PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

45
1 © 2011 IBM Corporation Dennis Eichelberger IT Specialist IMS Advanced Technical Skills [email protected] Guardium Encryption for IMS data
  • date post

    19-Oct-2014
  • Category

    Technology

  • view

    563
  • download

    1

description

 

Transcript of PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

Page 1: PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

1 © 2011 IBM Corporation

Dennis EichelbergerIT Specialist IMS Advanced Technical [email protected]

Guardium Encryption for IMS data

Page 2: PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

2Copyrite IBM 2013

Topics

• What are the business needs driving data protection

• Intro to data protection terminology

• An encryption solution from IBM for IMS databases

Page 3: PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

Copyrite IBM 2013

The Primary Source of Breached Data are Database Servers

Source: http://www.verizonbusiness.com/resources/reports/rp_data-breach-investigations-report-2012_en_xg.pdf

Source of Records Breached (2012)

0 20 40 60 80 100

% of Records Breached

All other sources <1%

Desktop/Workstation 34%

Mail server 2%

Reg employee/end-user 1%

Database server 96%

Web/app server 80%

POS server 1%

Page 4: PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

Copyrite IBM 2013

LensCrafters -- Mainframe Breach Luxottica Group S.p.A. owns LensCrafters chain and world's

largest supplier of high-end eyewear

Personally Identifiable Information (PII) for 59,419 employees stolen, with victims in all 50 states

"Generally, mainframes are not accessible to the Internet, so the hacker most likely had to compromise other systems internally before getting to the mainframe," said Chris Petersen, a former IT auditor with Price Waterhouse and Ernst & Young.

Sources: http://www.internetnews.com/security/article.php/3787431/Mainframe+Breach+at+LensCrafters+Parent+Hits+59K.htm http://privacy.wi.gov/databreaches/2008/nov08.jsp

Polo Ralph LaurenPradaVersace brands

Ray-BanDolce & GabbanaDonna Karan

Page 5: PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

Copyrite IBM 2013

LensCrafters -- Mainframe Breach “As mainframes become a major component in service-oriented

architectures, they are increasingly exposed to malware. Web services on the mainframe have had a significant impact on security.” -SearchCompliance.com

Page 6: PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

Copyrite IBM 2013

TJX Companies -- Security Breach

Parent company of T.J. Maxx, HomeGoods, Marshalls, etc. A security breach originally reported to have occurred in May of 2006

was not discovered until December of the same year A forensic investigation by IBM and General Dynamics

showed the breach may have occurred in July of 2005 How much did the breach cost TJX Companies?

• Initial estimate: $4.5B ($100 per stolen record)• Later estimate: Up to $300 per stolen record

Sources: http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9014782/TJX_data_breach_At_45.6M_card_numbers_it_s_the_biggest_ever https://www.braintreepayments.com/blog/pci-compliance-and-the-cost-of-a-credit-card-breach

http://www.informationweek.com/news/199203277SearchCompliance.com

Page 7: PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

Copyrite IBM 2013

Certegy -- an Insider Tale Certegy is a subsidiary of Fidelity National Information Services

that provides check authorization & check cashing services, partly for the gaming industry

Senior DBA sold 8.5 million customer records containing the following for $580K to data broker

Data theft came to light after retailer reported correlation between transactions and receipt of marketing offers by its customers

• Certegy engaged the U.S. Secret Service, which found data had come from separate company owned by the Certegy DBA

• “Why did it take Certegy more than five years to find out that confidential consumer information was being sucked out of its database?” (St. Petersburg Times)

NamesAddresses Birth dates

Bank account info Credit card info

Sources: http://www.sptimes.com/2007/11/15/news_pf/Northpinellas/Largo_man_stole_data_.shtmlhttp://www.prnewswire.com

Page 8: PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

Copyrite IBM 2013

Settled class-action suit for $4 million, plus:• $975,000 in fines from Attorney General• Mandatory security audit every year• 2 years of credit monitoring services ($180 per customer)

Rogue DBA sentenced to nearly 5 years in prison

Certegy -- an Insider Tale

Sources: http://www.sptimes.com/2007/11/15/news_pf/Northpinellas/Largo_man_stole_data_.shtmlhttp://www.prnewswire.com

Page 9: PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

Copyrite IBM 2013

Other Real-World Examples of Insider Threats

Unauthorized changes to financial data• DBA accidentally deleted critical financial table during production

hours (was doing a favor for application developer, bypassing change process)

• Outsourcer erased logs showing he made changes during the day (because it was more convenient than during the night)

Theft of sensitive data• Departing employees stealing design information & other intellectual

property• DBAs and outsourcers selling customer information to competitors and

crime syndicates

Page 10: PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

Copyrite IBM 2013

Other Real-World Examples of Insider Threats

Internal fraud• Mortgage processor -- insider changed credit scores to make loans

look better• Mobile telecom -- insider created & sold pre-paid phone cards• Electric utility -- insider gave free service to friends and family as part

of low-income assistance program• Health provider -- insider sold medical identities for insurance fraud

Page 11: PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

Copyrite IBM 2013

The Smarter (& More Secure) Mainframe

71% of the Global 500 run on mainframes• 100% of the world’s top 50 banks• 22 of the top 25 retailers

Unique IT value proposition• Efficiency, utilization & server consolidation• Proven reliability, availability & quality-of-service

• z/OS with IMS, SAP, WebSphere, InfoSphere Warehouse, Cognos 8 BI, …

• z/VM & Linux with Oracle, MySQL, Cognos, …• Virtualization

Robust Security Model

• Built-in encryption with hardware acceleration• z LPAR hosting is the only server with Common Criteria EAL5

certification• z/OS, RACF & Tivoli zSecure Audit protect access to system

resources (CICS, DB2, IMS…)

Page 12: PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

12Copyrite IBM 2013

Data Protection Drivers

Industry Compliance

Regulatory Compliance

Information Governance

Page 13: PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

13Copyrite IBM 2013

Industry Compliance Driving Data Protection

PCI “Payment Card Industry” compliance…• World-wide accepted standards that protect against credit

card fraud- Requires adaptation of business controls to protect against

compromising sensitive data• Examples of standards- Protect stored cardholder data- Restrict access to cardholder data by business on a

“need-to-know” basis- Restrict physical access to cardholder data

Page 14: PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

14Copyrite IBM 2013

PCI “Payment Card Industry” compliance (cont’d)• PCI standards require sensitive personal information of

credit card holders to be encrypted, including:- Account number- Expiration date- Name and address- Social Security number

• Compressed data is not acceptable as data encryption

Industry Compliance Driving Data Protection

Page 15: PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

15Copyrite IBM 2013

Regulatory Compliance Driving Data Protection Governmental Regulations

• Basel III (2010-2011)− Measurement of total banking risk based on capital adequacy,

stress tests and market liquidity risks• Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002)

• Strengthen financial reporting and internal controls by fixing responsibility within a companies’ management

• HIPAA (1996)− Provide national standards for electronic health care records

and secure those medical records, prove how they have been used and who has used them

Page 16: PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

16Copyrite IBM 2013

Regulatory Compliance Driving Data Protection Governmental Regulations

• Patriot Act (2001)- Prevent usage of the financial system to support illegal

activities, particularly terrorism• Various anti-money laundering (AML)- Prevent the laundering of money derived from illegal activities

• Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (1999)- Protection of personally identifiable financial information (PII)

Page 17: PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

17Copyrite IBM 2013

Data Protection - Not Just an Activity for One Group

Initial concerns and questions

- What is the right database encryption solution?- Would the application need to be modified?- Would application performance be impacted?- Which group will own key management?- What is the security team’s role?- What is the audit team’s role?- What is IMS systems programmer role?- What is the DBA’s role?

Page 18: PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

18Copyrite IBM 2013

Focal Areas for a Strong Security Strategy Encrypting the data

• Reduce the liability even if data is accessed, using encryption reduces the usability of that data

Monitoring access to the data• Have visibility to data access -- identify who accessed data,

when it was accessed or updated

Page 19: PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

19Copyrite IBM 2013

What is Encryption? Data that is not encrypted is referred to as “clear text” Clear text is encrypted by processing with a “key” and an

encryption algorithm• Several standard algorithms exist including DES, TDES and

AES Keys are bit streams that vary in length

• For example AES supports 128, 192 and 256 bit key lengths

Page 20: PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

20Copyrite IBM 2013

What is Encryption?

Encryption is a process where clear-text is converted using a known ALGORITHM

• AES• DES• TDES

A key is used in the encryption process to produce CYPHERTEXT and can be either a:

• Clear key• Secure key

Page 21: PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

21Copyrite IBM 2013

Encryption is a technique used to help protect data from unauthorized access

Data that is not encrypted is referred to as “clear text” Clear text is encrypted by processing with a “key” and an encryption algorithm

– Several standard algorithms exist, include DES, TDES and AES (next slide) Keys are bit streams that vary in length

– For example AES supports 128, 192 and 256 bit key lengths

Encryption Process

Encryption algorithm(e.g. AES)

Clear TextCiphertext

(Encrypted Data)

Decryption Process

Encryption algorithmCiphertext

Clear TextKey

Key

Page 22: PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

22Copyrite IBM 2013

Encryption Algorithms – Which Ones Are Best?

DES (Data Encryption Standard)− 56-bit, viewed as weak and generally unacceptable today by the

NIST TDES (Triple Data Encryption Standard)

− 128-bit, universally accepted algorithm AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)

− 128- or 256- bit, newest commercially used algorithm What is acceptable?

– DES is viewed as unacceptable– TDES is viewed as acceptable and compliant with NIST (National

Institute of Standards and Technology)– AES 128 or 256 is also viewed as acceptable and strategic

Page 23: PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

23Copyrite IBM 2013

Encryption Algorithms – Which Ones Are Best?

For more information:– TDES NIST Special Publication 800-67 V1 entitled

"Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher" and can be found at

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-67-Rev1/SP-800-67-Rev1.pdf

– TDES NIST FIPS Publication 197 entitled "Announcing the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)" and can be found at

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf

Page 24: PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

24Copyrite IBM 2013

Integrated Cryptographic Service Facility (ICSF) Provides: z/OS integrated software support for data encryption Operating System S/W API Interface to Cryptographic

Hardware − CEX2/3C hardware feature

Enhanced Key Management for key creation and distribution− Public and private keys− Secure and clear keys− Master keys

Created keys are stored/accessed in the Cryptographic Key Data Set (CKDS) with unique key label− CKDS itself is secured via Security Access Facility

See Reference Section of this presentation for more details

Page 25: PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

25Copyrite IBM 2013

What are Encryption Keys?

Master Keys– Used to generate, encrypt, and store user keys into the

CKDS (Cryptographic Key Data Set)– Loaded into the CEX2/3C hardware, and stored

NO WHERE else

User Keys (Data Encrypting Keys)– Generated via ICSF services – Stored inside the CKDS– Public or Private– Clear or Secure– Used by the IBM InfoSphere Guardium Encryption Tool

along with encryption algorithm to convert user data to Ciphertext

Page 26: PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

26Copyrite IBM 2013

Cryptography on z/OS

Clear Key– Key is exposed in the storage

of processor– Can be viewed in dump of

storage– If correctly interpreted can

expose data– Sometimes acceptable for

short-lived keys with other constraints

– Used in software-based cryptography

– Used by CPACF

Secure Key– Key is only ever exposed in

bounds of a secure processor– Can never be seen in storage– Dump will not reveal key– Key is held encrypted under

Master key– Crypto Express 2/3 (Configured

as CEX2/3C) provides this function for System z Fee based option

– APIs available via Integrated Cryptographic Support Facility (ICSF)

– Can be used from Java on z/OS platform

Page 27: PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

27Copyrite IBM 2013

How can you as an IMS Support person achieve this ?

Encryption in a Nutshell

Page 28: PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

28Copyrite IBM 2013

InfoSphere Guardium Data Encryption for DB2 and IMS Databases

InfoSphere Guardium Data Encryption protects Sensitive and Private information minimizing the liability risks associated with Information Governance.

High Performance and Low overhead by using the available cryptographic hardware

Uses the major encryption algorithms

Conforms to the existing z/OS security model

Complies with Security and Privacy regulations

Implementation at the IMS segment level

No changes to application programs

Page 29: PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

29Copyrite IBM 2013

To create an exit that encrypts and decrypts IMS data, the Tool can be implemented in one of two ways:

1) Through JCL. The product provides sample jobs where the JCL can be modified to meet your needs for encrypted IMS databases. These jobs can be found in the distribution libraries:

DECIMSSK – IMS Secure Key DECIMSCK – Clear Key DES DECIMSCB – Clear and Secure Key AES DECIMSDV – Driver exit for compressed and encrypted IMS segmentDECIMSJB – IMS Clear Key

2) Using the ISPF interface. ISPF panels are presented to you to create customized jobs for encrypting non-compressed and compressed IMS database segments.

InfoSphere Guardium Data Encryption for DB2 and IMS Databases

Page 30: PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

30Copyrite IBM 2013

Implementation steps

− Create an encryption key

− Create an encryption exit

− Unload database to be encrypted

− Generate and install DBD with encryption exit

− Reload database using the new DBD

InfoSphere Guardium Data Encryption for DB2 and IMS Databases

Page 31: PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

31Copyrite IBM 2013

Selections:1 = use to create an encryption exit that will be used standalone; that is without co-existence with a compression routine2 = use to create both an encryption exit and a driver module to call an existing compression routine then the encryption exit

InfoSphere Guardium Data Encryption – ISPF Main Menu

Page 32: PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

32Copyrite IBM 2013

CSF lib = Installation Encryption datasetZAP lib = Dataset containing AMASPZAP programSMP lib = Guardium load datasetEXIT lib = Load dataset for Encryption exitExit Name = Load module name for Encryption exit

IMS Clear key selected

Usual Jobcard

Encryption routine is called DSECRYPT

The label (name) of the Encryption key that has been previously created by a security administrator

InfoSphere Guardium Data Encryption – ISPF Definition for Creating Encryption Exit

Page 33: PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

33Copyrite IBM 2013

ISPF created linkjob for encryption exit creation (step 1)

Encryption routine is called DSECRYPT

InfoSphere Guardium Data Encryption – ISPF Definition for Creating Encryption Exit

Page 34: PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

34Copyrite IBM 2013

Encryption routine is called DSECRYPT

Encryption key label used by DSECRYPT exit

InfoSphere Guardium Data Encryption – ISPF Creating Zap Job for Encryption Exit Key

Page 35: PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

35Copyrite IBM 2013

Encryption routine is called DSECRYPT

The COMPRTN is added to the DBD source to invoke encryption Note, that only DATA is being encrypted here

InfoSphere Guardium Data Encryption – DBD Definition with Encryption Exit

Page 36: PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

36Copyrite IBM 2013

InfoSphere Guardium Data Encryption – Browse of IMS HDAM Database with Clear Data

Clear data

Page 37: PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

37Copyrite IBM 2013

Implementation steps

− Unload database

− Generate and install DBD with encryption exit

− Reload database using the new DBD

InfoSphere Guardium Data Encryption for DB2 and IMS Databases

Page 38: PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

38Copyrite IBM 2013

Encrypted data

InfoSphere Guardium Data Encryption – Browse of IMS HDAM Database with Encrypted Data

Page 39: PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

39Copyrite IBM 2013

Protects sensitive and private data

Reduces liability risks

Uses the available cryptographic hardware

Conforms to the existing z/OS security model

Complies with Security and Privacy regulations

Implementation at the IMS segment level

Implemented using standard IMS procedures and exits

InfoSphere Guardium Data Encryption

Page 40: PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

40Copyrite IBM 2013

Protects sensitive and private data

Reduces liability risks

Uses the available cryptographic hardware

Conforms to the existing z/OS security model

Complies with Security and Privacy regulations

Implementation at the IMS segment level

Implemented using standard IMS procedures and exits

InfoSphere Guardium Data Encryption

Page 41: PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

Copyrite IBM 2013

Reference Section

Page 42: PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

42Copyrite IBM 2013

Cryptography on z/OS

Clear Key– Key is exposed in the storage

of processor– Can be viewed in dump of

storage– If correctly interpreted can

expose data– Sometimes acceptable for

short-lived keys with other constraints

– Used in software-based cryptography

– Used by CPACF

Secure Key– Key is only ever exposed in

bounds of a secure processor– Can never be seen in storage– Dump will not reveal key– Key is held encrypted under

Master key– Crypto Express 2/3 (Configured

as CEX2/3C) provides this function for System z Fee based option

– APIs available via Integrated Cryptographic Support Facility (ICSF)

– Can be used from Java on z/OS platform

Page 43: PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

43Copyrite IBM 2013

CKDS – Cryptographic Key Dataset Key element of the IBM encryption solution on z/OS VSAM Key Sequenced Dataset Contents are ICSF generated data encrypted keys Accessed by ICSF API and Services

− Key Label (known by application requestor) used to find key record in the CKDS

Copy of CKDS cached in operating system storage at first ICSF invocation for performance− Refreshable

CKDS administration performed using ICSF services and ISPF interfaces.

Use of specific individual keys can be controlled via RACF profiles and permissions

CEX2/3C hardware feature required for use− Unless with a combination of HCR7751 or greater and clear key only,

then CEX2/3C is optional

Page 44: PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

44Copyrite IBM 2013

IMS Data Encryption for IMS and DB2 Databases The following restrictions apply:

An IMS segment can be associated with only one Segment Edit/Compression exit. If your IMS segment is already associated with a non-IBM Segment Edit/Compression exit and you want to implement Data Encryption for IMS and DB2 Databases, you must code an alternative solution for your existing exit.

HIDAM index databases cannot be encrypted (the IMS DBD COMPRTN) parameter does not allow index databases to be specified on the Segment Edit/Compression exit).

Administrators of data governance should consider the following points: When you install and initialize ICSF, consider setting the CHECKAUTH installation option to

NO. Setting CHECKAUTH to YES adds considerable CPU path length. Setting KEYAUTH to YES also adds CPU path length.

Depending on your security requirements, you can define different encryption key labels for as many segments as you need to. (Encryption key labels are set up by your security analyst.) A separate exit must be built for each encryption key label that you define. Note that you need

to balance your security requirements against the increased maintenance of multiple exits.

The first time that you use Segment Edit/Compression exits at your installation, your system programmer needs to provide APF authorization for the Segment Edit/Compression EXITLIB. If you are already using Segment Edit/Compression exits, you need to ensure that the Segment

Edit/Compression exits reside in an APF-authorized EXITLIB.

Page 45: PUG IMS Encryption - IMS UG March 2013 Phoenix

45Copyrite IBM 2013

Details About Clear Key Versus Secure Key Performance

Clear key elapsed time performance is MUCH superior than secure key.

Secure key (performed inside the CEX2C) is generally viewed as more secure from a cryptographic perspective.

Clear key uses special instructions that run on the z9 – z10 general purpose processors, so performance is measured in milliseconds.

Secure key encryption is dispatched to run on the cryptographic coprocessors on the CEX2C crypto feature. This tends to be measured in microseconds as this is essentially an I/O operation.

Secure key elapsed time measurements (depending on workload and type) can be from 10x to 40x more than clear key.

Secure key is probably NOT appropriate for most (to date all) OLTP workloads, but each customer needs to make this encryption decision based on their security requirements and performance expectations