Rachlin pragmatismo 2009

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TAKING PRAGMATISM SERIOUSLY: A REVIEW OF WILLIAM BAUMS UNDERSTANDINGBEHAVIORISM: BEHAVIOR, CULTURE, AND EVOLUTION (SECOND EDITION)

HOWARD RACHLIN

STONY BROOK UNIVERSITY, STONY BROOK, NY, USA

AND

MARVIN FRANKEL

SARAH LAWRENCE COLLEGE, BRONXVILLE, NY, USA

This important book has two main purposes. The first is to present, in a non-technical way, accessible tointelligent laypeople, a scientific, behavioral approach to all aspects of human activity including choice,rule-governed behavior, self control, religious belief, linguistic interaction, ethics, and culture. Its scopeequals that of Skinners nontechnical writings, but Baums approach is more molar and more pragmaticthan Skinners. The books second purpose is to embed behavioral science firmly in the context of

Darwinian evolution. Baum is generally successful, we believe, in both of these ambitious purposes.Key words: behavioral evolution, biological evolution, behaviorism, Darwin, group selection, molarbehaviorism, pragmatism, social evolution

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Contemporary philosophers generally rejectexplanations of mind in terms of overtbehavior on the grounds that mental eventsmay occur in the absence of overt behavior.For example, the neuroscientist M.R. Bennettand the philosopher P.M.S. Hacker (2003), ina highly influential book on the relationbetween neuroscience and the mind, say(p. 82, fn), It is not only possible butcommon for people to be in (mild) pain,thinking, or intending something, and notexhibit the fact that they are.We are notdefending a form of behaviorism Yet theyalso argue, consistently with behaviorism, thatthe brain is not the organ of thought. Theycorrectly say (p. 180), it is I who think, notmy brain. Their error lies in their conceptionof both thought and behavior as momentaryevents. If they had said: It is common forpeople to be in (mild) pain, thinking, orintending something, and not at the presentmoment exhibit the fact that they are, theywould be absolutely correct. But without theitalicized qualification, their argument is false.

How then can mental activity be explained interms of overt behavior even though a personengaged in mental activity does not show it atthe present moment? That is the centralquestion that Baum sets out to address in thisbook. The answer lies in a molar andbehavioral conception of what it means to bepresently doing something. Let us considerwhat such a conception entails.

If a locomotive is traveling at a constantspeed of 0.5 miles per minute, the distance thelocomotive travels (in miles) divided by thetime it takes to go that distance (in minutes) will always be 0.5 regardless of how small atime interval or how small a distance youobserve. Differential calculus is essentiallybased on that fact. But now suppose a groupof schoolchildren is visiting the barn wherelocomotives are kept. Two locomotives aresitting there, not moving at all. The engineershowing the children around points to one ofthem and says, This locomotive is going100,000 miles per year at present. Then hepoints to the other and says, This one is alittle older and we use it less; its only going50,000 miles per year at present. One child,not the brightest, pipes up, How can you saythat one locomotive is going at twice the rate

of the other at present if theyre both standingstill? The engineer patiently responds, Atpresent can refer to any time even one muchlonger than a moment. The locomotives dont

This review was prepared with the assistance of a grantfrom the National Institutes of Health.

Correspondence concerning this review should be sent

to Howard Rachlin: Psychology Department, Stony BrookUniversity, Stony Brook, NY 11794 (e-mail: [email protected]) or Marvin Frankel (e-mail: [email protected]).

doi: 10.1901/jeab.2009.92-131

JOURNAL OF THE EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF BEHAVIOR 2009, 92, 131137 NUMBER 1 (JULY)

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go at a constant speed all year. Sometimes theygo slow, sometimes fast, and sometimes theystand still like now. The locomotives may doone thing at the present second (both standstill) but do another thing over the present

year (one go at twice the rate of the other).This is just a way we have of talking about thebehavior of locomotives. No problem. TheEnglish language is flexible enough to meantwo different things by the phrase, atpresent, and its a good thing that it can.This year overlaps this second; a locomotivemay do one thing this second and a completelyopposite thing this year. Yet both the secondand the year are referred to as the present.Only a child might fail to understand this

convention. Regardless of whether were talk-ing about the present second or the present year, were referring to what the locomotivesare actually doingtheir overt behavior. Eventhat not-too-bright child understands that atthis moment, while both locomotives aresitting in the barn, there need be no internalstate within them, spiritual or physical, where-in their yearly mileage is represented. We usethe same phrase, at present, to refer toevents occurring over different time periods

because present is a relative term defined byits context. Otherwise we would need differentterms for events occurring over the presentsecond, hour, week, century, etc.

When we say that a locomotive is beingdriven 100,000 miles this year we convenientlyignore the particular distribution of thosemiles over the year. There are an infinitenumber of ways they could be distributed. Therailroads accountants may be intensely inter-ested in how many miles the locomotive wasdriven but completely uninterested in theirdistribution over the year. The child, if he werestubborn, might yet argue that the locomotivesare really standing still whereas their differingrates over the year are just an abstraction.But a locomotives rate of 100,000 miles thisyear is no less real than its rate of 0 miles thissecond. It may be more real, in a sense,because it is more significant to the railroadthan the rate this second. If we take pragma-tism seriously, the reality of any description ofbehavior depends not on how particular it is

but on how useful it isand that depends onits context.

Moreover, taking pragmatism very very seri-ously, reality itselfwhat is real and what is not

realdepends on similar considerations. Is ituseful to say that some things really exist andthat other things do not really exist but onlyappear to exist? Is it useful to say that someevents really happened while some events did

not really happen but only appeared tohappen? It certainly seems so; it is hard toimagine how language could function in this world (in everyday life as well as in science)without such a distinction. Then, on that basis,and on that basis only, we can argue aboutwhat is real and what is not real. Then it wouldbe clear that the identical (zero) rates of thetwo locomotives this second is no more realthan the difference in their rates this year.That is, the particular is essentially no more

real than the abstract; the brief event isessentially no more real than the temporallyextended event; the molecular is no more realthan the molar; the atom is no more real thanthe chair. We have introduced this review withthe behavior of locomotives so that, except forthose who might take The Little Engine ThatCould to be nonfiction, psychological ormental states would not interfere with theargument. Now let us turn to the behavior oforganisms.

Two rats are currently pressing levers in twoSkinner boxes. One is pressing the lever at arate of 10 responses per minute and the other ispressing the lever at a rate of 20 responses perminute. Yet neither rat is pressing the lever atthis very second. One is sniffing around in thecorner of the cage while the other is groomingitself. In one sense both rats are doing differentthingspressing at different rates; in anothersense they are both doing the same thingnotpressing the lever this second; in still anothersense they are doing different thingssniffingversus grooming. Are they really doing the samething or different things? Again taking pragma-tism seriously, it depends on what use you aregoing to make of the information. Skinnersconcept of the operant implies that even if therats were both pressing the lever at this verysecond they might be pressing it in differentways; one might be pressing with its left paw, theother with its right paw or nose or tail. Howimportant are such differences? For Skinnerthey were not important because it is more

useful, in terms of behavioral prediction andcontrol, to focus on the common operant thanon the different muscular movements. (On theother hand, if you were a physiologist interested

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in motor control such distinctions might becrucial.) The difference between Skinner andearlier behaviorists was his focus on the operantand its environmental consequences (the con-tingencies of reinforcement) as opposed to the

earlier behaviorists more molecular focus onmuscular movements and connections withinthe organism. The operant is an abstract andmolar concept whose particulars are individualmuscular movements but, as argued above, anoperant is no less real for that.

It is important to note, however, thatSkinners molarism was strictly limited. ForSkinner, response rates over a period as longas an hours session could not serve as rawdata; they would have to be explained in terms

of contingencies of reinforcement of discreteoperants (or possibly in terms of reinforce-ment of interresponse times). To just present aresponse rate as it might vary from session tosession would, Skinner thought, obscure theimmediate changes in rate that a cumulativerecorder might reveal. Still less would Skinneracknowledge that relative rate of responsecould be fundamental. For him, as for manySkinnerians today, relative rates over a session would be explicable only in terms of contin-

gencies of reinforcement of individual change-over responses.As all readers of this journal know, in a series

of books starting with Walden Two (1948),running through Science and Human Behavior(1953), Verbal Behavior (1957), Beyond FreedomAnd Dignity (1971), and About Behaviorism(1974), Skinner extended the concept of theoperant and its control by reinforcementcontingencies to embrace all of human behav-ior ranging from individual acts, throughverbal interchange, to the structure of culturalinstitutions. The behavior that Skinner ex-plained (in terms of prediction and control) inthese books might be highly complex but inprinciple all of it was interpretable in terms ofindividual operants and their reinforcementand punishment. The first of the two mainthemes in Baums Understanding Behaviorism:Behavior, Culture, And Evolution goes over theground Skinner covered in his books onhuman nature and society but from a moremolar viewpoint. [Disclosure: The book fairly

and sympathetically presents the views of oneof us (HR) along with Baums own views.Baum stresses commonalities rather thandifferences, as we do in this review.] So,

the reader may ask, What have locomotivesand rats in Skinner boxes to do with humannature? Let us then consider a human case.Two men, dressed similarly, are sitting along-side each other on a commuter train (pulled

by one of the locomotives) heading to New York City; both are silently reading newspa-pers. That is, they are doing the same thing atthe present moment. But one is going to seehis dentist while the other is going to work inthe city. As with the locomotives and the rats,the men are doing the same thing at thepresent moment, interpreted narrowly, anddoing different things at the present momentinterpreted widely. What they are really doingdepends on who wants to know. If it is the

conductor of the train then they are reallydoing the same thing. If it is their wives thenthey are really doing different things.

Another human case, from the neuroscien-tist Jeffrey Grey (as quoted by John Staddon,2001, p. 177): Whatis the difference be-tween two awake individuals, one of themstone deaf, who are both sitting immobile in aroom in which a record player is playing aMozart string quartet? The obvious answer istautological: one is hearing the quartet and

the other is not. But what does it mean to hearsomething? For Gray and many philosophers,even some modern ones (although not forBennett and Hacker), it means that somethingnonphysical is going on in their headsthehearing person is having a quale or a trainof sensations or a raw feel and the deafperson is not. Over and over again Baumquestions the pragmatic value of such an-swerswhich he labels mentalistic. What differ-ence would it make if blue objects caused youand everyone else to have blue quales butthose same blue objects caused me to have redquales? I would just learn to call all my redquales blue and we would all get along inperfect agreement. In such cases it is ourability to communicate about colored ob-jects our overt discriminative behavior overtimethat counts.

A second interpretation of the differencebetween the hearing and deaf individuals isthat the essential difference resides in theirbrain activity; the hearing person has activity in

the auditory paths of her brain while the deafperson does not and that is the bottom line ofthe difference between them. Like the physi-ological difference between the two rats in our

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example above, the reality of this distinctiondepends on how you intend to use it. If youwere a physiologist or an audiologist interestedin treating the deaf persons deafness orunderstanding the mechanism underlying

the hearing persons hearing then the physi-ological difference would indeed be crucial foryou. But then you should be looking not at twopeople sitting in a room where a record isplaying but at the results of an audiometertestthat is, you should be looking at mea-surable discriminatory behavior over time.Even a physiologist might want to make adistinction between hearing (really hearing)and the physiological mechanism in the brainunderlying hearing. Otherwise she might have

to pick and choose among the various com-ponents of the physiological mechanism todecide which of them contains the essence ofthe persons hearing. It would be like trying todecide which of the various components of acar contains the essence of its acceleration.

If a physiologist must define hearing anddeafness in behavioral terms, still more must apsychologist do so. For the psychologist thedifference between a hearing person and adeaf person lies in their discriminatory behav-

ior over time. The two people in the room withthe quartet playing are, like the two locomo-tives, the two rats, and the two train riders,both doing the same thing in the short run butdoing different things in the long run. Grayspostulation that one can hear and the other isstone deaf means that for one person soundsare discriminative stimuli while for the otherthey are not. The identity of their behavior atthe present moment means no more than theidentity of the behavior of the two locomotives,the two rats, the two train riders, at the presentmomentor the identity of the behavior ofPicasso and a kindergarten child both, at thepresent moment, painting a yellow line in theupper right corner of a piece of paper. In allcases the crucial distinction lies in behavior inthe long run, behavior considered in molarterms, behavior as real as a punch in the nose.

This distinction between behavior over ashort period and behavior over a long periodunderlies Baums approach to complex hu-man behavior such as human purpose, knowl-

edge, language, consciousness, and thought as well as social issues such as freedom, cooper-ation, responsibility, government, religion,and culture in general. Pragmatic consider-

ations dominate throughout. According toBaum (p. 33), Ifit is useful to say that aperson is running a race in order to qualify forthe Olympics, then running a race in order toqualify for the Olympics constitutes a behav-

ioral event. And (p. xi) all behavioristsagree that a science of behavior is possible. Inorder to treat a pattern of behavior over timeas a real event, and to deal with it as a scientificdatum, it is not necessary to postulate aspiritual event, a neurophysiological event, ora cognitive event whose only property is tointernally represent the behavioral pattern atevery moment during its performance. To doso is like saying that a locomotive that travels100,000 miles per year, going fast sometimes,

slow at others, standing still at others, hassomewhere inside it a representation of itselfrunning at a constant speed of 100,000 milesper year. Such supposedly more real internalrepresentations (spiritual, physiological, cog-nitive) have no function in a science ofbehavior. It is these internal representations,not the molar patterns they supposedly repre-sent, that are, if you take pragmatism seriously,made up and not real.1

In taking this molar view Baum avoids one ofthe classical criticisms of pragmatism: that it isfocused on short-term utility (Russell, 1945/1972). Such criticism, according to Baum,overlooks the possibility that people mightobey the golden rule out of self-interest(p. 239). In emitting a valuable pattern ofbehavior such as obeying the golden rule there will be many instances where narrow self-interest dictates behavior inconsistent withthe pattern. How, it may be asked, do peoplelearn to ignore immediate in favor of long-term self-interest? According to Baum, rein-

forcement may act primarily on groups of acts

1 The pragmatism advanced by Baum is in its negativeaspects the same as that advanced by philosophicalpragmatists ranging from Peirce (1878/1992), James(1907), and Dewey (1910), to Rorty (1979). Like thesephilosophers Baum rejects the identification of mentalstates with inner representations or events. Baumspragmatism differs from philosophical pragmatism how-ever by taking, as its criterion for the truth of a concept,usefulness in a science of behavior. For others useful-ness meant usefulness in the clarification of concepts(Peirce), usefulness in the promotion of individual

happiness (James), usefulness for the efficient orderingof experience (Dewey), or usefulness for everyday linguis-tic communication (Rorty). But none of these philosoph-ical pragmatists combines molarism with behaviorism asBaum does.



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constituting a functional behavioral pattern just as natural selection acts on groups ofgenes constituting a functional organism. Thisbrings us to the second of Baums two majorthemeslearning as a Darwinian, evolutionary

process.Baum discusses three such processes: 1) the

evolution of species (biological evolution)across the lifetimes of individuals; 2) theevolution of behavioral patterns (shaping) within the lifetime of an individual; 3) theevolution of cultural practices. Within each ofthese major evolutionary processes, three sub-processes are required: a) variation; b) repro-duction (which Baum calls, recurrence); c)selection. In biological evolution, an individu-

als genetic structure is determined by that ofhis or her parents. Across a population ofindividuals, genetic structure varies accordingto the laws of genetic combination. Selection isthe process by which the environment acts onindividuals. The fittest individuals are preservedand reproduce (or recur) while the unfit dieoff. The population as a whole thus evolves overtime in the direction of greater fitness. Butevolution would not work if fitness wereconstricted only to the momentary environ-

ment. Environments change. For a species tosurvive it must vary enough for some membersto survive and reproduce if the environmentshould change within the bounds of reasonablepossibility. Another way to put this is that aspecies would not survive if it lost contact with achanging environment. Although it is genesthat determine a species structure and innatebehavioral patterns, it is individual organisms(groups of genes) that live and reproduce ordie. You could thus divide the action ofbiological evolution into inner and outer. Theinner part (not in direct contact with theenvironment) is molecular: DNA. The outerpart is molar: the living organism. Only thelatter is in direct contact with the environment.The existence and flourishing of molecularbiology in no way precludes the existence andflourishing of evolutionary biology as an inde-pendent science.

Creationists have argued against biologicalevolution on the grounds that highly complexstructures, such the eye, that require the

coordinated action of many genes in theirdevelopment, are too complex to have evolvedby random mutation and natural selection. Butbiologists have been able to point to primitive,

less complex eyes in other animals and to tracea plausible story of how complex human eyesmight have evolved from a simple light-sensitivepatch on the skin, to a depression with a light-sensitive patch at the bottom, to a sphere with a

pin-hole opening, to a transparent protectivecover over the pin-hole, to a lens that wouldfocus an image on the light-sensitive patch allof these theoretical stages of eye evolutioncorresponding to structures on various speciesexisting currently.

The evolution of behavioral patterns withinthe lifetime of an individual organism works ina parallel way to the evolution of species. Theprocesses of variation and recurrence inindividual behaviorthe reflexes and fixed

action patterns and the tendency to repeatreinforced actions (to develop habits)which were the almost exclusive concerns ofbehaviorists before Skinnerare generallyinner and molecular. But the selective actionof the environment on these reflexes, fixedaction patterns and habits, is outer and molar.Complex patterns evolve (are shaped) fromsimpler ones (such as fixed action patterns)over the lifetimes of organisms in the same waythat complex structures evolve over the life-

times of species: survival of the fittest. Just ascreationists question biological evolution onthe grounds that complex structures such asthe eye could not have arisen from simplerones, so cognitivist creationists question be-havioral evolution on the grounds that com-plex behavioral patterns could not have arisenfrom simpler ones without an active internalmind acting on internal representations of theworld. But in behavioral evolution groups ofresponses may work together for the sake of ahigher-valued and highly complex pattern justas in biological evolution groups of genes maywork together to form a complex structure.

Obedience to the golden rule (to rules ingeneral) is, according to Baum, understandablein terms of the molar behavior of wholeorganisms in contact with their environment.The environment (in the form of contingenciesof reinforcement and punishment) acts onlyindirectly on internal physiological or cognitiveevents but directly on overt behavior. The beliefthat such direct interaction may be understood

on its own terms is what Baum means when hesays that a science of behavior is possible.

Just as the inner processes of behavioralevolution are the products of biological evolu-



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tion so the inner processes of cultural evolutionare the products of behavioral evolution. Variation and recurrence of behavioral rules(such as the golden rule) depend on contin-gencies of reinforcement and punishment over

the lifetimes of individuals. Prevalence of suchrules in a culture then determines the survivalof the culture as a whole as it interacts directlywith itsenvironment (other cultures).

But are not such sciences as evolutionarybiology, behavioral psychology, and culturalevolution only temporary and provisionaljust placeholders until brain research eventu-ally explains the entire human soul in all itsmanifestations? To Baum as to us such anexpectation is ridiculous. He says (p. 39), We

expect that if a surgeon opens up your skull,inside will be a brain. The brain could be takenout, held in the hands, weighed, have itsvolume measured; we could play catch with it.Nothing of the sort could be said of yourmind. The expectation that the human mindand soul will someday be explained in terms ofbrain physiology is to us not very differentfrom the expectation that the gross nationalproduct will eventually be explained in termsof atomic physics.

Understanding Behaviorism is an accessible aswell as an important book. Like Skinners laterbooks on human behavior, which it emulates,it contains no descriptions of experiments, noequations, and no graphs of data. Instead it isfull of illustrations from everyday life andanalyses of everyday speech and usage. LikeSkinners books, it will appeal to anyoneperplexed by the booming, buzzing confusionof modern life. One of us (MF) has used it withconsiderable success in undergraduate coursesat Sarah Lawrence College. Although few ofthe students would say that the book madethem behaviorists, they did all develop agreater sympathy and understanding of behav-iorism, and its relevance to their lives, which isno small accomplishment.

As an example of how Baum applies behav-ioral principles to wider issues, consider histreatment of social interaction. Instead ofsympathy, empathy, chemistry, etc., Baumfollows Skinner in his analysis of mutualreinforcement and punishment contingencies.

He says (p. 234), Although relationshipsbased on coercion are obviously inequitable, asubtler form of inequity marks exploitiverelationships, in which both parties actions

are positively reinforced [by each other]. Theseare said to be inequitable because one party ischeated in the long run; the exploited partysparticipation in the relationship is ultimatelyseverely punished. For example (p. 230231),

if a child works for all the years of childhoodthe results are considered disastrous.That thepunishment is both delayed and incrementalmakes the relation particularly difficult for theexploited person to detect. However, eventu-ally, The exploited child who has lost inhealth, education, or ability to enter intonormal relationships may now reject theparents.Equity is the only stable policy.Baum goes on to define equity in terms ofreinforcement relative to investment, and to

discuss various means of countercontrol by anexploited party. Imbalances of power betweenparties are analyzed, again, in terms of contin-gencies. Like Skinner, Baum is completelynonjudgmental in these matters; the differenceis that Baum emphasizes context, long-termcontingencies and molar patterns more thanSkinner does. Students may frequently disagreewith many of Baums observations and conclu-sions, but the discipline he imposes of framingobjections as well as agreements in terms of

overt behavioral patterns and reinforcementcontingencies can excite students and breathefresh air into class discussions of these topics.

Our only reservation is that Baum does not gofar enough in the behavioral analysis of everydaylanguage, including mentalistic language. LikeSkinner, Baum feels that terms such as free will, responsibility, and consciousness,while useful in everyday life and amenable tobehavioristic interpretation, can never be partof a science of behavior. But a developedscience of behavior will eventually have toconfront the pragmatic fact that life in themodern world would be almost impossiblewithout the behavioral distinctions that thoseterms make. For example, as Baum points out(p. 56), Jurors frequently have to judge wheth-er a person decided to commit a crimeconsciously or not. Still more do they havejudge questions of free will and responsibility. Itis not enough to say that we hold a personresponsible when to punish his undesirablebehavior or reinforce his desirable behavior

would be useful (p. 207). When dealing withfree will and responsibility, questions arise aboutlong- and short-term behavioral patterns andreinforcers, rejected alternatives, contingencies



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of reward and punishment, as well as the socialcontext of current and desired behavior.

We believe that it is possible to avoidmentalism without banishing mentalistic termsfrom a science of behavior. Skinner ceded

such terms to less pragmatic, more mentalisticpsychologies; this led people to believe that abehavioristic science could not deal with theaspects of their lives that most concerned themwhen the exact opposite was and is the case. Asthis book so elegantly shows, Baums molar,functional view enables a deep understanding(in terms of behavioral prediction and con-trol) of all aspects of life, including onesusually regarded as mentalistic.

REFERENCESBaum, W. (2005). Understanding behaviorism: Behavior,

culture, and evolution. Second Edition. Malden, MA:Blackwell Publishing.

Bennett, M. R., & Hacker, P. M. S. (2003). Philosophical foundations of neuroscience. Malden, MA: BlackwellPublishing.

Dewey, J. (1910). How we think. Lexington, MA: D.C.Heath.

James, W. (1907). Pragmatism. New York: Longmans,

Green, & Co.Peirce, C. S. (1878/1992). How to make our ideas clear. InN. Houser, & C. Kloesel (Eds.), The Essential Peirce,

Vol. 1 (pp. 124141). Bloomington IN: IndianaUniversity Press.

Rorty, R. (1979). Philosophy and the mirror of nature.Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Russell, B. (1945/1972). History of western philosophy. NewYork: Simon & Schuster.

Skinner, B. F. (1948). Walden two. New York: Macmillan.Skinner, B. F. (1953). Science and human behavior. New York:

Macmillan.Skinner, B. F. (1957). Verbal behavior. New York: Appleton-

Century-Crofts.

Skinner, B. F. (1971). Beyond freedom and dignity. New York:Knopf.

Skinner, B. F. (1974). About behaviorism. New York: Knopf.Staddon, J. E. R. (2001). The new behaviorism: Mind,

mechanism, and society. Philadelphia: Taylor & Francis.


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