LAND LAWS PROJECT

ON

‘PUBLIC PREMISES (EVICTION OF

UNAUTHORISED OCCUPANTS) ACT, 1971

Submitted to:

Dr. Kahkashan Y. Danyal

Associate Professor

Faculty of Law

Jamia Millia Islamia

Prepared by:

Gaurav Bhalla

B.A. LL.B.(Hons.)

Faculty of Law

Jamia Millia Islamia

Roll No. - 13

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Acknowledgement...........................................................................4

2. Research Methodology....................................................................5

3. Table of cases...................................................................................6

4. Introduction.....................................................................................8

5. Public Premises – Meaning of clause (e)..........................................9

6. Expression “belonging to”..............................................................12

7. Enquiry for eviction........................................................................15

8. Authorised Occupation - Meaning of Clause (g)............................16

9. Validity of the Act...........................................................................18

10. Retrospective effect of the Act....................................................18

11. Eviction of unauthorised occupants.............................................19

12. Appointment of Estate Officer.....................................................20

13. Claim for damages.......................................................................20

14. Discretionary Power of Estate Officer..........................................21

15. Estate Officer not a Judge............................................................21

16. Eviction Order..............................................................................22

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17. Natural Justice..............................................................................22

18. Proceedings for eviction..............................................................28

19. Unauthorised occupant................................................................31

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The success and final outcome of this project required a lot of guidance and assistance from

many people and I am extremely fortunate to have got that all along the completion of my

project work. Whatever I have done is only due to such guidance and assistance and I would

not forget to thank them.

I owe my profound gratitude to our Seminar Course teacher Dr. Kahkashan Y. Danyal, who

took keen interest in my project work guided me all along, till the completion of my project

by providing all necessary information for the project report.

I am thankful and fortunate enough to get constant encouragement, support and guidance

from all teaching staff of Faculty of Law, Jamia Millia Islamia which helped me in successfully

completing my project work. Also, I would like to extend my sincere regards to all the non-

teaching staff of Faculty of Law, Jamia Millia Islamia, Indian Law Institute and Indian Society

for International Law.

I would also not forget to remember my friends for their unlisted encouragement and more

over for their timely support and guidance till the completion of my project work.

GAURAV BHALLA

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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This research was conducted using the ‘Doctrinal’ method of research.

Doctrinal legal research, as conceived in the legal research domain, is research ‘about’ what

the prevailing state of legal doctrine, legal rule, or legal principle is. A legal scholar

undertaking doctrinal legal research, therefore, takes one or more legal propositions,

principles, rules or doctrines as a starting point and focus of his study.

I located principles, rules or doctrines in statutory instrument(s), judicial opinions thereon,

discussions thereof in legal treatises, commentaries, textbooks, encyclopedias, legal

periodicals, and debates, if any, that took place at the formative stage of such a rule,

doctrine or proposition. Thereafter, I ‘read’ them in a holistic manner and made an ‘analysis’

of the material as well as of the rules, doctrines and formulated my ‘conclusions’.

Doctrinal legal research, thus, involves: (i) systematic analysis of statutory provisions and of

legal principles involved therein, or derived therefrom, and (ii) logical and rational ordering

of the legal propositions and principles.

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TABLE OF CASES

A&S Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 1708

A.B. Tukaral v. G.V. Javalkar, AIR 1981 Bom 72

Accountant & Secretarial Service Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 1708

Adya Nath Ghatak v. Krishna Prosad Singh, AIR 1949 PC 124

Ashoka Marketing Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank, AIR 1991 SC 855

Baij Nath v. Bank of Maharashtra, AIR 1987 Del 231

Bhagavatula K. Rao v. Mungara Sanyasi, ILR 55 Mad 610

Blaze and Central (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1980 Kant 186

Board of Education v. Rice, 1911 AC 179

Frome United Breweries Co. v. Bath, JJ., 1926 AC 586

Gauri Mohan Giri v. Union of India, AIR 1995 Ori 158

Gullappalli Nageswara Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1959 SC 1376

Hari Singh v. Military Estate Officer, 1973 (1) SCR 515

Indo Imex Agencies (Pvt.) Ltd. v. L.I.C. of India, AIR 1983 Del 409

Jain Ink Mfg. Co. v. L.I.C. of India, AIR 1981 SC 670

Komalam Vardarajan v. Union of India, AIR 1997 Bom 57

Kriapak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 308

L.S. Nair v. Hindustan Steel Ltd., Bhilai, AIR 1980 MP 106

Laxmipat Singhania v. Larsen & Toubro Ltd., 1950 (52) Bom LR 688

M. Mohammad v. Union of India, AIR 1982 Bom 443

M.L. Joshi v. Director of Estates, Government of India, New Delhi, AIR 1967 Del 86

M.S. Oberoi v. Union of India, AIR 1970 P&H

M/s. Indo Imex Agencies (Pvt. ) Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, AIR 1983

Del 409

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Mahomed Amir Ahmad Khan v. Municipal Board of Sitapur, AIR 1965 SC 1923

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597

Maniklal v. Premchand, AIR 1957 SC 425

Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.C.) Ltd. v. Lannoon, 1969 (1) QB 577

N.D.M.C. v. M/s. House of Handicrafts, AIR 1993 Del 349

Nageshwara Rao v. A.P. Road Transport Corporation, AIR 1959 SC 308

National Jewellery Works v. D.P. Works, 1959 (63) Cal WN 192

Shri Krishna Investment v. Union of India, AIR 1976 Cal 333

Union of India v. M/s. Manton Co. Ltd., AIR 1982 Cal 461

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INTRODUCTION

The Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958 was enacted to provide

for a speedy machinery for the eviction of unauthorised occupants of public premises.

Section 5 of the Act provides for taking possession of the public premises which are in

unauthorised occupation of persons. Section 7 of the Act provides for the recovery of rent

or damages in respect of public premises from persons who are in unauthorised occupation

thereof. The Act, as it originally stood, did not debar the Government from taking recourse

to Civil Courts to seek the aforesaid reliefs.

The Act provides for the eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises and, for

this purpose, the Act provides for appointment of estate officers who have been given

power, after necessary inquiry, to pass orders of eviction of such unauthorised occupants.

The estate officer has also been given powers to remove, and to order demolition of

unauthorised constructions.

Parliament having provided otherwise by the 1971 Act, that Act will, it can be said, prevail

over the 1956 and 1962 Acts. It is, however, common ground before the Court that thought

the Bank is a corporation wholly owned or controlled by the Government, it has a distinct

personality of its own and its property cannot be said to be the property of the Union.

Clause (e) of section 2 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971

contains the definition of public premises. Item (i) of sub-clause (2) of clause (e) of section 2

of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 provides that any

premises belonging to, or taken on lease by, or on behalf of, any company as defined in

section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956, in which not less than fifty-one per cent. of the paid-

up share capital is held by the Central Government or any company which is a subsidiary of

the first-mentioned company as public premises. The paid-up share capital held by one or

more State Governments is not included under this item.

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Public Premises – Meaning of clause (e)

The expression ‘public premises’ has been defined in Section 2(e) of the Act. This definition

is in three parts. Sub-clause (1) of Clause (e) takes in premises belonging to, or taken on

lease for appointment by, or on behalf, of the central Government as well as premises

placed by that Government under the control of either House of Parliament for providing

residential accommodation to the members of the staff of the Secretariat of either House of

Parliament. Sub-clause (3) of clause (e) takes in premises belonging to certain local

authorities in the Union Territory of Delhi. Sub-clause (2) of clause (e) brings in premises

belonging to or taken on lease by, or on behalf of, various kinds of bodies, such as

Universities, Institutes of Technology, Board of Trustees of Major Port trusts and the Bhakra

Management Board. It takes in any premises belonging to or taken on lease by, or on behalf

of, a Government company or its subsidiary. It also taken in - and that is what is court is

concerned with here – premises of “any corporation (not being a company as defined in

Section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 of a local authority) established by or under Central

Act and owned or controlled by the Central Government. There is no dispute that the

premises in question in the present appeal is “public premises” within the meaning of the

Act.1

The procedure for the eviction of the petitioners will be governed by the 1971 Act as well as

either or both of the State Acts and the question is, which of these will prevail.2

Section 2(e)(1) only defines what “Public Premises” means, the Government is entitled to

possession of premises as an owner, as a Lessee and as the beneficiary of a Requisition. The

said Act provides for a speedy remedy in favour of the Government to obtain possession of

any such premises i.e. premises covered by any of the three categories, when the same is

found to be in unauthorised occupation. The relationship of the Government when it is a

lessee qua the owner of the premises is that of a tenant and landlord. The landlord, who

may be the allottee and who happens to have purchased the right, title and interest of the

original owner in the premises, cannot, on such acquisition, turn round and say that the

lease like a requisition cannot be for an unreasonably long duration. The relationship of the

1 A&S Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 1708 at p. 1712

2 Accountant & Secretarial Service Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 1708 at p. 1713

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owner and the Government, who is the lessee is governed by the law of the land in respect

of landlord-tenant and the purchase by the allottee of the landlord’s interest cannot

extinguish the leasehold interest of the Government which can be done only by adopting

eviction proceedings in a proper forum and obtaining a decree for possession.3

It is in direct conflict with the Premises Act which expressly provides for the forum for

evicting persons in unauthorised occupation of premises which fell in Section 2 of the

Premises Act. The Premises Act being subsequent to the Slums Act, as amended in 1964,

and again being a special Act have a very limited sphere, must necessarily override the

Slums Act on the same lines of reasoning as the Court has indicated in the case of the Rent

Act.4

There is no warrant for confining the scope of the definition of ‘public premises’ contained

in Section 2(e) to premises used for residential purposes only and to exclude premises used

for commercial purposes from its ambit. In Hari Singh v. Military Estate Officer5, similar

contention was advanced and it argued that the expression ‘premises’ in Public Premises

Act would not apply to agricultural land. This Court rejected the contention with the

observation:

“The word ‘premises’ is defined to mean any land. Any land will include agricultural land.

There is nothing in the Act to exclude the applicability of the Act to agricultural land.”

The Court was also unable to hold that the inclusion of premises used for commercial

purposes within the ambit of the definition of ‘public premises’, would render the Public

Premises Act as violative of the right to equality guaranteed under Article 14 of the

Constitution or right to freedom to carryon any occupation, trade or business guaranteed

under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution or the right to liberty guaranteed under Article 21

of the Constitution. It is difficult to appreciate how a person in unauthorised occupation of

public premises used for commercial purposes, can invoke the Directive Principles under

Articles 39 and 41 of the Constitution, As indicated in the Statement of Objects and Reasons,

3 Komalam Vardarajan v. Union of India, AIR 1997 Bom 57 at p. 62: 1997 (1) Bom CR 428: 1997 (2) Mh LJ 632:

1997 (1) Mah LR 664: 1996 (4) All Mah LR 545 4 Jain Ink Mfg. Co. v. L.I.C. of India, AIR 1981 SC 670 at p. 674: 1980 Rajdhani LR 626: 1980 DRJ 82: 1980 (2) Ren

CJ 459: 1980 (2) Rent LR 650: 1980 (4) SCC 435: 1980 (18) DLT 262: 1980 (1) Ren CR 590: 1981 (1) SCR 498 5 1973 (1) SCR 515: AIR 1972 SC 2205

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the Public Premises Act has been enacted to provide for a speedy machinery for the eviction

of unauthorised occupants of public premises. It serves a public purpose, viz., making

available for use, public premises after eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation. The

need to provide speedy machinery for eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation

cannot be confined to premises used for residential purposes. There is no reason to assume

that such a need will not be there in respect of premises used for commercial purposes. No

distinction can, therefore, be made between premises used for residential purposes and

premises used for commercial purposes in the matter of eviction of unauthorised occupants

of public premises and the considerations which necessitate providing a speedy machinery

for eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation of public premises apply equally to both

the types of public premises. The Court is, therefore, unable to accept the contention of Shri

‘Y’ that the definition of public premises contained in Section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act

should be so construed as to exclude premises used for commercial purposes from its

ambit.6

The term ‘public premises’ is defined in Section 2(e) of the Act. The premises in question are

“Public Premises”. Now, an occupant of a public premises will be deemed to be in

authorised occupation thereof until and unless he is a person, who is in occupation of the

public premises: (1) without authority for such occupation, such as a rank trespasser, or (2)

one, who was continuing in occupation of the public premises under some authority,

whether that authority was by way of grant or any other mode of transfer, and that

authority has either expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever. From the

very beginning the trespasser will be deemed to be in unauthorised occupation because he

had no authority to occupy the premises. But, the Courts are mainly concerned in this case

with an occupant, who was in occupation of the premises with authority on the date the

premises were declared public premises by the Act. He was an authorised occupant at that

time. But, if the authority under which that person was occupying the premises has either

expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever by the LIC, the person in

occupation becomes an unauthorised occupant.7

6 Ashoka Marketing Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank, AIR 1991 SC 885 at p. 869, 870: 1990 (4) SCC 406

7 Indo Imex Agencies (Pvt.) Ltd. v. L.I.C. of India, AIR 1983 Del 409 at pp. 410, 411: 1983 (2) Rent LR 293: 1983

(1) Rent CR 417

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Expression “belonging to”

There is no doubt that the expression “belonging to” does not mean the same thing as

“owned by”. The two expressions have two different connotations. The expression

“belonging to” will take within its sweep not only ownership but also rights lesser than that

of ownership. It must be remembered in this connection that the expressions used in the

statute are to be interpreted and given meaning in the context in which they are used. The

present Act has been placed on the statute book to give a summary remedy to the

Government to evict persons in occupation of public premises to obviate the long or deal of

trial in a Civil Court and of further proceedings, thereafter. Hence, a wider meaning will have

to be given to the expressions used in the Act for defining the concept of public premises.

So, viewed there is no reason why the premises of which possession for the time being vests

in the Government and which are allotted by the Government to others while so in

possession should not be held to be public premises.8

In Mahomed Amir Ahmad Khan v. Municipal Board of Sitapur9, the Supreme Court was

called upon to consider the expression “belonging to me” used by the tenant in an

application to the Compensation Officer under Act 26 of 1948 for the Rehabilitation of

Refugees. While commenting upon this in para 14 of the judgment, the Court observed as

follows:

We do not agree that this is the only or proper construction which the words are capable of

bearing. Though, the words “belonging” no doubt is capable of denoting an absolute title, is

nevertheless not confined to connoting that sense. Even possession of an interest less than

that of full ownership could be signified by that word. In Webster, ‘belong to’ is explained as

meaning inter alia ‘to be owned by the possession of’. The precise sense which the word

was meant to convey can, therefore, be gathered only be reading the document as a whole

and adverting to the context in which it occurs....”

8 M. Mohammad v. Union of India, AIR 1982 Bom 443 at p. 464

9 AIR 1965 SC 1923

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In Stround’s Judicial Dictionary at page 269, the word “belonging” has been defined as

follows:

“Property ‘belonging’ to a person, has two general meanings, (1) ownership, (2) the

absolute right of user: ‘A road may be said, with perfect propriety to belong to a man, who

has the right to use it as of right, although the soil does not belong to him’.”

Therefore, where a person has an absolute right to user i.e., right of user even against the

owner, it can be said that the property belongs to him. It must be remembered that the

absolute right of user is distinct from the possessory title which a person has against the

whole world except the true owner. In the present case, in the first instance there is no

dispute between the landlord and the Government that the Government is the monthly

tenant of the premises in question. Secondly, even under the Bombay Rent Act, by virtue of

Section 4(1), thereof, the Government’s tenancy is protected. Therefore, it can legitimately

be held that the Government has an absolute right of user of the premises in question. If

this is so, then the premises can properly be said to “belong to” the Government. Since

Court has already observed that the expression “belonging to” does not merely includes the

right of ownership but also something less than that and since further the premises of which

the absolute right of user vests in a person can be said to belong to him the present

premises will squarely be embraced by the definition of public premises within the meaning

of the said Act.

In Laxmipat Singhania v. Larsen & Toubro Ltd.10, the facts were that the plaintiff had filed a

suit for eviction against the defendants, who were a Company to whom a portion of the

building was let out. The plaintiff’s predecessor had taken on lease the land from the Port

Trust for constructing the building. After constructing the building, he had let out a portion

of the same to the defendants. The question was whether the building belonged to the Port

Trust or to the plaintiff. If it belonged to the Port Trust, the Rent Court had no jurisdiction in

view of Section 4(1) of the Bombay Rent Act. While holding that the building belonged to

the plaintiff the Court observed as follows:

“These decisions, in my opinion, establish that there may be in time relation to property a

dual ownership for a limited period of time; and it would be possible to say in such cases

10

1950 (52) Bom LR 688: AIR 1951 Bom 205

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that even a person, who was not the absolute owner but had a right of ownership limited to

that period was a person to whom the property belonged. No doubt these cases related to

movable property; but I do not conceive that the principle is any different when we are

dealing with immovable property. The tests as to whether for a limited period of time, a

temporary ownership has been created is according to the cases (1) whether there is a

demise of the property, (2) whether there is full dominion and control over the property in

the demises and (3) whether the risk of the property falls on the premises, or the absolute

owner. Applying these principles to the case of lease of land together with the building for a

limited period of time – particularly a period as long as 99 years – it appears to me that if

the lease demises the land with the building and conforms on the transferee full dominion

and control over the property the transferee taking the risk of the property, then, for that

limited period, the lessee is the owner of the property and the property can be said to

belong to him. Ownership is nothing more than a bundle of rights in relation to property.

The aggregate of rights constitutes absolute ownership. It may be that during a stated

period some of these rights are vested in one person and some in others. In the case of a

lessor and a lessee such as we are considering, the lessee has the right of reversion which of

course is not tangible immovable property, but an intangible thing. He has also a right of re-

entry under the terms of the lease and he has further a right by covenant to claim the

building upon termination of the lease or upon its determination in any other manner

provided by the lease. With regard to all other rights in the property, these vest completely

in the lessee, who is under the circumstances the owner qua at any rate those to whom he

has let or sub-let such premises. It is consistent with dual ownership that qua the lessee it

may be that the lessor is the owner of the property; and in any proceedings between the

lessor and the lessee it would be possible to say that the premises belonged to the lessor

and not to the lessee. That is not the case before me. The case here arises between the

lessee and those to whom he has let the premises. I have no doubt in my mind that qua the

defendants in these two suits the premises in suit belong to the plaintiff and to nobody else

so long as the lease is subsisting. That being so, those premises are not excluded from the

operation of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, and this Court

has, therefore, no jurisdiction to entertain or try either of these suits.”

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Enquiry for eviction

It was contended that the procedure available under the Public Premises (Eviction of

Unauthorised Occupants) Act, ought to be followed by the railway administration because it

not only provides for a show cause notice but an elaborate enquiry is also available to

unauthorised occupant, and therefore, it confers a wider protection to the person

concerned. It is necessary in this context to examine the scheme of the said Act. Public

Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958 which was passed earlier was

challenged on the ground that there was two procedure and the choice of either was left to

the unguided discretion of the Estate Officer. It was then amended by the Amending Act,

1971. 1971 Act was deemed to have been given retrospective effect since 16th

September,

1958, except to some of its provisions. Further scheme of the 1971 Act is that it confers a

power on Estate Officer to issue notice to persons who are in unauthorised occupation of

any public premises to show cause why an order of eviction should not be made.

‘Unauthorised occupation’ under the Act in relation to any public premises means the

occupation by any person of the public premises without authority for such occupation, and

includes the continuance in occupation by any person of the public premises after the

authority (whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer) under which he was

allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason

whatsoever. ‘Premises’ are defined to mean any land or any building or part of a building

and includes the garden, grounds and outhouses, appertaining to such building or part of a

building and any fittings affixed to such building or part of a building for the more beneficial

enjoyment thereof. ‘Public Premises’ means any premises belonging to or taken on lease or

requisitioned by, or on behalf of the Central Government as enumerated in Section 2(e) of

the Act.11

11

A.B. Tukaral v. G.V. Javalkar, AIR 1981 Bom 72 at p. 80: 1980 Bom CR 863: 1980 Cri LR (Mah) 490: 1981 Mah

LR (Bom) 1: 1981 Mah LJ 525: 1981 (2) Rent LR 181: 1981 (2) Ser LR 198

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Authorised Occupation - Meaning of Clause (g)

In Ashoka Marketing Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank12

, the Supreme Court held that the

expression unauthorised occupant contained in Section 2(g) of the Act would even cover a

lessee. Therefore, t he contention of the counsel for the petitioner is liable to be rejected.

It is manifest that Section 2(2)(g) of the Act does not use the word ‘possession’ or the words

‘entry into possession’ at any point of time at all. The section merely requires occupation of

any public premises. Entry into possession connotes one single terminus, viz., the point of

time when a person enters into possession or occupies the property whereas occupation if a

continuation process which starts right from the time when the person enters into

possession or occupies the premises and continues, until he leaves the premises. What is

germane for the purpose of interpretation of Section 2(2)(g) is whether or not the parson

concerned was in occupation of the public premises when the Premises Act was passed. In

the instant case, it is not disputed that the appellant continued to occupy the property even

after the Premises Act came into force and in fact accepted the LIC as his landlord. In these

circumstances, therefore, the case of the appellant squarely falls within the ambit of the

definition of ‘unauthorised occupation’ as contemplated by Section 2(2)(g). There is yet

another aspect of the matter which distinguishes the present case from the language

employed in the Punjab Act. Section 2(2)(g) is an inclusive definition and consists of several

limbs – (1) where a person is in occupation in relation to any public premises without any

authority for such occupation, and (2) even if the possession or occupation of the tenant

continues after the lease is determined. In the instant case, the lease was doubtless

determined by the landlord by a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act

whose validity for purposes for deciding the question of law has not been questioned by the

learned counsel for the appellant. Therefore, there can be no doubt that the appellant was

in unauthorised occupation of the premises once the lease was determined. The second

limb mentioned in Section 2(2)(g) is conspicuously absent from the provisions of the Punjab

Act. For the reasons, the Court overrule the first contention raised by the counsel for the

12

AIR 1991 SC 855: 1990 (3) JT (SC) 417

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appellant and the Court held, agreeing with the High Court, that the appellant was

undoubtedly in unauthorised occupation of the premises.13

The opposite party having come to occupy the disputed premises before the said premises

were purchased by the petitioner, they cannot be said to be in unauthorised occupation

thereof notwithstanding the subsequent determination of the authority for the occupation

by the notice to quit. The Court thought this question was no longer res integra in view of

the Supreme Court decision in the case of Jain Ink Manufacturing Company v. L.I.C. of

India14, the Supreme Court in the case of Jain Ink Manufacturing Company v. L.I.C. of India15,

in this decision, the Supreme Court was interpreting the provisions of the said Act of 1971

which is not under consideration and the Supreme Court clearly explained and distinguished

their own observations in Rajkumar Divendar Singh’s case16

wherein the Act under

consideration was a different Act. It was pointed out that those observations were made

having regard to the particular terms of the Punjab Act thereunder consideration which

made entry into possession in the public premises unauthorised is it was so made otherwise

than under and in pursuance of any allotment, lease or grant. Whereas in the Act now under

consideration a person, who occupies any public premises without any authority for such

occupation or even continues to occupy the same after such authority had been determined

is said to be in unauthorised occupation in view of the definition clause Section 2(2)(g) of

the said Act of 1971. Thus, there exists material difference between the provisions of the

two Acts. Though, the attention of the learned Chief Justice was drawn to such difference,

he failed to appreciate the same and wholly misread the statute in observing that there is

no material difference between these two statutes. As a matter of fact dealing with the

particular statute, the Supreme Court laid down that what is germane for the purpose of

interpretation of Section 2(2)(g) of the said Act of 1971 is whether or not the person

concerned was in occupation of the public premises when the said Act came into force

irrespective of how and when he came to occupy the same. It was held that, the principal

ground on which the Chief Justice reversed the decision of the Estate Officer is clearly

13

Jain Ink Mfg. Co. v. L.I.C. of India, AIR 1981 SC 670 at p. 672: 1980 Rajdhani LR 626: 1980 DRJ 82: 1980 (2)

Ren CJ 459: 1980 (2) Rent LR 650: 1980 (4) SCC 435: 1980 (18) DLT 262: 1981 (1) Ren CR 590: 1981 (1) SCR 498 14

AIR 1981 SC 670 15

Ibid. 16

AIR 1973 SC 66

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misconceived and is based upon misreading of the material provisions of the said Act of

1971. Such a decision, therefore, can hardly be sustained on such a ground.17

Eviction of unauthorised occupants

Section 5. Eviction of unauthorised occupants. - (1) If, after considering the cause, if any,

shown by any person in pursuance of a notice under section 4 and 3[ any evidence produced

by him in support of the same and after personal hearing, if any, given under clause (b) of

sub- section (2) of section 4], the estate officer is satisfied that the public premises are in

unauthorised occupation, the estate officer may make an order of eviction, for reasons to be

recorded therein, directing that the public premises shall be vacated, on such date as may be

specified in the order, by all persons who may be in occupation thereof or any part thereof,

and cause a copy of the order to be affixed on the outer door or some other conspicuous part

of the public premises.

(2) If any person refuses or fails to comply with the order of eviction 2[ on or before the date

specified in the said order or within fifteen days of the date of its publication under sub-

section (1), whichever is later,] the estate officer or any other officer duly authorised by the

estate officer in this behalf 2[ may, after the date so specified or after the expiry of the

period aforesaid, whichever is later, evict that person] from, and take possession of, the

public premises and may, for that purpose, use such force as may be necessary.

Retrospective effect of the Act

In Indu Bhushan v. Rama Sundari, “the relation of landlord and tenant”, as mentioned in this

Entry, is with reference to land tenures which would not appropriately cover tenancy of

buildings or of house accommodation and that the expression is only used with reference to

relationship between landlord and tenant in respect of vacant lands. As further explained by

the Supreme Court leases in respect of non-agricultural property are dealt with in the

Transfer of Property Act and would more appropriately fall within the scope of Entry 6 read

with Entry 7 of List III. The Supreme Court in the same case observed that non-agricultural

leases of all kinds, and rights governed by such leases, including the termination of leases

and eviction from property leased, would be covered by the topics of transfer of property

17

Union of India v. M/s. Manton Co. Ltd., AIR 1982 Cal 461 at pp. 464, 465

Page | 19

and contracts. In the light of the ruling of the Supreme Court in Indu Bhushan’s case18 the

Accommodation Control Act will fall within Entries 6 and 7 read with Entry 46 of the

Concurrent List. Similarly, the Public Premises Act, insofar as it deals with the eviction of

lessees or licenses from premises belonging to a Government company would also fall

within these entries. The Public Premises Act was enacted in 1971 and being a law later to

the Accommodation Control Act will prevail over it in view of the proviso to Article 254(2) of

the Constitution, in spite of the fact that the Accommodation Control Act had received the

assent of the President. The effect of the Public Premises Act is that accommodations

belonging to the Government companies are taken out from the operation of the

Accommodation Control Act and are exclusively governed by the former because the two

Acts in this respect cannot stand together. The submission of the counsel for the petitioner

in this behalf is that the Public Premises Act though enacted on 23rd

August, 1971, was given

retrospective effect from 1958 and, therefore, it should be deemed to be a law enacted

earlier to the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961. The Public Premises Act,

1971, by Section 20 was given retrospective effect to save the actions taken under the

Public Premises Act, 1958; but it cannot be held that the 1971 Act was enacted in 1958. As

earlier stated, this Act was enacted on 23rd August, 1971 and is a law which falls within the

Proviso to Article 254(2) and, therefore, it must prevail against the M.P. Accommodation

Control Act, 1961, which is an earlier law made by the State Legislature. 19

Validity of the Act

Under Article 228 of the Constitution is not competent as no question arises relating to the

interpretation of any Article of the Constitution. What is contended is that Sections 4, 5 and

7 of the Public Premises Act are unconstitutional. The challenge to the constitutionality of

some sections of an Act does not mean that a question of law relating to the interpretation

of a provision of the Constitution is involved and, therefore, the learned District Judge was

right in dismissing the application, but he decided finally that sections 4, 5 and 7 of the said

Act were valid and constitutional, that is, while deciding the miscellaneous application, the

18

AIR 1970 SC 228 19

L.S. Nair v. Hindustan Steel Ltd., Bhilai, AIR 1980 MP 106 at pp. 109, 110: 1980 Jab LJ 183: 1980 (1) Ser LR

645: 1980 (1) Rent LR 553: 1980 MP RCJ 140: 1980 MPLJ 429: 1980 (2) Ren CR 216

Page | 20

learned District Judge decided that appeal. The petitioner challenges the validity of that

order under Article 227 of the constitution.20

Appointment of Estate Officer

The authority of the Estate Officer is dealing with the eviction proceeding has been

questioned on the ground of his lack of jurisdiction. Section 2(b) of the Public Premises

(Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, defines “Estate Officer” to mean an officer

appointed as such by the Central Government under Section 3 of the said Act provides that

the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette appoint such persons

being Gazetted Officers of Government or officers of equivalent rank of the statutory

authority, as it thinks fit, to be Estate Officers for the purpose of the said Act. Held: In view

of such conferment of powers of officers as Estate Officers, the impugned proceedings

having been dealt with by such officers, who were appointed as Estate Officers by the

Central Government, the Court does not see any lack of jurisdiction in their dealing with the

matter.21

Claim for damages

No damages were claimed by any action of the respondent in the Court of Law. That apart

the petitioner has today placed before Court statement showing the consumption of

electricity by the respondent, and the respondent, on Court’s direction, has also produced

the telephone bills in respect to the telephone installed in the premises in question. The

perusal of the two clearly shows that the office premises have been used by the respondent

all along and, therefore, the contention that the said premises were inhabitable or were not

being used does not seem to be correct. Apart from anything else the principle of quantum

merit must apply and the respondent having used the premises till today was bound to pay

the license fee specially when it chose firstly, to challenge the correctness of the order of

cancellation and, secondly, did not terminate the license deed on finding the premises to be

inhabitable. It is clearly a case where the respondent has succeeded, uptil now in retaining

the premises, using them and not paying any money to the licensor. The order of the

Additional District Judge is clearly contrary to law and the Court, therefore, allowed the writ

20

M.S. Oberoi v. Union of India, AIR 1970 P&H 407 at p. 409: 1970 (72) Pun LR 830 21

Gauri Mohan Giri v. Union of India, AIR 1995 Ori 158 at p. 160

Page | 21

petition, issued a writ of certiorari quashing the said order of the Additional District Judge,

dated 10th

January, 1992 and the Court restored the order of the Estate Officer.22

Discretionary Power of Estate Officer

The Act itself has laid down sufficient guidelines for exercise of power under the Act and

also provides reasonable opportunities for the parties likely to be affected to make

representations and showing cause as to why such an order for eviction should or should

not be made against them. The power or the discretion vested in the Estate Officer is not

arbitrary. But, no statute can be struck down only on the ground that the powers

thereunder, when abused, would result in discrimination. An abuse of powers vested by a

statute does not render the source of the power tainted; it only renders such act of abuse

liable to be struck down. Section 5 no doubt uses the word ‘may’ in authorising the Estate

Officer to make an order of eviction as such words are always used in all enabling

provisions. That Section contemplates an adjudication prior to the making of the order and

furnishing of a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the party proceeded against. Such

adjudication may in some cases, make out reasonable grounds for not making an order of

eviction. Therefore, on the scheme of things, the statute cannot but only make an enabling

provision leaving the exercise of such powers to the discretion of the Estate Officer to be

exercised only on the guidelines prescribed by the statute.23

Estate Officer not a Judge

The Estate Officer would be both the prosecutor and the Judge which is hit by the ratio of

the Supreme Court decision in Gullappalli Nageswara Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh24

, is

unconvincing and of no avail to the petitioner in the present case because the Estate Officer

does not appear to Court to be acting as a Judge in his own cause when he is disposing of

the proceedings initiated by the show cause notice under Section 4 of the Act. To say that

no one shall be a Judge in his own cause means that the Judge must not have anything like a

personal interest in the cause he is to adjudicate upon and not that an officer discharging his

22

N.D.M.C. v. M/s. House of Handicrafts, AIR 1993 Del 349 at pp. 350, 351: 1993 (2) Rent LR 768 23

Shri Krishna Investment v. Union of India, AIR 1976 Cal 333 24

AIR 1959 SC 1376

Page | 22

official functions must not start proceedings in a manner which he is, under the law

competent to adjudicate upon.25

Eviction Order

Whether the order for eviction as passed against the lessee by itself determines the lessee’s

title to realise rent from the sub-lessee and whether such an order even before its execution

can constitute eviction by title paramount. On a careful consideration of the point so raised,

it appears to Court that such a point is no longer res integra. Such a point was specifically

raised before a Division Bench of this Court in the case of National Jewellery Works v. D.P.

Works26

, and this Court in express terms upheld the claim of rent of a lessee, who has

suffered a decree for eviction but yet had not been evicted in execution thereof. ‘M’, has

rightly drawn our attention to two other decisions supporting the same view. In the case of

Adya Nath Ghatak v. Krishna Prosad Singh27

, the Privy Council held that a tenancy between

A and C stood determined not by the decree for eviction obtained in 1925 against A, but by

execution thereof in 1928. The view taken by the learned trial Judge is fully supported by a

decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Bhagavatula K. Rao v. Mungara Sanyasi.28

Natural Justice

The modern concept of the rule against bias is rooted on the well-known principle that

“justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be

done.” A man may be disqualified from sitting in a judicial capacity on one of two grounds.

First, a “direct pecuniary interest” in the subject matter; second, “bias” in favour of one side

or against the other. The bias may be actual bias or a real likelihood of bias and mere

surmise or conjecture is not enough. Professor Smith has written29:

“A ‘real likelihood’ of bias means at least a substantial possibility of bias. The Court, it has

been said, will judge of the matter ‘as a reasonable man would judge of any matter in the

conduct of his own business.”

25

M.S. Oberoi v. Union of India, AIR 1970 P&H 407 at p. 410: 72 Pun LR 830 26

1959 (63) Cal WN 192 27

AIR 1949 PC 124 28

ILR 55 Mad 610 at pp. 605, 606: AIR 1932 Mad 298 at p. 299 29

Judicial Review of Administrative Action, Second Edition, 1968 at p. 244

Page | 23

The test of real likelihood of bias which has been applied in a number of leading cases in

magisterial and liquor licensing law, is based on the reasonable apprehension of a

reasonable man fully apprised of the facts. It is no doubt desirable that all judges, like

Ceaser’s wife, should be above suspicion, but it would be hopeless for the courts to insist

that only ‘people, who cannot be suspected of improper motives’ were qualified at common

law to discharge judicial functions, or to quash decisions on the strength of the suspicions of

fools or other capricious and unreasonable people.

Certainly, on the question of bias Court cannot proceed on the basis of suspicions of fools or

on the whims of unreasonable people. The Court must proceed on the reasonable suspicion

or on the ‘real likelihood of bias’. The tide of judicial opinion in the past was more on ‘real

likelihood of bias’ rather than on reasonable suspicion. But, Lord Denning M.R. in

Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.C.) Ltd. v. Lannoon30, interwove these principles with the

other test, saying:

“The Court does not look to see if there was a real likelihood that he would, or did, in fact

favour one side at the expense of the other. The Court looks at the impression which would

be given to other people.” And he continued:

“Nevertheless there must appear to be a real likelihood of bias. Surmise or conjecture is not

enough...‘There must be circumstances from which a reasonable man would think it likely or

probable that the Justice or Chairman, as the case may be, would, or did, favour one side

unfairly at the expense of the other. The Court will not inquire whether he did in fact, favour

one side unfairly. Suffice it that reasonable people might think he did. The reason is plain

enough. Justice must be rooted in confidence and confidence is destroyed when right-

minded people go away thinking: ‘the Judge was biased’.”

What Lord Denning was concerned with in his reference to a real likelihood of bias was

perhaps to emphasise the irrelevance of whether the Court or Tribunal was in fact biased.

Commenting on these principles, Professor Paul Jackson in his book “Modern Legal Studies -

Natural Justice”, writes at page 52:

30

1969 (1) QB 577

Page | 24

“The antithesis between the two tests remain, it is suggested somewhat unconvincing, it is

hard to envisage a Court holding that a reasonable man might properly suspect the

existence of bias but refusing to interfere because it was not itself convinced of a real

likelihood of bias. In the end all turns on the view of the Court takes on the facts. The Judge,

who says there is no real likelihood of bias was unreasonable; a Judge, who is prepared to a

find a reasonable suspicion of bias is hardly likely to deny that there was a real likelihood of

bias. Perhaps, it is unfortunate that the courts ever tried to improve on Lord Carson’s simple

test; was there ‘such a likelihood of bias as entitled to the Court interfere’?”31

In Maniklal v. Premchand32

, Gajendragadkar, J. said:

“It is of the essence of judicial decisions and judicial administration that Judges should be

able to act impartially, objectively and without say bias. In such cases the test is not whether

in fact, a bias has affected the judgement; the test always is and must be whether a litigant

could reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable to a member of the tribunal might have

operated against him in the final decision of the tribunal. It is in this sense that it is often

said that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done.”

In Nageshwara Rao v. A.P. Road Transport Corporation33, it was observed that the authority

empowered to decide the dispute must be one without bias by which is meant an operative

prejudice, whether conscious or unconscious towards one side or the other in the dispute.”

In Kriapak v. Union of India34, thus:

From the above discussion it clearly follows that what has to be seen in a case where there

is an administrative Board or body is whether there is a reasonable ground for believing that

he was likely to have been biased. In other words whether there is substantial possibility of

bias animating the mind of the member against the aggrieved party.” From these decisions,

it appears that a ‘likelihood’ of bias is given the meaning of ‘possibility’ of bias rather than

31

Frome United Breweries Co. v. Bath, JJ., 1926 AC 586, 618 32

AIR 1957 SC 425 at p. 429 33

AIR 1959 SC 308 34

AIR 1970 SC 308

Page | 25

‘probability’. For it is always assumed that a reasonable man would suspect bias only on the

real possibility and not on probability.”35

It all depends upon how the Court looks with the judicial hindsight at the adjudicating

authority, and in particular at his behaviour in conducting the proceedings, his attitude

towards the aggrieved party, his attachment to the cause and his frame of mind whether

preconceived or not. After getting the sum total of all these, the Court must ask whether it

would be enough to erode the detachment and impartiality of the adjudicating authority. If

there was any likelihood of such erosion the decision complained of must be struck down so

that the streams of justice may be kept clear and pure which is the basic requirement in the

administration of justice. It was Lord Hardwicke St. James Evening Post Case36, who said in

1742:

“There cannot be anything of greater consequence than to keep the streams of justice clear

and pure, that parties may proceed with safety both to themselves and their characters.”

The Estate Officer herein was none other than the Regional Officer of the Indian Bank. The

Branch of the Bank wanted the premises occupied by the petitioner for the purpose among

others, to accommodate the Regional Officer and his staff. Even before the Estate Officer

initiated the proceedings, the Bank called upon the petitioner to vacate the premises by

letter dated 1st March, 1978 followed by reminder letter, dated 11th July, 1978. In both the

letters it was stated:

“We require the portion let out to you bona fide for locating our staff training centre to be

opened shortly and also for the Regional Manager’s Office and other requirements of our

own.”

The notice issued by the Estate Officer reiterated the above grounds by referring to the said

letters. During the pendency of the proceedings the Manager of the Branch Office has

written letter to the Estate Officer to expedite the disposal of the matter. The Estate Officer

while reluctantly adjoining the case at the request of the petitioner, made it clear that the

Bank requires very badly the premises under the occupation of the petitioner for its own

35

Blaze and Central (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1980 Kant 186 at pp. 189, 190 36

1972 (2) Atkins 469 at p. 472

Page | 26

use and also to locate the office of the Regional Manager. The final order made by the

Estate Officer also gives the same reasoning stating that the Office of the Regional Manager

had to be shifted to a more spacious building and the premises under the occupation of the

petitioner were required for that purpose. In other words, he as the adjudicating authority

decided that he wanted the premises for his own use. These facts and circumstances clearly

prove that he was vitally interested in the cause.

It was, however, urged for the contesting respondents that the Estate Officer had no

personal interest in the matter and he was required to discharge his statutory authority, he

could not said to have acted both as the Prosecutor and the Judge. In support of the

contention, reliance was placed on the decision of the Delhi High Court in M.L. Joshi v.

Director of Estates, Government of India, New Delhi.37

The decision therein proceeded on

different facts which are far remote from those of the present case. In the present case,

from the very start of the proceedings the impression gained was that the dice were loaded

against the petitioner. No amount of evidence or argument for the respondents could

remove that impression or establish affirmatively, that the end result of the Estate Officer

was a product of detachment and impartiality. The likelihood of bias animating the mind of

the Estate Officer was inevitable and its exercise was very much conscious and not

unconscious.

This takes the Court to the second contention relating to the denial of natural justice.

Counsel for the petitioner urged that the Estate Officer did not record the statements of the

witness produced for the Bank in the presence of the petitioner and he did not even furnish

a copy of the statement of that witness in spite of a specific request made for the purpose.

The District Judge has summarily rejected the latter part of the contention on the ground

that there is no provision under the Act to furnish copies of the statements recorded in the

proceedings. This reasoning would be leading into the trap of legalism of the 17th century.

The Act need not provide for all the minor details how an enquiry should be conducted by

the Estate Officer. The Estate Officer must hold an enquiry as required under Section 4 of

the Act, read with the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Rules, 1971.

Rule 5 of the Rules provides that the Estate Officer shall record the summary of the

37

AIR 1967 Del 86

Page | 27

evidence and any relevant documents filed before him shall form part of the record of the

proceedings. Exercise of the power under the Act is undoubtedly quasi-judicial. The petioner

has a right to be heard before the Estate Officer and if the right to be heard is to be a real

right which is worth anything, it must carry with it a right to know the evidence of the

opposite side. The petitioner must, therefore, be told what evidence has been given or what

statements have been made by the opposite side. The other words, to put it shortly, the

petitioner must be given a fair opportunity to correct or contradict the statements recorded

or the evidence collected in his presence or absence. This one principle uniformly appears in

all cases commending from the celebrated judgement of Lord Loreburn L.C. in Board of

Education v. Rice38

, wherein the following passage appears:

“Comparatively recent statutes have extended, if they have not ficers of State the duty of

deciding or determining questions of officer of State the duty of deciding or determining

questions of various kinds. In the present instance, as in many others, what comes for

determination is sometimes a matter to be settled by discretion, involving no law. It will, I

suppose usually be of an administrative kind; but sometimes it will involve matter of law

alone. In such cases, the Board of Education will have to ascertain the law and also to

ascertain the facts. I need not ass that in doing either they must act in good faith and fairly

listen o both sides, for that is a duty lying upon everyone, who decides anything. But I do not

think they are bound to treat such a question as though it were a trial. They have no power

to administer an oath, and need not examine witnesses. They can obtain information in any

way they think best, always giving a fair opportunity to those, who are parties in the

controversy or correcting or contradicting any relevant statement prejudicial to their view.”

Since then, Judges and writers have expanded the procedure laid down by statutes and laid

down the obligation to observe the principles of natural justice where it is not plainly

contrary to the intention of the legislature. The courts recently have also resorted to such

alternatives to natural justice as “fairplay in action” or “fairness in procedure” or “the

fundamental principles of fair trial”, while discouraging a tendency to subject hearing to

“legal strait-jackets”. Sometimes, “fairness” has been understood to impose a higher

38

1911 AC 179 at p. 182

Page | 28

standard than that required by natural justice. In a historic decision of our Supreme Court in

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India39

, Bhagwati, J., who spoke for the majority view observed:

“The principles of reasonableness must be right and just and fair and not arbitrary, fanciful

or oppressive; otherwise, it would be no procedure at all.”

A tribunal or a person to whom judicial or quasi-judicial functions are entrusted is thus,

presumed to have an obligation to act with fairness, that is not only the obligation to

observed the principles of natural justice but, on the contrary, to observe a higher standard

of behaviour than that required by natural justice.40

Proceedings for eviction

If the petitioner’s tenancy still subsists, in the eye of law, then there can be little doubt as to

the outcome of the proceedings intended against the petitioners. If the petitioners are in

lawful possession of the premises in question then no valid order of eviction under Section 5

of the Act can be passed against them. The question as to whether the petitioners continue

to be in lawful occupation or not is, however, essentially a question of fact. In the present

case, it will have to be seen, after examining all the evidence, whether the tenants has

exercised their option under clause 6 of the lease agreement. Furthermore, if such option

had been exercised, the next question which will arise for consideration is whether any of

the terms of the agreement have been violated by the tenants which alone would give the

respondent jurisdiction to terminate the lease agreement. In the notice terminating the

lease two infringements of the lease agreement are alleged against the petitioners.

Whether these two infringements exist or not is again a question of fact. In Court’s view,

therefore, ‘R’ is right in submitting that these questions of fact ought not to be determined

in these proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. In support of his contention, he

has relied on certain observations of the Division Bench of this Court in Mirchandani’s

case41

, in that case also it was sought to be contended that the tenant was in lawful

occupation of the premises. While declining to adjudicate on this issue, this Court observed

as follows:

39

AIR 1978 SC 597 at p. 624 40

Blaze and Central (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1980 Kant 186 at pp. 190-192 41

ILR 1980 (1) Del 329

Page | 29

“These contentions have been traversed in the counter-affidavit where the reference is also

made to the merits of the case as to whether the tenant-petitioner has or has not

contravened the terms of the lease and the prohibition contained in the lease of the land

held by respondent No. 1 from the lessor. We have entertained the writ petition only

because of the constitutional and legal contentions urged by the petitioner as set out above.

As for the merits of the question, whether on the proper interpretation of the lease

between the parties the tenants have been guilty of such contravention of the lease as

would entitle the landlord to re-enter, the proper procedure is for the tenant to show cause

against the notice issued to him by the landlord and then contest the proceedings for

eviction before the Estate Officer with the benefit of a right of appeal to the Additional

District Judge. It would not be proper for us to deal with the merits of the question in this

writ petition and we have informed the parties that we would not do so.”

To the same effect is the decision of the single Bench of this Court in the case of M.L. Joshi v.

Director of Estates42, and M/s. Indo Imex Agencies (Pvt. ) Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of

India43

. The question in issue in the present case, therefore, whether the petitioners are in

lawful occupation of the premises or not, is one which can be raised before the Estate

Officer and, it may be even by initiating any independent action in a Court of competent

jurisdiction. That by virtue of Section 15 of the said Act such an action would not be

maintainable but it is not necessary for Court to go into this contention because no such suit

has been filed so far. If such a suit is filed the Court will, if called upon, adjudicate on the

point in issue. One thing, however, is clear that as far as this Court is concerned, the

consistent view has been that the question as to whether the occupant is an unauthorised

occupant or not is a question of fact which will not be adjudicated upon in proceedings

under Article 226 of the Constitution. In view of the aforesaid, the question of Court’s

determining this question of fact would, therefore, not arise.44

42

AIR 1967 Del 86 43

AIR 1983 Del 409 44

Baij Nath v. Bank of Maharashtra, AIR 1987 Del 231 at pp. 234, 235: 1987 (1) Rent LR 561: 1987 (1) Ren CR

684: 1987 (4) IJ Rep 275

Page | 30

Unauthorised occupant

Apart from the question of discrimination, consideration of the dehiring by the Government

under its dehiring policy would arise only when the petitioner vacates the premises. As of

now admittedly petitioner has not vacate the premises. Only after this is done, the question

of dehiring the premises will be considered. In the event of Government declining to dehire,

the petitioner would become entitled to agitate this issue of discrimination and not

before.45

It was contended that as huge amount is due to him from the employer on the count of

retirement benefit, no order of eviction could be passed. The contention is devoid of any

merit. As the petitioners are ex-employees cannot have premium over the premises in

question merely because some of their dues might be pending with their employer. Once

the order of eviction has been passed on valid grounds, the same has to be given effect to

and the petitioners are bound to vacate the premises.46

45

Komalam Vardarajan v. Union of India, AIR 1997 Bom 57 at p. 64: 1997 (1) Bom CR 428: 1997 (2) Mah LJ 632:

1997 (1) Mah LR 664: 1996 (4) All Mah LR 545 46

Goura Mohan Giri v. Union of India, AIR 1995 Ori 158 at p. 161

Page | 31

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Dr. S.K. Awasthi, Law of Public Premises, First Edition, 2010, Ashoka Law

House, New Delhi

2. P.S. Narayana, Law of Public Premises, 2005, Universal Publishing Co. Ltd.

3. S.P. Gupta, Commentaries on Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised

Occupants) Act, 1971, Third Edition, 2004, Eastern Book Company