William T. Box, with the artillerygroup's advance party, "we hikedup from Munda using a nativeguide. I remember we hikedthrough jungle most of the way. Iremember I was scared. I rememberI was glad to see that open areawith the supply parachutes" left bythe Army. Soon afterwards, BatteryB moved to Piru and on 2 Septemberparticipated in the shelling of Vila. AJapanese defender there with the 8thCombined Special Naval Landing Forcewrote in his diary, with "the situa-tion as it is, one just can't help butdistrust the operational plans of theImperial Headquarters."

Dead at his post, this Japanese soldier liesby a smashed 37mm antitank gun near theairfield. As the tanks broke through, the in-fantry followed and the fighting continueduntil the positions were overrun or buriedin the rubble.

Marine Corps Historical Collection

The artillery group used the ser-vices of spotter aircraft, but becauseof enemy gunfire, switched fromthe light observation planes toGrumman TBFs because theirarmor plating gave the pilotsgreater protection. First LieutenantDonald V. Sandager and SergeantHerschel J. Cooper flew these mis-sions over Kolombangara. "We bothvolunteered to a request from MajorHiatt. When we reported to MundaAirfield we had no parachutes andwere told each flier had to have hisown," recalled Sandager. "The pi-lots were inexperienced and flewup from Guadalcanal each morn-ing and we had to direct them tofind the battery and Kolomban-gara. Radio communication withthe battery was bad." AdmiralHalsey noted the artillery groupand Lieutenant Colonel O'Neil'sability to "utilize air spotting andthe accuracy of their fire whichstood out above other more experi-enced groups."

The peak of enemy air activityover Munda Airfield occurred thenight of 14-15 September whenenemy planes kept gun crews atbattle stations all night. The 90mmgroup expended 3,378 rounds,downing one plane and causingmost of the enemy planes to jettisontheir bombs over the jungle or the

27

sea. At Vila, a Japanese commanderreported, "it had become very diffi-cult to fire the antiaircraft guns asthe enemy places their artilleryupon our position immediatelyafter we commence firing upon theaircraft." At Piru, Japanese counter-battery fire hit the artillery groupthroughout September and the firsttwo days of October. A number ofthe enemy artillery projectiles failedto detonate and there were no casu-alties from the shelling.

On 15 September, General Sasakiwas ordered to evacuate his remain-ing 12,400 men from Kolombangara.The next month on 3 October, whileflying his assigned air spotter mis-sions, Lieutenant Sandager reportedVila evacuated; the Japanese hadpulled out. Lieutenant ColonelScheyer was pleased to state that forthe "first time in this war the enemyhad been driven from his base by

Other Japanese defenses included this25mm automatic dual-purpose twin-bar-relled gun in position on the airfield ap-proaches. These proved to be deadly againstboth American air and ground forces.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 69975

Marine Corps Historical Collection

Close-in air defense around the airfield was accomplished by regrouping defense battalionassets from Rendova, Laiana, and Zanana. This "Twin-Twenty" is at Munda, and is onone of several types of mobile mounts at New Georgia.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 58411

This 1 August 1943 bombing attack struck Marine positions on Rendova, only wounding one Marine, but destroying a height finder with flying coral.

bombing and artillery fire." Heconcluded that at Kiska it wasbombing and ship's gunfire, atKolombangara it was naval gun-fire, bombing, and artillery fire thatturned the tide. The final action ofthe campaign was a sea battle on6-7 October when U.S. Navy de-stroyers intercepted Japanese evac-uation ships during the Battle ofVella Lavella.

The Japanese air effort slackenedconsiderably in October, and cameto an abrupt halt in November1943. While at Munda Airfield, the9th Dfense Battalion accounted foreight more enemy planes. Numer-ous alerts, conditions red, and gen-eral quarters stand-tos that began

an hour before dawn and an hourafter sunset, had occurred daily forall gun crews. In early November,Battery A moved to Nusalavata Is-land and Battery B to Roviana Is-land where the 155mm guns cov-ered Munda Bar and the easternapproach to Blanche Channel re-spectively. Lieutenant ColonelScheyer remained in command ofthe 9th until 3 November, when hewas assigned to I Marine Amphibi-ous Corps and the command wasturned over to Lieutenant ColonelArchie E. O'Neil.

On 22 November, the 9th De-fense Battalion was attached to VICorps Island Command for occu-pation duties. On 31 December, the

28

battalion, with the exception ofone radar crew and two search-light sections, was relieved of theMunda Airfield defenses by theArmy 77th AAA Group. The 9thDefense Battalion spent severalweeks in camp in the Munda areawaiting for transportation. Theseweeks were not idle as centralcamps for the several groups hadto be set up and improved. Train-ing schedules, begun in the laterstages of the campaign, were car-ried out. Transport ships wereavailable for the trip to the RussellIslands beginning on 13 January1944 and continued until the en-tire battalion move was com-pleted on 25 February.

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The fighting by the 9th DefenseBattalion contributed considerablyto the victory of the land forces onNew Georgia, and demonstratedthe value of advance base defense.The 9th was in action againstJapanese aircraft on 59 differentdays, for a total of 159 fire missionsand 249 alerts, with 46 enemyplanes downed. Not counted inthese statistics were aircraft dam-aged or diverted from their in-tended targets and forced to under-take less accurate nighttimebombing missions. The fire of155mm guns destroyed a numberof enemy artillery positions andtroops on Munda, Baanga, andKolombangara. Numerous pill-boxes and machine gun positionswere destroyed and enemy troopskilled by the tank platoon on NewGeorgia Island. Although the firingbatteries and tanks were the mostactive elements of the battalion,other components of the battalionwere deeply involved in the fight-ing also. The battalion also de-stroyed a machine gun positionand killed three Japanese on Ren-dova and killed another 22 enemyand captured two prisoners atZanana.

Battalion losses throughout thecampaign were remarkably few: 13dead, 1 missing, over 50 woundedin action, and other non-battle casu-alties. Malaria caused a number ofthe Marines to be evacuated. Gen-eral Griswold summarized the bat-talion's performance by concludingthat every "officer and man of theorganization has reason to feelproud of its accomplishment." The IMarine Amphibious Corps com-mander, Lieutenant GeneralAlexander A. Vandegrift, said "howproud I am to belong to the sameoutfit as they do."

Milk Runs and Black Sheep

The first Marines to fight atNew Georgia were the aircrewswho were sent to blunt Japanese

efforts to establish an airfield atMunda Point in December 1942.Thus began a routine air and seapounding of the Munda Airfielduntil ground forces could captureit for Allied use.

For Marine flyers, these missionsevoked "a parade of impressions—long over-water flights; jungle hillsslipping by below; the sight of thetarget—airfield, ship, or town, some-times all three; the attack and the vio-lent defense; and then the seeminglylonger, weary return. . . . "The roleof land-based aviation in the CentralSolomons Campaign was critical, be-cause the Japanese air effort had tobe neutralized before Allied air andground forces could climb up theSolomons ladder towards Rabaul.Unless the Allies could capture suit-able airfields closer to the Japanesebase areas at Rabaul and Bougain-yule, the air war would be limited inrange and effect. The Guadalcanalairfields were 650 miles from Rabaul,Munda Point was a somewhat-closer440 miles. For Marines aviators,

29

Munda was a rung on the ladder thatended at Rabaul.

The air war for the CentralSolomons was a series of sorties—fighter sweeps and bombing runs.For aviation units, the operatingarea was divided into the combatarea, the forward area, and the reararea. These zones shifted as thecampaigns moved north towardsthe Rabaul area. While the 1st and2d Marine Aircraft Wings were pre-sent in the Southern Pacific,Marines flew under a joint air com-mand, Commander AircraftSolomons (ComAirSols). Rear Ad-miral Marc A. Mitscher's ComAir-Sols was comprised of three subor-dinate segments: Bomber, Fighter,and Strike Commands. Strike Com-mand was led by Colonel ChristianF. Schilt, who had been awarded aMedal of Honor for heroism inNicaragua in 1928, and FighterCommand was under Colonel Ed-ward L. Pugh; both veteran Marineaviators in a structure where experi-ence, "not rank, seniority, or ser-

Flight Clothing and Equipment

light clothing was considerednaval aviation equipmentrather than a purely Marine

Corps uniform and was strictly func-tional. Basic items included leatherboots, leather gloves, goggles, acloth helmet that contained head-phones, and a one-piece cottonkhaki flying suit. Captain John M.Foster, flying from Munda, stated hewore a flying suit and then slung a"leather shoulder holster containingmy 45-caliber automatic over myneck and buckled the belt, strungwith my hunting knife, first-aid kit,extra cartridges and canteen,around my waist." He also wore abaseball cap and carried his flyinghelmet, goggles, and gloves. In ad-dition, the pilots carried 65 poundsof parachute, rubber raft, and "jungle pack."

The Douglas R4D 'Skytrain'

Not all aircraft in the Central Solomons were fightersor bombers. The Douglas DC—3 Skytram or Dakota(C—47 in the Navy version) was designed in 1933,

and became the standard American transport of the war.The plane was an all-metal monoplane with twin enginesand retractable landing gear. It was powered by two Pratt &Whitney radial engines of 1,200 horsepower each. It carried

a crew of three, 28 passengers or 18 stretchers, and threemedical attendants. It could also carry up to 6,000 poundsof cargo at average speeds of 185 miles-per-hour. The U.S.Navy and Marines had some 600 Skytrains, designated asR4Ds. In the Central Solomons they were used for air re-supply and medical evacuation. The Marines were stillusing the C117, a variation of the R4D into the 1970's.

vice," was paramount. The Marinesquadrons flew Grumman F4FWildcats, Grumman F6F Hellcats,and Chance-Vought F4U Corsairs inFighter Command; and Grummanor General Motors TBF Avenger tor-pedo bombers and Douglas SBDDauntless dive bombers in StrikeCommand. Also operating in thetheater was Marine Aircraft Group25, the South Pacific Combat AirTransport Command (SCAT), whichflew unarmed transport planes,Douglas R4D Skytrains, bringing insupplies and replacements and

evacuating wounded withoutfighter escorts such as the bombingmissions had. Some 40 othersquadrons were in rearward bases,making a total of 669 aircraft avail-able for the Central Solomons cam-paign. They were opposed in the airby the Japanese Eleventh Air Fleetand Japanese Army air units de-fending New Guinea.

The Corsair, known as the"Whistling Death" to the Japaneseand the "Bent Wing Widow Maker"to the Marines, was delivered inMarch 1943 in time to have eight

30

Marine squadrons available for theNew Georgia campaign. The Cor-sair, along with the new F6F Hell-cat fighter, dominated the air-to-airbattle to sweep the skies of the Japan-ese. This superiority was enhancedby Army Air Corps aircraft, the Lock-heed P-38 Lightning, for example.Once introduced, each new aircraftversion could do a little more thanthe basic models; it could fly higher,fly longer, and carry more armamentthan its predecessor. Advances inradio detection and ranging (radar)and communications continued as

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Not all aircraft in the Central Solomons were fighters a crew of three, 28 passengers or 18 stretchers, and threeor bombers. The Douglas DC—3 Skytrain or Dakota medical attendants. It could also carry up to 6,000 pounds(C—47 in the Navy version) was designed in 1933, of cargo at average speeds of 185 miles-per-hour. The U.S.

and became the standard American transport of the war. Navy and Marines had some 600 Skytrains, designaLed asThe plane was an all-metal monoplane with twin engines R4Ds. In the Central Solomons they were used for air re-and retractable landing gear. It was powered by two Pratt & supply and medical evactiation. The Marines were stillWhitney radial engines of 1,200 horsepower each. It carried using the C117, a variation of the R4D frito the 1970's.

well to ensure the control systemskept pace with the aircraft.

One Marine with Fighter Com-mand, Major John P. Condon, re-called that ComAirSols routinelystruck the airfields of southernBougainville "with escorted bombers,night attacks by Navy and MarineCorps TBFs, and some mining atnight of the harbors." He went onto observe that the shorter-rangeSBDs were "invariably escorted intheir routine reduction effortsagainst the fields in New Georgia."Routine did not mean safe, as theJapanese just as routinely madetheir fighter presence known. Navalofficer and novelist James A. Mich-ener heard a pilot observe that hewas "damned glad to be the guythat draws the milk runs." But, "ifyou get bumped off on one of them,why you're just as dead as if youwere over Tokyo in a kite."

One incident occurred that sym-bolized the joint nature of the air ef-fort, the destruction of the aircraft

transporting Admiral Isoroku Ya-mamoto, who had planned the at-tack on Pearl Harbor. Allied intelli-gence agencies learned that theadmiral and his staff would fly toKahili on 18 April 1943. AdmiralMitscher ordered Fighter Com-mand to intercept Yamamoto's air-craft. Planning for this mission fellto the Fighter Command's deputy,Lieutenant Colonel Luther S.Moore, who scheduled Army long-range P-38 Lightnings fitted withNavy navigational equipment forthe task. The flight plan was pre-pared by the command operationsofficer, Major Condon. Yamamoto'splane was intercepted and shotdown, ending the life of one ofJapan's major combat leaders.

At the end of April 1943, theJapanese Eleventh Air Fleet launcheda series of determined, but unsuc-cessful, attacks to disrupt the Alliedbuildup on Guadalcanal and in theRussell Islands. These continuedthrough the month, and on 16 June,

ComAirSols planes intercepted andvirtually destroyed 100 Japaneseaircraft before they reached theirtarget, the New Georgia invasionfleet. By the end of the month, theAllied forces were landing on NewGeorgia and the Japanese lost thebattle to disrupt the offensive. TheJapanese responded with repeatedraids against shipping and landingareas, but the balance of air powerwas decidedly with CommanderAircraft Solomons. A Marine air-man wrote that the Japanese werecreating an ever-growing number ofMarine, Army, and Navy fighteraces in the process.

By June, Marine Aircraft Group(MAC) 21 was pounding away atMunda, but not without losses. Hy-ing from Guadalcanal and RussellIslands, ComAirSols fighter andstrike aircraft covered the Toenailslandings and subsequent operationsashore. From 30 June 1943 throughJuly, there were only two days thatdid not have "Condition Red" and

The first Marines to fight in the Central Solomons campaign were and elsewhere on New Georgia prior to the landings. In 1943, thethe airmen based on Guadalcanal and the Russell Islands. They flew planes were painted, from top to bottom, sea blue, intermediate blue,the Douglas SBD Dauntless dive-bombers that struck at Munda and semi-gloss sea blue, with insignia white undersurface.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 81420

31

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dogfights with Japanese aircraftover the objective area by Alliedcombat air patrols. At the sametime, Japanese naval forces were lo-cated and attacked, thus forcing theJapanese to move at night by cir-cuitous routes with landing bargesalone. Bomber and Strike Com-mand aircraft ranged as far north asBallale, Bum, Kahili, and the Short-lands in concert with Fifth Air Forcestrikes at the same locations.

Despite this pressure, the Japan-ese continued to attack Allied forcesfrom the air. ComAirSols planeswere not able to operate effectivelyat night within range of Allied anti-aircraft artillery that could not tellfriendly from enemy aircraft. An-other obstacle to total Allied successwas the dense jungle-covered ter-rain that hindered identification tar-

gets and accurate assessment of theresults of air strikes.

For efficient air control for theNew Georgia operation, AdmiralMitscher set up a new command,Commander Aircraft New Georgia(ComAir New Georgia), as part ofthe landing force and under MarineBrigadier General Francis P. Mul-cahy, who commanded the 2d Ma-rine Aircraft Wing. ComAir NewGeorgia had no aircraft of his own,but controlled everything in the airabove or launched from a NewGeorgia airfield. Mulcahy and hisstaff ensured command, control,and coordination of direct supportair for the New Georgia OccupationForce after it had landed.

ComAir New Georgia establishedits command on Rendova after theassault waves landed on D-Day, 30

June 1943. From Rendova, he beganto integrate the air defense and sup-port system to provide XIV Corpswith direct air support. On 11 July,Commander Aircraft Segi underLieutenant Colonel Perry 0.Parmelee was established underMulcahy's direct command. Theground forces were ashore on NewGeorgia and pushed ahead atZanana and Laiana and were poisedat the edge of Munda Airfield at theend of July. Mulcahy provided airsupport to the infantry advance atMunda Point and against otherJapanese-held areas on New Geor-gia. By the end of the campaign,Mulcahy had ordered over 1,800preplanned sorties mainly flown bySBDs and TBFs against targets atViru, Wickham, Munda, Enogai,and Bairoko.

The Vought F4U Corsair, such as these on the Russell Islands, pro-vided much of the air support in the New Georgia campaign. Here

32

they taxi out from revetments onto the air strip to meet Japaneseplanes coming down The Slot from Bougainville and Rabaul.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 61335B

BGen Francis P. Mulcahy, Commander Air Solomons, at right, athis headquarters at Munda. On the left is Army Air Force Col

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 59989

Fiske Marshall and lstLt Dorothy Shikoski, an Army nurse whoflew with Marine transport squadrons during medical evacuations.

In addition, there were some 44close air support strikes using adhoc forward air control and tacticalair control parties from Mulcahy'scommand. This was a significantstep in the evolution of the air con-trol system that eventually formedthe air-ground team for theMarines. Close air support mis-sions were planned in detail theday prior to execution. The re-quested missions went to Mulcahyand, if he approved, they thenwere forwarded to Guadalcanal,the Russells, or Segi Point forscheduling. The next day these air-craft reported to a rendezvouspoint and contacted an air supportparty on the ground which usedradio, lights, smoke, or air panels todirect the strike. General Mulcahycommented that the use of aircraft

close to the frontlines "proved to beimpractical" with accuracy.

The R4D Skytrains of MAG-25 de-livered 100,000 pounds of food,water, ammunition, and medicinethat was the Northern LandingGroup's only source of supply attimes. This support prompted oneMarine raider to ask that the air dropcontainers be combat, or spread,loaded as on one occasion they re-covered 19 of a 20-container loaddrop and "only later discovered themissing drop contained medicinalbrandy." Air drops of supplies wentto the other ground forces as well,throughout a campaign fought indifficult, trackless, terrain.

On 25 July, a massive strike con-sisting of 66 B-17 and B-24 bombersin concert with naval gunfire shipsstruck at Lambetti Plantation, fol-

33

lowed by an 84-plane strike on anti-aircraft artillery positions at BiblioHill. This was coordinated with thefinal drive to take the campaign'smain objective, Munda airstrip. TheJapanese continued to delay the 43dInfantry Division and another strikefollowed on 1 August by a 36-planeattack of SBDs and TBFs, protectedby some 30 fighters.

After the capture of MundaPoint, General Mulcahy moved hiscommand from Rendova to Mundaairfield to set up strike and fightercontrol at Kokengolo Hill. In aJapanese-built tunnel that NavySeabees had cleared of debris anddead, Mulcahy was able to conductround-the-clock operations. Thefirst fighters assigned to Mundalanded at 1500 on 14 August.While safe, the Seabee-cleared shel-

-.'

ter was also hot and smelled of itsformer dead occupants. On 15 Au-gust, Mulcahy sent VMF-123 and-124 fighters from Munda and Segifields to cover the Vella Lavellalandings, during which theyclaimed 26 Japanese aircraftdowned. On this day, VMF-124'sFirst Lieutenant Kenneth A. Walshbegan a streak that would eventu-ally earn him the Medal of Honorfor shooting down 21 Japanese air-craft. After accounting for threeaircraft over Vella Lavella, hebrought his Corsair back to Munda

Field with 20mm holes in thewings, several hydraulic lines cut,a holed vertical stabilizer, and aflat tire.

From 16 through 19 August1943, the Japanese shelled the air-field in the day and bombed it atnight. The artillery threat waseliminated with the capture ofBaanga Island, but the air raidscontinued with intermittent bomb-ing and strafing through the fall.From then, until the establishmentof airfields on Bougainville threemonths later, Munda Field was the

scene of intense activity as planeslanded and took off to strike atRabaul and Japanese shippingwhich were first trying to supply,and then evacuate, ground forces.Many barges were destroyed inthe withdrawal that took some9,400 Japanese off Kolombangara.Admiral Halsey believed that3,000 to 4,000 other Japanese werekilled during these evacuations.

Captain John M. Foster, an F4Upilot, wrote about flying during thistime and his first mission fromMunda. "Never had I attempted to

Munda Airfield was an essential element in supporting Allied air Augusta Bay on Bougainville in November 1943, Munda was thesupport in the battles for Vella Lavella, Bougainville, and New scene of intense aviation activity.Britain that followed. Until air fields were established at Empress

34

Marine Corps Historical Collection

Here Batteries A and B set up at Piru Plantation to shell Vila.The counterbattery exchanges with the Japanese on Kolorn ban-gara gave the battle a personal note. Soldiers from the 25th In-

Marine Corps Historical Collection

fan try Division add graffiti to a shell to be sent as a "Messagefrom FDR" at the campaign's end.

land a plane on a field as narrowand short as the Munda strip," herecalled. Rolling onto the taxiway,he was thankful for the 2,000 horse-power of engine to "plow throughthe mud." The crews lived in tentsand messed in a screened framedbuilding chow-hall which theSeabees built. The air units provideddawn to dusk coverage, with thenight spent in rest and recovery. Thenight's sleep was often disrupted bythe appearance of a single Japanesebomber variously called "WashingMachine Charlie," "Louie theLouse," "Maytag Charlie," or "othernames less printable."

On 24 August, ComAir NewGeorgia at Munda was relievedby Commander Aircraft Solomon'sFighter Command, at which time,General Mulcahy turned over hisresponsibilities to Colonel William0. Brice. Mulcahy's staff continuedto coordinate liaison and spotteraircraft and strike missions launch-ing from Munda Field until re-lieved of these responsibilities byComAirSols on 24 September.

"Success in the air is a lot of littlethings," observed VMF-214's com-mander and Medal of Honor recipi-ent, Major Gregory (Pappy) Boying-ton, and most of them "can be takencare of before takeoff." With theJapanese air bases now within closerrange of Allied aircraft, Boyingtonand others conducted fighter sweepsof 36 to 48 planes that were classicsof their kind. Throughout this, es-corted bomber and strafing attackscontinued. The capture and use ofMunda Field was now felt by theJapanese "in spades" observedFighter Command's Condon, as divebombing and strafing attacks againstthe enemy were daily routine.

On 28 August, First LieutenantAlvin J. Jensen of VMF-214 was lostin a rainstorm over Kahili andwhen he broke through the cloudshe found himself inverted over theJapanese field. Turning wings level,he proceeded to shoot up the flight-line and accounted for 24 enemyaircraft on the ground. Photographsconfirmed the damage and Jensenearned the Navy Cross for this

35

work, described as "one of thegreatest single-handed feats" of thePacific War.

During this time, LieutenantColonel Frank H. Schwable'sVMF(N)-531 arrived in the Russellsto begin night-fighter operationsalong with a similar Navy unit.Using ground-controlled radar in-tercept vectors, the squadron'sLockheed PV-1 Venturas thenclosed for the kill using the air-craft's on-board radar. This beganthe Marines' ability to deny theJapanese the cover of darkness overVella Lavella and elsewhere.

Air support during the CentralSolomons campaign was consideredof high quality by all commanders.Aviation historian and veteran Pa-cific War correspondent RobertSherrod estimated that of the 358aircraft the Japanese lost during thiscampaign, 187 were destroyed byMarine air. More significant werethe resultant deaths of highlytrained and experienced pilots andcrews whom the Japanese could notreplace. Marine aviation unit casual-

—p

% V

ties for operations in the CentralSolomons were 34 of the 97 Alliedaircraft lost. As a postscript to NewGeorgia operations, on 20 October1943, Commander Aircraft Solo-mons moved to Munda to use theairfield as his headquarters fromwhich he would fight the NewBritain and Bougainville campaigns.

A Joint Pattern for Victory

The last Japanese air attacks onNew Georgia came the nights of 16and 17 January 1944, but by thenthe campaign was finished and thefinal score taken. Army historianJohn Miller quoted a senior officeras concluding that the heavily out-numbered Japanese stood off nearlyfour Allied divisions in the courseof the action, and successfully with-drew to fight again. One Japanesenoted at the time that the:

Japanese Army is stilldepending on the hand-to-hand fighting of the Meiji Erawhile the enemy is usinghighly developed scientificweapons. Thinking it over,

however, this poorly armedforce of ours has not beenovercome and we are stillguarding this islandIn his postwar memoirs, Admi-

ral Halsey commented on how thesmell of burnt reputations in theNew Georgia campaign still filledhis nostrils. The smoking reputa-tions Halsey referred to came asthe result of outright reliefs andtransfers of senior officers and theywere not limited to any one ser-vice. Numerous changes weremade in the command structureuntil he got the commandersneeded to produce results. Thepayoff to the New Georgia opera-tion resulted in the Vella Lavellalandings that bypassed Kolomban-gara and successful Bougainvilleand New Britain campaigns thatdemonstrated the pattern for suc-cessful joint operations there andthroughout the Pacific War.

The Army had 1,094 men killedand 3,873 wounded in the fightingfor New Georgia, while the Marinessuffered 650 casualties in all. TheMarines came through in better con-

dition than might have been other-wise expected. Morale during the pe-riods of greatest danger had beenhigh. In the last two months of thecampaign with enemy activity virtu-ally nonexistent, the effects of therough conditions showed to a certainextent, but at no time, was there anyslackening in the performance ofduty. For most of the campaign, shel-ter and sanitation were absent andthe food, though usually of sufficientquantity was seldom appetizing.

It was felt after the Solomons cam-paign that "struggle for control of theSolomon Islands was a critical turn-ing point in the war against Japan.These campaigns can best be appre-ciated as a sequence of interactingnaval, land, and air operations." Thecontribution to the ability to conductjoint operations was measured in thedifferences between the fighting onNew Georgia in the summer 1943and the success realized atBougainville and Cape Gloucesterlater in the year. Here was a patternfor joint operations, and, as coast-watcher D.C. Horton phrased it, itwas a "pattern for victory."

Even though the 9th Defense Battalion Artillery Group posi-tions at Munda Airfield were bombed, they continued to fire

36

at assigned targets. Here elements of Battery A smolders afteran air raid. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) Photo 56830

I

I

'V

The basic sources for this pam-phlet were the second volume in theseries History of U.S. Marine CorpsOperations in World War II, Isolationof Rabaul, written by Henry I. Shaw,Jr. and Maj Douglas T. Kane, USMC(Washington: Historical Branch, G-3Division, HQMC, 1963), and MajJohn T. Rentz, USMCR, Marines inthe Central Solomons (Washington:Historical Branch, HQMC, 1952).Other books used in this narrativewere: Adm William F. Halsey and J.Bryan III, Admiral Halsey's Story(New York, McGraw Hill, 1947);Saburo Hayashi and Alvin D. Coox,Kogun, The Japanese Army in the Pa-cific (Quantico: Marine Corps Asso-ciation, 1959); RAdm Samuel E.Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Bar-rier: History of U.S. Naval Operationsin World War II, vol VI (Boston: Lit-tle Brown and Company, 1950);Robert L. Sherrod, History of U.S.Marine Corps Operations in WorldWar II (Washington: Combat ForcesPress, 1952); Charles A. Updegraph,Jr., U.S. Marine Corps Special Units ofWorld War II (Washington: Historyand Museums Division, HQMC,1972); Col Joseph E. Zimmer, TheHistory of the 43d Infantry Division(Baton Rouge, LA: Army and NavyPublishing Co., 1947); John Miller,Jr., Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul(Washington: Office of the Chief ofMilitary History, Department of theArmy, 1959). In addition, in the Ma-rine Corps Historical Center, Wash-ington Navy Yard, Washington,D.C., are the Marine CorpsArchives, which contain much pri-mary source material produced bythe Marine Corps units in the fight-ingin the Central Solomons. Also inthe Center are the Oral History andPersonal Papers Collections, con-taining many first-hand accountsof the operation.

The author wishes to thank mem-bers of the raider, aviation, and de-fense battalion reunion groups andassociations which provided letters,:manuscripts, and recollections toaid in the writing of this history.

M ajor Charles D. Melson, USMC (Retired)is originally from the San Fransciso Bay

area. He is married to Janet Ann Pope, a formerNavy Nurse.

Major Melson completed graduate educationat St. John's College in Annapolis. He is acoauthor of The War that Would Not End, avolume in the official history of Marine Corpsoperations in Vietnam, and is the author of

Vietnam Marines. He served as a historian in the Marine Corps Historical Center,Washington Navy Yard, for six years and continues to deal with the past as thedirector of The Queen Anne's Museum of Eastern Shore Life in Maryland. MajorMelson was a Marine for 25 years, 1967 to 1992, and served in Vietnam in a varie-ty of Fleet Marine Force positions. He was a history instructor at the United StatesNaval Academy, and served also at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.

THIS PAMPHLET HISTORY, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines in theWorld War II era, is published for the education and training of Marines bythe History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,Washington, D.C., as a part of the U.S. Department of Defense observanceof the 50th anniversary of victory in that war.

Printing costs for this pamphlet have been defrayed in part by the DefenseDepartment World War II Commemoration Committee. Editorial costs ofpreparing this pamphlet have been defrayed in part by a bequest from theestate of Emilie H. Watts, in memory of her late husband, Thomas M. Watts,who served as a Marine and was the recipient of a Purple Heart.

WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

DIRECTOR OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUMSBrigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret)

GENERAL EDITOR.WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

Benis M. Frank

CARTOGRAPHIC CONSULTANTGeorge C. MacGillivray

EDITING AND DESIGN SECTION, HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISIONRobert E. Struder, Senior Editor; W. Stephen Hill, Visual Information

Specialist; Catherine A. Kerns, Composition Services Technician

Marine Corps Historical CenterBuilding 58, Washington Navy Yard

Washington, D.C. 20374-0580

1993PCN 190 003121 00

WORLD WAR II

50thNN LF.<SARV

WAR