Punishment & Society 2011 Birkbeck 307 32

7/29/2019 Punishment & Society 2011 Birkbeck 307 32

1/27

http://pun.sagepub.com/Punishment & Society

http://pun.sagepub.com/content/13/3/307The online version of this article can be found at:

DOI: 10.1177/1462474511404320

2011 13: 307Punishment & SocietyChristopher Birkbeck

SouthImprisonment and internment: Comparing penal institutions North and

Published by:

http://www.sagepublications.com

can be found at:Punishment & SocietyAdditional services and information for

http://pun.sagepub.com/cgi/alertsEmail Alerts:

http://pun.sagepub.com/subscriptionsSubscriptions:

http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navReprints:

http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navPermissions:

http://pun.sagepub.com/content/13/3/307.refs.htmlCitations:

What is This?

- Jul 15, 2011Version of Record>>

by BIBHUMA Biblioteca de Humanidades on October 27, 2011pun.sagepub.comDownloaded from
http://pun.sagepub.com/http://pun.sagepub.com/http://pun.sagepub.com/http://pun.sagepub.com/content/13/3/307http://pun.sagepub.com/content/13/3/307http://www.sagepublications.com/http://pun.sagepub.com/cgi/alertshttp://pun.sagepub.com/cgi/alertshttp://pun.sagepub.com/cgi/alertshttp://pun.sagepub.com/subscriptionshttp://pun.sagepub.com/subscriptionshttp://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navhttp://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navhttp://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navhttp://pun.sagepub.com/content/13/3/307.refs.htmlhttp://pun.sagepub.com/content/13/3/307.refs.htmlhttp://pun.sagepub.com/content/13/3/307.refs.htmlhttp://online.sagepub.com/site/sphelp/vorhelp.xhtmlhttp://online.sagepub.com/site/sphelp/vorhelp.xhtmlhttp://online.sagepub.com/site/sphelp/vorhelp.xhtmlhttp://pun.sagepub.com/content/13/3/307.full.pdfhttp://pun.sagepub.com/http://pun.sagepub.com/http://pun.sagepub.com/http://online.sagepub.com/site/sphelp/vorhelp.xhtmlhttp://pun.sagepub.com/content/13/3/307.full.pdfhttp://pun.sagepub.com/content/13/3/307.refs.htmlhttp://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navhttp://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navhttp://pun.sagepub.com/subscriptionshttp://pun.sagepub.com/cgi/alertshttp://www.sagepublications.com/http://pun.sagepub.com/content/13/3/307http://pun.sagepub.com/


2/27

Punishment & Society

13(3) 307332

! The Author(s) 2011

Reprints and permissions:

sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.navDOI: 10.1177/1462474511404320

pun.sagepub.com

Article

Imprisonment and

internment: Comparingpenal institutions Northand South

Christopher BirkbeckUniversity of Salford, UK

Abstract

Recent references to the warehouse prison in the United States and the prision-deposito

in Latin America seem to indicate that penal confinement in the Western Hemispherehas converged on a similar model. However, this article suggests otherwise. It contrastspenal facilities in North America and Latin America in terms of six interrelated aspects:regimentation; surveillance; isolation; supervision; accountability; and formalization.Quantitatively, control in North American penal facilities is assiduous (unceasing, per-sistent and intrusive), while in Latin America it is perfunctory (sporadic, indifferent andcursory). Qualitatively, North American penal facilities produce imprisonment (whichenacts penal intervention through confinement), while in Latin America they produceinternment (which enacts penal intervention through release). Closely entwined withthis qualitative difference are distinct practices of judicial involvement in sentencing andpenal supervision. Those practices, and the cultural and political factors that underpinthem, represent an interesting starting point for the explanation of the contrastingnature of imprisonment and internment.

Keywordsimprisonment, internment, Latin America, North America, penal facilities

Introduction

In their introduction to a useful set of essays on criminal justice and political

cultures, Newburn and Sparks (2004: 3) comment on the increasing evidence of

certain forms of convergence in the languages and practices of crime control.

Corresponding author:

Christopher Birkbeck, University of Salford, Salford, M5 4WT, UK.

Email: [email protected]

http://pun.sagepub.com/http://pun.sagepub.com/http://pun.sagepub.com/http://pun.sagepub.com/


3/27

A look at recent research and commentary on penality in the Americas would seem

to confirm this trend. For example, US scholars often use the term warehouse

when talking about prisons in that country (e.g. Fleisher, 1989; Irwin, 2004; Lynch,

2001; Robertson, 1997; Simon, 2000; Toch, 1985). In so doing, they invite us to

recognize that contemporary prisons in the USA do little more than provide secure

confinement for sentenced offenders. In Latin America, penal facilities are similarly

perceived to emphasize confinement and neglect treatment, and are often referred

to as depositos (warehouses) (e.g. Carrion, 2008; Neuman, 2004; Sozzo, 2008).

The use of equivalent terms for confinement seems to imply that, in the penal

domain if nowhere else, convergence in the Americas is now complete. However,

such a notion is problematic in both a quantitative and qualitative sense. The

quantitative problem concerns the extent to which warehousing has emerged in

the penal institutions of either region (e.g. Listwan et al., 2008; Sozzo, 2008). Thequalitative problem concerns the degree to which the terms warehouse and depos-

ito can be understood and used in the same way in their respective regions.

Addressing this latter question is the primary objective of the present article.

Melossi (2001: 405) points out the problem in working with superficial notions of

linguistic equivalence: the usage of identical words often obscures the degree to

which they are embedded in the different history of different places, as well as

being articulated through (partially) different discourses (see also Worrall, 2000). I

take this to mean, among other things, that terms which have cross-linguistic equiv-

alence may conceal underlying differences in content and context. In relation to thespecific focus of this article, I seek to show that warehouse and deposito may be apt

descriptors of their respective realities, but that they denote very different kinds of

institution and are embedded (to use Melossis term) in very different conceptions

of penal intervention. Whether or not the Americas are witnessing a convergence in

patterns of crime and social control, which is a matter that cannot be debated here,

the character of penal confinement is still markedly different in each region.

I develop my analysis by comparing six interrelated aspects of penal facilities:

regimentation; surveillance; isolation; supervision; accountability; and formalization.

Collectively, they represent dimensions of control the heart of all penal projects. Iseek to show that the level of control is considerably higher in the North than the

South1 and that there is also a qualitative difference in the character of confinement.

While imprisonment, in the Foucauldian sense of spatially concentrated disciplin-

ary technologies (Foucault, 1979), is still an apt descriptor of penal confinement in

the North, internment is a better descriptor of confinement in the South.

Assembling the material for such an analysis is a challenge because of the need

to construct a general description that is not distorted by excessive attention to

particular years or institutions. The challenge is also compounded by the unequal

volume and availability of material on penal confinement in each region. Wealthysocieties (such as those in North America) produce more certified knowledge than

poorer ones (such as those in Latin America), whether through government agen-

cies, universities or research organizations, and this generalization holds for peno-

logical studies as well. In what follows, I focus particularly on the United States

308 Punishment & Society 13(3)



4/27

and Venezuela, the two countries in the hemisphere that I know best, but where

possible I broaden the descriptions to Canada and to other Latin American

nations in order keep the comparison at the level of regions.

If comparative studies of penality are aligned according to the emphasis that they

place on similarities or differences in institutional developments and procedures,

my analysis falls squarely in the latter category. And difference, of course, invites

explanation, as evidenced by the small but growing body of studies in comparative

penology and by the calls to add to them (e.g. Garland, 2009; Jefferson, 2007; Lacey,

2006). Almost without exception, those studies have focused on sentencing and rates

of imprisonment in Western Europe and North America (e.g. Cavadino and Dignan,

2006; Downes, 1988; Tonry, 2004; Whitman, 2003; Zimring and Hawkins, 1991; but

see also Weiss and South, 1998). Their explanandum tends to be conceptualized as

tolerance or harshness and their explanatory frameworks too diverse and finelywrought to be adequately summarized here incorporate political (e.g. Whitman,

2003; Zimring and Hawkins, 1991), legal (e.g. Downes, 1988) and cultural (e.g.

Garland, 2001; Melossi, 2001) variables.

In contrast to prior research, the present essay focuses not on punitiveness

(a normative property) but on regimes of penal confinement (a social property).

Its comparative framework is not limited to wealthier societies, but also includes

poorer ones. Given these departures from what has gone before, I prefer to let the

description, albeit provisional, suggest a possible explanation. My hypothesis for

the existence of imprisonment in the North and internment in the South, brieflyoutlined in the final section of this article, focuses on differing conceptions of penal

intervention. With imprisonment, penal intervention is enacted through confine-

ment; with internment, it is enacted through release. Closely entwined with these

alternative conceptions of intervention are different models of judicial involvement

in sentencing and penal supervision. This type of explanation, centred on the dif-

fering roles of the judiciary in each region, points immediately to the relevance of

comparative legal studies (e.g. Damaska, 1986) but also to the importance so well

illustrated by existing work in comparative penology of placing penal practices in

their social, political and cultural contexts (Garland, 2006; King and Maguire,1994). Such extensive theoretical exploration would, however, be premature at

this stage: the assembly of comparative descriptive material is the first necessity.

Physical arrangements in confinement: Regimentation,

surveillance, isolation

Regimentation

As used here, regimentation refers to the spatial organization of inmates. Suchorganization is obviously relevant to the goals of the institution because it reflects

and enables a particular kind of control. A key aspect of regimentation is classi-

fication an activity that has a long history in some penal systems (e.g. McCartney,

1933). In general, classification allows the grouping of like individuals in order to

Birkbeck 309



5/27

achieve some purpose. In penal facilities, key dimensions of classification are

reflected in residential arrangements, whereby different classes of inmate inhabit

different spaces or buildings. Classification also affects patterns of movement

within the institution another important aspect of regimentation.

In North America, facilities for confinement reflect a systemic approach to orga-

nization. First, a basic distinction exists between jails (used for preventive detention

and short-term confinement) and prisons. Second, individual prisons generally form

part of a classificatory system which encompasses both their role in relation to other

prisons in the same jurisdiction, and the characteristics and uses of their component

parts. The current organizing principle for classification is the level of security, and

the basic categories of facility are maximum, medium and minimum security.

What these terms mean is illustrated by the following description from the

North Carolina Department of Correction (NCDC, 2007):

Close security prisons typically are comprised of single cells and divided into cell blocks,

which may be in one building or multiple buildings. Cell doors are generally remotely

controlled from a secure control station . . . The perimeter barrier is designed with a

double fence with armed watch towers or armed roving patrols . . . Medium security

prisons typically are comprised of secure dormitories that provide housing for up to

fifty inmates each . . . Each dormitory is locked at night with a correctional officer pro-

viding direct supervision of the inmates and sleeping area . . . The prison usually has a

double fence perimeter with armed watch towers or armed roving patrols. . .

Minimumsecurity prisons are comprised of non-secure dormitories which are routinely patrolled

by correctional officers . . . The prison generally has a single perimeter fence which is

inspected on a regular basis, but has no armed watch towers or roving patrol.

Of course, the classification of inmates also requires its own facility (or unit within

a facility), where convicted offenders spend the first weeks or months of their sen-

tence and are assessed in terms of risks and needs. In addition, custodial staff

require a disciplinary unit in order to handle particularly troublesome inmates, usu-

ally known as the maximum security unit/facility (or supermax if the term max-imum has already been applied to a lower security level). Once again, the North

Carolina Department of Correction (NCDC, 2007):

Maximum security units are comprised of cells with sliding doors that are remotely

operated from a secure control station . . . These units are utilized to confine the most

dangerous inmates who are a severe threat to public safety, correctional staff, and

other inmates. Inmates confined in a maximum security unit typically are in their cell

23 hours a day. During the other hour they may be allowed to shower and exercise in

the cell block or an exterior cage.

Freedom of movement within the facility is closely correlated with the security

level: at maximum security level, physical restraints are used when inmates are

moved and all inmates are escorted by custodial staff; medium security facilities




6/27

may employ a pass system for inmates; while at minimum security facilities, control

on movement may be limited to certain spaces and times of the day.

In Latin America, the classification of different types of facility may exist on paper,

but much less so in practice. The distinction between jails and other penal facilities is

not so clear because physical arrangements do not correspond entirely with legal cat-

egories of inmate. Thus, the police have holding cells, but these rarely represent the

equivalent of the American jail. They are used for short-term detention during the

initial phases of the criminal case, but individuals on preventive detention are held in

larger facilities. By law, these larger facilities would approximate to the North

American jail, but in practice they are part of the prison system and used as such.

For example, in Venezuela, the Criminal Code (Venezuela, 1964, 2005) and the

penal laws (Venezuela, 1975, 2000) have for long distinguished between penitentiaries

(solitary confinement, forced labour), prisons (group confinement, voluntary labour),penal colonies (for frontier regions) and judicial internment centres (for preventive

detention and sentences of up to one year). The materialization of this array of insti-

tutions required the construction of judicial internment centres in each state2 and the

construction of prisons, penitentiaries and penal colonies in selected sites around the

country to house offenders serving longer sentences. In practice, the resources for such

a system were never forthcoming, and as a result most states have one or other of these

types of facility, but only one. Thus, the officially designated judicial internment cen-

tres not only house suspects in preventive detention and convicted offenders with

sentences of up to one year, but also house convicted offenders with longer sentences.Likewise, the prisons and the penitentiaries house all categories of convicted offen-

ders and also suspects in preventive detention. Moreover, the distinction between

prisons and penitentiaries is found only in their architectural characteristics and

not in their regimes. In a similar vein, Ecuador implemented a new law in 1982

which renamed penal institutions as Social Rehabilitation Centres and classified

them into maximum, medium and minimum security levels. However, this classifica-

tion system was never implemented (lack of resources was cited as one

reason), and Today, there are 36 Centres of Social Rehabilitation in abominable phys-

ical condition, where classification is applied only in terms of sex (del Olmo, 1998: 128).Colombia represents a slight exception to this trend because during the 1990s it

embarked on an ambitious programme for constructing new maximum security

facilities to house drug traffickers and guerrilla leaders. However, these facilities

relied on both ideas and financial aid from the United States and have a limited,

though high profile, presence in the countrys inventory of penal facilities (del Olmo,

1998; Toro Vanegas, 2007). As an exception, they prove the rule that most Latin

American governments are unable (or unwilling?) to construct penal facilities, even

in the face of quite high levels of overcrowding (Carranza, 2003).3

The distinction between preventive detention and the diverse types of secureconfinement could still be maintained if facilities were internally divided into spe-

cialized units, but often this does not occur: offenders are located according to

other criteria, mainly social extraction or geographic region of origin (Aldana,

1972; Olivero, 1998). This results in a mixing of inmates by legal category (accused

Birkbeck 311



7/27

or convicted), sentence length and type of crime, which makes the population

within any facility far more heterogeneous than in North America.4 However,

the relative lack of differentiation between facilities makes Latin American insti-

tutions far more homogeneous than their North American counterparts, most of

them approximating the latters medium security model.

Surveillance

Surveillance of inmates relies on the physical presence of custodial staff together with

any technological resources that are available to them. Table 1 shows the ratio of

inmates to staff in Canada, the United States and Latin American countries for which

data were available. Although these figures contain an unknown amount of internal

error springing from likely differences in the methods for defining and counting staff,the broad picture that emerges is one of higher numbers of inmates per staff member

in Latin America. In a detailed comparison of a US jail and a Venezuelan judicial

internment centre, Jordan (1996) found that the US facility had an average of one

custodial staff member for every five inmates, while the Venezuelan facility had one

custodial staff member for every 17 inmates. In terms of custodial staff on the job at

any time, the ratios were 1:20/25 and 1:65, respectively.

As is to be expected, North American facilities also routinely incorporate

surveillance technology, particularly CCTV and metal detectors, in order to keep

an eye on what is going on. The trend for the future is well illustrated by a new186-bed jail that was recently opened in New York State:

[T]he facilitys integrated electronic security system . . . included five touchscreen con-

trol stations, three graphic panels, 260 controlled and monitored doors, 165 intercom

stations, 165 proximity readers and more than 110 cameras . . . With the installation of

Table 1. Ratios of inmates to staff, North and Latin America

Country YearTotal numberof inmates

Total numberof staff

Number ofinmates/staff member

Canada 2001a 35,166 32,588 1.1

United States 2000b 1,305,253 430,033 3.0

Colombia 2001c 53,156 6390 8.3

Costa Rica 2001d 11,152 2258 4.9

Chile 2001a 34,717 6614 5.2

Ecuador 2001a 7738 1567 4.9

El Salvador 2002a

11,055 1303 8.4Peru 2001a 26,989 4812 5.6

Venezuela 2001a 18,768 2703 6.9

Sources: aUnited Nations (2005); bBJS (2003); cCampo Vasquez and Vargas de Roa (2003); dRico (2003).




8/27

[a] security electronics system, the facility is able to significantly increase its inmate

monitoring capacity. The intuitive and scalable nature of the touchscreens, as well as

its ease of configuration enables a single corrections officer to view the activity of 42

inmates at a time compared to the original capacity of 24. (Werner, 2006)

In addition, various inmate tracking systems have also been developed, based

on bracelets worn by inmates, and are gradually being installed in prisons and jails.

The publicity for one of these systems cites the following benefits:

The RFID prison management system is intended to have a three-fold function. It

ensures inmates do not escape by issuing an alarm if the bracelet approaches the jail

perimeter; it reduces violence by allowing officers to monitor who is congregating with

whom; and it allows for administrative functions such as tracking where an inmate is

when they are needed. (Swedberg, 2005)

Not surprisingly, in the less wealthy continent that is Latin America, technology

is almost entirely absent from penal facilities. With fewer custodial staff to man

them, Latin American penal institutions exercise a far lower level of surveillance

over their inmates than do correctional facilities in North America.

IsolationThe degree of isolation of inmates from society is governed by policies on visiting,

the use of telephones, the availability of televisions and so on. In this regard, an

interesting difference emerges around visiting. In North America, the extent and

mode of visitation generally varies by the security level of the facility. Inmates in

maximum security facilities are only permitted non-contact visits (conducted in

booths with glass partitions and telephone intercoms), with greater restrictions on

the number of visitors and the length of time for which the visits can last. Inmates in

medium and minimum security facilities are allowed contact visits (in a supervised

visiting room or patio) from a greater number of visitors and for a greater period oftime. Family (conjugal) visits are also available to these inmates (e.g. CSC, 2007a).

The degree of control over visitors and visiting is quite strict. Inmates must

request approval of nominated visitors; visitors must comply with guidelines

regarding appropriate attire (Comfort, 2003); and behaviour in the visiting room

must minimize physical contact:

An inmate and his/her visitor(s) are allowed to briefly embrace and kiss at the begin-

ning and end of their visit. An inmate may hold his or her minor children . . . Holding

hands on top of the table in plain view is permitted, with no other physical contact.Excessive contact, (kissing, massaging, stroking, and sitting with legs intertwined or

sitting on laps) could result in termination of the visit. (CDCR, 2007: 9)

This, at least, is the mandate from the authorities.

Birkbeck 313



9/27

Visiting policy in Latin American facilities is much more permissive. Typically,

one or two days per week are designated for visits and on these days the friends and

family of all inmates except those in administrative or disciplinary segregation are

allowed in to the facility. Staff do not keep lists of authorized visitors, but anyone

wishing to enter the facility must know the name of a person held there, must

produce identification, must comply with a minimum dress code and must be

willing to be searched. The visiting period generally lasts from four to six hours

and there is usually no designated visiting area, nor direct supervision of visitors

and inmates. In Brazil, for example:

Few penal facilities have special areas for visits; instead, visitors are often allowed to

enter directly into prisoners living areas. In some prisons, such as Sao Paulos Casa de

Detencao, social visits with family and friends take place in the courtyard, while

wives and girlfriends are allowed to enter prisoners cells. (HRW, 1998: 115)

Conjugal visits are also permitted for most inmates, on a relatively frequent

basis, and independent of marital status (Olivero, 1998). In some cases, prostitutes

may go into the facility on pre-arranged appointments with inmates (HRW, 1997,

1998).

All observers agree that visiting days transform penal institutions in Latin

America. Thus, MacNeil (2006: 9495) on a Venezuelan facility:

After three days in prison, I experienced my first visit day. The atmosphere of the

prison was completely transformed as women and children streamed in to the com-

pound, laden with bags of groceries, and the whole place took on a gala atmosphere

for a few hours.

And Olivero (1998: 104) reports an analogous situation in Mexico: In some

facilities, entire families are allowed to live for extended periods behind prison walls

with their loved ones. It is common for children to be seen running and playing

throughout Mexican prisons. In Bolivia, too, many facilities have families living inwith the inmates (Pinto Quintanilla, 2007).

While visits clearly reflect the importance of family in Latin American countries

and provide welcome relief from the boredom and violence of institutional life, it is

their character as open days that I wish to emphasize here. Once or twice weekly,

the institution becomes an arena for mingling with visitors which draws in almost

all of the inmates whether or not someone goes specifically to visit them (an inmate

can meet the visitors of companions, or even sell snacks and handicrafts to the

assembled throng). This represents a significant weakening of the social isolation

that would otherwise prevail. In addition, the relative freedom given to inmates andvisitors to do what they like, where they like, is a considerable departure from the

close control that is typically associated with penal facilities in North America and

constitutes a visible acknowledgement that the interior of each facility belongs to

the inmates, not the authorities.




10/27

Social arrangements: Supervision, accountability,

formalization

SupervisionPenal institutions are a clear example of Goffmans (1991 [1961]) assertion that in

total institutions there is a basic division between a large managed group of inmates

and a small supervisory staff. But these institutions can vary in the extent to which

the inmates are managed by the supervisory staff and the extent to which they

manage themselves.

In North America, the last 70 years have seen a marked decline in inmate par-

ticipation in running the facility (Jacobs, 1977; Marquart and Crouch, 1984, 1985).

Nowadays, participation by inmates in administrative or custodial matters is rarely

(if ever) countenanced and instead tends to be confined to programme developmentand management (e.g. Daz-Cotto, 1996). Even here, the possibilities may be lim-

ited: using DiIulios tripartite typology of managerial styles (control, responsibility,

consensual), Reisig (1998) found that only two out of 11 state facilities surveyed in

the United States corresponded to the responsibility model (which gives inmates a

greater voice in institutional affairs).

One result of the trend to exclude them from administrative and custodial pro-

cedures is a greater levelling of inmates, because there are fewer positions from

which to garner power or influence. Although gangs represent an important mode

of social organization among contemporary inmates (Gaes et al., 2002), and insome respects reproduce the hierarchies and styles of control shown by the old

convict-guards and building tenders, unlike the latter they are not sponsored by the

facilitys administration and are therefore seen as a far less suitable mechanism

for internal governance. Thus, the attitude of the custodial staff towards gangs

may range from strictly adversarial to cautiously tolerant, but never to wholesale

acceptance. Absent the possibility of the formal incorporation of inmates into the

structure of internal control, administrations appear to have responded in a variety

of ways: increasing the number of custodial staff; increasing the restrictions and

control on the movements of inmates; increasing surveillance; seeking a balance ofpower between gangs; or simply turning a blind eye to all but the most egregious

disorder.

In Latin America, the use of some kind of building tender appears to be wide-

spread and longstanding. For example, Aldana (1972: 54) described the Delegado de

Pabellon (Dormitory Delegate) in the Catia Judicial Internment Facility (Caracas)

where he served time (an inmate whom the authorities recognise as having good

behaviour and the capacity to exercise internal control over each dormitory), as did

Bayer (1978) the jefes de patio o pasillo (heads of patio or corridor) at about the same

time in a Bogota facility. More recently, Human Rights Watch (HRW, 1997) foundthat the dormitory delegates in Catia Prison were being called polipresos (inmate

police); Pinto Quintanilla (2007) described the prisoner Delegate Councils in

Bolivia; and MacNeil (2006) found a well-entrenched system of inmate control in

Venezuelas Western General Penitentiary.5

Birkbeck 315



11/27

MacNeil, however, had previously been in a Venezuelan facility where there was

no strategic alliance between the prison staff and the inmates, nor any attempt to

replace that form of control with a more permanent and intrusive presence on the

part of the administration. The custodial staff limited themselves to controlling

certain doors and railings, to trying to impose some kind of order on the lines

that formed at meal times and to the evacuation of inmates who were ill, injured or

dead. Human Rights Watch found a similar situation in some Brazilian prisons.

For example, at the Joa o Chaves Penitentiary in Natal, with an inmate population

of 646, only three guards were on duty while the organization was visiting: [T]he

three guards remained stationed at a table near the entrance of the prison. During a

day at the facility, we rarely saw them get up from the table to monitor the situ-

ation of the inmate population (HRW, 1998: 71).

When custodial staff give up any attempt at internal control, relations betweenprisoners can quickly descend into internecine warfare (Hidalgo and Jordan, 1993

1994), with truces only for visiting days. This is the more problematic form of

prisoner self-government, built on anarchy rather than authority.6 Throughout

Latin America these two styles of internal governance ebb and flow, providing a

striking contrast to the structure of power in the North.

Accountability

As a result of relatively recent historical developments, North American prisonscurrently find themselves accountable to a broad range of institutions and groups.

Since the 1960s, inmates and prisoners rights groups in the United States have

successfully used litigation to seek redress for the inhumane treatment of inmates

and the arbitrary nature of decisions regarding key aspects of the penal trajectory,

such as, good time, furloughs and parole (Feeley and Rubin, 1999; Feeley and

Swearingen, 2004; Jacobs, 1980). Judicial responses have not only materialized in

decisions that are often favourable to inmates, but also in the active involvement of

the courts in the oversight of prison reform. In Canada, government-appointed

commissions of inquiry have performed something of a similar role, their creationoften triggered by crises in the correctional system and their reports filled with

criticisms of the inhumane and arbitrary treatment of prisoners and with proposals

for reform (Gaucher and Lowman, 1998). Collectively, the activities in the US

courts and the Canadian commissions of inquiry reflect a trend to include pris-

oners as members of mass society with many of the same rights as other citizens

(Jacobs, 1977).

A second set of external observers comprises the general public and elected

politicians who, concerned by rising crime rates from the 1960s onwards, have

often developed strategic alliances to demand punishment rather than welfareand treatment for offenders (Garland, 2001). This trend is generally acknowledged

to be stronger in the United States (Melossi and Lettiere, 1998) than in Canada

(Moore and Hannah-Moffatt, 2005) and, insofar as it has affected penal facilities,

has arguably led to a greater concern for security (understood as the attempt to




12/27

limit problem behaviours among inmates). The confluence of these external

demands on penal control is neatly reflected in the Correctional Service of

Canadas slogan Safety, Respect and Dignity for All (CSC, 2007b) and has

led to a self-conscious attempt to achieve a balance (Meyer and OMalley, 2005)

between what many see as potentially conflicting objectives. However, one result

has been that the principle of less eligibility, which in the penal domain mandates

worse material conditions for inmates than for the poorest members of society, has

been somewhat attenuated.7

Latin America has experienced a similar punitive turn to that in the North but

there has not been the counter-trend towards more humanitarian confinement.

Rapid increases in crime rates since the late 1980s have not necessarily translated

directly into expanding prison populations, but they have fuelled historically high

levels of concern about crime and personal safety (Caldeira, 2000; Rotker, 2000)which have led to calls for mano dura (a strong hand) (Godoy, 2005). They have

also been an important stimulus to self-help in crime prevention as communities

gate themselves off, harden property targets and hire varying types of watchmen

and security personnel. Attitudes towards offenders have also hardened (Bricen o-

Leo n et al., 2006) and self-help in criminal justice has spilled over into execution,

either as spontaneous lynching (Godoy, 2006) or the more organized death squads

(Huggins and Mesquita, 1995; Perea, 2003). In this social climate, the prospects for

examining what goes on in penal facilities and for improving the inmates lot are

quite bleak.Latin American penal facilities have always attracted their share of moral cru-

saders, whether they be wealthy philanthropists (Aguirre, 2005), religious groups

(Miller, 1998), academics (e.g. Cordova, 1999) or, more recently, human rights

groups (e.g. HRW, 1997, 1998). These have done much to publicize and criticize

conditions inside. Inmates themselves have also drawn attention to the conditions of

confinement through letters, the occasional book and, most frequently, protests and

strikes. However, these initiatives have not been sufficient to produce a sustained

shift in the position of penal facilities, or inmates, vis-a` -vis the rest of society. One

barrier has been the relative lack of inmates organizations and of the articulation oftheir problems: the typical inmate has little education or social capital. This situation

only changes when political figures are confined in these facilities, because they have

a peculiar motivation and the necessary discursive skills to publicize penal ills

(Aguirre, 2005; del Olmo, 1998). Occasionally, a government takes it upon itself to

proclaim a new condition for inmates, as did the populist Pero n government in 1950s

Argentina (Caimari, 2004), but such changes have rarely gone beyond rhetoric and

have lasted only as long as the corresponding political regime.

Another barrier to the humanitarian movement has been the unwillingness of

the courts to get involved with conditions within the facilities. This is strikingbecause the courts have for long held the legislatively assigned responsibility of

periodically inspecting all penal facilities (Sa nchez Galindo, 2004), although they

have rarely complied with this directive (e.g. Saavedra, 1977).8 The response to the

penal crisis in Latin America has been an attempt to lower the use of preventive

Birkbeck 317



13/27

detention through reforms to criminal procedure (Tocora, 2005; Vogler, 2005),

rather than to deal with the problems of penal facilities themselves. In Latin

America, these facilities continue to be much less open to scrutiny than their coun-

terparts in North America.

Formalization

In North America, accountability has accentuated the trend in correctional bureau-

cracy towards the development of codified rules and the use of written documen-

tation as part of a culture of audit and control (Feeley and Swearingen, 2004;

Riveland, 1999). A brief look at the websites of correctional administrations or

of accessory bodies concerned with standards confirms this. For example, the

Correctional Service of Canada has nearly 140 Commissioners Directives andnine Standard Operating Practices (CSC, 2007c); and the United States Federal

Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has more than 280 policy documents (BOP, 2007). The

latter deal with such varied matters as the acceptance of donations, incentive

awards for employees, inmate grooming and furniture testing. The flavour of

this style of administration is well captured in a recent statement by the Director

of the BOP to the Prison Commission:

Beyond externally-mandated oversight, the Bureau is a policy-driven agency with

numerous built-in mechanisms of critical self-review and managementcontrol . . . The primary system of control in the Bureau of Prisons is the program

review process . . . [An example] from the Food Services institution guidelines [is] pro-

vided below:

. Review documentation over the past 6 months to determine if job efficiency

lectures (monthly safety talks) are being conducted and topics include

instruction on job specific equipment, hazardous materials, safety, and san-

itation procedures.

. Determine through direct observation if safety procedures are establishedand there is proper use of all protective safety equipment (where applicable)

in the inmate work area (e.g. machine guarding, eye protection, safety shoes,

fire extinguishers charged and functional, and eye wash stations operable).

(Lappin, 2006: 57)

The meaning of this comparatively new administrative style for corrections per-

sonnel is direct and obvious:

Its a new day. When I first started with the department, there was very little docu-mentation. If you locked an inmate up, you verbally reported that to the captain

on duty. You did not write a report at that particular time like we do

now . . . In the old days, you had what you referred to as a guidebook. Now we

manage by standards and policies. We are not allowed mistakes. Its important that




14/27

officers stay on top of the rules and regulations. Its important they stay on top of the

standard operating procedures and its important they stay on top of the administra-

tive memos that come out from the department, the division or the wardens office.

(Beck, 2005: 2)

This managerial style is absent in Latin American penal facilities, where policy is

largely legislated. Most countries have a basic penal law which is complemented by

a few sets of legislated regulations and by the occasional ministerial decree. For

example, Argentina has five sets of regulations that accompany its Organic Law of

the Federal Penitentiary Service (SPFA, 2007), while Colombia which has been

more diligent in this regard has at least 40 presidential or ministerial decrees that

develop or modify the basic Ley 65 de 1993 (see INPEC, 2007). Neither these nor

other countries approach the level of codification or administrative control foundin North America.

Legislative guidelines, sometimes dubbed as bright and shiny,9 coexist with a

preference for verbal orders and control within penal facilities (Jordan, 1996).

Administration is based heavily on inertia and institutional tradition while docu-

mentation is relatively scarce. Two consequences flow from this. The first is that

relatively little information is routinely collected about these facilities, further

underlining their opacity to the public gaze. In extreme situations, there may not

even be an accurate count of the number of inmates in the facility (e.g. Hidalgo and

Jordan, 19931994). The second is that the specification and control of operatingprocedures may be tenuous, such that wardens have a lot of autonomy and out-

comes can be quite varied. The development and codification of rules usually pro-

motes a universalistic ethos in bureaucracies, and where this does not occur

particularism may be quite strong. Evidence of the latter is seen in the reproduction

within the Latin American penal facilities of the social inequalities found in wider

society, a feature commented on by numerous observers who compare the rela-

tively comfortable quarters of the wealthy inmates with the squalid dormitory areas

inhabited by the poor (Bayer, 1978; Bretas, 1996; Olivero, 1998).10

Imprisonment and internment

Looking across the various institutional dimensions reviewed in this essay, we find

a relatively clear set of differences between North America and Latin America. In

the North, inmates are more regimented, more isolated and subject to greater

surveillance; they are also less involved in the running of the institution. North

American penal facilities are more open to external scrutiny and their bureaucra-

cies are more formalized. In Latin America, inmates are less regimented, less iso-

lated and subject to less surveillance; they are also more involved in the running ofthe institution. Latin American penal facilities are less open to external scrutiny

and their bureaucracies are less formalized.

One way to express these contrasts quantitatively is as a difference in the level

of control: in North America, control is assiduous in the sense that it is unceasing,

Birkbeck 319



15/27

persistent and intrusive; in Latin America, control is perfunctory in the sense that it

is sporadic, indifferent and cursory. But another way to express these contrasts

qualitatively is in terms of the character of confinement: in North America there

is imprisonment; in Latin America there is internment.

Despite the lengthy historical existence of the word prison, there is much of value

in Foucaults (1979: 233) point that, since the late 18th century, the prison is to be

differentiated from detention because it also involves the technical transformation of

individuals: [t]he margin by which the prison exceeds detention is filled . . . by tech-

niques of a disciplinary type. In other words, the prison is an institution in which

individuals are not merely detained, but disciplined through projects, improvements,

experiments, theoretical statements, personal evidence and investigations (Foucault,

1979: 235). It does not matter that what is being done has changed over time, from

reform to rehabilitation (Rothman, 1995) to punishment (Feeley and Simon, 1992); itdoes not even matter that the technical transformations fail to materialize (as evi-

denced by the periodic and persistent pronouncements on the failure of prisons).

Even when imprisonment is reduced to nothing more than control, it is still more

than detention: Inmates do not control anything inside the walls. Everything is

structured in accordance with strict policy and procedure (Bruton, 2004: 41). In

all of this, imprisonment is conceived as a project, as an act of social engineering.

It may be possible to transform criminals through rehabilitation or treatment; but

even when not, it is still possible to organize facilities and people in a rational,

planned and calculated manner to reduce disorder, danger and risk (Feeley andSimon, 1992). In Irwins (2004: 80, emphasis in the original) characterization of

the contemporary warehouse prison: the routine . . . is not brutal, dangerous, or

excessively cruel. It is tightly controlled, limited, monotonous, and lacking in oppor-

tunities for self-improvement.

Scholars who study the history of penal institutions in Latin America have

provided some valuable insights into the emergence and spread of ideas regarding

penitentiaries, prisons and the rehabilitative ideal as social and political projects

(Aguirre, 2005; del Olmo, 1981; Salvatore and Aguirre, 1996a). In these studies, we

find ample evidence of experts, commentators and reformers who, in the best tra-dition of social engineering, articulated visions of the prison as a site for the tech-

nical transformation of offenders. Most drew heavily on international sources but

also incorporated local, more idiosyncratic, perspectives. However, there is also

equally ample evidence that these visions were either never realized or only short

lived (see particularly, Aguirre, 2005; Salvatore and Aguirre, 1996b; Santiago-

Valles, 1996). For reasons that require exploration, the margin by which these

regimes went beyond detention, that is, became a prison in Foucaults terms,

was either small or non-existent. The information presented here suggests that

this state of affairs still persists today.

11

When detention is the sole objective, penal intervention is limited to a spatial

policy of confinement. What happens inside penal facilities is strictly irrelevant and

concern only arises when inmates escape. Control focuses on containment rather

than internal organization and activity. This is the paradigm of internment, which




16/27

materialized to a greater or lesser degree in forms as diverse as the pre-modern

English jail (McConville, 1998), US prisoner of war camps (Glidden, 1973) and

relocation centres (Hayashi, 2004; Starn, 1986), and other concentration camps the

world over (Applebaum, 2001; Walston, 1997). For the observer familiar with

contemporary Latin American penal facilities, the literature on internment

offers many points of resonance: makeshift and relatively harsh conditions;

inmate self-government; inmate unrest; and the overwhelming focus on contain-

ment. By contrast, for the same observer, the literature on North American prisons

is as likely to stimulate a sense of difference from Latin American penal facilities as

it is to generate a perception of similarity.

Conclusion imprisonment, internment and the

role of the judiciary

In seeking to understand these different regimes, the key to any explanation for

their separate occurrences must focus on the presence (imprisonment) or absence

(internment) of projects for doing something with or to inmates while in confine-

ment, whether it is rehabilitation, punishment, treatment or caring. Viewing the

task in this light immediately indicates that certain sorts of explanation are invalid

or unhelpful. Thus, we cannot explain imprisonment and internment by the pres-

ence or absence in wider society of projects for penal confinement, because researchattests to the ready availability of such projects across the hemisphere, both his-

torically (e.g. Rothman, 1971; Salvatore and Aguirre, 1996a) and currently (Feeley

and Simon, 1992; OLP, 2007; Rico, 1997: 269291). Nor should we cast the expla-

nation in terms of resource disparities, as if the wealthier North American societies

have had the resources to implement penal projects while the poorer Latin

American societies have not. Disciplinary projects (in the Foucauldian sense)

depend much more on social organization than they do on economic resources

and material technology.

We should also be wary of explanations built on normative perspectives that,implicitly or explicitly, view internment simply as a failure to produce and sustain

imprisonment. The modernization agenda of earlier Latin American reformers

and academics (Salvatore and Aguirre, 1996a) and the currently fashionable critical

stances that portray the regions prisons in terms of deficiencies, problems and the

failure to live up to legislative prescriptions (OLP, 2007) all point to explanations

that ultimately rest on some notion of state capability in the North and incapability

in the South. The problem with this kind of explanation is that it ranges impris-

onment and internment along a scale rather than treating them as qualitatively

distinct categories. In so doing, it precludes the significant possibility that each typeof confinement regime combines with other penal practices to produce a particular

form of criminal justice.

Viewed in isolation, internment looks like an empty and meaningless container

a simple holding action. And that may be all there is to it, at least in cases where

Birkbeck 321



17/27

inmates are subsequently to be expelled from society (through deportation or

death), or in which problematic social events such as wars (that generate the

need to confine groups such as aliens and captives) have well-defined and structur-

ally important conclusions (peace). But most crime is not dealt with by deportation

or death, and criminality (as an attribute ascribed to offenders) does not have a

clearly defined end. Therefore, holding criminals by internment inevitably raises the

question of how and when they will be released. It means that the heart of penal

social control lies in the journey back to society, not in the time away from it.

Whereas imprisonment enacts penal intervention through confinement, internment

enacts it through release.

I will focus briefly on several aspects of the criminal justice system in the United

States and Venezuela that fit with the preceding characterization. First, penal con-

finement in the United States is a sentencing option, and its use is determined bycriteria of appropriateness, such as criminal history and seriousness of the current

offence. In fact, currently, about 30 per cent of US convicted offenders are not

sentenced to prison at all, but to probation (mostly) and other non-confinement

sanctions (BJS, 2007). By contrast, in Venezuela penal confinement is prescribed

for all felony convictions and there is no possibility of sentencing to probation

(Venezuela, 2005). All convicted offenders therefore begin their sentence in a penal

facility; probation must be applied for by inmates and is treated as a type of early

release mechanism.

Second, the mechanisms for early release from penal confinement are fewer in theUnited States than in Venezuela and restricted to the final segment of the prison

sentence. Thus, in the United States work release and halfway house programmes,

when not used as an initial sentencing option, are only available to inmates within

four to six months of their release date (e.g. Knapp and Burke, 1992; Savage and

Dumovich, 1991). Discretionary parole, in many ways a progressive step down from

minimum security confinement, has declined markedly in the face of mandatory

parole, which simply adds a phase of penal supervision to an already completed

prison sentence (Petersilia, 1999). In Venezuela, work release is available after a

quarter of the sentence has been completed, halfway houses after a third, conditionalrelease after two-thirds, and confinement12 after three-quarters. In addition, pres-

idential pardons can be granted to inmates who have completed two-thirds of their

sentence (Ministerio de Justicia, 1997; Venezuela 2005, 2006). Given this array of

mechanisms, inmates naturally tend to focus more on getting out of confinement

than they do on getting through it (Birkbeck and Pe rez Santiago, 2006).

Third, criteria for awarding total or partial release from confinement tend to

look backwards in the United States and forwards in Venezuela. In the United

States, decisions concerning release are based mainly on criminal history and the

instant offence and partly on in-prison performance, the latter envisaged as whathas been done to make sure this criminal is no longer a danger before he is released

(Petersilia, 1999: 481). In Venezuela, decisions are based mainly on projected

arrangements for conventional living (family support, the offer of employment)

following release (e.g. Birkbeck, 2007, 2009) and in the oft-cited words




18/27

from the Penitentiary Law are concerned with concepts of social responsibility

and coexistence and the will to live according to the law (Venezuela, 2000:

Article 7).

Fourth, release decisions in the United States are in the hands of prison admin-

istrators and parole boards and are routinized through the use of computer systems

(that deduct good time, monitor and flag up time served, etc.) and through pre-

dictive instruments that indicate the probability of recidivism. In Venezuela, all

release decisions except presidential pardons are taken by judges. Judicial control

over release and presidential control over pardons not only reflect the importance

assigned to these decisions but also frame them as matters of justice (however

defined) rather than of management.

The attempt to explain the existence of imprisonment in the North and internment

in the South might profitably begin with this latter difference. In the United States,judicial involvement in criminal cases usually ends with the act of sentencing and

convicted offenders are handed over to prison and parole bureaucracies to serve out

their terms.13 The administrative uncoupling of sentencing from penal supervision

which arguably emerged 200 years ago has undoubtedly been an important stim-

ulus to the growth of those bureaucracies and to the penal projects that they have

envisaged or adopted. In Venezuela, judicial involvement in criminal cases is a con-

stant:14 even the release from confinement after serving a completed sentence requires

a judicial order. Judicial authority over the penal trajectory creates enduring links

between judges and convicted offenders, which the latter must seek to cultivate andexploit if they are to regain their freedom (Birkbeck and Pe rez Santiago, 2006).

Given this fundamental relation, those who staff the penal bureaucracy are merely

custodians for the judicial system and they generally know it. For convicted offen-

ders (and arguably also for those held in preventive detention), the content and

meaning of criminal justice is essentially supplied by the judges remote and often

inaccessible figures who vary from efficient to indolent, honest to corrupt, but who

control all penal destinies. This difference between North and South suggests that a

plausible explanation of imprisonment and internment could emerge from further

study of the roles of the judiciary in sentencing and penal supervision, and of thecultural and political processes that underpin those roles.15

Acknowledgements

This article was written for the University of Floridas programme on Crime, Law and

Governance in the Americas. My thanks to Michael Welch, Odilza Lines and colleagues

at the University of Florida for comments on an earlier version of this essay.

Notes

1. North and South are used as abbreviations for North America and Latin America.

2. Criminal law and criminal justice (with the exception of some police agencies) are

organized nationally. Within this framework, each state constitutes a judicial circuit.

Birkbeck 323



19/27

3. According to figures presented by Carranza (2003), the average level of overcrowd-

ing (prison population as a percentage of rated capacity) in Latin America was 147

per cent in 1999. This compares with the following situation in the United States: 134

per cent for federal facilities, 101 per cent for state facilities, 89 per cent for private

facilities (BJS, 2003) and 93 per cent for jails (BJS, 2001). In Canada, a recent

government report observed that in many jurisdictions, the number of incarcerated

adults has reached the levels of institutional capacity in recent years (Juristat, 2006:

19), therein suggesting that overcrowding has not been a recent problem, although it

may become so.

4. One consequence is the existence of a large number of prisoners without sentence

(Carranza et al., 1983) or punishment before trial (HRW, 1997), which has been of

so much concern to penal reformers in Latin America.

5. We were introduced to the cabo, or head man in the letra [dormitory], and began to

understand a little about how the prison was organised. There was the usual man-

agement team of hard men who ran the prison, but they, together with everyone

else in the prisoners organisation, played a dual role. To the prisoners, they were

the gremio, or management, and were the law within the prison, holding the power

of life and death over prisoners. . . To the prison authorities, though, they were

known as the prisoners committee, and met regularly with the prison director

and other officials to organise sports competitions, cultural events, educational

courses and other aspects of prison life. (MacNeil, 2006:200; cf. Marquart and

Crouch, 1985)6. When warring factions of inmates are not kept apart, a considerable number of deaths

can occur, as for example at the Sabaneta National Prison in Maracaibo, Venezuela,

where more than 100 inmates were killed in one day of internal conflict in January

1994 (HRW, 1994). Typically, this style of inmate self-government and conflict is also

accompanied by military containment and re-take strategies on the part of the author-

ities, which are prime opportunities for state brutality. The most egregious example

was the retaking of the Carandiru prison in Sao Paulo, Brazil, after a riot in October

1992, during which 111 inmates were killed (HRW, 1998).

7. When the demand for greater punitiveness has been particularly vocal, some ofthe frills of institutional life (the weight room, TVs and so on) may disappear

for a while (Riveland, 1999). However, there is little doubt that the material condi-

tions of life in North American facilities are now above those experienced by the

poorest segments of society: Prison staff must deliver services and programs to an

increasingly diversified inmate population. Staff must be sensitive to the lighting,

caloric intake of inmates, food temperature, recreational needs, cell size and popu-

lation density, racial and ethnic composition of offender living areas and cells, dis-

ciplinary requirements and personal security, health care, mail and correspondence

needs, hygiene needs, and a host of other issues on a daily and hourly basis(Marquart, 2005: 6).

8. However, there are isolated cases of judges ordering the closure of individ-

ual facilities, for example in Brazil (HRW, 1998: 19) and Venezuela (Martnez,

19931994).




20/27

9. These [penal] codes have been referred to as bright and shiny, which is a polite

way of saying that they are seldom, if ever, used in so far as the practice in the

prisons is concerned (Teeters, 1946: 24).

10. The organization of life within Mexican prisons is a mirror image of life in

Mexican society. That is to say that there are clear class and economic distinctions.

Those who can afford the quality amenities of life can purchase them (Olivero,

1998: 103).

11. del Olmo (2002: 377) posits that contemporary Latin American penal facilities

fall into three categories: (1) the prison-ghetto, which looks like a very poor urban

settlement and where inmates are self-governing and have much contact with family

members and the world outside prison (e.g. in Bolivia, Mexico); (2) the prison-con-

centration camp, characterized by high levels of violence perpetrated by inmates and

prison personnel, inmate self-government and very poor infrastructure (e.g.

Venezuela, Brazil); (3) the prison hotel, occupied mainly by wealthier inmates.

12. Confinement (confinamiento) dates at least from the Criminal Code of 1915 and

requires the person to reside in a municipality designated by the court and to report

periodically to the parish Prefect.

13. The most important exceptions are the recently developed reentry courts (based

on the drug court model) which move the court into a sentence management

role, overseeing the convicted persons eventual return to the community (Maruna

and LeBel, 2003: 92).

14. This contrasts with judicial oversight of penal facilities which, although mandatedby law (Venezuela, 1962, 2006), is rarely exercised.

15. One place to begin (but not end) this kind of exploration in North America would

be to look at therapeutic jurisprudence (e.g. Wexler, 2001; Winick and Wexler,

2003) and the sometimes heated reactions that it produces (Hoffman, 2002).

In Latin America, extensive discussion of jueces de vigilancia, or jueces de ejecucion

(sentence oversight judges) (e.g. Sa nchez Galindo, n.d.) tends to focus on their

potential role as prison ombudsmen rather than their role as penal case supervisors.

This latter role seems to be so taken for granted that it escapes comment among

those who research criminal law and criminal justice.

References

Aguirre C (2005) The Criminals of Lima and Their Worlds: The Prison Experience,

18501935. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Aldana JS (1972) Reten de Catia. Caracas: Editorial Fuentes.

Applebaum A (2001) A history of horror. New York Review of Books 48(16). Available

at: http://www.anneapplebaum.com/communism/2001/10_18_nyrb_horror.html.

Bayer T (1978) Gancho Ciego: 365 Noches y una Misa en la Carcel Modelo. Medelln:

Ediciones Hombre Nuevo.

Beck T (2005) The 2005 Correctional Officer: New Roles, New Inmates, New Challenges.

Presented to the Commission on Safety and Abuse in Americas Prisons on November

Birkbeck 325



21/27

12, 2005, St. Louis, Missouri. New York: Vera Institute of Justice, Commission on

Safety and Abuse in Americas Prisons.

Birkbeck C (2007) Variables associated with probation outcomes in Venezuela.

In: Deosaran R (ed.) Crime, Delinquency and Justice: A Caribbean Reader.

Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randall Publishers, 348367.

Birkbeck C (2009) El funcionamiento de la libertad condicional: Un estudio de caso de

la Regio n Andina de Venezuela, 19812004. Revista Cenipec 28: 2967.

Birkbeck C and Pe rez Santiago N (2006) The character of penal control in Latin

America: Sentence remissions in a Venezuelan prison. Criminology and Criminal

Justice 6(3): 289308.

BJS (Bureau of Justice Statistics) (2001) Census of Jails, 1999. NCJ 186663.

Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics.

BJS (Bureau of Justice Statistics) (2003) Census of State and Federal Correctional

Facilities, 2000. NCJ 198272. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics.

BJS (Bureau of Justice Statistics) (2007) Felony Sentences in State Courts, 2004. NCJ

215646. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics.

BOP (Bureau of Prisons) (2007) Policy Documents. Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of

Prisons.

Bretas ML (1996) What the eyes cant see: Stories from Rio de Janeiros prisons.

In: Salvatore R and Aguirre C (eds) The Birth of the Penitentiary in Latin

America. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 101122.

Bricen o-Leo n R, Camardiel A and A vila O (2006) Attitudes toward the right to kill inLatin American culture. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 22(4): 303323.

Bruton WJH (2004) The Big House: Life Inside a Supermax Security Prison. Stillwater,

MN: Voyageur Press.

Caimari L (2004) Apenas un Delincuente: Crimen, Castigo y Cultura en la Argentina,

18801955. Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI.

Caldeira TPR (2000) City of Walls: Crime, Segregation and Citizenship in Sao Paulo.

Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Campo Va squez R and Vargas de Roa RM (2003) World Factbook of Criminal Justice

Systems: Republic of Colombia. NCJ 199271. Washington, DC: Bureau of JusticeStatistics.

Carranza E (2003) Pol tica Penal y Penitenciaria en America Latina y el Caribe. Bogota :

Universidad Libre de Bogota /Instituto Latinoamericano de las Naciones Unidas

para la Prevencio n del Delito y Tratamiento del Delincuente. Available at: http://

www.bibliojuridica.org/libros/4/1727/6.pdf.

Carranza E, Houed M, Mora LP and Zaffaroni ER (1983) El Preso sin Condena en

America Latina y el Caribe. San Jose , Costa Rica: ILANUD.

Carrio n FM (2008) La carcel: Del Extranamiento a la Inclusion. Quito: FLACSO.

Cavadino M and Dignan J (2006) Penal Systems: A Comparative Approach. London:Sage.

CDCR (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation) (2007) Inmate

Visiting Guidelines. Sacramento, CA: California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation.




22/27

Comfort ML (2003) In the Tube at San Quentin: The secondary prisonization of

women visiting inmates. Journal of Contemporary Ethnography 32(1): 77107.

Co rdova TL (1999) Sabaneta: La Casa donde Crecen las Sombras. Maracaibo:

Universidad del Zulia.

CSC (Correctional Service of Canada) (2007a) Private Family Visiting. Cat. No. PS84-

1/2004. Ottawa, Canada: Correctional Service of Canada.

CSC (Correctional Service of Canada) (2007b) Home Page. Ottawa, Canada:

Correctional Service of Canada. Available at: http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/.

CSC (Correctional Service of Canada) (2007c) Policy and Legislation. Ottawa, Canada:

Correctional Service of Canada.

Damaska M (1986) The Faces of Justice and State Authority. New Haven, CT: Yale

University Press.

del Olmo R (1981) America Latina y su Criminolog a. Mexico: Siglo XXI.

del Olmo R (1998) The state of prisons and prisoners in four countries of the Andean

Region. In: Weiss RP and South N (eds) Comparing Prison Systems: Toward a

Comparative International Penology. Amsterdam: Gordon & Breach, 115139.

del Olmo R (2002) Por que el actual silencio carcelario? In: Bricen o-Leo n R (ed.)

Violencia, Sociedad y Justicia en America Latina. Buenos Aires: CLACSO, 369381.

Daz-Cotto J (1996) Gender, Ethnicity and the State: Latina and Latino Prison Politics.

Albany, NY: SUNY Press.

Downes D (1988) Contrasts in Tolerance: Post-War Penal Policy in The Netherlands and

England and Wales. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Feeley MM and Rubin EL (1999) Judicial Policy Making and the Modern State: How

the Courts Reformed Americas Prisons. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Feeley MM and Simon J (1992) The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of

Corrections and Its Implications. Criminology 30(4): 449474.

Feeley MM and Swearingen V (2004) The prison conditions cases and the bureaucra-

tization of American corrections: Influences, impacts and implications. Pace Law

Review 24(2): 433475.

Fleisher MS (1989) Warehousing Violence. Los Angeles, CA: Sage.

Foucault M (1979) Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. London: Peregrine.Gaes GG, Wallace S, Gilman E, Klein-Saffran J and Suppa S (2002) The influence of

prison gang affiliation on violence and other prison misconduct. Prison Journal

82(3): 359385.

Garland D (2001) The Culture of Control. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Garland D (2006) Concepts of culture in the sociology of punishment. Theoretical

Criminology 10(4): 419447.

Garland D (2009) A culturalist theory of punishment? Punishment and Society 11(2):

259268.

Gaucher B and Lowman J (1998) Canadian prisons. In: Weiss RP and South N (eds)Comparing Prison Systems: Toward a Comparative International Penology.

Amsterdam: Gordon & Breach, 6197.

Glidden WB (1973) Internment camps in America, 19171920. Military Affairs 37(4):

137141.

Birkbeck 327



23/27

Godoy AS (2005) Converging on the Poles: Contemporary punishment and democracy

in hemispheric perspective. Law and Social Inquiry 30(3): 515548.

Godoy AS (2006) Popular Injustice: Violence, Community and Law in Latin America.

Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Goffman E (1991 [1961]) Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and

Other Inmates. London: Pelican.

Hayashi BM (2004) Democratizing the Enemy: The Japanese American Internment.

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Hidalgo R and Jordan M (19931994) Amotinamientos carcelarios: De los cambios

administrativos a la ruptura del control (Sabaneta, Enero de 1994). Revista Cenipec

15: 125142.

Hoffman MB (2002) Therapeutic jurisprudence, neo-rehabilitationism, and judicial

collectivism: The least dangerous branch becomes the most dangerous. Fordham

Urban Law Journal 29: 20632098.

HRW (Human Rights Watch) (1994) Prison Massacre in Maracaibo. Publication No.

B601. Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch.

HRW (Human Rights Watch) (1997) Punishment before Trial: Prison Conditions in

Venezuela. New York: Human Rights Watch.

HRW (Human Rights Watch) (1998) Behind Bars in Brazil. New York: Human Rights

Watch.

Huggins MK and Mesquita MP (1995) Scapegoating outsiders: The murders of street

youth in modern Brazil. Policing and Society 5(4): 265280.INPEC (Instituto Nacional Penitenciario y Carcelario) (2007) Normas. Bogota :

Instituto Nacional Penitenciario y Carcelario.

Irwin J (2004) The Warehouse Prison: Disposal of the New Dangerous Class. Los

Angeles, CA: Roxbury Publishing.

Jacobs JB (1977) Stateville: The Penitentiary in Mass Society. Chicago, IL: University

of Chicago Press.

Jacobs JB (1980) The prisoners rights movement and its impacts, 19601980. Crime

and Justice 2: 429470.

Jefferson AW (2007) Prison officer training and practice in Nigeria. Punishment andSociety 9(3): 253269.

Jordan M (1996) Objetivos institucionales, definicio n de roles y procesos de comunica-

cio n: Una comparacio n entre las ca rceles de Me rida, Venezuela y Albuquerque, New

Mexico, USA. In: Gabaldo n LG and Birkbeck C (eds) Control Social y Justicia

Penal en Venezuela. Me rida, Venezuela: Universidad de Los Andes, 259291.

Juristat (Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics) (2006) Adult correctional services

in Canada, 2004/2005. Statistics Canada Catalogue No. 85-002-XIE, Vol. 26

No. 5.

King R and Maguire M (1994) Contexts of imprisonment: An international perspective.British Journal of Criminology 34(5): 113.

Knapp K and Burke P (1992) Residential Community Corrections Facilities: Current

Practice and Policy Issues. Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, National

Institute of Corrections.




24/27

Lacey N (2006) Historicizing contrasts in tolerance. In: Newburn T and Rock P (eds)

The Politics of Crime Control: Essays in Honour of David Downes. Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 197226.

Lappin H (2006) Statement of Harley G. Lappin, Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons,

before the Commission on Safety and Abuse in Americas Prisons. Presented on

February 9, 2006, Los Angeles, California. New York: Vera Institute of Justice,

Commission on Safety and Abuse in Americas Prisons.

Listwan SJ, Jonson CL, Cullen FT and Latessa EJ (2008) Cracks in the penal

harm movement: Evidence from the field. Criminology and Public Policy 7(3):

423465.

Lynch M (2001) From the punitive city to the gated community: Security and

segregation across the social and penal landscape. Miami Law Review 56(1):

601623.

MacNeil D (2006) Journey to Hell: Inside the Worlds Most Violent Prison System.

Preston, UK: Milo Books.

Marquart J (2005) The American Correctional Environment and Prison Officers.

Presented to the Commission on Safety and Abuse in Americas Prisons, November

12 2005, Saint Louis, Missouri. New York: Vera Institute of Justice, Commission

on Safety and Abuse in Americas Prisons.

Marquart J and Crouch B (1984) Coopting the kept: Using inmates for social control in

a Southern prison. Justice Quarterly 4(1): 491509.

Marquart J and Crouch B (1985) Judicial reform and prisoner control: Theimpact of Ruiz v. Estelle on a Texas penitentiary. Law and Society Review 19(4):

557586.

Martnez JF (19931994) Un caso de amparo penitenciario. Revista Cenipec 15: 6596.

Maruna S and LeBel TP (2003) Welcome home? Examining the reentry court from a

strengths-based perspective. Western Criminology Review 4(2): 91107.

McCartney JL (1933) Classification of prisoners. Psychiatric Quarterly 7(3):

369377.

McConville S (1998) Local justice: The jail. In: Morris N and Rothman DJ (eds) The

Oxford History of the Prison: The Practice of Punishment in Western Society.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 266294.

Melossi D (2001) The cultural embeddedness of social control: Reflections on the com-

parison of Italian and North-American cultures concerning punishment. Theoretical

Criminology 5(4): 403424.

Melossi D and Lettiere M (1998) Punishment in the American democracy: The para-

doxes of good intentions. In: Weiss RP and South N (eds) Comparing Prison

Systems: Toward a Comparative International Penology. Amsterdam: Gordon &

Breach, 2159.

Meyer J and OMalley P (2005) Missing the punitive turn? Canadian criminal justice,balance, and penal modernism. In: Pratt J, Brown D, Brown M and Hallsworth S

(eds) The New Punitiveness: Trends, Theories, Perspectives. Cullompton, UK: Willan

Publishing, 201217.

Miller D (1998) The Lord of Bellavista. London: Triangle.

Birkbeck 329



25/27

Ministerio de Justicia (1997) Instructivo para la Tramitacion de las Formulas de

Cumplimiento de Penas Pautadas en la Ley de Regimen Penitenciario e Indulto

Presidencial. Caracas: Ministerio de Justicia.

Moore D and Hannah-Moffatt K (2005) The liberal veil: Revisiting Canadian penality.

In: Pratt J, Brown D, Brown M and Hallsworth S (eds) The New Punitiveness:

Trends, Theories, Perspectives. Cullompton, UK: Willan Publishing, 85100.

NCDC (North Carolina Department of Correction) (2007) Assigning Inmates to Prison.

Available at: http://www.doc.state.nc.us/dop/custody.htm.

Neuman E (2004) La prisio n como control social en el neoliberalismo. Memoria del

Congreso Internacional de Cultura y Sistemas Jurdicos Comparados. Mexico:

Universidad Auto noma de Me xico (UNAM), 115141.

Newburn T and Sparks R (eds) (2004) Criminal Justice and Political Cultures.

Cullompton, UK: Willan Publishing.

Olivero JM (1998) The crisis in Mexican prisons: The impact of the United States.

In: Weiss RP and South N (eds) Comparing Prison Systems: Toward a

Comparative International Penology. Amsterdam: Gordon & Breach, 99113.

OLP (Observatorio Latinamericano de Prisiones) (ed.) (2007) A la Sombra de la

Sociedad: Situacion Penitenciaria en Latinoamerica. Caracas: Observatorio

Venezolano de Prisiones.

Perea CM (2003) El territorio es sagrado: Pandillas y guerras del pavimento en

Colombia. In: Llorente MV and Rubio M (eds) Elementos para una Criminolog a

Local: Pol ticas de Prevencion del Crimen y la Violencia en Ambitos Urbanos. Bogota :Alcalda Mayor, Secretara de Gobierno, 355375.

Petersilia J (1999) Parole and prisoner reentry in the United States. Crime and Justice

26: 479529.

Pinto Quintanilla JC (2007) Bolivia: Desde la ca rcel, democratizar el pas. In: Observatorio

Latinoamericano de Prisiones (ed.) A la Sombra de la Sociedad: Situacion Penitenciaria

en Latinoamerica. Caracas: Observatorio Venezolano de Prisiones, 83107.

Reisig MD (1998) Rates of disorder in higher-custody state prisons: A comparative

analysis of managerial practices. Crime and Delinquency 44(2): 229244.

Rico JM (1997) Justicia Penal y Transicion Democratica en America Latina. Mexico:Siglo XXI.

Rico JM (2003) Costa Rica. In: World Factbook of Criminal Justice Systems. NCJ

199273. Washington: Bureau of Justice Statistics. Available at: http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.

gov/content/pub/ascii/wfcjscr.txt.

Riveland C (1999) Prison management trends, 19752025. Crime and Justice 26:

163203.

Robertson J (1997) Houses of the dead: Warehouse prisons, paradigm change and the

Supreme Court. Houston Law Review 34: 10031063.

Rothman DJ (1971) The Discovery of the Asylum: Social Order and Disorder in the NewRepublic. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company.

Rothman DJ (1995) Perfecting the prison: United States, 17891965. In: Morris N and

Rothman DJ (eds) The Oxford History of the Prison. Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 117150.




26/27

Rotker S (ed.) (2000) Ciudadan as del Miedo. Caracas: Editorial Nueva Sociedad.

Saavedra E (1977) Informe sobre la visita mensual de funcionarios a las ca rceles dis-

tritales. Revista Prisiones, Segunda Epoca, No. 3, diciembre.

Salvatore R and Aguirre C (eds) (1996a) The Birth of the Penitentiary in Latin America.

Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.

Salvatore R and Aguirre C (1996b) The birth of thepenitentiaryin Latin America: Toward

an interpretive social history of prisons. In: Salvatore R and Aguirre C (eds) The Birth

of the Penitentiary in Latin America. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 143.

Sa nchez Galindo A (2004) El juez de vigilancia en el derecho comparado. Memoria del

Congreso Internacional de Cultura y Sistemas Jurdicos Comparados. Mexico:

Universidad Auto noma de Me xico (UNAM), 153177.

Sa nchez Galindo A (n.d.) La Judicializacion de la Administracion de Prisiones. Available

at: http://www.bibliojuridica.org/libros/4/1628/19.pdf.

Santiago-Valles KA (1996) Forcing them to work and punishing whoever resisted:

Servile labor and penal servitude under colonialism in nineteenth century Puerto

Rico. In: Salvatore R and Aguirre C (eds) The Birth of the Penitentiary in Latin

America. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 123168.

Savage DA and Dumovich M (1991) NIC Focus: Community Residential Programs.

Washington, DC: National Institute of Corrections.

Simon J (2000) From the big house to the warehouse: Rethinking prisons and state

government in the 20th Century. Punishment and Society 2(2): 213234.

Sozzo M (2008) Populismo punitivo, proyecto normalizador, y prisio n-depo sito enArgentina. Jura Gentium. Revista de Filosof a del Derecho Internacional y de la

Pol tica Global IV(1). Available at: http://www.juragentium.unifi.it/es/surveys/

latina/sozzo/index.htm.

SPFA (Sistema Penitenciario Federal Argentino) (2007) Legislacion. Buenos Aires,

Argentina: Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos. Available at: http://

www.spf.gov.ar/FramePPal/Legislacion/Newlegislacion.htm.

Starn O (1986) Engineering inte

Punishment & Society 2011 Birkbeck 307 32

Documents

Transcript of Punishment & Society 2011 Birkbeck 307 32