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SECURITIES ANDEXCHANGE COMMISSION

Washington, D. C. 20549(202) 755-4846

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SPEECH BEFORE THESECURITIES LAw COMMITTEEFEDERAL BAR ASSOCIATION

AT THENATIONAL LAWYERS CLUBWASHINGTON~ D. C.

JUNE 16~ 1978

"REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLVING DOOR"*

By: ROBERTA S. KARMEL~** COMMISSIONERSECURITIES AND tXCHANGE COMMISSION

*

**

PORTIONS OF THIS SPEECr WERE INCLUDED IN AN ARTICLEWHICH APPEARED IN THE OS ANGELES TIMES ONMARCH 29~ 1978.THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION~ AS A MATTEROF POLICY~ OISCLAIMS RESPON~IBILITY FOR SPEECHES BYANY OF ITS COMMISSIONERS. IHE VIEWS EXPRESSEDHEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE SPEAKER AND DO NOT NECESSARILYREFLECT THE VIEWS OF THE COMMISSION.

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I,

As A COMMISSIONER OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGECOMMISSION} I AM DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT HOW MY ETHICALSTANDARDS} AS WELL AS MY COMPETENCSARE PERCEIVED BY THEPUBLIC I WAS APPOINTED TO SERVE, I AM CONCERNED ABOUT THECURRENT NEGATIVE VIEW OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT} AND ABOUTTHE SUGGESTION THAT OUTSTANDING LEADERS FROM THE PRIVATESECTOR WILL ONLY ENTER PUBLIC LIFE FOR PERSONAL GAIN,

ONE OF THE LINGERING EVILS OF THE WATERGATE ERA ISWIDESPREAD PUBLIC DISTRUST OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS,LIMITATIONS ON THE AWESOME POWER OF GOVERNMENT} DIRECTLY BYTHE ELECTORATE AND INDIRECTLY BY OUR SYSTEM OF CHECKS ANDBALANCES} ARE CRUCIAL TO CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY, AT THESAME TIME} IN ORDER FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT TO WORK} THEHEALTHY DISTRUST OF GOVERNMENT WHICH IS EMBEDDED IN OURCONSTITUTION MUST NOT LEAD TO AN AUTOMATIC DISTRUST OF OURELECTED AND APPOINTEB OFFICIALS, WE NEED A SENSE OFCOMMUNITY BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC AND GOVERNMENTOFFICIALS WHO ARE} AFTER ALL} MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC INGOVERNMENT SERVICE,

2.IN ORDER TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE IN THE GOVERNMENT AND

THE PEOPLE WHO RUN ITJ PRESIDENT CARTER HAS PROPOSED THEETHICS IN GOVERNMENT ACT AND SPECIAL PROSECUTOR LEGISLATION.*THE LAUDABLE PURPOSE OF THESE STATUTES WOULD BE TOSTRENGTHEN ETHICAL STANDARDS AND ESTABLISH SAFEGUARDSAGAINST CONFLICTS OF INTEREST WHICH LEAD TO ABUSE OF PUBLICTRUST. THESE LAWS COULDJ HOWEVER) HAVE A SIGNIFICANT) ANDPOSSIBLY ADVERSE) IMPACT ON THE COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT ATTHE POLICY-MAKING LEVEL. I AM SURPRISED AND DISAPPOINTEDTHAT THESE PROPOSALS HAVE NOT ENGENDERED WIDESPREAD DEBATE.

I AM ALSO SURPRISED THAT THE ETHICAL PROBLEMS OF THEPRIVATE PRACTITIONER WHO ENTERS GOVERNMENT SERVICE HASRECEIVED SO MUCH LESS ATTENTION THAN THE PROBLEMS OF THEGOVERNMENT LAWYER WHO ENTERS PRIVATE PRACTICE.

AN INCREASED SENSITIVITY TO CONFLICTS BETWEEN PUBLICAND PRIVATE INTERESTS CAN ONLY BENEFIT THE CONDUCT OF OURGOVERNMENT. WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE) HOWEVERJ THAT SUCHCONFLICTS ARE INEVITABLE IN OUR SOCIETY) AND FOCUS UPON THEETHICAL QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN THE RESOLUTION OF SUCHCONFLICTS. THERE IS NOTHING INHERENTLY WRONG OR UNETHICALABOUT A CONFLICT OF INTEREST WHICH IS PROPERLY RESOLVED BYELIMINATING ONE OF THE COMPETING INTERESTS OR BY REGULATION.IN MANY SITUATIONS) FULL DISCLOSURE OF THE CONFLICT MAY MAKEREGULATION UNNECESSARY.

* S, 555; H.R, I,

3.THE VIEW HAS BEEN ESPOUSED THAT IN ORDER TO AVOID

INHERENT CONFLICTS BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERESTSJ

GOVERNMENT POLICYMAKERS SHOULD NOT BE CHOSEN FROM THE RANKSOF THE REGULATED. WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE AGENCY OFWHICH I AM A MEMBERJ IT HAS BEEN SUGGESTED THAT THERE SHOULDBE A MORE ADVERSARIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE BUSINESSCOMMUNITY AND THE GOVERNMENT ANDJ IN PARTICULARJ BETWEENREGULATED INDUSTRIES AND THEIR ACCOUNTANTS AND LAWYERS ANDTHE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCY. SOME BELIEVE THAT THEREGULATORY AGENCY WOULD BE SANITIZED BY LIMITING APPOINT-MENTS TO PERSONS UNRELATED TO THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY OR THEREGULATED INDUSTRY.

PERSONALLYJ I DISAGREE WITH THIS VIEW. THE PURPOSE OFBUSINESS REGULATION IN A DEMOCRATIC COUNTRY SHOULD NOT BE TOALIENATE AND SHACKLE THE REGULATEDJ BUT RATHER TO ASSURE THEOPTIMUM USE OF OUR NATURALJ ECONOMIC AND HUMAN RESOURCES.THE SO-CALLED REVOLVING DOORJ BY WHICH INDIVIDUALS PASS FROMPRIVATE ENTERPRISE INTO THE GOVERNMENTJ AND FROM PUBLICSERVICE INTO PRIVATE BUSINESSJ PROVIDES A CONSTANT RENEWALOF TALENT FOR BOTH SECTORS.

I BELIEVE THAT CONFLICTS OF INTEREST ON THE PART OFPERSONS WHO MOVE BETWEEN THE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTORSSHOULD BE RESOLVED BY REGULATION AND FULL DISCLOSUREJ

RATHER THAN BY PROHIBITIONS AGAINST SUCH MOVEMENT. FURTHERJ

SUCH REGULATION SHOULD NOT DISCOURAGE THIS MOVEMENT.

4.THE TERMS OF PASSAGE THROUGH THE REVOLVING DOOR SHOULD BEDISCLOSED AND THERE SHOULD BE REGULATION OF THOSE TERMS.HOWEVER} CLOSING THE REVOLVING DOOR WOULD HAVE A DELETERIOUSEFFECT ON OUR GOVERNMENT AND WOULD MAKE THE INDEPENDENTREGULATORY AGENCIES UNRESPONSIVE TO THE NEEDS OF THE NATION.

THERE ARE MANY REVOLVING DOORS INTO AND OUT OFGOVERNMENT. A MEMBER OF A CONGRESSIONAL OR PRESIDENTIALSTAFF WHO BECOMES A POLICY-MAKING AGENCY OFFICIAL HAS ASMUCH POTENTIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST AS A BUSINESS MAN ORWOMAN WHO RECEIVES SUCH AN APPOINTMENT. I AM A GREATADMIRER OF COLLEGE PROFESSORS} AND I AM MARRIED TO ONE} BUTI RECOGNIZE THAT PROFESSORS} WHO OFTEN ACT AS CONSULTANTS TOBUSINESS AND TO GOVERNMENT} ALSO HAVE BIASES AND POTENTIALCONFLICTS OF INTEREST. ATTORNEYS} ACCOUNTANTS AND OTHERPROFESSIONALS ARE SUBJECT TO POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTERESTBETWEEN THEIR FORMER CLIENTS AND A REGULATORY AGENCY TOWHICH THEY MAY BE APPOINTED. POLITICIANS WHO USE AN AGENCYAPPOINTMENT AS A PLATFORM FOR HIGHER OFFICE OR A SAFEHARBOR FOR RETIREMENT MAY BE FACED WITH CONFLICT PROBLEMS.EVEN CAREER CIVIL SERVANTS CAN BE ACCUSED OF THE BASICCONFLICT OF INTEREST BETWEEN JOB PRESERVATION AND PROMOTIONON THE ONE HAND AND GOVERNMENT REFORM ON THE OTHER HAND.

5,

IN SHORT} VIRTUALLY ANYONE WHO WOULD BE A QUALIFIEDCANDIDATE FOR A HIGH-LEVEL POSITION IN A FEDERAL REGULATORYAGENCY COULD BE CAUGHT IN A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE SPECIFICPUBLIC INTEREST HE OR SHE IS CHARGED TO SERVE AND SOME OTHERCOMPETING INTEREST.

I BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT THAT QUALIFIED CITIZENS FROMALL PARTS OF OUR SOCIETY} AND CERTAINLY FROM THE BUSINESSCOMMUNITY AND THE PROFESSIONS} SERVE IN OUR GOVERNMENT,THE SEC FREQUENTLY LECTURES THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY ABOUT THEVIRTUES OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS, INDEPENDENCE ON THE PARTOF AGENCY COMMISSIONERS IS EQUALLY VIRTUOUS. A REGULATORFROM THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY IS NOT AUTOMATICALLY LESSINDEPENDENT THAN A CANDIDATE FROM ANOTHER REALM,INDEPENDENCE} LIKE OTHER ETHICAL NORMS} IS A PERSONALQUALITY,

WE CANNOT HAVE EFFECTIVE AND RESPONSIVE GOVERNMENT ANDREGULATION OF INDUSTRY WITHOUT THE EXPERTISE AND UNDER-STANDING OF PERSONS WHO HAVE WORKED IN AND KNOW THE PROBLEMSOF THE INDUSTRIES BEING REGULATED, OUR AGENCY HAS PROGRAMSTO ATTRACT EXPERIENCED ATTORNEYS} ACCOUNTANTS AND ECONOMISTSTO SERVE AS FELLOWS ON OUR STAFF. I BELIEVE THAT THEINSIGHTS OF THESE PROFESSIONALS ARE OF VALUE IN EXPANDINGOUR VISION,

6.PROHIBITIONS AGAINST ACTUAL CONFLICTS OF INTERESTJ

WHICH HAVE LONG PREVENTED A FORMER GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL OR.EMPLOYEE FROM APPEARING BEFORE AN AGENCY ON MATTERS AS TOWHICH THAT PERSON PREVIOUSLY HAD PARTICIPATED OR HADOFFICIAL RESPONSIBILITYJ ARE CONSISTENT WITH TRADITIONALETHICAL CONCEPTS. PRESIDENT CARTER REQUESTED FROM HISAPPOINTEES CERTAIN FURTHER COMMITMENTS. SOME OF THESECOMMITMENTS WOULD BECOME FEDERAL LAW BY ENACTMENT OFTHE ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT LEGISLATION WHICH WOULD AFFECT NOTONLY PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEES BUT ALSO MANY OTHER HIGH-LEVELFEDERAL EMPLOYEES.

THE ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT LEGISLATIONJ WHICH THEPRESIDENT HAS PROPOSED AND WHICH IS PENDING IN CONGRESSJ

CONTAINS TWO PROVISIONS WHICH I BELIEVE WOULD IMPOSE UNDULYHEAVY PENALTIES ON COMMISSIONERS OF INDEPENDENT REGULATORYAGENCIESJ AND EVEN WORSEJ ON HIGH-LEVEL STAFF EMPLOYEESJ ANDTHEREFORE MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO RECRUIT THE TALENTS WHICHTHESE POSITIONS REQUIRE. THESE PROVISIONS ARE A BLANKETPROHIBITION AGAINST ANY CONTACT WITH AN AGENCY FOR FINANCIALREMUNERATION FOR ONE YEAij AFTER TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENTJ

AND THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF PERSONAL FINANCIAL INFORMATION.

7.BEFORE I WAS APPOINTED TO THE SEC I AGREED TO THE

EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONj THUS1 THE FAILURE OF SUCH ARESTRICTION TO BECOME LAW WILL NOT BENEFIT ME PERSONALLY. IAGREED TO THIS RESTRICTION BECAUSE I BELIEVE IT IS APRESIDENT'S PREROGATIVE TO IMPOSE HIS VIEWS OF GOOD PUBLICPOLICY ON HIS APPOINTEES. NEVERTHELESS I EMBEDDING CURRENTPOLICIES AND RESTRICTIONS IN THE CONCRETE OF FEDERALLEGISLATION MAY TRANSFORM A STANDARD WHICH IS APPROPRIATE ATTHIS JUNCTURE IN OUR HISTORY INTO ONE WHICH OVER A LONGERPERIOD WILL NOT SERVE THE PUBLIC INTEREST. MOREOVER1 ONCEENACTED INTO FEDERAL LAW1 IT WOULD BE A LEGISLATIVE MANDATEDIFFICULT TO REVERSE EVEN IF IT PROVED A DISINCENTIVE TORECRUITING TOP TALENT FOR GOVERNMENT. A RESTRICTION WHICHPREVENTS AN EX-GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE FROM EARNING A LIVING1

FOR A PERIOD OF A YEAR1 IN HIS OR HER CHOSEN FIELD1 ELEVATESFORM OVER SUBSTANCE. IT INTERFERES WITH THE STAFFING OF THEGOVERNMENT FOR THE SAKE OF AVOIDING THE APPEARANCE OFIMPROPRIETY1 WHEN IN FACT NO DIRECT OR ACTUAL CONFLICT OFINTEREST MAY EXIST.

IN MY OPINION1 THE ENACTMENT OF THE ETHICS IN GOVERNMENTLEGISLATION WOULD HAVE A POTENTIALLY ADVERSE EFFECT ON THECOMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT STAFFS. AT THE SEC IN PARTICULAR1DIRECTORS AND ASSOCIATE DIRECTORS OF THE DIVISIONS AND HEADSOF PRINCIPAL OFFICES1 WHO LEAVE THE AGENCY1 AS WELL ASDEPARTING COMMISSIONERS1 WOULD BE UNABLE TO PRESENT THEIRVIEWS ORALLY OR IN WRITING TO THE COMMISSION ON ANY MATTERPENDING BEFORE THE AGENCY FOR A PERIOD OF ONE YEAR.

8.As A RESULT OF THIS RESTRICTIONJ IT IS LIKELY THAT EMPLOYEESWOULD LEAVE THE COMMISSION BEFORE THEY REACHED THE AFFECTEDSUPERVISORY LEVEL UNLESS THEY INTENDED TO MAKE THEGOVERNMENT A CAREER.

ANOTHER PROVISION OF THE ETHICS IN GOVERNMENTLEGISLATION WHICH COULD OPERATE AS A SERIOUS DISINCENTIVE TOGOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT IS THE PUBLICATION OF PERSONALFINANCIAL STATEMENTS. ALTHOUGH THERE IS VALUE IN REQUIRINGTHAT SUCH INFORMATION BE REPORTED FOR REVIEW BY APPROPRIATEAUTHORITIESJ MAKING SUCH REPORTS PUBLICJ WITHOUT CAUSEJ ISCONTRARY TO THE PUBLIC POLICY OF PROTECTING THE PRIVACY OFINDIVIDUALS. ONCE AGAINJ TO REQUIRE THE PUBLICATION OFFINANCIAL INFORMATION FOR THE SAKE OF AVOIDING THEAPPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETYJ WHEN ALL OF THE INFORMATION HASALREADY BEEN REPORTED AND REVIEWED BY THE INTERESTEDAUTHORITIESJ ELEVATES FORM OVER SUBSTANCE AND IMPOSES ANUNNECESSARY IMPEDIMENT TO THE RECRUITMENT OF TOP TALENT FORGOVERNMENT.

As A RESULT OF INCREASED SENSITIVITY TO CONFLICTS OFINTEREST WHICH A NEWLY APPOINTED GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL MAYHAVEJ THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION HAS ALSO FOCUSED ONCIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH DISQUALIFICATION BY A REGULATORWOULD BE APPROPRIATE. AN ATTORNEY WHO LEAVES PRIVATEPRACTICE FOR GOVERNMENT SERVICE HAS SOME GUIDANCE INRESOLVING THIS PROBLEM FROM THE CANNONS OF ETHICS APPLICABLETO LAWYERS. HOWEVERJ THE CANNONS DO NOT ANSWER ALL OF THEQUESTIONS WHICH MAY ARISE IN SUCH A SITUATION.

9.WHEN I WAS APPOINTED A COMMISSIONER OF THE SECJ BOTH

THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE SENATE BANKING COMMITTEE WHICH HELDHEARINGS ON MY NOMINATION WERE CONCERNED ABOUT WHEN I WOULDDISQUALIFY MYSELF FROM COMMISSION BUSINESS. AT THAT TIME IWAS A PARTNER IN ROGERS & WELLSJ A LARGE LAW FIRM WHICHREPRESENTS MANY CLIENTS BEFORE THE COMMISSION. I WAS ALSOCONCERNED BECAUSE I WAS CONSCIOUS OF POTENTIAL CONFLICTSBETWEEN MY FORMER LAW FIRMJ MY FORMER CLIENTS AND THE AGENCYTO WHICH I WAS BEING APPOINTED. As AN ATTORNEYJ I WAS ALSOCONCERNEDJ AS ALL OF US ALWAYS SHOULD BEJ OF MY OWNPROFESSIONAL INTEGRITY AND REPUTATION.

THE DISQUALIFICATION STATEMENT WHICH I PROPOSED ANDWHICH WAS ACCEPTED BY THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE SENATE STATEDMY INTENTIONS AS FOLLOWS:

As A COMMISSIONER I INTEND TO DISQUALIFY ANDRECUSE MYSELF FROM MATTERS BEFORE THE COMMISSIONIN THE NATURE OF A REQUEST FOR AN EXEMPTION FROMA RULE OR STATUTE OF GENERAL APPLICABILITYJ ORMATTERS INVOLVING THE INSTITUTION OF ENFORCEMENTPROCEEDINGSJ UNDER THE FOLLOWING CIRCUMSTANCES:

WHERE ROGERS & WELLS REPRESENTS ANYPARTY; ORWHERE I HAD ANY CONNECTION OR GAINEDSIGNIFICANT KNOWLEDGE WHILE I WAS ATROGERS & WELLS.

IN ADDITIONJ I INTEND TO DISQUALIFY AND RECUSEMYSELFJ ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASISJ WITH RESPECT TOANY MATTERJ WHEREJ IN ORDER TO AVOID THE POSSIBLEAPPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETYJ IT APPEARS DESIRABLETO ME TO DISQUALIFY MYSELFJ DESPITE THE LACK OFANY ACTUAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST.

10.AT THE TIME OF MY CONFIRMATIONJ THERE WAS SOME CONCERN

AS TO WHETHER MY PROPOSED DISQUALIFICATION WAS OVERLY BROADAND WOULD PREVENT ME FROM ACTING FULLY AND EFFECTIVELY AS ACOMMISSIONER. I AM HAPPY TO REPORT THAT THIS DISQUALIFI-CATION HAS NOT PROVED ONEROUS OR UNDULY RESTRICTIVEJ AND IHAVE BEEN VERY COMFORTABLE IN ADHERING TO IT. ON OCCASIONI HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN A MATTER WHERE I HADSTRONG PHILOSOPHICAL VIEWS. HOWEVERJ THE COMMISSION IS ACOLLEGIAL BODY WHICH MEETS FREQUENTLY ANDJ TO THE EXTENT MYGENERAL THEORETICAL VIEWS WERE KNOWN TO THE OTHERCOMMISSIONERSJ I AM SURE THEY WERE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. MOSTIMPORTANTLYJ MY DISQUALIFICATION HAS NOT PREVENTED ME FROMFULLY PARTICIPATING IN RULEMAKING PROCEEDINGS.

As MANY OF YOU MAY BE AWAREJ A COMMISSIONER OF THE SECWHO HAS BEEN ON THE STAFF AND PARTICIPATED, IN THEINVESTIGATION OR PROSECUTION OF A CASE WOULD ORDINARILY BEDISQUALIFIED FROM PARTICIPATING IN THE CONSIDERATION OF THATCASE. * I HAVE PROBABLY HAD TO DISQUALIFY MYSELF AS ACOMMISSIONER FROM AS MANY SIGNIFICANT CASES FOR THE REASONTHAT THE CASE WAS UNDER MY SUPERVISION WHEN I WAS A STAFFATTORNEY AS FOR THE REASON THAT MY FORMER LAW FIRMREPRESENTED A PARTY.

* AMOS TREAT & CO'I V. ~.E,C'I 306 F. 2D 260 (D.C.C. 1962).~

II.

r~EVERTHELESSI ALTHOUGH I BELIEVE MY DISQUALIFICATION ISAPPROPRIATE FOR MEl I DO NOT BELIEVE IT SHOULD NECESSARILYBE IMPOSED ON ALL PRIVATE PRACTITIONERS WHO BECOME COMMISSIONERSOF AN INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCY. AND I WOULD STRONGLYOBJECT TO CODIFYING SUCH A DISQUALIFICATION.

THE OBJECTIVE WHICH WE ARE TRYING TO ACHIEVE ISGOVERNMENT INTEGRITY IN A DEMOCRACY. ACHIEVING THAT OBJECTIVEREQUIRES THAT WE CREATE INCENTIVESI RATHER THAN DISINCENTIVESIFOR PERSONS OF THE HIGHEST QUALITY TO SEEK GOVERNMENT SERVICE.A PERSON OF HIGH ETHICAL STANDARDS WHO HOLDS PUBLIC OFFICEWILL RESOLVE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN FAVOR OF THE PUBLICINTEREST. CODES OF ETHICS CAN BE USEFULI BUT ETHICALSTANDARDS ARE ONLY AS HIGH AS THE STANDARDS OF THE OFFICIALSEXERCISING THEM.

ONE OF THE PREMISES OF CURRENT EFFORTS TO CLOSE THEREVOLVING DOOR IS THAT GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES ARE VULNERABLETO IMPROPER ATTEMPTS TO INFLUENCE THEM. I MUST TAKE ISSUEWITH THAT CONCEPT AS APPLIED TO THE STAFF OF THE SECURITIESAND EXCHANGE COMMISSION WHICH HAS A WELL-DESERVED REPUTATIONFOR INTEGRITY. INVULNERABILITY TO IMPROPER INFLUENCECANNOT BE LEGISLATED. IT WILL BECOME AND REMAIN A FACT ONLYBY REASON OF THE TACIT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE HEADS OF ANAGENCY AND ITS STAFF THAT ANYTHING LESS THAN ABSOLUTEPROBITY WILL NOT BE TOLERATED.

12.GOVERNMENT SERVICE SHOULD NOT BE A SOURCE OF PRIVATE

GAIN AT THE EXPENSE OF PUBLIC GOOD. AT THE SAME TIMEJ

RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED UPON THOSE IN GOVERNMENT CANNOT IMPEDETHE LONG-TERM PERSONAL GOALS AND THE GROWTH OF THEINDIVIDUAL ENGAGED IN SUCH SERVICE IF GOVERNMENTALEMPLOYMENT IS TO BE ATTRACTIVE TO PERSONS OF ABILITY ANDAMBITION. IF THE GOVERNMENT IS TO FUNCTION EFFECTIVELYJ ITMUST ATTRACT THE MOST ABLEJ AS WELL AS THE MOST ETHICALJ

PEOPLE FROM ALL PARTS OF OUR SOCIETY. UNJUSTIFIABLERESTRAINTS ON GOVERNMENT OFFICALS WILL ONLY DISCOURAGEOUTSTANDING MEN AND WOMEN FROM SEEKING SUCH EMPLOYMENT ANDFROM SERVING THEIR COUNTRYJ WHERE THEIR SERVICES ARE SORELYNEEDED.