Crime Prevention and coping mechanisms in

Neighbourhoods: Insights from Kibera, Nairobi.

Louise Skilling and Colin Rogers

University of South Wales.

Abstract

Kenya’s capital, Nairobi is known to have one of the highest crime rates in Africa (World

Bank, 2011). The crime situation in Kenya is exacerbated by high rates of poverty and an

alleged ineffective, corrupt and under resourced police force (UNODC, 2005).Further, it is

recognised that the lower-income population of Nairobi are disproportionately affected by

crime and are at particular risk from robbery, theft, burglary and sexual violence (OECD,

2011; World Bank 2011; MapKibera, 2010; SRIC, 2014).

This article considers one area of Nairobi, a settlement called Kibera, and explores the

community’s attempts to prevent particular crimes. It discusses the coping mechanisms,

crime prevention strategies, and methods of informal social control that residents believe

regulates deviance (Reiner, 2000). The paper concludes by arguing that the mobile banking

facility, M-PESA provides lower income populations in Nairobi with a crime prevention tool

that removes the ‘cash reward’ (Clarke, 1997) that offenders are primarily targeting victims

for in Kibera, whilst other forms of crime preventing attempts appear to assist overall in

controlling criminality.

Key Words. Crime Prevention; Africa; Coping Mechanisms.

Introduction

The concept of community safety and crime prevention in the western world is well

established (see Rogers, 2012: Clarke, 1997; Hughes, 1998). It is now embedded in Acts of

Parliament such as the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 in England and Wales and has spawned

a security industry in most countries that provide target hardening devices for domestic and

business premises. Evaluation of such initiatives provides in the main positive results for the

reduction of crimes and also community satisfaction. The idea of community cohesion and

community mobilisation is similarly well developed and social crime prevention activities are

encouraged and well reported. (See for example Halpern, 2007: Home Office 2005)

However, the question arises as to how this type of approach to dealing with criminality

manifests itself in countries that are not perhaps as advanced in terms of social cohesion and

suffer from high unemployment and a lack of social support and government administration.

One such area is a township called Kibera, situated in Nairobi, Kenya.

Kenya

Kenya is located in East Africa and borders the countries of Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan,

Tanzania, Uganda and has a coast line of 536km with the Indian Ocean. The country is made

up of 47 different counties and its capital city is Nairobi. Kenya has a population of 40

million people of which 40% are unemployed and 45.5% live below the poverty line. The

population of Nairobi is three and half million and of this population 60% live in informal

settlements (UNHABITAT, 2011). Those that reside in informal settlements in Nairobi have

an average monthly household income between Khs 10-20,000 (£70-£140) and

approximately half of this income is used to pay rent (UNHCR & DRC, 2012). Nairobi has a

very transient population, this is reflected by 80% of Nairobi’s population residing in rented

accommodation (Anyanba, 2014).

There are 70 distinct ethnic groups in Kenya but the five largest groups make up 70% of the

population, these are the Kikuyu (22%), Luhya (14%), Luo (13%), Kalenjin (12%) and the

Kamba (11%). Kenya’s ethnic diversity and interethnic rivalries have been blamed for mass

violence, particularly around elections (CIA, 2014). Following the December 2007 elections

there were accusations of vote rigging which triggered months of post-election violence,

resulting in over 1300 people being killed (Tranchant, 2013).

Crime in Kenya

Everyday crime and violence in Kenya is predominantly concentrated in the capital, Nairobi

and other urban centres (Francis and Nyamongo, 2008) and it is acknowledged that the poor

are disproportionately affected by crime and violence (OECD, 2011). In 2012 The Kenya

National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) recorded the most common crime reported to the police

in Nairobi as theft (Republic of Kenya. Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2012a). The

World Bank’s (2011) study had similar findings, they found robbery and assault were the

most common types of crimes committed in Nairobi with the majority of offenders being

male.

The majority of violence that occurs in Nairobi takes place within the informal settlements.

Oxfam (2009) found that up to two thirds of the population residing in informal settlements

in Nairobi reported that they do not feel safe. A study on crime in urban slums in Kenya

found that 98.8% of respondents had witnessed crime being committed in the last three

months of the study period. The main crimes noted during this time were robbery, theft and

burglary (SRIC, 2014), with young males being the main perpetrators of crime (World Bank,

2011). Between 2007 and 2012 85% of crimes reported in Kenya were committed by males

(Republic of Kenya. Kenya National Bureau Statistics, 2012a). Notwithstanding the well-

known problems associated with the use of official statistics, as a barometer of crime,

acquisitive crime seems to predominate.

Residents of informal settlements in Nairobi have increased concerns about security and

attribute this to a lack of police stations and an absence of law enforcement. Due to the high

crime rates in the country there is a need for strong law enforcement but the police force are

poorly equipped, inadequately trained, underpaid and often corrupt so communities are

reluctant to rely on them for protection (UNODC, 2005). Ruteere et al. (2013) provide four

main explanations for the high rate of crime in Nairobi, failings in law and order, political

disorder, unemployment and poverty, and inequality.

Kibera

The informal settlement of Kibera (see figure 1 and 2) emerged in 1912 when a group of

former soldiers from the Nubian community were granted temporary rights to settle on a

small area of forest in Nairobi, this is where its name originates from, in Nubian language

Kibera means forest. Over time Kibera became inhabited by more people from different

tribes, transforming it from a forest to an informal settlement that is densely populated,

covering 2.5 kilometres squared, which is located five kilometres from the city centre. In

2015 and 2016 Kibera was dominated by the Luo tribe but all the major Kenyan ethnic

groups were represented. After the post-election violence in 2007/8 some residents chose to

move to live in the same area as people from their tribe, this resulted in some parts of Kibera

being ethnically concentrated.

There have been inconsistencies over the population size of Kibera, with estimates have

varying from around one million to 200,000, with 200,000 being the latest government

statistics gathered from the 2009 census (Republic of Kenya. Kenya National Bureau of

Statistics, 2010). Utilising mapping techniques seems to confirm this figure more or less as

being between 220,000 and 250,000 when MapKibera estimated the population in 2009 using

mapping techniques (MapKibera, 2010). Even though an accurate population figure is not

known, it is clear that Kenya is facing rapid urbanisation which will lead to a significant

growth in informal settlements. Urbanisation in Kenya is a result of population growth as

well as rural-urban migration and Kibera is made up of a lower-income, transient population.

A high proportion of these are youths with the majority being unemployed. Those that work

are usually engaged in casual work or labour and are expected to earn money and ‘send it

home’ to their family in the rural areas of Kenya (UN HABITAT, 2007). Figure 1 below

illustrates the area of Kibera.

Figure 1 Photographic map of Kibera.

Source: Google Maps 2016

The context of crime in Kibera

This research, like previous studies (SRIC, 2014; MapKibera, 2010; World Bank, 2011)

identified there was a significantly high rate of robbery, theft, Sexual and Gender Based

Violence (SGBV) and burglary within Kibera. Robberies are more likely to occur during the

night or early hours of the morning, apart from the village of Soweto East where robberies

occur at any time. Residents walking out of Kibera in the early hours of the morning (around

4am) are usually on their way to the market to buy items from the suppliers and robbers know

these individuals will be carrying cash. Rates of robbery incidents increase over Friday and

Saturdays, when it is known casual workers and labourers receive their weekly wage. This

was also similar to the findings of the research conducted by MapKibera (2010).

A small local health facility in Mashimoni village, Lani Saba ward (located in the north east

of Kibera) treats at least two victims of robbery a night who have sustained cuts or stab

wounds caused by pangas (machetes) or knives. The number of robbery victims treated by

this small health facility demonstrates the high rate of robberies that are occurring in a small

area of Kibera on a daily basis. It is important to note that these figures only take into account

victims who required medical treatment after a robbery and were in close proximity to the

small health facility located in Mashimoni village. Staff at the health facility stated that

robbery victims who sought medical attention are never in a position to pay for their

treatment because their money has always been stolen. Targeting victims when they are most

likely to be in possession of cash would strongly suggest that perpetrators were motivated for

the ‘reward’ of cash.

Prevention Discussion

Crime prevention strategies frequently involve the mobilisation of community members to

participate actively in planning and implementing prevention strategies. Community

mobilisation involves both community members and those from outside the community to

help solve local problems. Resource mobilisation is concerned with the transfer of economic

resources it empowers local communities to develop.

Economic freedom enables the formation of trust and the emergence of tied social networks,

what Putnam (2002) referred to as ‘bridging social capital- that are essential for robust long-

term economic development. It assists in bolstering the willingness of people to trust, so that

markets and street retail are not placeless phenomena but lie at the heart of economic

development (Daisuke et al., 2012).

In terms of the approaches discussed in this article, the main concepts revolve around two of

Clarke’s (1997) typology of crime prevention activities, namely denying benefits to offenders

and target hardening. Target hardening involves reducing criminal activity through the use of

physical barriers such as locks, screens, safes etc. thus denying access for would be criminals.

Denying benefits includes the use of devices to reduce any benefits for the criminal in

carrying out the criminal act. Therefore such technology as the use of PIN numbers on mobile

devises denies any benefit from its theft if the thief cannot access the device.

Methodology

This article uses data gathered from key informant interviews in 2015 and a qualitative study,

conducted between January and June 2015 with residents from Sarang’ombe (north-west) and

Lani Saba Ward1 (north-east) of Kibera. The study involved in-depth interviews, Focus

Groups Discussions (FGD) and the diary method. The diary method was used as an approach

for gathering crime incidents not linked to official statistics. In Kenya, there are large

discrepancies between official crime statistics and actual crime that occurs, far more than in

developed western countries. A lack of trust in the police and justice system results in a

reluctance to report crimes and those crimes that are reported to the police are not always 1 Kibera is made up of 14 villages which are grouped into administrative wards.

recorded (McEvoy, 2012; Ngunyi & Katumanga, 2012). Informal community settlements

within Nairobi have the highest rates of crime but they have the lowest police presence,

highlighting further challenges for residents of informal settlements to report offences (World

Bank, 2011).

As recognised by Ruteere et al (2013) beyond official crime statistics, which are inaccurate

and unreliable, there is minimal data on crimes that are being committed in Nairobi’s lower-

income neighbourhoods. Therefore in order to understand the crime situation occurring in

Kibera at the time of the research, a trusted resident from each village within Sarang’ombe

(two males and two females) and Lani Saba Ward (two males and two female) were asked to

keep a diary and record known crimes within their village over a period of a week. Gray et al.

(2011) believe an advantage of using a diary method reduces the potential for recall errors

when you compare it to an individual being interviewed a period of time after events occur.

It is recognised the incidents recorded in the dairies may not be completely accurate as the

residents were not present in their village for the whole time during the reporting period.

Some were only present during the night time as they worked elsewhere during the day.

Therefore all incidents that actually occurred during the recording period are unlikely to have

been recorded in the diary. However, the incidents that were recorded by residents were

triangulated through interviews with police officers located at the nearby police posts and

through attending weekly meetings with elders representing all villages within Kibera who

provided an update on incidents and issues that were relevant to their village. This provided

an informed understanding of what crime was occurring in Kibera at the time of the study.

Despite the problems associated with this method, such as reliability upon a third party to be

objective in the reporting process, this approach actually strengthened the research process

owing to the problems with non-reporting of crimes to the police.

Findings

Protection Mechanisms

Residents adopt protection strategies to reduce the risk of becoming a victim of robbery, theft

or burglary. One option is to pay members of protection rackets or vigilante groups to protect

your business or to act as an escorts for pedestrians walking through Kibera at night.

Residents know there is a high probability they will be mugged when walking through

Kibera, particularly when it is dark and if offenders believe they have cash or items worth

stealing that could be sold for cash. The layout of Kibera mean that pedestrians are forced to

walk through the dense labyrinth of interconnecting paths within the informal settlement,

which facilitates a favourable environment for robbers to easily target victims with the

knowledge they were unlikely to get caught (Coleman and Moynihan, 1996).

An alternative collective protection mechanism is to walk in groups, with the rational there is

‘safety in numbers’ and as a group you will hopefully be considered a less suitable target.

However, this is not always a deterrent to offenders, especially when they have weapons.

Keeping a weapon in your home is another method used by residents of Kibera but there are

mixed opinions about whether neighbours would intervene when a robbery was taking place.

Members of the community are more likely to respond to an incident if there are others

responding.

It is apparent collective violence is used as a method of informal social control against

thieves.

This is likely due to the significant security gap within Kibera and cynicism towards the law

and justice system amongst residents. The sociologist Donald Black (1976) recognised when

the law is weak or absent other means of social control can arise, such as collective violence.

Instead of a protracted process that is not trusted, residents feel they have limited options to

deal with criminals and prefer instant justice. Mob justice is a common occurrence in Kenya

but particularly within informal settlements. As one resident from Kibera put it “mob justice

is very common, it’s how people deal with insecurity”. A common form of punishment

delivered during mob justice is known as ‘necklacing’, this involves “beat[ing] them up, put

a tyre [around them] and paraffin and burn him”.

Self-protection mechanisms vary depending on age, elders discussed returning home early to

reduce their risk of victimisation but acknowledging “… if they [criminals] know you have

something, they could come to your house”. Some younger residents took the approach of

‘be-friending’ known offenders but a strategy used by all individuals, irrespective of age or

sex was to pretend not to see an incident, you “look the other way” or “… stay mum” for your

own safety.

Target Hardening

The doors to dwellings in Kibera are usually secured with a small padlock. Where dwellings

have gates to a communal entrance, a padlock can be used to lock the gate but many had been

vandalised during the post-election violence and residents have not replaced them. Placing a

padlock on the door to the dwelling prevents opportunist burglars but would not prevent a

forced entry.

Considering the majority of residents in Kibera reside in flimsy structures (most are shacks) it

is not worthwhile or cost effective to invest in target hardening any more substantial than a

padlock on the entry door to the dwelling. It is therefore understandable why people are

concerned about keeping money in their dwellings as there is a high probability of it being

stolen or destroyed. In addition to this, many people ‘house-share’ to reduce costs, and can

therefore lack control on who has access to the dwelling. A few elders spoke of how their

grandchildren had stolen their ‘home bank’ from within their home. Fire is also a significant

risk within the informal settlement due to the illegal electricity connections, faulty wiring and

close layout of the structures. Residents are aware of these risks and for these reasons prefer

not to keep valuable items within their dwellings.

An area of Kibera called Soweto East is known to be very dangerous, when walking through

the area during the day or night there is a high risk of being robbed or raped. A river cuts

across Soweto East, which means there is only one path you can take to use the bridge to

cross the river. Offenders know that people walking through the area have to use the bridge

and as it is a choke point it is an ideal spot to target pedestrians “you have to take the bridge,

because it’s the only path and you fear being thrown off the bridge into the river”. Power cuts

occur frequently in the area, the dark is advantageous for offenders because they are not

noticed before an incident or identified during an attack.

During the eight nights when crime was recorded in the village of Soweto East (the recorder

was away working during the day), robberies occurred every evening apart from the nights

when there was torrential rain, which caused flooding to the extent crossing the area required

wadding through water up to your waist. During the six nights when robberies occurred there

were a total of 20 robbery victims just within the village of Soweto East and three of these

individuals were also victims of attempted rape. The attempted rapes were intervened by the

community volunteer patrol group from Soweto East.

On a Saturday evening, when it was known casual labourers had been paid the following

incident was recorded by a resident in Soweto East who could observe the bridge from her

house.

“It was like an operation, I had just arrived in the house when it started. Whoever passed over the bridge was searched, the victims were men, women, even old women. The only way to pass was over the bridge and it was as if the offenders knew people had money they were carrying guns, knives and a strong cane and threatened victims to hand over everything they had. They operated in full force to scare the volunteers. It’s true the volunteers feared them because of the guns and they all ran away … they were shooting up in the air to warn off the volunteers to make sure they weren’t interrupted. They obviously knew there was money”.

The volunteer patrol group was established in March 2015 in response to the high rate of

robberies occurring in Soweto East and the lack of response from the police. “The community

are frustrated because the police know who the criminals are but the parents are rich and

can afford to pay bribes to prevent their children from being arrested or get them released”.

Approximately 100 households each contributed Khs100 (£0.65) towards the volunteer

patrol, for them to purchase weapons such as knives, long sticks and pangas (machetes) plus

torches and whistles. The torches are useful because the patrol takes place at night and the

whistles are used to alert the rest of the community if an incident occurs. There can be up to

15 volunteers patrolling at one time, all men. Understandably, retention of volunteers is

challenging because the patrol are tackling armed offenders, whilst they only have wooden

sticks and knives.

Despite this imbalance, the volunteers continue to intervene in robberies and attempt to stop

incidents escalating. On occasions when the volunteers outnumber the offenders, the

offenders have been forced to run away but intervening in incidents aggravates the offenders

and they retaliate during the next meeting. The volunteer patrol has proven to have some

success but they are at a significant disadvantage and risk, as one resident acknowledged

“The volunteers are doing well to guard the area but all in vain, they don’t have guns”.

Shops that are located in Soweto East are at high risk of being targeted for robberies carried

out by armed gangs. Shop keepers have adapted the design of their premises, so only one

customer can physically fit in the shop at one time and the view of the shop keeper is

obstructed so they cannot be seen by an offender and therefore not directly threatened with a

weapon. Although these target hardening methods do not completely prevent shops from

being targeted, they make the shop a harder target to carry out a robbery. It is evident robbers

in Kibera are looking for a cash ‘reward’ or items they can sell to acquire cash, therefore a

method of crime prevention would be to remove the ‘reward’, which is what the mobile

money facility, M-PESA provides.

Mobile Banking

Kibera has a lower-income, transient population who migrate to Nairobi to earn money. Most

residents have a responsibility to ‘send money home’ to support the extended family who

reside in a rural area of Kenya. This was recognised during the pilot phase of M-PESA and

when launched, it was marketed as a way to ‘send money home’. In addition, as Felson

(2002) points out, poorer people have poorer credit ratings and as such they tend to carry

more cash relative to their income than middle class people. With cash in their pockets, they

provide more adequate crime targets compared to their income.

M-PESA is a safe mobile banking facility established to enable Kenyans to ‘bank’ using their

mobile phone. M-PESA is an SMS-based transfer system that allows individuals to deposit,

send and withdraw money from one of the 90,000 M-PESA outlets located throughout the

country. The ‘M’ within the name is an abbreviation for mobile and ‘pesa’ in Swahili means

money. M-PESA was developed by Vodafone through funding from the Department for

International Development (DFID) and trialled in collaboration with the Kenyan operator,

Safaricom in 2005. It was established initially as a facility for customers to receive and re-pay

a small loan using a mobile phone but during the pilot phase it became evident the system

was being used to send and receive money (Hughes and Lonie, 2007).

Safaricom officially introduced M-PESA into the Kenyan market in March 2007, targeting

the unbanked, prepaid segment of the population. In 2012 the Communications Commission

of Kenya recorded over 19 million mobile money transfer service users (Republic of Kenya.

Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2012b). M-PESA offers Kenyans with a secure, cheap

and convenient way to store or transfer money. This is particularly significant for lower-

income Kenyans who seldom have alternative affordable banking options and incur high

costs and risk when transferring money by other methods. It is often difficult for lower-

income Kenyans to be considered for a bank account as they cannot guarantee the monthly

bank charges because they do not have a steady income.

M-PESA now facilitates numerous financial services such as checking balances, making

deposits, withdrawals, transferring money (both nationally and internationally) and phone

credit. To access these services, individuals must register at one of the retail agent outlets

which are located countrywide - as of 2011 just within Kibera there were 157 authorised

MPESA agents (Safaricom, 2011). Cash that is deposited (or transferred) is reflected as e-

money in a virtual account that is managed by Safaricom. A small transaction fee is charged

for both sending and withdrawing money via M-PESA. Once an account is established all

transactions can be conducted via a mobile phone, which is ‘access controlled’ by a pin

number. The pin has to be entered into the phone for every transaction made, a follow up text

message is sent for every transaction made (see figure 3 below as an example). Proof of

identification is required for transactions taking place at a retail agent outlet and the

transaction number is verified by the user with the agent, making M-PESA transactions safe

and secure. If a mobile phone is physically lost or stolen (and the pin number has been

protected) Safaricom will reimburse or transfer the cash within the M-PESA account. Figure

2 below illustrates the use of the M-PESA system

Figure 2: M-PESA transaction text message

Source: Authors

Morawczynski & Miscione (2008) conducted research on the use of M-PESA in Kibera

between September and December 2007. At the time of their research they found that

respondents had reservations about Kenyan banks being involved in ‘tribal politics’ but

members of the public trusted M-PESA because of its affiliation to Safaricom. This research

took place around the time of the post-election violence and during that period Michael

Joseph was the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) for Safaricom, who was South African and

therefore he did not belong to a Kenyan tribe and hence would not have any tribal alliance.

During their study Morawczynski & Miscione (2008) found that more deposits were being

made than withdrawals. Although large deposits were being made, M-PESA users would

make several small withdrawals, suggesting that the service was also being used for storing

money as well as a method to transfer money ‘back home’.

Residents of Kibera have been known to store money under their mattress in ‘home banks’.

One elderly resident in Kibera spoke of how her grandson had stolen her ‘home bank’ from

her dwelling the previous week. The majority of working residents from Kibera are engaged

in casual work or labour. M-PESA provides an opportunity for employers to pay wages in a

safe and accountable way as M-PESA provides proof of payment and it also means that the

employee’s wages are stored in a safe location. The National Youth Scheme (NYS) that

employs youth from Kibera to clean garbage, construct toilets and trenches pays the weekly

wage via M-PESA. M-PESA has reduced the amount of cash people need to carry on their

person or store within their dwelling, cash only needs to be withdrawn from M-PESA as and

when it is required. Carrying or storing small amounts of cash minimises the risk of losing

money through being robbed or burgled and it decreases the cash ‘reward’ for offenders

(Clarke, 1997).

Although very popular, M-PESA is not used for all transactions. A business lady who sold

household items in Lani Saba village explained she did not accept M-PESA payments from

customers because it is not cost effective with the transaction fees she would incur for each

item sold via M-PESA. Another issue raised about M-PESA was regarding withdrawing

money, residents stated they are cautious when withdrawing cash from M-PESA outlets.

There are however, options of withdrawing cash from M-PESA outlets that are located within

secure malls on the outskirts of Kibera but it is appreciated this may not always be convenient

for residents to use.

Crime Displacement

Displacement theory argues that removing the opportunity for crime, or seeking to prevent

crime by changing the situation in which it occurs, does not actually prevent crime but merely

moves it around (Rogers 2012). When a target of crime is blocked, it is argued, the would be

offender does something else instead.

Some displacement of crime appears to be attributed to M-PESA because offenders are

confident M-PESA outlets (where cash is deposited and withdrawn) will have money and for

this reason they have become a ‘crime attractor’ (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1995),

whereas before being a M-PESA outlets the cash stored at the outlet was unknown and

therefore less attractive to armed robbers because they could not be guaranteed a worthwhile

‘reward’ (Clarke & Mayhew, 1980). Criminal access to M-PESA accounts usually occurs

through fraudulent means, often by deceiving the account holder to share their details and pin

number (Group Kenya, 2016). For many residents of Kibera M-PESA would have been the

first time they had an account which used a pin number for ‘access control’ and therefore

they are vulnerable to deception. During the research residents of Kibera did not report being

threatened to share their M-PESA details and pin-number during robberies. Robberies on

pedestrians in Kibera are usually ‘snatch and grab’ and the offender leaves the scene quickly,

this is likely due to fear of collective violence against them (Mutahi, 2011; Plural Security

Insights, 2016). However, there is evidence to suggest M-PESA pin numbers and money

from M-PESA accounts are being obtained during car-jacking and kidnappings. Although,

this is not a new phenomenon, these crimes are likely to have occurred anyway and the pin

numbers for bank cards were, and continue to be demanded during car-jacking and

kidnappings (Mathenge-Murigu, 2013; Maina, 2016). However, those who own or travel in

private vehicles are more at risk of car-jacking or kidnapping compared to residents of Kibera

whose main mode of transport is on foot or public transport.

Perceptions of Crime Reduction

It is evident to residents and from the analysis of the crimes recorded in the diaries during the

research period that robbers were clearly motivated by a ‘cash reward’. Robberies are taking

place when it was known people have money because as residents identified “they want

money”. Robberies increase significantly on a Friday and Saturday when it is known casual

labourers are paid their weekly wage. As one resident pointed out “they don’t attack anyone

who they know don’t have money. But if they think you have something they’ll come for you”.

Referring to one of the gangs operating in Kibera, a respondent stated “they would usually

engage in looting someone who is known to have money”.

Due to the lack of crime statistics available as a result of under reporting to the police and a

lack of recording by officers when crimes are reported to them, it is very difficult to use

crime statistics to demonstrate M-PESA has led to a reduction in robbery, theft and burglary.

However, Mutiga (2014) writing in The New York Times is of the opinion M-PESA has

‘hobbled crime by substituting cash for pin-secured virtual accounts’ and anecdotally

residents in Kibera feel that it has reduced the chances of becoming a victim of crime. When

lower-income individuals are paid their wages through M-PESA they only withdraw the

money from their M-PESA account as and when cash is required, minimising the risk of

losing their wages through crime. In a society that has been typically cash based M-PESA

provides a trusted and affordable banking option for the lower income population. The 157

authorised M-PESA agents present just within Kibera demonstrates the high demand and

usage of M-PESA within the informal settlement (Safaricom, 2011). M-PESA minimises the

amount of cash individuals need to carry on their person both locally and whilst travelling

back to their home area, they now have the option to ‘send money home’ rather than

physically carrying cash whilst traveling home. It also offers an alternative to ‘home banks’,

so residents don’t need to store money in their dwellings where it can be easily stolen.

Conclusion

A large number of Kenyans migrate to the capital from their rural homes to earn a living and

‘send money home’ to the family (UNHABITAT, 2007). Unemployment is high amongst

residents of Kibera, those that are employed are usually casual workers or labourers, who

receive their wages in cash but have limited ‘banking’ options available to them. Within

Kibera there is a significantly high rate crime, with offenders looking for ‘cash rewards’.

Robbery, theft and burglary is a daily risk that residents are exposed to. Residents of Kibera

have adopted a variety of coping mechanisms to deal with crime, such as returning home

before it gets dark, ‘be-friending’ offenders and paying protection rackets to be escorted

through the settlement, or for your business premises to be protected. Collective responses to

robbery, theft and burglary are present as a result of a lack of law enforcement, including

mob justice and community volunteer patrols. Whilst both represent forms of informal social

control attempting to regulate deviance (Reiner, 2000) it is debatable how successful and

sustainable these approaches are to reducing crime in Kibera. Basic target hardening

methods, like locks on doors and padlocks on communal entrance gates are used, and some

shop keepers have amended the layout of their shop to minimise access. However, as most

dwellings and business premises are shacks within the settlement, the target hardening

options are limited.

M-PESA offers Kenyans with a secure, cheap and convenient way to store or transfer money.

It has been well documented that the mobile banking facility M-PESA is actively used by

residents of Kibera to ‘store’ money (Morawczynski & Miscione, 2008) and ‘send money

home’ (Hughes and Lonie, 2007). M-PESA appears to be a useful crime prevention tool for

the lower-income population of Nairobi because it removes the cash ‘reward’ from offenders

who they are at high risk from (Clarke, 1997). However, further in depth research is likely to

be required to establish any long term crime reduction impact it has made.

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