Pursuing Happiness

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Pursuing Happiness: The Architecture of Sustainable Change Sonja Lyubomirsky University of California, Riverside Kennon M. Sheldon University of Missouri—Columbia David Schkade University of California, San Diego The pursuit of happiness is an important goal for many people. However, surprisingly little scientific research has focused on the question of how happiness can be increased and then sustained, probably because of pessimism engendered by the concepts of genetic determinism and hedonic adaptation. Nevertheless, emerging sources of opti- mism exist regarding the possibility of permanent increases in happiness. Drawing on the past well-being literature, the authors propose that a person’s chronic happiness level is governed by 3 major factors: a genetically determined set point for happiness, happiness-relevant circumstantial factors, and happiness-relevant activities and prac- tices. The authors then consider adaptation and dynamic processes to show why the activity category offers the best opportunities for sustainably increasing happiness. Finally, existing research is discussed in support of the model, including 2 preliminary happiness-increasing interventions. The pursuit of happiness holds an honored position in American society, beginning with the Declaration of Independence, where it is promised as a cherished right for all citizens. Today, the enduring U.S. obsession with how to be happy can be observed in the row upon row of popular psychology and self-help books in any major bookstore and in the millions of copies of these books that are sold. Indeed, many social contexts in the United States have the production of happiness and positive feel- ings as their primary purpose, and questions such as “Are you happy?” and “Are you having fun?” fit nearly every occasion (Markus & Kitayama, 1994). Not surprisingly, the majority of U.S. residents rate personal happiness as very important (Diener, Suh, Smith, & Shao, 1995; Triandis, Bontempo, Leung, & Hui, 1990) and report thinking about happiness at least once every day (Freedman, 1978). Furthermore, the pursuit of happiness is no longer just a North American obsession, but instead it is becoming ever more global as people seek to fulfill the promises of capitalism and political freedom (Diener et al., 1995; Freedman, 1978; Triandis et al., 1990). It seems that nearly all people believe, or would like to believe, that they can move in an “upward spiral” (Sheldon & Houser- Marko, 2001) toward ever greater personal well-being. Is the pursuit of happiness merely a bourgeois concern, a symptom of Western comfort and self-centeredness, a factor that has no real im- pact on psychological adjustment and adapta- tion? The empirical evidence suggests that this is not the case. Indeed, a number of researchers and thinkers have argued that the ability to be happy and contented with life is a central crite- rion of adaptation and positive mental health (e.g., Diener, 1984; Jahoda, 1958; Taylor & Brown, 1988). Bolstering this notion, Ly- ubomirsky and her colleagues recently com- Sonja Lyubomirsky, Department of Psychology, Univer- sity of California, Riverside; Kennon M. Sheldon, Depart- ment of Psychology, University of Missouri—Columbia; David Schkade, Rady School of Management, University of California, San Diego. This work was supported in part by grants from the Positive Psychology Network. We are grateful to Linda Houser-Marko, Kathleen Jamir, and Chris Tkach for con- ducting library research and to Shelley Taylor, David Sher- man, and the other members of Psychology 421 for valuable comments on a draft. Correspondence concerning this article should be ad- dressed to Sonja Lyubomirsky, Department of Psychology, University of California, Riverside, CA 92521, or Kennon M. Sheldon, Department of Psychological Sciences, 112 McAlester Hall, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO 65211. E-mail: [email protected] or sheldonk@missouri .edu Review of General Psychology Copyright 2005 by the Educational Publishing Foundation 2005, Vol. 9, No. 2, 111–131 1089-2680/05/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/1089-2680.9.2.111 111

Transcript of Pursuing Happiness

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Pursuing Happiness: The Architecture of Sustainable Change

Sonja LyubomirskyUniversity of California, Riverside

Kennon M. SheldonUniversity of Missouri—Columbia

David SchkadeUniversity of California, San Diego

The pursuit of happiness is an important goal for many people. However, surprisinglylittle scientific research has focused on the question of how happiness can be increasedand then sustained, probably because of pessimism engendered by the concepts ofgenetic determinism and hedonic adaptation. Nevertheless, emerging sources of opti-mism exist regarding the possibility of permanent increases in happiness. Drawing onthe past well-being literature, the authors propose that a person’s chronic happinesslevel is governed by 3 major factors: a genetically determined set point for happiness,happiness-relevant circumstantial factors, and happiness-relevant activities and prac-tices. The authors then consider adaptation and dynamic processes to show why theactivity category offers the best opportunities for sustainably increasing happiness.Finally, existing research is discussed in support of the model, including 2 preliminaryhappiness-increasing interventions.

The pursuit of happiness holds an honoredposition in American society, beginning withthe Declaration of Independence, where it ispromised as a cherished right for all citizens.Today, the enduring U.S. obsession with how tobe happy can be observed in the row upon rowof popular psychology and self-help books inany major bookstore and in the millions ofcopies of these books that are sold. Indeed,many social contexts in the United States havethe production of happiness and positive feel-ings as their primary purpose, and questions

such as “Are you happy?” and “Are you havingfun?” fit nearly every occasion (Markus &Kitayama, 1994). Not surprisingly, the majorityof U.S. residents rate personal happiness as veryimportant (Diener, Suh, Smith, & Shao, 1995;Triandis, Bontempo, Leung, & Hui, 1990) andreport thinking about happiness at least onceevery day (Freedman, 1978). Furthermore, thepursuit of happiness is no longer just a NorthAmerican obsession, but instead it is becomingever more global as people seek to fulfill thepromises of capitalism and political freedom(Diener et al., 1995; Freedman, 1978; Triandiset al., 1990). It seems that nearly all peoplebelieve, or would like to believe, that they canmove in an “upward spiral” (Sheldon & Houser-Marko, 2001) toward ever greater personalwell-being.

Is the pursuit of happiness merely a bourgeoisconcern, a symptom of Western comfort andself-centeredness, a factor that has no real im-pact on psychological adjustment and adapta-tion? The empirical evidence suggests that thisis not the case. Indeed, a number of researchersand thinkers have argued that the ability to behappy and contented with life is a central crite-rion of adaptation and positive mental health(e.g., Diener, 1984; Jahoda, 1958; Taylor &Brown, 1988). Bolstering this notion, Ly-ubomirsky and her colleagues recently com-

Sonja Lyubomirsky, Department of Psychology, Univer-sity of California, Riverside; Kennon M. Sheldon, Depart-ment of Psychology, University of Missouri—Columbia;David Schkade, Rady School of Management, University ofCalifornia, San Diego.

This work was supported in part by grants from thePositive Psychology Network. We are grateful to LindaHouser-Marko, Kathleen Jamir, and Chris Tkach for con-ducting library research and to Shelley Taylor, David Sher-man, and the other members of Psychology 421 for valuablecomments on a draft.

Correspondence concerning this article should be ad-dressed to Sonja Lyubomirsky, Department of Psychology,University of California, Riverside, CA 92521, or KennonM. Sheldon, Department of Psychological Sciences, 112McAlester Hall, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO65211. E-mail: [email protected] or [email protected]

Review of General Psychology Copyright 2005 by the Educational Publishing Foundation2005, Vol. 9, No. 2, 111–131 1089-2680/05/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/1089-2680.9.2.111

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piled evidence showing that happiness has nu-merous positive byproducts that appear to ben-efit individuals, families, and communities(Lyubomirsky, King, & Diener, 2004; see alsoFredrickson, 2001). Furthermore, Lyubomirskyet al.’s analysis revealed that happy people gaintangible benefits in many different life domainsfrom their positive state of mind, includinglarger social rewards (higher odds of marriageand lower odds of divorce, more friends, stron-ger social support, and richer social interac-tions; e.g., Harker & Keltner, 2001; Marks &Fleming, 1999; Okun, Stock, Haring, & Witter,1984), superior work outcomes (greater creativ-ity, increased productivity, higher quality ofwork, and higher income; e.g., Estrada, Isen, &Young, 1994; Staw, Sutton, & Pelled, 1995),and more activity, energy, and flow (e.g., Csik-szentmihalyi & Wong, 1991).

Further supporting the argument that subjec-tive happiness may be integral to mental andphysical health, happy people are more likely toevidence greater self-control and self-regulatoryand coping abilities (e.g., Aspinwall, 1998;Fredrickson & Joiner, 2002; Keltner & Bon-anno, 1997), to have a bolstered immune system(e.g., Dillon, Minchoff, & Baker, 1985; Stone etal., 1994), and even to live a longer life (e.g.,Danner, Snowdon, & Friesen, 2001; Ostir,Markides, Black, & Goodwin, 2000). Also,happy people are not just self-centered or self-ish; the literature suggests that happy individu-als instead tend to be relatively more coopera-tive, prosocial, charitable, and “other-centered”(e.g., Isen, 1970; Kasser & Ryan, 1996; Wil-liams & Shiaw, 1999).

In summary, happy individuals appear morelikely to be flourishing people, both inwardlyand outwardly. Thus, we argue that enhancingpeople’s happiness levels may indeed be a wor-thy scientific goal, especially after their basicphysical and security needs are met. Unfortu-nately, however, relatively little scientific sup-port exists for the idea that people’s happinesslevels can change for the better. For example,the happiness-boosting techniques proposed inthe self-help literature generally have limitedgrounding in scientific theory and even lessempirical confirmation of their effectiveness(Norcross et al., 2000). Consider a representa-tive best seller, You Can Be Happy No MatterWhat: Five Principles for Keeping Life in Per-spective, by Carlson (1997). Do the five princi-

ples work? Do some work better than others?Do the principles work better for some peoplethan for others? Are any positive effects of theprinciples due, ultimately, to placebo effects? Ifthe book actually helps people “get happier,”does the happiness boost last? Although it ispossible that some of the advice given in thisand other similar books could well be appropri-ate and effective, the authors provide almost noempirical research in support of their claims.

One receives little more guidance from con-temporary academic psychology. Of course, re-search psychologists have identified many pre-dictors of people’s happiness or subjective well-being. For example, well-being has been shownto be associated with a wide variety of factors,including demographic status (e.g., Argyle,1999; Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999; My-ers, 2000), personality traits and attitudes (e.g.,Diener & Lucas, 1999), and goal characteristics(e.g., McGregor & Little, 1998). However, alimitation of previous research is that the vastmajority of studies have been cross sectionaland have reported between-subjects effectsrather than investigating well-being longitudi-nally and examining within-subject effects. Inaddition, very few happiness intervention stud-ies have been conducted. Thus, researchers stillknow surprisingly little about how to changewell-being, that is, about the possibility of “be-coming happier.” Doubtless, part of the reasonfor this neglect is the difficulty of conductinglongitudinal and intervention studies. The prob-lem is further compounded by the tendency ofapplied mental health researchers to focus onpathology rather than on positive mental health(Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000) and bythe thorny issues raised when theorists speculateon how people “should” live their lives to max-imize their potential for happiness (Schwartz,2000). However, we believe the principal rea-son for the neglect of this question is the con-siderable scientific pessimism over whether it iseven possible to effect sustainable increases inhappiness.

Historical Sources of Pessimism

Three considerations serve to illustrate thedepth of this pessimism. First is the idea of agenetically determined set point (or set range)for happiness. Lykken and Tellegen (1996)have provided evidence, based on twin studies

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and adoption studies, that the heritability ofwell-being may be as high as 80% (although amore widely accepted figure is 50%; Braungart,Plomin, DeFries, & Fulker, 1992; Tellegen etal., 1988; cf. Diener et al., 1999). Whatever theexact coefficient, its large magnitude suggeststhat for each person there is indeed a chronic orcharacteristic level of happiness. Consistentwith this idea, Headey and Wearing (1989)found, in a four-wave panel study, that partici-pants tended to keep returning to their ownbaselines over time (see also Suh, Diener, &Fujita, 1996). Thus, although there may be sub-stantial variation around this baseline level inthe short term, in the long term people perhapscannot help but return to their set point, or to themiddle of their set range: “What goes up mustcome down” (a more detailed description of thehappiness set point is provided later).

A second and closely related source of pes-simism comes from the literature on personalitytraits. Traits are cognitive, affective, and behav-ioral complexes that are, by definition, consis-tent across situations and across the life spanand therefore may account for part of the sta-bility of the set point. In support of the latterassumption, McCrae and Costa (1990) haveshown impressive long-term stability for the“Big Five” traits, including the two traits mostclosely related to well-being: neuroticism andextraversion. Specifically, people tend to main-tain the same rank ordering in their levels ofworry, rumination, and guilt, as well as in theirlevels of social engagement, enthusiasm, andself-confidence. Because of the close relationbetween psychological well-being and thesepersonality characteristics, McCrae and Costaargued that people also tend to maintain thesame relative level of happiness over time (seealso Costa, McCrae, & Zonderman, 1987; Die-ner & Lucas, 1999).

A third source of pessimism arises from theconcept of the hedonic treadmill (Brickman &Campbell, 1971), which suggests that any gainsin happiness are only temporary, because hu-mans so quickly adapt to change (see also Kah-neman, 1999; Tversky & Griffin, 1991). Thus,although new circumstances may temporarilycause people to become happier or sadder, theyrapidly adjust, and the effect of these new cir-cumstances on happiness then diminishesquickly or even disappears entirely. For exam-ple, Brickman, Coates, and Janoff-Bulman

(1978) showed that, after 1 year, lottery winnerswere no happier than controls, and furthermorerecent paralysis victims were not as unhappy asone would expect. Further evidence of hedonicadaptation comes from findings of remarkablysmall correlations between happiness andwealth (Diener & Lucas, 1999) and Myers’s(2000) observation that while U.S. citizens’ per-sonal income has more than doubled in thepast 50 years, their happiness levels have re-mained the same. The notion of an individualfighting against the effects of adaptation bringsto mind an image of a pedestrian walking up adescending escalator. Although the improvingcircumstances of her life may propel her upwardtoward ever greater happiness, the process ofadaptation forces her back to her initial state.

Together, these concepts and findings suggestthat trying to become happier may be as futile astrying to become taller (Lykken & Tellegen,1996). Indeed, some have argued that pursuinghappiness may backfire altogether, if the pursuitbecomes a conscious “extrinsic” goal that dis-tracts people from enjoying the moment(Schooler, Ariely, & Loewenstein, in press; seealso Sheldon, 2004). Moreover, striving forhappiness may inevitably result in deep disap-pointment for many people. From this perspec-tive, rather than seeking an upward spiral,maybe people would be better off simply ac-cepting their current personality and happinesslevels (McCrae & Costa, 1994). In Zen terms,perhaps one should try to transcend the pursuitof happiness rather than trying to maximize it(Gaskins, 1999). Indeed, a number of philo-sophical traditions embrace the notion that hap-piness should not be increased beyond an ideallevel, one akin to a “Golden Mean” (Aristotle,1974) between agony and ecstasy. To be sure,most people would undoubtedly reject an unre-strained, ceaseless pursuit of well-being.

Present Sources of Optimism

Is the pursuit of happiness futile? We believenot. Despite the seemingly compelling reasonswe have listed for pessimism regarding attemptsto elevate levels of well-being, there are alsocompelling reasons for optimism. In the follow-ing, we briefly describe four sources of opti-mism, returning to consider some of them ingreater detail later. First, some researchers havehad success, albeit limited and short term, in

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using interventions to increase happiness (e.g.,Fava, 1999; Fordyce, 1977, 1983, Lichter,Haye, & Kammann, 1980; Sheldon, Kasser,Smith, & Share, 2002). The potential of happi-ness-enhancing interventions is further reflectedin emerging research in the positive psychologytradition demonstrating that practicing certainvirtues, such as gratitude (Emmons & McCul-lough, 2003), forgiveness (McCullough, Parga-ment, & Thoresen, 2000), and thoughtful self-reflection (King, 2001; Lyubomirsky, Sousa, &Dickerhoof, 2004), can bring about enhancedwell-being. Furthermore, research documentingthe long-term effectiveness of cognitive andbehavioral strategies to combat negative affectand depression has encouraging implicationsfor the possibility of elevating long-term happi-ness (e.g., Gloaguen, Cottraux, Cucherat, &Blackburn, 1998; Jacobson et al., 1996).

Second, many different motivational and at-titudinal factors have been linked to well-being,factors that are presumably amenable to somevolitional control. Examples of possible moti-vational factors include the successful pursuit oflife goals that are intrinsic in content (e.g.,Kasser & Ryan, 1996); concordant with a per-son’s interests, motives, and values (Brunstein,Schultheiss, & Grassman, 1998; Sheldon & El-liot, 1999; Sheldon & Kasser, 1995); and inter-nally consistent (e.g., Emmons & King, 1988;Sheldon & Kasser, 1995). Examples of poten-tially controllable attitudinal factors include thetendency to take an optimistic perspective onone’s life situations (e.g., DeNeve & Cooper,1998; McCrae & Costa, 1986), the inclinationto avoid social comparisons and contingent self-evaluations (e.g., Lyubomirsky & Ross, 1997),and the tendency to feel a sense of optimism orefficacy regarding one’s life (Bandura, 1997;Scheier & Carver, 1993; Seligman, 1991; Tay-lor & Brown, 1988).

A third reason for optimism is provided byrecent findings that older people tend to besomewhat happier than younger people(Charles, Reynolds, & Gatz, 2001; Diener &Suh, 1998; Roberts & Chapman, 2000; Sheldon& Kasser, 2001). Specifically, both cross-sec-tional and longitudinal work has shown thatolder persons report higher life satisfaction andlower negative affect. Although these main ef-fects do not always emerge, they are observedfrequently enough to suggest that greater hap-piness can indeed be achieved over time, not

just by a few people but perhaps by the majorityof people. Indeed, Carstensen’s (1995) socio-emotional selectivity theory suggests that olderpeople learn to structure their lives and pursueparticular goals that maximize positive emo-tions, consistent with the proposal that peoplecan learn to sustainably increase their well-being. Further supporting this notion are Shel-don and Kasser’s (2001) results, which showedthat age-related increases in well-being are inpart mediated by volitional changes, includingolder people’s ability to select more enjoyableand self-appropriate goals.

Yet another reason why genes are not neces-sarily destiny is that they appear to influencehappiness indirectly, that is, by influencing thekinds of experiences and environments one hasor seeks to have. Thus, unwanted effects ofgenes could be minimized by active efforts tosteer oneself away from situations that detractfrom well-being or by avoiding being enticedtoward maladaptive behaviors (Lykken, 2000;Lyubomirsky, 2001). In addition, it is worthnoting that heritability coefficients describe co-variations, not mean levels. Furthermore, even ahigh heritability coefficient for a particular trait(such as happiness) does not rule out the possi-bility that the mean level of that trait for aspecific population can be raised. Under theright conditions, perhaps anyone can becomehappier, even if her or his rank ordering relativeto others remains stable.

To summarize, it appears there is a paradox:Some theoretical perspectives and empiricaldata suggest that happiness can be increased,whereas other theories and data imply that itcannot. How can these conflicting perspectiveson the possibility of happiness enhancement beresolved? Also, if enhanced happiness is indeedpossible, what kinds of circumstances, activi-ties, or habits of mind are most likely to bringgains, especially gains that can be maintained?

Model of Happiness

Accordingly, the primary question addressedin this article is the following: Through whatmechanisms, if any, can a chronic happinesslevel higher than the set point be achieved andsustained? To this end, we describe the archi-tecture of sustainable happiness. The integra-tive model of happiness we present accommo-dates the role of both personality/genetic and

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circumstantial/demographic factors in happi-ness. However, it also goes beyond these cross-sectional or concurrent factors to incorporatedynamic, time-sensitive factors. This extensionallows the question of within-subject change inwell-being, and maintained change, to be ad-dressed. Most important, the model incorpo-rates the role of motivational and attitudinalfactors, consistent with the assumption that hap-piness can be actively pursued. We attempt toshow that certain types of intentional activitiesindeed offer ways to achieve sustainablechanges in well-being, despite the counteractingeffects of adaptation.

In the sections to follow, we first provide aworking definition of chronic happiness. Thenwe define the three factors that affect it (geneticset point, circumstances, and activities) and ar-gue that intentional activities offer the best po-tential route to higher and sustainable levels ofhappiness. Subsequently, we consider somemore complex issues pertaining to the achieve-ment of sustainable well-being via intentionalactivity, such as the role of person–activity fit,optimal timing and variety of activity, and thesupportive role of sustained effort and posi-tive habits. Then, in the final section of thearticle, we describe several preliminary effortsto increase happiness, based on our model,and discuss the nature of effective happinessinterventions.

Defining Happiness

Here we define happiness as it is most oftendefined in the literature, that is, in terms offrequent positive affect, high life satisfaction,and infrequent negative affect. These three con-structs are the three primary components ofsubjective well-being, according to Diener andcolleagues (for reviews, see Diener, 1984, 1994;Diener et al., 1999). Supporting the legitimacyof considering them as indicators of the sameunderlying construct, we find that the measuresare highly correlated and typically yield a singlefactor after negative affect has been recoded(Sheldon & Kasser, 1998, 2001; Sheldon &Lyubomirsky, 2004). To refer to this group ofmeasures, we use the term happiness or subjec-tive well-being, although we also discuss moodand life satisfaction at times according to thespecific ideas and data being presented.

It is important to note as well that we use asubjectivist definition of happiness, one thatcommonly relies on people’s self-reports. Webelieve this is appropriate and even necessarygiven our view that happiness must be definedfrom the perspective of the person. In otherwords, happiness is primarily a subjective phe-nomenon for which the final judge should be“whoever lives inside a person’s skin” (Myers& Diener, 1995, p. 11; see also Diener, 1994).However, the fact that the judgment of happi-ness is necessarily subjective does not mean thatinfluences on that judgment cannot be studiedempirically; for example, researchers might in-vestigate the effects of factors such as a per-son’s recent experiences of positive emotion(Frijda, 1999), the frame in which the questionis presented (Larsen & Fredrickson, 1999), themeaning that the person ascribes to the question(Schwarz & Strack, 1999), and the person’ssense of making satisfactory progress towardlife goals at the time of the judgment (Carver &Scheier, 1990). We consider some of these fac-tors in greater detail in a later section. Finally,the fact that self-reported happiness is subjec-tive does not mean that it is unrelated to rela-tively more “objective” variables. For example,research has shown significant convergence ofself-reported well-being with peer and spousereports of well-being (e.g., Lyubomirsky &Lepper, 1999; Sandvik, Diener, & Seidlitz,1993), with recall of particular types of events(e.g., Seidlitz, Wyer, & Diener, 1997), withsmiling behavior (e.g., Harker & Keltner,2001), and with physiological responses (e.g.,Lerner, Taylor, Gonzalez, & Stayn, 2002).

Chronic Happiness Level

Our primary focus in this article is on aperson’s characteristic level of happiness duringa particular period in his or her life, which weterm the chronic happiness level. We definehappiness this way because we wish to identifya quantity that is more enduring than momen-tary or daily happiness but that is also somewhatmalleable over time and, thus, amenable tomeaningful pursuit. According to this defini-tion, although it is possible to alter one’schronic happiness level, it is much more diffi-cult to do so than to alter one’s happiness levelat a particular moment or on a particular day.Operationally, one might define a person’s

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chronic happiness level in terms of his or herretrospective summary judgments regarding hisor her mood and satisfaction during some recentperiod (such as the past 2, 6, or 12 months) or asthe average of momentary judgments of moodand satisfaction made at several times duringthe selected period. It is worth adding, however,that people may vary in their “hedonic profiles,”such that two individuals with similar chronichappiness levels might differ in their relativelevels of contentment with life versus their rel-ative frequency of experiencing positive andnegative mood states.

Determinants of the Chronic HappinessLevel

We focus on three primary types of factorsthat we believe causally affect the chronic hap-piness level, namely, the set point, life circum-stances, and intentional activity. We focus onthese three factors because they have histori-cally received the majority of attention in thewell-being literature, providing a substantial re-search base. We also focus on this three-factordistinction because it allows us to address sev-eral important issues and paradoxes, such as thequestion of whether it is even possible to “be-come happier” given strong genetic influenceson happiness, the question of why past well-being research has revealed such weak associ-ations between demographic/circumstantialvariables and happiness, and the question ofhow a person might appropriately take action to“pursue” happiness.

Figure 1 provides an illustration of the ap-

proximate percentage of the variance that eachof the three factors accounts for in cross-sec-tional well-being, as suggested by past research.As can be seen in the pie chart, existing evi-dence suggests that genetics account for approx-imately 50% of the population variation (Braun-gart et al., 1992; Lykken & Tellegen, 1996;Tellegen et al., 1988), and circumstances ac-count for approximately 10% (Argyle, 1999;Diener et al., 1999). This leaves as much as40% of the variance for intentional activity,supporting our proposal that volitional effortsoffer a promising possible route to longitudinalincreases in happiness. In other words, changingone’s intentional activities may provide a hap-piness-boosting potential that is at least as largeas, and probably much larger than, changingone’s circumstances. In the following, we pro-vide a definition of each factor, briefly considerwhether and how changing that factor can leadto changes in people’s chronic well-being, anddiscuss whether such changes may be sustain-able over the long term, that is, whether theforces of hedonic adaptation can be counter-acted by that factor.

Happiness Set Point

We assume that an individual’s chronic hap-piness level is in part determined by her or hisset point, which is defined as the central orexpected value within the person’s set range.The happiness set point is genetically deter-mined and is assumed to be fixed, stable overtime, and immune to influence or control. Con-sistent with this assumption, twin studies(Lykken & Tellegen, 1996; Tellegen et al.,1988), long-term panel studies (Headey &Wearing, 1989), and studies of the effects of lifeevents on well-being (Brickman et al., 1978) allindicate substantial long-term stability in hap-piness. For example, Lykken and Tellegen(1996) assessed well-being in twins at 20 yearsof age and then again at 30 years of age. Thetest–retest correlation was a considerable .50.Even more important, the cross-twin, cross-timecorrelation for the happiness of monozygotictwins was .40 (or 80% of the test–retest corre-lation), suggesting that the heritability of the“stable” component of happiness is approxi-mately .80. In contrast, the cross-twin, cross-time correlation for dizygotic twins was close tozero (.07). Other studies, although differing in

Figure 1. Three primary factors influencing the chronichappiness level.

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their estimates of heritability, have consistentlyshown that monozygotic twins exhibit consid-erably more similar patterns of happinesschange than do dizygotic twins, providing con-verging support that the variance in adult hap-piness is in large part determined genetically.

The set point probably reflects relatively im-mutable intrapersonal, temperamental, and af-fective personality traits, such as extraversion,arousability, and negative affectivity, that arerooted in neurobiology (e.g., Ashby, Isen, &Turken, 1999; Davidson, 1999; Depue & Col-lins, 1999; Gray, 1990; Kagan, 2003; Robinson,Emde, & Corley, 2001), are highly heritable(Tellegen et al., 1988), and change little overthe life span (McCrae & Costa, 1990). For ex-ample, Kagan has followed children from 4months to 11 years of age and shown that so-ciability in 11-year olds can be traced to aparticular type of infant temperament (called“low reactive”) that appears to involve a distinctneurochemical profile. Other writers, includingGray and Depue, have also compiled persuasiveevidence for the neurobiological underpinningsof personality. This rapidly growing body ofresearch supports the set point theory of person-ality and affect.

Implications of the Set Point forSustainable Increases in ChronicHappiness

The preceding analysis implies that one’schronic happiness during a particular life periodcan be increased, but not by changing one’s setpoint, because by definition it is constant. Inother words, although it is possible that futurescientists will learn how to alter people’s basictemperaments and dispositions, at present it ap-pears that focusing on the set point is not afruitful avenue for happiness increase. Again,however, one can posit that nongenetic factorsalso influence a person’s chronic happinesslevel, helping to determine whether the personfalls in the lower or upper portion of his or herpotential range at a particular time. The remain-ing variables in the model are designed to rep-resent these other factors.

Circumstances

This category consists of happiness-relevantcircumstantial factors, that is, the incidental but

relatively stable facts of an individual’s life.Happiness-relevant circumstances may includethe national, geographical, and cultural regionin which a person resides, as well as demo-graphic factors such as age, gender, and ethnic-ity (see Diener et al., 1999, for a review). Cir-cumstantial factors also include the individual’spersonal history, that is, life events that canaffect his or her happiness, such as having ex-perienced a childhood trauma, being involved inan automobile accident, or winning a presti-gious award. Finally, circumstantial factors in-clude life status variables such as marital status,occupational status, job security, income,health, and religious affiliation.

Again, previous cross-sectional research haslinked all of the circumstantial factors just de-scribed to subjective well-being (Diener et al.,1999). For example, empirical evidence showsthat people who are paid more are relativelyhappier (e.g., Diener, Sandvik, Seidlitz, & Die-ner, 1993) and that middle-class individuals aresomewhat happier than working-class individu-als (e.g., Warr & Payne, 1982). Married peopleare happier than those who are single, divorced,or widowed (e.g., Mastekaasa, 1994), even incultures as diverse as those of Belarus and Spain(Diener, Gohm, Suh, & Oishi, 2000). Findingsalso reveal that religiously committed peopleare relatively more likely to rate themselves as“very happy” (Gallup, 1984) and that, not sur-prisingly, healthy people, especially older ones,declare themselves to be slightly happier thansick people (e.g., Okun et al., 1984).

However, as suggested earlier, all circum-stances combined account for only 8% to 15%of the variance in happiness levels (Argyle,1999; Diener et al., 1999). These relativelyweak associations have been deemed surprisingand paradoxical, given well-being researchers’initial expectations that circumstantial factorssuch as income and physical health would bestrongly related to happiness (Diener et al.,1999). We believe that these counterintuitivelysmall effects can be largely accounted for byhedonic adaptation and the fact that peopleadapt rapidly to new circumstances and lifeevents. This appears to be the case becauseadaptation—whether it is sensory (e.g., to a foulodor or a heavy weight; Brown, 1953), physio-logical (e.g., to very hot or cold temperatures;Dar, Ariely, & Frank, 1995), or hedonic (e.g., toa salary raise; Brickman et al., 1978; Parducci,

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1995)—occurs in response to stimuli that areconstant or repeated. By definition, constancy isa feature of most circumstantial changes.

Implications of Circumstances forSustainable Increases in ChronicHappiness

Of the different types of circumstances, lifestatus variables in particular seem to offer somepotential for increasing chronic happiness, inthat individuals often have considerable controlover them. For example, a college footballplayer may sign a lucrative NFL contract, amiddle-aged divorcee may remarry, or a retiredcouple may move to Florida to a condominiumwith a view, all becoming happier as a result.Will such new happiness last, however? Per-haps not, because, as mentioned earlier, hedonicadaptation tends to shuttle people back to theirstarting point following any positive circum-stantial change. For example, Headey andWearing (1989) found in their four-wave panelstudy that positive and negative events (e.g.,“made lots of new friends,” “got married,” “ex-perienced serious problems with children,” or“became unemployed”) influenced life satisfac-tion, positive affect, and negative affect aswould be expected but that people kept return-ing to their original baselines. And Schkade andKahneman (1998) revealed that although “liv-ing in California” is a seductive notion formany, it does not actually make people anyhappier in the long run. Furthermore, Lucas,Clark, Georgellis, and Diener (2003) showedthat, for most people, the life satisfaction ben-efits derived from getting married tended to fadeover the years. Thus, although one may gain atemporary “boost” by moving to a new region,increasing one’s income level, or changingone’s appearance, such boosts will probably notlast, because people tend to adapt to constantcircumstances. Other reasons why circumstan-tial changes may prove ineffectual for perma-nently increasing happiness include the fact thatcircumstantial changes can be costly (e.g., interms of money, resources, and time) and, inmany cases, impractical or even impossible.Also, once a realistic “ceiling” of positive cir-cumstances is reached, it may be difficult toimprove matters further.

In short, the data suggest that changes incircumstances have limited potential for pro-

ducing sustainable changes in chronic happi-ness. Although this strategy may work in theshort term, it probably will not work in the longterm. Of course, if people have not achievedbasic subsistence and security, then it is logicalfor them to attend to these circumstances andbasic needs first, before focusing on maximiz-ing their happiness. However, we assume that,at best, satisfying basic needs can move peopleonly up to their set point, not beyond.

Intentional Activity

Now we turn to the third and arguably mostpromising means of altering one’s happinesslevel: intentional activity. This is a very broadcategory that includes the wide variety of thingsthat people do and think in their daily lives.Obviously, humans are very active creatures,with innumerable behaviors, projects, and con-cerns to which they devote energy. By “inten-tional,” we mean discrete actions or practices inwhich people can choose to engage (althoughthe choice to initiate the activity may have be-come habitual, as discussed in a later section).We also assume that intentional activities re-quire some degree of effort to enact. That is, theperson has to try to do the activity; it does nothappen by itself. Indeed, this point touches onone of the critical distinctions between the cat-egory of activity and the category of life cir-cumstances; that is, circumstances happen topeople, and activities are ways that people acton their circumstances.

There is good reason to believe that inten-tional activity can influence well-being. For ex-ample, some types of behavioral activity, suchas exercising regularly or trying to be kind toothers, are associated with well-being (e.g.,Keltner & Bonanno, 1997; Magen & Aharoni,1991), as are some types of cognitive activity,such as reframing situations in a more positivelight or pausing to count one’s blessings (Em-mons & McCullough, 2003; King, 2001; Selig-man, 1991), and some kinds of volitional activ-ity, such as striving for important personal goals(Sheldon & Houser-Marko, 2001) or devotingeffort to meaningful causes (M. Snyder &Omoto, 2001). Notably, it is impossible to fullyseparate behavioral, cognitive, and volitionalactivity; still, we believe the distinction is use-ful, and we continue to use it throughout thearticle.

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Implications of Intentional Activity forSustainable Increases in ChronicHappiness

Again, it appears that increasing one’s setpoint and changing one’s life circumstances arenot fruitful avenues for sustainable increases inchronic happiness. What, if anything, can pro-vide such an avenue? In the following, we arguethat intentional behavioral, cognitive, or voli-tional activity offers the best potential route.Some work has already investigated the impactof adopting new behaviors on longitudinal well-being, showing, for example, that faithfully en-gaging in a new exercise program positivelyboosts people’s mood and vitality and can evenmaintain the boosts for as long as 6 months(e.g., Ransford & Palisi, 1996; Stewart et al.,1997). Although little work has directly inves-tigated the longitudinal effects of changingone’s cognitive attitudes and practices on en-hanced well-being, the general success of cog-nitive–behavioral therapy in reducing suffering(Gloaguen et al., 1998) and recent work indi-cating positive effects of prompting people topractice positive psychological “virtues” suchas gratitude (Emmons & McCullough, 2003),hope (C. R. Snyder, Ilardi, Michael, & Cheav-ens, 2000), and forgiveness (McCullough et al.,2000) suggest that cognitive activity offersmany excellent possibilities for happiness inter-ventions (Fordyce, 1983).

Turning to the third type of intentional activ-ity, recent longitudinal studies have focusedspecifically on volitional activity as a producerof enhanced well-being (see Sheldon, 2002, fora review). In such studies, students are typicallyasked to pursue self-generated personal goalsover the course of a semester. High levels ofgoal progress or attainment consistently predictincreased well-being (i.e., higher positive affectand life satisfaction and lower negative mood)from the beginning to the end of the semester,whereas low levels of progress predict reducedwell-being (Brunstein, 1993; Sheldon, 2002).Specifically, Sheldon’s longitudinal research inthis area (Sheldon & Elliot, 1998, 1999; Shel-don & Kasser, 1995, 1998) has shown thatwell-being increases are most likely when aperson chooses and attains self-concordantgoals, that is, goals that “fit” the person (asdescribed subsequently). This work has also

highlighted one potential mediator from suc-cessful volitional activity to enhanced well-be-ing, namely, accumulations of positive dailyexperiences along the way. The question ofwhat other proximal factors may mediatechanges in chronic happiness is addressed inmore detail in a later section.

Notably, these studies do not extend beyond asingle span of time. Thus, they do not directlyaddress the crucial question raised by the cur-rent article: whether gains in well-being last.Although Headey and Wearing’s important(1989) work suggests that gains in happiness donot last, notably, their study focused only on lifeevents (“circumstances,” in our model) and didnot take intentional activity into direct account.

Recently, Sheldon and Houser-Marko (2001)addressed the question of sustainability by ex-amining the effects of goal attainment on emo-tional well-being over two consecutive semes-ters. Consistent with earlier studies, they foundthat students who attained their personal goalsduring the first semester of their freshman yearexperienced enhanced adjustment and emo-tional well-being at the end of that semester.More important, they found that students couldmaintain their enhanced level of well-being, butonly if they continued to do well at their goalsduring the second semester. In contrast, stu-dents who did well in the first semester but notin the second semester tended to regress back totheir original well-being levels. This study of-fers direct support for our assumption that hap-piness can be enhanced and then maintained atthe new level, especially when volitional activ-ity is effectively pursued over long periods oftime. Further supporting this conclusion, Shel-don and Lyubomirsky (2004) recently resur-veyed these participants 3 years after the origi-nal study and found that initially high-perform-ing students had maintained their earlier gainsin emotional well-being throughout their col-lege career.

But what about adaptation? Is it not the casethat even the most successful striver adapts tohis or her happy situation eventually? Moregenerally, is it not the case that people ulti-mately adapt to the positive effects of any ac-tivity in which they engage, whether it be be-havioral, cognitive, or volitional, so that theactivity loses its potency over time?

Although hedonic adaptation undoubtedlyconstrains the happiness-inducing effects of in-

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tentional activities, just as it does for circum-stances, this adaptation effect appears to beweaker in the case of activity, as shown byrecent data. For example, Sheldon and Ly-ubomirsky (2004) recently conducted severalshort-term longitudinal studies in which partic-ipants’ well-being (positive affect, negative af-fect, and life satisfaction) was measured atTime 1, and positive circumstantial and activ-ity-based life changes were measured at Time 2.Well-being was then measured twice more, atTimes 3 and 4. These investigators found con-sistent support for a path model, displayed inFigure 2, in which both positive circumstantialchange and positive activity change predictedenhanced life satisfaction and positive affect atTime 3, but only positive activity change pre-dicted maintained happiness gains at Time 4,with positive circumstantial change droppingout of the model. In other words, consistent withthe present model, only activity-based well-be-ing change lasted; circumstance-based happi-ness change did not.

In a separate study, Sheldon and Lyubomir-sky (2004) randomly assigned participants toreport on either activity-based positive changesor circumstantially based positive changes intheir lives. Relative to those in the circumstan-tial-change group, those in the activity-changegroup reported a weaker sense of “having gottenused to the change, such that it does not give thesame boost as before,” and more strongly en-dorsed the statement “the change is somethingthat varies over time, that is, something thatadds variety to my life.” These findings furthersupport the claim that activity changes are char-acterized by less hedonic adaptation than cir-cumstantial changes. Parenthetically, Sheldonand Lyubomirsky’s (2004) findings, taken as awhole, support the validity of our distinction

between circumstantial changes and activitychanges. Although the boundaries betweenthese categories can be fuzzy, apparently theyare clear enough to produce the predictedeffects.

Specific Advantages of Intentional Activity

What are the sources of the sustainable hap-piness gains afforded by intentional activity?We posit that activity-based change, unlike cir-cumstance-based change, has several desirablefeatures that may help to combat adaptation.

Intentional activity is episodic. One featureof activities is that they are, by definition, epi-sodic and transient; after all, people cannotspend all of their time doing one thing. This initself suggests that individuals may adapt lessreadily to new activities than to new circum-stances. The episodic nature of activity alsosuggests that an additional way to maximize theimpact of an activity is to attend to the timing ofthat activity. For example, a person mightchoose to “count her blessings” only after brav-ing a difficult period, or only when she is espe-cially needful of a boost. Suppose instead thatshe counts the same blessings every day, in anonvarying routine. This person may becomebored with the routine and cease to extractmeaning from it. The length of time before onereengages in a happiness-boosting activity is animportant part of its potency in the next appli-cation. By being mindful of the “refractory pe-riod” (Kalat, 2001) after which a recently per-formed activity regains its full happiness-induc-ing potential, individuals may maximize thebenefits of the activity over time and avoidreducing or eliminating the activity’s effective-ness through overuse. Thus, people shouldstrive to discover the optimal timing for eachactivity, that is, a frequency of engagement thatallows that activity to remain fresh, meaningful,and positive for a particular person.

Intentional activity can be varied. Anotherimportant parameter of behavioral, cognitive,and volitional activities is that people can con-tinually vary them, both in their foci and in theways they engage in them. This may help toreduce adaptation to the activity, allowing it toretain its potency (McAlister, 1982). Indeed, bydefinition, adaptation does not occur to stimulithat are variable or changeable but only to thosethat are constant or repeated (cf. Frederick &

Figure 2. Longitudinal path model predicting maintainedchanges in well-being from positive circumstantial changesand positive activity changes. Asterisks indicate p � .01.

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Loewenstein, 1999). For example, a scientistmay regularly ask new questions and becomeinvolved in new projects. In the process, sheoften feels the joy of making fascinating newdiscoveries and thus may remain particularlyhappy (i.e., at the upper end of her potentialrange) over a long period of time. If the personcounting her blessings varies the domains of lifein which she counts them (i.e., in relationships,in work, in her health, or in her most recentlysuccessful domain), then the strategy may re-main “fresh” and meaningful and work indefi-nitely. Supporting this notion, past researchsuggests that people tend to seek variety in theirbehavior (McAlister, 1982; Ratner, Kahn, &Kahneman, 1999), perhaps because change—inboth thoughts and actions—is innately pleasur-able and stimulating (Berlyne, 1970; Rolls etal., 1981).

Intentional activity can directly counteractadaptation. Yet another advantage of inten-tional activity is that it can directly tackle theproblem presented by adaptation. For example,the cognitive practice of pausing to savor thegood things in one’s life can directly counteractthe effects of hedonic adaptation to one’s con-stant circumstances by drawing attention to thefeatures that produced the initial happinessboost and helping to keep them from beingtaken for granted. As another example, prac-ticed meditators frequently report renewed ap-preciation of the ordinary as a result of theirintentional reencounters with the world.

The fact that intentional activity can directlycounteract adaptation and the hedonic treadmillhelps shed further light on the distinction be-tween life circumstances and intentional activi-ties. Obviously, many personal characteristicsare both. For example, “being married” and“being a student” both denote demographic sta-tus, yet they also reflect particular sorts of ac-tivities. From our perspective, the crucial dis-tinction with respect to well-being is whetherone exerts intentional effort with respect to thecircumstantial category, that is, whether oneacts upon the circumstance (e.g., using inten-tional practices to keep the circumstance“fresh”). For example, an individual can engagein a number of intentional activities with respectto the circumstantial category “marriage”: Ahusband can have the goal of making his mar-riage work (a volitional activity), he can makethe effort to appreciate his wife’s positive qual-

ities (an attitudinal activity), and he can try toremember to bring her flowers (a behavioralactivity). A person who performs these activi-ties would probably best counteract adaptationto this particular circumstance and derive themost benefit from it. In contrast, consider ahusband who is not intentionally engaged in hismarriage; for him, this demographic circum-stance would essentially become a backgroundfactor, to which adaptation is very likely.

For all of these reasons, intentional activityappears to offer the best prospects for increasingand sustaining happiness. Of course, followingthrough on new intentions, such as the ubiqui-tous “New Year’s resolutions,” is not necessar-ily easy (Sheldon & Elliot, 1998). Indeed, weassume that happiness-increasing strategies canbe initiated and effectively pursued only withconcerted, consistent commitment and effort.Still, activity-based factors are, by definition,under greater potential control by the individualthan are genetic, demographic, and most lifestatus factors. In other words, if anything can doit, intentional activity can.

Implementing Happiness-IncreasingStrategies

In this section, we briefly consider severalimportant issues pertaining to how intentionalactivity might be used for increasing happi-ness. In other words, having established thatactivity can potentially sustainably elevatehappiness, how might one put this potential towork? We discuss these strategic issues inroughly chronological order, proceeding fromthe question of how to choose a particularhappiness-boosting activity to the question ofhow such activity may be initiated and thequestion of how the activity can be main-tained over time to produce a sustained in-crease in the chronic level of happiness. In theprocess, we discuss the issue of person–strat-egy fit, the meaning and nature of effort, thedefinition and role of habits, and the impact ofshort-term versus long-term considerations.

Choosing an Activity: The Role ofPerson–Activity Fit

Any one particular activity will not help ev-ery person become happier. People have endur-

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ing strengths, interests, values, and inclinationsthat undoubtedly predispose them to benefitmore from some strategies than others. For ex-ample, extraverts may benefit most from activ-ities that bring them into regular contact withother people, and people high in nurturancemotivation may benefit most from activities thatafford them opportunities to take care of others.This general “matching” hypothesis (Harack-iewicz & Sansone, 1991) is supported by muchrecent work showing that the positive effects ofgoal attainment on well-being are moderated bygoal–person fit (Brunstein et al., 1998; Diener &Fujita, 1995; Sheldon & Elliot, 1999; Sheldon& Kasser, 1998). It is also supported by pastwell-being intervention research. For example,in several studies that instructed participants toapply 14 different techniques to increase theirpersonal happiness, the particular techniquesconsidered most effective for raising happinessvaried greatly from one individual to anotherand appeared to be determined by each partici-pant’s needs and areas of specific weakness(Fordyce, 1977, 1983).

The fit of an activity with a person might beconceptualized in a variety of ways, for exam-ple, with respect to individuals’ motive dispo-sitions, basic needs, core values, signaturestrengths, personal resources, hedonic profiles,or other individual-difference characteristics.There are also a variety of ways that fit might beoperationalized, such as in terms of self-re-ported fit, in terms of consistency between im-plicit and explicit measures of activity-relevantmotives, or in terms of informant-rated person–activity fit. Another approach is to assume thatcertain kinds of experiences are likely to bebeneficial to anyone, because these experiencesreflect universal psychological needs. From thispoint of view, any activity that provides certainexperiences, such as those involving belonging-ness (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), self-efficacy(Bandura, 1997), or autonomy (Deci & Ryan,2000), might be assumed to “fit” the person, apriori.

Role of Effort

Initiating an activity. We assume that en-gaging in an activity requires at least two dif-ferent kinds of effort: first, the effort required toinitiate the activity and, second, the effort re-quired to actually carry out and maintain the

activity. This distinction is necessary because itis clear that many activities have definite posi-tive effects if the person can only get starteddoing them. For example, exercising in themorning, making time to work on at least oneimportant project during the day, or pausing tocount one’s blessings at the end of the day canhave significant benefits, but only if the personcan “get over the hurdle” of remembering to dothem and overcoming any obstacles to initiatingthem. Obviously, those who do not implementtheir activity intentions stand a worse chance ofbenefiting from them than those who do! Weassume that this kind of self-regulatory effortrequires considerable self-discipline and will-power. Furthermore, such effort may constitutea limited resource, one that must be marshaledcarefully; in Muraven and Baumeister’s (2000)terms, self-regulatory will is like a “muscle”that has limited capacity in a given unit of timeand must be used strategically to avoid fatigue.

If this analogy is accurate, then it seemslogical that some people develop the muscle toa greater extent than others, thus attaining agreater ability to “get started” on their intentionsand gaining greater happiness potential. Ofcourse, some activities will appear intrinsicallymore appealing and will be easier to jumpstart;this is undoubtedly one advantage of selectingan activity that fits one’s personality. For exam-ple, rather than running on a track, a fitness-seeking wilderness lover might instead chooseto run on a trail through the woods, therebyfeeling much less initial resistance to beginningthe activity. As another example, rather thanlearning classical pieces, a jazz-loving pianostudent might instead choose to work on jazzstandards, enhancing the intrinsic appeal of sit-ting down to practice.

Maintaining an activity. This brings us tothe second type of effort. Obviously, if a par-ticular activity is to yield sustained happinesschange, the person must keep performing theactivity over the long term. For many effectivehappiness-enhancing activities, this will not bedifficult, because the task will probably be in-herently interesting or rewarding and thus willbe “autotelic” in nature (Deci & Ryan, 2000),that is, self-reinforcing and self-sustaining. Thisis especially true to the extent that the personcontinually varies what he or she does. If, forexample, a person shifts attention among sev-eral projects at work, explores new trails in the

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state park, or seeks out interesting new pianopieces, his or her activities should remain intrin-sically enjoyable and conducive to many reward-ing “flow” experiences (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990).

What if the activity is not enjoyable and thusdifficult to maintain? In this case, stopping theactivity may not be problematic, because itprobably is not working anyway. By emphasiz-ing the importance of enjoying one’s intentionalactivity, however, we do not mean to imply thatpeople should seek out only “fun” activities.Sometimes choosing to endure boring or evenaversive experiences in the short term can haveconsiderable positive effects on chronic happi-ness in the long term; for example, studying foran important exam in a tedious but requiredclass may well represent an excellent invest-ment in one’s future chronic happiness, eventhough it may detract from one’s momentaryhappiness. As another example, a naval officercandidate is paying a short-term cost (bootcamp) to receive a longer term benefit (a careeras an officer).

Of note, self-determination theory (Deci &Ryan, 2000; Sheldon, Joiner, & Williams,2003) posits that the crucial factor in such casesis whether the person has internalized the non-enjoyable activity, that is, whether he or she isable to find meaning and value expression in it,even if it is not pleasant to perform. From thisperspective, the naval officer candidate wouldpay a smaller short-term cost if he could un-dergo boot camp thinking that “this is importantand valuable” rather than thinking that “this isunnecessary and stupid.” The question of whenand how to sacrifice short-term happiness inexchange for longer term happiness is an im-portant one, as is the question of how to pro-mote internalization of important happiness-rel-evant activities that are not intrinsically enjoy-able. These questions represent promisingdirections for future research.

Role of Habitual Activity

If activities such as “looking on the brightside,” “making time for the things that matter,”and “working on an important life goal” make adifference for happiness, then it seems it wouldbe a good idea to make a habit of doing them.However, on the surface, habits appear topresent a conundrum for our model. Is it not thecase that acquiring a habit means that one has

turned a formerly conscious activity into anunconscious routine, practiced automaticallyand without variation? If so, is it not the casethat one is especially likely to experience hedo-nic adaptation to that activity, such that it losesits happiness-boosting potential?

We think not. However, to illustrate, we mustfirst distinguish between the habit of regularlyinitiating a potentially beneficial activity andthe habit of implementing it the same way everytime (the two types of effort mentioned earlier).We assume that hedonic adaptation occurs onlywith respect to particular experiences, and notwith respect to the decisions that give rise tothose experiences. Thus, making a habit out ofdeciding to initiate an activity is not problem-atic but may instead help people to keep getting“over the hump.” For example, a woman mightmake running an automatic part of her dailyroutine, such that she does not even have tomake the decision of whether or not to run eachday, thus deriving considerable benefit. What ispotentially problematic is when people make ahabit out of how they implement the activity.When this happens, the flow of experiencesproduced by such a habit is likely to remainrelatively constant, and thus, adaptation is likelyto have the most pernicious effects. To over-come this, as suggested earlier, people shouldmindfully attend to optimal timing and varietyin the ways they practice an activity. For exam-ple, the woman might want to vary the route,time of day, and speed of her running. This willhelp forestall the effects of adaptation.

Extensions and Further Questions

Now that we have presented our basic con-ceptual model of sustainable changes in happi-ness, we briefly consider a variety of additionalissues that extend beyond this basic model.What are the key ingredients of particular ac-tivities that lead a person to a higher level ofwell-being? Although this question is somewhatperipheral to our model, it merits brief discus-sion. We assume that happiness increases comefrom at least two sources that are described,respectively, by bottom-up and top-down theo-ries of well-being (Diener, 1994). Bottom-uptheories postulate that people make global well-being judgments in part with reference to emo-tions associated with their recent experiences(Kahneman, 1999). If they can recall a large

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number of recent affectively positive experi-ences, then they report being very happy (seeSheldon & Elliot, 1999, for supporting data).Studies have produced support for this bot-tom-up perspective by showing that accumula-tions of need-satisfying daily experiences overtime (such as competence, relatedness, and au-tonomy; Deci & Ryan, 2000) lead to enhancedglobal well-being at the end of that time (Reis,Sheldon, Ryan, Gable, & Roscoe, 2000; Shel-don, Ryan, & Reis, 1996). Furthermore, Shel-don and Lyubomirsky (2004) found, in theircomparison of the sustained effects of circum-stantial changes and activity changes onchanges in well-being among students, that themore enduring activity-based effects on happi-ness were mediated by the greater feelings ofcompetence and relatedness associated with ac-tivity changes during the semester.

But what about when people say they arehappy despite having had recent negative emo-tional experiences? Although bottom-up theo-ries cannot account for this, top-down theoriescan. According to such models, well-beingjudgments are in part determined by global at-titudinal or meaning-based factors. Thus, a per-son who “suffers for a cause” might still feelvery happy because her suffering demonstratesher commitment to, and also perhaps moves hercloser to obtaining, an important life goal. Asanother example, a man who has a bad day atwork might still report being very happy thatnight, because of a short but meaningful visitfrom his grandchildren that evening that helpedhim to reframe the day. Again, we believe thatintentional activity can lead to new well-beingby both top-down and bottom-up routes, that is,both via accumulations of small positive expe-riences and via a sense of global meaning andpurpose.

Preliminary Data: Happiness Interventions

The model of sustainable happiness that wehave proposed has clear implications for how todesign interventions for increasing happiness.Before describing these, we first discuss someof the few happiness intervention studies thathave been conducted, to show their general con-sistency with our approach. As noted earlier,Fordyce (1977, 1983) conducted several happi-ness intervention studies in which he taught 14happiness-relevant strategies to students as part

of their coursework. All of the strategies fit intoone or more of the three categories of activityoutlined earlier: behavioral (e.g., “spend moretime socializing”), cognitive (e.g., “becomepresent oriented”), and volitional (e.g., “get bet-ter organized and plan things out”). Consistentwith our conceptual model, Fordyce found thatthe strategies worked; that is, a significant maineffect of participation was found for the exper-imental conditions. Again, intentional activitycan successfully increase happiness. Also con-sistent with our model, he found that somestrategies worked better than others and, in ad-dition, that person–strategy fit had a moderatingeffect on strategy effectiveness.

More recently, Sheldon and colleagues(2002) conducted an intervention study basedon participants’ personal goals. Early in thesemester, they taught experimental participantsa set of four strategies for enhancing their ex-perience and attainment of their personal goals:“own the goal,” “make it fun,” “keep a bal-ance,” and “remember the big picture.” Consis-tent with the studies cited earlier, goal attain-ment predicted increases in well-being at theend of the semester. Interestingly, there was nomain effect of experimental condition on in-creased well-being or goal attainment. Instead, asignificant interaction was observed, such thatonly participants whose goals “fit” their inter-ests and values benefited from the intervention.In other words, those with self-concordant goalswho received the intervention evidenced thegreatest goal attainment and, thus, the greatestincrease in well-being. In addition to demon-strating that happiness-boosting interventionscan work for at least some people, this findingprovides further support for our proposition thatthe fit of the activity to the person makes adifference.

Obviously, much future work remains to bedone regarding happiness-increasing interven-tions, particularly research that explicitly ma-nipulates the various factors in our model. As apreliminary test, Lyubomirsky, Tkach, andSheldon (2004) recently conducted two 6-weekhappiness-enhancing interventions based in be-havioral and cognitive–attitudinal change.Drawing on promising interventions groundedin the positive psychology tradition—that is,focused on building positive affect and personalstrengths rather than on reducing or coping withnegative affect, pathology, or weakness—they

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used two diverse strategies (one cognitive andone social behavioral) to serve as initial exis-tence proofs of our conceptual model. To thisend, experimental participants were promptedto perform kind acts or to pause and “count theirblessings.”

The strategy of committing acts of kindnesswas expected, on the basis of previous theoryand research, to boost temporary moods andlong-lasting well-being. For example, individu-als who report a greater interest in helping oth-ers, an inclination to act in a prosocial manner,or intentions to perform altruistic or courteousbehaviors are more likely to rate themselves asdispositionally happy (see Lyubomirsky, King,& Diener, 2004, for a review). We assume thatacts of kindness and generosity can boost hap-piness in a variety of ways. Such acts may fostera charitable perception of others and one’s com-munity, an increased sense of cooperation andinterdependence, and an awareness of one’sgood fortune. In addition, people who commitacts of kindness may begin to view themselvesas altruistic people, as well as to feel moreconfident, efficacious, in control, and optimisticabout their ability to help. Furthermore, acts ofgenerosity can inspire greater liking by others,along with appreciation, gratitude, and proso-cial reciprocity (Trivers, 1971), all of which arevaluable in times of stress and need. Finally,kind behaviors may help satisfy a basic humanneed for relatedness (Baumeister & Leary,1995), thereby contributing to increasedhappiness.

Thus, in their first intervention, Lyubomir-sky, Tkach, and Sheldon (2004) asked studentsto perform five acts of kindness per week overthe course of 6 weeks, either all five acts in 1day or five acts spread over the week. Such actswere described as behaviors that benefit otherpeople or make others happy, usually at somecost to oneself (e.g., donating blood, helping afriend with a paper, visiting an elderly relative,or writing a thank-you note to a former profes-sor). A no-treatment control group simply com-pleted measures of well-being immediately be-fore the intervention and immediately after. Theresults, displayed in the top panel of Figure 3,provided preliminary evidence that a short-termhappiness-enhancing activity can increase well-being. Furthermore, supporting our model’spredictions, Lyubomirsky et al. found that op-timal timing was critical. Whereas control par-

ticipants experienced a reduction in happinessover the course of the 6-week period, partici-pants who committed acts of kindness experi-enced a significant increase in well-being, butthis increase was evident only among those whoshowed their weekly generosity all in a singleday. Because many of the kind acts that studentsperformed were small ones, spreading themover the course of a week might have dimin-ished their salience and power or made themless distinguishable from participants’ habitualkind behavior.

The second intervention tested a cognitivehappiness-increasing activity. Recently, Em-mons and McCullough (2003) found that prac-ticing grateful thinking on a regular basis canenhance concurrent well-being. Gratitude pro-motes the savoring of positive life experiencesand situations so that maximum satisfaction andenjoyment are distilled from one’s circum-stances. As noted earlier, this practice may di-rectly counteract the effects of hedonic adapta-tion by helping people extract as much appre-ciation from the good things in their lives aspossible. In addition, the ability to appreciatetheir life circumstances may also be an adaptive

Figure 3. Changes in well-being over the course of two6-week interventions: performing acts of kindness (top) andcounting one’s blessings (bottom).

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coping strategy by which people positively re-interpret stressful or negative life experiences,bolster coping resources, and strengthen socialrelationships. Finally, the practice of gratitudeappears to be incompatible with negative emo-tions and thus may reduce feelings of envy,anger, or greed.

Thus, in the second 6-week intervention, stu-dents were instructed to contemplate “the thingsfor which they are grateful” either once a weekor three times a week. Examples of “blessings”listed by students included “a healthy body,”“my mom,” and “AOL instant messenger.”Control participants completed only the happi-ness assessments. The results again suggestedthat short-term increases in happiness are pos-sible and, furthermore, that optimal timing isimportant. In summary, students who regularlyexpressed gratitude showed increases in well-being over the course of the study relative tocontrols, but these increases were observed onlyamong students who performed the activity justonce a week (see Figure 3, bottom panel). Per-haps counting their blessings several times aweek led people to become bored with the prac-tice, finding it less fresh and meaningful overtime.

Although the results of these two interven-tions are encouraging, they notably did not testthe sustainability of the well-being increases forthe experimental groups (i.e., “kindness” and“blessings”) and did not examine the impact ofkey moderators of activity effects. In the future,in addition to assessing the efficacy of differentactivities for producing sustainable increases inwell-being, we will investigate the effects ofsuch potential moderators as fit, effectiveness,timing, variety, cultural membership, socialsupport, and the habits associated with theactivity.

What are the most general recommendationsfor increasing happiness suggested by ourmodel? Simply, happiness seekers might be ad-vised to find new activities to become engagedin, preferably activities that fit their values andinterests. They should make a habit out of ini-tiating the activity while at the same time vary-ing their focus and timing in terms of the waythey implement the activity. People might beadvised to avoid basing their happiness on theacquisition of particular circumstances or ob-jects (e.g., buying a luxury car or moving toCalifornia), because they will tend to habituate

to such stable factors. Again, however, one candeter, or at least delay, such adaptation to pos-itive circumstantial changes by engaging in in-tentional effort and activity with respect tothem. That is, if one can remember to appreciateor actively engage with the object or circum-stance (i.e., pause to savor the new Mercedes ortake advantage of the California weather), thenstable objects and circumstances may not bestable after all, from a phenomenological per-spective. Thus, it remains the case that only lifechanges involving intentional activity can beexpected to lead to sustainable changes inwell-being.

Conclusion

If it is meaningful and important to pursuehappiness, then it is crucial to find out how thiscan be accomplished. To what extent, and how,can people succeed in making themselves hap-pier? In this article, we have attempted to inte-grate what is known about happiness change,especially longitudinal variations in well-being,into a single summary model. The model en-compasses a wide variety of findings and sug-gests a number of new directions for research.More than two centuries have passed since the“pursuit of happiness” was proclaimed as a di-vinely ordained human right. We believe it isfinally time for the issue of sustainable well-being to be given the scientific attention that itdeserves.

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Received September 25, 2004Accepted September 28, 2004 �

131SPECIAL ISSUE: ARCHITECTURE OF SUSTAINABLE HAPPINESS