Puboff Cases - July 6 and July 8

8/9/2019 Puboff Cases - July 6 and July 8

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FIRST DIVISION[G.R. No. 98107. August 18, 1997]BENJAMIN C. JUCO,petitioner , vs . NATIONALLABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and NATIONALHOUSING CORPORATION,respondents .D E C I S I O NHERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside theDecision of the National Labor RelationsCommission (NLRC) dated March 14, 1991, whichreversed the Decision dated May 21, 1990 of Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.Petitioner Benjamin C. Juco was hired as a projectengineer of respondent National HousingCorporation (NHC) from November 16, 1970 toMay 14, 1975. On May 14, 1975, he wasseparated from the service for having beenimplicated in a crime of theft and/or malversationof public funds.On March 25, 1977, petitioner filed a complaintfor illegal dismissal against the NHC with theDepartment of Labor.On September 17, 1977, the Labor Arbiterrendered a decision dismissing the complaint onthe ground that the NLRC had no jurisdiction overthe case.Petitioner then elevated the case to the NLRCwhich rendered a decision on December 28, 1982,reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter.Dissatisfied with the decision of the NLRC,respondent NHC appealed before this Court andon January 17, 1985, we rendered a decision, thedispositive portion thereof reads as follows:WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.

The questioned decision of the respondentNational Labor Relations Commission is SETASIDE. The decision of the Labor Arbiterdismissing the case before it for lack of

jurisdiction is REINSTATED.On January 6, 1989, petitioner filed with the CivilService Commission a complaint for illegaldismissal, with preliminary mandatory injunction.

On February 6, 1989, respondent NHC moved forthe dismissal of the complaint on the ground thatthe Civil Service Commission has no jurisdictionover the case.On April 11, 1989, the Civil Service Commissionissued an order dismissing the complaint for lackof jurisdiction. It ratiocinated that:The Board finds the comment and/or motion todismiss meritorious. It was not disputed that NHCis a government corporation without an originalcharter but organized/created under theCorporate Code.

Article IX, Section 2 (1) of the 1987 Constitutionprovides:The civil service embraces all branches,subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the government, including government ownedand controlled corporations with original charters.(underscoring supplied)From the aforequoted constitutional provision, it isclear that respondent NHC is not within the scopeof the civil service and is therefore beyond the

jurisdiction of this board. Moreover, it is pertinentto state that the 1987 Constitution was ratifiedand became effective on February 2, 1987.WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction, the instantcomplaint is hereby dismissed.On April 28, 1989, petitioner filed with respondentNLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal withpreliminary mandatory injunction againstrespondent NHC.On May 21, 1990, respondent NLRC thru LaborArbiter Manuel R. Caday ruled that petitioner wasillegally dismissed from his employment byrespondent as there was evidence in the recordthat the criminal case against him was purelyfabricated, prompting the trial court to dismiss thecharges against him. Hence, he concluded thatthe dismissal was illegal as it was devoid of basis,legal or factual.He further ruled that the complaint is not barredby prescription considering that the period fromwhich to reckon the reglementary period of fouryears should be from the date of the receipt of the decision of the Civil Service Commission

promulgated on April 11, 1989. He alsoratiocinated that:It appears x x x complainant filed the complaintfor illegal dismissal with the Civil ServiceCommission on January 6, 1989 and the same wasdismissed on April 11, 1989 after which on April28, 1989, this case was filed by the complainant.Prior to that, this case was ruled upon by theSupreme Court on January 17, 1985 whichenjoined the complainant to go to the Civil ServiceCommission which in fact, complainant did.Under the circumstances, there is merit on thecontention that the running of the reglementaryperiod of four (4) years was suspended with thefiling of the complaint with the said Commission.Verily, it was not the fault of the respondent forfailing to file the complaint as alleged by therespondent but due to, in the words of thecomplainant, a legal knot that has to beuntangled.

Thereafter, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision,the dispositive portion of which reads:"Premises considered, judgment is herebyrendered declaring the dismissal of thecomplainant as illegal and ordering the


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respondent to immediately reinstate him to hisformer position without loss of seniority rightswith full back wages inclusive of allowance and tohis other benefits or equivalent computed fromthe time it is withheld from him when he wasdismissed on March 27, 1977, until actuallyreinstated.On June 1, 1990, respondent NHC filed its appealbefore the NLRC and on March 14, 1991, the

NLRC promulgated a decision which reversed thedecision of Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday on theground of lack of jurisdiction.

The primordial issue that confronts us is whetheror not public respondent committed grave abuseof discretion in holding that petitioner is notgoverned by the Labor Code.Under the laws then in force, employees of government-owned and /or controlledcorporations were governed by the Civil ServiceLaw and not by the Labor Code. Hence,Article 277 of the Labor Code (PD 442) thenprovided:"The terms and conditions of employment of allgovernment employees, including employees of government-owned and controlled corporationsshall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rulesand regulations x x x.

The 1973 Constitution, Article II-B, Section 1(1),on the other hand provided:The Civil Service embraces every branch,agency, subdivision and instrumentality of thegovernment, including government-owned orcontrolled corporations.Although we had earlier ruled in National HousingCorporation v . Juco, that employees of government-owned and/or controlledcorporations, whether created by special law orformed as subsidiaries under the generalCorporation Law, are governed by the CivilService Law and not by the Labor Code, this rulinghas been supplanted by the 1987 Constitution.

Thus, the said Constitution now provides:The civil service embraces all branches,subdivision, instrumentalities, and agencies of theGovernment, including government owned orcontrolled corporations with original charter .(Article IX-B, Section 2[1])In National Service Corporation (NASECO) v .National Labor Relations Commission, we had theoccasion to apply the present Constitution indeciding whether or not the employees of NASECO are covered by the Civil Service Law orthe Labor Code notwithstanding that the casearose at the time when the 1973 Constitution wasstill in effect. We ruled that the NLRC has

jurisdiction over the employees of NASECO on theground that it is the 1987 Constitution that

governs because it is the Constitution in place atthe time of the decision. Furthermore, we ruledthat the new phrase with original charter meansthat government-owned and controlledcorporations refer to corporations chartered byspecial law as distinguished from corporationsorganized under the Corporation Code. Thus,NASECO which had been organized under thegeneral incorporation stature and a subsidiary of the National Investment DevelopmentCorporation, which in turn was a subsidiary of thePhilippine National Bank, is excluded from thepurview of the Civil Service Commission.We see no cogent reason to depart from theruling in the aforesaid case.In the case at bench, the National HousingCorporation is a government owned corporationorganized in 1959 in accordance with ExecutiveOrder No. 399, otherwise known as the UniformCharter of Government Corporation, dated

January 1, 1959. Its shares of stock are and havebeen one hundred percent (100%) owned by theGovernment from its incorporation under Act1459, the former corporation law. Thegovernment entities that own its shares of stockare the Government Service Insurance System,the Social Security System, the DevelopmentBank of the Philippines, the National Investmentand Development Corporation and the PeoplesHomesite and Housing Corporation. Consideringthe fact that the NHA had been incorporatedunder act 1459, the former corporation law, it isbut correct to say that it is a government-ownedor controlled corporation whose employees aresubject to the provisions of the Labor Code. Thisobservation is reiterated in recent case of TradeUnion of the Philippines and Allied Services(TUPAS)v . National Housing Corporation, wherewe held that the NHA is now within the jurisdictionof the Department of Labor and Employment, itbeing a government-owned and/or controlledcorporation without an original charter.Furthermore, we also held that the workers oremployees of the NHC (now NHA) undoubtedlyhave the right to form unions or employeesorganization and that there is no impediment tothe holding of a certification election among themas they are covered by the Labor Code.

Thus, the NLRC erred in dismissing petitionerscomplaint for lack of jurisdiction because the rulenow is that the Civil Service now covers onlygovernment-owned or controlled corporationswith original charters. Having been incorporatedunder the Corporation Law, its relations with itspersonnel are governed by the Labor Code andcome under the jurisdiction of the National LaborRelations Commission.One final point. Petitioners have been tossedfrom one forum to another for a simple illegal


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dismissal case. It is but apt that we put an end tohis dilemma in the interest of justice.WHEREFORE, the decision of the NLRC in NLRCNCR-04-02036089 dated March 14, 1991 ishereby REVERSED and the Decision of the LaborArbiter dated May 21, 1990 is REINSTATED.SO ORDERED.Padilla, (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug, and

Kapunan, JJ., concur.Rollo , pp. 20-21.Id ., pp. 22-26.Id ., pp. 27-37.Id ., pp. 38-42.Id ., pp. 43-47.Id ., p. 52.Id ., pp. 53-58.Id ., p. 68.Id ., p. 69.Id ., pp. 78-86.134 SCRA 172 (1985).168 SCRA 122 [1988].National Housing Corporation vs . Juco, 134 SCRA172 (1985).173 SCRA 33 (1989).PNOC-Energy Development Corporation v . NLRC,201 SCRA 487 1991 The NHC (now NHA)

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

ManilaEN BANC

G.R. No. 129133 November 25, 1998ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE ANDINVESTIGATION BUREAU, petitioner,vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS and CIVIL SERVICECOMMISSION, respondents.

PURISIMA, J.:Before the Court is a Petition for Review onCertiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court to review and set aside the 7 November1996 Decision 1 and 18 March 1997 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals 3 in CA- G.R. SP No. 37720.As culled by the Court of Appeals, the antecedentfacts that matter are, as follows:In a letter dated October 13, 1988, respondentCSC through Chairman Patricia A. Sto. Tomasrequired the Secretary of Finance to submit to the

CSC all appointments in the Economic Intelligenceand Investigation Bureau (EIIB).Instead of complying with the said letter,petitioner Jose T. Almonte, as Commissioner of EIIB, wrote a letter dated March 29, 1989, torespondent CSC, requesting for confirmation of EIIB's exemption from CSC rules and regulationswith respect to appointments and other personnelactions invoking as basis for such exemption PD

No. 1458 and LOI No. 71.On June 21, 1989, respondent CSC issued thesubject Resolution No. 89-400, denying petitionerAlmonte's request for exemption of the EIIB fromthe coverage of the civil service rules andregulations and reiterating its order thatpetitioner EIIB submit to the CSC all appointmentsto career or non-career positions in the Bureau.Not having received any compliance frompetitioners, respondent CSC, in its Order of December 7, 1990, directed petitioner Jose T.Almonte to immediately implement Resolution No.

89-400, with a warning that any EIIB official whoshall fail or refuse to comply with the said ordershall be held liable for indirect contempt.On June 4, 1991, respondent CSC issued anotherorder, requiring petitioner Almonte to Show causewhy he should not be cited for indirect contemptfor his continued refusal to implement or complywith CSC Resolution No. 89-400 and the Order of December 7, 1990.In a letter, dated June 13, 1991, petitionerAlmonte explained to the respondent CSC thereasons of the EIIB for its inability to comply withResolution No. 89-400. He invoked PD No. 1458and LOI No. 71 exempting the EIIB from thecoverage of civil service rules and regulations onappointments and other personnel actions.Petitioner Almonte prayed that Resolution No. 89-400, the Order of June 4, 1991, and thesubsequent orders be set aside.On August 22, 1991, respondent CSC issued anorder, finding petitioner Almonte guilty of indirectcontempt of the Commission, the dispositiveportion of which reads as follows:WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, thecommission hereby resolves to find and adjudge

Jose T. Almonte, Commissioner, EIIB, guilty of indirect contempt of the Commission pursuant toSection 12 (11), Book V, Subtitle A of Executiveorder No. 292 and memorandum Circular No. 42,series of 1990. He is thus meted the penalty of fine P1,000.00 each day from the date of receiptof this Order dated December 7, 1990.Accordingly, the Cashier of the EIIB is herebydirected to deduct from the salary of Commissioner Almonte the amount of P1,000.00each day of his failure to comply with the aboveCSC Order. Let copies of this Order be furnishedthe Resident Auditor of the EIIB as well as the


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COA, the Secretary of the Department of Financeand the CSFO-DND, for their information andguidance.SO ORDERED.Dissatisfied therewith, petitioner went to theCourt of Appeals on a Petition for Certiorari .However, on November 7, 1996, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition; ratiocinating thus:

The 1987 Constitution is so clear and categoricalin its mandate that:Art. IX (B), Section 2 (1). The civil serviceembraces all branches, subdivisions,instrumentalities, and agencies of theGovernment, including government-owned orcontrolled corporations with original charters.

The civil service contemplated in theconstitutional provision is very comprehensive inits scope, that it includes every category of officeror employee of the government, its branches,subdivisions and instrumentalities, and evenemployees of private corporations, if suchcorporations are controlled or owned by thegovernment with original charters.In the light of his constitutional mandate,petitioner EIIB, being a government agency, isnecessarily embraced by the civil service. The factthat positions in the EIIB are primarily confidentialdid not place it outside the domain of civilservants, since "it is conceded that one holding inthe Government a primarily confidential positionis in the Civil Service" (Ingles v. Mutuc, 26 SCRA171). That fact merely exempts confidentialpositions in the EIIB from the constitutional rule

that "appointments in the civil service shall bemade only according to merit and fitness to bedetermined, as far as practicable . . . bycompetitive examination [Art. IX (B), Sec. 2 (2) ]".And it is in this sense that the provisions of PD1458, particularly Section 5 and LOI 71 reliedupon by the petitioners should be interpreted.Neither does petitioners' contention that "if EIIB'spositions and personnel actions will be opened,one may know its operations, movements,targets, strategies, and tactics and the whole of its being" deserve merit, as the same is purespeculation and conjecture. EIIB officials andpersonnel remain civil servants and as correctlyargued by the Solicitor General, "EIIB officialsoccupying confidential positions, remainaccountable to the people and are subject to thesame state policies on morale, efficiency,integrity, responsiveness and courtesy in the civilservice". Thus We hold that the personnel in theEEIB are covered by the Civil Service.

xxx xxx xxxWHEREFORE, the Court upholds Resolution No.89-400 but declares CSC Orders of December 7,1990, June 4, 1991, and of August 22, 1991, as

NULL AND VOID, the Civil Service Commission nothaving jurisdiction to cite and punishCommissioner Jose T. Almonte of the EconomicIntelligence and Investigation Bureau for indirectcontempt of the Commission.With the denial of its motion for reconsiderationby Resolution, dated March 18, 1997, of the Courtof Appeals, petitioner found its way to this Courtvia the present Petition; contending, that:

IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER IS COVERED BYCIVIL SERVICE, RESPONDENT COURT VIOLATEDP.D. No. 1458 AND LOI No. 71 WHICH EXPRESSLYEXEMPT IT FROM CIVIL SERVICE COVERAGE.

The pivotal issue here is: whether or not thepetitioner, Economic Intelligence InvestigationBureau (EIIB), is embraced by the Civil Service.Sec. 2, subparagraph (1), Article IX, paragraph (B)of the 1987 Constitution provides:

The civil service embraces all branches,subdivisions, instrumentalities, agencies of theGovernment, including government-owned orcontrolled corporations with original charter.Succinct and clear is the provision of theConstitution in point that all governmentagencies, without exception , are covered by thecivil service.Petitioner EIIB is a government agency under theDepartment of Finance as provided by Section 17,Chapter 4, Title II, Book IV of the 1987Administrative Code. 4 Therefore, EIIB is within theambit of the Civil Service Law.

The civil service within the contemplation of the

aforecited constitutional provision iscomprehensive in scope. It embraces all officersand employees of the government, its branches,subdivisions and instrumentalities. Evenemployees of corporations owned or controlled bythe government, with original charters, arecovered thereby.Petitioner contends that EIIB is expresslyexempted from civil service coverage, underSection 5 of P.D. No. 1458, which provides:

Application of WAPCO and Civil Service Rules Personnel of the FDIIB shall be exempted fromWAPCO and Civil Service Rules and Regulationsrelative to appointments and other personnelactions: Provided , That they shall be entitled tothe benefits and privileges accorded togovernment employees . . .On the other hand, LOI No. 71, the ImplementingRules of P.D. No. 1458, reads:10. It is further directed that personnel of the BIIshall be exempt from OCPC and Civil ServiceRules and Regulations relative to appointmentsand other personnel actions; Provided , That theyshall be entitled to the benefits accorded togovernment employees . . .


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Petitioner's submission is barren of merit. The aforecited provisions of law provide for theexemption of petitioner EIIB only from CivilService Rules and Regulations relative toappointments and other personnel actions, butnot from the Civil Service Law or Civil ServiceRules and Regulations relative to any othermatter.Neither can we uphold petitioner's reliance onSection 26 of Executive Order No. 127, 5Petitioner, in gist, asserts exemption from CivilService coverage since the Bureau forms part of the intelligence community created under thesaid executive Order.

There is merit in the disquisition by the Court of Appeals that membership of petitioner EIIB in theintelligence community is of no moment, insofaras application of the Civil Service Law isconcerned. The National Bureau of Investigation(NBI), also a member of the intelligencecommunity which performs functions similar to

those of EIIB, e .g ., intelligence gathering,investigation, research, etc ., submits to the CivilService Commission the appointments of all NBIpersonnel, whether belonging to the career ornon-career service. Besides, in Ingles vs. Mutuc ,26 SCRA 171, this Court ruled that " . . . oneholding in the Government a primarily confidentialposition is 'in the Civil Service'."Equally untenable is petitioner's contention that,because the personnel of EIIB are occupying jobshighly confidential in nature, the EIIB should notbe required to submit the names of its personnelto the Civil Service Commission.In Almonte vs. Vasquez , 244 SCRA 286 [1995],EIIB was ordered by the Ombudsman to producedocuments relating to personnel services andsalary vouchers of EIIB employees. The Bureaupleaded that such documents are classified, andknowledge of EIIB's documents relative to itsPersonnel Services Funds and its plantilla willinevitably lead to knowledge of its operations,movements, targets and strategies, which coulddestroy the Bureau itself. The Court ruled that therequired documents can be examined by theOmbudsman; explaining that:

. . . [T]here is no claim that military or diplomaticsecrets will be disclosed by the production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB.Indeed, EIIB's function is the gathering andevaluation of intelligence reports and informationregarding "illegal activities affecting the nationaleconomy, such as, but not limited to, economicsabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting."Consequently, while in cases which involve statesecrets it may be sufficient to determine from thecircumstance of the case that there is reasonabledanger that compulsion of the evidence willexpose military matters without compelling

production, no similar excuse can be made for aprivilege resting on other considerations.Nor has our attention been called to any law orregulation which considers records of the EIIB asclassified information . . .All things viewed in proper perspective, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the Court of Appealserred not in holding that:

. . . [R]espondent CSC's act of requiring petitionerEIIB to submit to it all appointments in theBureau, for appropriate action, is part of itsadministrative function as the central personnelagency of the government.WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED; andthe Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SPNo. 37720 AFFIRMED, without any pronouncementas to costs.SO ORDERED.Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,

Martinez, Quisumbing and Pardo, JJ., concur.Footnotes1 "Annex A," Petition; Rollo , pp. 12-25.2 "Annex B, "Petition; Rollo , pp. 26-27.3 Eighth Division composed of Justices Jaime M.Lantin ( Chairman and the Ponente ), Lourdes K.

Tayao-Jaguros and B.A. Adefuin-De La Cruz(Members ).4 Sec. 26, E.O. No. 127 reads. as follows:"Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau The Economic Intelligence and InvestigationBureau, which shall be headed by and subject tothe supervision and control of the Commissionerwho shall be appointed by the President upon therecommendation of the Minister, shall have thefollowing functions:(1) Receive, gather and evaluate intelligencereports and information and evidence on thenature, modes and extent of illegal activitiesaffecting the national economy, such as, but notlimited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, taxevasion, and dollar-salting, investigate the sameand aid in the prosecution of cases;

(2) Coordinate with external agencies inmonitoring the financial and economic activities of persons or entities, whether domestic or foreign,which may adversely affect national financialinterest with the goal of regulating, controlling orpreventing said activities;(3) Provide all intelligence units of operatingBureaus or Offices under the Ministry with thegeneral framework and guidelines in the conductof intelligence and investigation works;


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(4) Supervise, monitor and coordinate all theintelligence and investigation operations of theoperating Bureaus and Offices under the Ministry;(5) Investigate, hear and file upon clearance bythe Minister, anti-graft and corruption casesagainst personnel of the Ministry and itsconstituent units;(6) Perform such other appropriate functions asmay be assigned by the Minister or his deputies.5 See Footnote No. 4; same provision of Section17, Chapter 4, Title II, Book IV of the 1987Administrative Code.


ManilaEN BANC

G.R. No. 88979 February 7, 1992LYDIA O. CHUA, petitioner,

vs.THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, THENATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION andTHE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET ANDMANAGEMENT, respondents. PADILLA, J.:Pursuant to the policy of streamlining andtrimming the bureaucracy, Republic Act No. 6683was approved on 2 December 1988 providing forbenefits for early retirement and voluntaryseparation from the government service as wellas for involuntary separation due toreorganization. Deemed qualified to avail of itsbenefits are those enumerated in Sec. 2 of theAct, as follows:Sec. 2. Coverage . This Act shall cover allappointive officials and employees of the NationalGovernment, including government-owned orcontrolled corporations with original charters, aswell as the personnel of all local governmentunits. The benefits authorized under this Act shallapply to all regular, temporary, casual andemergency employees, regardless of age, whohave rendered at least a total of two (2)consecutive years of government service as of thedate of separation. Uniformed personnel of theArmed Forces of the Philippines including those of the PC-INP are excluded from the coverage of thisAct.Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she isqualified to avail of the benefits of the program,filed an application on 30 January 1989 withrespondent National Irrigation Administration(NIA) which, however, denied the same; instead,she was offered separation benefits equivalent toone half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of

service commencing from 1980. A recourse bypetitioner to the Civil Service Commission yieldednegative results. 1 Her letter for reconsiderationdated 25 April 1989 pleaded thus:

xxx xxx xxxWith due respect, I think the interpretation of theHonorable Commissioner of RA 6683 does notconform with the beneficent purpose of the law.

The law merely requires that a governmentemployee whether regular, temporary,emergency, or casual, should have twoconsecutive years of government service in orderto be entitled to its benefits. I more than meet therequirement. Persons who are not entitled areconsultants, experts and contractual(s). As to thebudget needed, the law provides that theDepartment of Budget and Management willshoulder a certain portion of the benefits to beallotted to government corporations. Moreover,personnel of these NIA special projects art entitledto the regular benefits, such ( sic ) leaves,compulsory retirement and the like. There is noreason why we should not be entitled to RA 6683.

xxx xxx xxx 2

Denying the plea for reconsideration, the CivilService Commission (CSC) emphasized:

xxx xxx xxxWe regret to inform you that your request cannotbe granted. The provision of Section 3.1 of JointDBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1 does not onlyrequire an applicant to have two years of satisfactory service on the date of separation/retirement but further requires said

applicant to be on a casual, emergency,temporary or regular employment status as of December 2, 1988, the date of enactment of R.A.6683. The law does not contemplate contractualemployees in the coverage.Inasmuch as your employment as of December31, 1988, the date of your separation from theservice, is co-terminous with the NIA project whichis contractual in nature, this Commission shallsustain its original decision.

xxx xxx xxx 3

In view of such denial, petitioner is before thisCourt by way of a special civil action for certiorari ,insisting that she is entitled to the benefitsgranted under Republic Act No. 6683. Herarguments:It is submitted that R.A. 6683, as well as Section3.1 of the Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1requires an applicant to be on a casual,emergency, temporary or regular employmentstatus. Likewise, the provisions of Section 23 ( sic )of the Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 88-1,implementing guidelines of R.A. No. 6683,provides:


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"2.3 Excluded from the benefits under R.A. No.6683 are the following:a) Experts and Consultants hired by agencies for alimited period to perform specific activities orservices with a definite expected output: i.e .membership in Task Force, Part-Time,Consultant/Employees.b) Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of the PhilippineConstabulary and Integrated National Police (PC-INP).c) Appointive officials and employees who retireor elect to be separated from the service foroptional retirement with gratuity under R.A. No.1616, 4968 or with pension under R.A. No. 186, asamended by R.A. No. 6680 or P.D. No. 1146, anamended, or vice- versa.d) Officials and employees who retired voluntarilyprior to the enactment of this law and havereceived the corresponding benefits of thatretirement/separation.e) Officials and employees with pending casespunishable by mandatory separation from theservice under existing civil service laws, rules andregulations; provided that if such officials andemployees apply in writing within the prescriptiveperiod for the availment of the benefits hereinauthorized, shall be allowed only if acquitted orcleared of all charges and their applicationaccepted and approved by the head of officeconcerned."Based on the above exclusions, herein petitionerdoes not belong to any one of them. Ms. Chua is a

full time employee of NIA entitled to all theregular benefits provided for by the Civil ServiceCommission. She held a permanent status asPersonnel Assistant A, a position which belongs tothe Administrative Service. . . . If casuals andemergency employees were given the benefit of R.A. 6683 with more reason that this petitionerwho was holding a permanent status as PersonnelAssistant A and has rendered almost 15 years of faithful, continuous service in the governmentshould be similarly rewarded by the beneficient(sic ) purpose of the law. 4

The NIA and the Civil Service Commissionreiterate in their comment petitioner's exclusionfrom the benefits of Republic Act No. 6683,because:1. Petitioner's employment is co-terminous withthe project per appointment papers kept by theAdministrative Service in the head office of NIA(the service record was issued by the WatershedManagement and Erosion Control Project(WMECP), Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija). The project,funded by the World Bank, was completed as of 31 December 1988, after which petitioner'sposition became functus officio .

2. Petitioner is not a regular and career employeeof NIA her position is not included in its regularplantilla. She belongs to the non-career service(Sec. 6, P.D. No. 807) which is inherently short-lived, temporary and transient; on the other hand,retirement presupposes employment for a longperiod. The most that a non-career personnel canexpect upon the expiration of his employment isfinancial assistance. Petitioner is not evenqualified to retire under the GSIS law.3. Assuming arguendo that petitioner'sappointment is permanent, security of tenure isavailable only for the term of office ( i.e ., durationof project).4. The objective of Republic Act No. 6683 is notreally to grant separation or retirement benefitsbut reorganization 5 to streamline governmentfunctions. The application of the law must bemade consistent with the purpose for which it wasenacted. Thus, as the expressed purpose of thelaw is to reorganize the government, it will nothave any application to special projects such asthe WMECP which exists only for a short anddefinite period. This being the nature of specialprojects, there is no necessity for offering itspersonnel early retirement benefits just to inducevoluntary separation as a step to reorganization.In fact, there is even no need of reorganizing theWMECP considering its short and limited life-span.6

5. The law applies only to employees of thenational government, government-owned orcontrolled corporations with original charters andlocal government units.

Due to the impossibility of reconciling theconflicting interpretations of the parties, the Courtis called upon to define the different classes of employees in the public sector ( i.e . governmentcivil servants).Who are regular employees? The Labor Code inArt. 280 (P.D. No. 492, as amended) deems anemployment regular where the employee hasbeen engaged to perform activities which areusually necessary or desirable in the usualbusiness or trade of the employer. No equivalentdefinition can be found in P.D.No. 807(promulgated on 6 October 1975, whichsuperseded the Civil Service Act of 1965 R.A.No. 2260) or in the Administrative Code of 1987(Executive Order No. 292 promulgated on 25 July1987). The Early Retirement Law itself (Rep. ActNo. 6683) merely includes such class of employees (regular employees) in its coverage,unmindful that no such specie is employed in thepublic sector.

The appointment status of governmentemployees in the career service is classified asfollows:


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1. permanent one issued to a person who hasmet the requirements of the position to whichappointment is made, in accordance with theprovisions of the Civil Service Act and the Rulesand Standards promulgated in pursuance thereof;7

2. temporary In the absence of appropriateeligibles and it becomes necessary in the publicinterest to fill a vacancy, a temporary

appointment should be issued to a person whomeets all the requirements for the position towhich he is being appointed except theappropriate civil service eligibility: Provided, Thatsuch temporary appointment shall not exceedtwelve months, but the appointee may bereplaced sooner if a qualified civil service eligiblebecomes available. 8

The Administrative Code of 1987 characterizesthe Career Service as:(1) Open Career positions for appointment towhich prior qualification in an appropriate

examination is required;(2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, orhighly technical in nature; these include thefaculty and academic staff of state colleges anduniversities, and scientific and technical positionsin scientific or research institutions which shallestablish and maintain their own merit systems;(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service;namely, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary,Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director,Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director,Chief of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by theCareer Executive Service Board, all of whom areappointed by the President.(4) Career officers, other than those in the CareerExecutive Service, who are appointed by thePresident, such as the Foreign Service Officers inthe Department of Foreign Affairs;(5) Commission officers and enlisted men of theArmed Forces which shall maintain a separatemerit system;(6) Personnel of government-owned or controlledcorporations, whether performing governmental

or proprietary functions, who do not fall under thenon-career service; and(7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled. 9

The Non-Career Service , on the other hand, ischaracterized by:. . . (1) entrance on bases other than those of theusual tests of merit and fitness utilized for thecareer service; and (2) tenure which is limited to aperiod specified by law, or which is coterminouswith that of the appointing authority or subject tohis pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of

a particular project for which purposeemployment was made.Included in the non-career service are:1. elective officials and their personal orconfidential staff;2. secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rankwho hold their positions at the pleasure of thePresident and their personal confidential staff(s);

3. Chairman and Members of Commissions andboards with fixed terms of office and theirpersonal or confidential staff;4. contractual personnel or those whoseemployment in the government is in accordancewith a special contract to undertake a specificwork or job requiring special or technical skills notavailable in the employing agency, to beaccomplished within a specific period, which in nocase shall exceed one year and performs oraccomplishes the specific work or job, under hisown responsibility with a minimum of directionand supervision from the hiring agency.5. emergency and seasonal personnel. 10

There is another type of non-career employee :Casual where and when employment is notpermanent but occasional, unpredictable,sporadic and brief in nature (Caro v. Rilloroza, 102Phil. 70; Manuel v. P.P. Gocheco Lumber Co., 96Phil. 945)Consider petitioner's record of service:Service with the government commenced on 2December 1974 designated as a laborer holding

emergency status with the NIA UpperPampanga River Project, R & R Division. 11 From24 March 1975 to 31 August 1975, she was aresearch aide with temporary status on the sameproject. On 1 September 1975 to 31 December1976, she was with the NIA-FES III; R & R Division,then on 1 January 1977 to 31 May 1980, she waswith NIA UPR IIS (Upper Pampanga RiverIntegrated Irrigation Systems) DRD. On 1 June1980, she went to NIA W.M.E.C.P. (WatershedManagement & Erosion Control Project) retainingthe status of temporary employee. While with thisproject, her designation was changed topersonnel assistant on 5 November 1981; starting9 July 1982, the status became permanent untilthe completion of the project on 31 December1988. The appointment paper 12 attached to theOSG's comment lists her status as co-terminuswith the Project.

The employment status of personnel hired underforeign assisted projects is considered co-terminous , that is, they are considered employeesfor the duration of the project or until thecompletion or cessation of said project (CSCMemorandum Circular No. 39, S. 1990, 27 June1990).


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Republic Act No. 6683 seeks to cover and benefitsregular, temporary, casual and emergency employees who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years government service .Resolution No. 87-104 of the CSC, 21 April 1987,provides:WHEREAS, pursuant to Executive Order No. 966dated June 22, 1984, the Civil Service Commissionis charged with the function of determiningcreditable services for retiring officers andemployees of the national government;WHEREAS, Section 4 (b) of the same ExecutiveOrder No. 966 provides that all previous servicesby an officer/employee pursuant to a dulyapproved appointment to a position in the CivilService are considered creditable services, whileSection 6 (a) thereof states that services renderedon contractual, emergency or casual status arenon-creditable services;WHEREAS, there is a need to clarify the aforesaidprovisions inasmuch as some contractual,emergency or casual employment are covered bycontracts or appointments duly approved by theCommission.NOW, therefore, the Commission resolved that services rendered on contractual, emergency or casual status, irrespective of the mode or manner of payment therefor shall be considered ascreditable for retirement purposes subject to thefollowing conditions : (emphasis provided)1. These services are supported by approvedappointments, official records and/or othercompetent evidence. Parties/agencies concerned

shall submit the necessary proof of said services;2. Said services are on full time basis andrendered prior to June 22, 1984, the effectivitydate of Executive Order No. 966; and3. The services for the three (3) years period priorto retirement are continuous and fulfill the servicerequirement for retirement.What substantial differences exist, if any,between casual, emergency, seasonal, project,co-terminous or contractual personnel? All aretenurial employees with no fixed term, non-career, and temporary. The 12 May 1989 CSCletter of denial 13 characterized herein petitioner'semployment as co-terminous with the NIA project which in turn was contractual in nature. The OSGsays petitioner's status is co-terminous with theProject . CSC Memorandum Circular No. 11, seriesof 1991 (5 April 1991) characterizes the status of a co-terminous employee (3) Co-terminous status shall be issued to aperson whose entrance in the service ischaracterized by confidentiality by the appointingauthority or that which is subject to his pleasureor co-existent with his tenure.

The foregoing status (co-terminous) may befurther classified into the following:a) co-terminous with the project When theappointment is co-existent with the duration of aparticular project for which purpose employmentwas made or subject to the availability of fundsfor the same;b) co-terminous with the appointing authority when appointment is co-existent with the tenureof the appointing authority.c) co-terminous with the incumbent whenappointment is co-existent with the appointee, inthat after the resignation, separation ortermination of the services of the incumbent theposition shall be deemed automatically abolished;andd) co-terminous with a specific period , e.g. "co-terminous for a period of 3 years" theappointment is for a specific period and uponexpiration thereof, the position is deemedabolished.It is stressed, however, that in the last twoclassifications (c) and (d), what is termed co-terminous is the position, and not the appointee-employee. Further, in (c) the security of tenure of the appointee is guaranteed during hisincumbency; in (d) the security of tenure islimited to a specific period.A co-terminous employee is a non-career civilservant, like casual and emergency employees.We see no solid reason why the latter areextended benefits under the Early Retirement Lawbut the former are not. It will be noted that Rep.

Act No. 6683 expressly extends its benefits forearly retirement to regular, temporary, casual andemergency employees. But specifically excludedfrom the benefits are uniformed personnel of theAFP including those of the PC-INP. It can beargued that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius .

The legislature would not have made a specificenumeration in a statute had not the intentionbeen to restrict its meaning and confine its termsand benefits to those expressly mentioned 14 orcasus omissus pro omisso habendus est Aperson, object or thing omitted from anenumeration must be held to have been omitted

intentionally.15

Yet adherence to these legalmaxims can result in incongruities and in aviolation of the equal protection clause of theConstitution.

The case of Fegurin, et al . v . NLRC, et al ., 16comes to mind where, workers belonging to awork pool, hired and re-hired continuously fromone project to another were considered non-project-regular and permanent employees.Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired and re-hired infour (4) successive projects during a span of fifteen (15) years. Although no proof of the


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existence of a work pool can be assumed, herservice record cannot be disregarded.Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitutionguarantees: "No person shall be deprived of life,liberty, or property without due process of law,nor shall any person be denied the equalprotection of the laws.". . . In Felwa vs . Salas , L-26511, Oct. 29, 1966, Weruled that the equal protection clause applies onlyto persons or things identically situated and doesnot bar a reasonable classification of the subjectof legislation, and a classification is reasonablewhere (1) it is based on substantial distinctionswhich make real differences; (2) these aregermane to the purpose of the law; (3) theclassification applies not only to presentconditions but also to future conditions which aresubstantially identical to those of the present; (4)the classification applies only to those who belongto the same class. 17

Applying the criteria set forth above, the Early

Retirement Law would violate the equal protectionclause were we to sustain respondents'submission that the benefits of said law are to bedenied a class of government employees who aresimilarly situated as those covered by said law.

The maxim of Expressio unius est exclusioalterius should not be the applicable maxim in thiscase but the doctrine of necessary implicationwhich holds that:No statute can be enacted that can provide all thedetails involved in its application. There is alwaysan omission that may not meet a particularsituation. What is thought, at the time of enactment, to be an all-embracing legislation maybe inadequate to provide for the unfolding eventsof the future. So-called gaps in the law develop asthe law is enforced. One of the rules of statutoryconstruction used to fill in the gap is the doctrineof necessary implication. The doctrine states thatwhat is implied in a statute is as much a partthereof as that which is expressed. Every statuteis understood, by implication, to contain all suchprovisions as may be necessary to effectuate itsobject and purpose, or to make effective rights,powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants,including all such collateral and subsidiary

consequences as may be fairly and logicallyinferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis . Andevery statutory grant of power, right or privilegeis deemed to include all incidental power, right orprivilege. This is so because the greater includesthe lesser, expressed in the Maxim, in eo plus sit,simper inest et minus . 18

During the sponsorship speech of CongressmanDragon (re: Early Retirement Law), in response toCongressman Dimaporo's interpellation oncoverage of state university employees who areextended appointments for one (1) year,

renewable for two (2) or three (3) years, 19 heexplained:

This Bill covers only those who would like to go onearly retirement and voluntary separation. It isirrespective of the actual status or nature of theappointment one received, but if he opts to retireunder this, then he is covered.It will be noted that, presently Pending inCongress, is House Bill No. 33399 (a proposal toextend the scope of the Early Retirement Law). Itswording supports the submission that Rep. ActNo. 6683 indeed overlooked a qualified group of civil servants. Sec. 3 of said House bill, oncoverage of early retirement, would provide:Sec. 3. Coverage . It will cover all employees of the national government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, as well as thepersonnel of all local government units. Thebenefits authorized under this Act shall apply toall regular, temporary, casual , emergency andcontractual employees , regardless of age, who

have rendered at least a total of two (2)consecutive years government service as of thedate of separation. The term "contractualemployees" as used in this Act does not includeexperts and consultants hired by agencies for alimited period to perform specific activities orservices with definite expected output.Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of thePhilippines, including those of the PC-INP areexcluded from the coverage of this Act. (emphasissupplied)

The objective of the Early Retirement or VoluntarySeparation Law is to trim the bureaucracy, hence,vacated positions are deemed abolished uponearly/voluntary retirement of their occupants. Willthe inclusion of co-terminous personnel (like thepetitioner) defeat such objective? In their case,upon termination of the project and separation of the project personnel from the service, the termof employment is considered expired, the officefunctus officio . Casual, temporary and contractualpersonnel serve for shorter periods, and yet, theyonly have to establish two (2) years of continuousservice to qualify. This, incidentally, negates theOSG's argument that co-terminous or projectemployment is inherently short-lived, temporaryand transient, whereas, retirement presupposesemployment for a long period. Here, violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitutionbecomes glaring because casuals are not even inthe plantilla, and yet, they are entitled to thebenefits of early retirement. How can theobjective of the Early Retirement Law of trimmingthe bureaucracy be achieved by granting earlyretirement benefits to a group of employees(casual) without plantilla positions? There would,in such a case, be no abolition of permanentpositions or streamlining of functions; it wouldmerely be a removal of excess personnel; but the


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positions remain, and future appointments can bemade thereto.Co-terminous or project personnel, on the otherhand, who have rendered years of continuousservice should be included in the coverage of theEarly Retirement Law, as long as they file theirapplication prior to the expiration of their term,and as long as they comply with CSC regulationspromulgated for such purpose. In this connection,

Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of 1990 (5March 1990) implementing Rep. Act No. 6850, 20requires, as a condition to qualify for the grant of eligibility, an aggregate or total of seven (7) yearsof government service which need not becontinuous, in the career or non-career service,whether appointive, elective, casual, emergency,seasonal, contractual or co-terminous includingmilitary and police service, as evaluated andconfirmed by the Civil Service Commission. 21 Asimilar regulation should be promulgated for theinclusion in Rep. Act No. 6683 of co-terminous

personnel who survive the test of time. This would

be in keeping with the coverage of "all sociallegislations enacted to promote the physical andmental well-being of public servants" 22 After all,co-terminous personnel , are also obligated to thegovernment for GSIS contributions, medicare andincome tax payments, with the generaldisadvantage of transience.In fine, the Court believes, and so holds, that thedenial by the respondents NIA and CSC of petitioner's application for early retirementbenefits under Rep. Act No. 6683 is unreasonable,unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner had filedan application for voluntary retirement within areasonable period and she is entitled to thebenefits of said law. While the application wasfiled after expiration of her term, we can giveallowance for the fact that she originally filed theapplication on her own without the assistance of counsel. In the interest of substantial justice, herapplication must be granted; after all she servedthe government not only for two (2) years theminimum requirement under the law but foralmost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successivegovernmental projects.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

Let this case be remanded to the CSC-NIA for afavorable disposition of petitioner's application forearly retirement benefits under Rep. Act No.6683, in accordance with the pronouncements inthis decision.SO ORDERED.Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras,Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea,Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ.,concur.

Separate Opinions GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:I concur but only insofar as our rulings are appliedto RA 6683 applicants.

Separate OpinionsGUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:I concur but only insofar as our rulings are appliedto RA 6683 applicants.Footnotes1 Letter of Commissioner Samilo Borlongay, 17March 1989.2 Annex "E", Rollo , P. 113 Annex "F", Rollo , p. 14.4 Rollo , p. 24-25.5 AN ACT PROVIDING BENEFITS FOR EARLY,RETIREMENT AND VOLUNTARY SEPARATION FR

THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE, AS WELL ASINVOLUNTARY SEPARATION OF CIVIL SERVICEOFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES PURSUANT TOVARIOUS EXECUTIVE ORDERS AUTHORIZINGGOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION AFTER THERATIFICATION OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTIONAPPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOROTHER PURPOSES.6 See Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 88-1, 12December 1988, Rollo , 61.7 Sec. 25, a and b, P.D. No. 807; see also CSCMemorandum Circular No. 11, S. of 1991, 5 April1991.8 Ibid ., also Perez v. City of San Carlos, G.R. No. L-48196-R, 11 July 1978; Ata v. Namocatcat, G.R.No. L-35703, 30 October 1972, 47 SCRA 320.9 Executive Order No. 292, Section 7, 83 O.G. No.39, 75 (September 1987)10 Ibid , Section 9, p. 77.11 Per Service Record, Rollo , p. 7.12 Rollo , p. 70.13 Page 3, this decision.14 See Agpalo, Ruben. Statutory Construction,1986 ed. p. 161.15 People v. Manantan, 115 Phil. 664.16 G.R. No. 54083, 28 February 1983, 120 SCRA910.17 Ormoc Sugar Co. v. Treasurer of Ormoc City, L-23794, 17 February 1968.


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18 Statutory Construction by Ruben E. Agpalo,1986 ed., p. 118-119 citing In re Dick, 38 Phil. 41(1918); City of Manila v. Gomez, G.R. No. L-37251,August 31, 1981, 107 SCRA 98; Escribano v. Ovila,G.R. No. L-30375, September 12, 1978, 85 SCRA245 (1978), also Go Chico v. Martinez, 45 Phil.256 (1923); Gatchalian v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-32560, October 22, 1970, 35 SCRA 435 (1970);People v. Uy Jui Pio, 102 Phil. 679 (1957) andPeople v. Aquino, 83 Phil. 614 (1949).19 Deliberations House Bill No. 4942 8 March1988, 6:30. p.m.20 An Act to Grant Civil Service Eligibility UnderCertain Conditions to Government EmployeesUnder Provisional or Temporary Status Who haverendered a Total of Seven (7) Years of EfficientService and for other Purposes.21 Rule 1, Sec. 2(c) as amended by MemorandumCircular No. 25, series of 1990, 21 May 1990.22 See Joint CSC-DBM Circular No. 1, series of 1991, 27 June 1991.EN BANC[G.R. No. 139382. December 6, 2000]

THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SERAFIN R. CUEVAS,EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RONALDO B. ZAMORA,and ATTY. CARINA J. DEMAISIP, petitioners, vs.ATTY. JOSEFINA G. BACAL,respondent .D E C I S I O NMENDOZA, J.:

This case involves the appointment and transferof career executive service officers (CESOs).

More specifically, it concerns the appointmentof respondent Josefina G. Bacal, who holds therank of CESO III, to the position of Chief PublicAttorney in the Public Attorneys Office, which hasa CES Rank Level I, and her subsequent transfer,made without her consent, to the Office of theRegional Director of the PAO.In its decision rendered on March 25, 1999, theCourt of Appeals declared respondent Josefina G.Bacal entitled to the position of Chief PublicAttorney in the Public Attorneys Office.Petitioners moved for a reconsideration, but theirmotion was denied by the appeals court in its

resolution dated July 22, 1999. Hence thispetition for review on certiorari. Petitionerscontend that the transfer of respondent to theOffice of the Regional Director of the PAO isappropriate considering her rank as CESO III.

The background of this case is as follows:Respondent Josefina G. Bacal passed the CareerExecutive Service Examinations in 1989. On July28, 1994, she was conferred CES eligibility andappointed Regional Director of the PublicAttorneys Office. On January 5, 1995, she wasappointed by then President Fidel V. Ramos to the

rank of CESO III. On November 5, 1997, she wasdesignated by the Secretary of Justice as ActingChief Public Attorney. On February 5, 1998, herappointment was confirmed by President Ramosso that, on February 20, 1998, she took her oathand assumed office.On July 1, 1998, petitioner Carina J. Demaisip wasappointed chief public defender by President

Joseph Estrada. Apparently because the position

was held by respondent, another appointmentpaper was issued by the President on July 6, 1998designating petitioner Demaisip as chief publicdefender (formerly chief public attorney), PUBLICDEFENDER'S OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICEvice ATTY. JOSEFINA G. BACAL, effective July 1,1998. On the other hand, respondent wasappointed Regional Director, Public DefendersOffice by the President.On July 7, 1998, petitioner Demaisip took her oathof office. President Estrada then issued amemorandum, dated July 10, 1998, to thepersonnel of the Public Defenders Officeannouncing the appointment of petitionerDemaisip as CHIEF PUBLIC DEFENDER.Petitioner Secretary of Justice was notified of theappointments of petitioner Demaisip andrespondent Bacal on July 15, 1998.On July 17, 1998, respondent filed a petition forquo warranto questioning her replacement asChief Public Attorney. The petition, which wasfiled directly with this Court, was dismissedwithout prejudice to its refiling in the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, respondent brought hercase in the Court of Appeals which, on March 25,

1999, ruled in her favor, finding her to be lawfullyentitled to the Office of Chief Public Attorney.Petitioners seek the reversal of the decision of theCourt of Appeals on the following grounds I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING

THAT RESPONDENT JOSEFINA G. BACAL, ACAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE OFFICER, HAS AVALID AND VESTED RIGHT TO THE POSITION OFCHIEF PUBLIC ATTORNEY AND, AS SUCH, CANNBE REASSIGNED OR TRANSFERRED TO THEPOSITION OF REGIONAL DIRECTOR, PUBLICATTORNEYS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT BACAL, WHO HOLDS A CESRANK LEVEL III, WAS REASSIGNED OR

TRANSFERRED TO A POSITION WHICH DOES NOTCORRESPOND TO HER PRESENT RANK LEVELINASMUCH AS THE POSITION OF BUREAUREGIONAL DIRECTOR CARRIES A CES RANK LEVV ONLY. CONTRARY TO THE CONCLUSIONS OF

THE COURT OF APPEALS, SAID POSITION OFREGIONAL DIRECTOR, PUBLIC ATTORNEYSOFFICE, THE POSITION TO WHICH RESPONDENTBACAL WAS REASSIGNED OR TRANSFERRED,CARRIES A CES RANK LEVEL III WHICH


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CORRESPONDS TO HER CES RANK III LEVEL. ASAN OFFICER WITH A RANK III LEVEL, RESPONDENTBACAL IS NOT THEREFORE ELIGIBLE FOR THEPOSITION OF CHIEF PUBLIC ATTORNEY WHICHCARRIES A CES RANK LEVEL I.III. UPON HER REASSIGNMENT OR TRANSFER TO

THE POSITION OF REGIONAL DIRECTOR,RESPONDENT BACAL DID NOT LOSE HER CESRANK III AND HER RIGHT TO RECEIVE THE SALARY

CORRES-PONDING TO HER PRESENT RANK.IV. RESPONDENT BACAL FAILED TO SHOW THATSHE HAS A CLEAR RIGHT TO THE POSITION OFCHIEF PUBLIC ATTORNEY.V. RESPONDENT BACAL FAILED TO FULLYEXHAUST THE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIESAVAILABLE TO HER BEFORE FILING THE PETITIONFOR QUO WARRANTO WITH THE COURT OFAPPEALS.I. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

We first consider petitioners contention thatrespondents quo warranto suit should have beendismissed for failure of respondent to exhaustadministrative remedies by appealing to theOffice of the President.

The contention has no merit. If, as has been held,no appeal need be taken to the Office of thePresident from the decision of a department headbecause the latter is in theory the alter ego of theformer, there is greater reason for not requiringprior resort to the Office of the President in thiscase since the administrative decision sought tobe reviewed is that of the President himself.Indeed, we have granted review in other cases

involving the removal of the Administrator of thePhilippine Overseas Employment Administrationand the Executive Director of the Land

Transportation Office without requiring thepetitioners to exhaust administrative remediesconsidering that the administrative actions inquestion were those of the President.In any event, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when thequestion raised is purely legal. In this case, thequestion is whether respondents transfer to theposition of Regional Director of the PublicAttorneys Office, which was made without herconsent, amounts to a removal without cause.

This brings us to the main issue in this appeal.II. Merits of the Case

In holding that respondents transfer amounted toa removal without cause, the Court of Appealssaid:. . . Her appointment as Regional Director was ineffect a removal in the guise of transfer, torepeat, without her consent. Having been validlyappointed Chief Public Defender by the Presidenton February 8, 1998, would naturally entitle her to

security of tenure since on the basis of theappointment, she was appointed, not merelyassigned, to a particular station. Her involuntarytransfer, through appointment, to that of a mereRegional Director, did not either conform to therules on the constitutional protection of securityof tenure. Above all, her supposed appointmentas a Regional Director is not only temporary but ison the other hand permanent wherein she lost herposition as Chief Public Attorney, or herconnection with the previous position beingsevered.. . . .In the case of the petitioner, there is certainly adiminution in duties and responsibilities when shewas downgraded through the July 6, 1998appointment, involuntarily made, from that of Chief Public Attorney to a mere Regional Director.

To repeat, the rank equivalent to a BureauDirector is Rank III while that of a mere BureauRegional Director is Rank V. Diminution in dutiesand responsibilities, certainly becomes apparentand then in the matter of salary, the basic salaryof a Chief Public Attorney together with all theperks, would amount to P575,199.00. In the caseof a Regional Director, his basic salary togetherwith all the perks, would only amount toP341,479.96. Admittedly, when a CESO isassigned or made to occupy a position with alower salary grade, he shall supposedly continueto be paid his salary that attaches to his CESrank. It cannot, on the other hand, be denied thatthe moment a non-CESO is appointed to a CESposition, he shall receive, at the same time, thesalary of his CES position. There is merit in thepetitioners argument that allowing the RegionalDirector to receive continuously the salary rate of Chief Public Attorney in effect would amount to anillegal consequence since the disbursement of public funds, as budgeted, provides funding foronly one Chief Public Attorney. The dilemmaarises when both the petitioner and respondentDemaisip would be claiming the salary of a Chief Public Attorney. There is no pretension either inthe Brief of the public respondents that there hasbeen a supplemental budget for the petitioner,now downgraded to a mere Regional Director, tobe receiving continuously the salary scale of aChief Public Attorney.. . . .Changing a CESO, Rank III, with a non-CESOeligible nor a CESO defies the recruitment,selection and appointment process of the CareerExecutive Service. As a matter of fact, as a rule(1997 Revised Edition, Handbook, CareerExecutive Service), the appointment to mostpositions in the CES is supposed to be made bythe President only from the list of CES eligibles,but recommended by the CES Board. Admittedly,an incumbent of a CES position may qualify for


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appointment to a CES rank, only upon theconfirming of a CES Eligibility and compliance withthe other requirements being prescribed by theBoard (Ibid. p. 5). Precisely, the CES was createdpursuant to PD No. 1 (adopting the IntegratedReorganizational Plan, dated September 24,1972), if only to form a continuing pool of well-selected and development-oriented careeradministrators who shall provide competent andfaithful service (Ibid. p. 2). We cannot see thisfrom that of the petitioner then being replaced bya non-CESO.

The appealed decision will not bear analysis.First . What should be emphasized in this case isthat respondent Josefina G. Bacal is a CESO III andthat the position of Regional Director of the PAO,to which she was transferred, corresponds to herCES Rank Level III and Salary Grade 28. This washer position before her appointment onFebruary 5, 1998 to the position of Chief PublicAttorney of the PAO, which requires a CES RankLevel I for appointment thereto. RespondentBacal therefore has no ground to complain. Shemay have been considered for promotion to RankI to make her appointment as Chief PublicAttorney permanent. The fact, however, is thatthis did not materialize as petitioner Carina J.Demaisip was appointed in her place. If respondent was paid a salary equivalent to SalaryGrade 30 while she was holding that office, it wasonly because, under the law, if a CESO is assignedto a position with a higher salary grade than thatcorresponding to his/her rank, he/she will beallowed the salary of the CES position.

As respondent does not have the rank appropriatefor the position of Chief Public Attorney, herappointment to that position cannot beconsidered permanent, and she can claim nosecurity of tenure in respect of that position. Asheld in Achacoso v. Macaraig :It is settled that a permanent appointment can beissued only to a person who meets all therequirements for the position to which he is beingappointed, including the appropriate eligibilityprescribed. Achacoso did not. At best, therefore,his appointment could be regarded only astemporary. And being so, it could be withdrawn

at will by the appointing authority and at amoments notice, conformably to established jurisprudence. . . . The mere fact that a position belongs to theCareer Service does not automatically confersecurity of tenure on its occupant even if he doesnot possess the required qualifications. Suchright will have to depend on the nature of hisappointment, which in turn depends on hiseligibility or lack of it. A person who does nothave the requisite qualifications for the positioncannot be appointed to it in the first place or, onlyas an exception to the rule, may be appointed to

it merely in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles. The appointment extendedto him cannot be regarded as permanent even if itmay be so designated. . . .It is contended, however, that respondent isqualified for the position of Chief Public Attorneybecause this position has a CES Rank Level III,while that of Regional Director, Public AttorneysOffice, has a CES Rank Level V. This is not so.

The position of Chief Public Attorney has a CESRank Level I and a Salary Grade 30, while that of Regional Director of the PAO has a CES RankLevel III and a Salary Grade 28. This is shown bythe following:1. Certification, dated April 6, 1999,issued by the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), which states thatthe position of the head of Public AttorneysOffice (PAO) is classified as Chief Public Attorneyat Salary Grade 30 (Annex A of Annex M,Petition).

2. Certification, dated April 15, 1999, issued byElmor D. Juridico, then Executive Director of theCES Board, which states that the Rankequivalent to the position of Chief Public Attorneyand Regional Public Attorney are CESO Rank I andCESO Rank III respectively (Annex B of Annex M,Petition); and3. Certification, dated July 8, 1998, previouslyissued to respondent Bacal by then ExecutiveDirector Juridico of the CES Board, stating that theposition of Chief Public Attorney has a CES rankequivalent of Rank I. (vide Annex C of Annex M,Petition). The certification reads:

This is to certify that Atty. JOSEFINA G. BACAL,Chief Public Attorney, Public Attorneys Office wasconferred CES Eligibility on July 28, 1994 perBoard Resolution No. 94-4620 and was appointedCareer Executive Service Officer (CESO) Rank IIIby then President Fidel V. Ramos on January 5,1995. She is yet to fulfill the requirements for anadjustment of her CES rank (from CES Rank III toRank I) to a level equivalent to her presentposition.

This certification is issued upon the request of Atty. Bacal for whatever purpose it may serve

best.Second. The Court of Appeals held thatrespondent Bacal had acquired security of tenureas Chief Public Attorney by the mere fact of herappointment to that position. This is likewise thepoint of the dissent of Justice Gonzaga-Reyes whocontends that a CES eligibility is all that a personneeds in order to acquire security of tenure in anyposition embraced in the Career Executiveservice; that a CESO rank is only necessary todifferentiate a CESOs general managerialduties/responsibilities, personal qualifications, anddemonstrated competence; and that no other CES


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examination is required for appointment to ahigher rank.Appointments, assignments, reassignments, andtransfers in the Career Executive Service arebased on rank. On this point, the IntegratedReorganization Plan cannot be any clearer. Itprovides:c. Appointment . Appointment to appropriateclasses in the Career Executive Service shall bemade by the President from a list of careerexecutive eligibles recommended by the Board. Such appointments shall be made on the basis of rank; provided that appointments to the higherranks which qualify the incumbents toassignments as undersecretary and heads of bureaus and offices and equivalent positions shallbe with the confirmation of the Commission onAppointments. The President may, however, inexceptional cases, appoint any person who is nota Career Executive Service eligible; provided thatsuch appointee shall subsequently take therequired Career Executive Service examinationand that he shall not be promoted to a higherclass until he qualifies in such examination.At the initial implementation of this Plan, anincumbent who holds a permanent appointmentto a position embraced in the Career ExecutiveService shall continue to hold his position, butmay not advance to a higher class of position inthe Career Executive Service unless or until hequalifies for membership in the Career ExecutiveService.. . . .e. Assignments, Reassignments and Transfers.Depending upon their ranks, members of theService shall be assigned to occupy positions of Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, BureauDirector, Assistant Bureau Director, RegionalDirector, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Boardon the basis of the members functional expertise.. . .

The rules and regulations promulgated by the CESBoard to implement the Integrated ReorganizationPlan are equally clear in providing that

Career Executive Service EligibilityPassing the CES examination entitles theexaminee to a conferment of a CES eligibility andthe inclusion of his name in the roster of CESeligibles. Conferment of CES eligibility is done bythe Board through a formal Board Resolution afteran evaluation of the examinees performance inthe four stages of the CES eligibility examinations.. . . .Appointment to CES Rank

Upon conferment of a CES eligibility andcompliance with the other requirementsprescribed by the Board, an incumbent of a CESposition may qualify for appointment to a CESrank. Appointment to a CES rank is made by thePresident upon the recommendation of theBoard. This process completes the officialsmembership in the CES and most importantly,confers on him security of tenure in the CES.

There are six (6) ranks in the CES rankingstructure. The highest rank is that of a CareerExecutive Service Officer I (CESO I), while thelowest is that of CESO VI.

The appropriate CESO rank to which a CES eligiblemay be appointed depends on two majorqualification criteria, namely: (1) level of managerial responsibility; and, (2) performance.Performance is determined by the officialsperformance rating obtained in the annualCESPES. On the other hand, managerialresponsibility is based on the level of the general

duties and responsibilities which an eligible isperforming, as follows:Levels of Dutiesand Rank EquivalentResponsibilities

if level of managerialresponsibilities Iare comparable to that of an Under-secretaryif comparable to that of anAssistant II

Secretaryif comparable to that of a BureauIII

Director or a Department RegionalDirectorif comparable to that of anAssistant IVBureau Director, DepartmentAssistant Regional Director orDepartment Service Chief if comparable to that of a Bureau

VRegional Director

if comparable to that of a BureauVIAssistant Regional DirectorAs a general rule, a CES eligible will berecommended for appointment to the rankequivalent of the level of his managerialresponsibility if his performance rating isSatisfactory or higher. If the performance ratingis Outstanding , he will be recommended one rankhigher than his level of managerial responsibility.Security of tenure in the career executive serviceis thus acquired with respect to rank and not to


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position. The guarantee of security of tenure tomembers of the CES does not extend to theparticular positions to which they may beappointed a concept which is applicable only tofirst and second-level employees in the civilservice but to the rank to which they areappointed by the President. Accordingly,respondent did not acquire security of tenure bythe mere fact that she was appointed to thehigher position of Chief Public Attorney since shewas not subsequently appointed to the rank of CESO I based on her performance in that positionas required by the rules of the CES Board.Indeed, to contend, as does the dissent of JusticeGonzaga-Reyes, that a CES eligibility was all thatwas required to make her appointment to theposition of Chief Public Attorney permanent wouldgive rise to an anomalous situation. Followingsuch theory, even if respondent is not appointedCESO I because her performance as Chief PublicAttorney does not warrant her appointment tosuch higher rank, she cannot be transferred to

any other office to which her rank (CESO III)qualifies her. This theory of the dissent, i.e. , thata CES eligibility gives the appointee security of tenure - not the ruling in this case that it isappointment to the appropriate rank that conferssecurity of tenure - is what will undermine theCareer Executive Service.Third . Within the Career Executive Service,personnel can be shifted from one office orposition to another without violation of their rightto security of tenure because their status andsalaries are based on their ranks and not on their

jobs. To understand this, it is necessary toconsider the reason for the creation of the CareerExecutive Service.R.A. No. 5435, as amended by R.A. Nos. 6076,6172, and 6175, created a commission chargedwith the specific function of reorganizing thegovernment to promote simplicity, economy, andefficiency in its operations. The result was thepreparation of the Integrated Reorganization Planwhich was adopted and declared part of the law of the land by P.D. No. 1 on September 24, 1972. Amajor feature of the Integrated ReorganizationPlan was the creation of the Career ExecutiveService whose justification was explained by theCommission on Reorganization, thus:

The present Civil Service system is not geared tomeet the executive manpower needs of thegovernment. The filling of higher administrativepositions is often based on considerations otherthan merit and demonstrated competence. Thearea of promotion is currently confined to theperson or persons next-in-rank in the agency.Moreover, personnel classification andcompensation are uniformly based on conceptsand procedures which are suited to positions inthe lower levels but not to managerial posts in the

higher levels. To fill this crucial gap, it isrecommended that a Career Executive Service beestablished. This group of senior administratorsshall be carefully selected on the basis of highqualifications and competence. Skilled in bothtechniques and processes of management, thesecareer executives will act as catalysts foradministrative efficiency and as agents of administrative innovation.

The status and salary of the career executives willbe based on their rank, and not on the job thatthey occupy at any given time . . . . In this sense, the rank status of the Career Executive Service issimilar to that of the commissioned officers in theArmed Forces or members of the Foreign Service. Unlike these latter organizations, however,entrance to the Career Executive Service will notbe generally at an early age in a relatively juniorlevel but at a senior management level.. . . .

The rank classification in the Service will allow for

mobility or flexibility of assignments such that thegovernment could utilize the services or specialtalents of these career executives wherever theyare most needed or will likely create the greatestimpact. This feature is especially relevant in adeveloping country which cannot afford to haveits scarce executive manpower pegged toparticular positions.Mobility and flexibility in the assignment of personnel, the better to cope with the exigenciesof public service, is thus the distinguishing featureof the Career Executive Service. To attain thisobjective, the Integrated Reorganization Planprovides:e. Assignments, Reassignments andTransferees . . . .Any provision of law to the contrarynotwithstanding, members of the CareerExecutive Service may be reassigned ortransferred from one position to another and fromone department, bureau or office to another;

provided that such reassignment or transfer ismade in the interest of public service and involvesno reduction in rank or salary; provided , further,that no member shall be reassigned or transferred

oftener than every two years; and provided ,furthermore , that if the officer concerned believesthat his reassignment or transfer is not justified,he may appeal his case to the President.

The implementing rules and regulations of theCES Board provide:Salary of Career Executive Service Officers . ACESO is compensated according to his CES rankand not on the basis of the CES position heoccupies. However, if a CESO is assigned to aCES position with a higher salary grade than that


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of his CES rank, he is allowed to receive the salaryof the CES position.Should he be assigned or made to occupy a CESposition with a lower salary grade, he shallcontinue to be paid the salary attached to his CESrank.Petitioners are, therefore, right in arguing thatrespondent, as a CESO, can be reassigned fromone CES position to another and from onedepartment, bureau or office to another. Further,respondent, as a CESO, can even be assigned ormade to occupy a CES position with a lower salarygrade. In the instant case, respondent, who holdsa CES Rank III, was correctly and properlyappointed by the appointing authority to theposition of Regional Director, a position which hasa corresponding CES Rank Level III.Indeed, even in the other branches of the civilservice, the rule is that, unless an employee isappointed to a particular office or station, he canclaim no security of tenure in respect of any

office. This rule has been applied to suchappointments as Director III or Director IV orAttorney IV or V in the Civil Service Commissionsince the appointments are not to specifiedoffices but to particular ranks; Election Registrars;Election Officers, also in the Commission onElections; and Revenue District Officers in theBureau of Internal Revenue. Reiterating theprinciple in Sta. Maria v. Lopez , this Court said:. . . [T]he rule that outlaws unconsented transfersas anathema to security of tenure applies only toan officer who is appointed - not merely assigned- to a particular station. Such a rule does notproscribe a transfer carried out under a specificstatute that empowers the head of an agency toperiodically reassign the employees and officersin order to improve the service of the agency.

The use of approved techniques or methods inpersonnel management to harness the abilities of employees to promote optimum public servicecannot be objected to. . . .For the foregoing reasons, we hold thatrespondents appointment to the position of Chief Public Attorney was merely temporary and that,consequently, her subsequent transfer to theposition of Regional Director of the same office,which corresponds to her CESO rank, cannot beconsidered a demotion, much less a violation of the security of tenure guarantee of theConstitution.Fourth. On the other hand, Justice Puno makesmuch of the fact that petitioner Carina J. Demaisipis not a CES eligible. Suffice it to say the lawallows in exceptional cases the appointment of non-CES eligibles provided that the appointeessubsequently pass the CES Examinations. ThusPart III, Chap. I, Art. IV, par. 5(c) of the IntegratedReorganization Plan provides that the President

may, in exceptional cases, appoint any personwho is not a Career Executive Service eligible;provided that such appointee shall subsequentlytake the required Career Executive Serviceexamination and that he shall not be promoted toa higher class until he qualified in suchexamination.For the same reason that the temporaryappointment of respondent Josefina G. Bacal as

Chief Public Attorney is valid under this provisionof the law despite the fact that she does not holdthe rank of CESO I, so is the appointment to thesame position of petitioner Carina J. Demaisip.

The question in this case is not the validity of theappointment to such position but whether theappointee acquires security of tenure even if hedoes not possess the requisite rank. There is noclaim that petitioner Demaisip has a right toremain in the position of Chief Public Attorneypermanently.On the other hand, as respondent herself does nothave the requisite qualification for the position of Chief Public Attorney, she cannot raise the lack of qualification of petitioner. As held in Carillo v.Court of Appeals, in a quo warranto proceedingthe person suing must show that he has a clearright to the office allegedly held unlawfully byanother. Absent that right, the lack of qualification or eligibility of the supposed usurperis immaterial. Indeed, this has been theexacting rule since it was first announced, 95years ago, in Acosta v. Flor . As at presentembodied in Rule 66, 5 of the Rules of CivilProcedure, the rule is that a person claiming tobe entitled to a public office or position usurped orunlawfully held or exercised by another may bringan action therefor in his own name.WHEREFORE , the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and the petition for quowarranto filed by respondent is DISMISSED.SO ORDERED.Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan, Pardo,Buena, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ.,concur.Puno J., see separate opinion.Vitug J., join Justice Puno in his separate opinion.Panganiban and Quisumbing, JJ., join the dissentof J. Reyes.Gonzaga-Reyes J., see dissenting opinion.Per Justice Bernardo Ll. Salas and concurred in by

Justices Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr. and Candido V.Rivera.It is unnecessary to determine whether the PublicAttorneys Office has been renamed PublicDefenders Office by reason of such appellationin R.A. No. 8194 (General Appropriations Act of 1996). It is sufficient to point out that petitioner
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/139382_puno.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/139382_gonzaga_reyes.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/139382_gonzaga_reyes.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/139382_puno.htm


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Secretary of Justice himself, in an opinion datedOctober 5, 1998, stated that the correct andofficial name of [the] office and its senior officersare still those stated in the Administrative Code of 1987, because the General Appropriations Actcannot amend the Administrative Code.Petition, pp. 7-8; Rollo , pp. 15-16.E.g. , Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod ng mgaMagtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ngMuntinglupa, Inc. v. Dominguez, 205 SCRA 92(1992).Achacoso v . Macaraig, 195 SCRA 235 (1991).Pangilinan v . Maglaya, 225 SCRA 512 (1993).NDCv . Collector, 9 SCRA 429 (1963); Mangubat v .Osmea, 105 Phil. 1308 (1959).CA Decision, pp. 14-16, 20-21; Rollo , pp. 53-55,59-60 (emphasis by the Court of Appeals).195 SCRA 235, 239-240 (1991).Memorandum for Petitioners, dated Sept. 18,

2000, pp. 9-10.Part. III, Chap. I, Art. IV, par. 5(c) (emphasisadded).CES Handbook, pp. 5-6 (emphasis added).An act authorizing the President of the Philippineswith the help of a Commission on Reorganization,to reorganize the different executivedepartments, bureaus, offices, agencies, andinstrumentalities of the government includingbanking or financial institutions and corporationsowned or controlled by its subject to certainconditions and limitations.Part. III, Chap. I, Art. IV, par. 5(e).CES Handbook, p. 8.Petition, pp. 11-12; Rollo , pp. 19-20.Fernandez v . Sto. Tomas, 242 SCRA 192 (1995).Ibaez v . Commission on Elections, 19 SCRA 1002(1967).De Guzman, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R.No. 129118, July 19, 2000.244 SCRA 787 (1995).31 SCRA 637, 653 (1970).Carillo v . Court of Appeals, 77 SCRA 170 (1977).

Accord, Santiago v . Guingona, 298 SCRA 756(1998).Id . at 177. Accord, Santiago v . Guingona, 298SCRA 756 (1998).Garcia v . Perez, 99 SCRA 628, 634 (1980).5 Phil. 18 (1905).


Manila

SECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 141141 June 25, 2001PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMINGCORPORATION (PAGCOR), petitioner,vs.CARLOS P. RILLORAZA, respondent.DE LEON, JR., J.:Before us is a petition for review on certioraripraying for the reversal of the Decision datedAugust 31, 1999 1 as well as the Resolution datedNovember 29, 1999, rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51803.

The facts are undisputed:On November 5, 1997, administrative charges fordishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct prejudicialto the best interest of the service, and loss of confidence, were brought against respondentCarlos P. Rilloraza, a casino operations managerof petitioner PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT ANDGAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR). Respondentallegedly committed the following acts:Summary description of charge(s) :Failure to prevent an irregularity and violations of casino and regulations committed by co-officersduring his shift on October 9, 1997.1. During his shift of 6:00 a.m.2:00 p.m. onOctober 9, 1997, four (4) personal checks with atotal value of Pesos: Five Million (P5,000,000)were issued by a small-time financier/player andwere facilitated by a COM with the TreasuryDivision which enabled the small-timefinancier/player to withdraw and receive saidamount. The facilitation of the checks was notauthorized by the Senior Branch Manager (SBM)or the Branch Manager for Operations (BMO) andthe COM who facilitated the checks was not onduty then.2. He even facilitated one (1) of the personalchecks with a value of Pesos: Five Hundred

Thousand (P500,000.00).3. He failed to stop a top-ranking officer fromplacing bets over and above the allowable limit of P5,000.00 per deal, he failed to stop the sameofficer from playing in the big tables and lastly, he

allowed the same officer to play beyond theallowable time limit of 6:00 a.m.Respondent duly filed his answer during aninvestigation conducted by petitioners CorporateInvestigation Unit. He narrated the events thattranspired:"When I reported for my 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.shift, on October 9, that morning I saw BMRICHARD SYHONGPAN beside TABLE #22 (BB)sitting at a coffee table inside Area 3. While insidethe Area 3, GAM RENE QUITO approached me witha check worth P500,000.00 requested by a


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customer for endorsement to the Treasury. SinceIve been out of Manila branch for 2 years and Ive

just been recalled to this branch for only morethan 3 weeks, Im not quite familiar with thesystems and I dont know this customer. Iimmediately approached COM CARLOSGONZALES, who at that time was still around, toverify regarding the said check and his immediatereply was "ITS OKAY AND GOOD AND IT WASGUARANTEED BY BM SYHONGPAN. In fact, Ireconfirmed it again with COM GONZALES sincehe is more familiar with the systems andcustomers, he answered me the same. So I gavethe approval to GAM QUITO for endorsement.When I went in the office, I instructed OOSGILBERT CABANA to beep SBM VIC ADVINCULAand BMO DARIO CORDERO to call office "ASAP"because I wanted to relay this matter to them andthere were no reply from both of them. Iinstructed OOS CABANA to send messages againto SBM & BMO, but still I received no reply. It wasuntil after noontime that BMO CORDERO returnedmy call and I reported the incident to him. When Iwas at home at around 3:30 p.m. SBM ADVINCULAreturned my call and I reported the incident. I alsorelayed the incident to SBM REYES.While during my rounds, I went down to the NewVIP area and there I saw BM SYHONGPAN sittingat TABLE #3(BB) and he was holding house cardsat that time. I approached and stopped him buthe reacted that the bet was not his but to aCUSTOMERS. I took his words because as asubordinate, I respected him as one of oursuperior who very well know all our companyspolicy esp. that an officer is not allowed to play at

BIG table and are only allowed to bet with amaximum of P5,000.00 only. So I believe it wasnot his bet but the said customer. At that timethere was no way for me to stop the gamebecause I saw the said customer, named MS.CORAZON CASTILLO, whom I dont know her [sic]since I wa

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