmost individuals responding to the question-naire believe that WARC-79 had a favorableimpact on both U.S. national interests (53percent) and their own organization (58 per-cent). The major exception to this view isfound among a minority of individuals main-ly in the private sector, who maintain thatWARC-79 had a net unfavorable impact ontheir organizations’ operations (15 percent).A substantial number of respondents (33percent) said that the results of WARC-79were neither favorable or unfavorable to U.S.national interests.

● The 1977 broadcasting satellite WARCwas of great importance for the United

States because it demonstrated conclusivelythat the developing countries could unite topursue a collective goal. In this case, the goalwas consistent with the objectives of theWestern European countries goal (albeit fordifferent reasons), but inconsistent with U.S.(and others) proposals and efforts to adopt adifferent approach based on technical argu-ments to support the U.S. position. It alsoshowed that the perceptions and priorities ofthe developing countries differed from oursand that technical arguments could not becounted upon to win out over political con-siderations.

● At WARC-79, there was too much to do,too little time to do it, and too many conflict-ing interests to deal effectively with many ofthe issues. Therefore, the conference madeuse of the several vehicles available to an ad-ministrative conference to proceed withoutforcing agreements or attempting to resolvedifficult issues that could be postponed. Tak-ing footnotes to the allocation table; adopt-ing resolutions; postponing issues to futureconferences; and taking reservations are ve-hicles that have always been available, butat WARC-79 ITU members found it neces-sary to use them more than ever before.

● No immediate changes in operationsusing the radio spectrum or geostationarysatellite orbit are required in the UnitedStates as a result of WARC-79. However, thelonger range impacts in terms of increasedoperating costs, reduced operating flexibil-ity, uncertainty surrounding importantpending issues, and the need for thoroughpreparations to address issues at future con-ferences require immediate attention.

● The radio regulations serve essentiallytwo functions: 1) to establish technicalstandards and regulations about what kindsof services can use what parts of the spec-trum under given conditions; and 2) to estab-lish procedures for countries to acquire oper-ating rights and protection from interfer-


ence. Developed countries participate inWARCs with a strong focus on improvingand elaborating on technical standards andprocedures to protect existing spectrumusers; developing countries want to focus onunderlying principles, alternative ways tovest rights in the use of frequencies, andways to make ITU more responsive to theirneeds.

● INTELSAT, as a world organization of106 member countries, had significant influ-ence at WARC-79 on fixed-satellite service(FSS) matters.

• The nonalined nations played a signifi-cant role at WARC-79, frequently operatingas an effective force.

● WARC-79 adopted several resolutionsand provisions that call for increased assist-ance in various forms to developing coun-tries.

● The conference resolutions calling for anumber of future conferences, includingthose to “plan” space services and the inter-national broadcasting service, demonstratethat the achievement of U.S. objectives atITU conferences will no longer be a matter ofreaching agreement on technical solutions toproblems of spectrum allocations and fre-quency coordination; it will require im-aginative approaches, with political negotia-tions involving long, hard bargaining.

Major Decisions and Consequences

● There is no major immediate cost im-pact imposed by WARC-79 regarding na-tional security systems, largely because ofthe frequency flexibility of existing U.S.equipment, the success of the U.S. delega-tion at WARC, and reservations taken bythe United States. However, there will befuture, undetermined costs resulting fromactions at WARC-79—costs associated withfrequency management, the developmentand procurement of more sophisticatedequipment, compatibility studies, and coor-dination to prevent harmful interferencewith competing users of the spectrum.

● Department of Defense (DOD) interestswere impacted by losses of exclusivity forradiolocation (radar) operations and by in-creased sharing with other services in manyof the radiolocation bands. For example,demands that radar operations be discon-tinued in certain bands in order to accom-modate expanded FSS operations led to con-siderable acrimony, which was only eased bya nonbinding U.S. commitment in a formaldeclaration to try to accommodate FSS inthose bands. The status of radiolocation wasretained but the pressure from FSS interestswill certainly continue.

● Radar usage by the radiolocation serv-ice is extremely heavy in the radiolocationbands between 8500 and 10,000 MHz. Theaddition of the radionavigation service andthe multicountry fixed and mobile footnotesin this band have taken 900 MHz of virtuallyexclusive radiolocation allocations in the cur-rent radio regulations and added one or moreprimary services over the entire band. Tech-nical and administrative solutions must besought if radiolocation is to retain its effec-tiveness. IRAC, in particular, could developa set of recommendations for use by theState Department in discussions with othercountries with a view to encouraging theorderly and restrained introduction of radio-navigation on an “as needed” basis in orderto buy time for the development of technicalsolutions to sharing problems. In theabsence of such a planned introduction, theradiolocation service may soon find itselfhaving a de facto secondary status becauseof the safety-of-life priorities accorded the ra-dionavigation service.

● The United States took a reservation in-dicating that the United States, in the opera-tion of radars, will not guarantee protectionto, nor coordination with, other services. Theaction was necessary because the existenceof the fixed and mobile services footnotes inevery radiolocation band between 1 and 40GHz jeopardized radar operations to servenational defense.

● Notwithstanding the fact that WARC-79 did little to reduce the total spectrum


available for radar operations, and also, thatU.S. military radars are now required tooperate worldwide in a secondary status, thecosts of radar development and operationmust increase as a result of decisions takenat WARC. New coordinating activity mustnow take place between the radiolocationservice and a number of other services thatwill share the same frequency bands, par-ticularly the fixed, mobile, and radionaviga-tion services. A significant number of in-terference incidents can be anticipated inthese bands. In the long term, modificationsof existing systems and development of newones must be increased to guarantee the per-formance of military radars in the presenceof increased interference. A further addedcost derives from the need for radar develop-ers to expand their participation in CCIR inorder to lay a better foundation for U.S. pro-posals concerning radars at future con-ferences.

● U.S. objectives for FSS and the mobile-satellite service (MSS) (including DOD satel-lite interests) were achieved in large meas-ure. The DOD goal of adding 125 MHz forup- and down-links for the two services wasachieved, but this meant that the partial ex-clusivity that existed for FSS was lost.There may be problems in satisfying someDOD satellite communication requirementsin the 7- and 8-GHz bands. Also, the UnitedStates and most NATO countries took areservation regarding language in the FinalActs that requires that stations in MSS op-erating in the band 235 to 399.9 MHz notcause harmful interference to those of otherservices operating, or planning to operate, inaccordance with the table of allocations.

● Significant amounts of spectrum wereadded to allocations for FSS, in general ac-cordance with U.S. objectives. The technicalrules that affect the design, operation, andcost of satellite systems were generally inagreement with U.S. positions. Where U.S.desires were not precisely met, no signif-icantly adverse repercussions resulted. Noimmediate or significant changes in thestructure or operation of U.S. fixed-satellite

telecommunication services will result fromconference decisions. No operational or eco-nomic dislocation was imposed on any ex-isting FSS system. No major burden appearsto be placed on the U.S. Government or pri-vate operating entities in order to complywith the decisions of WARC. However, thedifferences between the United States andmany developing countries over approachesto use of the geostationary satellite orbit, tobe resolved by future conferences, leaves theimpact on FSS uncertain.

• While, based on U.S. proposals,WARC-79 largely eliminated frequency shar-ing between FSS and broadcasting-satelliteservices (BSS) in the Americas, BSS mustnow share with the terrestrial-fixed service.This sharing could result in interference toBSS Earth-station receivers operating in thesame area as fixed-station transmitters. Thiscould have a negative impact on privatemicrowave systems that use the band 12.3 to12.7 GHz. These private systems are widelyused in the United States by a variety ofusers. If required to vacate the band to pro-tect BSS and move to a higher frequencyband, there would be economic and opera-tional consequences.

● WARC-79 made substantial increasedallocations to FSS in the “lower” frequencybands where technology is well developedand relatively economical. WARC-79 alsoreaffirmed the FSS allocations near 20 and30 GHz where the next generation of domes-tic communication satellites is now underdevelopment. This new generation of satel-lites is likely to offer a greater variety ofservices to more users and lower costs.

• Because of the highly efficient usealready being made of existing allocationsfor the fixed service, the changes adopted atWARC-79 consisted mainly of attempts toaline the allocations among the three regionsand, through footnotes, to accommodate thespecific needs of individual countries.

● The decisions of WARC-79 affecting theuse of microwave radio relay systems do not

Ch. 6—Findings, Conclusions, and Observations . 141

mandate any drastic U.S. changes in spec-trum allocation and management.

● In order to simplify the administrativeprocess for certain countries which other-wise might need to coordinate with a numberof neighboring states, the radio regulationswere revised and simplified at the risk ofcreating future interference problems. Thechanges were opposed by the United States,Canada, and others that felt that sound tech-nical judgments should not be eroded by po-litical or administrative considerations.

• The U.S. objective to gain more frequen-cy allocations for high frequency (HF) broad-casting could only be done at the expense of

the fixed service, and was therefore opposedby many developing countries. The HFbroadcasting allocations were increased con-ditioned on the successful outcome of aspecialized HF broadcasting conference tobe held in the mid-1980’s to “plan” for moreefficient and equitable use of the broad-casting bands. While the conference agendawill be relatively broad and open, it was ap-parent at WARC-79 that the United Statesand the developing countries have signifi-cant differences as to the type of planning tobe undertaken. Also, political issues, such as“prior consent,” could prove troublesome, atthis conference.

Options Regarding Ratification of theFinal Acts of WARC-79

1. The United States can ratify the FinalActs without delay with the normal clarifica-tion of U.S. statements in the Final Protocol.Completing the ratification process prior toJanuary 1, 1982, when the 1979 radio regula-tions enter into force will indicate to othernations our goodwill and determination toabide by our international obligations. TheFinal Acts constitute the “Radio Regula-tions, Geneva, 1979, ” which replace the 1959regulations as partially revised by the ad-ministrative radio conferences held in 1963,1966, 1967, 1971, 1974, and 1978. The FinalActs also incorporate the provisions of the1977 broadcast satellite WARC as modifiedby WARC-79.

2. The United States can ratify the FinalActs with conditions, thereby underscoringand making explicit the reservations takenat Geneva. In particular, the United Statescould reiterate the reasons for taking reser-vations in the Final Protocol to emphasizeU.S. Government concern regarding theseissues.

3. The United States can ratify the FinalActs with additional reservations that either

state U.S. refusal to acquiesce to particulardecisions taken at WARC-79, beyond thosecited in earlier U.S. protocol statements, orset forth U.S. policy with respect to futureactions by ITU or specific implementation ofthe WARC-79 Final Acts. While it is not un-common for the Senate to attach conditionsto a resolution of ratification of a bilateral in-ternational agreement, which the other par-ty can readily accept or reject through itsown ratification processes, attaching condi-tions to a multilateral agreement raises dif-ficulties.

4. The United States can ratify the FinalActs in part, specifically withholding rat-ification of those provisions (which wouldhave to be listed in precise detail) where theUnited States chooses to remain bound bythe provisions of existing regulations previ-ously ratified (which would also have to belisted in precise detail).

5. The United States can withhold ratifica-tion of the Final Acts pending the outcomeof several important international confer-ences dealing with telecommunication is-sues. This would deny FCC and the current


administration any legal basis for imple-menting decisions taken at WARC-79, manyof which were strongly advocated by theUnited States and fought for by the U.S. del-egation, and which are scheduled for imple-mentation by other ITU members on Jan-uary 1, 1982. The most immediate interna-tional telecommunication conference of greatimportance to the Unites States is the Sep-tember 1982 plenipotentiary. The actions

taken at this conference to revise the ITUconvention will be basic to all future con-ferences of ITU.

6. The United States can reject the FinalActs of WARC-79 in their entirety and an-nounce that we intend to abide by the preex-isting radio regulations, as amended. Theconsequences would be similar to those citedabove.

Future Conferences and Issues1982 Plenipotentiary

● This conference provides the UnitedStates with an opportunity to proposechanges in the structures and procedures ofITU, and to resist changes proposed byothers that are not in the interest of theUnited States. It is vital that the UnitedStates make thorough preparations for thismeeting and to anticipate fully the proposalsthat may be put forward by other ITUmembers.

● The basic principles contained in theITU convention will be reviewed and modifi-cations made in accordance with the will ofthe majority. The convention serves to guideinternational cooperation for use of telecom-munications of all kinds, and governs thefunctioning of ITU itself. Changes in theconvention will be fundamental to futuremeetings of ITU. For example, any changein article 33 of the convention concerning useof the spectrum and the geostationarysatellite orbit would have a direct bearing onthe WARC scheduled to plan space servicesusing the geostationary orbit.

● The United States should give carefulconsideration to the future role of ITU vis-a-vis international information policy issuesand the New World information order de-mands of Third World countries.

The results of the OTA-sponsored surveyshows that more than 80 percent of the re-spondents agree that the conflicting posi-

tions and approaches between the UnitedStates and other countries for use of theradio spectrum and the geostationary satel-lite orbit are issues for the 1982 ITU plen-ipotentiary conference and justify a majorU.S. effort to prepare for the conference.

Space Planning Conference

. This specialized WARC on the use of thegeostationary satellite orbit and the plan-ning of space services utilizing it will havetwo sessions—July 1985 and September1987. It poses a serious threat to potentialU.S. use of space communications because itcould result in a form of “planning” contraryto U.S. interests. The extent to which a flexi-ble and efficient method of planning spaceservices can be devised and “sold” to theconference represents a challenge to theUnited States.

● The conference will also determinewhich frequency bands used for space serv-ices are to be planned. U.S. efforts to havethe conference concentrate on those higherfrequency bands that are unoccupied, or lit-tle used, will collide with the demands ofdeveloping countries to have the conferenceconcentrate on planning the use of the moreeconomical, lower frequency bands. TheUnited States must determine its own readi-ness to incur the expense of moving tohigher frequencies and its readiness tounderstand the motivations and deal effec-

tively with the pressures to plan a broadrange of frequency bands.

HF Broadcasting Conference

● This conference, to be held in two ses-sions starting in January 1984, is to plan theefficient and equitable use of the HF broad-casting bands. Active U.S. participation andcareful preparation will help ensure that theincreased allocations to HF broadcastingmade at WARC-79 are not jeopardized byfailure to accommodate the fixed servicesthat were removed from the internationalbroadcasting bands, but must be reaccom-modated in other parts of the spectrum.

• Rapid developments in direct broadcast-ing from satellites are likely to rekindledebate on such political issues as “prior con-sent” at the HF planning conference. TheUnited States will need to be prepared todress this and other current issues overquestion of the free flow of information.

1983 Broadcasting SatelliteConference for Region 2

ad-the

● To prepare for the 1983 region 2 confer-ence, the United States will need to developits detailed requirements for broadcastingsatellite channels and submit them to ITU ayear in advance of the meeting. Also, thedesired satellite coverage areas are requiredto be submitted. A U.S. position will need tobe taken on the total bandwidth to be allo-cated to broadcasting satellites as opposedto satellites operating in the fixed satelliteservice in the 12 GHz band.

● The United States could be faced withthe prospect of a majority of region 2 coun-tries voting for a rigid orbital and frequencyallotment plan such as the one adopted forregions 1 and 3 at the 1977 WARC for BSS.According to the OTA-sponsored survey, amajority of the respondents, 68 percent,believe that a practical compromise is possi-ble and desirable, although relatively fewhave any specific concept of the form suchcompromise could take; an additional 15 per-

Ch. 6—Findings, Conclusions, and Observations • 143

cent believe that a compromise is possible,but undesirable; only 8 percent of the re-spondents believe that a compromise be-tween the United States and the ThirdWorld positions on a priori assignment is im-possible; another 9 percent expressed noopinion. This underscores the need to iden-tify and analyze specific strategies and op-tions which might provide the basis for sucha compromise.

• WARC-79 made allocations for BSSfrom 12.3 to 12.7 GHz and for FSS from 11.7to 12.1 GHz. Left to be resolved at the 1983conference is the band 12.1 to 12.3 GHzallocated in 1979 to both services. Decisionssurrounding the 1983 conference bear direct-ly on the future growth of domestic satelliteservice. FSS and BSS both will be affectedby these decisions. Domestic issues involv-ing direct broadcasting satellites planned foroperation in the 12-GHz band must be ad-dressed as a part of the overall policy con-siderations by the United States.

Other Conferences

● The 10 additional administrative radioconferences to be held over the next 7 yearsinclude some that will be as important, if notmore so, than WARC-79 itself. (Scheduling istentative and some could be delayed by ac-tion of the ITU’s administrative counciland/or the 1982 plenipotentiary conference.)Some of these conferences offer the UnitedStates an opportunity to reopen the questionof allocation proposals that were not ac-cepted by WARC-79 (e.g., WARC for the mo-bile services in 1983).

● These future conferences offer a forumfor the United States to reiterate the impor-tance of the radiolocation service and to helpresolve coordination problems arising fromthe sharing of bands with the fixed andmobile services.

. The following is a list of the future ITUconferences currently scheduled:

November 1981,6 weeks, region 2, MF-BCRARC, second session;


August 1982, 4 weeks, region 1, FM-BCRARC, first session;

September 1982, 6 weeks, ITU Plenipo-tentiary Conference;

February 1983, 3½ weeks, Mobile ServicesWARC;

June 1983, 5 weeks, region 2, Broadcast-ing Satellite RARC;

January 1984, 5 weeks, HF-BroadcastingWARC, first session;

October 1984, 6 weeks, region 1, FM-BCRARC, second session;

July 1985, 6 weeks, Space ServicesWARC, first session;

January 1986, 7 weeks, HF-BroadcastingWARC, second session;

September 1986, 4 weeks, region 2, HF-Broadcasting RARC (New Bands);

January 1987, 4 weeks, African VHF/UHF-Broadcasting RARC;

September 1987, 6 weeks, Space ServicesWARC, second session;

March 1988,6 weeks, region 3, VHF/UHFBands RARC; and

September 1988, 6 weeks, Mobile ServicesWARC.

Acronyms, Abbreviations,and Glossary

Acronyms and Abbreviations—AFNAVSATAMARFA

AWACS

BSSC-E

CCIR

CCIs

CCITT

CITEL

COMSAT

COPUOS

C 3 I

DNS

DODDSCS

ECAC

EHF

EIRP

EMCFAS

FCC

———

—

——

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

——

—

—

—

——

—

Air Force Navigation Satelliteamplitude modulationAllied Radio FrequencyAgency (NATO)Airborne Warning andControl Systembroadcasting-satellite servicecommunications-electronics(DOD parlance)International RadioConsultative Committee ofthe InternationalTelecommunication Unionreference to both the CCIRand CCITTInternational Telegraph andTelephone ConsultativeCommittee of theInternationalTelecommunication UnionInter-AmericanTelecommunicationConference of theOrganization of AmericanStatesCommunications SatelliteCorp.The United NationsCommittee on the PeacefulUses of Outer Spacecommand, control,communications, andintelligence (DOD parlance)The Department of DefenseNavigation Satellite systemDepartment of DefenseDefense SatelliteCommunication SystemElectromagneticCompatibility AnalysisCenter (DOD), Annapolis,extremely high frequencyto 300 GHz)

Md.(30

effective isotropically radiatedpower (measured in watts)electromagnetic compatibilityFrequency AssignmentSubcommittee of theInterdepartment RadioAdvisory CommitteeFederal CommunicationsCommission

FLTSATCOM

FMFMAC

FSSFXGHz

GPS

HFHzIBI

ICA

ICAO

IFLIFRB

IMCO

INMARSAT

INTELSAT

IRAC

ITU

kHz

LFLRMF

MHz

MOMRNASA

NATO

NTIA

—

——

———

—

———

—

—

——

—

—

—

—

—

—

———

—

———

—

—

Fleet Satellite CommunicationSystem (Naval)frequency modulationFrequency ManagementAdvisory Committee to theNational Telecommunicationsand InformationAdministrationfixed satellite servicefixed servicegigahertz (1 billion cycles persecond)global positioning satellite(sometimes NAVSTAR/GPS)(DOD)high frequency (3 to 30 MHZ)hertz (one cycle per second)International Bureau ofInformaticsInternationalCommunications AgencyInternational CivilAeronautical OrganizationInternational Frequency ListInternational FrequencyRegistration BoardIntergovernmental MaritimeConsultive OrganizationInternational MaritimeSatellite OrganizationInternationalTelecommunications SatelliteSystemInterdepartment RadioAdvisory CommitteeInternationalTelecommunication Unionkilohertz (1000 cycles persecond)low frequency (30 to 300 kHz)radiolocation service (fixed)medium frequency (300 to3000 kHz)megahertz (1 million cyclesper second)mobile serviceradiolocation service (mobile)National Aeronautics andSpace AdministrationNorth Atlantic TreatyOrganizationNational Telecommunications

147

——.


RARC

RLRO

SHF

UHF

U.N.UNDP

—

——

—

—

——

and InformationAdministrationRegional AdministrativeRadio Conferenceradionavigation service (fixed)radionavigation service(mobile)super high frequency (3 to 30GHz)ultrahigh frequency (300 to3000 MHz)United NationsUnited Nations DevelopmentProgram

UNESCO – United Nations Educational,Scientific, and CulturalOrganization

UPU – Universal Postal UnionVHF — very high frequency (30 to

300 MHz)VLF — very low frequency (3 to 30

kHz)WARC – World Administrative Radio

ConferenceWIPO – World Intellectual Property

Organization

.

Glossary

A priori planning—procedure by which frequen-cies and orbital locations are allotted to indi-vidual countries according to a plan negoti-ated by member-nations and implemented byITU,

Aeronautical mobile service-a mobile service be-tween aeronautical stations and aircraft sta-tions, or between aircraft stations, in whichsurvival craft stations may participate; emer-gency position-indicating radiobeacon sta-tions may also participate in this service ondesignated distress and emergency frequen-cies.

Aeronautical mobile-satellite service-a mobile-satellite service in which mobile Earth sta-tions are located onboard aircraft; survivalcraft stations and emergency position-indi-cating radiobeacon stations may also par-ticipate in this service.

Aeronautical radionavigation-satellite service-aradionavigation-satellite service in whichEarth stations are located onboard aircraft.

Aeronautical radioavigation service—a radionav-igation service intended for the benefit andfor the safe operation of aircraft.

Allocation (of frequency band) –entry in the tableof frequency allocations of a given frequencyband for the purpose of its use by one or moreterrestrial or space radiocommunication serv-ices or the radio astronomy service underspecified conditions. This term shall also beapplied to the frequency band concerned.

Allotment (of a radio frequency or radio fre-quency channel) —entry of a designated fre-quency channel in an agreed plan, adopted bya competent conference, for use by one ormore administrations for a terrestrial orspace radiocommunciation service in one ormore identified countries or geographicalareas and under specified conditions.

Amateur service-a radiocommunication servicefor the purpose of self-training, intercom-munication, and technical investigations car-ried out by amateurs, i.e., by duly authorizedpersons interested in radio technique solelywith a personal aim and without pecuniary in-terest.

Analog transmission—a technique that trans-mits the signal in a continuous electricalwaveform. The information context of the sig-nal is conveyed by the value or magnitude ofsome characteristics of the signal such as theamplitude, phase, or frequency of a voltage.

Assigned frequency–the center of the frequencyband assigned to a station.

Assigned frequency band–the frequency bandwithin which the emission of a station is au-thorized; the width of the band equals the nec-essary bandwidth plus twice the absolute val-ue of the frequency tolerance. Where spacestations are concerned, the assigned fre-quency band includes twice the maximumDoppler shift that may occur in relation toany point of the Earth’s surface.

Assignment (of a radiofrequency or radiofre-quency channel) —authorization given by anadministration for a radio station to use aradiofrequency or radiofrequency channelunder specified conditions.

Band–in radio, frequencies that are within twodefinite limits and are allocated for a definitepurpose or service, e.g., the standard AMbroadcast band.

Broadcasting-satellite service–a radio-communi-cation service in which signals transmitted orretransmitted by space stations are intendedfor direct reception by the general public.

Broadcasting service– a radio-communicationservice in which the transmissions are in-tended for direct reception by the generalpublic. This service may include sound trans-missions, television transmissions, or othertypes of transmission.

CCIR–International Radio Consultative Com-mittee, a permanent organ of ITU wheremember-nations and recognized private oper-ating agents formulate recommendationsconcerning technical and operational radiomatters.

CCITT–International Telegraph and TelephoneConsultative Committee, a permanent organof ITU where member-nations and recognizedprivate operating agents formulate recom-mendations concerning technical, opera-tional, and tariff aspects of telecommunica-tion.

CCIR SPM–special preparatory meeting ofCCIR convened in 1978 by the Secretary Gen-eral of ITU to provide technical support toWARC-79.

dBW–a measure of power, decibels referened to1 watt,

Digital transmission—a technique that transitsthe signal in the form of one of a diswenumber of codes. The information contentthe signal is concerned with discrete state

8 4 - 5 9 1 f) - 82 - 11

150 “ Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

the signal, such as the presence or absence ofa voltage, a contact in the open or closed posi-tion, or a hole or no hole in certain positionson a card.

Earth exploration-satellite service–a radio-com-munication service between Earth stationsand one or more space stations, which may in-clude links between space stations, in which:1) information relating to the characteristicsof the Earth and its natural phenomena is ob-tained from active sensors or passive sensorson Earth satellites; 2) similar information iscollected from airborne or Earth-based plat-forms; 3) such information maybe distributedto Earth stations within the system con-cerned; and 4) platform interrogation may beincluded. This service may also include feederlinks necessary for its operation.

Emission–radiation produced, or the productionof radiation, by a radio transmitting station.

Evolutionary planning approach–procedure bywhich frequency assignments and orbital lo-cations are notified by member-nations andrecorded by ITU on a more or less first-come,first-served basis without any rigid a prioriplan.

Facsimile–a form of telegraphy for the transmis-sion of fixed images, with or without half-tones, with a view to their reproduction in apermanent form.

Feeder link-a radio link from an Earth station ata specified fixed point to a space station, orvice versa, conveying information for a spaceradio-communication service other than forthe fixed-satellite service.

Fixed-satellite service-a radio-communicationservice between Earth stations at specifiedfixed points when one or more satellites areused; in some cases this service includes sat-ellite-to-satellite links, which may also be ef-fected in the intersatellite service; the fixed-satellite service may also include feeder linksfor other space radio-communication services.

Fixed service–a radio-communication service be-tween specified fixed points.

Footnote– in the international table of frequencyallocations a “footnote” conveys specialinformation and often is a means by which anITU member-nation may claim frequencyband usage for a service that is in addition toor alternative to the service stated in thecable of allocations.

Frequency allocation table (international)–atable in the radio regulations allocating bands

for frequencies, in the usable portion of theradio spectrum, to radio-communication serv-ices.

Frequency allocation table (national)–a table inthe FCC Rules and Regulations allocatingbands of frequencies, in the usable portion ofthe radio spectrum, to radio-communicationservices.

Geostationary satellite–a geosynchronous satel-lite whose circular and direct orbit lies in theplane of the Earth’s Equator and which thusremains fixed relative to the Earth; by exten-sion, a satellite that remains approximatelyfixed relative to the Earth.

Geostationary satellite orbit–the oribit in whicha satellite must be placed to be a geostation-ary satellite.

Geosynchronous satellite–an Earth satellitewhose period of revolution is equal to theperiod of rotation of the Earth about its axis.

Harmful interference–interference that en-dangers the functioning of a radionavigationservice or of other safety services or seriouslydegrades, obstructs, or repeatedly interruptsa radio-communication service operating inaccordance with these regulations.

HF broadcasting—high frequency, or shortwavebroadcasting, used primarily for government-sponsored information services (e.g., RadioMoscow, Voice of America), and for domesticbroadcasting in many developing countries.

IFRB–International Frequency RegistrationBoard, a permanent organ of ITU with fiveofficials elected by the plenipotentiary confer-ence, examines notifications of frequency as-signments from member-nations for conform-ity with the radio regulations.

INTELSAT– International TelecommunicationSatellite Organization with 106 member-nations that own and operate the satellites inthe Global Communication Satellite System.

Interference–the effect of unwanted energy dueto one or a combination of emissions, radia-tions, or inductions upon reception in a radio-communication system, manifested by anyperformance degration, misinterpretation, orloss of information that could be extracted inthe absence of such unwanted energy.

International frequency list-a listing of all thefrequencies in use in the world, as notified byadministrations to the International Tele-communication Union.

IRAC–Interdepartment Radio Advisory Com-mittee; a body of 20 Federal agencies and de-

Acronyms, Abbreviations, and Glossary ● 151

partments that assists NTIA in the develop-ment of the National Table of Frequency Al-locations, the assignment of frequencies tostations operated by the Federal Governmentand other spectrum management functions.

IRAC Ad Hoc 144–the ad hoc group establishedwithin IRAC to develop recommended U.S.proposals for WARC-79 pertaining to theFederal Government use of the spectrum andto comment on U.S. position papers.

ITU—International Telecommunication Union;the U.N. related organization with responsi-bilities in the field of international telecom-munications including spectrum manage-ment; present membership of 155 nations.

ITU Convention–the governing instrument ofITU that sets forth the structure and activi-ties of the Union; only the plenipotentiaryconference of ITU can amend or revise theConvention; it last met in Malaga-Tor-remolinos in 1973.

Land mobile-satellite service-a mobile-satelliteservice in which mobile Earth stations are lo-cated on land.

Land mobile service—a mobile service betweenbase stations and land mobile stations, or be-tween land mobile stations.

Maritime mobile-satellite service–a mobile-satellite service in which mobile Earth sta-tions are located onboard ships; survival craftstations and emergency position-indicatingradiobeacon stations may also participate inthis service.

Maritime mobile service-a mobile service be-tween coast stations and ship stations, or be-tween ship stations, or between associatedonboard communication stations; survivalcraft stations and emergency position-indi-cating radiobeacon stations may also partici-pate in this service.

Maritime radio-navigation-satellite service—aradio-navigation-satellite service in whichEarth stations are located onboard ships.

Maritime radionavigation service-a radionav-igation service intended for the benefit andfor the safe operation of ships.

Meteorological aids service—a radio-communica-tion service used for meteorological, includ-ing hydrological, observations and explora-tion.

Mobile-satellite service—a radio-communicationservice: 1 ) between mobile Earth stations andone or more space stations, or between spacestations used by this service; or 2) between

mobile Earth stations by means of one ormore space stations.

Mobile service—a radio-communication servicebetween mobile and land stations, or betweenmobile stations.

Orbit–the path, relative to a specified frame ofreference, described by the center of mass of asatellite or other object in space subjectedprimarily to natural forces, mainly the forceof gravity.

Permissible interference–interference at a higherlevel than that defined as permissible inter-ference and which has been agreed upon be-tween two or more administrations withoutprejudice to other administrations.

Permitted service-a class of allocation. Per-mitted and primary services have equalrights, except that in the preparations fre-quency plans, the primary service shouldhave prior choice of frequencies (printed in“grotesque light” type in the ITU table ofallocations. )

Plenipotentiary conference–the supreme body ofITU that has the power to amend or revisethe ITU convention.

Power flux density—a measure of the powerradiated by a transmitter, used as a con-straint on certain services to protect otherservices in a shared band.

Primary service–a class of allocation. Stations ina primary service may not cause harmful in-terference to stations in the same, or anotherprimary service, and can claim protectionfrom interference from stations in primary,permitted, and secondary services. Printed insolid capitals in the ITU table of allocations.

Private operating agency–any individual or com-pany or corporation, other than a governmen-tal establishment or agency, which operates atelecommunication installation intended foran international communications service orcapable of causing harmful interference withsuch a service.

Radar-a radiodetermination system based onthe comparison of reference signals with radiosignals reflected, or retransmitted, from theposition to be determined.

Radiation–the outward flow of energy from anysource in the form of radio waves.

Radio–a general term applied to the use of radiowaves.

Radio astronomy service–a service involving theuse of radio astronomy.

Radio Regulations, Geneva, 1979–the Final Acts

—


of WARC-79 will constitute the Radio Regu-lations, Geneva, 1979 and enter into force onJanuary 1, 1982, for those countries that haveformally adopted the Final Acts.

Radio waves or hertzian waves–electromagneticwaves of frequencies arbitrarily lower than3000 GHz, propagated in space without arti-ficial guide.

Radio communication–telecommunication bymeans of radio waves.

Radiocommunication service-a service involv-ing the transmission, emission, and/or recep-tion of radio waves for specific telecommuni-cation purposes.

Radiodetermination–the determination of theposition, velocity, and/or other characteris-tics of an object, or the obtaining of informa-tion relating to these parameters, by means ofthe propagation properties of radio waves.

Radiodetermination-satellite service–a radio-communication service for the purpose of ra-diodetermination involving the use of one ormore space stations.

Radiodetermination service–a radio-communica-tion service for the purpose of radiodeter-mination.

Radiolocation—radiodetermination used for pur-poses other than those of radionavigation.

Radiolocation service—a radiodeterminationservice for the purpose of radiolocation.

Radionavigation-radiodetermination used forthe purposes of navigation, including ob-struction warning.

Radionavigation-satellite service–a radio-deter-mination-satellite service used for the pur-pose of radionavigation.

Radionavigation service—a radiodeterminationservice for the purpose or radionavigation.

Recognized private operating agency–any pri-vate operating agency, as defined above,which operates a public correspondence orbroadcasting service and upon which the obli-gations provided for in article 44 of the con-vention are imposed by the member in whoseterritory the head office of the agency is sit-uated, or by the member that has authorizedthis operating agency to establish and oper-ate a telecommunication service on its ter-ritory.

Regions of ITU–for the allocation of frequencies,the world has been divided into three regionsby ITU. Exact boundaries of the regions aregiven in the radio regulations; a general de-scription follows: region I—Europe, Africa,

the U. S. S. R., Turkey, the Territory of theMongolian People’s Republic, and areas tothe north of the U. S. S. R.; region 2–North,Central, and South Americas, the Caribbean,and Greenland; and region 3—Asia, Oceania,Australia, and New Zealand.

Safety service—a radio-communication serviceused permanently or temporarily for the safe-guarding of human life and property.

Satellite-a body that revolves around anotherbody of preponderant mass and that has amotion primarily and permanently deter-mined by the force of attraction of that otherbody.

Satellite link-a radio link between a transmit-ting Earth station and a receiving Earth sta-tion through one satellite.

Satellite system—a space system using one ormore artificial Earth satellites.

Secondary service—a class of allocation. Stationson a secondary service may not cause interfer-ence to stations in a primary or secondaryservice, and may not claim protection againstinterference from stations in a primary serv-ice existing or subsequently installed. Printedin upper and lower case in the ITU table of al-locations.

Services—a functional use of the radio spectrumwhere designated frequency bands are allo-cated for particular uses, e.g., broadcastingservice, radiolocation service.

Space-radio communication—any radio communi-cation involving the use of one or more spacestations or the use of one or more reflectingsatellites or other objects in space.

Space research service—a radio-communicationservice in which spacecraft or other objects inspace are used for scientific or technologicalresearch purposes.

Space system–any group of cooperating Earthstations and/or space stations employingspace-radio communication for specific pur-poses,

Telecommunications—any transmission, emis-sion, or reception of signs, signals, writing,images, and sounds or intelligence of any na-ture by wire, radio, optical, or other electro-magnetic systems.

Telegram—written matter intended to be trans-mitted by telegraphy for delivery to the ad-dressee. This term also includes radiotele-grams unless otherwise specified.

Telegraphy–a form of telecommunication that isconcerned in any process providing transmis-

Acronyms, Abbreviations, and Glossary ● 153

sion and reproduction at a distance of docu-mentary matter, such as written or printedmatter or fixed images, or the reproduction ata distance of any kind of information in sucha form. For the purposes of the radio regula-tions, unless otherwise specified therein, tele-graphy shall mean a form of telecommunica-tion for the transmission of written matter bythe use of a signal code.

Telephony–a form of telecommunication set upfor the transmission of speech or, in somecases, other sounds.

Television—a form of telecommunication for the

transmission of transient images of fixed ormoving objects.

Terrestrial radio communication—any radio com-munication other than space-radio communi-cation or radio astronomy.

WARC-77—a specialized World AdministrativeRadio Conference that met in Geneva in thewinter of 1977 to plan for the broadcasting-satellite service in the band 11.7 to 12.5 GHz.

WARC-79–a General World AdministrativeRadio Conference that met in Geneva in thefall of 1979 to revise the international radioregulations of ITU.

Selected Bibliography

Selected Bibliography

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4. Agnew, C. E., Gould, R. G., Dunn, D. A., andStilbolt, R. D., Mathtech, Inc., and Telecom-munications Systems, “Economic Tech-niques. for Spectrum Management, ” studyprepared for NTIA, Boulder, Colo., Dec. 20,1979.

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10

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12

(Beverly Hills, Calif.:1978).Bowie, N. A., “ThirdWARC: Positions and

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22

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38

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