Public Goods and Social Contracts
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Transcript of Public Goods and Social Contracts
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Public Goods and Social ContractsKarl Sigmund
University of Vienna and IIASA, Laxenburg
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Evolutionary games with cultural transmission
)y probabilit some(with exploring andcopying) prefential (i.e., learning,by
strategies of updating),...,( payoff
)...with ( sfrequencie,...,1 strategies
constant size population
1
1
nii
ni
XXPPXXMX
niM
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Simple cases
payoffhigher ith strategy w toalwaysswitch :selection Strong (B)
simplex)unit on equation replicator(),...,(for dynamics ticdeterminis
s.t.
:population Infinite (A)
1 nn
ii
xxx
xMXM
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Prisoner‘s Dilemma
D)percent 100on distributiy (stationarselection strongfor (B))0 coops of (freq. population infinitefor (A)
toleads always learning Social
t don' :defect) (to )(with cost own at
player-co to donate :cooperate) (to
AllD
DcbcbC
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Example: Mutual Aid Game
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Example: Mutual Aid Game
Dilemma Socialbetter do riders freebut )1( payoff ,contribute all if
11 rs)(cooperato rscontributo
1earn s)(exploiter freeriders
)(t don' ,contribute players players 1 among divided
1by multipliedon contributinotor 0 contribute
)2(with size of groups
cr
cmmrc
mmrc
mmmmmotherm
rc
mMm
C
C
DCDC
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Mutual Aid Game
• For 2-player groups, PD gameReciprocation helps (sometimes) to overcome the social dilemma
• But what if more than 2 players?
• Many economic experiments in game labs
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Herrmann, Thöni,Gächter (Nature 2009)
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Peer Punishment (self-justice)
Players can impose fine After every round(at an own cost )
leverage
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Fehr and Gächter (Nature 2002)
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Costly Peer Punishment
To be a punisher is costlyOpportunity for second-order free-riders (who contribute to Mutual Aid, but not to punishment) They do better than punishers if free-riders around (and equally well if not)
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Peer Punishment vanishes
Infinite population
Strong selectionStationary distribution:100 percent freeriders
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Peer Punishment vanishes
•
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Optional Mutual Aid Game
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Optional Mutual Aid Game
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Optional Mutual Aid
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Optional Public Good game
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Optional, with peer punishment
catalyzers tsparticipan-non win!punisherspeer
riders freeorder -second and
riders, free ts,participan-non offrequency 8
2
punishers offrequency 82
ondistributi stationaryselection Strong
M
MM
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Peer Punishment
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Peer Punishment
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Voluntary vs Compulsory Games
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Peer punishment?
Reputation effects (Hauert, Hilbe, Barclay)Consensus (Boyd, Gintis, Ertan, Puttermann…)Asocial punishment (Herrmann, Gächter, Nikiforakis…)Hardly any second order punishmentLittle peer punishment of free riders (Guala)
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Peer punishment?
Counter-punishment, asocial punishment
John Locke (Two treatises on government, 1689):‚…resistance (by defaulters) many times makes the punishment dangerous, and frequently destructive, to those who attempt it‘.
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Pool punishment
Sanctioning institution replaces self-justiceYamagishi (1986):Players contribute to punishment fundsbefore the Mutual Aid game Defectors pay fine Bistability if compulsory
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Optional Pool Punishment
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Optional Pool Punishment
punisherspercent 100punishmentorder second and optional, If
)1,2,2,2(71on distributi stationary
punishmentorder first only and optional, If
freeriderspercent 100 ,compulsory is game if
:selection strongfor on distributi Stationary
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Competition of pool with peer
Second order free riders,
Free riders,Non-participants,Peer punisherPool punisher:without second orderpunishmentstationary distribution
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Competition of pool with peer
efficiency vs.Stability
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Without or with second order punishment
Sigmund, DeSilva,Hauert,Traulsen (Nature 2010)
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Mutual coercion, mutually agreed
Whether in conditions of anarchy (peer punishment, i.e. self-justice)Or if institutions provide the sanctions,voluntary participation promotes cooperation
self-committment
No rational deliberation, just social learning
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Du Contrat Social
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778)
‚L‘homme est né libre, et les hommes sont partout dans les fers.‘
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Experiments?
Experimental Economics (2013)
The evolution of sanctioning institutions. An experimental approach to the social contract
(with Boyu Zhang, Cong Li, Hannelore DeSilva,Peter Bednarik)
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Traulsen, Röhl, Milinski (Proc. Royal Soc. B, 2012)Kamei, Putterman, Tyran (preprint 2011)Markussen, Putterman, Tyran (preprint 2011)
‚Formal‘ vs. ‚Informal‘ sanctions
Other experiments on Peer vs Pool
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On offer: Peer Punishment
• Players see number of freeriders• Can decide: Punish freerider? It costs a punisher 0.5 MU (Monetary units) to substract 1 MU from a freerider
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On offer: Pool PunishmentAlternatives:• Contribute nothing (Freerider)
• Contribute 1 MU to Mutual Aid Game (2nd order free rider)
• Contribute 1 MU to Mutual Aid Game AND 0.5 MU to Punishment Pool (punisher)
(for each 0.5 to Punishment Pool, each freerider is fined 1 MU)
Two versions:First and second order punishment
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25 practice rounds
• 5 rounds (a) Mutual Aid without punishment• 5 rounds (b) Mutual Aid with peer punishment• 5 rounds (c) Mutual Aid with pool punishment• 10 rounds full game: choice between (a),(b),(c) and
(d) (no participation)
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50 rounds experiment
9 groups of 12-14 play first-order version9 groups of 12-14 play second-order version
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50 rounds experiment
9 groups of 12-14 play first-order version9 groups of 12-14 play second-order version
6 end up with peer regime: 3 from each version6 end up with pool regime: all second-order
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Parallel histories
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Time evolution
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Contribution to Mutual Aid
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Social learning of social contract
• Decisions to switch: 70 percent to higher payoff
• Decisions NOT to switch: 76 percent had optimal payoff
• After optimal payoff: 81 percent do not switch
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Social learning of social contract
‚social learner‘ if at least 90 percent of decisions can be explained as switching towards higher payoff, or sticking with optimal payoff
• 80 percent of players social learners
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Sanctioning institutions
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Self-domestication?
Blumenbach (1752-1840):Humans as ‚the most perfect domestic animal‘
Konrad Lorenz (1903-1989) ‚Verhausschweinung‘
(Fat belly, soft skin, neoteny, infantility)