Punishment in Socratic Philosophy

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    The Problem of Punishment in Socratic PhilosophyAuthor(s): Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. SmithSource: Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science, Vol. 30, No. 4, Wisdom,Ignorance and Virtue: New Essays in Socratic Studies (December 1997), pp. 95-107Published by: De GruyterStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40913827.

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    TheProblemfPunishmentnSocratichilosophyThomasC. BrickhousendNicholasD. Smith

    Socrates1snotoriousor eing n ntellectualishats, newhobelievesthatveryoneoeswhat hey obecause fwhat hey elieve obegoodorbeneficialor hem. ecausehe alsobelieves hatt s never oodorbeneficialor nyone odowrong,hen llWhodowrong o so invol-untarilyn some ense, or llwrongdoersct n a waythat s actuallycontraryowhat hey eallywant.Accordingly,newouldexpect hattherewouldbenoroom tallfor unishmentnSocratic hilosophy,unless y punishment ereallymean implyomeform f nstruction.But n a numberfplaces nPlato s arly ialogues, ocrateseemstothink hat omepunishments,hoseeducationalmeritsre, tbest,unclear,reentirelyppropriate:or xamples,whippingCri51b5;HMa292b4-ll;Grg 80c8-dl ndperhaps 24c5),mprisonmentCri 1b5;Grg 80dl),finesGrg 80dl-2), anishmentGrg 80d2),ndevendeath(Grg 80d2-3,ndprobablyuthphral-3, c2-4).2ocratesharacterizes

    1 BySocratesnthis aper,wemean nly he haractery hat amenPlato s arlydialogues.2 It s curioushathosewhohavewrittennPlato s iscussionsf unishmentaveso ittleo ay bout his roblem. ackenzie,orxample,eemsatisfiedo xplain

    themore uzzling unishmentsefind sfunctioninghroughsimpleondition-ing see, .g., 87).Wearenever old yMackenzie owthismightit rfail ofitwith ocraticntellectualismr ocrates onceptionfmotivation.aundersoticesthe roblem,ut cceptshatt s implyfailuren he ocratichilosophy:Clearlythiss nonsense166).

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    many f hese orms fpunishments evils at east f heywere obeinflictedponhim seeAp37b5-e2). etSocratess alsowell-knownorclaiminghat neought ever oreturnarm or arm r evil for vil(Ap25c5-6a7, 9b7-9, 7a5-6, 7b2-5; ri49a4-cll;Grg 79c8-e9, ep ,335b2-e5).f uchpenaltiesre vils, ow anheadvocate he se of uchpunishments?ven f hey re not lways vils, twould seem hat,norder obeproper unishments,heywouldhavetoeducatehewrong-doer n someway.There ppears, hen, obe a tension etween heintellectualismo evidentn theApology,or xample,nd theforms fpunishmentocrateslsewhere ndorses.Inthis aper,we seek o olve heproblemfpunishmentnSocraticphilosophy.ur rgumentill how hatllof hekinds f unishmentsSocrates ndorsesan nddo serve n educationalunction hen ightlyapplied,where uch n educationalunctionanbeconstrued, oreover,in way hatscompatible ith ocraticntellectualism.owever,nthefinal ectionf hepaperwe showthat ocrates iew ofhowpleasureaffects otivationequireshat unishmentometimese nflictedvenwhen t erves o direct ducative unction.heburden f he inal artof hepaper s to showhowSocrates cceptancefnon-educativeun-ishmentnsuch ases s consistentith is ntellectualism.I SocraticntellectualismInthemiddle art f heGorgias,ocrates iscusseswith oluswhetheror not thetyrant, ho can do whatever e thinkss best, s trulypowerful. s the rgumentnfolds,ocrates nd Polusagree hatwealwayspursuewhatwe thinks bestfor s,and so never ursuewhatwethinks bad for s. Because ll desiresdesire orwhat sgoodfor s(Grg 68a5-b6), owever,t followshat llwrongdoings theproductof cognitiveailure.his swhy ocrates oes not ccept hepossibilityof krasia,he oing fwhat nerecognizesssomethingad orharmfulto oneself.3Wrongdoing,hen,must e a product ffalse elief:we dowrong,whenwedo,bybelievinghatwhatwe do isgoodfor s, when,nfact,it snot. fwe supposed hatwhatwe weredoingwas actually adfor

    3 This ssue s discussed t engthn Brickhousend Smith85-102).hefollowingsummarizeshatwepresentnmore etail here.

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    us as t s, ccordingoSocrates, hent swrong r vil), henwewouldnotdo it.Butnot veryones a good udgethatwhat hey redoing sevil, nd noteveryoneealizes hat ll evil s bad for hosewho do it.There an be two differentorms fmisapprehensionnwrongdoing,therefore:1) onecoulddo thewrong revil, hinkinghat twas rightorgood, r 2)onecoulddo thewrong r vil, alselyupposinghathewrong revilwouldbenefithewrongdoer.nthe irstase,plainlyhebest orrective ouldbe to how hewrongdoerhatwhathe or hehasdonereallyswrong revil. uchpersons eed the ort fmoral duca-tion ywhich hey ouldbecome etterudgesofrightndwrong.Wehaveargued lsewherehat he estwayto do thiswouldbe to ead theexamined ife , s Socrates xhorts is urors o do in theApology(38a5-6).4n the econd ase,thebestcorrective ouldbe to show thewrongdoer ow and why t is thatwrongdoings injurious o thewrongdoer,ust s Socrates oes with olus ntheGorgias.o,for othof hepossible orts f gnorancenderror, hich rethe oot ausesofallevil, he est orrective ouldappear obe tosubjecthewrongdoertoSocraticxamination,rsomethingike t.II Punishment,Wrong, nd HarmSocrates ntellectualism,y tself,oes not ntail ny pecificheoryfpunishment.ntellectualism,y tself,scompatible ith heview thatcorrectionf thewrongdoers not theonly or eventhe main-purposeofpunishment.ut a Socraticheoryfpunishmentan beinferredrom isconvictionhat t swrong ver oharm nyone,veninreturn or arms onetoone Ap25c5-6a7,9b7-9,7a5-6,7b2-5; ri49a4-cll;Grg 79c8-e9,ep , 35b2-e5).rom histfollowshatt s notopen oSocrates oaccept nyform fpunishmenthats harmfulotheonepunished.5rotectingocietyrom hewrongdoer,hen,annot ea sufficientxcusefor oing omethingothewrongdoerhatwould

    4 See BrickhousendSmith18-23).5 Socrates tatementntheCrito,that if ne fails opersuade he ity],nemusteverywhereowhateverne scityndcountryemands751b9-cl),may eem obe a counter-exampleothis laims, or heLawsrecognizehat hey an makemistake51e9). ut, f ourse,t snot he ntentf he awstoharmhe ersonhatthey unish,ndthis s all that ocrateshinksnemust ever o.

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    98 Thomas . Brickhousend Nicholas . Smith

    harmhim or her.Butexactlywhichforms fpunishmentoes thisprohibitionule ut?To answer hisquestion,we shall have to look morecarefullytSocrates onceptionfwhat onstitutesarm.t s nowwell-knownhatSocrateswas an eudaimonist one who connects heconceptionfgoodnesswith udaimoniahappiness).n an earlier tudy fSocratesethicalhought,6e showed hat ocrates elievedhathe nly bsolutegood- thats,the nly oodthatwas sufficientor appiness,sgoodactivity.hat which s conducive o vice and evil activity,ocratesregardss evil ndharmfulreciselyecause tpromotes retchedness,theopposite fhappiness. ut he pecific ay nwhich ocrates on-ceivesof these inkagesmplies hatmany f thethings ormallye-garded s goodscan,when mployed yviceor gnorance,ctually eevils orharms. hegoodlooksof theconfidencertist r therobusthealth fthe hief reexamples.twouldbe betteror hemo be ugly,poor, rphysicallyisabled.Ofcourse,twouldbe far etter or hemto spire ovirtue. ut twouldnone he essnot ount s a harmf omesufferinghat rustratednd diminishedheirbilityocarryuttheirwrongdoingsefellhem.7Wearenow n positiono eewhywhatmight ell ounts awrongorharmfor nepersonwould not be a wrong r harmfor nother:penaltiesuch s imprisonmentrbanishment,hichwould ake wayone sfreedomfmovementr xpression,orxample, ouldbewrongand harmfulo Socrates ecause hisactions im at what s goodforhimselfndhisfellow thenians.his swhyhesays uchpunishmentswouldbe eviland harmfultohim) n theApology.o one whoperpe-tratesvil,however,he oss wouldberightndbeneficial notonlyfor hosewhomight therwiseecomevictimsfthepreventedvils,but also for hosewho would otherwise ave done the evil deeds.Imprisonmentnd banishmenthatwe inflictponthewicked renotonlynotwrongs,heyrenotharms othem.

    6 SeeBrickhousend Smith103-36).7 Weagree,hen, ith nly art fVlastos nalysisf he ocraticiewofpunish-ment.We agree hat ocrates hinkshat ightfulunishments nota form freturningrong orwrong. ut, ecause ocratescceptsheirquivalence,ocra-tes lsobelieveshat ightfulunishmentsnot matterf eturningarmor arm.See Vlastos179-99,sp.186-7).

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    III Punishmentnd MoralCorrectionOurexplanationfSocrates iew ofpunishments as yet ncomplete.Whatwehave said works nly or unishmentshat erve s a kind frestraint,hichpreventshewrongdoerrom ursuing urthervils.Socrates lso endorses ertain orms fpunishment for xample,whipping whosepurposessurely ot implyo restrainhewrong-doer.How, then, ould Socrates ndorse ucha variety fpainful,alienating,isabling,nd evenfatal atastrophess ustpunishments?One possibleanswerto thishas been offeredalbeit n a ratherincompletend ndirect ay)bya number f cholarswhobelieve hatan importantevelopmentnPlato stheoryfhumanpsychologyc-curswithin heGorgias.8n thediscussionwithPolus,Plato sSocratesacknowledgesnlyone form f motivation:esireforbenefitand,presumably,he orrespondingversion oharm); ut t s sometimesclaimed hatbythetimewe find ocrates peakingwithCallicles,distinctnd independentorm f motivation one which s inde-pendent f the desirefor enefit is introduced,amely, esireforpleasureandthe orrespondingversion opain).9Thosewhoargue hatwefind changen the onceptionfmotiva-tion etweenhediscussion ith olus ndthe newith alliclesmightapply hemore ophisticatedonceptiono theproblemfpunishmentby supposinghat ocrateswouldregard ainful orms fpunishmentas effectiverecisely ecause theywork on thewrongdoer snde-pendentdesire forpleasure. n thisview,the work theseforms fpunishmenterformss to chasten hewrongdoer sppetiteor leas-urebybringingtunder he ontrolf he ationalmotivationallement.Elsewhere, e have rgued gainsthe iew hat heGorgiasontainstwo ncompatibleheoriesf humanmotivationt leastpartly n thegroundhat f heresa shiftwayfrom ocraticntellectualism,t omeswithoutnyclear ignal rom lato.10 ut ven fPlatodidintroduce

    8 See Cornford306-7,nd317); rwin1979), ote n507b, 22, nd 1977), 23-4;Kahn89-90);Mackenzie161-62).9 Inthis iew, latos, n heGorgias,orkingisway owards he venmoreomplexpsychologyf theRepublicndPhaedrus,hichprovide hreeistinct orms fmotivation:he ational,he humoticr pirited,nd the ppetitive.

    10 See BrickhousendSmith97-101).

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    newtheoryfmotivationnthe iscussion ith allicles,twillnothelpus to olve he roblemf unishment.ocrates ndorsementfvariouspunishmentsccurswithinrgumentativeontextsnwhich he llegednewtheoryfmotivationas notyet een ntroduced.ecall hatmostof he roblematicassages nwhich ocrates efersopunishmentshatappear ll-suitedohis ntellectualismccurwithin hediscussion ithPolus, speciallytGorgias80c8-d3. hey lsoappear n theCritoat51b5), heHippiasMajor at292b4-ll), nd theEuthyphroat9al-3and9c2-4).fwe must esort o theviewthat latochangedhistheoryfmotivation,n order oexplain ll ofthereferenceso various orts fpunishments,ewillhavetomove he hiftnthe heoryfmotivationnow to nclude hediscussion ith olus, ndalso to nclude heCrito,HippiasMajor,ndEuthyphro)erhapswemightven uppose hat hemore ophisticatedheory ad been there ll along.But t is in theargumentith olusthat ocratesxplicitlyrticulateshe iew hat lldesires desire orwhat sgoodfor s (Grg 68a5-b6).o,apparently,tleast tthis ointn the rgument,here reno forms fmotivationhataimatanythingtherhan enefit.11

    IV CorrectionndFaulty eliefsSince henewmotivationalheoryomeclaim ofind nthe atter artof theGorgias ould notresolve hedifficultye areaddressing, emust eturno ourproblem: owcould Socratesuppose hat unish-mentsuch swhippingould erve s correctionsowrongdoershenthere ppearsto be no placeinhismotivationalheoryor distinctaversion opain andwhen,bythe ights f his intellectualism,herelevantorrectionas tobea cognitivene?Of ourse,ocraticntellectualismllowsforwrongsobe committedfor varietyf reasons.nparticular,n agentmight ail o calculatecorrectlyhe onsequencesf ome ction,o that he esultingarm sunintended.n cases such s these,ducationsappropriaten so far s

    11 Thispoint ffectivelyullifies ackenzie s ccount fpunishmentntheGorgias,whichppeals o he llegedhangen he sychologicalheories ithinheGorgias.(Seenote ,above.)Mackenzie ever otices rquestionsocrates pparentn-dorsementfwhippingsa formf unishmentn he iscussion ith olus tGrg480c8-d3,nd this assagedoesnot ven ppearnthe ndexocorumoher ook.

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    theharm esults romome ackofunderstanding.ducation,otpun-ishment,lso seems he ppropriate eans f orrectionhere he gentfalselyupposes hat hewrongdoings actuallyn example fdoingwhat sright. his sort fcase that ocrates as inmindwhen, nthecross-examinationn theApology,e ridicules hefolly f Meletusposition. s Socratesays here,t s not he usiness f he aw tobringpeopleto courtfor ucherrors, ut, nstead, o provide hemwithinstructionnd admonishmentnprivateAp26al-4).But heresyet notherauseofwrongdoing,nwhichhewrongdoerplainly oesintend owrong nd harm ome other rothers,ut thistime he error s in thinkinghatby doingso,he will achieve omeadvantage orhimself.Whatwould lead anyone o commituch anerror?resumably,he rror ere,fwe aretopreserveocrates implemotivationalheoryndintellectualism,ust ie n how suchpersonswouldconceive fwhat enefitonsistsn,for lainly hey o not hinkthat enefits only o be achieved hroughmorally oodactions. heerror ere, hen, omesfromeparatingmoralgoodnessfrom thersupposedgoods, nd regardinghe other oodsas trumpingr out-weighingmoral oodness. his spreciselyhe oint ocratessmakingintheprotrepticassage n theEuthydemus278e3-81e5) henhesaysthatheregards one ofthe hingso many f other eopletake o begoods- health,wealth, leasure,nd honor to haveany ntrinsicvalue of heir wn.Socratessconvincedhat heresonly nethinghat sgood n tself:virtue281d2-el).12nlythis nvariablyenefitstspossessor; heseother o-calledgoodsbenefitnlythosewho are alreadygood,andactually armthewicked.Because all desire s desireforbenefit,tfollows hat llwrongdoersave benefits their im. notherwords,wrongdoersho akewealth,rhonor,rpleasureobe moremportantthan moralgoodness mistakenlyupposethat ll-gotten ealth, rhonor,rpleasurewillbenefithem.If he onnectionhewrongdoer akes etweenwrongdoingnd tsperceivedenefitsor hewrongdoer ere evered, e wouldno ongerbe attractedowrongdoing.ivenhis ownconceptionfbenefit,hen,ifhewere obecome onvinced hat given ort fwrongdoing ould

    12 For discussion f his oint,nd ts mportantonsequences,ee BrickhousendSmith103-36).

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    bring imust he pposite fwhathe was seeking,hat ort fwrong-doing, tleast,wouldno longer e attractiveo him.As such,we cannow seewhywhipping,mprisonment,anishment,nd fines rprop-ertyonfiscationsouldcount o Socrates s appropriatehingsodo tocertain rongdoers.uchpenalties enefithewrongdoernso far sthey hange hecognitiveonnectionhewrongdoermakesbetweenwrongdoingnd benefit.uchcorrectionsre, dmittedly,ncomplete- surely,t would be betterfthewrongdoerameto hold therightgeneral iewofwhatbenefitonsistsn, nd the ssential lacevirtueoccupieswithin hat onception.ut t houldnowbe clear hat reciselybecausehewrongdoerndergoes favorablehiftn hisbeliefsboutwhatparticularctswillproducebenefit,hewrongdoer smprove-ment, roducedby thepain ofthewhip,can be understoodn theintellectualistaySocratichilosophyequires.V Punishmentnd CureTo the xtenthat hewrongdoero longer elieveswrongdoingro-videshimwith nybenefit,hewrongdoersclearlymadebetterff,ortothat xtent e lacks nymotivationoengage nwrongfulcts.Butthis annot ethe nly eason ocrateshinkshat he nflictionfpainasa punishmentsa goodforhewrongdoer.irst,heresa straightfor-ward ense n which uch personsnot ured.n theGorgias,ocratesseems othink hat ffectiveunishmentoesmuchmore hanmerelyincrease he ikelihood hat hewrongdoerwill find iciousactivityunprofitable.t the ndofhisdiscussionwith olus, ocrates eviewswhywevalue the raftsfmoney-making,edicine,nd ustice:Thenmoney-makingreess fromoverty, edicinerees s fromllness,ndjustice dike) rees s fromntemperancendinjustice478a8-bl, lso479dl-2).He then oesonto xplainwhy unishment akes hewrong-doerbetter ff hanhe wouldbe werehe toescapepunishment:Was,then,unishmentdiknidonai)ot he elease romhe reatestf vil?... fort emperssandmakesmoreust, nd ustice ringsbout cure(iatrik)or he vil 478d4-7).As ong sthe riminalontinuesohold hewrong onceptionf hegood,hisreluctanceoengagenvice scontingentponthe trengthfthe inkbetween hepunishmenteceived ndhis belief hatfuturevicious ctionswill resultnpunishment. e caneasily magine itu-ations e.g., herobber ho hasbeenbeaten everelyor isthieverybutwhohasexcellenteason naparticularccasion o hink ewillnot

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    getcaught inwhich t wouldonlybe rational, iven misguidedconceptionf hegood, or he reviouslyunishedriminalorevertowrongdoing.nemightrgue, f ourse,hathiswouldonly how hatthe riginalunishmentasnot ufficientlyevere nd that ad tbeenso, he riminal ouldneverhink ewas n situationnwhichtwouldbe beneficialo do wrong.But this s possibleonly fwe think hatpunishmentan nstilln rrationalear fgettingaughthat salwayssufficientodeter he obber.hismay e a possibilitynsome ccountsofhumanmotivation,utnot nSocrates .Before e askhowpunishmentouldcurehewrongdoer,e woulddowell firstoaskwhy ocrateshinkshatwrongdoingsalwaysbadfor hewrongdoer.fweareright,ocrateshinkshat ll vicemanifestsitselfn thepursuit fthewrong ort fpleasures.As we haveseen,accordingo Socrates ntellectualism,he viciousperson akes suchpleasures o bebeneficial,or ethinks hat y having hem ewillbebetter ff. ocrates requentomparisonsetweenvice and diseasesuggesthat e thinkshatust s illness nflameshe ody ndkeeps tfromunctioningell, o vice nfectshe oul ndkeeps tfromerform-ing tsfunctionfgoverningndmanaging ell, Rep , 53elO-ll). orSocrates, ice consists,n part, n a falsebelief hat ertain orts fpleasures ught obepursued. uch disastrous eliefmaybe formedby isteningo adviceof hewrong eople.But f oming oacquire heworst ort f haracter ere nly matterf akinghewrong eople ooseriously,ocrates ouldhavenoreason o ay, s hedoes n heGorgias,that ice,unless reated,ecomesingrainedaniaton480b2]).We canexplain henotion f belief ecomingngrained,owever,fwethinkthat ocratesakes he xperiencef omepleasuresohavethe owera)tocausethe gent othink hat leasures f hat ort regoodand b)tohinder, r even toprevent,ationalhinkingbout theagent sgood.Because f b),Socrates hinks fharmfulleasures s like ntoxicants.If his sright,hedanger f isteningoCallicles svery eal, or emaywellpersuade ne tobelieve hat life fviolent leasuressgood.Andbecauseof a),as we wouldexpect,t s evenworse o actonCalliclesadvice nd topartake f hemost iolent leasures.Ifpunishmentsactuallyocure newhohas become onvincedhatthemost iolent leasuresrebeneficial,hen hewrongdoer ust irstbe freed rom he ntoxicatingontrolhat leasure as overhim. ocra-tesmight ell uppose hathe nflictionf ainfor nact fwrongdoinghaspreciselyhat ffect.hus, fterufferinghepainofthewhip, orexample,he hiefs more ble to consideroberlywhethertealingsthebetter ourseforherto take.Ofcourse,herewe mustaskwhy

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    Socrates ouldcount his s a cure , or urelyhe hiefmay till hinkthat hewillprofitrom utureheftsnd that ircumstancesight esuchthat utureunishments,egardlessfhowsevere,re worth hegain.Ifwe recall ocrates nalogies etweenmedicine ndphysicalrain-ing, n the nehand,withegislationnd criminalustice, espectively,on the therseeGrg 17e3ff.),e can seethat ocrates oes nothavetosupposethat he cure ofpunishment ustmake hewrongdoerntosomeonewhonever ouldorwouldperformnjusticegain.To dothis,punishmentouldhavetomake hewrongdoerirtuous.ut ocrateshas eenno evidence hat ven hemost ssiduous ursuitf hilosophi-cal nquiry,she conceivest, an achieve hat.Inourview, ocrates hinkshat unishmentcures hewrongdoerand rids thewrongdoerf njustice,otby replacinghewrong on-ception fthegoodwith notheronception,r evenby replacinghewrong onception ith hebelief hat t swrong, ut rather ith nopenness oquestionwhat hegoodis. Ifso,whenSocratesaysthatpunishmenthould cure ,he does not mean that hewrongdoerssomehowndemnifiedgainst ll future rongdoing.here snothingabout he xperiencef hepainofpunishmenthatwouldpreventhethief romisteningoandbeing ersuaded y omeone othink hat eshouldengage ncrime gain.Moreover,ven after unishment,hewrongdoerannever e sure hat ewillnot xperienceome speciallyviolent leasure ychance, e captivatedy t, nd revert o his unre-flectiveife fvice.Butunlesshe suffershepainofpaying hepenaltyfor iscrimes,ewillcontinueothink,mindlessly,hat hepleasuresfor he akeofwhich esteals rethegreatestenefitsecanpossess. fthis s correct,yseeinghowto solve theproblem fpunishmentnSocratichilosophy, e learn omethingfthefirstmportanceboutSocrates onceptionfvice.Vice s notmerelyalse elief bouthowtolive; t sfalse elief bouthow to ivethats itself ot ntirelypentoreason.We cannow see whySocrates harply istinguishesetween hepersonwhohasmistakenlyoncludedhat life fvicious leasure-seek-ing s goodbut whohas notyetexperiencedhosepleasures,nd aperson, hohas experiencediolent leasures nd, thus,mindlesslythinkshey re good.The formermay yetbe improved y Socraticdiscussion,or emayyet each notheronclusionnthe asisofwhatseemsmost easonable.he atter,owever,eedspunishment,or nlythe ainof unishmentor specificct fwrongdoingillfree er rompleasure sontrol.t lsofollowsromhis ccounthat ot ven ocrates

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    isimmune romeing aken verviolent leasures houldhe, hroughsomemistakermisfortune,appen oexperiencenespeciallyntoxi-cating leasure. ocratess wiser han thersnpart ecauseherealizesthat uchpleasures reto be avoided.Buteven this humanwisdomgiveshimnospecialpower oovercome leasure s ffectnthemindonce hemindhasexperiencedt.The distinctionetween ne who hasmerelyoncludedhat life fvicious leasure eekingsgoodand one who hasactually xperiencedviolent leasures ells s somethingmportantbout ocrates oncep-tion fvice.To be sure, he oulof nyonewhomerelyelieves iolentpleasuresgood s indanger: ivenhisfalse eliefbout hegood, t slikely hathe willpursueviolent leasure,with he ubsequent esultthat ewillno onger ecapable freflectingbout hegood.Neverthe-less,until eactually amples hepleasures evalues, uch personsstill apable fbeing uled yreason, nd,hence,s notyet icious. hesoul oftheviciousperson,nthe ther and, lready uffersheharmofbeingncapable freasoningbouthowbest o ive, harm owhichthepersonwithmere alse eliefbout hegood s, syet,merelyiable.Corporal unishment ayhelp he icious ersono eewhy he houldnotpursue iolent leasure. utbecause orporal unishmentctuallyfrees he oulfromleasure s rasp,tremoves heharm hat onstitutesvice nd so cantrulye said to cure hewrongdoer.Finally,tdoesnot ollow romhe act hat unishmentsim tcuringthe nepunishedhat hey analwaysdo so.Pleasuresmayvaryntheeffecthey ave on the ouls ofthosewhoexperiencehem.Moreover,if eft ntreated,ome oulsmay ind hathehold hat leasure as overthem rowsncreasingtrong.f o,that ripmay ecome ostronghatno amount fpunishmentanrelease he oul. uchpersonsredoomedmindlesslyoremainonvincedhat hewrongort fpleasuresgood;no amount fpaincan make hem uestionheironviction.We are now n a positionoseewhy,nthegreatmytht the ndoftheGorgias,ocrates tates hat unishmentanbeappropriateneitherof woways:

    Punishment akes veryone, henhe hasbeenpunished ightlyyanother,ecome etterndprofitromt, rbemade nexampleo heothers,norder hatwhen thers ee the ufferingshich e endureswill, nfear, ecomebetter. hosewho havecommittedemediablewrongsre the nesbenefitedndpaythepenalty ygodsandmen.Nevertheless,t s through ainandsufferinghat hey chieve heirbenefit,othhere nd nHades. For heresno otherwaytoberidof

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    injustice.utfor hosewho havedonethemost xtreme rongs,nd,as a consequence,ecomerremediable,romhesexamplesremade.Theythemselveso longer rofit,incethey re irremediable,utothersrofit ho ee themnduringor heir rongshegreatestndmostpainful nd mostfearfulufferinghroughoutll time. Grg525bl-c6)There stragedyere forome, he nly enefitfproper unishmentmust otoothers,ndnot o hewrongdoerimself.13vengodscannotcorrect hathas beenruined ythemost gregious rongs.Proper unishmentorwrongdoers,hen, alls ar hort fwhatwemightonceive s an ideal. Thosepunishedmaybe madebetter,utmuch fwhatmade hem owrongobeginwithmay emain ith hem.Inendorsingunitivecorrections ,ocrates id not maginehat uchcorrectionsere deal solutions o theproblemfwrongdoing.uthisdimviewof venhisownpowers f orrection,hich imedfor ighergoals, eft im, ealistically,ithnoclearlyetterption han hose hestate egally rovided. is pessimismbout hehuman apacityo bemadegood,however, as notworsenedrconfusedy contradictorypositionegardinghegoalsandmethods f riminalorrections.un-ishment, as,for ocrates,ot problemor he oherencefhisviews,but necessaryeaturef hehuman ondition.twas an nstrumentorthe emediationf vils,whichhough heyould ecome uinous,ouldnever,nall ikelihood,ewholly liminated.

    13 This eaturef ocrates onceptionfpunishmentoesunnoticedyMackenzie,whowronglylaims hatsomeattemptso remove is [sc.thewrongdoer s]disposition such s deterrentunishmentswill urn ut obe neffective,incehe cannot elpwhathe does/ 146).Mackenziemisseshow t s that eterrentpunishmentsanbeeffective,ithin ocrates onceptionfmotivation,reciselyby changinghepotential rongdoer selevant eliefs bout the connectionsbetween ertainctionsndthe enefitshey esire.Mackenzieater ttributeshedeterrentspect f his assage othe lleged hangesnthe sychologicalheoryintroducednthe iscussion ith allicles.Seenotes and11, bove.)

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    BibliographyBrickhouse,.C., ndSmith, .D.Plato s ocrates.ew York ndOxford: xford niver-sity ress, 994.Cornford,.M. The Athenianhilosophicalchools,. ThePhilosophyf Socrates .nCambridgencient istory,ol. 6 (1933)302-9. ambridge: ambridge niversityPress.Irwin, .H. Plato sMoral heory.xford:xford niversityress, 977.

    .Plato s orgias.xford: xford niversityress, 979.Kahn, .H. On theRelativeateof heGorgiasnd he rotagoras .xfordtudiesnAncientPhilosophy(1988) 9-102.Mackenzie, .M.Plato nPunishment.erkeley,osAngeles,nd London:UniversityfCaliforniaress, 981.Saunders,.J. lato s enal ode. xford: xford niversityress, 991.Vlastos,G. Socrates:ronistnd MoralPhilosopher.thaca nd Cambridge: ornell ndCambridgeniversityresses,991.