Question 6- Predestination
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Question Six: Predestination
1. Primo utrum praedestinatio pertineatad scientiam vel voluntatem.
2. Secundo utrum praescientia meritorum sit causa vel ratio praedestinationis.
3. Tertio utrum praedestinatiocertitudinem habeat.
4. Quarto utrum numeruspraedestinatorum sit certus.
5. Quinto utrum praedestinatis sit certasua praedestinatio.
6. Sexto utrum praedestinatio possitiuvari precibus sanctorum.
1. Does predestination belong toknowledge of will?
2. Is foreknowledge of merits thecause of or reason forpredestination?
3. Is predestination certain? 4. Is the number of predestined
certain? 5. Are the predestined certain of their
predestination? 6. Can predestination be helped by
the prayers of the saints?
ARTICLE I
This question treats predestination.
In the first article we ask:
Does predestination belong to knowledge or will?
[ARTICLE S.T., I, 23, aa. 1, 3-4; I Sent., 40,1, 2; C.G., III, 163; In Rom., c. 1, lect. 3 (P. 13:7a,
82).]
Quaestio est de praedestinatione. Et primoquaeritur utrum pertineat ad scientiam, vel
ad voluntatem
Difficulties
Et videtur quod ad voluntatem sicut ad
genus.
It seems that it has will as its genus, for
Quia, ut dicit Augustinus in Lib. de
praedestinatione sanctorum,
praedestinatio est propositum miserendi.Sed propositum est voluntatis. Ergo et
praedestinatio.
1. As Augustine says,‟ predestination is the
intention of being merciful. But intention belongs
to the will. Consequently, predestination also belongs to the will.
Praeterea, praedestinatio videtur idem
esse cum electione aeterna, de qua diciturEphes., I, 4: elegit nos in ipso ante mundi
constitutionem, quia idem dicuntur electi
2. Predestination seems to be the same as the
eternal election referred to in the Epistle to theEphesians (1:4): “He chose us in him before the
foundation of the world”— because the chosen are
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et praedestinati. Sed electio, secundum
philosophum in VI et X Ethicorum, magisest appetitus quam intellectus. Ergo et
praedestinatio magis ad voluntatem, quam
ad scientiam pertinet.
the same as the predestinated. Now, according to
the Philosopher, choice belongs rather to appetitethan to intellect. Hence, predestination belongs
more to the will than to knowledge.
Sed dicebat, quod electio praedestinationem praecedit, nec est idem
ei.- Sed contra, voluntas sequitur
scientiam, et non praecedit. Sed electio advoluntatem pertinet. Si igitur electio
praedestinationem praecedit,
praedestinatio non potest ad scientiam
pertinere.
3. But it was said that election comes before predestination and is not the same as it. — On the
contrary, will comes after knowledge, not before
it. But choice pertains to the will. If, therefore,choice comes before predestination, then
predestination cannot belong to knowledge.
Praeterea, si praedestinatio ad scientiam pertineret, idem videretur esse
praedestinatio quod praescientia; et sic
quicumque praesciret salutem alicuius, praedestinaret illum. Sed hoc est falsum.
Prophetae enim praesciverunt salutem
gentium, quam non praedestinaverunt.
Ergo et cetera.
4. If predestination belonged to knowledge, then itwould seem to be the same as foreknowledge; and
thus whoever foreknew the salvation of a person
would predestine him. Now, this is false; for the prophets foreknew the salvation of the Gentiles;
yet they did not predestine it. Therefore.
Praeterea, praedestinatio causalitatemimportat. Sed causalitas non est de ratione
scientiae, sed magis de ratione voluntatis.
Ergo praedestinatio magis pertinet advoluntatem quam ad scientiam.
5. Predestination implies causality. Now, causalitydoes not have the nature of knowledge, but rather
the nature of will. Consequently, predestination
belongs more to the will than to knowledge.
Praeterea, voluntas in hoc a potentia
differt quod potentia effectus respicit
tantum in futuro (non enim est potentiarespectu eorum quae sunt vel fuerunt),
voluntas vero respicit aequaliter effectum
praesentem et futurum. Sed praedestinatio
habet effectum in praesenti et in futuro;unde et ab Augustino dicitur, quod
praedestinatio est praeparatio gratiae in
praesenti, et gloriae in futuro. Ergo praedestinatio ad voluntatem pertinet.
6. The will differs from a passive potency in this
respect, that the latter refers only to effects taking
place in the future, for we, cannot speak of passive potency in relation to things that are or have been,
whereas the will extends equally to both present
and future effects. Now, predestination has both
present and future effects; for, as Augustine says:“Predestination is the preparation of grace in the
present and of glory in the future.” Therefore, it
belongs to the will.
Praeterea, scientia non respicit res ut 7. Knowledge is not related to things in so far as
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factas vel faciendas, sed magis ut scitas
vel sciendas; praedestinatio vero respicitid quod faciendum est. Ergo
praedestinatio ad scientiam non pertinet.
they are made or to be made but in so far as they
are known or to be known. Now, predestination isrelated to a thing as something that must be
effected. Consequently, it does not belong to
knowledge.
Praeterea, effectus magis denominatur acausa proxima quam a causa remota, sicut
homo generatus ab homine generante
magis quam a sole. Sed praeparatio est ascientia et voluntate; scientia autem est
causa prior et remotior quam voluntas.
Ergo praeparatio magis pertinet ad
voluntatem quam ad scientiam. Sed praedestinatio est praeparatio alicuius ad
gloriam, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo et praedestinatio magis erit voluntatis quam
scientiae.
8. An effect receives its name from its proximatecause rather than from its remote cause. For
example, we say that a man is begotten by a man,
instead of saying by the sun, which also begetshim. Now, preparation is the effect of both
knowledge and will, but knowledge is prior to the
will and more remote than it. Consequently,
preparation belongs more to the will than toknowledge. But, as Augustine says:
“Predestination is the preparation of someone forglory.” Therefore, predestination pertains rather to
the will than to knowledge.
Praeterea, quando multi motus ordinantur
ad unum terminum, tota motuum
coordinatio recipit nomen ultimi motus;
sicut ad educendum formamsubstantialem de potentia materiae
ordinatur primo alteratio et secundo
generatio, et totum nominatur generatio.
Sed ad aliquid praeparandum ordinatur primo motus scientiae et deinceps motus
voluntatis. Ergo totum debet voluntati
attribui; et ita praedestinatio praecipue involuntate esse videtur.
9. When many motions are ordered to only one
term, then the entire co-ordinated complex of
motions takes the name of the last motion. For
example, in the drawing out of a substantial formfrom the potency of matter, the following order is
had: first, alteration, then generation. But the
whole is called generation. Now, when something
is prepared, this order is had: first, movements ofknowledge, then movements of the will.
Consequently, the whole should be attributed to
the will; therefore, predestination seems to beespecially in the will.
Praeterea, si unum contrariorum
appropriatur alicui, reliquum maxime
removetur ab eodem. Sed mala maxime
appropriantur divinae praescientiae;malos enim praescitos dicimus; ergo
praescientia non respicit bona. Sed
praedestinatio est de bonis salutaribustantum. Ergo praedestinatio non pertinet
ad praescientiam.
10. If he of two contraries is appropriated to
something, then the other contrary is removed
from it in the highest possible degree. Now, evil is
appropriated especially to God‟s foreknowledge,for we say that the damned are known beforehand.
Consequently, His foreknowledge does not have
good things as its object. Predestination, however,is concerned only with those good things that lead
to salvation. Therefore, predestination is not
related to foreknowledge.
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Praeterea, illud quod proprie dicitur,
glosatione non indiget. Sed in sacraScriptura quando cognitio respectu boni
dicitur, glossatur pro approbatione, ut
patet in I Cor., cap. VIII, 3: si quis diligitDeum, hic cognitus est ab eo id est
approbatus: et II Tim. II, 19: novit
dominus qui sunt eius, id est approbat.
Ergo notitia non est proprie de bonis. Sed praedestinatio est bonorum. Ergo, et
cetera.
11. When a word is used in its proper sense, it
does not need a gloss. But; whenever the sacredScripture speaks of knowledge of good, a gloss is
added saying that this means approval. This is
evident from the Gloss on the first Epistle to theCorinthians (8:3): “„If any man love God, the
same is known by him‟— that is, he is approved by
God”; and from the Gloss on the second Epistle to
Timothy (2:19): “„The Lord knows who are his‟— that is, God approves him.” In its proper sense,
therefore, knowledge is not related to good things.
But predestination is related to good things.
Therefore.
Praeterea, praeparare est motivae virtutis,
quia ad opus pertinet. Sed praedestinatioest praeparatio, ut dictum est. Ergo
praedestinatio ad virtutem motivam pertinet: ergo ad voluntatem, et non ad
scientiam.
12. To prepare belongs to a power that moves, for
preparation is related to some work. But, as has been said, predestination is a preparation.
Therefore, it belongs to a moving power and so tothe will, not to knowledge.
Praeterea, ratio exemplata sequitur
rationem exemplarem. Sed in rationehumana, quae est exemplata a divina,
videmus quod praeparatio est voluntatis,
et non scientiae. Ergo et in praeparatione
divina erit similiter; et sic idem quod prius.
13. A reasoning power modeled upon another
reasoning power imitates it. Now, in the case ofthe human reason, which is modeled upon the
divine, we see that preparation belongs to the will,
not to knowledge. Consequently, divine
preparation is similar; and the conclusion is thesame as before.
Praeterea, omnia attributa divina sunt
idem secundum rem, sed differentia
eorum ostenditur ex diversitate effectuum.Ad illud ergo attributum reduci debet
aliquid de Deo dictum, cui eius effectus
appropriatur. Sed gratia et gloria sunt
effectus praedestinationis, etappropriantur voluntati, sive bonitati.
Ergo et praedestinatio ad voluntatem
pertinet, non ad scientiam.
14. Although the divine attributes are one reality,
the difference between them is manifested in the
difference in their effects. Consequently,something said of God should be reduced to that
attribute to which this effect is appropriated. Now,
grace and glory are the effects of predestination,
and they are appropriated either to His will or Hisgoodness. Therefore, predestination also belongs
to His will, not to His knowledge.
Sed contra. To the Contrary
Est quod dicit Glossa Rom. VIII, 29 super 1. The Gloss on the Epistle to the Romans (8:29),
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illud quos praescivit, hos et
praedestinavit: praedestinatio, inquit, est praescientia et praeparatio beneficiorum
Dei, et cetera.
“For whom he foreknew, he also predestinates,”
says: “Predestination is God‟s foreknowledge and preparation of benefits...”
Praeterea, omne praedestinatum est
scitum, sed non convertitur. Ergo praedestinatum est in genere sciti. Ergo et
praedestinatio est in genere scientiae.
2. Whatever is predestined is known, but the
opposite is not true. Consequently, what is predestined belongs to the class of things that are
known; hence, it is included in the genus of
knowledge.
Praeterea, magis est ponendum
unumquodque in genere eius quodconvenit ei semper, quam in genere eius
quod non convenit ei semper. Sed
praedestinationi semper convenit id quodest ex parte scientiae: semper enim
praedestinationem praescientia
concomitatur, non autem semperconcomitatur eam appositio gratiae, quae
est per voluntatem: quia praedestinatio est
aeterna, appositio autem gratiae est
temporalis. Ergo praedestinatio magisdebet poni in genere scientiae quam
voluntatis.
3. A thing should be placed in the genus to which
it always belongs, rather than in a genus which isnot always proper to it. Now, the element of
knowledge always belongs to predestination,
because foreknowledge always accompanies it.The granting of grace, however, which takes place
through the will, does not always accompany
predestination, since predestination is eternalwhile the bestowal of grace takes place in time.
Predestination, therefore, should be placed in the
genus of knowledge rather than in that of will acts.
Praeterea, habitus cognitivi et operativi
inter intellectuales virtutes a philosophocomputantur, qui ad rationem pertinentmagis quam ad appetitum, ut patet de
prudentia et arte in VI Ethic. Sed
praedestinatio importat principiumcognitivum et operativum quia est et
praescientia et praeparatio, ut ex
definitione inducta patet. Ergo
praedestinatio magis pertinet adcognitionem quam ad voluntatem.
4. The Philosopher places habits of knowing and
doing among the intellectual virtues, for they belong more to reason than to appetite. This isclearly what he does in the case of art and
prudence, as can be seen in his Ethics.” Now,
predestination implies a principle of doing and ofknowing, since, as is evident from the definition
given, predestination is both foreknowledge and
preparation. Predestination, therefore, belongs
more to knowledge than it does to the will.
Praeterea, contraria sunt in eodem genere.
Sed praedestinationi est contrariareprobatio. Cum ergo reprobatio sit in
genere scientiae, quia Deus praescit
malitiam reproborum et non facit eam,
5. Contraries belong to the same genus. But
predestination is the contrary of reprobation. Now,since reprobation belongs to the genus of
knowledge, because God foreknows the malice of
the damned but does not cause it, it seems that
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videtur quod etiam praedestinatio sit in
genere scientiae.
predestination also belongs to the genus of
knowledge.
Responsio. REPLY
Dicendum, quod destinatio, unde nomen
praedestinationis accipitur, importat
directionem alicuius in finem: unde
aliquis dicitur nuntium destinare qui eumdirigit ad aliquid faciendum. Et quia id
quod proponimus, ad executionem
dirigimus, sicut ad finem; ideo id quod
proponimus, dicimur destinare, secundumillud II Machab., cap. VI, 20, de Eleazaro,
quod destinavit in corde suo non
admittere illicita propter vitae amorem.
Destination (from which predestination is
derived) implies the direction of something to an
end. For this reason, one is said to destine a
messenger if he directs him to do something. And because we direct our decisions to execution as to
an end, we are said to destine what we decide. For
example, Eleazar (2 Maccabees 6:19) is said to
have “destined” in his heart not to do “anyunlawful things for the love of life.”
Sed haec praepositio prae, quaeadiungitur, adiungit ordinem ad futurum;
unde cum destinare non sit nisi eius quod
est, praedestinare potest esse etiam eiusquod non est: et quantum ad haec duo
praedestinatio sub providentia collocatur
ut pars eius. Dictum est enim in
praecedenti quaestione quod ad providentiam pertinet directio in finem:
providentia etiam a Tullio ponitur
respectu futuri; et a quibusdam definitur,quod providentia est praesens notiofuturum pertractans eventum.
Now, the particle pre-, when joined to a word,adds a relation to the future. Consequently,to
destine refers to what is present, while to
predestine can also refer to what is future. For tworeasons, therefore, predestination is placed under
providence as one of its parts, namely, because
direction to an end, as pointed out in the preceding
question,” pertains to providence, and because providence — even according to Cicero — includes
a relation to the future. In fact, some define
providence by saying that it is present knowledge bearing upon future event.
Sed tamen praedestinatio quantum ad duo
a providentia differt: providentia enimdicit universaliter ordinationem in finem,
et ideo se extendit ad omnia quae a Deo in
finem aliquem ordinantur, sive rationalia
sive irrationalia, sive bona sive mala; sed praedestinatio respicit tantum illum finem
qui est possibilis rationali creaturae,
utpote gloriam; et ideo praedestinatio nonest nisi hominum, et respectu horum quae
pertinent ad salutem. Differt etiam alio
modo. In qualibet enim ordinatione ad
On the other hand, predestination differs from
providence in two respects. Providence means ageneral ordering to an end. Consequently, it
extends to all things, rational or irrational, good or
bad, that have been ordained by God to an end.
Predestination, however, is concerned only withthat end which is possible for a rational creature,
namely, his eternal glory. Consequently, it
concerns only men, and only with reference tothose things that are related to salvation.
Moreover, predestination differs from providence
in a second respect. In any ordering to an end, two
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finem est duo considerare: scilicet ipsum
ordinem, et exitum vel eventum ordinis:non enim omnia quae ad finem
ordinantur, finem consequuntur.
Providentia ergo, ordinem in finemrespicit tantum, unde per Dei
providentiam homines omnes ad
beatitudinem ordinantur. Sed
praedestinatio respicit etiam exitum veleventum ordinis, unde non est nisi eorum
qui gloriam consequentur. Sicut igitur se
habet providentia ad impositionem
ordinis, ita se habet praedestinatio adordinis exitum vel eventum: quod enim
aliqui finem gloriae consequantur, non est
principaliter ex propriis viribus, sed ex
auxilio gratiae divinitus dato.
things must be considered: the ordering itself, and
the outcome or result of the ordering, for noteverything that is ordered to an end reaches that
end. Providence, therefore, is concerned only with
the ordering to the end. Consequently, by God‟s providence, all men are ordained to beatitude. But
predestination is also concerned with the outcome
or result of this ordering, and, therefore, it is
related only to those who will attain heavenlyglory. Hence, providence, is related to the initial
establishment of an order, and predestination is
related to its outcome or result; for the fact that
some attain the end that is eternal glory is not due primarily to their own power but to the help of
grace given by God.
Unde, sicut de providentia, supra dictum
est, quod consistit in actu rationis, sicut et
prudentia cuius est pars, eo quod soliusrationis est dirigere vel ordinare; ita etiam
et praedestinatio in actu rationis consistit
dirigentis vel ordinantis in finem. Sed ad
directionem in finem praeexigiturvoluntas finis: nullus enim aliquid in
finem ordinat quem non vult: unde etiamet perfecta prudentiae electio non potestesse nisi in eo qui habet virtutem
moralem, secundum philosophum in VI
Ethicorum: per virtutem enim moralem
affectus alicuius in fine stabilitur, adquem prudentia ordinat. Finis autem in
quem praedestinatio dirigit, non est
universaliter consideratus, sed secundumcomparationem eius ad illum qui finem
ipsum consequitur, quem oportet esse
distinctum apud dirigentem ab his quifinem illum non consequentur: et ideo praedestinatio praesupponit dilectionem,
per quam Deus vult salutem alicuius. Ut
sicut prudens non ordinat in finem nisiinquantum est temperatus vel iustus, ita
Deus non praedestinat nisi inquantum est
diligens.
Therefore, just as we said above that providence
consists in an act of reason, like prudence, of
which it is a part, because it belongs to reasonalone to direct and to ordain, so now we say that
predestination also consists in an act of reason,
directing or ordering to an end. However, the
willing of an end is required before there can bedirection to an end, because no one directs
anything to an end which he does not will. This iswhy the Philosopher says that a perfect prudentialchoice can be made only by a man of good moral
character, because moral habits strengthen one‟s
affections for the end which prudence dictates.
Now, the one who predestines does not considerin a general way the end to which his
predestination directs him; he considers it, rather,
according to the relation it has to one who attainsit, and such a person must be distinct in the mind
of the one predestining from those persons who
will not achieve this end. Consequently, predestination presupposes a love by which Godwills the salvation of a person. Hence, just as a
prudent man directs to an end only in so far as he
is temperate or just, so God predestines only in sofar as He loves.
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Praeexigitur etiam et electio, per quam
ille qui in finem infallibiliter dirigitur abaliis separatur qui non hoc modo in finem
ordinantur. Haec autem separatio non est
propter aliquam diversitatem inventam inhis qui separantur quae posset ad amorem
incitare: quia cum nondum nati essent aut
aliquid boni egissent aut mali, dictum est:
Iacob dilexi, Esau autem odio habui; utdicitur Roman., cap. IX, 11-13. Et ideo
praedestinatio praesupponit electionem et
dilectionem; electio vero dilectionem. Ad
praedestinationem vero duo sequuntur:scilicet consecutio finis, quod est
glorificatio, et collatio auxilii ad
consequendum finem, quod est appositio
gratiae, quae ad vocationem pertinet; undeet praedestinationi duo effectus
assignantur, scilicet gratia et gloria.
Another prerequisite of predestination is the
choice by which he who is directed to the endinfallibly is separated from others who are not
ordained to it in the same manner. This separation,
however, is not on account of any difference,found in the predestined, which could arouse
God‟s love; for, as we read in the Epistle to the
Romans (9:11-13): “When the children were not
yet born nor had done any good or evil... it wassaid... „Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have
hated.‟” Consequently, predestination presupposes
election and love, and election presupposes love.
Again, two things follow upon predestination: theattainment of the end, which is glory, and the
granting of help to attain this end, namely, the
bestowal of the grace that pertains to the call to be
among the predestined. Predestination, therefore,has two effects: grace and glory.
Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod inactibus animae ita est quod praecedens
actus includitur quodammodo virtute in
sequenti: et quia praedestinatio
praesupponit dilectionem, quae est actusvoluntatis, ideo in ratione
praedestinationis aliquid includitur ad
voluntatem pertinens, et propter hoc, propositum, et alia ad voluntatem
pertinentia, in definitione
praedestinationis quandoque ponuntur.
1. The acts of the soul are such that a precedingact in some way is virtually contained in the act
that follows. Since predestination presupposes
love, an act of the will, the notion of
predestination includes something that belongs tothe will. For this reason, intention and other
elements belonging to the will are sometimes put
into its definition.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod
praedestinatio non est idem electioni, sed praesupponit eam, ut dictum est; et ideo
est quod idem sunt praedestinati et electi.
2.Predestination is not the same as election, but, as
we said above, it presupposes election. This iswhy the predestined are the same as the elect.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod cum electiosit voluntatis et directio rationis, semper
directio electionem praecedit, si referantur
ad idem; sed si ad diversa, tunc non est
3. Since choice belongs to the will, and directionto the intellect, direction always precedes election
if both have the same object. But if they have
different objects, then there is no inconsistency in
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inconveniens quod electio praecedat
praedestinationem, quae directionisrationem importat: electio enim, prout hic
accipitur, pertinet ad ipsum qui in finem
dirigitur: prius autem est accipere illumqui dirigitur in finem, quam ipsum in
finem dirigere; et ideo electio in proposito
praedestinationem praecedit.
election‟s coming before predestination, which
implies the existence of direction. As election istaken here, however, it pertains to one who is
directed to an end; and the acceptance of one who
is to be directed toward an end comes before thedirection itself. In the case stated, therefore,
election precedes predestination.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod praedestinatio, quamvis ponatur in genere
scientiae, tamen aliquid supra scientiam et
supra praescientiam addit: scilicet
directionem vel ordinationem in finem,sicut etiam prudentia supra cognitionem;
unde, sicut non omnis cognoscens quidagendum sit, est prudens, ita nec omnis
praesciens est praedestinans.
4. Even though predestination is placed under thegenus of knowledge, it adds something to
knowledge and foreknowledge, namely, direction
or an order to an end. In this respect, it resembles
prudence, which also adds something to the notionof knowledge. Consequently, just as every person
who knows what to do is not thereby prudent, soalso not every one who has foreknowledge
thereby predestines.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod quamvis
causalitas non sit de ratione scientiae
inquantum huiusmodi, est tamen de
ratione scientiae inquantum est dirigens etordinans in finem; quod non est
voluntatis, sed rationis tantum; sicut etiam
intelligere est de ratione animalis
rationalis, non inquantum est animal, sedinquantum est rationale.
5. Even though causality does not belong to the
notion of knowledge as such, it belongs to that
knowledge which directs and orders to an end; and
direction of this kind is not proper to the will butto the intellect alone. Similarly, understanding
does not belong to the nature of a rational animal
in so far as it is animal but only in so far as it is
rational.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod sicut voluntas
respicit effectum praesentem et futurum,
ita scientia; unde quantum ad hoc nonmagis potest probari quod praedestinatio
ad unum eorum pertineat quam ad
alterum. Sed tamen praedestinatio, proprie
loquendo, non respicit nisi futurum, quodex praepositione designatur, quae
importat ordinem ad futurum; nec est
idem dicere habere effectum in praesenti,et habere effectum praesentem, quia in
praesenti esse dicitur quidquid pertinet ad
statum huius vitae, sive sit praesens, sive praeteritum, sive futurum.
6. Knowledge is related to both present and future
effects, just as the will is. On this basis, therefore,
it cannot be proved that predestination belongsmore to one than to the other. Yet predestination,
properly speaking, is related only to the future-as
the prefix pre-indicates, because it implies an
ordering to the future. Nor is it the same to speakof having an effect in the present and of having a
present effect, because whatever pertains to the
state of this life — whether it be present, past, orfuture — is said to be in the present.
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Ad septimum dicendum, quod quamvis
scientia inquantum est scientia, nonrespiciat facienda, tamen scientia practica
facienda respicit; et ad talem scientiam
praedestinatio reducitur.
7. Even though knowledge as knowledge is not
related to things in so far as they are to be made, practical knowledge is related to things under this
aspect, and predestination is reduced to this type
of knowledge.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod praeparatio proprie importat dispositionem potentiae
ad actum. Est autem duplex potentia:
scilicet activa et passiva: et ideo duplexest praeparatio: una patientis, secundum
quem modum materia dicitur praeparari
ad formam; alia agentis, secundum quam
aliquis dicitur se praeparare ad aliquidagendum; et talem praeparationem
praedestinatio importat, quae nihil aliud inDeo ponere potest quam ipsam
ordinationem alicuius in finem.Ordinationis autem principium proximum
est ratio, sed remotum voluntas, ut ex
dictis patet; et ideo secundum rationeminductam, praedestinatio principalius
rationi quam voluntati attribuitur.
8. In its proper sense, preparation implies adisposing of a potency for act. There are, however,
two kinds of potencies: active and passive;
consequently, there are two kinds of preparations,There is a preparation of the recipient, which we
speak of when we say that matter is prepared for a
form. Then there is a preparation of the agent,
which we speak of when we say that someone is preparing himself in order to do something. It is
this latter kind of preparation that predestinationimplies; for it asserts simply this, that in God there
exists the ordering of some person to an end. Now, the proximate principle of ordering is
reason, and, as is clear from above, its remote
principle is will. Consequently, for the reasongiven in the difficulty, predestination is attributed
more to reason than to will.
Similiter autem dicendum est ad nonum. 9. A similar answer should be given to the ninth
difficulty.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod malaappropriantur praescientiae, non quia praescientia sit magis proprie de malis
quam de bonis, sed quia bona habent
aliquid aliud respondens in Deo quam praescientiam, mala vero non; sicut etiam
convertibile non indicans substantiam
appropriat sibi nomen proprii, quod etiam
aeque proprie definitioni convenit, propterhoc quod definitio aliquid dignitatis addit.
10. Evil things are ascribed as proper toforeknowledge, not because they are more properobjects of foreknowledge than good things, but
because good things in God imply something
more than mere foreknowledge, while evil thingshave no such added implication. Similarly, a
convertible term which does not signify an
essence appropriates to itself the name of
property, which belongs just as properly to thedefinition, because the definition adds a certain
priority.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod glossationon semper significat improprietatem, sed
est quandoque necessaria ad
specificandum quod generaliter dicitur; et
11. A gloss does not always mean that a word hasnot been used in its proper sense. Sometimes a
gloss is necessary merely to make specific what
has been stated in a general way. This is why the
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hoc modo glossatur notitia per
approbationem.
gloss explains knowledge as meaning knowledge
of approval.
Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod
praeparare vel ordinare est motivaetantum; sed motiva non solum est
voluntas, sed etiam ratio practica, ut patetin III de anima.
12. To prepare or direct belongs only to powers
that move. But to move is not peculiar to the will.As is clear from The Soul , this is also a property of
the practical intellect.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod
etiam in ratione humana ita est, quod
praeparatio, secundum quod importat
ordinationem vel directionem in finem,est actus proprius rationis, et non
voluntatis.
13. In so far as preparation made even in a human
reason implies an ordering or directing to an end,
it is an act proper to the intellect, not to the will.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod in
attributo divino non solum estconsiderandus effectus, sed respectus eius
ad effectum: quia idem est effectus
scientiae et potentiae et voluntatis, sednon idem respectus ad illum effectum per
illa tria nomina importatur. Respectus
autem quem praedestinatio importat ad
effectum suum, cum respectu scientiae,inquantum est dirigens, magis convenit
quam cum respectu potentiae et
voluntatis; et ideo praedestinatio adscientiam reducitur.
14. When treating a divine attribute, we should not
consider only its effect but also its relation to theeffect; for, while the effects of knowledge, power,
and will are the same, still, as the names of these
attributes imply, their relations to them are not. Now, in so far as predestination is directive, the
relation implied by predestination to its effect is
more logically said to be a relation of knowledge
than a relation of power or will. Consequently, predestination is reduced to a type of knowledge.
Answers to Contrary Difficulties
Alia concedimus: quamvis ad secundum
posset dici, quod non omne quod est in
plus, sit genus, quia potest accidentaliter
praedicari.
1.-2.-4. We concede the other arguments presented
here. One might reply to the second, however, by
pointing out that not everything that is found in
more things is thereby a genus, for it might be
predicated of them as an accident.
Ad tertium etiam posset dici, quod
quamvis dare gratiam non semperconcomitetur praedestinationem, tamen
velle dare semper concomitatur.
3. Even though the granting of grace does not
always accompany predestination, the will togrant grace always does.
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Ad quintum etiam posset dici, quod
reprobatio directe non opponitur praedestinationi, sed electioni, quia qui
eligit, alterum accipit et alterum reiicit,
quod dicitur reprobare; unde etiamreprobatio ex ratione sui nominis magis
pertinet ad voluntatem: est enim reprobare
quasi refutare; nisi forte dicatur reprobare
idem quod iudicare indignum quodadmittatur. Sed pro tanto reprobatio ad
praescientiam dicitur in Deo pertinere,
quia nihil positive ex parte voluntatis est
in Deo respectu mali culpae; non enimvult culpam, sicut vult gratiam. Et tamen
etiam reprobatio dicitur praeparatio
quantum ad poenam, quam etiam Deus
vult voluntate consequenti, sed nonantecedenti.
5. Reprobation is directly opposed, not to
predestination, but to election, for He whochooses accepts one and rejects another and this is
called reprobation. Consequently, as the word
itself shows, reprobation pertains more to the will.For to reprobate is, as it were, to reject — except
that it might be said that to reprobate means the
same as to judge unworthy of admittance.
However, reprobation is said to belong to God‟sforeknowledge for this reason, that there is
nothing positive on the part of His will that has
any relation to sin. He does not will sin as He
wills grace. Yet reprobation is said to be a preparation of the punishment which God wills
consequent to sin — not antecedent to it.
ARTICLE II
In the second article we ask:
Is foreknowledge of merits the cause of or reason for predestination?
[ARTICLE S.T., I, 19, 5; 2 3, aa. 2, 4-5; I Sent., 40, 1, 1; 41, 3; C.G., III,163; In Ephes., c. 1,
lects. 1, 4 (P. 13:445b, 45 1 b); In Evang. Johannis, c. 15, lect. 3 (P. 10:568b) ; In Rom., c. 1, lect.3; c. 8, lect. 6; c. 9, lect. 3 (P. 13:8a, 86b, 96a, 972).]
Secundo quaeritur utrum praescientia
meritorum sit causa vel ratio
praedestinationis
Difficulties
Et videtur quod sic. It seems that it is, for
Quia Rom., IX 15, super illud, miserebor
cui misereor etc., dicit Glossa Ambrosii:misericordiam illi dabo, quem praescio
post errorem toto corde reversurum ad
me. Hoc est dare illi cui dandum est etnon dare illi cui dandum non est; ut eum
vocet quem sciat obedire, illum vero non
quem sciat non obedire. Sed obedire et
1. In his gloss on the verse in Romans (9:15), “I
will have mercy on whom I will have mercy,”Ambrose writes as follows: “I will give mercy to
him who I know will return with his whole heart to
Me after his error. This is to give mercy to him towhom it should be given, and not to give it to one
to whom it should not. Consequently, He calls him
who He knows will obey, not him who He knows
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toto corde ad dominum reverti ad
meritum pertinet; contraria vero addemeritum. Ergo praescientia meriti vel
demeriti est causa quare Deus proponat
alicui misericordiam facere vel aliquema misericordia excludere; quod est
praedestinare vel reprobare.
will disobey.”‟ Now, to obey and to return to God
with all one‟s heart are meritorious; the oppositeactions are demeritorious. Foreknowledge of merit
or of demerit is therefore the cause of God‟s
intention of being merciful to some and ofexcluding others from His mercy. This is equivalent
to predestination and reprobation.
Praeterea, praedestinatio includit in se
voluntatem divinam salutis humanae;nec potest dici quod includat solam
voluntatem antecedentem, quia hac
voluntate Deus vult omnes salvos fieri,
ut dicitur I Timoth., II, 4, et sicsequeretur quod omnes homines essent
praedestinati, relinquitur igitur quodincludat voluntatem consequentem. Sed
voluntas consequens, ut dicitDamascenus, est ex nostra causa, scilicet
inquantum nos diversimode nos
habemus ad merendam salutem veldamnationem. Ergo merita nostra
praescita a Deo, sunt causa
praedestinationis.
2. Predestination includes God‟s will to save men.
It cannot be said that it includes only Hisantecedent will, because, according to this will — as
is said in the first Epistle to Timothy (2:4): “God
wills all men to be saved”; hence, it would follow
that all are predestined. It remains, therefore, that predestination includes only His consequent will.
Now, “We are the cause,” as Damascene says, “ofGod‟s consequent will,” according as we merit
salvation or deserve damnation. Our meritsforeknown by God are therefore the cause of
predestination.
Praeterea, praedestinatio principaliter
dicitur propositum divinum de salutehumana. Sed salutis humanae causa est
humanum meritum; scientia etiam causa
et ratio est voluntatis, quia appetibilescitum voluntatem movet. Ergo
praescientia meritorum causa est
praedestinationis, cum duo eorum quae praescientia continet, sint causa illorum
duorum quae in praedestinatione
continentur.
3. Predestination means primarily God‟s will with
respect to man‟s salvation. But men‟s merits are thecause of their salvation. Moreover, knowledge
causes and specifies the act of the will, since that
which moves the will is a desirable thing which isknown. Consequently, foreknowledge of merits is a
cause of predestination, since two of the things
which foreknowledge contains cause the two thingscontained in predestination.
Praeterea, reprobatio et praedestinatio
significant divinam essentiam, etconnotant effectum; in essentia autem
divina non est aliqua diversitas. Ergo
tota diversitas praedestinationis etreprobationis ex effectibus procedit.
Effectus autem sunt considerati, ex parte
4. Reprobation and predestination signify the divine
essence while connoting an effect. There is nodiversity, however, in the divine essence.
Consequently, the difference between
predestination and reprobation comes entirely fromtheir effects. Now, effects are considered as caused
by us. It is due to us, as cause, therefore, that the
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nostra. Ergo ex parte nostra causa est
quod praedestinati a reprobissegregantur, quod per praedestinationem
fit. Ergo idem quod prius.
predestined are segregated from the reprobate, as
takes place through predestination. Hence, the samemust be said as before.
Praeterea, sicut sol uniformiter se habet
quantum est de se, ad omnia corporailluminabilia, quamvis non omnia
possint eius lumen aequaliter participare;
ita Deus se habet aequaliter ad omniaquamvis non omnia aequaliter se habeant
ad participandum bonitatem ipsius, ut a
sanctis et philosophis communiter
dicitur. Sed propter similem habitudinemsolis ad omnia corpora, sol non est causa
huius diversitatis, quare aliquid sittenebrosum et aliquid luminosum, sed
diversa dispositio corporum adrecipiendum lumen ipsius. Ergo et
similiter causa huius diversitatis, quod
quidam perveniunt ad salutem, quidamautem damnantur, aut quod quidam
praedestinantur et quidam reprobantur,
non est ex parte Dei, sed nostra; et sic
idem quod prius.
5. Taken in itself, the sun is in the same relation to
all bodies that can be illuminated, even though all bodies cannot share its light equally. Similarly, God
is equally related to all, even though all do not
participate in His divine goodness in an equalmeasure, as the saints and philosophers say so
often. Now, since the sun is in the same relation to
all bodies, it is not the cause of the differences that
we find in these bodies, namely, that some of themare dark and others bright. This is due, rather, to
differences in the physical constitution of the bodies which affect their reception of sunlight.
Similarly, the reason for this difference, namely,that some reach salvation and others are damned, or
that some are predestined while others are rejected,
is to be found not in God but in us. Consequently,our original thesis stands.
Praeterea, bonum est communicativumsui ipsius. Ergo summi boni est summe
communicare se ipsum, secundum quod
unumquodque est capax. Si ergo alicuinon se communicat, hoc est quia illud
non est capax eius. Sed aliquis est capax
vel non capax salutis, ad quam praedestinatio ordinat, propter
qualitatem meritorum. Ergo merita
praescita sunt causa quare aliqui
praedestinantur, et aliqui non.
6. Good communicates itself. It belongs to thehighest good, therefore, to communicate itself in
the highest possible degree, that is, as much as each
and every thing is capable of receiving it.Consequently, if it does not communicate itself to
something, this is because that thing is not capable
of receiving it. Now, according to the quality of hismerits, a person is capable or not capable of
receiving that salvation which predestination
ordains. Foreknowledge of merits, therefore, is the
reason wily some are predestined and others are
not.
Praeterea, Numer., III, 12: ego tuli
Levitas, etc. dicit Glossa Origenis:
Iacob, natu posterior, primogenitusiudicatus est; ex proposito enim cordis,
quod Deo patuit priusquam in hoc
7. Concerning the passage in Numbers (3:12), “1
took Levites...,” Origen writes: “Jacob, younger by
birth, was judged to be the firstborn. Because whatthey intended to do was in their hearts, and this was
clear to God before they were born or did any good
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mundo nascerentur, aut aliquid agerent
boni vel mali, dictum est: Iacob dilexi,Esau autem odio habui. Sed hoc pertinet
ad praedestinationem Iacob, ut sancti
communiter exponunt. Ergo praecognitio propositi quod habiturus erat Iacob in
corde, fuit ratio praedestinationis eius; et
sic idem quod prius.
or evil, It was said of them:„Jacob have I loved,
Esau have I hated.‟” Now, this love, the saintscommonly explain, pertains to Jacob‟s
predestination. Consequently, God‟s
foreknowledge of the intention Jacob was going tohave in his heart was the reason for his
predestination. Thus, the same must be said as was
said previously.
Praeterea, praedestinatio non potest esseiniusta, cum universae viae domini sint
misericordia et veritas; nec potest ibi alia
iustitia attendi inter Deum et homines
quam distributiva; non enim cadit ibicommutativa iustitia, cum Deus, qui
bonorum nostrorum non eget, nihil anobis recipiat. Iustitia autem distributiva,
inaequalia nonnisi inaequalibus dat;inaequalitas autem non potest attendi
inter homines nisi secundum
diversitatem meritorum. Ergo, quodDeus aliquem praedestinat et alium non,
ex praescientia meritorum diversorum
procedit.
8. Predestination cannot be unjust, since the waysof the Lord are always the ways of mercy and truth.
Nor can there be any form of justice between God
and men other than distributive justice. There is no
place for commutative justice, since God, whoneeds none of our good things, receives nothing
from us. Now, distributive justice rewardsunequally only those that are unequal. But the only
cause of inequality among men is difference inmerit. Therefore, the reason why God predestines
one man and not another is that He foreknows their
different merits.
Praeterea, praedestinatio praesupponit
electionem, ut supra dictum est. Sedelectio non potest esse rationabilis, nisi
sit aliqua ratio propter quam unus ab
altero discernatur: nec in electione dequa loquimur, potest alia ratio
discretionis assignari nisi ex meritis.
Ergo, cum electio Dei irrationabilis essenon possit, ex praevisione meritorum
procedit, et per consequens etiam
praedestinatio.
9. As mentioned previously, predestination
presupposes election. But a choice cannot bereasonable unless there is some reason why one
person is to be preferred to another. Now, in the
election we are speaking about, there can be noreason for the preference other than merits.
Therefore, since God‟s choice cannot be irrational,
His election and, consequently, His predestinationalso must be caused by His foreknowledge of
merits.
Praeterea, Augustinus exponens illud
Malach., I, 2: Iacob dilexi, Esau autemodio habui, dicit, quod voluntas ista Dei
qua unum elegit, et alium reprobavit,
non potest esse iniusta; venit enim exoccultissimis meritis. Sed haec
occultissima merita non possunt accipi in
10. Commenting on that verse in the Prophecy of
Malachi (1:2-3), “I have loved Jacob, but havehated Esau,” Augustine says that “the will of God,”
by which He chose one and rejected the other
“cannot be‟ unjust, for it came from their hiddenmerits.” But the hidden merits can enter into an
intention only in so far as they are foreknown.
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proposito, nisi secundum quod sunt in
praescientia. Ergo praedestinatio de praescientia meritorum venit.
Consequently, predestination comes from
foreknowledge of merits.
Praeterea, sicut se habet abusus gratiaead effectum reprobationis, ita bonus usus
gratiae ad ultimum praedestinationiseffectum. Sed abusus gratiae in Iuda fuit
ratio reprobationis eius; secundum hoc
enim reprobus effectus est quod sinegratia decessit. Quod autem tunc gratiam
non habuit, non fuit causa quia Deus ei
dare noluerit, sed quia ipse accipere
noluit, ut Anselmus dicit, et Dionysius.Ergo et bonus gratiae usus in Petro vel
alio quolibet, est causa quare ipse estelectus vel praedestinatus.
11. As the use of grace is related to the final effectof predestination so the abuse of it is related to the
effect of reprobation. Now, in the case of Judas, theabuse of grace was the reason for his reprobation,
since he was made reprobate because he died
without grace. Moreover, the fact that he did nothave grace when he died was not due to God‟s
unwillingness to give it but to his unwillingness to
accept it — as both Anselm and Dionysius point out.
Consequently, the good use of grace by Peter oranyone else is the reason why he is elected or
predestined.
Praeterea, unus potest alteri mereri primam gratiam; et eadem ratione
videtur quod possit ei mereri gratiae
continuationem usque in finem. Sed ad
gratiam finalem sequitur esse praedestinatum. Ergo praedestinatio
potest ex meritis provenire.
12. One person can merit the first grace for another.For the same reason, it seems that he could merit
for that other person a continuation of grace up to
the end. Now, if one gets final grace, he is
predestined. Consequently, predestination can becaused by merits.
Praeterea, prius est a quo non convertitur
consequentia, secundum philosophum;sed hoc modo se habet praescientia ad praedestinationem, quia omnia Deus
praescit quae praedestinat; mala autem
praescit, quae non praedestinat. Ergo praescientia est prius quam
praedestinatio. Sed prius in quolibet
ordine est causa posterioris. Ergo
praescientia est causa praedestinationis.
13. According to the Philosopher: “One thing is
said to be prior to another when the sequence oftheir being cannot be reversed.” But God‟sforeknowledge is related to predestination in this
way, because God knows beforehand what He
predestines, while He foreknows the evil which Hedoes not predestine. Foreknowledge, therefore, is
antecedent to predestination. But what is prior in
any order is the cause of what is posterior.
Consequently, foreknowledge is the cause of predestination.
Praeterea, nomen praedestinationis a
destinatione vel missione imponitur. Sedmissionem vel destinationem cognitio
praecedit: nullus enim mittit nisi quem
cognoscit. Ergo et cognitio est prior
14. The word predestination is derived
from sending or destining. But knowledge precedessending or destining, because no one can send a
person without knowing him first. Knowledge,
therefore, is prior also to predestination; hence, it
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praedestinatione; et ita videtur esse causa
ipsius; et sic idem quod prius.
seems that it is the cause of predestination.
Consequently, our thesis stands.
Sed contra. To the Contrary
Est quod dicitur Rom. IX, 12, in Glossa
super illud: non ex operibus, sed ex
vocante dictum est, quae sic dicit: sicut
non pro meritis praecedentibus illudfuisse dictum ostendit, scilicet Iacob
dilexi, etc., ita nec pro meritis futuris. Et
infra, super illud: numquid iniquitas est
apud Deum? Nemo dicat Deum, quiafutura opera praevidebat, alterum
elegisse, alterum reprobasse. Et sic ut
prius.
1. The Gloss on the following verse in the Epistle
to the Romans (9:12), “Not of works, but of him
who calls was it said,” reads: “He shows that the
words „I have loved Jacob, etc.,‟ were due neitherto any previous nor to any future merits.” And the
Gloss on the verse, “Is there injustice with God?”
(9:4), says: “Let no one say that God chooses one
man and rejects another because He foresaw futureworks.” Consequently, it does not seem that
foreknowledge of merits is the cause of
predestination.
Praeterea, gratia est effectus praedestinationis, est autem principium
meriti. Ergo non potest esse quod
praescientia meritorum sit praedestinationis causa.
2. Grace is the effect of predestination but the principle of merit. Hence, foreknowledge of merits
cannot possibly be the cause of predestination.
Praeterea, ad Tit., III, 5, dicit apostolus:
non ex operibus iustitiae quae fecimus
nos. Sed secundum suam misericordiamet cetera. Ergo praedestinatio salutis
humanae non provenit ex praescientia
meritorum.
3. In the Epistle to Titus (3:5), the Apostle says:
“Not by the works of justice which we have done
but according to his mercy...” Predestination ofone‟s salvation, therefore, does not arise from
foreknowledge of merits.
Praeterea, si praescientia meritorumesset praedestinationis causa, nullusesset praedestinatus qui non esset merita
habiturus. Sed aliqui sunt huiusmodi,
sicut patet de pueris. Ergo praescientia
meritorum non est praedestinationis
causa.
4. If foreknowledge of merits were the cause of predestination, then no one would be predestinedwho did not merit. But some predestined never
merit, as is evidently the case of children.
Consequently, foreknowledge of merits is not the
cause of predestination.
Responsio. REPLY
Dicendum, quod hoc distat inter causam
et effectum, quod quidquid est causa
There is this difference between a cause and an
effect — that whatever is the cause of the cause must
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causae, oportet esse causam effectus;
non autem quod est causa effectus,oportet quod sit causa causae; sicut patet
quod causa prima per causam secundam
producit effectum suum, et sic causasecunda causat aliquo modo effectum
causae primae; cuius tamen causae causa
non est.
be the cause of the effect, but the cause of the effect
is not necessarily the cause of the cause. It isevident, for example, that the first cause produces
its effect through a second cause, and so the second
cause, in some way, causes the effect of the firstcause, although it is not the cause of the first cause.
In praedestinatione autem est duoaccipere; scilicet ipsam
praedestinationem aeternam, et effectum
eius temporalem duplicem, scilicet
gratiam et gloriam: quorum alter habetcausam meritoriam actum humanum,
scilicet gloria; sed gratiae causa non potest esse humanus actus per modum
meriti, sed sicut dispositio materialisquaedam, inquantum per actus
praeparamur ad gratiae susceptionem.
Sed ex hoc non sequitur quod actusnostri, sive gratiam praecedant, sive
sequantur, sint ipsius praedestinationis
causa.
Now, we must distinguish two aspects of predestination, the eternal predestination itself and
its twofold temporal effect, grace and glory. Glory
has human acts as its meritorious cause, but grace
cannot have human acts as its meritorious cause;human acts can act only as a certain material
disposition to grace, inasmuch as through these actsmen are prepared for the acceptance of it. It does
not follow from this, however, that our acts,whether they precede or follow grace, are the cause
of predestination.
Ad inveniendum autem causam
praedestinationis oportet accipere quod prius dictum est, scilicet quod
praedestinatio est quaedam directio in
finem, quam facit ratio a voluntate mota;unde secundum hoc potest aliquid esse
praedestinationis causa, prout potest esse
voluntatis motivum. Circa quodsciendum est, quod aliquid movet
voluntatem dupliciter: uno modo per
modum debiti, alio modo sine debiti
ratione. Per modum autem debiti movet
aliquid dupliciter voluntatem: uno modoabsolute, et alio modo ex suppositione
alterius. Absolute quidem ipse finisultimus, qui est voluntatis obiectum: et
hoc modo voluntatem movet, ut ab ipso
divertere non possit; unde nullus homo
potest non velle esse beatus, ut
Now, to discover the cause of predestination we
must recall what we have said previously, namely,that predestination is a certain direction to an end,
and this direction is brought about by reason,
moved by the will. Consequently, a thing can be thecause of predestination if it can move the will.
However, a thing can move the will in two ways,
first, as something due, secondly, as something notdue. Now, as something due, a thing can move the
will in two ways, namely, either absolutely or on
the supposition of something else. The ultimate
end, which is the object of the will, moves
absolutely; and it moves the will in such a fashionthat the will cannot turn away from it. For example,
as Augustine says, no man is capable of not willingto be happy. But that without which an end cannot
be had is said to move as something due “on the
supposition of something else.” If an end can be
had, however, without a certain thing which
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Augustinus dicit in Lib. de libero Arbit.
Sed ex suppositione alterius movetsecundum debitum illud sine quo finis
haberi non potest. Illud autem sine quo
finis haberi potest, sed facit ad bene essefinis ipsius, non movet voluntatem
secundum debitum, sed est libera
inclinatio voluntatis in ipsum. Sed tamen
ex quo voluntas libere inclinata est iamin ipsum, inclinatur in omnia sine quibus
hoc haberi non potest, per modum debiti,
ex praesuppositione tamen illius quod
primo volitum ponebatur: sicut rex exsua liberalitate facit aliquem militem;
sed quia non potest esse miles nisi
habeat equum, efficitur debitum et
necessarium ex suppositione liberalitatis praedictae quod ei det equum.
contributes merely to the well-being of the end,
then that thing does not move the will as somethingdue. In this case, the will inclines to it freely; but
when the will is already inclined to it freely, the
will is thereby inclined to all the things withoutwhich it cannot be had, as to things that are due on
the supposition of that which was first willed. For
example, out of liberality a king makes a person a
soldier; but, because one cannot be a soldierwithout a horse, on the supposition of the afore-
mentioned liberality, giving the soldier a horse
becomes due and necessary.
Finis autem divinae voluntatis est ipsa
eius bonitas, quae non dependet abaliquo alio; unde ad hoc quod habeatur a
Deo, nullo alio indiget; et ideo voluntas
eius non inclinatur ad aliquid primo
faciendum per modum alicuius debiti,sed liberaliter tantum, in quantum sua
bonitas in eius opere manifestatur. Sedex quo supponitur quod Deus aliquidfacere velit; per modum cuiusdam debiti
ex suppositione liberalitatis ipsius
sequitur quod faciat ea sine quibus res
illa volita esse non potest; sicut si facerevult hominem, quod det ei rationem.
Ubicumque autem occurrerit aliquid sine
quo aliud a Deo volitum esse possit, hocnon procedit ab eo secundum rationem
alicuius debiti, sed secundum meram
liberalitatem. Perfectio autem gratiae etgloriae sunt huiusmodi bona quod sineeis natura esse potest, excedunt enim
naturalis virtutis limites; unde quod
Deus velit alicui dare gratiam et gloriam,hoc ex mera liberalitate procedit. In his
autem quae ex liberalitate tantum
procedunt causa volendi est ipsa
Now, the end-object of the divine will is God‟s own
goodness, which does not depend on anything else.God needs nothing to help Him possess it.
Consequently, His will is inclined first to make
something freely, not something due, inasmuch as
it is His goodness that is manifested in His works.But, supposing that God wishes to make something,
it follows as something due from the supposition ofHis liberality that He make those things alsowithout which those that He has first willed cannot
be had. For example, if He wills to make a man, He
must give him an intellect. But if there is anything
which is not necessary for that which God wills,then that thing comes from God, not as something
due, but simply as a result of His generosity. Now,
the perfection of grace and glory are goods of thiskind, because nature can exist without them
inasmuch as they surpass the limits of natural
powers. Consequently, the fact that God wishes togive grace and glory is due simply to Hisgenerosity. The reason for His willing these things
that arise simply from His generosity is the
overflowing love of His will for His end-object, inwhich the perfection of His goodness is found. The
cause of predestination, therefore, is nothing other
than God‟s goodness.
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superabundans affectio volentis ad
finem, in quo attenditur perfectio bonitatis ipsius. Unde causa
praedestinationis nihil est aliud quam
bonitas Dei.
Et modo etiam praedicto potest solviquaedam controversia quae inter
quosdam versabatur: quibusdam
dicentibus omnia a Deo secundumsimplicem voluntatem procedere,
quibusdam vero asserentibus omnia
procedere a Deo secundum debitum.
Quarum opinionum utraque falsa est: prima enim tollit necessarium ordinem
qui est inter effectus divinos ad invicem;secunda autem ponit omnia a Deo
procedere secundum necessitatemnaturae. Media autem via est eligenda; ut
ponatur ea quae sunt a Deo primo volita,
procedere ab ipso secundum simplicemvoluntatem; ea vero quae ad hoc
requiruntur, procedere secundum
debitum, ex suppositione tamen: quod
debitum non ostendit Deum esse rebusdebitorem, sed suae voluntati, ad cuius
expletionem debetur id quod dicitur aDeo secundum debitum procedere.
According to these principles, a solution can befound to the controversy that has been taking place
between certain groups. Some have asserted that
everything comes from God‟s simple pleasure,while others say that everything which comes from
God is due. Both opinions are false. The former
ignores the necessary order that exists between the
things God causes, and the latter asserts thateverything arises from God because of a natural
necessity. A middle course must therefore bechosen so that it may be laid down that those things
which are first willed by God come from Hissimple pleasure, but those that are required for this
first class of things come as something due,
although on the basis of a supposition. This “debt”does not, however, make God obliged to things but
only to His own will; for what is said to come from
God as something due is due simply in order that
His will be fulfilled.
Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum igitur dicendum, quoddebitus gratiae usus est quiddam ad quod
divina providentia gratiam collatam
ordinat: unde non potest esse quod ipse
rectus gratiae usus praescitus sit causamovens ad gratiam dandum. Quod ergo
Ambrosius dicit: dabo illi gratiam quem
scio, ad me toto corde reversurum, nonest intelligendum quasi perfecta cordis
reversio sit inclinans voluntatem ad
dandum gratiam, sed quia gratiam datamad hoc ordinat ut aliquis ex accepta
gratia, perfecte convertatur in Deum.
1. Divine providence ordains that grace bestowed be used as it should. Consequently, it is impossible
for foreknowledge of this right use of grace to be
the cause that moves God to give grace. The words
of Ambrose, “I will give grace to him who I knowwill return to me with his whole heart,” cannot be
understood as meaning that a perfect change of
heart inclines God‟s will to give grace but that Hiswill ordains that the grace given be accepted by the
person and that he be turned completely toward
God.
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Ad secundum dicendum, quod
praedestinatio includit voluntatemconsequentem, quae respicit aliquo
modo id quod est ex parte nostra, non
quidem sicut inclinans divinamvoluntatem ad volendum, sed sicut id ad
cuius productionem divina voluntas
gratiam ordinat; vel etiam sicut id quod
ad gratiam quodammodo disponit, etgloriam meretur.
2. Predestination includes God‟s consequent will,
which is related in some way to that which wecause on our part, not by inclining the divine will to
act, but by bringing about that effect for which His
will has ordained grace or by bringing about thatwhich, in a certain sense, disposes us for grace and
merits glory.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod scientia est
movens voluntatem; non autem quaelibet
scientia, sed scientia finis, quod estobiectum movens voluntatem; et ideo ex
cognitione suae bonitatis procedit quodDeus suam bonitatem amet; et ex hoc
procedit quod eam in alios diffunderevelit; non autem propter hoc sequitur
quod meritorum scientia sit causa
voluntatis, secundum quod in praedestinatione includitur.
3. While it is true that knowledge moves the will,
not every kind of knowledge does this but only
knowledge of an end; and an end is an objectmoving the will. Consequently, it is because of His
knowledge of His own goodness that God loves it;and, from this love, He wishes to pour out His
goodness upon others. But it does not thereforefollow that knowledge of merits is the cause of His
will in so far as it is included in predestination.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod quamvis
secundum diversitatem effectuum
sumatur diversa ratio attributorum
divinorum, non tamen propter hocsequitur quod effectus sint attributorum
divinorum causae: non enim hoc modo
accipiuntur rationes attributorumsecundum ea quae in nobis sunt, sicut
secundum causas, sed magis sicut
secundum signa quaedam causarum; etideo non sequitur quod ea quae ex parte
nostra sunt, sint causa quare unus
reprobetur et alius praedestinetur.
4. Although the different formal characters of
God‟s attributes are drawn from the differences in
their effects, it does not follow from this that these
effects are the cause of His attributes. For thedifferent formal characteristics of His attributes are
not derived from our qualities as though our
qualities caused them; rather, our qualities are signsthat the attributes themselves are causes.
Consequently, it does not follow that that which
comes from us is the reason why one man isreprobated and another predestined.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod
habitudinem Dei ad res possumusdupliciter considerare. Uno modo
quantum ad primam rerum
dispositionem, quae est secundumdivinam sapientiam diversos gradus in
rebus constituentem; et sic non eodem
5. We can consider God‟s relation to things in two
ways. We can consider it only with respect to thefirst disposition of things that took place according
to His divine wisdom, which established different
grades of things. If only this is considered, thenGod is not related to all things in the same way. We
can, however, consider His relation to things also
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modo se habet Deus ad omnia. Alio
modo secundum quod iam rebusdispositis providet; et sic similiter se
habet ad omnia, in quantum omnibus
aequaliter dat secundum suam proportionem. Ad primam autem rerum
dispositionem pertinet totum hoc quod
dictum est a Deo procedere secundum
simplicem voluntatem, inter quae etiam praeparatio gratiae computatur.
according to the way in which He provides for
them as already disposed. If His relation to them isconsidered in this manner, then He is related to all
things in the same way, because He gives equally to
all, according to the proportion He has made. Now,all that has been said to proceed from God,
according to His will taken simply, belongs to the
first disposition of things, of which preparation for
grace is a part.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod ad bonitatem
divinam pertinet, in quantum est infinita,
ut de perfectionibus quas unaquaeque ressecundum suam naturam requirit,
unicuique largiatur, secundum quod eiusest capax; non autem requiritur hoc de
perfectionibus superadditis, inter quasest gloria et gratia; et ideo ratio non
sequitur.
6. It belongs to the divine goodness as infinite to
give from its perfections whatever the nature of
each thing requires and is capable of receiving. Butthis is not required for superabundant perfections
such as grace and glory. Hence, the argument proves nothing.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod
propositum cordis Iacob praescitum aDeo, non fuit causa quare ei dare gratiam
voluit, sed fuit quoddam bonum ad quod
Deus gratiam ei dandam ordinavit. Et
ideo dicitur, quod ex proposito cordis,quod ei patuit, eum dilexit, quia scilicet
ad hoc eum dilexit ut tale propositum
cordis haberet, vel quia praevidit quod propositum cordis eius fuit ad gratiae
susceptionem dispositio.
7. God‟s foreknowledge of what lay in the heart of
Jacob was not the reason for His willing to givegrace to him. Instead, the intention in Jacob‟s heart
was a good for which God ordained the grace to be
given to him. It is for this reason that God is said to
have loved him “because his heart‟s intention wasknown by Him.” For God loved him in order that
he might have such an intention in his heart or
because He foresaw that his heart‟s intention was adisposition for the acceptance of grace.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod in illis quae
sunt secundum rationem debiti inter
aliquos distribuenda, esset contrarationem iustitiae distributivae, si
aequalibus inaequalia darentur; sed in his
quae ex liberalitate donantur, in nulloiustitiae contradicit; possum enim uni
dare, et alteri non dare, pro meae libitu
voluntatis. Huiusmodi autem est gratia;et ideo non est contra rationem iustitiae
distributivae, si Deus proponat se
8. It would be contrary to the nature of distributive
justice if things that were due to persons and were
to be distributed to them were given out unequallyto those that had equal rights. But things given out
of liberality do not come under any form of justice.
I may freely choose to give them to one person andnot to another. Now, grace belongs to this class of
things. Consequently, it is not contrary to the nature
of distributive justice if God intends to give graceto one person and not to another, and does not
consider their unequal merits.
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daturum gratiam alicui, et non alteri,
nulla inaequalitate meritorumconsiderata.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod electio Deiqua unum reprobat et alterum eligit,
rationabilis est; non tamen oportet quodratio electionis sit meritum; sed ratio
electionis est divina bonitas. Ratio autem
reprobationis est in hominibus peccatumoriginale, ut Augustinus dicit, vel infuit
hoc ipsum quod est non habere debitum
ad hoc quod eis gratia conferretur.
Rationabiliter enim possum velledenegare aliquid alicui quod sibi non
debetur.
9. The election by which God chooses one man andreprobates another is reasonable. There is no reason
why merit must be the reason for His choice,however, since the reason for this is the divine
goodness. As Augustine says,” moreover, a
justifying reason for reprobation [in the present] isthe fact of original sin in man — for reprobation in
the future, the fact that mere existence gives man
no claim to grace. For I can reasonably deny
something to a person if it is not due to him.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod Magister
distinct. 41, l. I dicit illam auctoritatemesse retractatam ab August. in suo simili.
Vel si debeat sustineri, referendum est ad
effectum reprobationis et
praedestinationis, qui habet aliquamcausam vel meritoriam vel dispositivam.
10. Peter Lombard says that Augustine retracted
that statement in a similar passage. But, if it must be sustained, then it should be taken as referring to
the effect of reprobation and of predestination,
which has a meritorious or disposing cause.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod
praescientia abusus gratiae, non fuit
causa reprobationis in Iuda, nisi forte ex parte effectus, quamvis Deus nullivolenti accipere gratiam eam deneget;
sed hoc ipsum quod est velle accipere
gratiam, est nobis ex praedestinationedivina; unde non potest esse
praedestinationis causa.
11. God‟s foreknowledge of this abuse of grace was
not the reason why Judas was reprobated, unless we
are considering only the consequences of thisabuse — though it is true that God denies grace to noone who is willing to accept it. Now, the very fact
that we are willing to accept grace comes to us
through God‟s predestination. Hence, ourwillingness cannot be a cause of predestination.
Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod
quamvis meritum possit esse causaeffectus praedestinationis, non tamen
potest esse praedestinationis causa.
12. Although merit can be the cause of the effect of
predestination, it cannot be the cause of predestination itself.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod
licet illud a quo non convertiturconsequentia, sit aliquo modo prius, non
13. Although that with which the consequent
cannot be interchanged is prior in some way, it doesnot always follow that it is prior as a cause is said
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tamen sequitur quod semper sit eo modo
prius quo causa prius dicitur, sic enimcoloratum esset causa hominis; et
propter hoc non sequitur quod
praescientia sit causa praedestinationis.
to be prior; for, if this were true, then to be colored
would be the cause of being a man. Consequently,it does not follow that foreknowledge is the cause
of predestination.
Et per hoc patet solutio ad ultimum. 14. The answer to this difficulty is clear from ourlast response.
ARTICLE III
In the third article we ask:
Is predestination certain?
[ARTICLE S.T., I, 23, aa. 6-7; I Sent., 40, 3; Quodl., XI, 3, 3; XII, 3, 3; De rationibus fidei, c.10(P. 16:96a); C.G., III, cc. 94, 162-63. See also readings given for q. 5, a. 5.]
Tertio quaeritur de certitudine
praedestinationisDifficulties
Et videtur quod certitudinem non
habeat.
It seems that it has no certitude, for
Nulla enim causa cuius effectus variari potest habet certitudinem respectu
effectus sui. Sed effectus
praedestinationis potest variari, quia illequi est praedestinatus, potest non
consequi praedestinationis effectum;
quod patet ex hoc quod Augustinusdicit, exponens illud quod habetur
Apocal., III, 11: tene quod habes ne
alius accipiat etc.: si, inquit, alius non
est accepturus nisi iste perdiderit, certusest electorum numerus. Ex quo videtur
quod unus possit amittere, et alius
accipere coronam, quae est
praedestinationis effectus.
1. No cause whose effects can vary can be certain ofits effects. But the effects of predestination can
vary, for one who is predestined may not attain the
effect of his predestination. This is clear from thecommentary of Augustine on the words of the
Apocalypse (3:1 1), “Hold fast that which thou hast,
that no man take...” in which he says: “If one personwill not receive glory unless another loses it, then
the number of the elect is certain.”‟ Now, from this
it seems that one could lose and another receive the
crown of glory, which is the effect of predestination.
Praeterea, sicut res naturales subduntur
divinae providentiae, ita et res humanae.
2. Human affairs fall under God‟s providence as
things in nature do. But, according to the ordering
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Sed illi soli effectus naturales
certitudinaliter ex suis causis proceduntsecundum ordinem divinae providentiae,
quos necessario causae suae producunt.
Cum igitur effectus praedestinationis,qui est salus humana, non necessario,
sed contingenter ex causis proximis
eveniat, videtur quod ordo
praedestinationis non sit certus.
of God‟s providence, only those natural effects that
are produced necessarily by their causes proceedfrom them with certainty. Now, since the effect of
predestination, man‟s salvation, arises not
necessarily but contingently from its proximatecauses, it seems that the ordering of predestination
is not certain.
Praeterea, si aliqua causa habet certum
ordinem ad aliquem effectum, effectus
ille ex necessitate proveniet, nisi aliquid
possit resistere virtuti causae agentis;sicut dispositiones in corporibus
inferioribus inventae resistunt interdumactioni caelestium corporum, ut non
producant proprios effectus, quosnecessario producerent, nisi esset
aliquid resistens. Sed praedestinationi
divinae nihil potest resistere: voluntatienim eius quis resistit? Ut dicitur Rom.
IX, 19. Ergo si habet certum ordinem ad
effectum suum, effectus eius necessario
producetur.
3. If a cause has certitude with respect to some
effect, that effect will necessarily follow unless
there is something that can resist the power of the
agent. For example, dispositions in bodies here below are sometimes found to resist the action of
celestial bodies; and, as a consequence, thesecelestial bodies do not produce their characteristic
effects, which they would produce were there notsomething resisting them. But nothing can resist
divine predestination, because, as we read in the
Epistle to the Romans (9:19): “Who resists hiswill?” Therefore, if divine predestination is ordered
with certitude to its effect, its effect will necessarily
be produced.
Sed dicebat, quod certitudo praedestinationis ad effectum, est cum
praesuppositione causae secundae. —
Sed contra, omnis certitudo quae estcum suppositione alicuius, non est
certitudo absoluta, sed conditionalis;
sicut non est certum quod sol causetfructum in planta, nisi cum hac
conditione, si virtus generativa in planta
fuerit bene disposita, propter hoc quod
certitudo solis ad effectum praedictum
praesupponit plantae virtutem quasicausam secundam. Si igitur certitudo
divinae praedestinationis sit cum praesuppositione secundae causae, non
erit certitudo absoluta, sed conditionalis
tantum; sicut in me est certitudo quod
Socrates movetur si currit, et quod iste
4. The answer was given that the certitude which predestination has of its effect presupposes the
second cause. — On the contrary, any certitude based
on the supposition of something is not absolute butconditional certitude. For example, it is not certain
that the sun will cause a plant to bear fruit unless the
generative power of the plant is in a favorablecondition; and, because of this, the certitude of the
sun‟s producing this effect presupposes the power
of the plant as though the latter were a second
cause. Consequently, if the certitude of divine
predestination includes the presupposition of asecond cause, that certitude will not be absolute but
merely conditional — like the certitude I have thatSocrates is moving if he runs, and that he will be
saved if he prepares himself. Therefore, God will
have no more certitude about those who are to be
saved than I have. But this is absurd.
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salvabitur, si praeparabit se; et ita non
erit in divina praedestinatione aliacertitudo de salvandis quam apud me;
quod est absurdum.
Praeterea, Iob XXXIII, 24, dicitur:
conteret multos et innumerabiles, etstare faciet alios pro eis: quod exponens
Gregorius dicit: locum vitae, aliis
cadentibus, alii sortiuntur. Sed locusvitae est ad quem praedestinatio ordinat.
Ergo a praedestinationis effectu
praedestinatus deficere potest; et sic non
est certa praedestinatio.
5. We read in Job (34:24): “He shall break in pieces
many and innumerable, and shall make others tostand in their stead.” In explanation of this passage,
Gregory writes: “Some fall from the place of life,
while others are given it.” Now, the place of life isthat place to which men are ordained by
predestination. Hence, one who is predestined can
fall short of the effect of predestination; therefore,
predestination is not certain.
Praeterea, secundum Anselmum, eademest veritas praedestinationis et
propositionis de futuro. Sed propositio
de futuro non habet veritatem certam etdeterminatam, sed variari potest, ut patet
per philosophum in Lib. Periher., et in II
Perigeneseos, ubi dicit, quod futurus
quis incedere, non incedet. Ergo necveritas praedestinationis certitudinem
habet.
6. According to Anselm, predestination has thesame kind of truth that a proposition about the
future has. But a proposition about the future does
not have certain and determinate truth. Such a proposition is open to correction — as is clear from
that passage in Aristotle where he says: “One about
to walk may not walk.” Similarly, therefore, the
truth that predestination has does not possesscertitude.
Praeterea, aliquis praedestinatus
quandoque est in peccato mortali, sicut patet de Paulo, quando Ecclesiam persequebatur. Potest autem in peccato
mortali perseverare usque ad mortem,
vel tunc statim tunc interfici; quorumutrolibet posito, praedestinatio effectum
suum non consequetur. Ergo possibile
est praedestinationem non consequi
effectum suum.
7. Sometimes one who is predestined is in mortal
sin. This was clearly true of Paul when he was persecuting the Church. Now, he can stay in mortalsin until death or be killed immediately. If either
happens, predestination will not obtain its effect.
Therefore, it is possible for predestination not toobtain its effect.
Sed dicebat, quod cum dicitur
praedestinatus potest in peccato mortali
mori, si accipiatur subiectum prout statsub forma praedestinationis, sic est
composita, et falsa; si autem accipiatur
prout consideratur sine tali forma, sic est
8. But it was said that, when it is stated that one
predestined may possibly die in the state of sin, the
proposition is taken compositely and so is false; forits subject is taken as simultaneously having the
determination predestined. But if its subject is taken
without this determination, then the proposition is
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divisa, et vera.- Sed contra, in formis
illis quae non possunt removeri asubiecto, non differt utrum aliquid
attribuatur subiecto sub forma
considerato, vel sine forma; utroqueenim modo haec est falsa: corvus niger
potest esse albus. Sed praedestinatio est
talis forma quae non potest a
praedestinato removeri. Ergo praedictadistinctio in proposito locum non habet.
taken in a divided sense and is true. — On the
contrary, with those forms which cannot beremoved from the subject, it does not matter
whether a thing is attributed to the subject with
those qualifying determinations or without them.For example, taken either way, the following
proposition is false: “A black crow can be white.”
Now, predestination is the kind of form that cannot
be removed from the one predestined. In the matterat hand, therefore, there is no room for the afore-
mentioned distinction.
Praeterea, si aeternum coniungatur
temporali et contingenti, totum erittemporale et contingens: sicut patet de
creatione, quae est temporalis, quamvisclaudat in sua ratione essentiam Dei
aeternam et effectum temporalem; etsimiliter missio, quae importat
processionem aeternam et effectum
temporalem. Sed praedestinatio,quamvis importet aliquid aeternum,
tamen importat etiam cum hoc effectum
temporalem. Ergo totum hoc quod est
praedestinatio, est temporale etcontingens; et ita non videtur
certitudinem habere.
9. If what is eternal be joined to what is temporal
and contingent, then the whole is temporal andcontingent. Thus, it is clear that creation is
temporal, even though its notion includes God‟seternal essence as well as a temporal effect. The
same is true of a divine mission, which implies aneternal procession and a temporal effect. Now, even
though predestination implies something eternal, it
also implies a temporal effect. Therefore, predestination as a whole is temporal and contingent
and, consequently, does not seem to have certitude.
Praeterea, quod potest esse et non esse,
non habet aliquam certitudinem. Sed praedestinatio Dei de salute alicuius
potest esse et non esse; sicut enim potuit
ab aeterno praedestinare et non praedestinare, ita et nunc potest
praedestinasse et non praedestinasse;
cum in aeternitate non differant
praesens, praeteritum et futurum. Ergo
praedestinatio non habet certitudinem.
10. What can be or not be cannot have any
certitude. But the fact that God predestines tosalvation can be or not be. For just as He can, from
all eternity, predestine and not predestine, so even
now He can predestine and not predestine, since present, past, and future do not differ in eternity.
Consequently, predestination cannot have any
certitude.
Sed contra. To the Contrary
Est quod dicitur Roman. VIII, 29: quos
praescivit et praedestinavit, et cetera.
1. In explanation of that verse in the Epistle to the
Romans (8:29), “Whom he foreknew, he also
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Glossa: praedestinatio est praescientia et
praeparatio beneficiorum Dei, quacertissime liberantur quicumque
liberantur.
predestined,” the Gloss says: “Predestination is the
foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits ofGod by which whoever are freed are most certainly
freed.”
Praeterea, illud cuius est immobilis
veritas, oportet esse certum. Sed veritas praedestinationis est immobilis, ut
Augustinus dicit in Lib. de
praedestinatione sanctorum. Ergo praedestinatio habet certitudinem.
2. If the truth of a thing is unshakable, it must be
certain. But, as Augustine says: “The truth of predestination is unshakable.” Therefore,
predestination is certain.
Praeterea, cuicumque convenit praedestinatio, ab aeterno ei convenit.
Sed quod est ab aeterno, invariabile est.
Ergo praedestinatio est invariabilis, etita certa.
3. Whoever is predestined has this predestinationfrom all eternity. But what exists from all eternity
cannot be changed. Predestination, therefore, is
unchangeable and, consequently, certain.
Praeterea, praedestinatio includit
praescientiam, ut patet ex Glossa
inducta; sed praescientia habetcertitudinem, ut probat Boetius in V de
Consolat. Ergo et praedestinatio.
4. As is clear from the Gloss mentioned above,
predestination includes foreknowledge. But, as
Boethius has proved, foreknowledge is certain.Therefore, predestination is also certain.
Responsio. REPLY
Dicendum, quod duplex est certitudo:
scilicet cognitionis, et ordinis.Cognitionis quidem certitudo est,
quando cognitio non declinat in aliquo
ab eo quod in re invenitur, sed hocmodo existimat de ea sicut est; et quiacerta existimatio de re praecipue habetur
per causam rei, ideo tractum est nomen
certitudinis ad ordinem causae ad
effectum, ut dicatur ordo causae ad
effectum esse certus, quando causainfallibiliter effectum producit.
Praescientia ergo Dei, quia non importatuniversaliter habitudinem causae
respectu omnium quorum est, non
consideratur in ea nisi certitudocognitionis tantum; sed praedestinatio,
There are two kinds of certitude: certitude of
knowledge and certitude of ordination. Now,certitude of knowledge is had when one‟s
knowledge does not deviate in any way from reality,
and, consequently, when it judges about a thing as itis. But because a judgment which will be certainabout a thing is had especially from its causes, the
word certitudehas been transferred to the relation
that a cause has to its effect; therefore, the relation
of a cause to an effect is said to be certain when the
cause infallibly produces its effect. Consequently,since God‟s foreknowledge does not imply, in all
cases, a relation of a cause to all the things whichare its objects, it is considered to have only the
certitude of knowledge. But His predestination adds
another element, because it includes not only Hisforeknowledge but also the relation of a cause to its
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quia praescientiam includit, et
habitudinem causae ad ea, quorum est,addit, inquantum est directio sive
praeparatio quaedam; sic potest in ea
considerari supra certitudinemcognitionis, certitudo ordinis; de qua
solum certitudine praedestinationis nunc
quaerimus: de certitudine enim
cognitionis, in ipsa inventa, patere potest ex his quae dicta sunt, cum de
scientia Dei quaereretur.
objects, since predestination is a kind of direction or
preparation. Thus, not only the certitude ofknowledge, but also the certitude of ordination is
contained in predestination. Now we are concerned
only with the certitude of predestination; thecertitude of knowledge, found also in
predestination, has been explained in our
investigation of God‟s knowledge.
Sciendum est autem, quod, cum
praedestinatio sit quaedam providentiae pars, sicut secundum suam rationem
supra providentiam addit, sic etiam etcertitudo eius supra certitudinem
providentiae. Ordo enim providentiaedupliciter certus invenitur. Uno modo in
particulari; quando scilicet res quae a
divina providentia in finem aliquemordinantur, absque defectu ad finem
illum particularem deveniunt; sicut patet
in motibus caelestibus, et in omnibus
quae necessario aguntur in natura. Aliomodo in universali sed non in
particulari; sicut videmus ingenerabilibus et corruptibilibus, quorumvirtutes quandoque deficiunt a propriis
effectibus, ad quos sunt ordinatae sicut
ad proprios fines, sicut virtus formativa
quandoque deficit a perfectaconsummatione membrorum; sed tamen
ipse defectus divinitus ordinatur ad
aliquem finem, ut patet ex dictis, dumde providentia ageretur; et sic nihil
potest deficere a generali fine
providentiae, quamvis quandoquedeficiat ab aliquo particulari fine.
It should be known that, since predestination is a
particular type of providence, not only its notionadds something to providence, but also its certitude
adds something to the certitude of providence. Now,the ordering of providence is found to be certain in
two respects. First, it is certain with relation to a particular thing, when God‟s providence ordains
things to some particular end, and they attain that
end without failure. This is evident in the motionsof celestial spheres and in all things in nature that
act necessarily. Second, providence is certain in
relation to things in general, but not in particular.
For example, we see that the power of beingscapable of generation and corruption sometimes
falls short of the proper effects to which it has beenordered as its proper ends. Thus, the power thatshapes bodies sometimes falls short of forming
members completely. Yet, as we saw above when
treating providence, these very defects arc directed
by God to some end. Consequently, nothing can failto attain the general end of providence, even though
it may at times fall short of a particular end.
Sed ordo praedestinationis est certus
non solum respectu universalis finis, sed
etiam respectu particularis et
determinati, quia ille qui est ordinatus
The ordering of predestination, however, is certain,
not only with respect to its general end, but also
with respect to a particular and determinate end. For
one who is ordained to salvation by predestination
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per praedestinationem ad salutem,
nunquam deficit a consecutione salutis. Nec tamen hoc modo est certus ordo
praedestinationis respectu particularis
finis, sicut erat ordo providentiae: quiain providentia ordo non erat certus
respectu particularis finis, nisi quando
causa proxima necessario producebat
effectum suum; in praedestinationeautem invenitur certitudo respectu
singularis finis; et tamen causa proxima,
scilicet liberum arbitrium, non producit
effectum illum nisi contingenter.
never fails to obtain it. Moreover, the ordering of
predestination is not certain with reference to a particular end in the way in which the ordering of
providence is; for, in providence, the ordering is not
certain with respect to a particular end unless the proximate cause necessarily produces its effect. In
predestination, however, there is certitude with
respect to an individual end even though the
proximate cause, free choice, does not produce thateffect except in a contingent manner.
Unde difficile videtur concordare
infallibilitatem praedestinationis cumarbitrii libertate. Non enim potest dici
quod praedestinatio supra certitudinem providentiae nihil aliud addat nisi
certitudinem praescientiae; ut scilicet
dicatur, quod Deus ordinat praedestinatum ad salutem, sicut et
quemlibet alium; sed cum hoc de
praedestinato scit, quod non deficiet a
salute. Sic enim non diceretur praedestinatus differre a non
praedestinato ex parte ordinis, sedtantum ex parte praescientiae eventus; etsic praescientia esset causa
praedestinationis, nec praedestinatio
esset per electionem praedestinantis;
quod est contra auctoritatem Scripturaeet dicta sanctorum. Unde etiam praeter
certitudinem praescientiae ipse ordo
praedestinationis habet infallibilemcertitudinem; nec tamen causa proxima
salutis ordinatur ad eam necessario, sed
contingenter, scilicet liberum arbitrium.
Hence, it seems difficult to reconcile the infallibility
of predestination with freedom of choice; for wecannot say that predestination adds nothing to the
certitude of providence except the certitude offoreknowledge, because this would be to say that
God orders one who is predestined to his salvation
as He orders any other person, with this difference,that, in the case of the predestined, God knows he
will not fail to be saved. According to this position,
one predestined would not differ in ordination from
one not predestined; he would differ only withrespect to [God‟s] forek nowledge of the outcome.
Consequently, foreknowledge would be the cause of predestination, and predestination would not take place by the choice of Him who predestines. This,
however, is contrary to the authority of the
Scriptures” and the sayings of the saints. Thus, the
ordering of predestination has an infallible certitudeof its own — over and above the certitude of
foreknowledge. Nevertheless, the proximate cause
of salvation, free choice, is related to predestinationcontingently, not necessarily.
Quod hoc modo potest considerari.Invenimus enim ordinem infallibilem
esse respectu alicuius dupliciter. Uno
modo inquantum una causa singularis
necessario inducit effectum suum ex
This can be considered in the following manner. Wefind that an ordering is infallible in regard to
something in two ways. First, an individual cause
necessarily brings about its own effect because of
the ordering of divine providence. Secondly, a
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ordine divinae providentiae; alio modo
quando ex concursu multarum causarumcontingentium, et deficere possibilium,
pervenitur ad unum effectum; quarum
unamquamque Deus ordinat adconsecutionem effectus loco eius quae
defecit, vel ne altera deficiat; sicut
videmus quod omnia singularia unius
speciei sunt corruptibilia, et tamen persuccessionem unius ad alterum potest
secundum naturam in eis salvari
perpetuitas speciei, divina providentia
taliter gubernante, quod non omniadeficiant uno deficiente:
single effect may be attained only as the result of
the convergence of many contingent causesindividually capable of failure; but each one of
these causes has been ordained by God either to
bring about that effect itself if another cause shouldfail or to prevent that other cause from failing. We
see, for example, that all the individual members of
a species are corruptible. Yet, from the fact that one
succeeds another, the nature of the species can bekept in existence; and this is how God keeps the
species from extinction, despite the fact that the
individual perishes.
et hoc modo est in praedestinatione.Liberum enim arbitrium deficere potest
a salute; tamen in eo quem Deus praedestinat, tot alia adminicula
praeparat, quod vel non cadat, vel si
cadit, quod resurgat, sicut exhortationes,suffragia orationum, gratiae donum, et
omnia huiusmodi, quibus Deus
adminiculatur homini ad salutem. Si
ergo consideremus salutem respectucausae proximae, scilicet liberi arbitrii,
non habet certitudinem, sedcontingentiam; respectu autem causae primae, quae est praedestinatio,
certitudinem habet.
A similar case is had in predestination; for, eventhough free choice can fail with respect to salvation,
God prepares so many other helps for one who is predestined that he either does not fall at all or, if he
does fall, he rises again. The helps that God gives a
man to enable him to gain salvation areexhortations, the support of prayer, the gift of grace,
and all similar things. Consequently, if we were to
consider salvation only in relation to its proximate
cause, free choice, salvation would not be certain but contingent; however, in relation to the first
cause, namely, predestination, salvation is certain.
Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod
verbum illud Apocalypsis potest intelligi
vel de corona praesentis iustitiae, vel decorona gloriae. Utrolibet autem modo
intelligatur, secundum hoc unus dicitur
accipere coronam alterius, alio cadente,inquantum bona unius alteri prosunt vel
in auxilium meriti, vel etiam in
augmentum gloriae propterconnexionem caritatis, quae facit omnia
bona membrorum Ecclesiae communia
1. The word crown as used in the Apocalypse (3:11)
may mean either the crown of present justice or the
crown of future glory. No matter which meaning istaken, however, one person is said to receive the
crown of another when that other person falls in the
sense that the goods of one person help another,either by aiding him to merit or even by increasing
his glory. The reason for this is that all the members
of the Church are connected by charity in such away that their goods are common. Consequently,
one receives the crown of another when that other
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esse; et ita contingit quod unus coronam
alterius accipit, dum, aliquo per peccatum cadente et ita suorum
meritorum praemium non consequente,
alius fructum percipit de meritis quaeille habuit, sicut etiam percepisset alio
persistente. Nec ex hoc sequitur quod
praedestinatio umquam cassetur.
falls through sin and does not achieve the reward of
his merits; and another person receives the fruits ofthe sinner‟s merits, just as he would have benefited
from the sinner‟s merits had the latter persevered.
From this, however, it does not follow that predestination is ever in vain.
Vel potest dici, quod unus coronamalterius accipere dicitur, non quod
aliquis amittat coronam quae est ei
praedestinata, sed quia quandoque
aliquis amittit coronam sibi debitamsecundum praesentem iustitiam, et in
locum eius alius substituitur adcomplendum numerum electorum, sicut
in locum Angelorum cadentium sunthomines substituti.
Or it can be answered that one is said to receive thecrown of another, not because the other lost a crown
that was predestined for him, but because whenever
a person loses the crown that was due to him
because of the justice he possessed, another personis substituted in his place to make up the number of
the elect — just as men have been substituted to takethe place of the fallen angels.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod effectus
naturalis qui ex divina providentia
infallibiliter evenit, consequitur ex unacausa proxima in effectum necessario
ordinata; ordo autem praedestinationis
non est certus per hunc modum, sed per
alium, ut dictum est.
2. A natural effect issuing infallibly from God‟s
providence takes place because of one proximate
cause necessarily ordered to the effect. The orderingof predestination, however, is not made certain in
this manner but in the manner described above.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod corpuscaeleste agit in haec inferiora
necessitatem quasi inducens, quantum
est de se; et ideo effectus eius necessario provenit, nisi sit aliquid resistens. Sed
Deus agit in voluntate non per modum
necessitatis, quia voluntatem non cogit,
sed movet eam non auferendo ei modumsuum, qui in libertate ad utrumlibet
consistit: et ideo, quamvis nihil divinae
voluntati resistat, tamen voluntas, etquaelibet alia res, exequitur divinam
voluntatem secundum modum suum,
quia et ipsum modum divina voluntasrebus dedit, ut sic eius voluntas
impleretur; et ideo quaedam explent
3. A celestial body, taken in itself, imposes a kind ofdeterminism in its action on bodies here below.
Consequently, its effect necessarily takes place,
unless something resists it. But God does not act onthe will in the manner of one necessitating; for He
does not force the will but merely moves it, without
taking away its own proper mode, which consists in
being free with respect to opposites. Consequently,even though nothing can resist the divine will, our
will, like everything else, carries out the divine will
according to its own proper mode. Indeed, thedivine will has given things their mode of being in
order that His will be fulfilled. Therefore, some
things fulfill the divine will necessarily, otherthings, contingently; but that which God wills
always takes place.
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divinam voluntatem necessario,
quaedam vero contingenter, quamvisillud quod Deus vult, semper fiat.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod causasecunda, quam oportet supponere ad
inducendum praedestinationis effectum,etiam ordini praedestinationis subiacet;
non autem est ita in virtutibus
inferioribus respectu alicuius virtutissuperioris agentis. Et ideo ordo divinae
praedestinationis, quamvis sit cum
suppositione voluntatis humanae,
nihilominus tamen absolutamcertitudinem habet, etsi contrarium in
exemplo inducto appareat.
4. The second cause, which we must suppose as prerequisite for obtaining the effect of
predestination, lies also under the ordering of predestination. The relationship between lower
powers and the power of a superior agent is not one
of predestination. Consequently, even though theordering of God‟s predestination includes the
supposition of a human will, it nevertheless has
absolute certitude, despite the fact that the example
given points to the contrary.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod verba illa
Iob et Gregorii sunt referenda ad statum praesentis iustitiae, a quo aliqui
quandoque decidunt, aliis subrogatis;
unde per hoc non potest concludi aliquid
incertitudinis circa praedestinationemquia illi qui finaliter a gratia deficiunt,
nunquam praedestinati fuerunt.
5. Those words of Job and Gregory should be
referred to the state of present justice. If some fallfrom it, others are chosen in their place. From this,
therefore, we cannot conclude to any uncertainty
with reference to predestination; for those who fall
from grace at the end were never predestined at all.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod similitudo
Anselmi quantum ad hoc tenet, quod,sicut veritas propositionis de futuro nonaufert futuro contingentiam, ita nec
veritas praedestinationis; sed differt
quantum ad hoc, quod propositio defuturo respicit futurum ut futurum est, et
hoc modo non potest habere
certitudinem; sed veritas praescientiae et
praedestinationis respicit futurum ut est praesens, ut in quaest. de scientia Dei
dictum est; et ideo certitudinem habet.
6. The comparison Anselm makes holds good in this
respect, that just as the truth of a proposition aboutthe future does not remove contingency from afuture event, so also the truth of predestination
[does not take away the contingency of
predestination]. But, in another respect, thecomparison is weak. For a proposition about the
future is related to the future in so far as it is future,
and, under this aspect, it cannot be certain. As we
pointed out previously, however, the truth of predestination and foreknowledge is related to the
future as present, and, consequently, is certain.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod aliquid potest dici posse dupliciter. Uno modo
considerando potentiam quae in ipso est,
sicut dicitur quod lapis potest moveri
7. A thing can be said to be possible in two ways.First, we may consider the potency that exists in the
thing itself, as when we say that a stone can be
moved downwards. Or we may consider the
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deorsum. Alio modo considerando id
quod ex parte alterius est, sicut sidicerem, quod lapis potest moveri
sursum, non per potentiam quae in ipso
sit, sed per potentiam proiicientis.
potency that exists in another thing, as when we say
that a stone can be moved upwards, not by a potency existing in the stone, but by a potency
existing in the one who hurls it.
Cum ergo dicitur: praedestinatus iste potest in peccato mori; si consideretur
potentia ipsius, verum est; si autem
loquamur de praedestinato secundumordinem quem habet ad aliud, scilicet ad
Deum praedestinantem, sic ordo ille non
compatitur secum istum eventum,
quamvis compatiatur secum istam potentiam. Et ideo potest distingui
secundum distinctionem prius inductam,scilicet cum forma, vel sine forma
consideratio subiecti.
Consequently, when we say: “That predestined person can possibly die in sin,” the statement is true
if we consider only the potency that exists in him.
But, if we are speaking of this predestined personaccording to the ordering which he has to another,
namely, to God, who is predestining him, that event
is incompatible with this ordering, even though it is
compatible with the person‟s own power. Hence, wecan use the distinction given above; that is, we can
consider the subject with this form or without it.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod nigredo et
albedo sunt quaedam formae existentes
in subiecto, quod dicitur album vel
nigrum; et ideo non potest aliquidattribui subiecto nec secundum
potentiam nec secundum actum, quod
repugnet formae praedictae, quamdiu in
subiecto manet. Sed praedestinatio nonest forma existens in praedestinato, sed
in praedestinante, sicut et scitum
denominatur a scientia quae est insciente; et ideo quantumcumque
immobiliter stet sub ordine scientiae,
tamen potest ei aliquid attribuiconsiderando suam naturam, etsi etiam
repugnet ordini praedestinationis. Hoc
enim modo praedestinatio est aliquid
praeter ipsum hominem qui dicitur
praedestinatus, sicut nigredo est aliquid praeter essentiam corvi, quamvis non sit
aliquid extra corvum; considerandoautem tantummodo essentiam corvi,
potest aliquid ei attribui quod repugnat
nigredini eius; secundum quem modum
dicit Porphyrius, quod potest intelligi
8. Blackness and whiteness are, in a sense,
examples of forms that exist in a subject said to be
white or black. Consequently, nothing can be
attributed to the subject, either according to potencyor according to act, as long as blackness remains, if
it is repugnant to this form of blackness.
Predestination, however, is a form that exists, not in
the person predestined, but in the one predestining, just as the known gets its, name from knowledge in
the knower. Consequently, no matter how fixed
predestination may remain in the order ofknowledge, yet, if we consider only the nature [of
the predestined], we can attribute something to it
which is repugnant to the ordering of predestination.For, considered this way, predestination is
something other than the man who is said to be
predestined, just as blackness is something other
than the essence of a crow, even though it is not
something outside the crow, but, by consideringonly the essence of a crow, one can attribute to it
something that is repugnant to its blackness. For thisreason, as Porphyry says, one can think of a white
crow. Similarly, in the problem being discussed,
one can attribute something to a predestined person
taken in himself which cannot be attributed to him
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corvus albus. Et ita etiam in proposito
potest ipsi homini praedestinato attribuialiquid secundum se considerato, quod
non attribuitur ei secundum quod
intelligitur stare sub praedestinatione.
in so far as he is predestined.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod creatio etmissio, et huiusmodi, important
productionem alicuius temporalis
effectus, et ideo ponunt temporalemeffectum esse; et propter hoc oportet ea
esse temporalia, quamvis in se aliquid
aeternum claudant. Sed praedestinatio
non importat productionem alicuiuseffectus temporalis secundum suum
nomen, sed tantummodo ordinem adaliquid temporale, sicut voluntas,
potentia, et huiusmodi omnia: et ideo,quia non ponitur effectus temporalis
esse in actu, qui etiam est contingens,
non oportet quod praedestinatio sittemporalis et contingens: quia ad
aliquod temporale et contingens potest
aliquid ordinari ab aeterno et
immutabiliter.
9. Creation and mission imply the production of atemporal effect. Consequently, they affirm the
existence of a temporal effect, and so must be
temporal themselves, even though they includesomething eternal. Predestination, however, does
not imply the production of a temporal effect — as
the word itself shows — but only an ordering to
something temporal, such as will, power, and allsuch attributes also imply. Since it does not affirm
the actual existence of a temporal effect, which isalso contingent, predestination is not necessarily
temporal and contingent itself, because frometernity something can be unchangeably ordained to
a temporal and contingent effect.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod, absoluteloquendo, Deus potest unumquemque
praedestinare vel non praedestinare, aut
praedestinasse vel non praedestinasse:quia actus praedestinationis, cum
mensuretur aeternitate, nunquam cedit
in praeteritum, sicut nunquam estfuturus; unde semper consideratur ut
egrediens a voluntate per modum
libertatis. Tamen ex suppositione hoc
efficitur impossibile: non enim potest
non praedestinare cum suppositionequod praedestinaverit, vel e converso,
quia mutabilis esse non potest; et ita nonsequitur quod praedestinatio possit
variari.
10. Absolutely speaking, it is possible for God to predestine or not to predestine each and every
person, and it is possible for Him to have
predestined or not to have predestined. For, sincethe act of predestination is measured by eternity, it
never is past and never is future. Consequently, it is
always considered as issuing from His will assomething free. Because of the supposition,
however, certain things are impossible: He cannot
predestine if He has predestined, and He cannot
predestine if He has already not predestined — for
God does not change. Hence, it does not follow that predestination can change.
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ARTICLE IV
In the fourth article we ask:
Is the number of predestined certain?
[ARTICLE See readings given for preceding article.]
Quarto quaeritur utrum numerus praedestinatorum sit certus
Difficulties
Et videtur quod non. It seems not, for
Quia nullus numerus cui potest fieri additio, est
certus. Sed numero praedestinatorum additio
fieri potest: hoc enim petit Moyses Deuter. cap.I, 11,: dominus Deus patrum nostrorum addat
ad hunc numerum multa millia. Glossa:
definitum apud Deum, qui novit qui sunt eius.
Frustra autem peteret, nisi fieri posset. Ergonumerus praedestinatorum non est certus.
1. No number is certain if something can be
added to it. But something can be added to
the number of the predestined, becauseMoses‟ petition for such an increase is
described in Deuteronomy (1:11) where he
says: “The Lord God of your fathers add to
this number many thousands.” And the Glosscomments: “This number is fixed by God,
who knows who belong to Him.” Now,
unless such an addition were possible, Moseswould have asked in vain. Consequently, the
number of the predestined is not certain.
Praeterea, sicut dispositio naturalium bonorumest praeparatio ad gratiam, ita per gratiam praeparamur ad gloriam. Sed in quocumque est
praeparatio sufficiens ex naturalibus bonis, est
invenire gratiam. Ergo etiam in quocumque est
invenire gratiam, erit invenire gloriam. Sedaliquis non praedestinatus quandoque habet
gratiam. Ergo habebit gloriam; ergo erit
praedestinatus. Ergo aliquis non praedestinatus potest fieri praedestinatus, et sic augeri
numerus praedestinatorum; et ita non erit
certus.
2. As we are prepared for grace through thedisposition of natural perfections, so are we prepared through grace for the attainment of
glory. Now, grace is found in whomsoever
there is sufficient preparation of natural gifts.
Similarly, then, glory will be found wherevergrace is found. But one not predestined may,
at one time, possess grace. Therefore, he will
possess glory and so be predestined.Consequently, one not predestined may
become predestined. In this way, the number
of the predestined can be increased; hence, itis not certain.
Praeterea, si aliquis habens gratiam non sithabiturus gloriam: aut hoc erit propter
defectum gratiae, aut propter defectum dantis
gloriam. Non autem est ex defectu gratiae,
3. If one who has grace is not to have glory,his loss of glory will be due to a failure either
on the part of grace or on the part of the one
giving glory. However, this loss cannot be
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quae, quantum est in se, sufficienter ad gloriam
disponit; nec ex defectu dantis gloriam, quiaquantum est in se, paratus est omnibus dare.
Ergo quicumque habet gratiam, de necessitate
habebit gloriam; et sic aliquis praescitushabebit gloriam; et erit praedestinatus; et sic
idem quod prius.
due to a failure on the part of grace, for, in
itself, it sufficiently disposes for glory; norcan it be due to a failure on the part of the
one giving glory, for, on His part, He is ready
to give it to all. Consequently, whoever hasgrace will necessarily have glory. Thus, one
who is foreknown [as lost] will have glory
and be predestined. Accordingly, our original
argument stands.
Praeterea, quicumque praeparat se ad gratiam
sufficienter, habet gratiam. Sed aliquis
praescitus potest se ad gratiam praeparare.
Ergo potest habere gratiam. Sed quicumquehabet gratiam, potest perseverare in illa. Ergo
praescitus potest usque ad mortem in gratia perseverare, et sic fieri praedestinatus, ut
videtur; et sic idem quod prius.
4. Whoever prepares himself sufficiently for
grace, gets grace. But one foreknown [as
lost] can prepare himself for grace.
Therefore, it is possible for him to havegrace. Whoever has grace, however, can
persevere in it. So it seems that one who isforeknown [as lost] can persevere in grace up
to the time of his death and thus become predestined. Consequently, the same must be
said as before.
Sed dicebat, quod praescitum mori sine gratia,
est necessarium necessitate conditionata,quamvis non absoluta.- Contra, omnis
necessitas carens principio et fine, et
continuata in medio, est simplex et absoluta, et
non conditionata. Sed talis est necessitas praescientiae, cum sit aeterna. Ergo est
simplex, et non conditionata.
5. It was said, however, that God‟s
foreknowledge that a man will die withoutgrace is necessary by conditional necessity,
not by absolute necessity. — On the contrary,
any necessity, which lacks a beginning and
an end, and which is without succession, isnot conditional but simple and absolute.
Now, this is the kind of necessity that the
necessity of foreknowledge is, because it iseternal. Therefore, it is simple and not
conditioned.
Praeterea, quolibet numero finito potest esse
aliquis maior. Sed numerus praedestinatorum
est finitus. Ergo eo potest esse aliquis maior:ergo non est certus.
6. A number larger than any finite number is
possible. But the number of the predestined is
finite. Therefore, a larger number is possible,and the number of the predestined is not
certain.
Praeterea, cum bonum sit communicativumsui, infinita bonitas non debet terminum ponere
suae communicationi. Sed praedestinatis divina
bonitas se maxime communicat. Ergo non est
7. Since good communicates itself, infinitegoodness should not impose a limit on its
communication. Now, the divine goodness
communicates itself to the predestined in the
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eius statuere certum praedestinatorum
numerum.
highest possible degree. Therefore, it does
not belong to the divine goodness to establisha certain number of predestined.
Praeterea, sicut factio rerum est ex voluntatedivina, ita et hominum praedestinatio. Sed
Deus plura potest facere quam fecit: subestenim ei, cum voluerit, posse, ut dicitur Sap.
XII, 18. Ergo similiter non tot praedestinat
quin plures possit praedestinare; et sic idemquod prius.
8. Like the creation of things, the predestination of men depends on the divine
will. Now, God can make more things thanHe has made, because, as we read in Wisdom
(12:18): “His power is at hand when He
wills.” Similarly, He has not predestined somany men that He cannot predestine more;
and so our original argument returns.
Praeterea, quidquid Deus potuit, adhuc potest.
Sed Deus potuit ab aeterno illum praedestinare
quem non praedestinavit. Ergo modo etiam potest eum praedestinare, et sic potest fieri
additio numero praedestinatorum.
9. Whatever God was at one time able to do
He still is able to do. But from eternity God
was able to predestine one whom He did not predestine. Consequently, He is still able to
predestine him, and so an addition can be
made to the number of the predestined.
Praeterea, in omnibus potentiis quae non suntdeterminatae ad unum, quod potest esse, potest
non esse. Sed potentia praedestinantis ad
praedestinatum, et potentia praedestinati ad
consequendum praedestinationis effectum sunthuiusmodi, quia et praedestinans voluntate
praedestinat, et praedestinatus voluntate
effectum praedestinationis consequitur. Ergo praedestinatus potest esse non praedestinatus,et non praedestinatus potest esse
praedestinatus; ergo idem quod prius.
10. In the case of all powers not determinedto one course of action, what can be can also
not be. Now, the power of the one
predestining with respect to the one to be
predestined, and the power of the one predestined with respect to his obtaining the
effect of predestination, belong to this class
of powers, because the one predestining predestines by His will, and the one predestined obtains the effect of
predestination by his will. Consequently, the
predestined can be non-predestined, and thenon-predestined can be predestined. Hence,
the conclusion is the same as before.
Praeterea, Luc. V, 6, super illud: rumpebatur
autem rete eorum, dicit Glossa: in Ecclesiacircumcisionis rumpitur rete, quia non tot
intrant de Iudaeis, quot apud (Deum ad) vitam
erant praeordinati. Ergo numerus praedestinatorum potest diminui, et ita non est
certus.
11. In commentary on that verse in Luke
(5:6), “And their net broke,” the Gloss reads:“In the Church, the net of circumcision is
broken, for not as many Jews enter as were
preordained by God to life.” Consequently,since the number of the predestined can be
diminished, it is not certain.
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Sed contra. To the Contrary
Dicit Augustinus in libro de correctione et
gratia: certus est praedestinatorum numerus,
qui nec augeri potest nec minui.
1. Augustine says: “The number of the
predestined is certain and can neither be
increased nor diminished.”
Praeterea, Augustinus in Enchiridio, dicit:
superna Ierusalem mater nostra, civitas Dei,
nulla civium suorum numerositate fraudabitur,aut uberiori etiam copia fortasse regnabit. Sed
cives illius civitatis sunt praedestinati. Ergo
praedestinatorum numerus non potest augeri
nec minui, et ita est certus.
2. Augustine says: “The heavenly Jerusalem,
our mother, the City of God, will not be
robbed of any of the number of its citizensnor will it reign with more than the
predestined number.” Now, the citizens
mentioned are the predestined. Consequently,
the number of the predestined cannot beincreased or decreased. Hence, it is certain.
Praeterea, quicumque est praedestinatus, ab
aeterno est praedestinatus. Sed quod est ab
aeterno, est immutabile; et quod non fuit abaeterno, nunquam potest esse aeternum. Ergo
ille qui non est praedestinatus, non potest esse
praedestinatus, nec e contrario.
3. Whoever is predestined is predestined
from eternity. But what exists from eternity is
unchangeable, and what did not exist frometernity can never be eternal. Consequently,
he who is not predestined cannot be
predestined and, conversely, he who is predestined cannot be non-predestined.
Praeterea, omnes praedestinati post
resurrectionem erunt cum corporibus suis in
caelo Empyreo. Sed locus ille finitus est, cumomne corpus sit finitum: duo etiam glorificata
corpora, ut communiter dicitur, non possunt
esse simul. Ergo oportet esse determinatum
praedestinatorum numerum.
4. After the resurrection, all the predestined
will be in the highest heaven with their own
bodies. Now, that place is finite, since all bodies are finite, and, as is commonly held,
not even two glorified bodies can exist,
simultaneously [in one place]. Consequently,
the number of the predestined should bedeterminate.
Responsio. REPLY
Dicendum, quod circa hanc quaestionem
quidam ita distinxerunt dicentes, quod numerus praedestinatorum certus est, si loquamur denumero numerante, sive de numero formaliter;
non autem est certus, si loquamur de numero
numerato, sive materialiter accepto; puta, sidiceretur, quod certum est esse centum
praedestinatos, non autem est certum qui
centum sint. Et istud dictum occasionem
Treating this question, some have
distinguished, saying that the number of the predestined is certain if we mean numberunderstood actively or formally, but not
certain if we mean number understood
passively or materially. For example, onecould say that it is certain that one hundred
have been predestined, but it is not certain
who these one hundred are. The occasion for
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sumere videtur ex verbo Augustini supra
inducto, in quo innuere videtur quod unusamittere possit, et alius accipere
praedestinatam coronam, numero tamen
praedestinatorum nullatenus variato. Sed sihaec opinio loquatur de certitudine per
comparationem ad causam primam, scilicet
Deum praedestinantem, omnino apparet
absurda: ipse enim Deus habet certamcognitionem de numero praedestinatorum et
formali et materiali: scit enim quot et qui sint
salvandi, et utrumque infallibiliter ordinat, ut
sic, quantum ex parte Dei est, respectuutriusque numeri inveniatur certitudo non
solum cognitionis, sed etiam ordinis.
such a position seems to be the words of
Augustine mentioned previously. Augustineseems to imply that one can lose and another
receive the predestined crown without the
number of the predestined at all varying. But,if those holding this opinion are speaking
about certitude of predestination in its
relation to the first cause, that is, to God who
predestines, then the opinion is entirelyabsurd, because God Himself has definite
knowledge of the number of the predestined,
whether the number be taken formally or
materially. He knows exactly how many andwho are to be saved, and, with respect to
both, His ordination is infallible.
Consequently, with respect to both numbers,
God has certitude, not only of knowledge, but also of ordination.
Sed si loquamur de certitudine numeri
praedestinatorum per comparationem adcausam proximam salutis humanae, ad quam
praedestinatio ordinatur, non erit idem
iudicium de numero formali et materiali.
Numerus enim materialis aliquo modo subiacetvoluntati humanae, quae est variabilis,
inquantum salus uniuscuiusque est sub libertatearbitrii constituta, sicut sub causa proxima; etsic numerus materialis aliquo modo certitudine
caret. Sed numerus formalis nullo modo cadit
sub voluntate humana, eo quod nulla voluntas
se extendit per modum causalitatis alicuius adtotam integritatem numeri praedestinatorum; et
ideo numerus formalis remanet omnibus modis
certus. Et sic potest praedicta distinctiosustineri, ut tamen simpliciter concedatur, quod
uterque numerus ex parte Dei certitudinem
habet. Sciendum tamen est quod numerus praedestinatorum secundum hoc dicitur essecertus, quod additionem vel diminutionem non
patitur.
On the other hand, if we are speaking about
the certitude that can be had about thenumber of the predestined from its relation to
the proximate cause of man‟s salvation (to
which predestination is ordained), then our
judgment about the formal number and thematerial number will not be the same. For,
since the salvation of each individual has been produced through free choice as throughits proximate cause, in some way the material
number is subject to man‟s will, which is
changeable. Consequently, the material
number in some way lacks certainty. But theformal number is not determined in any
manner by man‟s will, because by no kind of
causality does the human will affect thenumber of the predestined taken as a whole.
Consequently, the formal number remains
completely certain. In this way theaforementioned distinction can be sustained,as long as we concede, without any
qualifications, that both numbers are certain
as far as God is concerned.
Secundum autem hoc pateretur additionem, si It should be noted, moreover, that the number
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aliquis praescitus posset praedestinatus fieri,
quod esset contra certitudinem praescientiaevel reprobationis; secundum hoc autem posset
diminui, si aliquis praedestinatus posset effici
non praedestinatus, quod est contracertitudinem praedestinationis. Et sic patet
quod certitudo numeri praedestinatorum
colligitur ex duplici certitudine: scilicet ex
certitudine praedestinationis, et certitudine praescientiae vel reprobationis. Sed hae duae
certitudines differunt: quia certitudo
praedestinationis est certitudo cognitionis et
ordinis, ut dictum est, certitudo autem praescientiae est certitudo cognitionis tantum.
Non enim Deus praeordinat ad peccandum
homines reprobos, sicut praedestinatos ordinat
ad merendum.
of the predestined is certain in this respect,
that it cannot be increased or diminished. Thenumber could be increased if one who was
foreknown [as lost] could be predestined; but
this would be contrary to the certainty offoreknowledge or of reprobation. Again, the
number could be diminished if it were
possible for one who is predestined to
become non-predestined; but this would becontrary to the certainty of predestination.
Thus, it is clear that the certitude about the
number of the predestined is made up of two
certitudes, the certitude of predestination andthe certitude of foreknowledge or
reprobation. These two certitudes differ,
however; for, as has been said, the certitude
of predestination is the certitude ofknowledge and of direction to an end, while
the certitude of foreknowledge is merely thecertitude of knowledge. For God does not
preordain the reprobate to sin as He ordains
the predestined to merit.
Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod auctoritas illa
est intelligenda non de numero praedestinatorum, sed de numero eorum qui
sunt in statu praesentis iustitiae; quod patet ex
interlineari, quae ibi dicit: numero et merito. Numerus autem iste et augetur et minuitur,
quamvis praefinitio Dei, qua etiam istum
numerum praediffinit, nunquam fallatur.Diffinit enim quod uno tempore sint plures et
alio pauciores; vel etiam diffinit per modum
sententiae aliquem certum numerum secundum
rationes inferiores convenientem, quae
definitio mutari potest; sed praediffinit alium per modum consilii secundum rationes
superiores; et haec praefinitio invariabilis est,quia ut dicit Gregorius: Deus mutat sententiam,
sed non consilium.
1. That quotation from Deuteronomy should
be understood as referring, not to the numberof the predestined, but to the number of those
who are in the state of present justice. This is
clear from the Interlinear Gloss, which adds:“In number and in merit.” Now, this number
of those in present justice is both increased
and diminished; but God‟s appointment,which predefines this number, too, is never
wrong, because it is He who decrees that
there be more of these at one time and fewer
at another. Or we could even answer that
God defines a certain number in the mannerof a judgment in harmony with inferior
reasons, and this limitation can be changed; but He predestines another number in the
manner of an election in harmony with
superior reasons, and this limitation cannot
be changed. For Gregory says: “He changes
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His judgment but never His election.”
Ad secundum dicendum, quod nulla
praeparatio disponit ad habendam aliquam
perfectionem nisi suo tempore; sicut naturaliscomplexio disponit puerum ad hoc quod sit
fortis vel sapiens, non quidem tempore pueritiae, sed tempore perfectae aetatis.
Tempus autem habendi gratiam est simul cum
tempore praeparationis naturae; unde non potest inter utrumque aliquod impedimentum
intercidere; et sic in quocumque invenitur
praeparatio naturae, invenitur et gratia. Sed
tempus habendi gloriam non est simul cumtempore gratiae; unde inter utrumque potest
medium impedimentum intercidere; et propterhoc non est necessarium quod praescitus qui
habet gratiam, sit habiturus gloriam.
2. No preparation disposes anything to have a
perfection at a time other than its proper
time. For example, his natural temperamentmay dispose a boy to be brave or wise — not,
however, in the days of his childhood, but inthe days of his manhood. Now, the time
when one obtains grace is simultaneous with
the time when nature is prepared.Consequently, no barrier can come between
them. Thus, when the preparation of nature is
found in a person, grace is also found in him.
But the time when one obtains glory is notsimultaneous with the time when he has
grace. Consequently, a barrier can come between these two. For this reason, one who
is foreknown to possess grace will notnecessarily possess glory also.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod non est neque ex
defectu gratiae neque ex defectu dantis
gloriam, quod habens gratiam gloria privetur,sed ex defectu recipientis, in quo
impedimentum intervenit.
3. That one who had grace is nevertheless
deprived of glory is not due to failure either
on the part of grace or on the part of Himwho gives glory. It is due rather to a failure
on the part of the recipient, in whom an
impediment has arisen.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod ex hoc ipso quod ponitur aliquis esse praescitus, ponitur nonhabiturus finalem gratiam, cum cognitio Dei
feratur ad res futuras sicut super praesentia, ut
alibi dictum est; et ideo, sicut huic quod estnon esse habiturum finalem gratiam, est
incompossibile hoc quod est eundem esse
habiturum finalem gratiam quamvis in se sit
possibile, ita est incompossibile ei quod estesse praescitum, quamvis in se scit possibile.
4. When we affirm that a person isforeknown [as lost], we thereby affirm thathe will not have final grace; for, as we
pointed out previously,” God‟s knowledge is
directed to future things as though they were present. Consequently, just as the condition
of not having final grace cannot be
reconciled with the condition of having final
grace, even though the former condition is possible if taken by itself, so the condition of
having final grace cannot be reconciled with
the condition of being foreknown [as lost],even though the former condition is also
possible if taken by itself.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod non est defectus 5. The fact that such a thing known by God is
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ex divina scientia, quin scitum a Deo sit
simpliciter necessarium, sed est defectus excausa proxima. Aeternitatem autem, ut sit sine
principio et fine durans in medio, habet
praedicta necessitas ex divina scientia, quaeaeterna est, non ex causa proxima, quae est
temporalis et mutabilis.
not absolutely necessary comes, not from a
defect in God‟s knowledge, but from a defectin the proximate cause. On the other hand,
the reason why this necessity is eternal —
without beginning and end, and, as it were,without succession —comes from God‟s
knowledge, which is eternal, not from the
proximate cause, which is temporal and
changeable.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod quamvis de ratione
finiti numeri non sit quin possit esse eo aliquis
maior, tamen hoc potest esse ex aliquo alio,
scilicet ex immobilitate divinae praescientiae,ut in proposito apparet; sicut quod aliqua
quantitate in rebus naturalibus accepta, non possit alia maior inveniri, non est ex ratione
quantitatis, sed ex condicione rei naturalis.
6. Even though finite number as finite
number does not prevent a larger number
from existing, the impossibility may come
from another source, namely, from the fixedcharacter of God‟s foreknowledge, which is
apparent in the problem at hand. Similarly,when we consider the size of some natural
thing, we see that a larger size cannot exist,not because of the nature of quantity, but
because of the nature of the thing itself.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod bonitas divina
non communicat seipsam nisi secundumordinem sapientiae; hic est enim optimus
communicandi modus. Ordo autem divinae
sapientiae requirit ut omnia sint facta in
numero et pondere et mensura, ut dicitur Sap.XI, 21; et ideo convenit divinae bonitati ut sit
certus praedestinatorum numerus.
7. The divine goodness communicates itself
only under the guidance of wisdom, for thisis the best manner for its communication.
Now, as we read in Wisdom (11:2 1), the
ordering of God‟s wisdom requires that all
things be made according to “number,weight, and measure.” Consequently, that
there be a definite number of predestined is
in harmony with God‟s goodness.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod, sicut ex dictis patet, quamvis de quolibet absolute concedi
posset quod Deus potest eum praedestinare vel
non praedestinare, tamen supposito quod
praedestinaverit, non potest non praedestinare,vel e contrario, quia non potest esse mutabilis.
Et ideo dicitur communiter quod haec: Deus
potest non praedestinatum praedestinare, vel praedestinatum non praedestinare; in sensu
composito est falsa sed in diviso est vera. Et
propter hoc omnes illae locutiones quaesensum compositum implicant, sunt falsae
simpliciter. Unde non est concedendum quod
8. As is clear from what was said previously,while it may be granted with reference to a
determined person that God, absolutely
speaking, can predestine or not predestine
him, nevertheless, supposing that God has predestined him, He cannot not predestine
him. Nor is the opposite possible, because
God cannot change. Consequently, it iscommonly said that the following
proposition, “God can predestine one who is
not predestined or not predestine one who is predestined,” is false if taken in a composite
sense, but true if taken in a divided sense. All
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numero praedestinatorum possit fieri additio
vel subtractio, quia additio praesupponit illudcui additur, et subtractio illud a quo
subtrahitur; et eadem ratione non potest
concedi quod Deus possit plures praedestinarequam praedestinet, vel pauciores.
statements, therefore, which imply that
composite sense are absolutely false. Thus,we must not concede that the number of the
predestined can be increased or diminished,
because addition presupposes somethingwhich is increased, and subtraction,
something which is diminished. For the same
reason, we cannot concede that God can
predestine more or fewer than He has already predestined.
Nec est simile quod inducitur de factione, quia
factio est actus quidam qui terminatur ad
effectum exterius; et ideo quod Deus facit primo, et post non facit aliquid, non ostendit
aliquam mutationem in ipso, sed in effectusolum. Sed praedestinatio et praescientia, et
huiusmodi sunt actus intrinseci, in quibus non posset esse variatio sine variatione Dei; et ideo
nihil quod ad variationem horum actuum
pertineat concedi debet.
Furthermore, the example drawn from the
making of things is not to the point; for
making is a particular action terminatingexteriorly in an effect, and the fact that God
makes something first and does not make itlater indicates no change in God but only in
the effect. On the other hand, predestination,foreknowledge, and similar things are acts
intrinsic to God; and no change can take
place in them without a change taking placein God. Nothing, therefore, that implies a
change in these acts should be granted.
Ad nonum autem et decimum patet responsio
per haec quia procedunt de potentia absoluta,
non facta aliqua praesuppositione de praedestinatione facta vel non facta.
9-10. The answer to these arguments is clear,
for they are based on an understanding of
God‟s power as absolute, not as modified bya supposition of predestination or non-
predestination.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod Glossa illa
intelligenda est hoc modo quod non intrant totde Iudaeis, quot sunt omnes qui sunt
praeordinati ad vitam, quia non soli Iudaei sunt
praedestinati. Vel potest dici, quod non
loquitur de praeordinatione praedestinationis,sed praeparationis, qua per legem
disponebantur ad vitam. Vel potest dici, quod
non intraverunt tot in primitiva Ecclesia, quiacum plenitudo gentium intraverit, tunc et
omnis Israel salvus fiet in Ecclesia finali.
11. That Gloss should be understood as
meaning this: the number of Jews entering isnot as large as the total number of all those
who have been preordained to life, for it is
not only Jews who have been predestined. Or
one could reply that the Gloss is not speakingabout the preordination of predestination but
about the preordination of preparation by
which the Jews were disposed for life bymeans of the Law. Or, finally, one could
reply that not as many Jews entered the early
Church as are predestined, because, as weread in the Epistle to the Romans(11:25-26):
“When the fulness of the Gentiles should
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come in... all Israel will be saved” in the
Church at the end of time.
ARTICLE V
In the fifth article we ask:
Are the predestined certain of their predestination?
[ARTICLE S.T., I, 23, 1, ad 4; I-II, 112, 5; In Evang. Johannis, c. 10, lect. 5 (P. 10:484b); In Psalm. 50 (P. 14:348b).]
Quinto quaeritur utrum praedestinatis sit certa
sua praedestinatioDifficulties
Et videtur quod sic. It seems that they are, for
Quia, ut dicitur I Ioan. cap. II, 27: unctio docet
nos de omnibus: et intelligitur de omnibus pertinentibus ad salutem. Sed praedestinatio
maxime pertinet ad salutem, quia est causa
salutis. Ergo per unctionem acceptam omnes
homines certi redduntur de sua praedestinatione.
1. The words of St. John, “His unction
teaches you of all things” (1 John2:27), areunderstood as referring to all things
pertaining to salvation. But predestination
pertains very much to salvation, since it is
the cause of salvation. Consequently,through an unction they receive, all men are
made certain of their predestination.
Praeterea, divinae bonitati convenit, cuius est
omnia optimo modo facere, ut homines optimomodo ducat ad praemium. Sed optimus modus
videtur ut unusquisque sit certus de suo
praemio. Ergo unusquisque certus redditur,quod ad praemium perveniet, qui illuc est
perventurus; et sic idem quod prius.
2. It is consonant with God‟s goodness,
which does all things in the best possibleway, to lead men to their reward in the best
possible way. Now, the best possible way
seems to be that each and every man becertain of his reward. Therefore, each and
every person who is predestined is given
assurance that he will come to his reward.
Consequently, the same must be said as before.
Praeterea, dux exercitus omnes quos adscribit
ad meritum pugnae, adscribit etiam ad
praemium; ut sicut sunt certi de merito, sic sintcerti de praemio. Sed homines certi sunt quod
sint in statu merendi. Ergo et certi sunt quod ad
3. All whom the leader of an army enrolls
for merit in battle are likewise enrolled for a
reward. Consequently, they are as certainabout their reward as they are about their
merit. But men are certain that they are in
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praemium pervenient. Et sic idem quod prius. the state of meriting. Consequently, they are
also certain that they will obtain theirreward. We conclude as before.
Sed contra, To the Contrary
est quod dicitur Eccle. IX, 1: nemo scit utrum
dignus odio vel amore sit.
In Ecclesiastes (9:1) we read: “Man knows
not whether he be worthy of love or hatred.”
Responsio. REPLY
Dicendum, quod non est inconveniens alicui
suam praedestinationem revelari: sed secundumlegem communem non est conveniens ut
omnibus reveletur, duplici ratione. Quarum prima potest sumi ex parte eorum qui non sunt praedestinati. Si enim omnibus praedestinatis
sua praedestinatio sic nota esset, tunc omnibus
non praedestinatis certum esset se praedestinatos non esse, ex hoc ipso quod se
praedestinatos nescirent; et hoc quodammodo
eos in desperationem induceret. Secunda ratio
potest sumi ex parte ipsorum praedestinatorum.Securitas enim negligentiam parit. Si autem
certi essent de sua praedestinatione, securi
essent de sua salute; et ita non tantamsollicitudinem apponerent ad mala vitanda. Et
propter hoc a divina providentia salubriter est
ordinatum ut homines suam praedestinationem
vel reprobationem ignorent.
There is nothing inconsistent in the
revelation to some person of the fact of his predestination; but, in view of His general
law, it would be inconsistent if He revealedthis to all the predestined for the followingtwo reasons. The first reason may be found
by considering those who are not
predestined. Now, if all the predestinedknew that they were predestined, then all
those not predestined would know that they
were not predestined from the very fact that
they did not know if they were predestined.This would, in some way, lead them to
despair. The second reason may be found by
considering those who are predestined. Now,security is the mother of negligence; and if
the predestined were certain, about their
predestination, they would be secure about
their salvation. Consequently, they wouldnot exercise so great care in avoiding evil.
Hence, it has been wisely ordained by God‟s
providence that men should be ignorant oftheir predestination or reprobation.
Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod cum dicitur,
quod unctio docet de omnibus pertinentibus ad
salutem, intelligendum est de illis quorumcognitio ad salutem pertinet, non de omnibus
quae secundum se ad salutem non pertinent.
Cognitio autem praedestinationis non est
1. When Scripture says that His unction
teaches everything connected with salvation,
this should be understood as referring tothose things knowledge of which pertains to
salvation, not to all those things which, in
themselves, do pertain to salvation. And,
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necessaria ad salutem, etsi ipsa praedestinatio
sit necessaria.
although predestination itself is necessary
for salvation, knowledge of predestination isnot.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod non essetconveniens modus dandi praemium, certificare
de praemio habendo certitudine absoluta; sedconveniens modus est ut illi cui praemium
praeparatur, detur certitudo conditionata; hoc
est quod perveniet, nisi ex ipso deficiat. Et taliscertitudo unicuique praedestinato per virtutem
spei infunditur.
2. It is not proper, when giving a reward, togive the person who is to receive it
unconditional assurance. The proper way isto give conditional assurance to the one for
whom the reward is being prepared, namely,
that the reward will be given him unless hefails on his part. This kind of assurance is
given to all the predestined through the
infusion of the virtue of hope.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod etiam hoc non
potest esse alicui per certitudinem notum utrumsit in statu merendi, quamvis ex aliquibus
coniecturis hoc possit probabiliter existimare.
Habitus enim nunquam possunt cognosci nisi per actus. Actus autem virtutum gratuitarum
habent maximam similitudinem cum actibus
virtutum acquisitarum, ut non possit de facili
per huiusmodi actus certitudo de gratia haberi,nisi forte per revelationem inde certificetur
aliquis ex speciali privilegio. Et praeterea in
pugna saeculari ille qui est a duce exercitus
adscriptus ad pugnam, non certificatur de praemio nisi sub conditione, quia non
coronabitur, nisi (qui) legitime certaverit.
3. One cannot know with any certainty that
he is in the state of meriting, although he canknow, by conjecture, that this is probably the
case. For a habit never can be known except
through its acts, and the acts of the infusedsupernatural virtues greatly resemble the
acts of the acquired natural virtues.
Consequently, it is not easy to be certain that
acts of this kind have their source in grace,unless, by a special privilege, a person is
made certain of it through a revelation.
Moreover, he who is enrolled by the leader
of an army for a secular struggle is givenonly conditional assurance of his reward,
because one “is not crowned,— except he
strive lawfully” (2 Timothy 2:5).
ARTICLE VI
In the sixth article we ask:
Can predestination be helped by the prayers of the saints?
[ARTICLE S.T., I, 23, 8; I Sent., 41, 1, 4; IV Sent., 45, 3, 3; C.G., III, cc. 95-96, 113.]
Sexto quaeritur utrum praedestinatio possitiuvari precibus sanctorum
Difficulties
Et videtur quod non. It seems not, for
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Quia eiusdem est adiuvari et impediri. Sed
praedestinatio non potest impediri. Ergo necaliquo adiuvari.
1. What can be aided can be prevented, but
predestination cannot be prevented.Therefore, it cannot be aided in any way.
Praeterea, illud quo posito vel remotonihilominus alterum habet suum effectum, non
iuvat ipsum. Sed praedestinatio oportet quodsuum effectum habeat, cum falli non possit:
sive oratio fiat, sive non fiat. Ergo
praedestinatio orationibus non iuvatur.
2. When one thing has its effect whetheranother thing is present or not, the latter is no
help to it. But predestination must have itseffect, because it cannot fail whether prayers
take place or not. Consequently,
predestination is not helped by prayers.
Praeterea, nullum aeternum praeceditur ab
aliquo temporali. Sed oratio est temporalis, praedestinatio autem aeterna. Ergo
praedestinationem oratio praecedere non potest,
et ita nec eam adiuvare.
3. Nothing eternal is preceded by something
temporal. But prayer is temporal, and predestination is eternal. Therefore, prayer
cannot precede predestination, and,
consequently, cannot help it.
Praeterea, membra corporis mystici gerunt in sesimilitudinem membrorum corporis naturalis,
ut patet I Corinth., cap. XII, 12 ss. Sed unum
membrum in corpore naturali non acquirit perfectionem suam per alterum. Ergo nec in
corpore mystico. Sed membra corporis mystici
maxime perficiuntur per praedestinationis
effectus. Ergo unus homo non iuvatur adeffectus praedestinationis consequendos
precibus alterius.
4. As is clear from the first Epistle to theCorinthians (12:12), the members of the
mystical body resemble the members of a
natural body. Now, in a natural body, amember does not acquire its perfection by
means of another member. Consequently, the
same is true [of members] in the mystical
body. But the members of the mystical bodyreceive their greatest perfection through the
effects of predestination. Therefore, one man
is not aided in obtaining the effects of predestination by the prayers of another.
Sed contra. To the Contrary
Est quod dicitur Genes. cap. XXV, 21: quod
Isaac rogavit dominum pro Rebecca uxore sua,
eo quod sterilis esset; qui exaudivit eum, et
dedit conceptum Rebeccae; et ex illo conceptu
natus est Iacob, qui ab aeterno praedestinatusfuerat; nec unquam fuisset praedestinatio
impleta, nisi natus fuisset. Quod oratione Isaacest impetratum; ergo praedestinatio orationibus
iuvatur.
1. We read in Genesis (25:2 1): “Isaac
besought the Lord for his wife because she
was barren; and he heard him, and made
Rebecca to conceive.” As a result of this
conception Jacob was born, who had been predestined from all eternity; and this
predestination would never have beenfulfilled had he not been born. But it was
effected by the prayer of Isaac.
Consequently, predestination is helped by prayers.
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Praeterea, in quodam sermone de conversione
sancti Pauli legitur quasi ex persona dominidicentis ad Paulum: disposui in mente mea
perdere te nisi Stephanus servus meus orasset
pro te; ergo oratio Stephani Paulum areprobatione liberavit; ergo et per eam est
praedestinatus; et sic idem quod prius.
2. In a certain sermon on the conversion of
St. Paul, in which the Lord is represented asspeaking to Paul, we read: “Unless Stephen,
my servant, had prayed for you, I would have
destroyed you.” The prayers of Stephen,therefore, freed Paul from reprobation; and
so through these prayers he was predestined.
Hence, we conclude as before.
Praeterea, aliquis potest alicui mereri primamgratiam. Ergo eadem ratione et gratiam
finalem. Sed quicumque gratiam finalem habet,
est praedestinatus. Ergo aliquis potest iuvari
orationibus alterius ad hoc quod sit praedestinatus.
3. One can merit the first grace for someone.For the same reason, therefore, he can also
merit final grace for him. But whoever
possesses final grace is predestined.
Therefore, the predestination of one personcan be furthered by the prayers of another.
Praeterea, Gregorius oravit pro Traiano, et eum
ab Inferno liberavit, ut Damascenus narrat in
quodam sermone de mortuis; et ita videturquod ipse liberatus sit a societate reproborum
orationibus Gregorii; et sic idem quod prius.
4. As Damascene tells us in a certain sermon
on the dead, Gregory prayed for Trajan and
freed him from hell. It seems, therefore, thathe was freed from the company of the
damned by Gregory‟s prayers. Hence, the
same must be said as before.
Praeterea, membra corporis mystici sunt similia
membris corporis naturalis. Sed membrumunum iuvatur per alterum in corpore naturali.
Ergo etiam in corpore mystico; et sic idem
quod prius.
5. The members of the mystical body
resemble the members of a natural body. Butin a natural body one member is helped by
another. Consequently, the same is true in
the mystical body, and the above propositionstands.
Responsio. REPLY
Dicendum, quod praedestinationem iuvari
precibus sanctorum dupliciter potest intelligi.
Uno modo, quod orationes sanctorum iuvent ad
hoc quod aliquis praedestinetur; et hoc non
potest esse verum neque de orationibussecundum quod in propria natura existunt, quia
temporales sunt, praedestinatio autem aeterna;neque etiam secundum quod existunt in Dei
praescientia, quia praescientia meritorum vel
propriorum vel alienorum non est praedestinationis causa, ut supra dictum est.
That predestination can be helped by the
prayers of the saints can be understood in
two ways. First, it can mean that the prayers
of the saints help one to be predestined. This,
however, cannot be true of prayers, either asthey exist in their own proper condition,
which is temporal while predestination iseternal, or as they exist in God‟s
foreknowledge, because, as explained above,
foreknowledge of merits is. not the cause of predestination, whether the merits be one‟s
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Alio modo potest intelligi praedestinationem
precibus sanctorum iuvari, quod oratio iuvet adconsequendum praedestinationis effectum,
sicut aliquis iuvatur instrumento, quo suum
opus perficit; et sic est inquisitum de hacquaestione ab omnibus qui Dei providentiam
circa res humanas posuerunt; sed diversimode
est ab eis determinatum.
own or those of another. On the other hand,
that predestination is furthered by the prayersof the saints can mean that their prayers help
us obtain the effect of predestination as an
instrument helps one in finishing his work.The problem has been considered in this way
by all those who have studied God‟s
providence over human affairs. Their
answers, however, have been different.
Quidam enim, attendentes immobilitatem
divinae ordinationis, posuerunt quod oratio vel
sacrificium vel huiusmodi in nullo prodesse
potest. Et haec dicitur fuisse Epicureorumopinio, qui omnia immobiliter evenire dicebant
ex dispositione superiorum corporum, quaedeos nominabant.
Attending only to the immutability of God‟s
decrees, some have declared that prayer,
sacrifice, and similar actions help in no way
at all. This is said to have been the opinion ofthe Epicureans, who taught that all things
happened necessarily because of theinfluence of celestial bodies, which they
called gods.
Alii autem dixerunt, quod secundum hoc
sacrificia et orationes valent, quia per
huiusmodi mutatur praeordinatio eorum ad
quos pertinet disponere de actibus humanis. Ethaec dicitur fuisse opinio Stoicorum, qui
ponebant res omnes regi quibusdam spiritibus,
quos deos vocabant; et cum ab eis esset aliquid
praedefinitum, orationibus et sacrificiis poteratobtineri ut talis definitio mutaretur, placatis
deorum animis, ut dicebant. Et in istam
sententiam quasi videtur incidisse Avicenna infine suae Metaph.: ponit enim omnia quae
aguntur in rebus humanis, quorum principium
est voluntas humana, reducuntur in voluntatesanimarum caelestium. Ponit enim, corpora
caelestia esse animata; et sicut corpus caeleste
habet influentiam super corpus humanum, ita
animae caelestes, secundum eum, habent
influentiam super animas humanas, et quod adearum imaginationem sequuntur ea quae in his
inferioribus eveniunt. Et ideo sacrificia etorationes valent, secundum eum, ad hoc quod
huiusmodi animae concipiant ea quae nobis
volumus evenire.
Others said that sacrifices and prayers help to
this extent, that they change the
preordination made by those who have the
power to determine human acts. This is saidto have been the opinion of the Stoics, who
taught that all things are ruled by certain
spirits whom they called gods; and, even
though something had been pre-established by them, according to the Stoics, such a
prearrangement could be changed by
placating their souls through prayers andsacrifices. Avicenna seems to have fallen
into this error, too; for he asserts that all
human actions whose principle is the humanwill can be reduced to the wills of celestial
souls. He thought that the heavenly bodies
had souls, and, just as a heavenly body
influences a human body, so, according to
him, the celestial souls influence humansouls. In fact, what takes place in things here
below is according to the notions of thesecelestial souls. Consequently, he thought that
sacrifices and prayers helped these souls to
conceive what we wished to take place.
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Sed istae positiones a fide sunt alienae; quia
prima positio tollit libertatem arbitrii, secundaautem tollit praedestinationis certitudinem. Et
ideo aliter dicendum est quod praedestinatio
divina nunquam mutatur; sed tamen orationeset alia bona opera valent ad consequendum
praedestinationis effectum. In quolibet enim
ordine causarum, attendendus est non solum
ordo primae causae ad effectum, sed etiamordo causae secundae ad effectum, et ordo
causae primae ad secundam, quia causa
secunda non ordinatur ad effectum nisi ex
ordinatione causae primae. Causa enim primadat secundae quod influat super effectum suum,
ut patet in Lib. de causis.
These theories, however, are opposed to the
Faith. For the first destroys freedom ofchoice; the second, the certainty of
predestination. Consequently, we must
answer the problem differently, and must saythat, while God‟s predestination never
changes, prayers and other good works are
nevertheless effective in obtaining the effect
of predestination. Now, when consideringany order of causes, we must consider not
only the order of the first cause to the effect
but also the order of the second cause to the
effect and the order of the first cause to thesecond cause, since the second cause is
ordered to an effect only through the
direction of the first cause. For, as is clear
from The Causes, the first cause gives to thesecond cause the power of influencing the
effect.
Dico igitur, quod praedestinationis effectus estsalus humana, quae ab ea procedit sicut a causa
prima; sed eius possunt esse multae causae
aliae proximae quasi instrumentales, quae sunt
ordinatae a divina praedestinatione ad salutemhumanam, sicut instrumenta applicantur ab
artifice ad effectum artis explendum. Unde,sicut praedestinationis divinae est effectus quodiste salvetur, ita et quod per orationes talis vel
per talia merita salvetur. Et hoc est quod
Gregorius dicit in I libro dialogorum ea quae
sancti viri orando efficiunt, ita praedestinatasunt, ut precibus obtineantur; propter quod, ut
dicit Boetius in libro V de consolatione: preces,
cum rectae sunt, inefficaces esse non possunt.
I say, therefore, that the effect of predestination is man‟s salvation, and this
comes from it as from its first cause. It can
have, however, many other proximate and, as
it were, instrumental causes, which areordered by divine predestination for man‟s
salvation, as tools are used by a craftsmanfor completing a product of his craft.Consequently, the effect of God‟s
predestination is not only that an individual
person be saved but also that he be saved by
certain prayers or certain merits. Gregoryalso said this: “What holy men effect by their
prayers is predestined to be obtained by
prayer.” Consequently, Boethius says: “If we pray well, our prayers cannot be without
effect.”
Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod nihil est
quod ordinem praedestinationis possitinfringere, et ideo impediri non potest; sed
multa sunt quae ordini praedestinationis
1. There is nothing that can check the
ordering of predestination. Consequently, predestination cannot be impeded. Many
things, however, are related to the ordering
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subiacent ut causae mediae; et ista dicuntur
iuvare praedestinationem, modo praedicto.
of predestination as intermediate causes; and
these are said to further predestination in themanner described.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod ex quo praedestinatum est quod talis orationibus
talibus salvetur, non possunt orationesremoveri nisi praedestinatione remota; sicut
nec salus humana, quae est praedestinationis
effectus.
2. From the fact that it is predestined that acertain man will be saved because of certain
prayers, these prayers cannot be omittedwithout detriment to his predestination. The
same is true of man‟s salvation, which is the
effect of predestination.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit
quod oratio non iuvet praedestinationem quasicausa; et hoc concedendum est.
3. That argument proves that prayer does not
help predestination by being, as it were, itscause. This we concede.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod effectus
praedestinationis, qui sunt gratia et gloria, non
se habent per modum perfectionis primae, sed per modum perfectionis secundae. Membra
autem corporis naturalis, quamvis non iuventur
ab invicem in perfectionibus primisconsequendis, iuvantur tamen invicem,
quantum ad perfectiones secundas; et est etiam
aliquod membrum in corpore quod primo
formatum iuvat ad formationem aliorummembrorum, scilicet cor; unde ratio procedit ex
falso.
4. The effects of predestination, which are
grace and glory, are not, as it were, basic
perfections but secondary perfections. Now,even though the members of a natural body
do not help each other in acquiring their
basic perfections, they nevertheless do helpeach other to acquire their secondary
perfections. There is, moreover, a member in
the body which, having been formed first,
helps in the formation of other members — namely, the heart. Consequently, the
argument proceeds on a false assumption.
Answers to Contrary Difficulties
Ad primum autem in contrarium concedimus. 1. We concede this argument.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod Paulus nunquamfuit reprobatus secundum dispositionem divini
consilii, quod est immutabile; sed solum
secundum dispositionem divinae sententiaequae accipitur secundum inferiores causas,quae quandoque mutantur. Unde non sequitur
quod oratio fuerit praedestinationis causa, sed
quod iuverit solum ad praedestinationiseffectum.
2. Paul was never reprobated according tothe disposition made by divine election,
because this is unchangeable. He was
reprobated, however, according to a[provisional] judgment of God in harmonywith lower causes, a judgment which
sometimes changes. It follows, therefore, not
that prayer was the cause of predestination, but that it furthered only the effect of
predestination.
8/10/2019 Question 6- Predestination
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/question-6-predestination 53/53
Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis
praedestinatio et gratia finalis convertantur,tamen non oportet quod quidquid est causa
gratiae finalis, quocumque modo, sit etiam
causa praedestinationis, sicut patet ex supradictis.
3. Although predestination and final grace
are interchangeable, it does not necessarilyfollow that whatever is the cause of final
grace in any manner whatsoever is also the
cause of predestination. This is clear fromwhat has been said previously.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod quamvis Traianus
esset in loco reproborum, non tamen erat
simpliciter reprobatus; praedestinatum enimerat quod precibus Gregorii salvaretur.
4. Although Trajan was in the place of the
damned, he was not damned absolutely; for
he was predestined to be saved by the prayers of Gregory.
Quintum concedimus. 5. We concede the fifth argument.