Publics Meet Market Democracy in Central and East Europe, 1991...

Publics Meet Market Democracy in Central and East Europe, 1991-1993

Mary E. McIntosh; Martha Abele Mac Iver; Daniel G. Abele; Dina Smeltz

Slavic Review, Vol. 53, No. 2. (Summer, 1994), pp. 483-512.

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seeks to compare the relative explanatory power of these two perspectives in shaping public preferences toward the market and democracy in central and east Europe. Many scholars have argued that self-interest-the maximization of one's personal material well-being-is a primary determinant of political attitudes. According to that perspective, those who feel they will be "losers" in the new political and economic order in central and east Europe are more likely to oppose the move to market democracy than those who feel they will be "winners." By contrast, the "symbolic politics" perspective argues that political so-cialization largely drives public attitudes toward policy. Thus, this model suggests that policy preferences toward the market and democracy are triggered by generally enduring attitudes about such "symbolic" issues as the relationship between the individual and the state, the importance of freedom versus equality and the value of new versus traditional ways. The policy implications of these two perspectives are quite different. If self-interest is the primary factor motivating the publics' policy preferences, then stable democracy is best addressed by ensuring that as many people as possible believe they will be "winners" in the new system. Yet, if the symbolic politics explanation has greater explanatory power in the public's policy preferences, these governments face the perhaps more daunting task of dealing with the legacy of the political socialization of the communist period and slowly changing political attitudes.

The historical record, as many have observed, suggests that "modern democracy is a product of the capitalist process." w h i l e the exact nature of the causal linkage between democracy and market forces is open to debate, many scholars assert that the market has historically preceded the development of modern democratic ins t i t~ t ions .~ Rose's typology of political systems (popularly elected versus unrepresentative) by economic systems (market versus non-market) illustrates that current history offers no notable examples of non-market economic systems with popularly elected political systems (figure l)."wo types of political regimes are distinguished, a representative system that is "accountable to a mass electorate through free elections" and an au-

Political Science Review 74 (1980): 670-83; Benjamin L. Page, "Elections and Social Choice: The State of the Evidence," American Journal ofPolitica1 Science 21 (1977): 639- 68; Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Economics and Elections: The ibfajor Western Democracies (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1988).

3. Joseph Alois Schumpeter, Cafiitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper and Bros., 1942).

4. Peter Berger, "The Uncertain Triumph of Democratic Capitalism," Journal of Democracy 3 (1993): 7-16; Claus Offe, "Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East Central Europe," Social Research 58 (1991): 864-902; Carlos Waisman, "Capitalism, the Market and Democracy," in Reexamining Democracy: Essays in Honor ofSeymour ibfartin Lifiset, eds. Gary Marks and Larry Jay Dia- mond (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1992).

5. Richard Rose, "Escaping from Absolute Dissatisfaction: A Trial-and-Error Model of Change in Eastern Europe," Journal of Theoretical Politics 4 (1992): 371-93.

485 Market Democracy in Central and East Europe

Figure 1 Alternative Political Economies

Political

Popularly elected Unrepresentative

Economic Market Market

derllocracy Market authoritarian

Non-market democracy

Non-market authoritarian

thoritarian regime which is not responsive to the mass public and is ruled by a select elite. Of course, there are different variants of each of these "ideal" types. Likewise, there are a number of variants of economic systems based on market principles and non-market systems. While virtually all economies contain mixed elements, individual economies can be classified as either predominantly market or non-market based. According to Rose, market democracy is characterized by those advanced industrial nations in the Organization of Economic Coop- eration and Development and a few less industrially developed na-tions. Included in this category are countries such as Sweden, which has developed an extensive welfare state, but bases its production on capitalist principles and private property. Many countries in the world are market authoritarian regimes: the market prevails but free competitive elections do not. The non-market democracy, according to Rose, is "difficult to find anywhere." Finally, the fourth logical construct, the non-market authoritarian type, depicts the political economy of the socialist states. This typology suggests that the free market has historically been a necessary, but not sufficient condition, for the development of democratic institutions. Nondemocratic forms of government may have free market economies (the "market authoritarian" system) but democratic forms of government have only existed in countries with market economies (the "non-market democracy" is an empty cell in the typology).

How may this historical sequencing be explained? Tocqueville and others%ontend that the market is conducive to the development of democracy because it provides the "social space within which individuals, groups and entire institutional complexes can develop independent of state control."' The market creates the opportunity for civil society-the kaleidoscope of organizations and groups that mediate

6. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol. 2 (New York: Vintage, 1945); Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited," Presidential Address, American Sociological Association, Miami, Florida, 1993; Larry Diamond, "Three Paradoxes of Democracy," in The Global Resurgence of Democracy, eds. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).

7. Berger, "The Uncertain Triumph of Democratic Capitalism," 7-16.

486 Slavic Review

between the state and the individual-to develop. Historically, capitalism produces a middle class that seeks to protect its rights and will challenge the state when its interests are at risk.8 It is the consequences of the market, not the intent or reason for establishing the market, that promote the formation of democratic organizing principles. Thus, the market itself is not essential to the development of democracy but the societal structures it promotes are essential.

Given the past sequencing of economic and political events, we might have expected the "non-market authoritarian" countries of central and east Europe to have gradually developed free market economies within the confines of an authoritarian political system (such as the east Asian newly industrializing countries). The social structures created by the market might then have become the foundation for the development of democratic institutions. To a limited degree, the first part of this sequence was occurring before 1989 in some of the countries in the region, most notably Hungary. But for the most part, central and east Europe stands as a case where the desire for political freedoms, not the free market, sparked the revolutions of 1989. Given the sequencing of democratic and then market reform, a key question is whether these fragile democracies can survive as they confront the overwhelming challenge of constructing market economies.

Relying on the Latin American experience, Przeworski explores the question of whether major economic reforms can be enacted under democratic conditions, or whether either economic reforms or de-mocracy must be sacrificed.' He first asserts that for democracy to consolidate, it must "evoke self-interested, spontaneous compliance from all the major political forces." He then argues that this compliance only occurs when democracy is "fair and effectiven-conditions under which economic transition from a command economy cannot easily be accomplished. The social costs of economic transition are high-unemployment, inflation, inequalities and general uncer-tainty-and the public and major political forces find it hard to accept these costs. "Losers" in the simultaneous processes of marketization and democratization comply to the rules of democracy because democracy offers oppositional political forces the chance to advance the "losers"' interests in the future. Thus, the opposition has an opportunity to turn today's loss into tomorrow's win under a democratic system of government. The recent "comebacks" of the leftist parties in Hungary, Poland and Lithuania stand as examples of how the economically disenfranchised used democratic tools to advance their agenda in politics.

8. Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comfiarative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Lipset, "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited"; Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Dewzocracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).

9. Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforwzs in Eastern Eurofie and Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).


Can the historical relationship between democracy and capitalism suggest hypotheses about the relationship between support for these two systems at the individual level? While we acknowledge the potential risks of an ecological fallacy, it seems reasonable to expect that if market structures (and presumable market values) have historically laid the foundation for the successful consolidation of democracy, then those who favor a free market economy should be more likely than others to embrace liberal democratic principles. We would expect that many of the underlying attributes that predispose one to accept market principles would also foster support for democratic principles.

We measure the relationship of support for democratic and market principles by constructing a two-by-two typology of public support for democratic principles and market economy. This approach is similar to Rose's typology of regimes, though we distinguish between high and low support for the free market and democratic principles rather than support for a command economy and authoritarianism. We would expect individuals, like states, to be clustered in cells of enthusiasm for both democracy and the market (reform enthusiasts) or skepticism of both (reform skeptics) (figure 2).1° We assume that the larger the proportion of reform enthusiasts to reform skeptics, the greater the probability of successful consolidation of democracy. While numerical size matters, the level of political involvement and influence of each group also figures into this calculation. If the reform enthusiasts are more politically motivated and thus more likely than others to become involved in the political process, reform-minded politicians will have a good chance to further the consolidation of democracy despite the reluc- tance of reform skeptics.

But the other diagonal in Rose's typology (non-representative market systems and representative command systems) is more problematic to translate to the individual level. States can have market economies without being democratic but historically there have not been democracies without a market economy. Can we thus infer that individuals can support a market economy without supporting democracy, but not vice versa? Given the initial sequencing of reforms in most of central and east Europe (basic democratic institutions such as competitive elections occurring before market reforms) and the higher social costs of market reforms than democratic reforms, it is more likely that this relationship would be reversed to some extent at the individual level.

10. Of course there are different types of capitalism and democracy. O u r discussion is based on support of basic principles that would arguably undergird most types of capitalism or democracy. See Terry Karl and Phillippe Schmitter, "Modes of Tran- sition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe," International Social Science Journal 128 (March 1991), for further discussion of the different types of capitalism and democracy. The distinction between liberal democratic and free market enthusiasts and skeptics is obviously more nuanced than represented in our heuristic typology. We choose the terms "enthusiasts" and "skeptics" to emphasize that these are new ideas and that it is unlikely they have crystallized into solid support o r opposition in the short time since 1989.

488 Slavic Review

Figure 2 Typology of Support for Democratic and Market Principles

Liberal Den~ocracy

Enthusiasts Skeptics

Free Market: Enthusiasts Reform enthusiasts Democratic

skeptics1 market enthusiasts

Skeptics Democratic enthusiasts1 Reform skeptics market skeptics

We would expect a significant number of central and east Europeans to embrace democratic principles but not market ones. We suspect that these democratic enthusiasts/market skeptics oppose market reforms either because they oppose the principles of the free market (greater economic inequality and high levels of private ownership of business are two of the contested principles) or are skeptical of whether the market can deliver greater prosperity or security than the previous system. In those countries where significant market reforms preceded democratic reforms (e.g. Hungary), however, we would expect a pattern closer to that found at the aggregate level-a higher number of demo-cratic skeptics/market enthusiasts. These likely are people who are profit- ing in the new economic system but are not faring as well in the new political system. We suspect they are people who are politically dis- advantaged under the new governments or who find "democracy" too unstructured and disorderly. Yet if market principles (such as com- petition) underlie the liberal democratic process, theoretically we would expect many of these individuals to eventually embrace democratic precepts.

To examine the public's attitude toward these fundamental political and economic changes, we turn to two distinct literatures-"self- interest" and "symbolic politics." According to the instrumental perspective, "self-interest" primarily drives people's political attitudes, policy preferences and voting choices. Publics adopt political attitudes or policy perspectives that offer the maximum utility or benefit at minimal costs." Individuals evaluate their past, current and future circumstances, and calculate what serves their best interests. If current practices have benefited them (e.g. they have a thriving small business) or if they believe their future prospects will be brighter (e.g. believe they or their children will profit from a market economy), they are likely to support the current policy. By contrast, the symbolic politics perspective asserts that people "acquire stable affective preferences"

11. Page, "Elections and Social Choice: The State of the Evidence," 639-68.


through the socialization process, "with little calculation of the future costs and benefits of these attitudes." '*In other words, attitudes toward new policy issues are formed more on the basis of enduring political and social values than according to personal interest or gain. We apply these two perspectives below to the question of political and economic policy preferences in central and east ~ u r o p e . ' "

As Sears, Hensler and Speer argue, the concept of "self-interest" is potentially so broad as to be meaningle~s. '~ Thus, we follow their lead and define self-interest in relatively short-term calculations which figure directly on a person's material well-being. The inability of the former communist governments in central and east Europe to offer their citizens economic improvement contributed greatly to both the public's and elite's demands for radical political and economic change. While political freedom was the rallying cry of the revolutions of 1989, people also expected their economic situations to improve. Yet survey data show that most central and east Europeans believe that their current economic situations are worse, not better, than they were under communi~rn . '~The current economic reforms have greatly diminished many people's standards of living and replaced their relatively "secure and certain" economic lives with a much higher degree of uncertainty and insecurity, at least in the short term. Numerous scholars have shown that political evaluations are influenced by economic condi- t i o n ~ . ' ~Broadly speaking, research on the relationship between political preferences and economic factors has focused on "pocketbook" considerations, a person's assessment of hislher personal economic well-being and what Lewis-Beck termed "sociotropic" assessments, an individual's general evaluation of the country's overall economic situation. The evidence from western industrial societies suggests that sociotropic assessments are better predictors of political attitudes than

12. Sears, Lau, Tyler and Allen, "Self-Interest versus Symbolic Politics in Policy Attitudes and Presidential Voting," 670-83.

13. We posit a nonreciprocal model which is ordered based on the generally held view that directionality flows from general attitudes to more specific ones. We ac-knowledge that many of the linkages between these attitudinal measures might be more accurately represented in a reciprocal model, but this is beyond the scope of this paper.

14. Sears, Hensler and Speer, "Whites' Opposition to 'Busing': Self-Interest o r Symbolic Politics?" 369-84.

15. Mary E. McIntosh and Martha Abele Mac Iver, "Coping with Freedom and Uncertainty: Public Opinion in Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, 1989-92," In-ternational Journal of Public Opinion Research 4 (1992): 375-91.

16. Lewis-Beck, Economics and Elections: The 1Vlajor Western Democracies; Donald R. Kinder and D. Roderick Kiewiet, "Economic Discontent and Political Behavior: The Role of Personal Grievances and Collective Economic Judgments in Congressional Voting," Awzerican Journal ofPolitica1 Sczence 23 (1979): 495-517; Morris P. Fiorina, "Short and Long-term Effects of Economic Conditions and Individual Voting Decisions," Social Science Working Paper 244, California Institute of Technology (December 1978); Raymond M. Duch, "Tolerating Economic Reform: Popular Support for Transition to a Free Market in the Former Soviet Union," American Political Science Reuiew 87 (1993): 590-606.

490 Slavic Review

"pocketbook" indicators." Nevertheless, we investigate both of these economic assessments, given the unique circumstances of the transitions in central and east Europe.

We hypothesize that those who evaluate their own or their country's current economic situations as good are likely to support the current policies. Conversely, it follows that frustration with the existing economic situation will generate support for changing the current policies.'' Likewise, those who have experienced an improvement relative to their own or the country's past economic situations (retrospective) or expect their own or the country's situations to improve in the future (prospective), are likely to support the current political and economic course. Given that objective economic conditions have improved for only a relatively small percentage of people, we would not expect current or retrospective economic assessments to generate strong support for democratic or market policies. Instead, we would expect prospective economic assessments to be more strongly linked to attitudes about these reforms. Following Bruszt and Simonl%nd Przew~rski ,~~ ' we hypothesize that central and east Europeans who are optimistic about the future will be more likely than others to support democratic and market policies. These individuals will support the new system even if they are currently "losers" if they think they (or members of their family) will eventually be "winners" in the system. The direction of the relationships between the current and retrospective indicators and market and democratic principles may even be the opposite of what we would expect, given the economic affairs in the region. Moreover, the relatively limited predictive power of self-interest on such a wide array of policy issues as congressional elections,*l school desegrega- t i ~ n , ~ ~energy policy,29 market reform in the former Soviet Union2*

17. Lewis-Beck, Econon~ics and Elections: The Major Western Democracies. 18. O u r hypotheses are the reverse of those of Duch because our data were col-

lected later in the reform process. Using 1990 data, Duch hypothesized that the more negative one's view of the economic system (before reforms started), the higher one's support for a free market. Since the reference point in our surveys was the economic system after free market reforms had begun, o;r expectations are reversed.

19. Laszlo Bruszt and Janos Simon, "The Great Transformation in Hungary and Eastern Europe: Theoretical Approaches and Public Opinion about Capitalism and Democracy" (unpublished manuscript, 1992).

20. Przeworski, Democracy and the Market. 21. Fiorina, "Short and Long-term Effects of Economic Conditions and Individual

Voting Decisions"; Kinder and Kiewiet, "Economic Discontent and Political Behavior: The Role of Personal Grievances and Collective Economic Judgements in Congres- sional Voting."

22. David 0 . Sears and Donald R. Kinder, "Racial Tensions and Voting in Los Angeles," in Los Angeles: Viability and Prospects for metropolitan Leadership, ed. Werner Z . Hirsch (New York: Praeger, 1971).

23. David 0. Sears, 'Tom R. Tyler, Jack Citrin and Donald R. Kinder, "Political System Support and Public Response to the Energy Crisis," American Journal of Political Science 22 (1978): 56-82.

24. Duch, "Tolerating Economic Reform: Popular Support for Transition to a Free Market in the Former Soviet Union," 590-606.

Market Democracy in Central and East Europe 491

and law enforcementL5 suggests that the contribution of self-interest on the formation of these political attitudes may be rather modest.

The symbolic politics perspective views attitude formation in a very different manner than the self-interest perspect ive. '~roadly stated, this perspective argues that political socialization plays a larger role in defining policy preferences than does self-interest. Through the political socialization process individuals acquire predispositions which influence their political attitudes by evoking emotional responses to "symbols" associated with early political socialization. This perspective contends that it is largely immaterial whether the policy issue has a direct bearing on the individual's well-being. Even when a new policy issue does not evoke a particular response, proponents of this perspective contend that people respond in a manner that maximizes cognitive consistency.

The general predispositions of political ideology,27 equalitarian- ismz8 and individualism2%re some of the most important in the for- nation of policy preferences. We assume that the policy issues of "mar-

ket economy" and "liberal democracy" are likely linked to such underlying predispositions as a person's belief about: 1) the relationship between the individual and the state; 2) the value of equality versus freedom; 3) the merit of new versus traditional ways of struc- turing societal relations; 4) one's openness to other cultures and outside influences; and 5 ) whether people can be trusted. We discuss each of these in more detail below.

The relationship between ideological orientation and political and economic attitudes is well established. In particular, the role of the state in society has long structured political debate in western indus- trialized countries and is at the heart of the transition in central and east Europe. As some have argued, democratic development and market formation in central and east Europe depend on greater individual responsibility and less state contr01.~'

While the terms left and right (or liberal and conservative) are

25. Albert J. Reiss, Jr., "Monitoring the Quality of the Criminal Justice Systems," in The Human Meaning of Social Change, eds. Angus Campbell and Philip E. Converse (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1972).

26. Jack Citrin, Beth Reingold and Donald P. Green, "American Identity and the Politics of Ethnic Change," Journal of Politics 52 (1990): 1124-54; Sears and Kinder, "Racial Tensions and Voting in Los Angeles"; Sears, Lau, Tyler and Allen, Jr., "Self- Interest versus Symbolic Politics in Policy Attitudes and Presidential Voting."

27. David 0.Sears and Jack Citrin, Tax Revolt: Somethingfor Nothing in California, enl. ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985).

28. M. Rokeach, Beliefs, Attitudes, and Values: A Theory of Organization and Change (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1968).

29. S. Feldman, "Economic Individualism and American Public Opinion," Amer-ican Political Quarterly 11 (1983) 3-29; S. Lukes, Individualism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973).

30. Ada Finifter and Ellen Mickiewicz, "Redefining the Political System of the USSR: Mass Support for Political Change," American Political Science Review 86 (1992): 857-74; Ralf Dahrendorf, Reflections on the Revolution in Europe: In a Letter Intended to Have Been Sent to a Gentleman in Warsaw (New York: Times Books, 1990).

492 Slavic Review

bandied about in central and east Europe, we have not found them to hold a shared meaning for publics in-the region. Consequently, we believe a measure of "preferred society" is a more useful indicator of an underlying liberal-conservative c o n t i n ~ u m . ~ ' Our expectation is that those who prefer an "individual opportunities society" will be more likely to support liberal democratic and market policies than those who prefer a "state guarantees society." Closely connected to prefer- ence for state guarantees is the ideal of egalitarianism, a central political tenet under socialism. Unlike the western tenet of "equality of opportunity," equality under socialism referred to economic equality (i.e., relatively low income differentials), which some assert curtailed individual initiative. Of course, historically the redistribution of resources has become fundamental to liberal democracy but not to nearly the same degree as in socialist systems. Many scholars3' have contended that political socialization during the communist period was relatively successful in fostering the value of egalitarianism among a portion of the population, in part because these regimes ensured a minimal stan- dard of living and a basic level of security for most. We expect those who favor economic equality over political freedom to be less likely than others to support liberal democratic and market policies.""

Following Rose and Haerpfer and others," we expect that those who are predisposed to change will be more inclined to support democratic principles and market reform since both require new ways of thinking and acting. As has often been observed," democracy and the free market are based on certainty in process but uncertainty in out- comes. Most of the old ways of doing things, both politically and eco-

31. McIntosh and Mac Iver, "Coping with Freedom and Uncertainty: Public Opin- ion in Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, 1989-92," 375-91.

32. David Mason, "Attitudes Towards the Market and the State in Post-Commu- nist Europe," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Phoenix, Arizona, 1992; James P. MacGregor, "Value Structures in a Developed Socialist System: The Case of Czechoslovakia," Com-parative Politics 23 (1991): 181-99; Peter M. E. Volten, "Introduction and Assessment," in Bound to Change: Consolidating Democracy in East Central Europe, ed. Peter M . E. Vol ten (New York: Institute for East-West Studies, 1992).

33. This research, as well as that of others, have noted that central and east Europeans welcome some differentiation in income. Yet the key question is not whether people accept the idea of differential rewards for different skill levels and quality of performance, but whether economic equality is more important than political freedom.

34. Richard Rose and Christian Haerpfer, "New Democracies Between State and Market: A Baseline Report on Public Opinion," Center for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, no. 204, 1992; Bruszt and Simon, "The Great Transformation in Hungary and Eastern Europe: Theoretical Approaches and Public Opinion about Capitalism and Democracy"; Dennis Chong, Herbert McClosky and John Zaller, "Pat- terns of Support for Democratic and Capitalist Values in the United States," British

Journal of Sociology 13 (1983): 401-40. 35. Przeworski, Democracy and the Market; Valerie Bunce, "Rising Above the Past:

The Struggle for Liberal Democracy in Eastern Europe," World Policy Journal 7 (Summer 1990): 395-430.


nomically, will not work in a market democracy: while initiative and adaptability were required in communist societies (the second economies in these countries are good examples of the initiative and adaptability of the people), they were not highly valued in the "official" political culture of these societies. The successful transition to market democracy requires that people be adaptive and open to change, and may rest even more on the ability of publics to take initiative than does the functioning of established market democracies ."~elated to acceptance of change and new ideas is an openness to other cultures and outside influences. Dalton and Weil emphasize the importance of outside influences in shaping democratic orientation^."^ Specifically, Weil has argued that the demonstration effect of the west has played a major role in shaping central and east European attitudes toward adoption of market democracy. Those who feel threatened by other countries or by "outsiders" within their own country are probably more likely than others to cling to the old political and economic system. Moreover, given that many economists contend that the successful transition from a command to market economy depends upon participation in the global economy and foreign investment in particular, we expect that those who are open to western influence will be more inclined than others to endorse both democratic principles and market reform.

Interpersonal trust is viewed as central to the building of a society in which democracy can flourish. Those who lack trust are less likely to cooperate with others (politically or economically) and are more likely to be alienated from society." As Gibson, Duch and Tedin have pointed out, interpersonal trust plays an integral role in the formation of political coalitions in the former socialist states."" If political culture theorists are correct that interpersonal trust is central to the building

36. Rose and Haerpfer, "New Democracies Between State and Market: A Baseline Report on Public Opinion."

37. Russel Dalton, "Con~~nunis t s and Democrats: Attitudes Toward Democracy in the Two Germanies," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, 199 1.

38. Donna Bahry and Brian D. Silver, "Soviet Citizen Participation on the Eve of Democratization," American Political Science Review 84 (1990): 821-47; Arthur Miller, "In Search of Regime Legitimacy," in Public Opinion and Regime Change: The New Politics of Post-Soviet Societies, eds. Arthur H . Miller, William M. Reisinger and Vicki L. Hesli (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993); Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989); Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); Edward C. Banfield with the assistance of Laura Fasano Banfield, The Moral Basis o f a Backward Society (New York: Free Press, 1958); Ronald Inglehart, "'The Ren- aissance of Political Culture," American Political Science Review 82 (1982): 1203-30; David S. Mason, Revolz~tion in East-Central Europe: The Rise and Fall of Communism and the Cold War (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992).

39. James Gibson, Raymond Duch and Kent Tedin, "Democratic Values and the Transformation of the Soviet Union," The Journal ofpolitics 54 (1992): 329-71.

Slavic Review

of democracy, we would expect trust to be related to support for liberal democratic principles and perhaps also to support for market reform.

A number of social characteristics have also been shown to be related to attitudes toward both the market and liberal democracy. Based on results from western ~ u r o p e , ~ ' and eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union,41 we expect support of both the market and liberal democracy to increase with level of education. Although some have argued that the educational system under communism likely acted as a transmitter of pre-1989 value^,^' others have found that education makes individuals more critical of regime value~.~"e expect that the process of exploring new ideas and acquiring skills and knowledge would make one more receptive to democratic and market precepts. Furthermore, as modernization theory would predict, we expect urban residents to be more likely than rural ones to support these reforms. Chong, McClosky and Zaller along with many others note that expo- sure to different political and economic ideas is likely to be greater in urban rather than rural areas, and that the limited communication in rural areas might impede learning the "new political and economic norms."44 Given that the young theoretically comprise a "nontradi- tional" element in society4%nd potentially will benefit more from the reforms than others, we hypothesize that younger people will be more likely than older ones to express support for democratic and market reforms. Other recent studies show that young people in eastern Eu- rope are more likely than older ones to espouse democratic principles4"

40. Ibid. 41. James Gibson, "Political and Economic Markets: Connecting Attitudes toward

Political Democracy and a Market Economy within the Mass Culture of the USSR," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, 1993; Duch, "Tolerating Economic Reform: Popular Support for Transition to a Free Market in the Former Soviet Union," 590-606.

42. Frederick D. Weil, "The Variable Effects of Education on Liberal Attitudes: A Comparative-Historical Analysis of Anti-Semitism Using Public Opinion Survey Data," American Sociological Review 50 (August 1985): 458-74; Dalton, "Communists and Democrats: Attitudes Toward Democracy in the Two Cermanies."

43. Jeffrey W. Hahn, "Continuity and Change in Russian Political Culture," British Journal of Political Science 21 (1991): 393-421; Brian Silver, "Political Beliefs of the Soviet Citizen: Sources of Support for Regime Norms," in Politics, Worlt and Daily Life in the USSR: A Survey of Former Soviet Citizens, ed. James R. Millar (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Donna Bahry, "Society 'Transformed? Rethinking the Social Roots of Perestroika," Slavic Review 52 (Fall 1993): 512-54; Mary E. McIntosh, Martha Abele Mac Iver, Daniel C. Abele and David Nolle, "Minority Rights and Majority Rule: Ethnic Tolerance in Romania and Bulgaria," forthcoming in Social Forces.

44. Dennis Chong, Herbert McClosky and John Zaller, "Patterns of Support for Democratic and Capitalist Values in the United States," British Journal of Sociology 13 (1983): 401-40.

45. Ada Finifter and Ellen Mickiewicz, "Redefining the Political System of the USSR: Mass Support for Political Change," American Political Science Review 86 (1992): 857-74.

46. Hahn , "Continuity and Change in Russian Political Culture," 393-421; Rich- ard Dobson, "Communism's Legacy and Russian Youth," unpublished manuscript;

ibfarket Democracy in Central and East Europe 495

and market reform.47 Consistent with the findings of others,48 we expect men to be more likely than women to support democratic and market reforms. This probably reflects women's greater concern for the economic and social welfare of their families in a system where the state no longer assumes the responsibility that it did in the past. Social class in its various meanings has repeatedly been found to be related to political and economic attitudes. Yet Bruszt and Simon warn that the fluidity of the social system makes class a less reliable predictor in the rapidly changing socio-political environment of central and east Europe than it might be in more stable s~c ie t ies .~" Although numerous scholars argue that the development of a middle class is central to the development of capitalism, we concur with Bruszt and Simon that it is probably too early for class to be a reliable predictor in central and east Europe. Thus, we do not expect to find a consistent relationship between self-identified social class and support for either liberal democratic or market reform.

Before we explore how these indicators of self-interest and symbolic politics shape market and democratic preferences, we examine the publics' support for three principles of liberal democracy. We then turn to the publics' attitude toward the free market. We conclude this section of the paper with an examination of the relationship between support for these liberal democratic principles and support for the market. These analyses are based on USIA-commissioned nationwide probability surveys conducted between early 1991 and early 1993 in Hungary, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria. (See appendix for a full de- scription of these surveys.)

Based primarily on Dahl's conception of polyarchy, we focus on three principles of liberal democracy-representative government, civil liberties and rule of law. Specifically, we asked respondents how important a multiparty system of government, freedom to criticize the government and a system ofjustice that treats everyone equally are for a "society to be called a democracy." While these items do not directly measure support for liberal democratic principles, analysis shows that

Finifter and Mickiewicz, "Redefining the Political System of the USSR: Mass Support for Political Change," 857-74.

47. Duch, "Tolerating Economic Reform: Popular Support for 'Transition to a Free Market in the Former Soviet Union," 590-606; Mason, "Attitudes Towards the Market and the State in Post-Communist Europe"; Barbar-a Heyns and Aleksandr-a Jasinska-Kania, "Values, Politics and the Ideologies of Reform: Poland in Transition," in Research on Democracy and Society: A Research Annual, ed. Frederick Weil (Greenwich: JAI Press, 1993).

48. Ellen Carnaghan and Donna Bahry, "Political Attitudes and the Gender Gap in the USSR," Comparative Politics (July 1990): 379-99; Kent M. Jennings, Continuities in Political Action: A Longitudinal Study of Political Orientations in Three Western Democracies (Berlin: W . de Gruyter, 1990).

49. Bruszt and Simon, "The Great Transformation in Hungary and Eastern ELI- rope: Theoretical Approaches and Public Opinion about Capitalism and Democracy."

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those who think these principles are essential to a democracy clearly hold views consistent with liberal democratic theory.") ~ h u s we believe it is fair to assume that those who think these items are essential for democracy also support these liberal democratic principles. Of course, democracy entails more than these three political principles," but these represent basic aspects that most would agree are essential to the functioning of a democracy."2 Moreover, these are familiar principles that central and east Europeans can evaluate with some confidence.

These questions were first asked in most countries" in fall 1991 or early 1992 and have been repeated once or twice since then except in Romania. While opinion has shifted slightly in these countries, no overall significant differences were noted when these questions were repeated. This suggests that, despite the rapid speed of political change, publics' views about the importance of these characteristics are rather stable. In Table 1 we see that solid majorities believe that equal justice, political opposition and freedom to criticize the government are important or essential to a democracy. Of these attributes, however, a system of equal justice is the only one that majorities in all these coun-

50. Measuring support for liberal democracy is a matter of some debate. Rose and Mishler have challenged the "idealistic" approach of measuring the extent to which citizens embrace norms considered fundamental to democratic government, arguing instead for a "realist" approach that ascertains support for the current regime. Using such a measure, they find majorities o r near majorities of democratic supporters throughout eastern Europe. McIntosh and Mac Iver find similar majorities preferring the current political systenl over the previous communist one. Measures of support for ideal norms such as a multiparty system, political dissent and freedoin of the press show nearly as sizable majorities embracing democratic principles.

Much as we hope the optimism voiced by these researchers about the prospects for democracy in central and eastern Europe is warranted, the historical precedent of democratic reversals noted by Huntington and others suggests to us that a more rigorous test of support for democratic principles rnay be in order. Respondents may prefer the current democratic regime and voice agreement with abstract democratic principles, but not consider those norms as essential for their political system. There- fore, based primarily on Dahl's conception of liberal democracy, we seek to measure the extent to which respondents regard the norms of competitive elections, freedom to criticize the government and equality under the law as essential for a democracy. While some may argue that this does not directly measure support for these norms, we would counter that it is indeed a more rigorous test of support. O u r analysis indicates that individuals who regard one of these principles as essential generally meet the Rose and Mishler test of a democrat (prefer the current democratic regime over the former communist one), while not all who support the new system regard these norms as essential. It is not the case that individuals view these principles as essential for a democracy but then don't theinselves support them. While our measure inay underestimate democratic support ainong publics in the region, we would argue that this more cautious measure is a t least as appropriate, if not more so, than others.

51. See Gibson, Duch and Tedin, "Democratic Values and the Transformation of the Soviet Union," 329-71, for extensive discussion.

52. David Held, Models of Democracy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987); Georg Sorensen, Democracy and Democratization: Processes and Prospects in a Changing World (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993).

53. Romania is an exception. The question was asked in fall 1991 but the wording was changed, thus comparisons are impossible to make.


Table 1 Support for Democratic Principles

Question: People associate democracy wi th diverse meanings such as those o n this card. For each o f these, please tell m e whether you think it is essential, important but no t essential, n o t very important or no t at all important for a society t o be called a democracy.

Hungary Poland Romania Bulgaria

1192 12192 9/91 5192 2193 5193 9191 3193 --- - - -

A system of justice that treats everyone equally

Essential Important but not essential Not very Important Not at all important

At least two stl-ong political parties competing in elections


Freedom to criticize the government


tries deem essential for a society to be called a democracy. By contrast, half or fewer except in Bulgaria say "freedom to criticize the government" or "at least two political parties competing in elections" are essential. To create a scale of support for democratic principles, we summed these three democratic item responses54 for each respondent (a multiparty system of government, freedom to criticize the government and a system of justice that treats everyone equally) after factor analysis revealed one significant factor.55

The transition from a command to a market economy buffets these publics with equal, or perhaps greater, challenges and confusion than does the transition from a nondemocratic to democratic system of government. For the public the costs of economic reform are "front- end loaded" since the pain of economic reform (price increases, unemployment and general uncertainty) is experienced before the benefits of reforms." The path that each of these countries has chosen to

54. T h e following analyses are based o n the November 1992 data in Hungary and the early 1993 data i n the other countries.

55. T h e factor loadings for bo th the liberal democracy and market economy indicators for all four countries are presented i n Table 5 .

56. Richard Rose and Wil l iam Mishler, "Reacting t o Regime Change in Eastern Europe: Polarization or Leaders and Laggards?" Center for the Study o f Public Policy, University o f Strathclyde, n o . 210, 1993.

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Table 2 Views on Creation of Free Market Economy

Question: Do you personally feel that the creation of a free market economy, that is, one largely free from state control, is right o r wrong for (survey country)?

Poles 5192 2193

Right 48% 48% Wrong 34 3 7 Don't know 18 15

100% 100%

Romanians 10191 4192 9192 5193

Right 35% 36% 37% 44% Wrong 48 39 46 45 Don't know 2 25 3 11

100% 100% 100% 100%

Hungarians 12192

Right 62% Wrong 19 Don't know -18

99%

Bulgarians 4192 3193

Right 51% 53% Wrong 23 25 Don't know 26 22

100% 100%

reform their economies varies considerably (from Poland's shock therapy to Romania's more halting approach). It would appear that no matter what the approach, the costs of market reform are more painful and concrete than those of political reform. Thus, as already noted, we would expect fewer people to embrace market than political reforms.

When asked if they think the "creation of a free market economy, that is, one largely free of state control" is right or wrong for their country's future, more central and east Europeans say it is right than wrong, except in Romania. As Table 2 shows, support for the free market is slightly higher in Hungary, followed by Bulgaria and Poland, while Romanians are evenly divided. The finding that Hungarians were more likely than others in 1992 to voice support for the creation of a free market likely corresponds with its longer history of market practices (starting with the New Economic Mechanism in 1968).

Market Democracy in Central and East Europe

Table 3 Views on Privatization

Question: There is much talk about privatization of business in (survey country). Some people feel that the majority of businesses should be privately owned. Others think that only some businesses should be privately owned and that the government should continue to run the majority of businesses. Which of the two alternatives is closest to your own views?

Poles 519 1 919 1 1192 5192 2193 --

Mostly private 45% 35% 40 % 41% 38% Mostly state 49 59 50 51 58 Don't know

Romanians 12/90 4192 9192 5/93

Mostly private 42 % 31% 36% 36% Mostly state 54 59 56 57 Don't know 4 10 9 7

100% 100% 101% 100%

Hungarians 1192 12/92

Mostly private 41% 42 % Mostly state 48 51% Don't know 2 2

99% 100%

Mostly private 24% 22% 22 % Mostly state 59 55 64 Don't know 17 23 16

100% 100% 101%

While economists dispute the degree and speed with which the economy should be marketized, most agree that privatization and foreign investment are critical to the development of a free market. Be- sides increasing efficiency of east European businesses, privatization will reduce governments' deficits by curbing subsidies to unprofitable firms. Privatization of the state "dinosaurs" has been approached with varying combinations of mass privatization, foreign investment and sales to small entrepreneurs. Hungary has relied more heavily on foreign investment, while Romania has adopted, but has yet to implement fully, the successful Czech model of mass privatization to "create a nation of shareholders."

Tables 3 and 4 reveal that publics are not as enthusiastic as economists about these economic reforms. On the specific issue of priva-

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Table 4 Views on Foreign Investment

Question: There are different opinions about foreign investment. Some people think that foreign investment is necessary and will have a positive influence on the development of the (survey country's) economy. Others say that foreign investment will not help a lot and we will become dependent on foreigners. Which view is closer to your own?

Poles 11190 519 1 919 1 1/92 5/92 2/93

Positive 37% 57% 45% 44 % 47 % 51% Negative 44 34 40 37 40 38 Don't know -19 -9 -15 -18 12 -10

100% 100% 100% 99 % 99% 99%

Romanians 10191 4192 9/92 5193

Positive 63% 51% 49 % 52% Negative 2 2 2 7 28 30

Don't know -15 2 2 23 -18 100% 100% 100% 100%

Hungarians 719 1 1/92 12192

Positive 43% 49 % 58% Negative 43 40 2 7 Don't know -14 -11 -14

100% 100% 99 %

Positive 44 % 41% 43% Negative 33 30 3 3 Don't know 22 -29 24

99 % 100% 100%

tization, a larger percentage in all four countries prefers that the majority of businesses remain state owned than favors majority private ownership. This suggests that many who support a free market economy in principle as the "right thing" for their country want more government intervention and control than is typical of a laissez-faire model of capitalism. As has been detailed elsewhere,'? central and east Europeans are clearly more inclined toward the greater state supports and social equality of a west European-style social democracy than to the more individualist and socially stratified American-style capitalism.

57. Mary E. McIntosh and Martha Abele Mac Iver, "Transition to What: Publics Confront Change in Central and East Europe," East European Studies Program Occasional Paper Series, Woodrow Wilson Center, 1993.

Market Democracy in Central and East Europe 50 1

More central and east Europeans support than oppose foreign investment, agreeing that it "is necessary and will have a positive influence on the development of the economy." Foreign investment is not only key to the privatization schemes in many of these countries but is also part of a broader effort to integrate these economies into the international market. After factor analysis revealed one significant market factor, we summed the three market item responses for each respondent (support for the creation of a free market, foreign investment and privatization) to create a scale of support for market prinicples (see discussion below for more details).

While these findings offer insights about the level of support for liberal democratic principles and a free market economy, we are also interested in the relationship between these two measures. Do attitudes toward liberal democratic principles and a free market economy constitute a single reformist dimension or separate dimensions? We hypothesized that attitudes toward liberal democracy and a free market are two distinct but related factors of an overall reformist dimension. The factor analysis of the measures of commitment to liberal democratic principles (competitive elections, freedom to criticize the government, system of justice that treats all equally) and the measures of support for a market economy (whether free market is rightlwrong, privatization, foreign investment) reported in Table 5 indicates that this is indeed the case. In each of the four countries, support for liberal democratic principles constitutes a separate dimension from support for a free market economy. As expected, however, these separate factors are moderately related." The data provide further evidence of the mutually reinforcing relationship between support for democratic principles and a free market found by Duch and Gibson among Soviet citizens." Our data cannot answer the question of whether democratic principles or free market principles "came first" in the public mind, but it would appear that from the public perspective the move toward the market and democratic institutions is an interrelated process. Since one of our key interests is how preferences for both the market and democracy are shaped, we examine this question next with the expectation that many of the same factors influence attitudes toward both of these reforms.

We employ multivariate analysis (ordinary least squares regression analysis) to uncover the relative importance of the "self-interest" and "symbolic politics" variables in explaining support for democratic principles and the free market. In Table 6 we see that the "self-interest" variables tend to account for less of the variance in the model than

58. The correlations between market and democracy measures are: Hungary r=.21; Bulgaria r=.35; Poland r=.13; Romania r=.39.

59. Duch, "Tolerating Economic Reform: Popular Support for Transition to a Free Market in the Former Soviet Union," 590-606; Gibson, "Political and Econolllic Markets: Connecting Attitudes toward Political Democracy and a Market Economy within the Mass Culture of the USSR."

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Table 5 Factor Loadings for Liberal Democratic Principles and

Market Economy

Rotated Factor Matrix: (Oblimin Rotation)

Factor 1 Factor 2 Democratic Principles Market Economy

H P B R H P B R

Competitive elections .75 .68 .74 .73 .23 .26 .33 .37 Equal justice .77 .SO .80 .74 . l l .08 .20 .30 Freedom to criticize govt. .77 .77 .77 .78 .13 .07 .21 .19

Free market right .16 .15 .39 .20 .69 .68 .74 .76 Privatization .21 .17 .16 .29 .72 .76 .76 .80 Foreign Investment .06 .07 .23 .37 .75 .78 .78 .71

the "symbolic politics" variables (a notable exception is support for democratic principles in Bulgaria). Moreover, when the symbolic politics variables are entered into the model first they account for substantially more of the variance than the self-interest variable^.^' This suggests that, at least at this stage of the transition in central and east Europe, these values and attitudes are as, or more, significant in de- termining attitudes toward political policies than the calculation of private self-interest.

Looking more closely at the self-interest variables, we find support for our hypothesis that the prospective indicators would be the strongest predictors of both support for the market and democratic policies. Those who are more optimistic about their personal financial situation over the next five years or express optimism in general (tomorrow's "winners") tend to be more supportive of democratic principles and a free market than those who are more pessimistic. To a lesser degree, we find support for our hypothesis that current and retrospective economic measures would be weak predictors of support for the market or democratic reform, and that the economic dislocation and turmoil might produce unexpected findings. For example, those who are positive about their current income (today's "winners") in Poland are more likely to support democratic principles, while the inverse relationship is found in Bulgaria (those who are negative about their current income are more likely to support democratic principles). Likewise, although assessments of the current economic situation in both Bulgaria and Poland produce the expected relationship with the market, we

60. The R' when the symbolic politics variables are entered first into the equation are: Hungary, democracy .02, market .16; Poland, democracy .06, market .20; Ro-mania, democracy .16; market .40; and Bulgaria, democracy .09, market .37.


find the opposite to be the case with democratic principles in Romania. These differences are probably due to the different stages of both market and democratic transitions in each of these countries. What is clear is that those who are optimistic about their future well-being are more likely than others to support the move to a market democracy.

Turning to symbolic attitudes, we find support for our hypotheses that political ideology (measured as preferred society) and acceptance of change are significant predictors of support for both the market and democracy, with two exceptions. None of the symbolic attitudes is a predictor of support for democratic principles in Hungary and acceptance of change is not a significant predictor of market principles in Poland. The symbolic attitude variables are notably stronger predictors of support for the market than for democratic principles. Rea- sons for this finding may be that our market scale is more concrete than our democratic measure and that respondents are more divided in their opinion about the market. These two factors probably account for the stronger correlation between the symbolic politics measures and market principles than between the symbolic politics measures and the democratic principles. With the exception of interpersonal trust, in at least three out of the four countries these symbolic attitudes are significant predictors of support for the market. Those who welcome change and new ideas are open to western influence in their country, favor freedom over equality and support an individual opportunities society are more likely than others to support the market.

As we hypothesized, in general the better educated, urban, male and younger central and east Europeans are more likely than others to support both democratic and market principles. Table 6 clearly shows that education is by far the strongest and most consistent predictor of support for both liberal democratic principles and a free market economy. Except in Romania, gender and urbanity are moderate predictors of these principles. When other social characteristics (especially education) are controlled, age and social class are relatively weak predictors of support for the market and democracy. Only in Bulgaria and Romania are the young and the self-defined middle and upper classes more likely than others to support one or both of these reforms after other factors are controlled. Although these cross-sec-tional data cannot address lifecycle versus generational theories, we suspect that one reason the well educated (who also tend to be younger), males and urban dwellers are the strongest supporters of the market and democratic principles is that they are in the best position to profit from these systemic changes.

In sum, Table 6 reveals that the strongest predictors of support for both liberal democratic and market principles are: preferred society, acceptance of change and new ideas, openness to western influence, general future assessment, education, urbanity and gender. Those who prefer an individual opportunities society, accept new ideas and change, are open to western influence, voice general optimism about the future, are well educated, urban and male are more likely than

Table 6 Standardized Regression Coefficients between Self-Interest, Symbolic Political

Attitudes, Social Characteristics and Support for Democratic and Market Principles

Hungary Poland Romania Bulgaria

Democracy Market 1)emocracy Market Democracy Market Self-Interest Five year economic assessment General future assessment Next year economic assessment Current: Country evaluation Subjective income Rrtrospectiue: Past economic Self-Interest R2

Symbolic Attitudrr Preferred society" Acceptance of change Openness to western culture Equality1' Interpersonal trust Symbolic R2

Social Characteristics Education Gender' 'Town size

Age Social class Total R2

Unless indicated all coding is from low to high. "Coded as 1 =state guarantees, "individual opportunities hCoded as 1=equality, 2=freedom 'Coded as I =male, P=female " ~ o tasked. *p< .05; **p< . O l


Figure 3 Distribution of Opinion on Liberal Democracy and Market Reforms

POLAND HUNGARY Liberal Democracy Liberal Democracy

Enthusiasts Skeptics Enthusiasts Skeptics

Free Market Free Market Enthusiasts 29 % 16% Enthusiasts 27 % 26% Skeptics 31% 24% Skeptics 17% 30%

BULGARIA ROMANIA Liberal Democracy Liberal Democracy

Enthusiasts Skeptics Enthusiasts Skeptics

Free Market Free Market Enthusiasts 32% 6% Enthusiasts 29% 13% Skeptics 36% 26% Skeptics 22 % 36%

others to support liberal democratic principles and a free market economy. We have looked at the relationship between these two measures of reform and the predictors of both measures, but we still have not addressed the critical question of the degree of public support for both reforms and the implications for the transitions to market democracy. While it is clearly important to examine the predictors of each of these measures separately, the interwoven nature of the reform process also dictates that we examine their joint effects. To address these questions, we return to the typology presented at the beginning of this paper.

Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of reform enthusiasts (who support both), reform skeptics (who are wary of both), democratic enthusiastslmarket skeptics and democratic skepticslmarket enthusiasts in each country. In each country roughly as many people support both liberal democratic and market principles as are inclined to be skeptical of both. Specifically, between a fourth and a third in each country support liberal democratic principles and market reform while a similar percentage are more skeptical of both these principles. The rest have divided views, with democratic enthusiastslmarket skeptics out- numbering democratic skepticslmarket enthusiasts significantly in each of the countries but Hungary.

As we hypothesized, Figure 3 shows that free market enthusiasts (except in Hungary) are substantially more likely to support liberal democratic principles than to be wary of them. By contrast, skeptics of the free market are somewhat more divided in their views of liberal democratic principles and are not necessarily concentrated in the democratic skeptic cell (especially in Poland and Bulgaria). While there is some relationship between support for the free market and support for democracy, there are a large proportion of people with mixed

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views. As we hypothesized, those with mixed views tend to be enthusiastic about democracy but skeptical of the market (except in Hun- gary).

What do these data tell us about each of these four groups? (See graphs, page 508 and page 509.) Looking first at those who support both liberal democracy and market reforms we see that although reform enthusiasts constitute only a minority in each of these countries, they comprise a much larger proportion of the population that is younger, better educated, male and politically interested. Clearly this bodes well for the future of market democracy in these countries, but whether members of this group will be able to carry their compatriots with them to a successful completion of the reform process remains to be seen. The greatest threat to a successful transition to market democracy comes from the minority in each country who remain skeptical of both democratic and market reforms. While members of this group may be inclined to strike or demonstrate to disrupt the reform process, they are otherwise generally less politically active, older, female, less well educated and less well mobilized than the reform-oriented sector of society. Thus, while equal in size to the reform enthusiasts, their "voice" is potentially much softer and less influential.

What about those members of the public who tend to support a market economy but are skeptical about liberal democracy? We have argued that if a free market is necessary for the consolidation of democracy, then those members of society who contribute to the building of a market economy are supporting democracy indirectly-whatever their own beliefs about how essential competitive elections and freedom to criticize the government may be. This group is relatively small in each country except Hungary, where it forms about a quarter of the population. Hungarians may be more supportive of a free market because the country began experimenting with a limited free market much earlier (under Kadar), so the principles of the market are pre- sumably much better known than in Bulgaria, Romania and Poland. While it is theoretically possible that such a group would advocate nondemocratic means to push through market reforms, it is more likely that their support for the market will be beneficial to democracy. The generally larger group of individuals who are enthusiastic about liberal democracy but skeptical about market reforms are apparently reluc- tant to give up the economic "security" they enjoyed under communism. The transition to a free market economy means that many may lose theirjobs and the benefits that they assumed were universal rights. Those who are enthusiastic about democracy but skeptical of the market, like those who are skeptical of both democratic and market reforms, are likely to exert pressure on their governments to ease the pain of market reforms and retain some socialist dimensions to the economy. If governments in the region had the resources to provide the kind of welfare state that these publics appear to be advocating, such pressure would not necessarily be detrimental to democratic consolidation. But in order to provide the kind of social safety net that


publics want, the economies of central and east Europe must first generate enough wealth to redistribute-and this will require that publics accept the economic costs (inflation, unemployment, greater disparity between rich and poor, greater uncertainty) in the interim. Whether this group's commitment to democracy will override its objections to the market reform process, should those come into severe conflict, remains to be seen.

What can these data tell us about the fate of societies that are attempting to make the transition to both a free market and liberal democracy simultaneously? While these reforms are distinct in the public mind, they are more related than at odds with each other. People who support one tend to support the other as well, though a notable percentage of these publics hold mixed views." Although the consen- sus over democracy and capitalism is clearly greater in the United States than it is among publics in central and east Europe, even in the United States debates routinely rage over some democratic and market pr in~iples ."~It may even prove helpful that publics are not polarized between support for or opposition to both reforms. Given that most central and east Europeans support one of these two principles, these mixed views might serve to moderate debates over the reform process and avoid extremist politics.

The data clearly show that both "symbolic politics" and "self-interest" play a role in predicting support for liberal democratic and market principles. Those who are best prepared (social psychologically and demographically) to "win" in the new system or who are already "win- ning" (economically or politically) tend to support both liberal democratic principles and a free market. The question becomes, how do governments create an environment where many feel they will eventually be winners? The answer suggests that governments in central and east Europe are caught in somewhat of a double bind. To be "responsive" to public demands requires governments to implement more gradual, less painful economic reforms than the "shock therapy" many economists advocate as the best approach. But the more gradual approach may only prolong the pain of the economic transition. Gov- ernments pursuing such a course may be perceived as making too little progress in moving toward the prosperity that publics associate with both western economies and "democracy." Moreover, the finding that symbolic attitudes are generally .stronger predictors than the self-interest measures of support for market and democratic reforms suggests that an upswing in the economy may only partially ease the way to a stable market democracy in these countries. If responses to these re-

61. Mixed views on democracy and capitalism are not necessarily an indication of lack of constraint o r consistency in attitudes. Unlike Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992), who early in the transition process concluded that Soviet publics displayed little consistency in their attitudes toward change, o u r data show a moderately high degree of consistency.

62. Chong, McClosky and Zaller, "Patterns of Support for Democratic and Cap- italist Values in the United States," 401-40.

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forms are driven more from deeply held predispositions, the public's skepticism of the market especially and of democracy to a lesser extent is unlikely to change quickly. Given that attitude change is a slow process, it is likely to take decades before solid majorities support both liberal democratic and market principles.

The simultaneous transitions to democracy and a free market thus pose an unprecedented challenge for publics and policymakers alike. If the dislocations caused by market reforms become too harsh, the "losers" might turn to democratic mechanisms to derail the reform process. But if market reforms become stalled because of public opposition, governments may be blamed for failing to produce the economic prosperity desired by publics. In either case, the new institutions of democracy potentially become the means to disrupt the reform process. Thus, it becomes critical in this high-wire act for governments to balance the public's demand for economic prosperity and social welfare together with the economic realities regarding the costs of these public desires. As a growing number of recent elections in the region illustrate (Lithuania, Poland and Hungary), this is an extremely difficult act to perform.

APPENDIX

Sample Design and iMethodology. USIA-commissioned surveys in central and east Europe were based on nationwide stratified probability sarnples of adults (aged 18 and older). Individual respondents were selected from voting lists in Bulgaria. In Poland the sample was constructed from a census list of housing units (individuals selected by Kish grid). In Hungary and Romania a random route method was used (with selection of respondent by Kish grid). Response rates are moderately high (average in the mid- 70% range). The US research team worked closely with the country teams to design the sampling plan and train interviewers. The questionnaires were translated by the country teams and reviewed by the US team. All interviews were face-to-face (not self- completed), fully structured interviews.

Number of Date of survey respondents Contractor

Bulgaria October 1991 April 1992 March 1993

CSD' CSD CSD

Hungary July 1991 January 1992 December 1992

Gallup Hungary Median Median

Poland May 1991 September 1991 January 1992 May 1992 February 1993

Central Europe Market Central Europe Market Demoskop Demoskop Demoskop

Romania October 1991 April 1992 September 1992 May 1993

SOCIOBIT SOCIOBIT SOCIOBIT SOCIOBIT

'Center for the Study of Democracy


Nineteen times out of 20, results from samples of 1,000 will differ by n o more than about 4 percentage points in either direction from what would be found if it were possible to interview every adult in the country. For a sample of 1,500 to 2,000, the sampling error is about 3%. The potential margin of sampling error is larger for smaller groups. In addition to sampling error, the practical difficulties of conducting a survey of public opinion may introduce other sources of error into the results.

Measures of Independent Variables

Scale construction. All scales were constructed by coding "don't knows" in the middle category and summing the responses from each measure (after factor analysis dem- onstrated that the measures constituted a single dimension). Don't know rates ranged from roughly 5 to 15 percent.

Symbolic Politics Indicators

Preferred Society:

Some people say individuals should take more responsibility for providingfor themselves. Others say the state should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for. Others have views somewhere i n between. How would you place your views on this scale? (4 pt. scale) What is more important for government to do, i n your opinion: to make certain that there are opportunities for people to get ahead on their own or to guarantee that people's basic needs are met?

Equality:

Which of these two statements comes closest to your own opinion: a) I j ind that both freedom and equality are important. But i f I were to choose one or the other, I would consider personal freedom more important, that is, that everyone can live i n freedom and develop .without hinderance

b) Certainly freedom and equality are important. But i f I were to choose one or the other, I would consider equality more important, that is, that nobody is needy and that social class dzfferences are not so strong

Acceptance of change and new ideas:

Now I would like to ask you about your viezus on various issues. Some people are zuilling to take big risks i n an attempt to gain big rewards. Others would rather play it safe and not risk losing what they have. Others have views somewhere i n between. How would you place your views on this scale? Show card. (4 pt. scale) Some people say when changes occur i n their lives, they worry about the dzficulties they may cause. Others say when changes occur i n their lives, they welcome the possibility that something new is begznning. Others llave views somewhere i n between. How would you place your views on this scale? Show card. (4 pt. scale)

Some people say ideas that have stood the test of time are generally best. Others say new ideas are generally better than old ones. Others have views somewhere i n between. How would you place your views on this scale? Show card. (4 pt. scale)

Interpersonal Trust:

Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful i n dealing with people?

Now I'm going to read you some statements that describe how people often feel. Please tell me whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree with each of these statements.

Most people can be trusted.

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Openness to outside world:


The influence of American culture is a threat to our own culture. The United States has too much injluence over our country's affairs.

Self-Interest Indicators

Current Economic Situation:

How would you describe the current economic situation i n (Suruey Country)? Would you say the economic situation is very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad? How would you evaluate your current jnancial situation? Is it very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?

Retrospective Economic Situation:

And turning to your householdj'inancial situation, cornpared to 12 months ago, do you think that thejnancial situation ofyour household has improved a lot, improved a little, remained the same, declined a little, declined a lot

Prospective Economic Situation:

A year from now, do you expect that thejnancial situation ofyour household will have iw~proved a lot, improved a little, remained the same, declined a little or declined a lot. Five years from now, do you expect that the jnancia l situation of your household will have improved a lot, improved a little, remained the same, declined a little, or declined a lot?

General Future assessment:


A young person of today can expect much of the future. Any person with ability and willingness to work hard has a good chance to get ahead.

Publics Meet Market Democracy in Central and East Europe, 1991...

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Transcript of Publics Meet Market Democracy in Central and East Europe, 1991...