A close range baseband radar transceiver for application ...
radar ww2 application
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--IE 4.()()L "C4. TIO~ OF R4.U4.R ~ --I E UUF UURI~G WORL() W 4.R II Throughout the history of large decisive cam- paigns and wars, and more so when opposing forces are clearly defined, appearing on a massive scale, conventional weapons and me- thods of warfare are produced in enormous quantities, to be used by every able-bodied person available; this because every war holds the threat that a state of attrition will be reached when superiority in numbers will tip the scales. To bolster morale, to minimise what is indeed a fateful attitude, a great deal of effort and energy is devoted to developing the secret weapon, the one that will more than restore the balance. Such were in their time: ballistae, the short sword, bows and ar- rows, gunpowder, breech loading rifles, ma- chine guns, submarines, aerial bombs, tanks, and poison gas. The World War II crop was roughly: Blitzkrieg, radar, V.-type bombs and the atomic bomb. Great leaps ahead like these, in advance of current practice, were the fruits of labour by devoted and untram- melled "Backroom Boys". They produced the strategic ideas and material which were then handed over to the combat forces to exploit tactically. With a strong element of secrecy and national security ever-present, it was in- variably necessary to create new units in the field for such exploitation, rather than to ex- tend the functions of existing organisations. It is against this background that the deve- lopment of radar in the South African Armed Forces must be seen. Great Britain, 1938-1939 The 'known' or current technique of locating aricraft was at this time Sound Location, i.e. listening for the sound of the engines with directional microphones. This was a method used towards the end of World War I and developed in the years between the wars to an advanced stage, especially in the USA, where the Radiolocation idea had not ger- minated. However sophisticated this method may have become, it cannot be compared with Radiolocation, or even called the fore- runner or harbinger, because only direction information was obtained on the spot. The vital element, range, had to be calculated from information obtained from more than 13 one apparatus. The discovery of Radioloca- tion is not at issue here; sufficient to say that from the time of the Munich crisis British military authorties and scientists knew it to be imperative to install whatever radio- location equipment they could manufacture in stations along primarily the East coast, so that sufficient warning of the approach of bombers could be obtained for Anti-Aircraft batteries to come to the ready, and for com- bat aircraft to be in position over France or over the Channel, to execute their defensive tasks. High Chain (CH) and Low Home Chain - [C(H)L] stations were erected and, later, Aircraft Interceptor Radar was incorporated in Spitfire aircraft, operating in a nightfighter role. Even before the declaration of war scientific and military authorities, in that order, were given an inkling of what Radiolocation was all about and furthermore, that South Africa, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and India must design and build their own equipment as Britain had her hands full and would not be able to export that sort of material for some considerable time after the start of a war, if indeed at all. South Africa, 1938-1939 The message about details (Radiolocation techniques and possible developments) was conveyed to Dr Basil Schonland personally by Dr Ernest Marsden, a New Zealand scien- tist, on his way home. It is on record that their meeting took place aboard a mailship between Cape Town and Durban. Dr. Schonland was then the Director of the Bernard Price Institute of Geophysics at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannes- burg, and he arranged with the UDF authori- ties for preparatory work to be done at his Institute and in the Department of Electrical Engineering (across the road) where Dr Boz- zoli was Professor of Electrical Engineering. The South African Corps of Signals became the military administrative control; obviously well-suited to do so in all respects, especially insofar as secrecy was concerned as the Di- rector of Signals (Colonel Freddie Colins) al- Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 4 Nr 2, 1974. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za
description
radar ww2 application in SOuth Africa in ww2
Transcript of radar ww2 application
--IE 4.()()L "C4.TIO~ OF R4.U4.R~ - -I E UUF UURI~G WORL() W 4.R II
Throughout the history of large decisive cam-paigns and wars, and more so when opposingforces are clearly defined, appearing on amassive scale, conventional weapons and me-thods of warfare are produced in enormousquantities, to be used by every able-bodiedperson available; this because every war holdsthe threat that a state of attrition will bereached when superiority in numbers will tipthe scales. To bolster morale, to minimisewhat is indeed a fateful attitude, a great dealof effort and energy is devoted to developingthe secret weapon, the one that will morethan restore the balance. Such were in theirtime: ballistae, the short sword, bows and ar-rows, gunpowder, breech loading rifles, ma-chine guns, submarines, aerial bombs, tanks,and poison gas. The World War II crop wasroughly: Blitzkrieg, radar, V.-type bombs andthe atomic bomb. Great leaps ahead likethese, in advance of current practice, werethe fruits of labour by devoted and untram-melled "Backroom Boys". They produced thestrategic ideas and material which were thenhanded over to the combat forces to exploittactically. With a strong element of secrecyand national security ever-present, it was in-variably necessary to create new units in thefield for such exploitation, rather than to ex-tend the functions of existing organisations.It is against this background that the deve-lopment of radar in the South African ArmedForces must be seen.
Great Britain, 1938-1939
The 'known' or current technique of locatingaricraft was at this time Sound Location, i.e.listening for the sound of the engines withdirectional microphones. This was a methodused towards the end of World War I anddeveloped in the years between the wars toan advanced stage, especially in the USA,where the Radiolocation idea had not ger-minated. However sophisticated this methodmay have become, it cannot be comparedwith Radiolocation, or even called the fore-runner or harbinger, because only directioninformation was obtained on the spot. Thevital element, range, had to be calculatedfrom information obtained from more than
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one apparatus. The discovery of Radioloca-tion is not at issue here; sufficient to saythat from the time of the Munich crisisBritish military authorties and scientists knewit to be imperative to install whatever radio-location equipment they could manufacture instations along primarily the East coast, sothat sufficient warning of the approach ofbombers could be obtained for Anti-Aircraftbatteries to come to the ready, and for com-bat aircraft to be in position over France orover the Channel, to execute their defensivetasks. High Chain (CH) and Low Home Chain- [C(H)L] stations were erected and, later,Aircraft Interceptor Radar was incorporatedin Spitfire aircraft, operating in a nightfighterrole.Even before the declaration of war scientificand military authorities, in that order, weregiven an inkling of what Radiolocation wasall about and furthermore, that South Africa,Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Indiamust design and build their own equipmentas Britain had her hands full and would notbe able to export that sort of material forsome considerable time after the start of awar, if indeed at all.
South Africa, 1938-1939
The message about details (Radiolocationtechniques and possible developments) wasconveyed to Dr Basil Schonland personallyby Dr Ernest Marsden, a New Zealand scien-tist, on his way home. It is on record thattheir meeting took place aboard a mailshipbetween Cape Town and Durban.
Dr. Schonland was then the Director of theBernard Price Institute of Geophysics at theUniversity of the Witwatersrand, Johannes-burg, and he arranged with the UDF authori-ties for preparatory work to be done at hisInstitute and in the Department of ElectricalEngineering (across the road) where Dr Boz-zoli was Professor of Electrical Engineering.
The South African Corps of Signals becamethe military administrative control; obviouslywell-suited to do so in all respects, especiallyinsofar as secrecy was concerned as the Di-rector of Signals (Colonel Freddie Colins ) al-
Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 4 Nr 2, 1974. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za
ready administered the Intercept and Crypto-graphic departments, important elements ofMilitary Intelligence.
When war was declared the Special SignalsServices (SSS came into existence, withHeadquarters at he Bernard Price Institute,using the workshops there. Accommodationand other military facilities were provided byWitwatersrand Command.
Recruiting was done by word of mouth,mostly within the South African Universities,whence came the Staff: Professors Hodges(Durban), Bozzoli (Wits) and Phillips (Dur-ban); and graduates Hewitt (Rhodes), Gane(Rhodes), Roberts (Cape Town), Boden(Durban) and many others.
Training in the construction, operation andmaintenance of Radiolocation equipment tookplace at the Bernard Price Institute and atHoward College, Durban. At the latter insti-tution Professor Clarke, with a small staff, un-dertook the ..crosstraining' 'of SSS recruitswith a grounding in subjects outside Light-Current Engineering discipline into, shall wesay, Radiolocation Electronics.
In the beginning the arrangement was for theman who built and installed the set also tooperate it, a workable concept as the firstsets were to be deployed outside the bordersof the Union. During the latter half of 1940,however, it was decided to form a chain ofstations along the coast from St Lucia, onthe remote Natal North coast, round to Veld-drift, north of Saldanha Bay, in the CapeProvince. This undertaking would overtax thetechnical manpower if the Operator-Mechanicsystem was to persist, consequently the Ra-diolocation Operator came into being here aswas already the practice overseas. SAWASofficers, Miss Nancy Blue and Mrs Hartshorn(wife of the Brigadier, 2TS) were secondedto the SSS to attend to the recruiting andtraining of women as operators and FilterRoom personnel.
UDF RadioJocation outside the Union bordersThe first two sets were designed and builtat the Bernard Price Institue, numbered JB 1and JB 2, to indicate their place of origin,and shipped to East Africa to operate withthe UDF at, among other places, Mombassa.As the campaigns in Africa progressed, thisequipment moved north, to end up at EI Arish,in the Suez Canal zone; this time no longerwith the UDF, but with British Forces. By
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mid-1941, the sets were recalled to theUnion, as the SSS effort was being concen-trated on the defence of ports and the SouthAfrican coast.
UDE Stations
From the beginning of 1941 the British au-thorities were in a position to provide SouthAfrica with Radiolocation equipment. It isknown that come of the sets were lost intransit as the result of enemy action, but ul-timately the SSS was fully equipped to putthe coastal chain into operation, without anygaps, using CH, Low Overseas Chain[C(O)L] and Anti-Aircraft sets. The C(O)Lsets replaced most of the JB and JB Mobileequipment which had rendered valuable ser-vice for a period in excess of one year. Inaddition, one ASV I' and quantities of ASV IIwere delivered for installation in SAAF air-craft, together with some YH and YJ bea-cons. All ground-based installations were de-signated U0 ES, following the British practiceof AMES (Air Ministry Experimental Station).The equipment mentioned above was all me-tric or long-weve in design as such was thestate of the art at the time. It was only to-wards the end of 1941 that the microwaveequipments, CD and CN became available inSouth Africa. It was also about this time thatthe name 'Radar' came into use.
Scope
The SSS progress and development, in itsseparate roles, took place along chronologic-ally parallel lines: UDE Mobiles (JB's) weredeployed; SSS sub-HQ's opened at Durbanand Cape Town, together with their asso-ciated Filter Rooms (at Brighton Beach andGerman Club respectively); AA, CD and CAstations installed and manned; ASV I fitted(at Wingfield) and tested in an Anson of aCoastal Reconnaissance Flight; ASV II in-stalled in Ansons and Venturas (at Youngs-field, Ysterplaat and Darling); personneldetached to SAAF to install, operate andmaintain airborne radar in Squadrons basedat stations in West Africa, Palestine, WesternDesert and in Italy and two GCI" systemsoperating in Libya, later in Italy.
1. ASV: Air-la-Surface Vessel an airborne radar apparatusfor detecting. and ranging on. floating craft.
2. CD. CA: Coast Defence and Coast Artillery radar.3. GCI: Ground Control of Interception. Similar to Anti-
Aircraft radar.
Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 4 Nr 2, 1974. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za
Deployment
The first JB equipment installed as coast-watching radars, either in the mobile or staticconfiguration, used the 'separate T-R' tech-nique, which means that two synchronouslyrotatable antennae (broadside arrays mountedon vertical poles coupled - ganged - witha hand-operated chain-drive) supplied thenecessary range and bearing information tothe display. This arrangement was mechanic-ally tiresome, clumsy and not very accurate;the advent of 'common T-R working' (single,hand-rotatable antenna) was an improvementwelcomed by all Radar Operators. When thiswas followed shortly afterwards by thepower-driven C(0) L type of equipment, theSSS Headquarters' staff could confidentlyleave the operation in the hands of the gentlerseX.
The deployment of Radar equipment was asfollows:-
1. U0 E Stations in the Cape Area:Baviaansberg _. JBYsterfontein - C(0) LSomersveld - CHBlue Hills - JB, followed by C(O)LSignal Hill - JB MobileI<arbonkelberg (Fort Collins) - CD andNT 277A
Cobra (Slangkop) - JBRooikrantz - CDCape Point - CDHangklip - JBSilversands -. C(0) LHermes (Port St. Johns) - JB, followedby C(O) L
These stations reported results to the FilterRoom at, successively, Signal Hill, The Ger-man Club and The Castle. In addition, AARadars were installed on Green Point Com-mon with the AA batteries and CA (Gun-laying) equipments for 9.2 inch guns atRobben Island, L1anelly (Apostle) and Simons-town (Scala) Batteries.
2. U0 E Stations in the Eastern Provinceand Border Area:
Sea View - C (0) LCape Receife followed by C(0) LMount Pleasant - (C (0) LSchoenmakerskop - CHHougham Park - CD-NT 271
Bat's Cave - C(0) LCoega Mouth - C(O)L
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Also CA equip-ment associat-ed with the 9.2inch HumewoodBattery
3. UDE Stations in Natal:Mainhluyami (St. Lucia Bay) - C(0) LPort Durnford - C(O)LUmhlanga - CD-NT 271Avoca - JBIsland View - JBBluff - CD-NT 271Brighton Beach - C(0) LAmanzimtoti - C(0) LBaven-on-Sea - C(0) L
These stations reported to the Filter Ropmat, successively, Stamford Hill and BrightonBeach.
In addition CA equipment was installed asgunlayer for the 9.2 inch Da Gama Battery,on the Bluff.
For a short while the original ASV I, using aFloodlight transmit antenna and a Vagi searchaerial, was installed almost at sea level, belowthe Bluff, to keep a watch for intruders intothe Durban anchorage, which is outside PortNatal.
YH and YJ Beacons were installed at theselected stations to serve as a navigationalaid to SAAF reconnaissance aircraft. AtDarling a BABS4 (Mobile) equipment was inuse to assist coastal patrol aircraft operatingfrom that airfield.
Radar in the SAAF
For a short while an ASV Mark I set (withoutantenna), which had been sent to SouthAfrica during 1940, was used experimentallyat the Bernard Price Institute to establishcertain essential features to do with EHF out-put and input feeder lines and the matchinginto antennae. After this it was installed(June 1941) in an Anson Aircraft of 22 Re-connaisance Flight, operating from Wingfield.
The aerial system was a Sterba array, mount-ed longitudinally within the fuselage. As theAnson has a fabric skin, this method waseffective and snags that could arise withoutside mounting, such as drag and factorsof general air-worthiness of the aircraft, were
4. BABS: Blind Approach Beacon System. a ground em.placed system enabling the pilot to affect a blind landing.
Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 4 Nr 2, 1974. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za
Italy. 25 Squadron: Beaufighters, ASV andGCI.
31 and 34 Squadrons and 2 Wing, Celone(near Foggia): Liberators, GEE' Navigatorand GEE Trainer; also Mandrel (RCM).40 Photo-Reconnaissance Squadron, SanSevero: Mosquitoes, GEE and GEE Train-er.
West Africa (Takoradi). 26 Squadron: ASVII in Wellingtons, BABS and YJ Beacon.
Egypt (Cairo and Helwan). SAAF HQ: a StaffOfficer for administration of GCI Sections.Later this Staff Officer moved to MAAF,Rear of Bari.
5. The RAF Convoy Escort and Patrol Wellingtons and Hud-sons used ASV II with a dual aerial system for a singleset: search was sideways-(both) looking by means of aBroadside type of array mounted vertically along the backof the aircraft, and forward homing with a pair of Yagis,one under each wing; the operator could switch from onefunction to the other as required.
6. H,S: An airborne (American-built) microwave radar usedby USAF. over land. as a bomb-aiming device. RAF andSAAF employed this type of radar in a coastal reconnais-sance role; it therefore carried an ASV mark number.
7. ASD: Anti-Submarine Detector.8. GEE: A navigational aid for aircraft.9. SHORAN: Short Range Aerial Navigation .
Ravenna and elsewhere:3 Wing,
Zwartkop and Waterkloof, as departure pointsfor personnel and material, a fairly compre-hensive Radar workshop was established atWaterkloof by SSS. In this workshop, forinstance, an ASD' Radar was fitted in theYork aircraft used by Field Marshal Smuts.
The same arrangement arrived at in the Union,whereby SSS personnel, in the form ofestablished sections, were attached to SAAFformations for Radar duties, was followedoutside the borders of South Africa. Thesections were integral parts of wings orsquadrons and shared workshop space withSAAF at the various bases. The sections,their Radar equipments, the venues and for-mations are enumerated below:-
SHORAN" in Marauders.
Palestine (St. Jean). 17 Squadron: PVcarrying ASD and ASD Simulator.
Radar Developments
The radar art developed at a rapid pace.Spurred on by the vital necessity of stayingahead of the enemy in all departments, thelaboratories and factories strove to produceelectronic equipment which would give the
obviated. This installation was successful in-sofar as target detection was concerned _a range of seven nautical miles was achieved- but the 'homing' onto targets could not befully accomplished. This was because of theplacing of the antenna system; in other words,the Radar was sideways- instead of forward-looking."
To make full use of the ASV system's homingcapability, the fuselage-mounted Sterba arraywas abandoned and an entirely different con-figuration employed in the Anson type ofaircraft: only forward-looking. Half-Yagi stubswere fitted, outside, one on each side of thenose (metal alloy) of the aircraft, using thewing root, plated, as a reflector and mountingthe radiator and one director projecting, slight-ly fared, horizontally from the nose portion ofthe airframe. This method was very success-ful and two Ansons were so fitted, to operatefrom the Darling airfield.
By this time, September 1942, ASV II sets,with matching (Rake) antennae (one com-plete Yagi for mounting accurately under eachwing of an aircraft) had been supplied toSouth Africa by the British Air Ministry, anda number of these were fitted to Venturaaircraft. The latter were based at Ysterplaatand also used airfields at Eerste Rivier andDarling. A facility for ASV fitting, testing andmaintenance was created by SSS at Yster-plaat, a mobile BABS was built for use thereand elsewhere and assistance in repair of theASV type of Radar was given to NetherlandsNavy Catalinas and to RN Walrus aircraft.
At Congella, Durban, a small Radar workshopwas opened by SSS for attending to theneeds of SAAF Sunderland Flying Boats whowere using an ASV XIII, a centimetric equip-ment, in fact, a version of H"SfJadapted foraircraft where the belly could not be usedfor the mounting of the radome: the disheswere fitted under each wing (this configura-tion needed special arrangements for one dishto take over from the other when the latterwas blanked off by the hull of the Aircraft).
At the UDF Commands the Filter Roomsbecame valuable adjuncts to the OperationalHeadquarters, which meant that here, as else-where, for the greater proportion of timeduring the war, Radar information was vitalto the conduct of operations.
Because the bulk of SAAF squadrons wasoperating overseas, using the Pretoria airfields,
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Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 4 Nr 2, 1974. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za
fighting man that extra edge. The ideal radarset would display unambiguously all theimportant information about target: range,speed, type, identification and a forecast ofthe next move. The perfect navigational aidwould enable the navigator, afloat or in theair, to pinpoint his position without having touse a slide rule or other device where, understress of battle, mistakes could be made.
South Africa was far removed from theOperations Research centres and developmentlaboratories and this made it difficult to keepup-to-date to prepare technical personnel fortheir tasks. As many officers were selectedas could be spared to attend extemporecourses on new equipment and techniquesoverseas. At one stage Dr Schon land wasfaced with the choice of having to detach allprospective South African Radar technicalpersonnel to British training centres in Canadaand the USA (Britain being under threat ofinvasion) for preparation if they were to con-tribute to the Radar war effort; because ofcommitment to coastal defence, and havingalready manned the Radar sections overseas,he compromised to the extent that only sixSouth Africans were detached to British units,where they served without direction from theSSS.
Development and training in South Africa,therefore, progressed at SSS Headquarters atthe Bernard Price Institute and in situ, whereradar equipment and Filter Rooms were inoperation, making use of the knowledge gain-
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ed by those who had been overseas, or byusing the standard Books of Reference issuedby manufacturers.
Conclusion
It is not possible to give any exact statisticalrecord or a score for the SSS. The natureof the work was not always direct, the unitdid not attack the enemy, the members them-selves were not lethally armed; they were themen behind the men behind the gun! Suffi-cient to say that the last War EstablishmentTable (1945) showed a total of 2200 persons.
After VJ-day the SSS was demobilised veryrapidly because so many of the memberswere scientists and engineers who were re-quired in essential tasks in returning thecountry to normal. The unit itself was dis-established, but certain Radar facilities were,of course, kept going, e.g. airborne equipmentand the CA-CD establishments at the fourports.
No exclusively Radar units were established inthe Permanent Force; those functions remain-ing were absorbed by the Signals organisa-tions of the branches of the UDF.
When Dr Schonland created the Council forScientific and Industrial Research he madefull use of SSS members. The nucleus of theCSIR were all ex-SSS, and a fair proportionof the apparatus and special instruments usedfor radar manufacture and maintenance, nowredundant, went to that new organisation.
Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 4 Nr 2, 1974. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za
