RADICAL REFORM OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS: Antitrust, Title IX, and Public Policy Implications...

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RADICAL REFORM OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS: Antitrust, Title IX, and Public Policy Implications Stephen F. Ross The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law Institute for Sports Law, Policy & Research CLE Lecture: April 16, 2011

Transcript of RADICAL REFORM OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS: Antitrust, Title IX, and Public Policy Implications...

Page 1: RADICAL REFORM OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS: Antitrust, Title IX, and Public Policy Implications Stephen F. Ross The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson.

RADICAL REFORM OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS:Antitrust, Title IX, and Public

Policy ImplicationsStephen F. Ross

The Pennsylvania State UniversityDickinson School of Law

Institute for Sports Law, Policy & ResearchCLE Lecture: April 16, 2011

Page 2: RADICAL REFORM OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS: Antitrust, Title IX, and Public Policy Implications Stephen F. Ross The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson.

THE PROBLEMS TODAY• Current levels of spending on

intercollegiate athletics are non-sustainable– as many as 60 schools lose money on

football– even wealthy programs like Michigan

spend more than they take in• Financially strapped universities are

spending millions more than necessary to provide athletes in non-revenue sports with the physical, mental, and social benefits derived from athletics participation

Page 3: RADICAL REFORM OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS: Antitrust, Title IX, and Public Policy Implications Stephen F. Ross The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson.

/2 PROBLEMS• Women’s sports and Title IX improperly blamed

for cutbacks, while universities reflexively seek formalistic equality without regard to real educational or social goals

• Revenue-sport star athletes are economically exploited– millions made from their efforts– grant-in-aid is often far below average support among

affluent classmates– ripe for corruption– huge inefficiencies in recruitment

Page 4: RADICAL REFORM OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS: Antitrust, Title IX, and Public Policy Implications Stephen F. Ross The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson.

CHARTER OF REFORM

• ARTICLE 1: Using newly-created “Generally Accepted Intercollegiate Athletics Accounting Principles,” schools cannot participate in Varsity men’s sports unless their revenues match or exceed expenses – revenue sharing– approved, transparent subsidies (Olympic sports,

strategic spending from general funds)

Page 5: RADICAL REFORM OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS: Antitrust, Title IX, and Public Policy Implications Stephen F. Ross The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson.

/2 Charter

• Article 2: Schools must provide varsity women’s sports opportunities equal to those provided to men under Art. 1– i.e. 68 scholarships if offer football and men’s

basketball (see Art. 4); more if hockey or other sports offered

– schools would select ~4-5 sports best suited for their history, facilities, etc.

Page 6: RADICAL REFORM OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS: Antitrust, Title IX, and Public Policy Implications Stephen F. Ross The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson.

/3 Charter

• Article 3: All other sports would be operated as ‘club sports’– no scholarships (need-based ok)– limited # of coaches– regional travel in localized conferences

Page 7: RADICAL REFORM OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS: Antitrust, Title IX, and Public Policy Implications Stephen F. Ross The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson.

/4 Charter

• Article 4: All varsity sports scholarships allocated on an equivalency basis, with football reduced to 55, and the individual award ranging from ¼ to 1 ½ full grant-in-aid

Page 8: RADICAL REFORM OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS: Antitrust, Title IX, and Public Policy Implications Stephen F. Ross The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson.

ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE: General Principles

• Commercial restraints– scope: limit competition to increase profits (Bd of

Regents; Law)– rivals need to agree in order to develop a competition (Bd

of Regents; American Needle): thus rule of reason applies– justified as effective product differentiation with

professional sports featuring vastly superior athletes (Bd of Regents)

• Non-commercial restraints– scope: inconsistent with profit-motive– antitrust laws do not apply (Smith v NCAA)

Page 9: RADICAL REFORM OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS: Antitrust, Title IX, and Public Policy Implications Stephen F. Ross The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson.

ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE: The Rule of Reason

• Bd of Regents: “Hallmark” of unreasonable restraint is where– price is higher– output lower– output unresponsive to consumer demand

• Law: shifting burden of proof– plaintiff shows actual restraint on competition– defendant can justify with purpose that is (a) legitimate

and (b) pro-competitive– plaintiff can rebut by showing overbreadth

Page 10: RADICAL REFORM OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS: Antitrust, Title IX, and Public Policy Implications Stephen F. Ross The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson.

ANTITRUST: applied

• In a sporting competition where rivals need to agree, money-losing programs reflect either– strategic behavior that distorts the competition, risking a

loss of fan appeal; or– non-commercial goals that can be restrained outside scope

of Sherman Act• THEREFORE ...

– Art 1 is lawful (enhancing competition or non-commercial)– Art 2 requirement of Title IX compliance is non-commercial– Art 2 bar on money-losing expenditures on women’s

sports not required by Title IX is also non-commercial

Page 11: RADICAL REFORM OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS: Antitrust, Title IX, and Public Policy Implications Stephen F. Ross The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson.

ANTITRUST: applied/2

• Key principle: these rules only apply to NCAA-sanctioned sports; members free to act on their own outside NCAA ambit– cf. NCAA response to CFA in 1984– indeed, removal of 14-sport rule for Division I

schools is actually pro-competitive

Page 12: RADICAL REFORM OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS: Antitrust, Title IX, and Public Policy Implications Stephen F. Ross The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson.

ANTITRUST: applied/3

• A limit on expenditures for club sports is a legitimate way of maximizing the non-economic goals of intercollegiate athletic competition– analogies upheld under antitrust: Division III, ‘minor’

competions (M&H Tire), NASCAR limits on expensive adjustments to stock cars

– just a matter of degree from current NCAA rules sharply limiting # of scholarships

Page 13: RADICAL REFORM OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS: Antitrust, Title IX, and Public Policy Implications Stephen F. Ross The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson.

ANTITRUST: Distinguishing Law v NCAA from limits on club sports

• Salary limits on basketball coach designed to maximize profits from commercial activity

• Restrained trade in a relevant market (labor market for coaches)

• No commercial market is being restrained by limit that only applies to non-revenue sports

• Not trying to save inefficient or unsuccessful competitors from market effects

Page 14: RADICAL REFORM OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS: Antitrust, Title IX, and Public Policy Implications Stephen F. Ross The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson.

ANTITRUST: new football rules

• Change from full scholarships only to equivalency is efficient and pro-competitive– indeed, agreement that schools must provide full

grant-in-aid or walk-on is suspect– facilitates more efficient allocation of players to

teams– provides athletes with a more informed choice

Page 15: RADICAL REFORM OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS: Antitrust, Title IX, and Public Policy Implications Stephen F. Ross The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson.

ANTITRUST: football /2

• Change from 85 full scholarships to 55 equivalency scholarships is not anti-competitive– no different than any roster limit– promotes competitive balance: particularly

output-enhancing in college sports due to capacity constraints

Page 16: RADICAL REFORM OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS: Antitrust, Title IX, and Public Policy Implications Stephen F. Ross The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson.

ANTITRUST: football /3

• Maximum grant of 1.5 x Cost of Education– for competitive balance, need to average– limits economic exploitation of stars– “amateurism” is a myth– real justification from Bd of Regents: product

differentiation based on “clear line of demarcation” between pro and college sports

– cash subsidy up to 50% of Cost of Education not so extensive as to significantly differentiate student-athletes from student body• trust fund alternative

Page 17: RADICAL REFORM OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS: Antitrust, Title IX, and Public Policy Implications Stephen F. Ross The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson.

TITLE IX COMPLIANCE

• By providing equal scholarships for men and women, will meet Prong 1 of Title IX regulations

• Title IX not violated if women’s coaches, in own discretion, allocate scholarships on a more or less equal basis then men

• Real controversy with Title IX is not equality between men and women but “mythical Title XI”:– right to play football– right to have equivalent opportunity if choose not to play

football

Page 18: RADICAL REFORM OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS: Antitrust, Title IX, and Public Policy Implications Stephen F. Ross The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson.

POLICY BENEFITS OF REFORM

• Eliminates special interest capture of university policy

• Improves competitive balance• Likely to improve physical, mental, and social

benefits for athletes in non-revenue sports• Frees up millions for educational mission– significantly reduces most schools’ subsidy for non-

revenue sports– allows top programs to use football profits for

libraries, liberal arts, etc.

Page 19: RADICAL REFORM OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS: Antitrust, Title IX, and Public Policy Implications Stephen F. Ross The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson.

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