R E S T R I C T E D E S T R I C T E D COMMANDING GENERAL PHILIPPINE ARMY Fort Andres Bonifacio,...

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City

23 October 2007

SUBJECT: Promulgation TO: All Concerned

1. The Philippine Army Communication, Electronics and Information Systems Manual (PAM 11-00), provides the framework and guidance for the management and employment of the Army’s Communication, Electronics and Information Systems.

2. This manual was reviewed by the PA Capability Development

Board and approved by the Commanding General, PA for use as reference and guide in the area of Army Communications, Electronics and Information Systems.

3. This manual is hereby promulgated for the information and

guidance of all concerned effective this date.

HERMOGENES C ESPERON JR General AFP

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COMMANDING GENERAL PHILIPPINE ARMY

Fort Andres Bonifacio, Metro Manila

FOREWORD

The PHILIPPINE ARMY COMMUNICATION, ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION SYSTEM (PAM 11-00) is an official publication that covers the mission and role of CEIS in Army’s operations. It includes important concepts and guidance on the CEIS as a functional area or major activity of the Philippine Army and its organization, infrastructure and management systems. During its interim implementation, its provisions were thoroughly tested and validated for use by our organization.

This manual is hereby approved for use of the Philippine Army. I urge our soldiers to adhere properly to the procedures and guidelines

set forth in this Manual. I likewise encourage all soldiers to send their comments on any aspect of the Manual to the Doctrine Center, TRADOC, PA in aid of doctrine development.

ROMEO P TOLENTINO Lieutenant General, AFP

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AMENDMENT CERTIFICATE 1. Proposals for amendment or additions to the text of this manual should be made through the normal channels to the sponsor. A sample format of an amendment proposal is found in Annex P of PAM 8-01. 2. It is certified that the amendments promulgated in the under-mentioned amendment list have been made in this manual.

Amendment List Number Date

Amended by (Printed Name and Initials)

Date of Amending

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

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PREFACE 1. Purpose

This manual provides the broad framework to guide the management and employment of Army Communications, Electronics and Information Systems.

2. Scope And Applicability

The manual covers the PA mission environment in which CEIS exists, its role in Army mission, the different Army CEIS infrastructures, their management and the Signal Corps that composes the personnel resources of the system. 3. User Information

The Proponent of this manual is the Assistant Chief Of Staff for CEIS, G6, PA. This office is responsible in the review and update of this publication. Users of this publication are encouraged to recommend changes and to submit comments for its improvement using the form provided at Appendix C. Send your comments and recommendations to the:

Commanding Officer Doctrine Center, TRADOC Fort Andres Bonifacio, Makati City

4. Reference

a. National Military Strategy, AFP, 2002 b. PAM 00-01 PA Basic Doctrine, 1996 c. PAM 24-1 CES Manual, 1979 d. Philippine Army Career Management Manual, 2001 e. AFPRG 125-022, AFPOS Classification and Structure, 1991 f. USA FM 24-1 Signal Support and the IMA, 1993 g. USA FM 11-56 CE Management System, 1985 h. USA FM 100-5 Information Operations, 1996

5. Recession

All publications, manuals and directives inconsistent with this manual are hereby rescinded. 6. Gender

Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

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CONTENTS

Letter of Promulgation i Foreword iii Amendment Certificate v Preface vii Contents ix

Section Title Page CHAPTER 1 – SIGNAL AND CEIS

1-1 Signal Fundamentals 1-1 1-2 CEIS as a functional area 1-2 1-3 The Signal Corps, Philippine Army 1-2

CHAPTER 2- CEIS MISSION ENVIRONMENT

2-1 The Role of PA in the Attainment of National Military Objectives

2-1

2-2 Evolving CEIS Environment 2-2 2-3 AFP Modernization Program and the PA CEIS

Development 2-4

CHAPTER 3 – ROLES OF CEIS

3-1 General 3-1 3-2 CEIS Support for Command And Control 3-1 3-3 In Support of Day to Day Administration 3-3 3-4 Support Elements of National Military Strategy 3-4 3-5 Applicable to the following Concepts of National Mil

Strategy 3-6

CHAPTER 4 – CEIS INFRASTRUCTURE

4-1 General 4-1 4-2 Required CEIS Infrastructures at the 3 Command

Levels 4-1

4-3 The Three Generic CEIS 4-2 CHAPTER 5 – CEIS MANAGEMENT

5-1 PA CEIS Philosophy 5-1 5-2 Management Organization 5-4 5-3 Management Strategy 5-10

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Glossary Abbreviations Record of Changes Recommendation for Changes

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CHAPTER 1 SIGNAL AND CEIS

Signal is the collective and integrated use of Communications, Electronics and Information Systems (CEIS). Their use supports war fighting capabilities across all levels of command. We need signal support to execute army operations successfully. While Signal and CEIS appear to be synonymous, they are however different in the sense that signal is the action that supports army operations while CEIS is the resource of Signal in order to support army operations.

Section 1-1 Signal Fundamentals 1. Signal. “Signal” is derived from the Latin word “signum”, meaning a mark or a sign. It is a means of transmitting information in accordance with pre-arranged system or code in cases were direct verbal or written statement is either unnecessary, undesirable or impractical.

2. The Signal Functions in the Philippine Army. The following are the basic signal functions in the Philippine Army:

a. Sensing and Detection. Signal function of collecting information especially on “beyond visual range” (BVR) targets. These functions also deal

Figure 1.1 Signal functions in the Philippine Army

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with the identification of location of enemy or friendly forces location and their tracking.

b. Provide Infrastructure for the Processing of Information. With the

aid of computer hardware and software, the signal automates processing of information for timely decision making. It further performs timely processing of information for responsive intelligence.

c. Transfer and Exchange of Information. These are performed

through the various communications functions whether electronic based or non-electronic based. These are done through different services or means such as voice, image, data or video and/or multi-media.

d. Protection of Information. Today’s information is likewise becoming the object of enemy activities. It is now not only a weapon in itself but also a target that must be protected in today’s “cyber warfare”. 3. Signal Support Operations. Signal organizations exist at every echelon of the Philippine Army. Their mission is to support the commanders perform command and control, administration and intelligence functions in order to accomplish his mission.

Section 1-2 CEIS as a Functional Area 4. CEIS. Communications Electronics and Information Systems (CEIS) is classified as a functional area or a major activity of the Philippine Army. It is the activity involving the management of CEIS infrastructures. 5. CEIS Infrastructure is a resource. CEIS are the linkages and information management tools for the commander in decision-making. CEIS enables him to plan, direct, control and coordinate the elements of his forces to accomplish his mission. 6. AC of S for CEIS, G11. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Communications Electronics and Information Systems, G11 is tasked to perform management of army CEIS resources.

Section 1-3 The Signal Corps, Philippine Army 7. Historical Background. The Signal Corps was created in 1936, shortly after the passage of the National Defense Act, as one of the technical services of the Philippine Army. It was given the mission of establishing communications in the ten (10) military districts of the country. Cadres were established in several training camps where selected PA personnel were given signal training and later assigned to the PA reserved divisions that were mobilized in 1941.

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Although ill equipped, the Signal Corps rendered commendable

services during the outbreak of World War II. It had established contact in critical parts of the country as well as the US headquarters in the US War Department and the Armed Forces Western Pacific (AFWESPAC) based in Australia. During the battle of Bataan, the men of the Signal Corps displayed a rare brand of courage by dashing in numerous battlegrounds to repair damaged wires. The vital information on enemy strength and disposition fed to AFWESPAC precipitated the conquest of Bataan and Corrigedor by the American Liberation Forces in early 1945 in fulfillment of Gen Douglas McArthur’s promise to return to the Philippines.

After the war, several Signal units were activated. Consequently, an

extensive communications network linking GHQ with subordinate units was established manned by the Signal Service Group (Comp), Military Police Command, PA. The network played a significant role of transmitting election returns during the first post-war election in November 1946.

The Signal Corps underwent a change to conform to the reorganization

of the AFP in April 1950. The Office of the Chief Signal Officer and several Signal units were transferred to the Philippine Army. Several changes were also noted with the expansion of the Philippine Army. Signal units were activated together with the activation of operating and support units.

On 06 May 1996, the Army Chief Commel Office was elevated to a

General Staff and was renamed the Asst Chief of Staff for Communications, Electronics and Information Systems, G11. The function of career management as Chief Army Signal Corps was transferred to the Signal Group, Philippine Army. On 01 January 2002, it was returned to OG11, PA.

8. The Signal Corps, Philippine Army. The Signal Corps is classified as a Primary AFPOS in the Philippine Army. The Signal Corps provides the personnel resources for the establishment, operations maintenance and training of the various (CEIS) Infrastructures. It is composed of personnel who were trained and/or actually engaged in the signal activities in the Philippine Army. 9. Signal Personnel. A member of the Philippine Army who is qualified to hold himself out and to perform signal functions defined in this Manual. He is authorized to affix to his name the letters “SC” and wear the official AFP Signal Corps Badge. 10. Army Chief Signal Corps. The Officer designated as the Branch Chief of the Army Signal Corps. Among his functions is the career management of the AFPOS. Currently, AC of S for CEIS, G11 is designated Army Chief, Signal Corps.

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11. The Subdivision of Signal Corps AFPOS. Military Personnel with Signal Corps AFPOS can have any of the following fields of concentration with corresponding AFPOS code prescribed by AFPRG 125-022:

a. Signal, General.

1) Signal, General (22A)

2) CEIS Materiel Integrations (22B)

3) CEIS Educator (22C)

b. Communications Systems.

1) C-E, General (22E)

2) Radio Communications Operations (22F)

3) Fixed Communications Operations (22G)

4) CE Engineering (22H)

c. Electronics Systems.

1) CE Electronics, General (22J)

2) Electronics Equipment Maintenance (22K)

3) EW Operations (22L)

d. Information Systems.

1) Information Systems, General (22M)

2) Computer Operations (22N)

3) Internet and Intranet Operations (22P)

4) Computer Management/Engineering (22Q)

5) Database Programming (22R)

6) IS Analysis and Design (22S)

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CHAPTER 2 CEIS MISSION ENVIRONMENT

Section 2-1 The Role of PA in the Attainment of National Military Objectives

1. Primary Ground Component of the AFP. Consistent with the vision and mission of the AFP and its National Military objectives, the Philippine Army will primarily provide the ground force component of all AFP operations as the AFP meets the challenges and other concerns of the 21st century. These challenges include the country’s internal security, territorial integrity, regional peace and stability, and peace and order. Other concerns on the other hand, include the safety and security of Filipinos abroad, economic development and the preservation of the environment. The PA will provide the ground force component taking the following into consideration: the country’s relations with its neighbors, the national economy and the geographic location of the Philippines. 2. Conduct of Internal Security Operations. The PA will be the primary ground force as the AFP decisively defeats the armed components of all internal security threats with finality. The PA will be the primary ground force as it focuses on the defeat of the ABU SAYYAF GROUP (ASG) in the near term. Likewise, the PA will be the primary ground force as it contains its biggest threat to the country’s internal security – the Local Communist Movement, and the main Southern Philippines Secessionist Group (SPSG) – the Moro Islamic Liberations Front (MILF), over the medium and long term. 3. Preservation of territorial Integrity. The threat to the country’s territorial integrity emanates from two main sources namely, the secessionist group in the Southern Philippines and the claimant countries of the Kalayaan Island Group and the Scarborough Shoal. The former is an internal security concern while the latter involves external defense threats. The goal of AFP operations is to prevent the dismemberment of any portion of the country and at the same time to defend the Philippine territory against any foreign encroachments or occupation. The threat of foreign invasion, through remote, cannot be discounted and the defense of the mainland remains to be an important military objective. As the AFP goes about its objective of maintaining territorial integrity and defending the country’s national territory, the PA, as expected, will be called upon to provide the primary ground force component. 4. Protect the EEZ and Natural Resources. Moreover, the AFP shall continue to preserve and protect Philippine EEZ to include its marine and natural resources. The intent is the furtherance of Philippine economic interests. Also, the AFP shall secure economic development programs of the government within the EEZ. Among these projects are oil/gas exploration and marine exploitation and development. In these activities the PA maybe called

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upon to provide ground force components to work jointly with other major services of the AFP. 5. Regional Peace and Stability. In the promotion of regional peace and stability, the AFP shall continue to participate in UN peacekeeping missions, as well as in efforts to combat international terrorism, within the ambit of Philippine foreign policy and subject to availability of resources. Contributions to regional peace and stability involves activities such as humanitarian missions abroad as well as evacuation missions of Overseas Filipinos from war torn areas. It includes supporting government diplomatic initiatives through participation in confidence-building measures, security dialogues and other defense cooperation with allies and friends. It also means participation in bilateral and multi-lateral activities in accordance with national policies. In all of these undertakings the PA shall be expected to provide ground forces components as has been done before. 6. Performance of Non-Traditional Roles. Furthermore, the AFP performs non-traditional roles to assist other government agencies in the pursuit of socio-politico-economic development programs. Primarily, the AFP creates an environment of safety and security conducive to development. Likewise, the AFP assists other agencies in enforcing local and international laws as well as in protecting the environment. During national emergencies, the AFP provides forces to undertake civil disturbance control missions. It supports local governments in the prevention of religious, ethnic, and tribal conflicts. In times of calamities and natural disasters, the AFP undertakes disaster response and search and rescue missions. In all of these aforementioned activities the PA is always called upon to provide assistance.

Section 2-2 Evolving CEIS Environment

7. Evolution. Communications, Electronics and Information Systems (CEIS) has evolved through the years. The signal functions have evolved from cumbersome manual systems to the present automated systems, limited only by the imagination of the individual and the capability of information and communications technology equipment. This evolution has revolutionized the way nations conduct war and the way commanders command and control their forces to achieve military victory. 8. Early Stage. For quite a long period, communications systems were unsophisticated and non-technical. The means of communications consisted chiefly of messengers and mechanically generated signals. The most important and effective means was the commander speaking directly to his subordinates. Centralized management of communications systems was unnecessary, as well as impossible, due to the limited speed and range of the communication systems. 9. Introduction of Electronics. Eventually, communications methods were converted to electronics systems and certain elements of

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standardization were necessarily imposed but the concept of decentralized control remains unchanged. Within broad limits, commanders were able to use their communications assets as they saw fit to enable them to control in the best possible way, those forces under their command. Communications between units were not a priority. This was reflected in the limited interface between units as each unit went about its own mission. When one unit had to talk to another, the pace of the battlefield allowed time for them to get together to iron out differences in communications procedures, and thus there was no real need for C-E standardization. Doctrine for the allocation and employment of tactical C-E resources called for every commander to be provided with the resources he needed to communicate with his subordinate commanders one echelon below. That commander, in turn, had the assets to communicate one echelon lower. The communications network paralleled the command structure. Doctrinal responsibility then existed from higher to lower units and also from right to left in the battlefield. At every echelon, more than one means of communications were provided. Every signal unit was organized with the goal of providing a self-contained, dependable, flexible, secure, and rapid communications capability. 10. Improved Capabilities. With the further introduction of electronics to communications, the battlefield environment changed. Time is a most important factor and distance becomes less and less significant. In conjunction with the development in mobility and firepower technology, units now move more quickly and shoot more accurately. The commanders thus, need to be able to exercise pinpoint control. New administrative and logistics systems require the transmission of large amount of data to support the commander. Subscribers now communicate throughout the width and depth of the battlefield. The intensifying requirements for dependability, flexibility, speed, security and volume capacity increased as mobility on the battlefield caused interdependence among units. Interface between units and between their communications systems became a major concern. 11. Need for Systems Integration. To meet the demands of today’s army, highly sophisticated C-E equipment is required. To provide voice, teletypewriter, facsimile, or data communications across the battlefield, high capacity trunk systems, tactical automatic voice, and data transmission systems are being fielded. To maximize their capabilities and to meet the total communications requirements, all of these systems must be integrated at every level. A commander no longer operates his own communications without concern for systems integration. To do so would degrade not only his portion but also the entire network. 12. Need for Information Superiority. Finally, the fast pace in the evolution of information and communications technology blurs the distinction between communications, electronics and information systems. Communications and computer systems are becoming an important integral component in the weapon system of any army today; in some, it is a weapon system by itself. CEIS is becoming a vital component of the total combat power of an army. Warfare is no longer a function of who puts the most capital, labor, and firepower on the battlefield, but who has the superior

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information. The use and dominance of information in all spheres of political, economic, military and social life has reached the level where it is now both a powerful weapon and a target. Today’s information are sensed and detected electronically, transported by appropriate communications systems, and processed by computers. Protecting the information held in computers is vital, whilst attacking your opponent’s computer systems can produce a significant advantage in the application of force.

Section 2-3 AFP Modernization Program and the PA CEIS Development

13. AFP Modernization Law. The passage of RA 7898, otherwise known as the AFP Modernization Act on February 23, 1995 has given the AFP a fresh mandate for the development of its capabilities as it prepares for the 21st century. RA 7898 thus, provided the enabling law for the submission of the AFP Modernization program which was subsequently passed by both houses of Congress in Joint Resolution No. 28 and approved finally by the President of the Philippines on December 19, 1996. The enactment of the AFP Modernization Program would enable the AFP to acquire the capabilities to perform its constitutional mandate of defending the sovereignty of the Philippines and perform effectively on other non-traditional missions such as disaster response, humanitarian assistance, security operations and other developmental tasks. The AFP Modernization Program (AFPMP) listed seven capabilities to be developed and one of these is the capability for Command and Control focusing on joint force procedures and systems..

While the bulk of the task for the development of these Command and Control capability was given to GHQ-AFP, the Philippine Army addresses some portions of this capability development. This is done as part of its normal tasks of providing every individual soldier and every unit of the Philippine Army its move, shoot and communicate capability.

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CHAPTER 3 ROLES OF CEIS

Section 3-1 General

1. Line of Communications. Like any other organizations, the Philippine Army follows a certain structure. The hierarchy of command starts from the Commanding General of the Philippine Army down to the lower levels of command including the front line units and elements. Likewise, the Philippine Army is part of the total organizational structure of the AFP and the whole government machinery. Like any other organizational structures, these hierarchical levels are connected by lines, which symbolize relationships in terms of authority, cohesion, interdependence, interest, responsibilities, and others. In military art, these are called lines of communications. In the AFP in general and the PA in particular, these lines of communications are important for Command and Control and for the general administration of the organization.

Communications, Electronics and Information Systems (CEIS) enables these lines of communications. CEIS functions as a support infrastructure for the exercise of command and control and administration geared towards achieving coordination, cohesion and synchronization of efforts and activities.

Likewise, today’s operational environment has reached a high level of technology that accuracy and timeliness in the access to the information becomes necessary in planning, directing, controlling, and coordinating elements of forces. The CEIS support infrastructure serves as the linkages and information management tools for the sensing, detection and the processing of wide array of information for a safe, accurate, and timely exchange of information and coordination of control, combat and support elements of an army. It is an axiom that mission effectiveness equates to the ability to move, shoot and communicate. Among the signal family, this translates to the requirement to communicate, move-communicate, and shoot-communicate since the need for communications is felt before, during and after any operations. This is a characteristics that should distinguish CEIS activities from other activities as it demands a 24 hour, 7-day a week, 365 day uninterrupted regimen.

Section 3-2 CEIS Support for Command and Control 2. Definition of Command and Control System – The PA adopts the following definition of Command and Control System: “the organization of resources that the commander uses to help him plan, direct, coordinate and control military operations to ensure mission accomplishment”.

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3. Resources for command and control – Command and Control functions are performed through the organization of personnel, bases and support facilities, doctrine and procedures, and the CEIS support infrastructures which are employed by the commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.

a. Personnel Resources – include the commanders and staffs, the system operators, the liaison personnel and others that ensure that the command and control process is efficiently and effectively done.

b. Bases and Support Facilities – are the headquarters, command

centers, operations centers and others that provide secure working environment. It likewise, includes the administrative and security organizations.

c. Procedures – are the manual or automated processes and

decision- making tools that govern and guide the conduct of each element of the command and control system.

d. CEIS Infrastructures – include the communications resources,

terminal equipment, other hardware and software that provide the electronic linkages and the information management tools for effective decision-making 4. Levels of Command and the Size and Sophistication of Command and Control System. There are varying sophistication and size of command and control system depending on the level of command it refers to. The Philippine Army, consistent with definitions of GHQ, adopts the following:

a. Strategic Level – include the Headquarters Philippine Army (HPA) and its relationship with GHQ-AFP, the National Command Authority, and other agencies that have grave impact to the security of the nation and the accomplishment of national military objectives.

b. Operational Level – include the HPA and its relations to the

Area/Unified Command headquarters, the PA’s major subordinate units, and other agencies that may affect the accomplishment of assigned objectives within the framework of the national military strategy.

c. Tactical Level – include the subordinate units of the Philippine

Army acting either from the direction of the Area/Unified Command commanders or from HPA, in the attainment of a specific objective within a specific locality. 5. CEIS Objectives in Support of Command and Control. In support of Command and Control, the CEIS support infrastructures must provide the following command and control requirements:

a. Common View of the Operational Situation. The CEIS infrastructures must provide the required situational display, messaging,

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database access, and other functionality needed to provide senior decision makers with a common, timely, and accurate viewpoint of the current operational situation. The view of the operational situation at the lowest tactical element or unit must be the same view of operational situation at the intervening headquarters up to HPA Operations Center, Area/Unified Command headquarters, the AFP Joint Operations Center and the National Command Center.

b. Collaborative Planning for Military Operations. The CEIS

infrastructures must allow key operational planners to collaborate electronically at their primary locations to prepare, coordinate and distribute operational plans.

c. Centralized Command and Decentralized Execution. The CEIS

infrastructures must furnish the vital information needed for rapid and effective decision-making. Likewise, it must provide the required capabilities to rapidly distribute directives and guidance from senior military leadership to forces responsible for the execution of mission within the operational area.

d. Integration of Intelligence and Operations. The CEIS

infrastructures must provide intelligence and operations staffs with the capability to rapidly receive, analyze and exchange the latest intelligence needed for operational planning and decision-making.

e. Apportionment and Reapportionment of Resources. The CEIS

infrastructures must provide the commander the capability to rapidly assemble and analyze information in the current situation, identify operational requirements, and verify the availability and location of required resources. Likewise, it must provide the capability to efficiently issue directives related to the apportionment and reapportionment of available resources to meet the changing operational requirements.

f. Command and Control Information Push and Pull. The CEIS

infrastructures must provide commanders at all levels with the capability to provide information to both superiors and subordinates (information push) and to access reliable information sources for specific information needed for decision making (information pull).

g. Security – The CEIS infrastructures must ensure that the

information goes only to those who need it and those who need to know it. Further, it must be capable to withstand cyberspace attacks.

Section 3-3 In Support of Day to Day Administration

The CEIS infrastructure, aside from its primary role for command and control functions, shall be used for the day-to-day administration of the Philippine Army. This shall be reflected on the following activities: morale and

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welfare; distance learning for military personnel, and for telecommunications services in areas where there are no commercial facilities available 6. Morale and Welfare – The excess transmission capacity and switching capacity of the telecommunications infrastructure could be used to support the requirements of military personnel in calling their families and friends for free. 7. Distance Learning of Military Personnel – Considering its capability for integrated voice, data and video (multi-media) services, the CEIS infrastructure, when not in use for command and control functions can support requirements for the effective conduct of distant learning activities for the benefit of PA personnel. When applicable, this could be extended to civilians needing the same services as part of the PA’s CMO efforts. 8. Telecommunications Services in Areas Without Commercial Telecommunications Facilities – Consistent with the intent to support other agencies in the pursuit of national development, the CEIS infrastructure may be used to support the requirements for telecommunications services of areas where there are no available commercial telecommunications facilities.

Section 3-4 Support Elements of National Military Strategy

The PA CEIS Infrastructure must be able to support the enumerated elements of national military strategy of pro-active posture, focus and contain, leverage alliance and retool the force. 9. Pro-active Posture. The CEIS infrastructures must be able to support the Philippine Army as it contributes to the intent of shaping the environment favorable to the AFP and to gain and maintain the initiative. The CEIS infrastructures must help PA acquire a keen appreciation of the environment and the ability to anticipate future events. Proactive stance implies the employment of military forces to address anticipated armed security challenges both from the Philippine Domestic environment or its external environment. The capability to foresee events and things that will happen is a direct result of good intelligence and as a result of statistical data analysis. The integrated CEIS infrastructures, as a resource of the PA’s Command and Control Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) system will provide the necessary linkages and information management tools needed to attain information superiority.

When hostile action is detected by one of the elements of the AFP Command and Control Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) Systems, the PA CEIS infrastructures supporting the requirements for PA Command and Control, must have the capability to alert regular and reserve forces in the army for mobilization. Likewise, the combat and combat support units must be alerted and placed on ready status for deployment.

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Vigilant monitoring complemented with deliberate planning is the cornerstone of pro-active stance. The CEIS infrastructure will provide linkages and information management tools as the intelligence service of the PA, in conjunction with the intelligence services of other Major Services and GHQ, monitor continuously the enemy’s activities. Also, the CEIS infrastructure will provide the linkages and information management tools as the PA complements vigilant monitoring by sustained and deliberate planning at all levels of the military organization. 10. Focus and Contain. This is the cornerstone of the AFP strategy. It requires the AFP to focus on priority objectives or threats while containing the others in the meantime. In essence, the strategy means, deliberately and sequentially, address each objective or threat one at a time. While focus is given to a particular objective, vigilant monitoring of the other threat groups is necessary so that alarms maybe raised when they become significant. The CEIS infrastructure is an important aspect of this “Focus and Contain” strategy of the AFP. These are essential on the following elements of the strategy.

a. Intelligence and Detection. Intelligence and detection is an important ingredient of the “Focus and Contain” strategy. Vigilance is necessary to avoid surprises. This requires information superiority in the battle space. The CEIS provide the linkages and the information management tools for the sensing, detection, and processing of wide array of information for timely intelligence.

b. Concentration of Forces/Application of Decisive Force. This

element of the focus and contain strategy means superiority at the point of contact which can be sustained as long as the situation requires. Put at another perspective, this calls for the concentration of maximum combat power at the selected time and place to strike and overwhelming blow at the decisive point in order to achieve the objective. Under this element the commander must choose the time and place and determine what combat power is available and how much of it is needed to overcome the enemy at a given time. This element of the focus and contain strategy calls for a precise allocation of available resources at a certain point at the right time. The resource management information system of the CEIS infrastructure will provide this necessity.

c. Economy of Forces. This element of “focus and contain”

strategy means employing the least possible resources elsewhere than at the decisive time and place. It means wise use of military resources. Its application involves the question of “what is” and “what is not” a necessity. The CEIS infrastructure will provide the linkages and information management tools towards this end. 11. Leverage Alliance. The AFP recognizes that there is no substitute for developing a unilateral capability for defense. However, the AFP also realizes the limitations it currently faces particularly with regards to its capability to defend the Philippines against external aggression. In this context, the

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pragmatic approach is to acquire leverage by maximizing the country’s alliances. By taking advantage of these security arrangements, allies can assist in the development of specific military capabilities by way of providing equipment through loans or grants and training. Necessarily, the AFP must develop the capability to operate with allies. Developing inter-operability in terms of personnel and equipment and forming habits in a bilateral and multi-lateral set-up lead towards this end. Policy support must be gained in this area. 12. Retool The Force This means responding to the imperative of replacing obsolete equipment and building sufficient capability to effectively deal with existing and emerging security challenges. Re-tooling the force simply means updating AFP capabilities so that it remains relevant to the changing environment. The Philippine Army on the other hand, being the primary ground force component, must continue to build an army that moves swiftly, shoot accurately, and communicate effectively. The move, shoot and communicate are basic capabilities not only of individual soldier but units, whether large or small, as well. The PA must be able to take advantage of modern information and military technology.

Capability enhancement shall be achieved through various complementing programs. The most important of this is the AFP Modernization Program (AFPMP). While adjustments to the program will continuously be pursued, other capability development programs must be implemented to fill the void. First, the Self Reliant Defense Posture (SRDP) Program needs to be revitalized. This not only complements the AFPMP but also lays the groundwork for a unilateral self-defense capability. Secondly, foreign military assistance in the form of equipment and financial grants or loans should be taken advantage of. Without supplanting the AFPMP, these maybe steered towards acquiring capabilities that cannot realistically be attained through government funding. Finally, additional government funding maybe sought to pursue specific projects not programmed for in the AFPMP.

Section 3-5 Applicable to the following Concepts of National Military Strategy

13. Strategic Flexibility. Within the context of the AFP’s war fighting role, strategic flexibility refers to the AFP’s ability to address different threat groups, whether these are internal or external and using conventional or unconventional methods. On a larger context, this concept also refers to the ability of the AFP to fulfill not only its core mission of war fighting but also other tasks in support to national development. An integral aspect of strategic flexibility is the capability to shift forces from one area to another, either as part of its military mission or in line with its support tasks. The CEIS infrastructures must support this requirement for flexibility. CEIS infrastructures, besides being effective, must not hamper the capability of the individual soldier or a unit to move swiftly.

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14. Asymmetric Warfare. Asymmetric warfare is the use of conventional or unconventional weapons or approaches to war fighting to nullify an opponent’s conventional advantage. Its practitioners were guided by the need to counter, nullify, or equalize an adversary’s quantitative and/or qualitative military superiority through ways in which the opponent has little or no means to counter. One aspect of asymmetric warfare deals with the means or instruments. One attractive instrument of asymmetric warfare is cyber attacks on computer systems. Given the heavy dependence of modern societies and armed forces on computer systems, these types of operations offer potentially decisive dividends to countries, even weak ones that would employ them in future conflicts. Taking this reality into considerations, the CEIS infrastructure while could be used for cyber attacks are likewise subject to the same efforts of the enemy. Maximum security considerations therefore, must be implemented to protect it against cyber attacks while developing our capability to launch one. 15. Comprehensive Approach. Comprehensive approach is addressing all aspects of the challenges/threats in an exhaustive manner. In internal security operations, comprehensive approach holds the advantage of not only militarily defeating the insurgents but also of dismantling the all-critical politico-military infrastructure that sustain them and addressing the root causes of insurgency. Equally important, this approach establishes and strengthens the governments defense apparatus against the rebels all over the country. As part of a national strategy against internal security threats, the AFP’s role is more focused. The AFP would have to be the initial government representative in insurgent controlled areas to lay the groundwork for the other agencies to operate in a safe and conducive environment. Then, the military is also tasked with support roles to other government agencies and has to harness the necessary capabilities to perform these functions. Applying comprehensive approach to challenges other than internal security follows the same tack. It simply means that all aspects of those challenges are addressed so that problems are solved smoothly and with finality. With this reality, the CEIS infrastructure must be inter-operable with the infrastructure of other government agencies. 16. Total Force. Under the total force concept, all of the nation’s resources to include its people maybe employed in the pursuance of national security. In times of war and national emergencies, the AFP takes the lead role in addressing security threats but integrates all other concerned agencies in its effort. These include the Philippine National Police, the Philippine Coast Guard, public utilities and other agencies necessary in the prosecution of the war effort. The total force concept also implies the mobilization of the Citizen’s Armed Forces when necessary. Reserves will be integrated into the active force to augment the latter’s capabilities. This concept also considers allied assistance as an integral component of the total force. The intent of the total force is to consolidate all available resources to bear upon the adversary as a single entity. This concept requires all the more that the CEIS infrastructure be inter-operable with the systems of other agencies.

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CHAPTER 4 CEIS INFRASTRUCTURE

Section 4-1 General

The PA CEIS Architecture Conceptual framework evolves from the

analysis of the required CEIS infrastructures at the three command levels (strategic, operational and tactical). Likewise, it evolves from the translation of these requirements into specific programs and projects which are functionally integrated and synthesized into the three CEIS generic systems, namely: communications systems, electronics systems, and information systems.

Section 4-2 Required CEIS Infrastructures at the 3 Command Levels

1. Strategic CEIS Infrastructures. These are CEIS capabilities employed at the international and national levels, utilizing predominantly fixed type, in support of the National Command Authorities, GHQ-AFP, the headquarters of the Major Services, and other agencies. These strategic players must be provided command and control linkages to the operational CEIS and tactical CEIS players. Strategic CEIS infrastructures also include special purpose and service peculiar systems centrally operated on a nationwide scale by the Philippine Air Force and the Philippine Navy such as

Figure 4.1 PA CEIS Conceptual Framework

TACTICAL

OPERATIONAL

STRATEGIC

Com

munications System

Information System

Electronics System

PEACE WARCRISIS

Integration

IntegrationIntegration

Integration

ISONTR PTIPEEZ/NR RPS

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the PAF Air Defense Surveillance System and the PN Coast Watch System. These systems are normally established by GHQ-AFP. 2. Operational CEIS Infrastructures – These are CEIS capabilities employed at the sub-national level utilizing a mix of fixed and mobile facilities in support of area or unified command or joint task forces headquarters. Command and Control linkages are provided to the strategic CEIS and tactical CEIS. 3. Tactical CEIS Infrastructures – These are CEIS capabilities employed at the field operating level utilizing predominantly mobile or transportable and self-contained facilities in support of deployed operating forces.

Section 4-3 The Three Generic CEIS

The PA CEIS is functionally structured into three (3) interdependent systems as follows: communications systems, electronics systems, and information systems. Each system is further sub-divided into sub-systems depending on the capabilities they should provide to the three command levels. 4. Communication Systems. The communications systems will serve as the PA telecommunications network, which shall provide the linkages from HPA to its subordinate units, from HPA to higher headquarters including the National Command Authorities, and from HPA to other agencies of government and the private sectors. The communications infrastructure shall support the transfer of information whether in the form of voice, data, images or video. Communications Systems are broadly categorized into fixed, mobile, and special systems depending on how they will be used.

a. Fixed Communication Systems. These are the permanently installed communications infrastructures providing telecommunications services within and between PA camps and bases throughout the country. The PA Fixed Communications System, like any other fixed communications systems, mabe broken down into the following major components, namely:

1) Transmission Facilities – This is the information superhighway between switches. This is normally provided to by GHQ-AFP operated communications systems such as the AFP Fixed Communications Systems (AFP FCS).

2) Switching Facilities – provides the routing of information from the source to the desired destination. In the Philippine Army, this includes the switching facility at HPA and the switching facilities of different army camps and bases nationwide. In conjunction with the transmission facilities, these switching facilities form into a network of switches for the delivery of the needed voice, data, images and video services.

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3) Cable Facilities – are the distribution lines interconnecting

the switching and terminal facilities.

4) Terminal Facilities – are devices such as telephone, computer systems, television sets, and other multi-media devices that interface with the user.

5) Support Facilities – include buildings, power generators, commercial power and water supply facilities, environmental control and other ancillary equipment, which are required to support the operations and maintenance of the fixed communications infrastructures.

b. Mobile Communication System. The PA Mobile Communications Systems cover those used in support of army operations when units and troops are on the move or temporarily halted. Because of this nature of employment, the PA Mobile Communications Systems are normally portable or transportable intended to support field operations. It should support rapid deployment and should be characterized by flexibility, simplicity and ruggedness. Mobile communications equipment shall be so specified that they not hamper the capability of the individual soldier or unit to move swiftly and shoot accurately.

c. Special Purpose Communication Systems. These systems are envisioned to enhance the capability for command and control in areas, where due to terrain limitations and peculiar operational environment could not be provided with links to the AFP Fixed Communications Systems. Projects in this category include the Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) satellite systems, mobile satellite communications systems, commercial cellular telephone system, and others that maybe appropriate in any particular operational environment. 5. Communications Connectivity Between the Different Command Levels Considering that communications systems shall provide the linkages from HPA, the following defines the appropriateness of each type of communications system to be used as connectivity means between the different command levels.

a. Within Strategic Level Headquarters – The primary connectivity among strategic level headquarters shall be provided by the AFP Fixed Communications System established by GHQ-AFP and is operated and maintained by CEISSAFP. Appropriate HF/SSB radios providing the same level and type of capability and services as the AFP FCS shall be established as the secondary means of connectivity. Commercial landline services maybe established as the tertiary means of connectivity. Commercial mobile communications systems such as cellular phones shall be subscribed to provide the means of communications connectivity while on the move and while the AFP has not yet established its appropriate mobile communications systems.

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b. From Strategic Level Headquarters to Operational Level Headquarters – The primary connectivity at this level shall be the AFP FCS as defined in the preceding paragraph. The Philippine Army shall provide drop and insert connectivity from appropriate AFP FCS breakouts to connect major PA camps. Appropriate HF/SSB systems providing the same level of capability and services as with the AFP FCS shall be established as the secondary means of connectivity. Commercial landline services maybe established as the tertiary means of connectivity subject to available resources to pay such services. Moreover, commercial mobile communications systems shall be used as appropriate and subject to available resources to pay such services

c. From Operational Level Headquarters to Tactical Level Headquarters – The primary connectivity at this level shall be the AFP FCS as previously defined, when technically feasible. Otherwise, appropriate HF/SSB systems providing the same level of capability and services as with the AFP FCS shall be used. Likewise, appropriate VHF/FM or UHF/FM systems shall be used. Considering this reality the PA shall endeavor to integrate the VHF/FM or UHF/FM systems through the establishment of repeater systems at strategic areas, for this purpose. Commercial landline or mobile communications systems maybe used as appropriate.

d. From Tactical Level Headquarters to Operating Units Headquarters – As in the preceding paragraph, the primary connectivity at this level shall be the AFP FCS when technically feasible. Otherwise, HF/SSB system shall be used. Appropriate VHF/FM or UHF/FM systems as in the previous paragraph shall be established. Likewise, commercial landline or mobile communications systems maybe used as appropriate.

e. From Operating Unit Headquarters to Unit Elements – Appropriate mobile communications systems shall be used at this level. Standardization of mobile communications equipment shall be observed to enhance inter-operability. 6. Electronics System. Electronics systems are those whose functions are related to but not primarily communications. This includes systems but not limited to Intelligence, Battlefield surveillance, land navigations, electronic warfare (EW), Public address, visual presentations, target acquisitions, combat camera, and Public affairs. 7. Information systems. – Information systems will cover the enhancement of the computer-based process of sourcing, manipulating, and storing data for the purpose of generating information for use of the Philippine Army. The development of this capability will ensure timely and detailed monitoring of a wide array of information thus, allowing top echelons of command to quickly assess emergency and crises situations to make the necessary decisions. This will help automate the command and control processes.

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a. Computer Networks. The PA computer network defines the depth and breadth of the physical connectivity of computers within the AFP both in support of the command and control and the day-to-day administration. In support of the command and control process, the network identifies as a minimum, the connectivity from HPA to GHQ-AFP, the NCA and other agencies and the connectivity from HPA to the different Infantry Divisions and other PA-Wide Support and Separate Units. These shall be used primarily for the conduct of AFP operations in time of peace, crises and war. In support of day-to-day computing, the servers and telecommunications linkages may support area common-user requirements for general computing activities. The computer network of the Philippine Army shall be called PA-NET. The primary hub shall be established at the PA communications center in Fort Bonifacio

b. Key Information System Software. As in any large and complex

organizations, the PA needs wide array of information in order to accomplish its mission. The following key information systems of the Philippine Army shall be developed:

1) Strategic Planning. This agenda embraces information concerning policymaking strategy formulation, international relations and national development program. Policy-making is the formulation of guidelines that shall govern the planning and programming of PA strategic activities. International relations information refers too the national government policies concerning other countries that has direct or indirect bearing on Army operations and projections. National development programs shall serve as guide to the Army in carrying out its nation-building role.

2) Army operations.Army operations information agenda

include a comprehensive view of combat operations, civil-military operations and organizational development programs for responsive planning and control. Information on combat operation should allow the commanders to see “the battlefield” in order for him to take quick and decisive actions. Civil-military operations shall guide the Army in dealing with the populace both in the battle and non-battle areas, thereby allowing it to avoid unpopular actions, which may affect the fighting ability of the troops. Information on organizational development programs on the other hand, shall help the Army whip up a very effective and potent fighting force.

3) Programs management. Information on programs

management shall indicate the state or progress of strategic and development programs of the Army for effective monitoring and direction. Program management deals with both long range and short-range plans and programs and the different measures that will ensure the efficient application and utilization of Army resources in the execution of these plans and programs. Information concerns in this agenda shall be on plans and programs details, programs monitoring and programs evaluation.

4) Resource management. Resource management

information should be concerned with the allocation, distribution and utilization

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of resources for effective monitoring and control. PA should properly manage these resources to support all of its assigned missions.

5) Functional and Staff Administration. This information

agenda provides the needed operational day-to-day information of the different functional activities and staff offices to support the effective and efficient staff management. 8. CEIS Integration. To achieve the information superiority desired in any situation and in any area of the Philippine archipelago, the integration of all CEIS infrastructures at all levels shall be established.

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CHAPTER 5 CEIS MANAGEMENT

Section 5-1 PA CEIS Philosophy

1. General. The PA Communications, Electronics, and Information Systems (CEIS) philosophy is the set of principles, concepts, and convictions guiding the management of CEIS infrastructure of the Philippine Army. It is adopted from and conforms with the AFP CEIS Philosophy. 2. Purpose and Scope – The PA CEIS Philosophy shall provide the unifying concept and underlying rationale in the formulation and implementation of policies, plans, programs and projects involving the CEIS infrastructure of the Philippine Army. 3. Conceptual Framework:

a. The PA CEIS Philosophy – CEIS is the voice of command. It provides the linkages and the information management tool for the safe, accurate, and timely sensing, detection, and processing of wide array of information in order to attain the all important information superiority needed in the fast changing battlefield. It is an integral part of the PA force structure and weapons systems vital to mission accomplishment. Therefore, the Philippine Army shall develop and maintain a reliable, responsive, secure, and cost-effective CEIS infrastructure for the command and control, intelligence, and administration requirements based on accepted principles, operational concepts and appropriate technology.

b. Conceptual Framework. A systems approach (input-process-

output) is used to portray the relationship between the CEIS Philosophy, the other inputs (requirements and resources), the formulation and implementation processes (policies, plans, programs, and projects), and the desired output – reliable, responsive, secure and cost-effective CEIS infrastructure. The philosophy is an input to the formulation and implementation processes as well as a harmonizing agent in matching the requirements (for command and control, intelligence, and administration) with the available resources (men, material, money and time). A feedback loop is shown to emphasize the need for assessing the performance and acceptability of the CEIS infrastructure as a basis for modifying any of the input factors and the processes. (Figure 4.1 ).

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Figure 5.1 CEIS Philosophy Conceptual Framework

REQUIREMENTS

PHILOSOPHY

RESOURCES

P1 P2

P3 P4

&

IMPLEMENTATION

FORMULATION

CEIS SYSTEM

4. PRINCIPLES AND CONCEPT:

a. Fundamental Principles – The following fundamental principles shall apply in the formulation and implementation of policies, plans, programs and projects on CEIS:

1) Command Responsibility – CEIS formulation and

implementation is a responsibility of command. Commanders in all echelons are responsible for the establishments, operations and maintenance of CEIS infrastructure within their respective units and their efficient interconnection with other units;

2) Inseparability of Operations and CEIS – Military operations and military CEIS are integral and inseparable. CEIS must be provided and maintained to obtain maximum overall effectiveness of the forces consistent with the projected rate of activity and scope of operations;

3) Advance Provision of CEIS Infrastructures – CEIS should be provided in advance of projected operations whenever practicable

4) Need for Common Procedures and Lateral Inter-connections – Functionally similar systems should be inter-related by use of common procedures and lateral inter-connections. Systems planning and procedures must permit transmission of messages from any point in any system to any point in any other system without major delay or major re-processing.

5) Relative Importance of Reliability, Speed and Security – CEIS Infrastructures must be reliable, rapid and secure. Reliability is paramount under all circumstances. The importance of speed may transcend the need for security, but the relative importance of these two must be weighed in the light of current conditions. Additionally, CEIS must be simple,

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flexible, and economical, but these requirements must not be permitted to outweigh reliability, security and speed.

b. Operational Concepts. The following operational concepts shall

apply in the establishment, operations and maintenance of CEIS Infrastructures:

1) Survivability – All CEIS infrastructures must be designed

in such a way that destruction of a portion of the system will not disrupt the entire system.

2) Flexibility – A high degree of flexibility is required for

CEIS infrastructures serving forces under the present and future warfare conditions. The wide dispersion of units and the multi-role that they perform requires a flexible CEIS infrastructure that can readily adapt to changing situations and diversified type of operations.

3) Economy of Force Principle – The principle of economy

of force demands that each commander make the most-efficient use of personnel and material available to him. Under this principle, CEIS are integrated among commands and services consistent with reliability and flexibility. For example, a part of the needs of a certain commander maybe provided by allocation of channels in the system of a higher commander or a commander may require a subordinate commander to provide certain communications channel for use of the higher commander’s systems or for use of another subordinate commander.

4) Uni-service Overall Facilities – Among the services, the

principle of economy of force makes it advisable, whenever practicable and consistent with reliability and flexibility that only one service maintains overall CEIS facilities between two geographic points, and provides from those facilities communications channels for the use of other services. When a single facility has been agreed upon to serve more than one command or service, it should normally be under the operational, maintenance, and security control of a single command as determined by competent authority. This command, will normally be that command having primary interest and responsibility in the use of the facility.

5) Common Use of Channels – Common use of communications channels by more than one command or service will be normal practice for all commands or services which can not justify exclusive allocation of channels. Standards of service as established by proper authority must be maintained at such a facility.

6) Inter-operability and Standardization – Effective joint

communications and the integration of CEIS facilities require that, as far as practicable, be standardized or made inter-operable. Plans for standardization and inter-operability must ensure that the essential requirements of all services are accommodated.

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Figure 5.2 CEIS Management Structure

7) Restricted Use – Military CEIS facilities are provided primarily for commanders, chiefs of offices, and their staffs in support of mission accomplishment. Provision of excessive or extravagant facilities is discouraged as it will not only waste limited resources but also nurture habits and expectations, which could be counter-productive especially in times of emergencies. Moreover, this provision would mean that not everybody could be provided by military CEIS facilities but only those specifically authorized by competent authority.

c. Appropriate Technology. In the establishment of CEIS facilities,

the latest and the most advanced technology is not necessarily the best choice since other factors such as viability, suitability, technology risks, manpower limitations, and others, may point to another technology as the more appropriate choice.

Section 5-2 Management Organizations

The continuing convergence of information and communications

technology all the more stresses the need for an integrated management of all CEIS infrastructures of the Philippine Army. A commander can no longer afford to operate his own system without regards to its integration with the total system of the Philippine Army. Along this premise, PA shall provide the necessary mechanisms towards an integrated management of all its CEIS infrastructures PA-wide. This emphasizes the need for a signal staff (G11) at the Headquarters Philippine Army for the integrated management of Communications, electronics and information systems and a command initially a brigade size that maybe upgraded to a division size to integrate CEIS support for HPA and major subordinate units such as the divisions, Separate Brigades and PAWSSUs.

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Figure 5.3 Signal Bde Organizational Chart

5. At the HPA Level. The integrated management of all CEIS infrastructure shall be strengthened with the continuing recognition of the need for the primary staff for CEIS as one of the general staffs of the Commanding General of the Philippine Army. Appropriate authority commensurate with the growing responsibility shall be continuously vested on this general staff

a. Title of the General Staff for CEIS – The officer designated as the general staff for CEIS shall be called the “Assistant Chief of Staff for Communications, Electronics, and Information Systems (G-11), Philippine Army”. Likewise, consistent with the economy of force principle, this general staff shall be concurrently designated as “Chief, Philippine Army Signal Corps”.

b. Responsibilities as the ACS for CEIS – The officer designated

as the ACS for CEIS, G11 shall have the following responsibilities:

1) Responsible to the Commanding General, PA in the formulation of policies, programming, providing direction, coordination and supervision of all matters pertaining to the CEIS infrastructures of the whole Philippine Army;

2) Acts as the principal staff adviser to the Commanding

General, PA and other staff offices and units on all matters pertaining to CEIS; 3) Act as the Program Director of all CEIS appropriations of

the Philippine Army.

c. Responsibility as the Chief, PA Signal Corps – As the Chief, PA Signal Corps is responsible for the career management of all signal officers and enlisted personnel of the Philippine Army.

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d. Signal Brigade, Philippine Army – A unit, brigade size minimum, shall be developed and organized to provide the requirements for integrated communications, electronics, and information systems in support of command and control, intelligence and day-to-day administrative functions for HPA to its major subordinate units. Likewise, this unit shall ensure that the CEIS infrastructures of HPA are continuously integrated with higher, lower and adjacent unit headquarters’ CEIS infrastructures. The Signal Brigade may be upgraded into a Signal Division when the Philippine Army reorganizes itself into corps. It shall be organized and have the capabilities as follows:

1) Headquarters and Headquarters Service Battalion. Composed of the Brigade Hqs and the Headquarters Company. It provides personnel for the command and control, administration, and staff planning and supervision of the brigade. It further provides the personnel, supply and admin services to the Brigade Headquarters.

2) Post Signal Battalion. This unit caters to the CEIS

requirements for command and control and administration of the HPA. This includes but not limited to operation of CEIS installations such as switches, communication center, cable facilities, HPA public address systems, HPA networking facilities, information resource management, and databases. It shall also provide technical expertise and assistance for the development of functional information systems of the HPA staff offices and post units.

3) Support Signal Battalion. This battalion is primarily tasked of providing CEIS service support to the Philippine Army. The unit is capable of higher-level restorative maintenance of CEIS equipments, Electronic Warfare, and visual information support.

4) The Army Signal School. The unit will be primarily tasked for the development of the professionalism of the Army Signal Corps. It shall have the facilities for the conduct of education and training of signal courses.

5) CEIS RDC. The Unit is tasked for development of

innovations, improvements and evaluations of communication, electronics and information systems and equipments.

6) Signal Support Units for Major Subordinate Commands.

A signal unit organic to the Signal Brigade/Division shall be organized and to be placed opcon to provide signal support to all Infantry Divisions, Separate Brigades and PAWSSU’s. These units shall be discussed in the succeeding paragraphs. 6. At the Infantry Division. The Philippine Army is the land force component provider of AFP operations. The Philippine Army does this through the different infantry divisions. The PA Infantry Divisions are the main maneuver and territorial forces of the different Area Commands in the conduct of Internal Security Operations (ISO) both for counter-insurgency operations

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and in meeting other security situations that may arise in the future. As the territorial forces against counter-insurgency, the area of responsibility of an infantry division normally covers several provinces. As the maneuver forces to meet other security situations in the future, they may be required to be rapidly deployed in areas well forward of their headquarters and or camps. In both cases the infantry divisions retain and maintain their respective headquarters in their respective division camps where most of their combat support and combat service support elements are maintained.

These characterize the role that the infantry division has. This and the characteristic of the area of responsibility will require a type of CEIS support infrastructure that will provide the division commander the capability to be connected to higher headquarters in real time, and in the process facilitate the exchange of large volume of information for quick and accurate decision making. Likewise, the division commander must be able to be connected to his subordinate units – the brigades and the battalions – that are deployed well beyond reach of the usual tactical communications equipment, for effective command and control. This will require a CEIS infrastructure that could provide the capability to integrate with the mobile communications systems today and in the future; the capability to integrate with the camps data network; and the strategic telecommunications systems of the whole AFP such as the AFPFCS.

a. The Division Signal Officer is a member of the General Staff of the Division commander for CEIS. Among its functions are the following:

1) Signal staff planning and supervision of the Division CEIS

infrastructure; 2) Signal Staff direction and supervision of CEIS education

and training; 3) Staff supervision of attached signal units; 4) In coordination with OG11, PA, plan, engineer and

develop division CEIS systems.

b. The Division Signal Battalion. The Division Signal Battalion organic to the Signal Brigade and is opcon to, is the unit charged with the mission of providing CEIS support to the Infantry Division. In order to be able to accomplish its primary mission, it is organized with a "Headquarters and Headquarters Company", a "Command Signal Company", a "Brigade Support Signal Company" and an “EW Platoon”.

1) Headquarter and headquarters Svc Company. It is

composed of the Battalion Hqs and the Hqs Company. It provides Command and control, admin, equipment, maintenance, staff planning and supervision of operations and Training of the Battalion.

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2) Command Signal Company. Provide CEIS facilities for the Division Headquarters and its echelons of Command. It further provides linkages between echelons of command and to subordinate and attached units of the division. This unit is also charged of maintaining liaison for the establishment of linkages and terminal facilities with higher and adjacent headquarters.

3) Brigade Support Signal Company. Provides CEIS facilities to the three infantry tactical brigade headquarters. A signal support platoon under this unit support each tactical brigade under the Division. In cases were their will be no designated organic signal staff officer of the supported brigade, The Brigade Signal Support platoon leader shall act as the Brigade Signal Officer.

4) EW Platoon. Conducts Electronic warfare support to the

infantry division. The platoon has the capability for Electronic support measures, electronic counter measure and electronic counter-counter measures.

5) Capabilities. At full strength, The Signal Battalion is

capable of the following:

(a) Technical assistance on signal matters to divisional units;

(b) CEIS support to three division headquarters

echelons and three Infantry Brigade Headquarters; (c) Multi-channel radio relay terminal support and

repeater or any combination thereof; (d) Organizational level CEIS maintenance and signal

supply support to divisional units; (e) Operate and maintain medium capacity switches

for the division headquarters and small capacity switches for tactical brigade headquarters;

(f) Operate and maintain computer network facilities

for division and brigade headquarters; (g) PAS support to the division headquarters; (h) Limited VI support and conduct electronic warfare; (i) Radio team support to ten stations.

7. At the Separate Brigades. The separate brigades are known as a “little division” because it has its support and service support units. It has the same characteristics as the infantry division but at a scaled down level.

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Included in this category are the infantry separate brigades, engineer brigades, FA brigade, special operations command and light armor brigade. The brigades may be deployed independently at a certain area of operations or provide supporting or reinforcing elements for Infantry Divisions.

a. Brigade Signal Officer. The brigade signal officer is a member of the staff of the brigade commander for communications electronics and information systems. Included in its functions are planning and engineering of brigade CEIS systems, monitoring and employment of CEIS assets and supervision of brigades signal operations. In cases that there were no assigned organic signal officer, the Signal Company Commander will act as the Brigade Signal Officer.

b. Brigade Signal Company. The Signal Company from the Signal

Brigade is the unit charged to provide CEIS support to a separate brigade. It was organized with a headquarters platoon, command signal platoon and a field support platoon. It is capable of establishing CEIS links with higher, adjacent, subordinate and attached units/headquarters; maintain and operate small capacity switches, multi-channel links, information networks and radio repeaters; conduct unit level maintenance; and technical assistance on signal matters to brigade units. 8. The PA Wide Support and Separate Units. These are units tasked to provide PA wide combat support and combat service supports to the Philippine Army such as logistics, training, intelligence, CMO, administrative and personnel services. These units are usually deployed nationwide, fixed based and collocated with other army major units. Communications requirements are usually supported by the AFP fixed communications system.

a. Unit Signal Officer. The unit signal officer as member of the special staff is the principal adviser of the unit commander on signal matters. In coordination with the OG11, PA may engineer and develop service peculiar CEIS systems to support the unit requirements.

b. Unit Signal Company. The unit signal company from the Signal

Brigade is organized with a headquarters platoon, a command signal platoon and a forward signal support platoon. This unit shall provide technical CEIS support to the unit headquarters and provide facilities for the command and control of organic and attached units and the linkages with HPA and other supported units.

c. Signal Section. Signal sections are organized for every major forward and detached units of the PAWSSU. This section provides internal CEIS support and linkages to subordinate and supported units.

9. At the Battalion Level. At this level, CEIS administration is decentralized to the tactical commanders thru his signal officer. He must have direct and immediate control and disposition over his CEIS unit. A Signal Platoon is organized to support the CEIS requirements of Infantry, FA, Armor, Engineer and equivalent Battalion level headquarters. The Signal Platoon

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Leader also acts as the Battalion Signal Officer, which is the primary staff of the commander on Signal support employment. All signal units at Battalion level therefore are organic elements. 10. At the Company level and below. For Company level units and below, CEIS management rests on the tactical commanders. It necessitates that at these levels, tactical commanders must have sufficient level of awareness and literacy for CEIS management and employment. Signal trained signal chiefs and CEIS equipment operators will assist them in the establishment, operations and preventive maintenance of CEIS systems.

a. Company Signal Section. At the infantry companies and equivalent headquarters, signal sections led by a signal chief performs the management of CEIS facilities. It provides support services for command and control requirements of the company headquarters.

b. Tactical CEIS Equipment Operators. At the platoon and squad

levels, signal trained personnel such as radiotelephone operators are capable of user level establishment, operations and preventive maintenance of tactical CEIS equipments. The Office of G11, PA, shall address loose ends in the management of CEIS in the Philippine Army. It shall serve as the integrating element in the centralized management of CEIS assets and capabilities.

Section 5-3 Management Strategy

The ultimate objective of the management strategy is to provide a CEIS

infrastructure that is reliable, responsive, secure and cost-effective taking into considerations the requirements of the Philippine Army, the evolving CEIS technology, available resources, and the CEIS philosophy. The management strategy of the Philippine Army on CEIS infrastructures is embodied on the following thrusts: Maintenance of existing systems, Improvement through innovations, Development of new systems within the limit of available resources, and the sustained implementation of the management strategy.

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Figure 5.4 PA CEIS Management Strategy.

11. Maintenance of Existing Systems. The Philippine Army, being burdened by shortage of funds for the acquisition of new systems and the continuing decline of the purchasing power of the peso, will, as much as possible, keep any inventory for as long as they could serve their purposes. The equipment is as valuable as dear life in itself. Along this premise, the PA recognizes the importance of maintenance activities to extend the life of every equipment beyond its service life. It is towards this end that the Philippine Army put premium aggressive maintenance activities of existing CEIS infrastructures, both on the preventive and restorative maintenance categories of activities.

a. Preventive Maintenance – This is emphasized at all levels of the organization, from the individual soldier to the biggest unit within the Philippine Army, involved in the operations and maintenance of CEIS infrastructures.

b. Restorative Maintenance - Appropriate levels of maintenance

shall be strengthened. Likewise, the capabilities of commercial companies to repair equipment shall be tapped.

12. Improvement Thru Innovations. The constraints on funds likewise affect the capability of the Philippine Army to acquire high-end military-specifications equipment. In order to provide the immediate requirements of PA units, the principle of “appropriate technology” provides guidance in the pursuit of innovative solutions. Oftentimes, available commercially-off-the-shelf (COTS) solutions are resorted to complement existing systems. Oftentimes also, self-reliant initiatives to appropriately modify existing system

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are done to suit the particular requirements. Moreover, existing facilities are leveraged in exchange for services that maybe needed.

a. Complementary Use of Available Commercial Systems – This is very much evident on the growing acceptance to use commercial cellular phone and commercially available handheld and base radios to complement communications requirements whenever is practicable.

b. Self Reliant Defense Posture (SRDP) Initiatives – Sometimes,

equipment and services available are not readily usable. Some adaptations have to be done to suit the requirements. Instead of discarding these equipment and services, modifications are done in order to make them suitable for the intended purpose.

c. System Enhancement by Leveraging Existing Facilities – The

liberalization of the telecommunications sector over the past few years provided the AFP and the PA in particular, the opportunity to leverage its existing telecommunications facilities in exchange for some services. Antenna tower and floor spaces, lot spaces, and other facilities can be offered to commercial telecommunications companies for their use. In exchange, services such as cellular phone services, trunk-lines and transmission facility requirements maybe received in exchange. This opportunity shall continuously be harnessed without sacrificing security. 13. Development of Appropriate Systems. As fund resources allow, the Philippine Army continually develop appropriate systems. At present, the AFP Modernization Program funds allocated to the Philippine Army will be used to develop some required capabilities. In-sufficiency of funds coupled with the decline in the purchasing power of the program due to peso depreciation has limited the type of capability to be purchased.

a. Acquisition of New Equipment Through the AFPMP – The PA Modernization fund component of the AFP Modernization Program has allowed the acquisition of two types of tactical radios, namely: the HF/SSB, 20-Watt, Man-pack radio and the VHF/FM, 5-Watt, Man-pack radio. Other programs have been put on hold to allow the acquisition of the aforementioned types of radios.

b. Sustainable Capability Enhancement Program Through

Available Capital Outlay Fund. – Pending amendment of the AFPMP, continuing capability enhancements could only be pursued depending on the availability of Capital Outlay funds. This shall be vigorously pursued and justified in order to continuously develop capabilities that were not considered under the AFPMP and that the usual MOE may not allow to be acquired.

c. Sustainable Capability Enhancement Program by Leveraging

Alliances – The Philippine Army shall continuously avail of the opportunity provided by the country’s alliances to continually develop CEIS capabilities.

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14. Sustained Strategy Implementation. Oftentimes, well-meaning programs have been derailed due to the lack of continuity in its implementations. The change in the chief-of-office normally affects the long-term implementation of an adopted strategy. Though the adoption of the strategy set forth in this manual may provide the foundation for its sustained implementation, the following activities shall be pursued to ensure the sustained implementation.

a. Continuing Awareness on the Role of CEIS Infrastructures – Continuing CEIS awareness and literacy program at all levels shall be vigorously pursued. It is only through a fully aware and CEIS literate army that sustained implementation could be ensured.

b. Continuing Review, Revision and Development of CEIS Policies

– In the absence of concrete doctrine on CEIS, the Philippine Army has continually developed policies, in the form of circulars and SOP, to guide the management of CEIS infrastructure. These policies shall be continuously reviewed and revised to keep them attuned to the changing environment. Likewise, additional policies shall be developed to continuously guide the management of the CEIS infrastructures of the Philippine Army.

c. Continuing Signal Corps Personnel Development – For a

country limited in material resources such as the Philippines, one of the most important resources that must be developed is the human resource. The Signal Corps of the Philippine Army is the human resource component that ensures the overall effectiveness of the whole CEIS infrastructure. The Philippine Army shall continuously develop the Signal Corps as a primary Armed Forces Occupational Specialty (AFOS) charged with the responsibility to plan, establish, operate and maintain the CEIS infrastructure of the command.

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GLOSSARY

AFP Modernization Program – The activities undertaken by the AFP to develop its capabilities as mandated by RA 7898 or the AFP Modernization Law.

Architecture – A framework or structure that portrays the relationships between and among elements of the subject force, system or activity.

Asymmetric Warfare – The use of conventional or unconventional weapons or approaches to war fighting to nullify an opponent’s conventional advantage.

CEIS Philosophy – Set of principles, concept and convictions guiding the management of CEIS Infrastructure.

Command – It is the authority that a commander in the military service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command and Control (C2) – The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission.. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Command, Control and Communications (C3) System – The organization of resources that the commander uses to help him plan, direct, coordinate and control military operations to ensure mission accomplishment. Communications – A method or means of conveying information of any kind from one person or place to another. Computer – an electronic device that receives input data, puts them into storage, operates on them according to a program, and outputs the results to the users. Doctrine – Military doctrine is officially believed and taught about as the best way to conduct military affairs. It is an authoritative statement of the principles for the employment of military resources designed for continuing applicability in war and peace. Economy of Force – Employing the least possible resources elsewhere than at the decisive time and place.

HF/SSB – High Frequency/Single Side Band (3-30 Mhz), frequency and transmission method of specification for radio sets used for long distance ground communications.

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Information – Refers to processed data in meaningful form.

Information System –Is a computer based sourcing, manipulating and storing data for the purpose of generating information for the use of organizations. Information Technology – Refers to computers, telecommunications and office systems technologies.

Infrastructure – The basic facilities, equipment, and installation needed for the function of a system, network, or integrated network.

Joint Operations – Combat operations that involve the employment of forces from two or more services (PA, PN and PAF). National Command Authority – The national government structure that exercise control over all armed forces.

National Military Strategy – The document that sets the AFP focus on current and emerging security concerns and adjusts the AFP strategy based on more realistic conditions. I set the national military objectives, the elements of strategy and the force required.

Radio Net – It is composed of two or more radios operating in the same frequency for the specific purpose of interchanging information.

Signal Corps –. The service branch of the Philippine Army primarily tasked in the management and operations of army CEIS. UHF/FM – Ultra High Frequency/Frequency Modulation (403-433 Mhz), frequency and modulation specification of radio sets for internal communications.

VHF/FM – Very High Frequency/Frequency Modulation (30-80 Mhz), frequency and modulation specification of radio sets for short distance communications.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AFP FCS – AFP Fixed Communications System AFPMP – AFP Modernization Program AFPOS – AFP Occupational Specialty BSO – Brigade/Battalion Signal Officer C-E – Communication-Electronics CEIS – Communications Electronics and Information System C2 – Command and Control CMO – Civil Military Operations COMCAM – Combat Camera COTS – Commercially Off the Shelf DATACOM – Data Communications DSO – Division Signal Officer EEZ – Exclusive Economic Zone EW – Electronic Warfare G11 – Assistant Chief Of Staff for CEIS, G11, PA HF/SSB – High Frequency/Single Side Band (3-30 Mhz) LAN – Local Area Network LIS – Logistics Information System IS – Information Systems ISO – Internal Security operations, Information Systems Office/Officer MIS – Management Information Systems NBC – Nuclear Biological Warfare NCA – National Command Authority

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PANET – Philippine Army Intranet PAWSSU – PA Wide Support and Separate Units PIS – Personnel Information System RDF – Rapid Deployment Force SC – Signal Corps SRDP – Self Reliant Defense Posture UHF/FM – Ultra High Frequency/Frequency Modulation VHF/FM – Very High Frequency/Frequency Modulation VI – Visual Information VSAT – Very Small Aperture Terminal

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RECORD OF CHANGES

Identification of change or Correction and Reg. No. (if

any)

Date Entered

By Whom entered (Signature, Rank, Grade, Name or Rate, Name of

Command)

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RECOMMENDATION FOR CHANGES

_____________________________________ ________________________________

_________________________ (Originating Agency)

________________ (Date) SUBJECT: Recommendation for Changes TO: Commanding Officer

Doctrine Center, TRADOC Fort Bonifacio, Makati City The following recommendation is submitted for improvement of _____________________________________________________________

(Short Title)

________________________________ __________________________ (Long Title) page ________________________________ __________________________

Article Para. No. Line Sentence ________________________________ Figure No. Comment: Recommendation:

_____________________________ (Signature of CO)

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R E S T R I C T E D E S T R I C T E D COMMANDING GENERAL PHILIPPINE ARMY Fort Andres Bonifacio,...

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