PUBLIC FORUM DEBATE RESEARCH SERIES VOL....

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PUBLIC FORUM DEBATE RESEARCH SERIES

VOL. 7 JANUARY 2016 NO. 4

RESOLVED: ON BALANCE, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE REDUCING THE THREAT RUSSIA POSES TOWESTERN INTERESTS.

The January Public Forum topic will focus on desirability of the sanctions imposed by the United States and theEuropean Union on Russia as a result of its recent activities in Crimea and Ukraine. In order to effectively debate thistopic, debaters will need to acquaint themselves with recent Russian history.

Just over two decades ago, Russia was the centerpiece in an empire that stretched from central Europe in thewest to the Pacific Ocean in the east. While the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) did not formally includePoland, East Germany, or Finland, there was little doubt that those countries were ruled from Moscow. The USSR’sbrand of communism included a powerful central government that maintained strict censorship of the news media anda system of secret police to enforce authoritarian control of the population. The Soviet KGB (Komitet gosudarstvennoybezopasnosti, translated as Committee for State Security) had its counterparts in Poland, East Germany, and theBaltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. In the mid-1980s, however, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachevintroduced a policy of Glasnost – a word meaning openness – exposing citizens in the Soviet bloc to an unfiltered viewof the stark differences between their economic and political circumstances, and similar conditions in Western nations.This exposure also made it clear that the Soviet economy could no longer support the massive military machine thathad seemed so invincible just a few years before. When Boris Yeltsin became the Soviet Premier in 1990, he presidedover a dismantling of the Soviet Communist Party, banning its activities and seizing its assets. In 1991, he recognizedthe independence of the Baltic Republics; one after another, more former Soviet states – including Ukraine-- declaredtheir independence from the USSR. The USSR formally dissolved itself in 1991, leaving in its place Russia with acollection of border regions who now declared themselves to be independent republics.

The 1990s were a turbulent period in Russia’s history as attention turned to securing the nuclear weapons facilitiesthat were spread throughout the countries that had now declared their independence. Western nations reached out toRussia and the new republics, believing that there would be an opportunity to turn a former enemy into an ally andsupporter of economic globalization. Some Russian business people became fabulously wealthy during this period,either by facilitating economic transformation or (as many observers claim) by engaging in black market schemes andother forms of corruption. Average Russian citizens, however, saw their economic fortunes change very little or evenbecome more bleak as a result of the opening to Western economies. Many commentators have pointed out thatRussian pride was severely bruised. Russian citizens have a memory of their nation as a superpower on par with theUnited States. The economic transition had left the country as a shadow of its former self, greatly reduced in size,military power, and political influence.

This political environment created the opening for the rise to power of Vladimir Putin, a former KGB officer whofrom the very beginning spoke of the need for Russia to return to its former glory. Putin was elected Russian Presidentin 2000 and has remained the most powerful Russian politician over the past fifteen years. He technically left the officeof the Presidency in 2008 to become the Russian Prime Minister, but even though another man had been electedPresident, there was never any question about who controlled decision making in Russia. Putin was re-elected to thePresidency in 2012 and continues to hold that office. Ben Judah, a staff writer for the New Statesman, explains howPutin was brought to power because of a yearning for a return to past glory:

The nation rallied round Putin, triggering a war wave that he used to grab full hold of the reins ofpower. Without it there would have been no President Putin, let alone the Putin era. His pollratings soared to 79 per cent by the end of 2000. When he promised to recapture Chechnya,Russian TV hosts and anchors were whipped into a state of hysteria, calling for Moscow to use“napalm” and for “carpet bombing” of Grozny. The frenzy for war made Putin. Back in StPetersburg, his dying father could not believe it. “My son is like a tsar!” he said. (TheRuthlessness of Vladimir Putin, Oct. 7, 2015, http://www.newstatesman.com/).

President Putin has taken the position that his government has the right, and even the responsibility, to protect its“sphere of influence.” In addition, he believes that Russia has the right to protect the interests of ethnic Russians,wherever they may reside in the states of the former Soviet Republics. On March 18, 2014, Putin gave a speech to theRussian Duma (Russia’s legislative body), announcing that Russia was annexing Crimea, a region of Ukrainebordering the Black Sea. The justification for this action was his claim that the rights of ethnic Russians were beingignored and that the residents of the region had conducted a referendum requesting a return to Russian rule. Crimearepresented a prized geographic location for Russia, offering greater access to a warm water port for the Russian

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navy. But the annexation was immediately and forcefully condemned by the United States and the European Union.Eric Engle, a Ukraine specialist at the Fulbright Foundation, explained the reason for the Western consternation:

Russia's annexation of Crimea was simply illegal as a matter of international law: Russia'sannexation was a violation of its treaty obligation under its Treaty of Friendship to respectUkraine's territorial integrity and under the universally recognized general principle of theterritorial integrity of each State under customary international law. Russia's argument that theannexation was somehow an exercise of national self-determination is nonsense since there is noCrimean nation. Russian nationals living in Crimea who wished to live in Russia were in fact freeto move to Russia, and were not facing discrimination or human rights abuses, contrary to theclaims of the Russian federation. (St. Louis U. Law Review, Fall 2014, p. 171)

Both the United States and the European Union announced a first wave of economic sanctions designed to punishRussia for its unilateral decision to annex a region belonging to another sovereign state. But President Putin seemed todouble down on his aggressive actions by sending Russian troops inside of eastern Ukraine. Putin claimed that theseforces were not regular Russian military troops, but rather domestic dissidents who were simply trying to defend therights of ethnic Russians whose rights were being denied. Yet persistent reports described well-equipped military units,using Russian rockets and other military equipment. The trigger for the tightening of Western sanctions came,however, with the shooting down of a passenger airliner in July of 2014, killing all 295 people on board. The Boeing777 Malaysian aircraft was flying from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur when it was hit by a ground-to-air missile.President Putin immediately blamed the Ukraine military for shooting down the aircraft, but the evidence has pointed toactions of Russian-backed military forces.

The following map shows the position of both Ukraine and the Crimean region of Ukraine (now annexed byRussia):

CRIMEA

CRIMEA

ANALYSIS OF THE TOPIC

Debaters will need to carefully consider the wording of the resolution: “Resolved: On balance, economic sanctionsare reducing the threat Russia poses to Western interests.”

What is meant by the term, “On balance?” As with several recent Public Forum resolutions, the January resolutionbegins with the phrase, “on balance.” Without the addition of this phrase, some PRO debaters might be able to arguethat the resolution only requires them to show some minor benefit to Western interests from economic sanctions. Butthe addition of the term, “on balance,” makes it clear that the advantages of economic sanctions must be weighedagainst the disadvantages. Consider the following definitions of “on balance:”

CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN IDIOMS, 2003. Retrieved Aug. 26, 2014 fromhttp://idioms.thefreedictionary.com/on+balance. On Balance: After considering everything.

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INVESTOR WORDS, 2014. Retrieved Aug. 26, 2014 from http://www.investorwords.com/3410/on_balance.html. On Balance: The net result or overall effect.

OXFORD DICTIONARIES, 2014. Retrieved Aug. 26, 2014 from http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/on-balance. On Balance: When all factors are taken into consideration.

What is the significance of including the phrase, “economic sanctions” in the resolution? Since the resolution latermentions “Russia,” the “economic sanctions” term obviously refers to the group of sanctions imposed by the UnitedStates and the European Union in response to Russian incursions into Crimea and Ukraine in 2014.

Another important term in the January resolution is “Western interests.” This term “Western,” when capitalized (asit is in the resolution), means more than merely a geographic direction. Since it is the United States and the EuropeanUnion that have imposed economic sanctions on Russia, the term “Western” almost certainly refers to the UnitedStates and members of the European Union – countries that are member nations in the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization. But what are Western interests? I suspect that debaters will find it almost impossible to locate adictionary definition of this phrase. It is, however, a phrase commonly appearing in the political science literature. Thefrustrating truth, however, is that most foreign policy experts use the term without really defining what they mean by it.Consider some of the following examples (in each case, the emphasis added is mine):

David Kramer, (Dir., McCain Institute and Former President, Freedom House), WORLDAFFAIRS, Apr. 2015. Retrieved Dec. 5, 2015 from http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/. The crisisis far from over for Ukraine, much less for Russia, but there are conclusions one can draw thatwill be important for the remaining two years of the Obama administration, for the new Congress,and for 2016 American presidential aspirants. The first one is that Vladimir Putin is a threat tovirtually everything the West stands for. The system he has overseen at home for the past fifteenyears is antithetical to our own; the effects of his foreign policy have been damaging to Westerninterests. Putin has consciously supported Bashar al-Assad’s slaughter of the Syrian people byarming Syrian forces; he has agreed with the mullahs to construct new nuclear reactors in Iran;he has menacingly reminded the world of Russia’s nuclear weapons capability; and, continuinghis energy blackmail by other means, he has challenged NATO states and others withprovocative military flights and submarine maneuvers. Given these challenges, we should setaside the reset button as long as he’s in power.

Jeffrey Stacey, (Prof., Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University), FOREIGNAFFAIRS, Oct. 19, 2015. Retrieved Dec. 4, 2015 from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/. But it wasonly when Putin intervened in Ukraine and found the Western response to be so feeble, in hisview, that he decided to up the ante and begin to subvert Western interests wherever andwhenever he can.

Joschka Fischer, (Former German Foreign Minister and Vice Chancellor), LEBANON DAILYSTAR, Oct. 8, 2015. Retrieved Dec. 1, 2015 from Nexis. But Europe should avoid the kind ofdismal realpolitik that would betray its core values elsewhere. It would be a grave mistake, forexample, to sell out Ukraine's interests and lift the sanctions imposed on Russia out of themistaken belief that the Kremlin's assistance is needed in Syria. Cooperation with Russia,however useful and advisable it may be, must not come at the expense of third parties andWestern interests and unity. Attempting to redeem past mistakes is not advisable when it meansmaking even bigger ones.

Edward Walker, (Prof., Political Science, U. California, Berkeley), STATES NEWS SERVICE,Apr. 1, 2014. Retrieved Dec. 1, 2015 from Nexis. And of course a hostile and lawless Russia cando great harm to Western interests globally, whether in Iran and Syria today or some other crisisin the future. In short, a permanently hostile and threatening Russia is not in anyone's interest,least of all Ukraine's. The immediate task for Western policymakers is to deescalate the crisis andapply sanctions that deter further acts of aggression by Moscow. Washington, its European allies,and IMF should also provide the financial assistance that Ukraine needs to begin to address itsdire economic problems as rapidly as possible. In the longer run, however, the West will need tocome up with a strategic response that makes war less likely and Russia less able, or perhapsless willing, to destabilize its neighbors.

Given the difficulty of really defining “Western interests,” it will fall to PRO or CON teams to establish the factorsthat are vital to the interests of the United States and/or the European Union. Candidates for such vital interests will bepreventing Russian expansion, support for the sovereignty of Ukraine, fighting terrorism, managing the rise of China,stopping nuclear proliferation (especially in Iran), and preventing nuclear war. In each case, it will likely be necessaryfor the PRO or CON team to provide evidence showing that this interest is vital to the U.S. and/or European nations.

PRO STRATEGIES

There are a large number of strategies available to PRO debaters on this topic. The first strategy argues thateconomic sanctions provide the best available response to Russia’s campaign to restore the old Soviet empire.

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Numerous experts believe that Vladimir Putin is determined to force the states of the former Soviet Union backtogether into a union controlled by Russia. This is a frightening prospect to nations such as Poland, Finland, and theBaltic states that have only just recently escaped the authoritarian rule of their Soviet masters. Former PolishPresident, Bronislaw Komorowski, has warned that Mr. Putin is trying to build a new Russian empire for Moscow, andthat the region now must choose whether it wants a Cossack Europe or a democratic one (Sept. 4, 2014, WashingtonTimes, http://www.washingtontimes.com/). The Russian takeover of Crimea and its incursions into Ukraine are seen assimply the first moves in this expansion campaign. Had it not been for the imposition of economic sanctions, Putinwould already have occupied all of Ukraine.

The second PRO cases argues that economic sanctions serve an important function because they limit the resourcesthat Putin has available to fund his aggressive foreign policy objectives. This case will work well as a response to CONteams claiming that sanctions simply entrench Putin’s power base and make him more aggressive. This PRO caseargues that Putin’s power base was absolutely secure well before sanctions were imposed, so the claim that thesanctions are counterproductive is bogus. In addition, Putin will be aggressive with or without the imposition of sanctions.He has already made that abundantly clear. His aggressive takeover of Crimea happened before any sanctions were inplace. It may also be true that sanctions will not force Putin to pull out of Crimea or Ukraine. But the sanctions will stillserve Western interests if they succeed in limiting the economic resources that Putin has available to carry out hisaggressive moves. This case proves that the sanctions are succeeding in limiting Russian access to advanced militarytechnologies.

The third PRO case argues that economic sanctions promote Western interests because they make an importantstatement about the importance of adhering to international law. Justice is served by forcing Russia to pay a high price forits blatant violations of international law. This case proves that the sanctions are, in fact, doing significant damage to theRussian economy.

CON STRATEGIES

There are also several excellent strategies available to CON debaters on this topic. The first CON case argues thateconomic sanctions are counterproductive, meaning they actually undermine Western interests by increasing thepower base for Vladimir Putin and making it more likely that he will pursue an aggressive foreign policy.

The second CON case argues that economic sanctions undermine Western interests by pushing Russia intoalliances with China and Iran. China has substantial financial reserves and has already declared its opposition to Westernsanctions and its willingness to assist Russia in evading the impact of the sanctions. Accordingly, the sanctions willaccomplish nothing other that pushing Russia to ally with China in opposing Western interests around the globe. Theeconomic sanctions are also increasing the incentives for Russia to obtain hard currency by selling advanced missile andnuclear technologies to Iran, undermining efforts to limit nuclear proliferation.

The final CON case argues that the greatest threat faced by the United States and the European Union is not Russia,but rather from terrorist groups such as ISIS. Russia is willing to join with Western nations in the fight against ISIS,especially in Syria. Russian assistance should be welcomed, but is made more difficult because of the presence of theeconomic sanctions. This case also argues that Russia is justified in maintaining its sphere of influence in Crimea andUkraine.

A FEW WORDS ABOUT THE PROPER USE OF BAYLOR BRIEFS IN PUBLIC FORUM DEBATE

The PRO and CON cases in public forum debate must be presented in only a few minutes. Since the emphasis inpublic forum debate is on persuasive delivery for the lay person, you would never want to try to speak more rapidly inorder to pack more arguments or quotations into the few minutes available in your speeches. Most successful publicforum teams won’t use more than six or seven short quotations in the whole debate. Most of the briefs offered in ourPublic Forum Debate Research Series are much longer – and present much more evidence – than could ever bepresented in a single public forum debate. You should consider each brief as a resource and cafeteria of possibilities.Rarely in public forum debate would you ever read more than one or two short pieces of evidence under each heading.In addition, debaters typically underline just the portion of a piece of evidence that they will read in their speech –hopefully the part of the evidence that makes the point most clearly. This is an acceptable practice under NSDA rulesof evidence so long as the debater has the whole piece of evidence available for viewing (upon request) by the otherteam and/or the judge(s).

Why does Baylor Briefs, then, sometimes provide several long pieces of evidence? We want to give you choices,to show you the whole context of the evidence, and also to make backup evidence available to you. You should makethe arguments your own by choosing only the arguments and evidence that makes the most sense to you.

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KEY WEB SITES RELEVANT TO THE JANUARY TOPIC

Barnato, Katy. (2015, Oct. 5). Why Sanctions Against Russia Are Here for the Long Term. http://www.cnbc.com/2015/10/05/why-sanctions-against-russia-are-here-for-the-long-haul.html. This article from a CNBCjournalist discounts the notion that Russian operations against ISIS in Syria will bring an end toeconomic sanctions: “Russia's military intervention in Syria has spurred speculation that a commonenemy — Islamist extremists — could soothe tensions between Moscow and the West and help in thelifting of sanctions over tensions in Ukraine. However, both sides are unwilling to step down overRussia's annexation of Crimea, raising concerns that tit-for-tat sanctions are here for the long-run andcould even be increased.”

Ellyatt, Holly. (2015, Jan. 30). Sanctions on Russia Are Economic War. http://www.cnbc.com/2015/01/30/new-sanctions-on-russia-are-economic-war.html. This article details the impact of the economicsanctions on the Russian economy: “Russia's economy has been severely impacted not only bysanctions, which have isolated it from international business and trade, but from the falling oil pricewhich has plummeted around 60 percent since June 2014, hurting its exports and revenues. As aconsequence, Russia is expected to enter recession in 2015.”

Gardner, Andrew. (2014, July 29). EU Agrees Economic Sanctions on Russia. http://www.politico.eu/article/eu-agrees-economic-sanctions-on-russia/. This article from a Politco journalist explains how theeconomic sanctions were targeted at Russia’s oil and gas industry: “The European Union today (29 July)agreed to impose economic sanctions on Russia, four and a half months after it first warned Russia thatit would suffer ‘far-reaching economic consequences’ if it did not try to end the crisis in Ukraine. Thesanctions, which were agreed by the EU member states ambassadors in Brussels, prevent EU statesand companies from entering new contracts to supply arms to Russia, halts the supply of some hi-techequipment to the Russian oil industry and limits the ability of Russian state-owned banks to raise capitalon the European financial markets.”

Steinbock, Dan. (2015, Aug. 24). For Whom the Bell Tolls; Really the Impact of the Sanctions AgainstRussia. http://www.economonitor.com/blog/2015/08/for-whom-the-bell-tolls-really-the-impact-of-the-sanctions-against-russia/. Dr. Bockman, the Research Director of International Business at the India,China, and America Institute, believes that the economic sanctions on Russia have done little more thanrally the Russian people behind the militaristic agenda of President Putin: “In March 2014, Washingtonand Brussels initiated sanctions against Russian individuals and interests in response to developmentsin Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. For 1.5 years, the hope has been that sanctions and the Ukraine crisiswould quash President Putin's popularity. In reality, Ukraine has been pushed close to default, while thesanctions have united Russians behind Putin. Before the Ukraine crisis, diminished economic prospectscaused Putin's approval rating to plunge to 61 percent; the lowest since 2000. In 2014, the sanctionsand the annexation of Crimea galvanized public opinion behind Moscow. Today, Putin's approval ratingsremain at 87 percent, according to Levada Center. Currently, some 56 percent of Russians supportPutin's "Unified Russia" Party, while communists, militant and nationalists, and social-democratstogether have about 15 percent, according to the Russian Public Opinion Research Center.”

Tass: Russian News Agency. (2015, Jan. 5). Hollande: Economic Sanctions Against Russia Must BeStopped. http://tass.ru/en/world/770356. This article quotes the French President, Francois Hollande,who worries what will happen to the economy of the European Union if the Russian economy collapses:“Hollande said on France Inter radio that deterioration of the economic situation in Russia is no good forEurope and that “now sanctions should be stopped.”

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PRO CASE #1: LIMITING RUSSIAN EXPANSION

The thesis of this case is that economic sanctions provide the best available response to Russia’s campaign torestore the old Soviet empire. Had it not been for the imposition of the sanctions, Russia would have already occupiedUkraine. This case also offers responses to claims that the sanctions are counterproductive.

OBSERVATION:

I. PREVENTING RUSSIAN EXPANSION TO RECREATE THE OLD SOVIET EMPIRE IS A VITAL WESTERN

INTEREST.

A. PUTIN’S GOAL IS THE RECREATION OF THE OLD SOVIET EMPIRE.

Ralph Peters, (Retired U.S. Army Officer Specializing in Russian Affairs), PUTIN’S PLAN TO RECLAIM THE OLD

RUSSIAN EMPIRE, May 3, 2014. Retrieved Dec. 4, 2015 from http://nypost.com/2014/05/03/putins-vengeful-plan-to-recapture-the-old-russian-empire/.

And make no mistake, Putin truly believes he’s entitled to reclaim Ukraine and a great deal more. In his view,independent capitals from Warsaw (yes, Warsaw) to Bishkek are integral and natural parts of the Russian imperium. Heregards them as property stolen from its rightful owner: Moscow.

Marc Bennetts, (Staff, Washington Times), FORMER SOVIET BLOC NATIONS FEAR PUTIN ASSEMBLING NEWUSSR, Sept. 4, 2014. Retrieved Dec. 4, 2015 from http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/sep/4/former-soviet-bloc-nations-fear-vladimir-putin-ass/?page=all.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s maneuvers in eastern Ukraine — and repeated statements about protectingRussian-speaking citizens wherever they live — are raising concerns that the former KGB officer is aiming to assemble anew Russian empire from the remnants of the old Soviet Union. “Putin’s real plan is the destruction of Ukraine and the re-establishment of the USSR,” Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk said hours after Mr. Putin on Wednesdayoutlined a seven-point plan for a cease-fire in eastern Ukraine that called for Ukrainian troops to withdraw from disputedregions in the former Soviet republic and for pro-Russia insurgents to “stop advancing.”

Marc Bennetts, (Staff, Washington Times), FORMER SOVIET BLOC NATIONS FEAR PUTIN ASSEMBLING NEWUSSR, Sept. 4, 2014. Retrieved Dec. 4, 2015 from http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/sep/4/former-soviet-bloc-nations-fear-vladimir-putin-ass/?page=all.

Late last month, Polish President Bronislaw Komorowski said Mr. Putin is trying to build a new Russian empire forMoscow, and that the region now must choose whether it wants “a Cossack Europe or a democratic one,” the Reutersnews agency reported. In a recent interview with the World Post, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who served as national securityadviser to President Jimmy Carter, said the Kremlin leader is aiming to destabilize Ukraine so that “Putin can assumepower and abandon the effort to take Ukraine into the democratic West. “Those in power would then join Putin on themarch to create a Eurasian Union. That Eurasian Union is nothing but a new name for the former Soviet Union, or for theformer Czarist Empire,” Mr. Brzezinski said.

Maxim Odessa, (Staff, London Times), PUTIN ACCUSED OF REBUILDING SOVIET EMPIRE, Nov. 6, 2015. Retrieved

Dec. 6, 2015 from http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/europe/article4605809.ece.Vladimir Putin plans to rebuild a Soviet-style empire and must be thwarted by making Ukraine a bulwark against

Kremlin expansionism, the former president of Georgia has warned. Mikheil Saakashvili, the Odessa governor, addedthat only a stable Slavic neighbor could prevent Moscow devouring more territory across the region. “If Ukraine doesn’tcontain Russia, I think Russia can easily wipe Georgia and the Baltic states from the map,” he told The Times. “A strongUkraine is the biggest check on Russia.”

Jamie Crawford, (Staff, CNN), PETRAEUS ACCUSES PUTIN OF TRYING TO RE-ESTABLISH RUSSIAN EMPIRE,Sept. 25, 2015. Retrieved Dec. 3, 2015 from http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/22/politics/david-petraeus-putin-syria-isis-iraq/.

Russian moves in Syria are designed to bolster and hold on to their naval base and airstrip along the Mediterraneancoast of Syria, and shore up the al-Assad regime in order to preserve Russian influence in the Middle East, [GeneralDavid] Petraeus said. "I think that what Vladimir Putin would like to do is resurrect the Russian empire," he said.

B. PREVENTING THE RECREATION OF THE OLD SOVIET EMPIRE IS A VITAL WESTERN INTEREST.

John Herbst, (Dir., Eurasia Center at the Atlantic Journal & Former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine), SENATE HEARING:U.S. POLICY IN UKRAINE: COUNTERING RUSSIA AND DRIVING REFORM, Mar. 10, 2015. Retrieved Dec. 2, 2015from Nexis.

Recent Kremlin provocations include the kidnapping of an Estonian intelligence official from Estonia. And thathappened on the day that the NATO summit ended last September. They also include the seizure of a Lithuanian shipfrom international waters of the Baltic Sea. He is telling the Baltic states and all the states in his neighborhood, "You arenot secure even if you are members of NATO." We have a vital interest -- again, I use that word "vital" -- in stoppingMoscow's revanchist policies before they move to other countries, especially to the Baltic states.

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David Kramer, (Dir., McCain Institute and Former President, Freedom House), WORLD AFFAIRS, Apr. 2015. RetrievedDec. 5, 2015 from http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/ukraine-invasion-one-year-later.

The crisis is far from over for Ukraine, much less for Russia, but there are conclusions one can draw that will beimportant for the remaining two years of the Obama administration, for the new Congress, and for 2016 Americanpresidential aspirants. The first one is that Vladimir Putin is a threat to virtually everything the West stands for. Thesystem he has overseen at home for the past fifteen years is antithetical to our own; the effects of his foreign policy havebeen damaging to Western interests. Putin has consciously supported Bashar al-Assad’s slaughter of the Syrian peopleby arming Syrian forces; he has agreed with the mullahs to construct new nuclear reactors in Iran; he has menacinglyreminded the world of Russia’s nuclear weapons capability; and, continuing his energy blackmail by other means, he haschallenged NATO states and others with provocative military flights and submarine maneuvers. Given these challenges,we should set aside the reset button as long as he’s in power.

Jeffrey Stacey, (Prof., Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University), FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Oct. 19, 2015.Retrieved Dec. 4, 2015 from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/audios/2015-10-19/jeffrey-stacey-russia-putin-and-iran.

Since the Russia invasion and occupation of Eastern Ukraine, Putin has been poking and prodding the West,seeking ways in which a militarily and diplomatically resurgent Russia can subvert Western security interests and forceWestern capitals to deal with Russia again as a major world power with its own unique set of legitimate interests.

Jeffrey Stacey, (Prof., Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University), FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Oct. 19, 2015.Retrieved Dec. 4, 2015 from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/audios/2015-10-19/jeffrey-stacey-russia-putin-and-iran.

But it was only when Putin intervened in Ukraine and found the Western response to be so feeble, in his view, thathe decided to up the ante and begin to subvert Western interests wherever and whenever he can.

CONTENTIONS:

I. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS OFFER THE BEST HOPE FOR STOPPING RUSSIAN EXPANSION.

A. SANCTIONS INCREASE THE COST OF RUSSIAN AGGRESSION.

Leon Aron, (Dir., Russia Studies at the American Enterprise Institute), HOW TO CHANGE PUTIN’S MIND, Nov. 25,2015. Retrieved Dec. 3, 2015 from https://www.aei.org/publication/how-to-change-putins-mind/.

It’s also important to keep in place economic sanctions. Mr. Putin must be forced to choose between, on the onehand, spending an estimated $2 million to $4 million a day in Syria, and robbing 38 million retirees (Mr. Putin’s mainpolitical base) by indexing their pensions at about a third of the inflation rate. Sanctions also would force a choicebetween further cuts in health care and education, and supplying and defending the “people’s republics” in southeasternUkraine at an estimated cost of $36 billion a year.

Ian Bond, (Analyst, Center for European Reform), FROZEN: THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF SANCTIONSAGAINST RUSSIA, Mar. 2015, 1.

Sanctions will remain one of the main Western tools for pressing Moscow to stop intervening in Ukraine. Whether ornot the West decides to support Ukraine militarily, sanctions need to be made as effective as possible.

Leon Aron, (Dir., Russia Studies at the American Enterprise Institute), HOW TO CHANGE PUTIN’S MIND, Nov. 25,2015. Retrieved Dec. 3, 2015 from https://www.aei.org/publication/how-to-change-putins-mind/.

The only effective way to change Russia’s behavior is for the West to increase the domestic political costs and risksof Mr. Putin’s foreign policy. The regime’s sustaining political dynamic must be gradually reversed until foreign policy—now virtually the sole source of the regime’s successes, legitimacy and popular support—becomes a wellspring of doubt,embarrassment and regret, forcing Mr. Putin, for the first time, to undertake a cost-benefit analysis.

B. HAD SANCTIONS NOT BEEN APPLIED, RUSSIA WOULD HAVE OCCUPIED ALL OF UKRAINE.

Rasmus Nielsen, (Staff, Danish Newspaper, Politiken), BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Feb. 9, 2015. Retrieved Dec.2, 2015 from Nexis.

[Danish Foreign Minister. Martin] Lidegaard believes that had the EU not imposed some sanctions, Russian wouldhave "gone further inside Ukraine and would have been even more aggressive." "We haven't stopped them, no. But thesanctions work better every day that passes in conjunction with the falling oil prices. One can hope that we are at a pointwhen, combined with the falling oil prices, they are able to realize how entirely hopeless is the project they are embarkedupon."


So far the EU has clearly not forced Russia to change its behaviour: Russia and its proxies are in control of moreUkrainian territory than was the case in March or July 2014, and are continuing to fight for more. It is hard to prove ordisprove the theory that sanctions have deterred Russia from going further still, but the Russian opposition activistAleksey Navalniy said in an interview with Le Monde in January 2015 that “without these sanctions, the Russian armywould already be in Odessa”. It is at least possible that the sectoral sanctions imposed in the wake of the shooting downof MH17 have led Russia to push forward more cautiously, for fear of provoking another round of even more economicallydamaging measures, but there is no proof of this. So the only objective which the EU has definitely achieved is to send asignal that it will not ignore the invasion of another European state.

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C. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS HAVE DETERRED FURTHER RUSSIAN AGGRESSION.

Eric Engle, (Ukraine Specialist at the Fulbright Foundation), SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL, Fall 2014, 127.Russia can always sell resources - but sanctions and the higher transaction costs associated with corruption lower

the price Russia would otherwise have obtained for those resources. Although the sanction regime will not force Russia toabandon its illegal annexation of Crimea, nor lead to an ouster of President Putin, the sanctions may have deterredRussia from further illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory.


European leaders have stressed that sanctions are a means to an end. The then President of the European Council,Herman Van Rompuy, said in March 2014 “Sanctions are not a question of retaliation; they are a foreign policy tool. Not agoal in themselves, but a means to an end. Our goal is to stop Russian action against Ukraine, to restore Ukraine’ssovereignty – and to achieve this we need a negotiated solution”. Sanctions can have a number of objectives: (a) to senda political signal of disapproval; (b) to deter further examples of negative behaviour; or (c) to force a state to change itsbehaviour. The EU seems to want to achieve all three.

D. SANCTIONS WILL BECOME EVEN TOUGHER IF RUSSIAN ADVANCES FURTHER.

Eric Engle, (Staff), INDIANA INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW, 2015, 162.Russian individuals and firms have been subjected to targeted sanctions due to Russia's illegal annexation of

Crimea. Russia also faces sectoral sanctions of entire industries, which will be imposed if Russia annexes furtherUkrainian territory or continues its illegal covert military actions in Ukraine. While sanctions may dissuade Russia fromfurther illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory, they likely will not force Russia to restore or share sovereignty over Crimeawith Ukraine. However, existing sanctions against Russian individuals will not be lifted until the Crimean annexation isresolved. Sanctions do work, but may take time to have their desired effect.


To persuade Mr. Putin to put aside his revisionist dreams, we need to do things that play on his weaknesses. Strongsanctions are part of this. We have to deal with Mr. Putin's economy. We must persuade Mr. Putin that by announcingstrong additional sanctions for aggression to come.

Rasmus Nielsen, (Staff, Danish Newspaper, Politiken), BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Feb. 9, 2015. Retrieved Dec.2, 2015 from Nexis.

Prior to today's meeting with the Foreign Affairs Committee, Foreign Minister Martin Lidegaard (Social Liberal Party)turned down the Conservatives' proposal to send weapons to Ukraine. Instead, he believes the existing economicsanctions on Russia must be tightened if Moscow does not deescalate the fighting between Russian-supportedseparatists and Ukrainian troops - fighting that has become even bloodier over the past few weeks. "The sanctions havethe purpose of pressuring the Russian Government to come to the negotiating table. We need this to happen in order tocontinue, in my view."

Victoria Nuland, (U.S. Assistant Secretary Of State for European and Eurasian affairs), SENATE HEARING: U.S.POLICY IN UKRAINE: COUNTERING RUSSIA AND DRIVING REFORM, Mar. 10, 2015. Retrieved Dec. 2, 2015 fromNexis.

As the president has said, we will judge Russia by its actions, not by his words, and the United States will, with ourinternational partners, start rolling back sanctions on Russia, but only when the Minsk agreements are fully implemented.The reverse is also true. If these are not implemented, there will be more sanctions, and we have begun consultationswith our European partners on further sanctions pressure, should Russia continue fueling the fire in the east or in otherparts of Ukraine, failed to implement Minsk or grab more land, as we saw in Debaltseve after the agreements weresigned.

II. CLAIMS THAT ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE ARE UNJUSTIFIED.

A. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS DO NOT INCREASE PUTIN’S POWER AS SOME CRITICS CLAIM – OVER THE

LONG-TERM, THE DEEPENING ECONOMIC CRISIS WILL UNDERMINE HIS POWER.

Chris Miller, (Analyst, Foreign Policy Research Institute), RUSSIA’S ECONOMY: SANCTIONS, BAILOUTS, ANDAUSTERITY, Feb. 2015. Retrieved Dec. 2, 2015 from http://www.fpri.org/articles/2015/02/russias-economy-sanctions-bailouts-and-austerity.

The news about Russia’s economy keeps getting worse. The IMF predicts that the country’s GDP will shrink by 3percent in 2015. Other forecasters fear the recession will be even worse. Meanwhile, Russia’s central bank has admittedthat inflation might hit 15 percent this year. Unemployment is rising, too. The Kremlin has already spent $100 billion—roughly a fifth of its reserves—fighting the crisis. Now, Moscow is seeking to apportion the costs of the recession,determining who will pay via higher taxes or lower benefits. In the face of the ruble’s collapse, business groups aredemanding bailouts and appear to be succeeding. The Kremlin is adopting a strategy of austerity, including swingingbudget cuts and perhaps pension cuts, too. Given that Putin’s rule has been predicated on steadily rising living standards,the Russian government’s response to the crisis risks undermining the foundations of its own legitimacy.

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Chris Miller, (Analyst, Foreign Policy Research Institute), RUSSIA’S ECONOMY: SANCTIONS, BAILOUTS, ANDAUSTERITY, Feb. 2015. Retrieved Dec. 2, 2015 from http://www.fpri.org/articles/2015/02/russias-economy-sanctions-bailouts-and-austerity.

When opposition leader Alexey Navalny began attracting attention with calls for an anti-crisis protest on March 1, tenother groups, including the Communist Party, filed for permission to hold protests that same day, a classic diversionarytactic. Games like this have proven repeatedly effective over Putin’s 15 years in power. As wages stagnate andunemployment picks up, Putin’s core claim to economic competency will begin to erode. The longer the recession lasts,the more Putin will have to rely on nationalism and repression to sustain his rule.


Mr. Putin has a serious vulnerability. The Russian people do not want Russian troops fighting in Ukraine. That's whyhe's lying to them. That's why the Russian dead that come back are buried in secret. That's why the families of theRussian dead are told, "If you tell the neighbors, these folks, your sons fought and died in Ukraine, you will not getbenefits."

B. PUBLIC OPINION POLLS IN AN AUTHORITARIAN STATE ARE MEANINGLESS.


Of course opinion polls in an authoritarian state, where independent media are heavily constrained, cannot beentirely trusted. The question is whether discontent, or confidence to express discontent, will grow as people realise thatthe state is in fact compensating elite ‘victims’ at the expense of the rest of society, and leaving Russia’s soldiers to beburied in secret, casualties of a war that the Russian government dare not admit it is fighting.

C. EVEN PUTIN REALIZES THAT HE CANNOT CONTINUE HIS CURRENT COURSE IF SANCTIONS

REMAIN.

Stratfor Global Intelligence, RUSSIA BEGINS TO BUCKLE UNDER SANCTIONS PRESSURE, Sept. 16, 2015.Retrieved Dec. 1, 2015 from https://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical-diary/russia-begins-buckle-under-sanctions-pressure.

Low energy prices and economic sanctions are taking their toll on the Russian economy, so much so that theKremlin is putting sanctions relief at the forefront of next year's policy agenda. The Western sanctions are in large partdesigned to affect the Russian economy down the road — for example, energy sanctions target long-term developmentprojects like Arctic oil and gas deposits. But Russia is getting to the point where delays in key projects, along withfinancing constraints on Russian companies and Western firms doing business in Russia, could cause irreparable harmto the economy in the not-too-distant future. In addition, there are increasing signs that the global economy is about toenter a downturn and that oil prices, which have dropped by more than half since the Ukraine crisis began, will remain lowfor the foreseeable future and possibly go lower. Simply put, Russia is starting to realize it cannot weather the sanctionsmuch longer, particularly because the next five years will already be a difficult time for the Russian economy.


Russia has limited ability to respond to Western sanctions in kind. Russia's counter-sanction options are either verydrastic, such as energy cuts to Europe, or very small, such as embargoes on European fruit. They offer no sense ofproportionality in response and thus have been ineffectual. Now Russia is trying to create circumstances in whichsanctions could be removed, relaxed or suspended, even if that turns out to be a slow process.


Moscow's key objective for 2016 and 2017 is getting relief from the sanctions, and it will use whatever it can —Ukraine and Syria included — to present itself as a willing partner. Theoretically, the European Union could remove somerestrictions as early as January, when EU sanctions are set to expire. Russia now aims for the removal of U.S. sanctionssometime in the next two years.

D. RUSSIA CANNOT SIMPLY TURN TO CHINA FOR RELIEF FROM THE SANCTIONS.


Russian leaders have for some time threatened Europe with the possibility that Russia will ‘turn east’, and have triedto portray the gas deal done between Russia and China in May in this light. The reality is, however, that China hasexploited Russia’s political need to show that it can live without Western markets to drive a very hard bargain. Trade andenergy negotiations which had dragged on for years were quickly brought to a conclusion in the margins of a meetingbetween Putin and the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, in May 2014, on terms which are far more favourable to China thanRussia.

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Priyanka Boghani, (Staff, PBS Frontline), WHAT’S BEEN THE EFFECT OF WESTERN SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA?, Jan.13, 2015. Retrieved Dec. 2, 2015 from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/whats-been-the-effect-of-western-sanctions-on-russia/.

They clearly are trying to get around it. They’ve been trying to get money from China. But it’s very striking that theChinese are not providing financing for Russia, because like everyone else they’re afraid of the American financialregulators.


Limits on financing have also affected several key medium-term projects. Novatek's Yamal liquefied natural gasfacility has been barred from using long-term dollar-denominated loans. Thus, the project stakeholders — Novatek (60percent), Total (20 percent) and China National Petroleum Corp., or CNPC (20 percent) — have had to turn to moreChinese financing than they had originally intended. Novatek finally agreed to sell a 9.9 percent stake to the China SilkRoad Fund on Sept. 3 during Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to China. But as China's own economy has slowed,Beijing has been more stringent in its overseas investment strategy, thus limiting Russia's ability to turn away from theWest and toward China to offset sanctions blowback. Gazprom's 2014 deal with CNPC on natural gas supplies throughthe Power of Siberia pipeline has also been difficult to move forward because of China's hesitance to prepay for gas;Gazprom needed the prepayment funds to help finance the construction of the project.

E. CLAIMS THAT SANCTIONS ARE HURTING UKRAINE AS MUCH AS RUSSIA ARE UNTRUE.

Eric Engle, (Ukraine Specialist at the Fulbright Foundation), SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL, Fall 2014, 127.Some argue that Russia can use energy pricing and exports as a political weapon. However, that does not seem to

be the case. For example, despite long-term delivery of low cost natural gas, Russian energy policy has had little or noinfluence on Ukraine. Furthermore, Russian energy exports are not generally driven by geopolitical ambitions, but by thepractical fact of who will pay the most.

F. CLAIMS THAT THE SANCTIONS ARE DAMAGING THE ECONOMIES OF OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES ARE

INCORRECT.

Edward Christie, (Defense Economist, North Atlantic Treaty Organization), NATO REVIEW, NOV. 20, 2015. RetrievedDec. 2, 2015 from http://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2015/Russia/sanctions-after-crimea-have-they-worked/EN/index.htm.

For European Allies and Partners, recent data demonstrates that the losses incurred due to Russia’s generaleconomic downturn have been well contained. Of course, exports to Russia have fallen substantially, on average byaround one third when comparing the first quarter of 2015 with the first quarter of 2014. However Russia’s importance asa destination market is quite limited for most European countries and, more importantly still, European businesses havebeen able to find new markets for their products, both within Europe and beyond – a phenomenon referred to byeconomists as trade diversion.


Some 21 out of the 28 EU Member States experienced a net gain in exports to the world in spite of the Russiandownturn, thanks to increases in exports to other markets (both within and beyond the EU) that more than compensatedfor the falls in exports to Russia. The same is true for the European Union in the aggregate, with exports to Russia fallingby 8.65 billion Euros, but exports to other destinations increasing by 49.02 billion Euros (including intra-EU trade).


As the European economy overwhelmingly shrugs off the effects of Russia’s recession – which is only partly causedby sanctions – Western Allies should take comfort in the knowledge that pursuing a strong and principled sanctions policyappears eminently affordable. The evidence indicates that the doomsayers have been proved wrong.


The perfect storm of sanctions, a falling oil price and a tumbling currency has now increased the economic pressureon Russia beyond what Western policy-makers could have imagined when imposing the sanctions. The EU economy, onthe other hand, has proven resilient – it has not deteriorated but instead grown slowly. One reason is that Europeanpolicy-makers have finally come around to supporting economic demand via looser monetary policy (‘quantitative easing’)and less onerous spending cuts, while the falling oil price acts as a further stimulus. The other reason is that Russia is notvery important for the EU economy.


Putin is striving to persuade people both that the sanctions are having no effect on Russia and that theyare doing much greater damage to the West. This paper has shown that neither assertion is true: at the veryleast, sanctions are exacerbating the serious long-term problems of the Russian economy.

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PRO CASE #2: LIMITING THE RUSSIAN MILITARY THREAT

The thesis of this case is that economic sanctions serve an important function because they limit the resources thatPutin has available to fund his aggressive foreign policy objectives. One of the key arguments of CON teams will be thatsanctions are counterproductive because they entrench Putin in power and cause him to be more aggressive. This caseargues that Putin’s power in Russia is solid, with or without sanctions. His authoritarian approach to governance meansthat he will remain in power with or without sanctions. Similarly, Putin is determined to pursue an aggressive foreign policywith or without sanctions. Thus, whether sanctions entrench Putin in power is irrelevant. Given Putin’s determination tochallenge Western interests, it is preferable to have an economically weak Russia than an economically strong Russia.The economic sanctions have succeeded in restricting Russian access to funds and to advanced defense technologies.

OBSERVATION:

I. LIMITING THE MILITARY THREAT FROM RUSSIA IS A VITAL WESTERN INTEREST.

A. RUSSIAN MILITARY EXPANSION REPRESENTS AN EXISTENTIAL THREAT TO WESTERN COUNTRIES.

Paul McCleary, (Staff), FOREIGN POLICY, July 14, 2015. Retrieved Dec. 5, 2015 fromhttp://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/14/more-pentagon-generals-line-up-to-proclaim-russia-existential-threat-to-u-s/.

U.S. Air Force Gen. Paul Selva — President Barack Obama’s pick to be the next vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff — told the Senate Armed Services Committee on Tuesday that he “would put the threats to this nation in thefollowing order: Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and all of the organizations that have grown around ideology that wasarticulated by al Qaeda,” offering the same list delivered last week by Obama’s nominee to be the next chairman of theJoint Chiefs, Marine Corps Gen. Joseph Dunford.

Paul McCleary, (Staff), FOREIGN POLICY, July 14, 2015. Retrieved Dec. 5, 2015 fromhttp://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/14/more-pentagon-generals-line-up-to-proclaim-russia-existential-threat-to-u-s/.

During his own July 9 confirmation hearing before the same committee, [General Joseph] Dunford [PresidentObama’s nominee to become the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] called, Moscow’s recent behavior in Ukraine and ineastern Europe “nothing short of alarming,” adding that “Russia presents the greatest threat to our national security” and“could pose an existential threat to the United States.”


I think it was Senator Isakson who thought -- who said that the Kremlin menace is the most important nationalsecurity danger we face today. I endorse that wholeheartedly. ISIL is a ragtag bunch of terrorists, a serious danger toindividual Americans; not an existential threat to the United States. A revanchist Moscow is an existential threat to theUnited States. Even Iran with its nuclear program is not on the same order of threat as the world's -- one of the world'stwo largest nuclear powers on -- on the move. If Western leaders clearly understand this danger, if they clearlyunderstood it, they would devote substantially more resources to deal with it and they would draw a bright red line inUkraine, stop Putin in Ukraine before he moves beyond Ukraine.

J.J. Green (Journalist), PENTAGON: RUSSIA POSES EXISTENTIAL THREAT TO THE U.S. ONCE AGAIN, Aug. 21,2015. Retrieved Dec. 4, 2015 from http://wtop.com/national-security/2015/08/pentagon-russia-poses-existential-threat-us/.

“Russia poses an existential threat to the United States by virtue, simply, of the size of the nuclear arsenal that it’shad. That’s not new,” Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter said at a Pentagon briefing Thursday. But in reiterating whattop generals recently told Congress, Carter said, “What’s new, that they were pointing to and I agree with them, is that fora quarter-century or so, since the end of the Cold War we have not regarded them as an antagonist.” Carter said that’snow changed: “Vladimir Putin’s Russia behaves in very important respects as an antagonist. That is new. That issomething that we need to adjust to and counter.”

B. AS RUSSIA INCREASES ITS DEFENSE SPENDING, THE THREAT TO WESTERN INTERESTS

BECOMES MORE SERIOUS.

J.J. Green (Journalist), PENTAGON: RUSSIA POSES EXISTENTIAL THREAT TO THE U.S. ONCE AGAIN, Aug. 21,2015. Retrieved Dec. 4, 2015 from http://wtop.com/national-security/2015/08/pentagon-russia-poses-existential-threat-us/.

Russia has a very serious military program. They are producing very sophisticated strategic and tactical weaponsand I can tell you that the threat from Russia is not over. The more Russia has money, the more aggressive will be itsforeign policy ,” [Sergei] Tretyakov [a Russian spy who has defected to the United States] said.

Thomas Grove, (Staff, Wall Street Journal), RUSSIA SHOWS OFF MILITARY MIGHT, Aug. 27, 2015. Retrieved Dec. 4,2015 from http://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-shows-off-military-might-as-budget-gets-squeezed-1440709682.

In 2011, Russia started on an ambitious rearmament program to equip at least 75% of its armed forces with morepowerful technology by 2020, a spending plan worth $680 billion when it was announced. The modernization hasencompassed a range of space projects, rocket programs and the next-generation fighter jet, the T-50.

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Since the end of the Cold War, the West’s assumption has been that as Russia became more prosperous it wouldbecome more like other European countries – that it would see the value of the rule of law, both in its internal affairs andits foreign policy; that making money would become more important than making war; and that it would be a partner inpromoting prosperity and democracy throughout Europe. The reality is that for most of the last two decades Russia hasasserted the rule of force over the rule of law, at home as well as abroad; national wealth has been spent on enriching anarrow and unaccountable elite and on rebuilding Russia’s military might to threaten its neighbours; and Russia hastreated not only its old military rival, NATO, but its would-be strategic partner, the EU, as adversaries.


As Russia’s economy has rebounded from the economic meltdown of the late 1990s, however, it has ploughed evermore money into its armed forces. 70 per cent of the armed forces’ weaponry is scheduled to be modernised by 2020.And Russia has not been afraid to use its forces: two wars in Chechnya killed perhaps 200,000 people; the invasion ofGeorgia left Russian- backed separatists in control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; and the last year has seen theoccupation of Crimea in a stunning and largely bloodless special forces operation, as well as the more violent seizure ofparts of eastern Ukraine. Russian forces are exercising provocatively and aggressively near Western countries.

CONTENTIONS:

I. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE AN ESSENTIAL MEANS OF LIMITING RUSSIAN MILITARY CAPABILITY.

A. RUSSIA UNDER PUTIN WILL BE AGGRESSIVELY CHALLENGING WESTERN INTERESTS WITH OR

WITHOUT SANCTIONS.

Luke Harding, (Staff, The Guardian), PUTIN’S AGGRESSION HAS LEFT EUROPE IN A PRE-WAR STATE, Sept. 18,2014. Retrieved Dec. 4, 2015 from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/18/putin-aggression-leaves-europe-in-pre-war-state-says-author.

Russia's pre-eminent literary novelist today warns that Vladimir Putin's invasion of Ukraine amounts to a "black hole"that threatens to suck in the whole of Europe. In an essay for the Guardian, Mikhail Shishkin says that Russia'saggression in Ukraine has left the unsuspecting European continent in a state of "pre-war". He says that unlike Russians– conditioned to expect violence by remorseless state propaganda – Europeans have not yet grasped "the new realitythat has set in".


Mr. Putin does want to overturn the post-Cold War order established in Europe and Eurasia. This order has been thefoundation of the unprecedented peace and prosperity that not just Europe, but the entire world has enjoyed over the past25 years. Mr. Putin has stated that he must have a sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space, not just the post-Russianworld, but going into the Warsaw Pact countries, and that he has the right to protect ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers wherever they reside. Mr. Putin has major resources to pursue aggression. He possesses the world's sixth-largest economy, one of the world's two-largest nuclear arsenals, and far and away the strongest military in Europe. Andwe all know Mr. Putin has committed multiple acts of aggression in Georgia in 2008, in Crimea early last year, and sinceApril of last year, he's been conducting an increasingly overt covert war in Ukraine's east.


In this covert war in Ukraine's east, [Putin] has escalated his intervention multiple times. He has agreed to twoceasefires, Minsk I and Minsk II, and violated each one of them. His goal in Ukraine is what the admiral said earlier today,to destabilize the country. But to achieve that, and this is not clearly understood, he cannot settle for a frozen conflict. Heneeds to be regularly on the offensive, albeit with tactical pauses. He has made clear by his statements and his actionsthat if he succeeds in Ukraine, there will be future targets. The targets may include NATO allies, specifically Estonia andLatvia where ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers comprise 25 percent of the population.

B. PUTIN’S HOLD ON POWER IN RUSSIA WAS ABSOLUTE WELL BEFORE SANCTIONS WERE IMPOSED.

Ben Judah, (Staff, New Statesman), THE RUTHLESSNESS OF VLADIMIR PUTIN, Oct. 7, 2015. Retrieved Dec. 5, 2015from http://www.newstatesman.com/2015/10/ruthlessness-vladimir-putin-0.

The nation rallied round Putin, triggering a war wave that he used to grab full hold of the reins of power. Without itthere would have been no President Putin, let alone the Putin era. His poll ratings soared to 79 per cent by the end of2000. When he promised to recapture Chechnya, Russian TV hosts and anchors were whipped into a state of hysteria,calling for Moscow to use “napalm” and for “carpet bombing” of Grozny. The frenzy for war made Putin. Back in StPetersburg, his dying father could not believe it. “My son is like a tsar!” he said.

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Shaun Walker, (Moscow Correspondent, The Guardian), INSIDE PUTINWORLD, WHERE FEW RISK SPEAKINGTRUTH TO POWER, Aug. 29, 2014. Retrieved Dec. 2, 2015 from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/29/putin-world-kremlin-moscow-power-circle.

Revered, even feared, to the point where no one will contradict him; aloof, isolated, a digital hermit who is never outof touch; broadly supported, but very narrowly advised by an ever-tighter group of confidantes. This is the picture ofVladimir Putin and his leadership style painted by a number of people with knowledge of the inner workings of theKremlin, at a time when such things matter more than at any time since the collapse of communism.

Caroline Howard, (Staff, Forbes), THE WORLD’S MOST POWERFUL PEOPLE, Nov. 2, 2014. Retrieved Dec. 4, 2015from http://www.forbes.com/sites/carolinehoward/2014/11/05/putin-vs-obama-the-worlds-most-powerful-people-2014/.

No one would call Vladimir Putin a good guy. In 2014 he strong-armed his way into possession of Crimea and wagedan ugly proxy war in neighboring Ukraine, during which an almost certainly Russian-supplied surface-to-air missiledowned a civilian jetliner. But as the undisputed, unpredictable and unaccountable head of an energy-rich, nuclear-tippedstate, no one would ever call him weak. So who’s more powerful: the omnipotent head of a feisty former superpower orthe handcuffed head of the most dominant country in the world? For the second year running, our votes went with theRussian president as the world’s most powerful person, followed by U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese leader XiJinping.

C. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE REDUCING THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT’S ABILITY TO FUND ITS

PROJECTS.

Eric Engle, (Ukraine Specialist at the Fulbright Foundation), SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL, Fall 2014, 126.Sanctions also caused the Russian stock market to lose about 40 billion euros worth of value and have also led to a

significant decline in value of the Russian ruble.


Recent data confirm Russia’s entry into recession, with GDP growth of -2.2% for the first quarter of 2015, ascompared to the first quarter of 2014. Recent forecasts suggest a fall in real GDP in the order of 3%-3.5% for 2015, andgrowth of around zero for 2016. In sum, Western sanctions have been a success in terms of the proximate goal ofinflicting damage on the Russian economy. This comes in addition to the signaling value of the economic sanctions.


The two main reasons for the recession are the fall in the oil price and the decline in the value of the rouble, whichare closely connected and interact with Western sanctions to the disadvantage of the Russian economy. Lower oilrevenues (in US dollars) mean less demand for the Russian currency. In addition, the loss of confidence in the Russianeconomy, combined with financial sanctions and political uncertainty, has led to capital flight as wealthy Russians andforeign investors dump rouble assets. That is not only leading to a collapse in investment, which further weakens theeconomy, but also exacerbating the fall in the currency.

Peter Feaver, (Prof., Political Science, Duke U.), NATIONAL INTEREST, Aug. 2015. Retrieved Dec. 1, 2015 from Nexis.Similarly, the United States has imposed sophisticated new sanctions on Russia that move well beyond simple

prohibitions on transacting with certain of Vladimir Putin's cronies. These new tools--which target Russia's ability torefinance its massive external debt, as well as prevent the country from developing key energy resources over themedium to long term--leverage advantages enjoyed by the United States: technological superiority and attractive capitalmarkets. A significant component of these sanctions prevents U.S. energy companies from providing cutting-edgetechnologies to Russian firms that would help those firms develop difficult-to-reach oil resources (such as shale, offshoreand Arctic resources). And like the sanctions aimed at isolating Iran from Western financial markets, U.S. and EUsanctions on Russia prohibit Western financial firms from dealing in new debt or equity with more than a thirty-daymaturity period, making it exceedingly difficult for Russian companies to secure the necessary financing to service thecountry's massive debt. These new forms of economic statecraft have proven powerful. For example, as a partial result ofthe sanctions, economists are predicting that the Russian economy will shrink by 3.5-4 percent in 2015 and continuecontracting in the medium term.

D. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE LIMITING RUSSIAN ACCESS TO ADVANCED MILITARY TECHNOLOGIES.

Thomas Grove, (Staff, Wall Street Journal), RUSSIA SHOWS OFF MILITARY MIGHT, Aug. 27, 2015. Retrieved Dec. 4,2015 from http://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-shows-off-military-might-as-budget-gets-squeezed-1440709682.

But a sharp drop in oil prices has sent shock waves through Russia’s economy, while Western sanctions have addedadditional strain on some of Russia’s largest businesses, including some defense firms now on Western blacklists.It isunclear how much Russia’s plans depend on imported parts and technology that are now off limits because of Ukrainecrisis. But in one high-profile blow, France this month broke a €1.2 billion ($1.35 billion) contract to deliver two warships,cutting Russia off from a much-needed glimpse at Western weapons technology.

Birgit Hansl, (Lead Economist, World Bank), RUSSIA ECONOMIC REPORT, Apr. 2015, 35-36.As of September 2014, these companies can only apply for loans and issue debt not exceeding 30 days maturity. In

the defense sector, the U.S and the EU cut access to financing exceeding 30 days maturity for Russia’s major companiesand banned the export of dual-use goods and technology for 14 mixed-defense companies. Sanctions on cooperationwith Russia in the military sector were also introduced by the U.K., Israel, Switzerland, and Sweden.

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Brian McKeon, (U.S. Deputy Undersecretary of Defense), SENATE HEARING: U.S. POLICY IN UKRAINE:COUNTERING RUSSIA AND DRIVING REFORM, Mar. 10, 2015. Retrieved Dec. 2, 2015 from Nexis.

Since the beginning of this crisis, the United States has vigorously pursued a multi-pronged approach in response toRussia's aggression in Ukraine. We have raised the cost to Russia for its actions, reassured allies of our unwaveringsupport to their security and provided tangible support to Ukraine to help it through the crisis. Working closely with Europeand other partners and allies, the administration has imposed real cost on Russia for its aggressive actions. TheDepartment of Defense has halted defense and military cooperation with Russia. The administration have prohibitedexports of sensitive technologies that could be used in Russia's military modernization, has imposed blocking sanctionson 18 Russian defense technology firms. Second, we are taking visible, concrete measures to reassure our allies andpartners in Europe and to deter future aggression.

Elina Kyselchuk, (Legal Counsel, Ukrainian Business Centre, London), THE SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA, Aug. 2015, 9.As a result of the sanctions the major Russian industries including oil and gas, metallurgy, trade, agriculture and real

estate which regularly received investment were significantly cut off from FDI. Russia's state-owned banks have been cutoff from Europe's capital markets, while its defence and energy firms were no longer able to import hi-tech westernequipment which could have been used for military purposes, ‘fracking’ or Arctic oil exploration.


Sanctions are also affecting the Russian financial system. By no means were sanctions the only cause of theRussian ruble's decline and the Russian banking sector's difficulties, but they add enormous weight to what was already amajor burden from low energy prices. Because oil prices are largely out of Russia's — or anyone's — control, Moscowmust do what it can. In theory, a country with ample financial reserves could use them to offset the decline in governmentrevenue stemming from lower oil prices, as Saudi Arabia and other major oil producers have. But the uncertainty aboutthe duration of sanctions on the Russian financial system has made the Kremlin a miser, holding on to its reserves incase Russia's economic situation grows even bleaker in the future. Therefore, Moscow will likely scale back some of itslong-term development plans, such as its military modernization or massive energy projects such as Turkish Stream,Nord Stream II and the Power of Siberia pipeline.

E. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS HAVE ELIMINATED RUSSIAN ABILITY TO FINANCE DEBT.


I think it's important to recognize that the economic outcomes that we have seen in Russia have really been aninteraction between what we have seen in oil and the impact of economic sanctions. Higher oil prices would definitely bea positive for the Russian economy. But I think it's relevant to look at what both Moody's and S&P have done to Russia'scredit rating. You know, Russia has been downgraded to junk for the first time since 2003-2004.

F. AN AGGRESSIVE, BUT ECONOMICALLY WEAK RUSSIA IS TO BE PREFERRED OVER AN

AGGRESSIVE, BUT WEALTHY RUSSIA.


The collapse of the Russian economy would not be in the interest of the West. But nor is it in the West’s interest for arevanchist Russia to have the power to dominate its neighbors. A prosperous, democratic Russia would be best foreveryone; as long as that is unachievable, an aggressive but weak Russia is better than an aggressive and strongRussia. Western leaders should therefore start considering sanctions that would support a policy of containment.

Ian Bond, (Analyst, Center for European Reform), FROZEN: THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF SANCTIONSAGAINST RUSSIA, Mar. 2015, 18-19.

Every Western leader wants to deal with a prosperous, peaceable Russia. The rhetoric of President Putin and hisclosest advisers strongly suggests that this is not on offer. In these circumstances, the West has to consider whether it isbetter to deal with a strong and aggressive Russia or a weak but aggressive Russia. If the latter, then Western leadersshould start considering how to redirect sanctions to support a policy of containment. As a share of the state budget,Russia’s military spending must already be close to the level which the Soviet Union found unsustainable. FinanceMinister Siluanov said on March 2nd that 40 per cent of the 2015 state budget would go to defense, intelligence and lawenforcement agencies. In such circumstances, the West has no interest in helping the Russian economy grow to the pointwhere the military modernization program is once again affordable. It should look to strengthen sectoral sanctions,particularly in relation to technology transfer.

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II. DOUBTS ABOUT THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE UNWARRANTED.

A. THOUGH THE DROP IN OIL PRICES HAS CONTRIBUTED TO RUSSIA’S ECONOMIC DECLINE, THE

IMPACT OF SANCTIONS HAS ALSO BEEN SIGNIFICANT.


For the Russian economy, the sanctions are generally assessed to have helped exacerbate the macroeconomicchallenges it was already facing, notably the rapid and pronounced fall in oil prices that started in the last months of 2014.Furthermore, the combined effect of these sanctions and of the fall in oil prices caused significant downward pressure onthe value of the Rouble and increased capital flight. At the same time, the sanctions on access to financing forced theRussian state to use part of its foreign exchange reserves to shore up the sanctioned entities. These developmentsforced the hand of the Central Bank of Russia, which abruptly ceased to defend the value of the Rouble and hike interestrates in December 2014.

Jim Zarroli, (Staff), NPR MORNING EDITION, Dec. 31, 2014. Retrieved Dec. 2, 2015 from Nexis.As part of its confrontation with Ukraine, Russia seized Crimea. It's showing no sign of giving up, but the Russian

economy, which was soaring one year ago, is now sagging. The government says the economy contracted last month -the first time in years. Oil prices are killing Russia's business, and so are economic sanctions.

B. RUSSIA’S COUNTER-SANCTIONS HAVE ONLY ADDED TO ITS ECONOMIC WOES.


Russia’s ban on Western food imports had a compounding effect on this challenging picture, as it led to higher foodprices and hence to further inflation. This was in addition to the effect of the fall in the value of the Rouble, which hadalready raised the price of imported goods and services in Roubles.

C. RUSSIA’S ECONOMIC RESERVES WILL NOT LAST INDEFINITELY.

Felix Chang, (Sr. Fellow, Foreign Policy Research Institute), EURASIA REVIEW, Dec. 26, 2014. Retrieved Dec. 2, 2015from Nexis.

Since half of Russia's government budget relies on revenues derived from energy production, the decline in thoserevenues has led to concerns that the Russian state may have trouble financing its dollar-denominated debts. It is widelyknown that Russia's 2015 budget balances only when the price of oil is over $105 per barrel. Today it is under $60 perbarrel. Those concerns grew into alarm in mid-December when the value of the Russian ruble plunged 20 percent in twodays, the sharpest fall the currency has experienced since Russia's sovereign debt default in 1998. But Moscow is notwithout financial defenses. Learning from its earlier experience, Russia has built up a massive foreign exchange reserveof $415 billion (as of late December 2014). Though that reserve was $100 billion larger only a year ago, it is still asubstantial sum that Russia can use to defend its currency. However, Russia also knows that the need to use thosereserves would be seen as a sign of weakness and might precipitate another run on the ruble. And so, the Russiancentral bank hiked its key interest rate to 17 percent in a bid to curb further market speculation. Unfortunately, the interestrate hike will also curb economic activity in Russia, likely pushing it into an even deeper recession. Even Putin expectsthat that economic downturn could last for two years.

Jim Zarroli, (Staff), NPR MORNING EDITION, Dec. 31, 2014. Retrieved Dec. 2, 2015 from Nexis.At the same time, Russia has lashed back by blocking imports from the West, making it much tougher to acquire

meat and produce from Europe and North America. Russia's oil wealth has given it large foreign reserves, but it's beenforced to spend more than a fifth of them this year to stabilize its banks and companies and keep its ruble from sliding toomuch. And Russian economist Sergei Guriev, who teaches at Sciences Po in Paris, says Moscow can't keep spendingdown its reserves forever.

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PRO CASE #3: SUPPORTING INTERNATIONAL LAW

The thesis of this case is that economic sanctions uphold Western interests because they make an essentialstatement in defense of international law. Russia should be made to pay a price for its violations of international law. Theeconomic sanctions make an important moral statement.

OBSERVATION:

I. RESPECT FOR NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND PEACEFUL RELATIONS AMONG NATION STATES IS VITAL

TO WESTERN INTERESTS.

A. PROTECTING THE SOVEREIGNTY OF UKRAINE IS VITAL TO WESTERN INTERESTS.


Today, Ukraine is central to our 25 year trans-Atlantic quest for a Europe whole, free and at peace. My interagencycolleagues and I are pleased to update you on U.S. efforts to support Ukraine as it works to liberate the country from itscorrupt oligarchic past and chart a more democratic European future and to bring an end to the Russian and separatistaggression.

Bob Corker, (Chair, Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations), SENATE HEARING: U.S. POLICY IN UKRAINE:COUNTERING RUSSIA AND DRIVING REFORM, Mar. 10, 2015. Retrieved Dec. 2, 2015 from Nexis.

Our country made a commitment in 1994 to defend Ukraine sovereignty and its territorial integrity, which has beenunder a near-constant assault by Russia for more than a year.


The objective of the U.S. and international -- and international economic assistance strategy toward Ukraine hasbeen to support the efforts of President Poroshenko's government to stabilize, revitalize and restructure Ukraine'seconomy.

Ramin Toloui, (U.S. Assistant Secretary of Treasury for International Finance), SENATE HEARING: U.S. POLICY INUKRAINE: COUNTERING RUSSIA AND DRIVING REFORM, Mar. 10, 2015. Retrieved Dec. 2, 2015 from Nexis.

As long as Ukraine's government continues to undertake difficult reforms, the international community must do all itcan to support -- to help Ukraine succeed and be prepared to adapt its assistance strategy as required. At the same time,the international community must continue to ensure that as long as Russia disregards its commitments and fuelsviolence and instability in Ukraine, the cost for Russia will continue to rise.

Robert Menendez, (U.S. Senator, New Jersey), SENATE HEARING: U.S. POLICY IN UKRAINE: COUNTERINGRUSSIA AND DRIVING REFORM, Mar. 10, 2015. Retrieved Dec. 2, 2015 from Nexis.

I believe the administration should fully implement measures in the Ukraine Freedom Support Act, which thepresident signed into law on December 18th. The legislation passed with unanimous consent in both houses of Congress.It authorizes the president to provide much needed military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine. And it imposes additionalsanctions against Russia. This legislation was necessary in December and it is certainly necessary today. Now, we allwant a diplomatic solution. But I believe this can only come about when Putin believes that the cost of continuing toravage Ukraine is simply too high.

B. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW REGIME IS VITAL TO WESTERN INTERESTS AND TO THE INTERESTS OF

ALL NATIONS.

Gbenga Oduntan, (Prof., Law, U. of Kent), DECOLONIZATION OF LEGAL KNOWLEDGE, 2009, 100-101.While it is true that much of the content of modern international law id dictated by the demands of Western interests,

it is not true in any sense at all that it is the European or western mind that is uniquely compatible with the idea ofinternational laws.

C. PRESERVATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IS MORALLY OBLIGATORY.

Mark R. Amstutz (Prof., Pol. Sci., Wheaton College), INTERNATIONAL ETHICS, 1999, 9.Political morality is rooted in binding norms expressed by the formal and informal rules of domestic society, whereas

international political morality is rooted in the shared norms embodied in the conventions, informal agreements, anddeclarations that states accept as obligatory in their international relations. These shared norms are obligatory becausethey are part of international law and morally obligatory because they specify norms conducive to order, justice, or theperceived common good. Some thinkers have argued that, because it is impossible to derive “ought” from “is,” it issimilarly impossible to derive international ethical obligations from existing interstate legal conventions. However, scholarssuch as Terry Nardin have convincingly demonstrated that to the extent that law establishes binding obligations onindividuals, groups, and states, it fulfills the criteria of an ethical framework. In her seminal study on twentieth-centuryinternational legal and political ethics, Dorothy Jones has illuminated how international law has produced an authoritativeand widely accepted framework, or “code,” of international peace. This framework, she argues, is a normative systembecause it prescribes behavior that is conducive to global order and international harmony. Jones’s study thus reinforcesthe claim that international morality can be based on consensual norms and multilateral declarations.

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Dorothy Jones (Visiting Scholar, History, U. Chicago), TRADITIONS OF INT’L ETHICS, 1995, 57-58.“What is of interest here is the ethical element, which is one of the most prominent characteristics of modem

international law. This element is so prominent that there is -no need to postulate morality as an ultimate source forinternational law, or to attach both law and ethics to primary moral notions as to a common parental stem. Thepreambular portions of dozens of inter-national instruments and the abundant lists of principles and rules derived fromthose principles are all the evidence that is needed. These portions of modem international law are strongly philosophical,and are much concerned with the ‘oughts’ of the international system. When they are abstracted from the routinebusiness of the system, the connections between them and their internal consistency over the years is obvious.Abstracted in this fashion, they can be studied as an explicit ethical tradition. Finally, what difference does it make thatsuch a tradition exists and that the states have been active in its articulation? Obviously, the tradition is not effectivelybinding on the states, despite their frequent attempts to give it obligatory force by saying that the fundamental principlesthat underlie the tradition are principles of law. The principles enjoin or call for certain kinds of state behavior, but theappeal is almost always to conscience, not to courts. What then, is the value of this ethical tradition? Most importantly, itprovides standards by which the conduct of states can be judged. These standards have not been imposed from theoutside. They have been set out and accepted by the states themselves. Moreover, since the mid-1960s, formulation ofthe tradition has resulted from the efforts and interaction of states of different political systems, ideological commitments,cultural heritages, and levels of economic development. If ever an ethical tradition could be called universal in the senseof encompassing the many varieties of states and peoples on the globe today, this one can.”

D. RESPECT FOR NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY IS ESSENTIAL TO PEACE.

Mary Ellen O’Connell, (Prof., Law, Notre Dame School of Law, THE POWER AND PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONALLAW, 2008, 20-21.

Law exists wherever human beings strive to live together in peace and this is true of the international community asof any national or local community. Certain limited use of force for the enforcement of the law is consistent with a well-functioning legal system; force to promote the ambitions of leaders free of legal restraint is not. Thus, the history of ideasabout enforcement in international law is blended with this teaching of restraint on the use of force and the superiority oflaw to leadership. That second issue, the relationship of law to political power, is also integral to the issue of internationallaw’s reality as law. (Chap. 1, note 6)

Mary Ellen O’Connell, (Prof., Law, Notre Dame School of Law, THE POWER AND PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONALLAW, 2008, 14.

International law has deficits, yet it persists as the single, generally accepted means to solve the world’s problems. Itis not religion or ideology that the world has in common, but international law. Through international law, diverse culturescan reach consensus about the moral norms that we will commonly live by. As a result, international law is uniquelysuited to mitigate the problems of armed conflict, terrorism, human rights abuse, poverty, disease, and the destruction fothe natural environment. It is the closest thing we have to a neutral vehicle for taking on the world’s most complex issuesand pressing problems.

Mary Ellen O’Connell, (Prof., Law, Notre Dame School of Law, THE POWER AND PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONALLAW, 2008, 16.

Our acceptance of law is part of a tradition of belief in higher things. To this tradition we have added positivist andlegal process theory. We can now see the emergence of a new classical theory of international law that revives the bestof what has come before, adapted to the needs of the international community today. It is a theory that supports not thehegemony of a few, but the flourishing of all humanity. (end of an early chapter, note 63)

E. ILLEGAL RUSSIAN ACTIONS THREATEN WESTERN INTERESTS.

Edward Walker, (Prof., Political Science, U. California, Berkeley), STATES NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 1, 2014. RetrievedDec. 1, 2015 from Nexis.

And of course a hostile and lawless Russia can do great harm to Western interests globally, whether in Iran andSyria today or some other crisis in the future. In short, a permanently hostile and threatening Russia is not in anyone'sinterest, least of all Ukraine's. The immediate task for Western policymakers is to deescalate the crisis and applysanctions that deter further acts of aggression by Moscow. Washington, its European allies, and IMF should also providethe financial assistance that Ukraine needs to begin to address its dire economic problems as rapidly as possible. In thelonger run, however, the West will need to come up with a strategic response that makes war less likely and Russia lessable, or perhaps less willing, to destabilize its neighbors.

Zalmay Khalilzad, (Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations), INTERNATIONAL NEW YORK TIMES, Mar. 26,2014, 7.

Left undeterred, Russia would be emboldened to pursue absolute hegemony in the region at tremendous cost to theUnited Nations' credibility and ideals - not to mention the independence of countries along Russia's frontiers.

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CONTENTIONS:

I. RUSSIA VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL LAW BY ITS ACTIONS IN CRIMEA AND THE UKRAINE.

A. RUSSIA’S ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA WAS IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

Eric Engle, (Ukraine Specialist at the Fulbright Foundation), SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL, Fall 2014, 171.Russia's annexation of Crimea was simply illegal as a matter of international law: Russia's annexation was a violation

of its treaty obligation under its Treaty of Friendship to respect Ukraine's territorial integrity and under the universallyrecognized general principle of the territorial integrity of each State under customary international law. Russia's argumentthat the annexation was somehow an exercise of national self-determination is nonsense since there is no Crimeannation. Russian nationals living in Crimea who wished to live in Russia were in fact free to move to Russia, and were notfacing discrimination or human rights abuses, contrary to the claims of the Russian federation.


Russia’s seizure of Crimea, the first annexation of another European country’s territory since World War II, took theKremlin’s relations with the West into uncharted territory. For the West, what is at stake is the post-Cold War order inEurope, and the right of countries to choose their own foreign policy orientation.

Kristina Daugirdas, (Staff), AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Oct. 2014, 784.On March 21, 2014, the Russian Federation celebrated the addition to its territory of the "Republic of Crimea." The

United States, together with other states and international organizations, condemned that addition as an illegalannexation that followed Russia's use of force in contravention of international law.

B. RUSSIAN ACTIONS IN UKRAINE VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL LAW.

Eric Engle, (Ukraine Specialist at the Fulbright Foundation), SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL, Fall 2014, 171.Russia's illegal annexation is a violation of international law and of Ukrainian national law. Consequently, an isolation

of Russia through economic sanctions has already started.

Eric Engle, (Ukraine Specialist at the Fulbright Foundation), SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL, Fall 2014, 168.Russia always asserts that all its actions are consistent with international law, even when that obviously is not the

case. In Georgia, for example, Russia claims that its military intervention and creation of the barely recognized puppetstates of "Abkhazia" and "South Ossetia" were perfectly legal under international law despite the clear prohibition of theuse of force under the U.N. Charter. In the 2008 Georgia war, the U.N. Security Council did not authorize the use of force.Moreover, there was no issue of self-defense of Russian territory, and while Russia could argue its defense of Russianpeacekeepers was legal self-defense, the formation of the puppet states of "Abkhazia" and "South Ossetia" was clearly aviolation of international law as an injury to the territorial integrity of Georgia.

Kristina Daugirdas, (Staff), AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Oct. 2014, 791-792.On March 2, the leaders of the G-7--without Putin-- collectively issued a statement declaring Russia's military

campaign a "clear violation" of international law: “We, the leaders of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UnitedKingdom and the United States and the President of the European Council and President of the European Commission,join together today to condemn the Russian Federation's clear violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity ofUkraine, in contravention of Russia's obligations under the UN Charter and its 1997 basing agreement with Ukraine. Wecall on Russia to address any ongoing security or human rights concerns, that it has with Ukraine through directnegotiations, and/or via international observation or mediation under the auspices of the UN or the Organization forSecurity and Cooperation in Europe. We stand ready to assist with these efforts.”

C. RUSSIAN EXCUSES FOR VIOLATING UKRAINIAN SOVEREIGNTY ARE UNACCEPTABLE.

Samantha Power, (U.S. Ambassador to the UN), AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Oct. 2014, 794.Russian military action is not a human rights protection mission. It is a violation of international law and of the

sovereignty and territorial integrity of the independent nation of Ukraine and a breach of Russia's Helsinki commitmentsand its United Nations obligations. The central issue is whether the recent change of Government in Ukraine constitutes adanger to Russia's legitimate interests of such a nature and extent that Russia is justified in intervening militarily inUkraine, seizing control of public facilities and issuing military ultimatums to elements of the Ukrainian military. Theanswer of course is no. The Russian military are secure. The new Government in Kyiv has pledged to honour all of itsexisting international agreements, including those covering Russian bases. Russian mobilization is a response to animaginary threat.

Samantha Power, (U.S. Ambassador to the UN), AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Oct. 2014, 795.Mr. Putin says: Russia's actions fall within the scope of the 1997 Friendship Treaty between Ukraine and the Russian

Federation. The Facts: The 1997 [Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership Between Ukraine and the RussianFederation] requires Russia to respect Ukraine's territorial integrity. Russia's military actions in Ukraine, which have giventhem operational control of Crimea, are in clear violation of Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty.

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Samantha Power, (U.S. Ambassador to the UN), AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Oct. 2014, 796.Mr. Putin says: There is a humanitarian crisis and hundreds of thousands are fleeing Ukraine to Russia and seeking

asylum. The Facts: To date, there is absolutely no evidence of a humanitarian crisis. Nor is there evidence of a flood ofasylum-seekers fleeing Ukraine for Russia. International organizations on the ground have investigated by talking withUkrainian border guards, who also refuted these claims. Independent journalists observing the border have also reportedno such flood of refugees.

Samantha Power, (U.S. Ambassador to the UN), AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Oct. 2014, 796.Mr. Putin says: Ethnic Russians are under threat. The Facts: Outside of Russian press and Russian state television,

there are no credible reports of any ethnic Russians being under threat. The new Ukrainian government placed a priorityon peace and reconciliation from the outset. President Oleksandr Turchynov refused to sign legislation limiting the use ofthe Russian language at [the] regional level. Ethnic Russians and Russian speakers have filed petitions attesting thattheir communities have not experienced threats. Furthermore, since the new government was established, calm hasreturned to Kyiv. There has been no surge in crime, no looting, and no retribution against political opponents.

Samantha Power, (U.S. Ambassador to the UN), AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Oct. 2014, 814.For the past six months, Russia has seized Ukrainian territory and ignored the repeated requests of the international

community to de-escalate--all in an effort to preserve influence in Ukraine, a country that has long made clear its desire tomaintain constructive ties with Moscow.

Eric Engle, (Ukraine Specialist at the Fulbright Foundation), SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL, Fall 2014, 100.Russia presents a real risk to the global rule of law due to domestic corruption and international lawlessness, as

most recently seen in Ukraine in Donetsk and Crimea, but also in Georgia and the various "frozen" conflicts in otherformer Soviet Republics (Moldova, Azerbaijan, and Armenia).

II. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE TO RUSSIAN VIOLATIONS OF

INTERNATIONAL LAW.

A. SANCTIONS ARE NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN PEACE IN EUROPE.


In conclusion, Russia's aggressive actions in Ukraine are a threat to the bipartisan objective of American policy sincethe end of the Cold War of seeking a Europe whole, free and at peace. The United States will continue to work closelywith our Ukrainian and European partners to counter these actions and provide reassurances for -- to our partners andNATO allies.

B. WESTERN NATIONS MUST SEND A SIGNAL THAT RUSSIAN ACTIONS ARE UNACCEPTABLE.

U.S. Department of State, UKRAINE AND RUSSIA SANCTIONS, 2015. Retrieved Dec. 2, 2015 fromhttp://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/ukrainerussia/.

These actions, in close coordination with our EU and international partners, send a strong message to the Russiangovernment that there are consequences for their actions that threaten the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.The United States, together with international partners, will continue to stand by the Ukrainian government until Russiaabides by its international obligations. The United States is prepared to take additional steps to impose further politicaland economic costs. A secure Ukraine, integrated with Europe and enjoying good relations with all its neighbors, is in theinterests of the United States, Europe, and Russia.


Crimea must not be forgotten. There may be a political consensus in Russia, uniting the authorities and theopposition, that it is now Russian territory; but the West cannot acquiesce in such a grave breach of international law. Itmust maintain measures to isolate Crimea and to sanction those Russians primarily responsible for its annexation. Itshould support Ukraine in any legal efforts to overturn the annexation or to seek redress for the theft of property. And itshould keep an international spotlight on Russia’s efforts to suppress the rights of Crimean Tatars and other minorities inCrimea


But it would be a terrible mistake, with global implications, for Western leaders to go back to business as usual withRussia, following a forced change of borders and the annexation of the territory of a sovereign state. If they do not want torespond with military force, then economic and political measures to constrain and deter Russia are the only alternative.The West must hope that that eventually a Russian leader will appear who thinks that Russia is stronger when itsneighbours are its friends than when they are its subjects. Meanwhile, the Kremlin must know that destabilising EasternEurope will carry a high cost for Russia.

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Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, members of this committee, America's investment in Ukraine is about far morethan protecting the choice of a single European country. It's about protecting the rules-based system across Europe andglobally. It's about saying no to borders changed by force, to big countries intimidating their neighbors or demanding asphere of influence.

III. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE PROPERLY PUNISHING RUSSIA FOR ITS ILLEGAL ACTIONS.

A. SANCTIONS ARE IMPACTING THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY.

Dan Steinbock, (Research Director of International Business at India China and America Institute), EURASIA REVIEW,Aug. 24, 2015. Retrieved Dec. 1, 2015 from Nexis.

After months of sanctions, Russian economy contracted by 3.5 percent last year. During the ongoing year, anothercontraction of up to 3-3.4 percent is likely. Currently, the most promising scenario is that Moscow would return to weak(less than 0.5%) growth in 2016. The ruble has fallen to about 67 against the dollar but 77 against the euro, which matterseven more, due to the close economic relations between Brussels and Moscow.

Eric Engle, (Ukraine Specialist at the Fulbright Foundation), SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL, Fall 2014, 125.The Russian economy performs sub-optimally due to a lack of foreign investment and now outright sanctions. Since

Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea, the Russian stock market has fallen drastically as foreigners have furtherdisinvested.

Timothy Homan, (Staff, Fiscal Times), ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE WOUNDING RUSSIA’S ECONOMY, Apr. 27,2014. Retrieved Dec. 2, 2015 from http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2014/04/27/Economic-Sanctions-Are-Wounding-Russia-s-Economy.

President Vladimir Putin may be making territorial gains in Ukraine, but they’re coming at the cost of economic lossesto Mother Russia. White House officials today said sanctions imposed last month are already wounding the Russianfinancial system, and that further military action from Putin will hurt his standing not just abroad but at home aswell. “Crimea is already becoming a dead weight on Russia,” Tony Blinken, deputy national security adviser to PresidentBarack Obama, said on CNN’s “State of the Union” program. “They are spending billions and billions of dollars to prop upCrimea.”

B. ORDINARY RUSSIANS ARE NOW PAYING THE PRICE FOR PUTIN’S ACTIONS.

Michael Birnbaum, (Moscow Bureau Chief, Washington Post), WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 27, 2015. Retrieved Dec. 2,2015 from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/a-year-into-a-conflict-with-russia-are-sanctions-working/2015/03/26/45ec04b2-c73c-11e4-bea5-b893e7ac3fb3_story.html.

The Russian economy is now expected to contract up to 6 percent this year, fueled by the dropping price of oil. Theruble has lost nearly half its value since the beginning of 2014, although it has strengthened in recent days. By someestimates, almost a third of Moscow restaurants will close by the end of this month, leaving storefronts empty across thecity. Ordinary Russians are also feeling the pain. Julia Lebedeva, 46, said her refrigerator has slowly gotten emptier inrecent months. Her pay as a customs broker was cut by a third even as prices have spiked.


I think, you know, we have yet to see what the political impacts will be but we clearly can see from some of thestatistics that Russian kitchen tables are being hit now by these policy choices that the Kremlin are making. When youhear Assistant Secretary Toloui talk about inflation at 15 percent to 17 percent, when we have statistics of skyrocketingfood prices across the Russian space, 20 percent to 40 percent in some places, when we know that average Russiansare having difficulty paying for loans for apartments, for cars, when we see imports way down, it is affecting lifestyles.Now that simply goes to the point that the Kremlin has prioritized their international adventure over the quality of the lifefor their own people and at what point that has an a political effect, I think we've yet to see.

C. SANCTIONS HAVE REMOVED THE BUFFERS THAT THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY NORMALLY RELIES ON.

Robert Kahn, (Staff), NPR MORNING EDITION, Dec. 31, 2014. Retrieved Dec. 2, 2015 from Nexis.The normal buffers that an economy like Russia has to respond to an oil price shock aren't there. Borrowing abroad

to smooth what might be a temporary shock can't do it. Expanding trade to offset the loss of oil revenue really is quitelimited in the current environment.

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D. SANCTIONS HAVE ISOLATED RUSSIA FROM THE FAMILY OF NATIONS.

Samantha Power, (U.S. Ambassador to the UN), AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Oct. 2014, 807-808.

On April 28, in response to Russia's "continued destabilizing, provocative, and dangerous actions in the Ukraine," theU.S. Department of the Treasury followed up on the G-7 statement by imposing additional "targeted sanctions" on "sevenRussia government officials and 17 entities." "[W]e've already seen that these sanctions and the isolation of Russia hashad an impact, a substantial impact on the Russian economy," a senior U.S. administration official said. "We believe thatwith these additional steps, the impact on the Russian economy will only grow, just as Russia's political isolation isgrowing because of its actions in violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity."

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CON CASE #1: SANCTIONS INCREASE PUTIN’S POWER

The thesis of this case is that economic sanctions are counterproductive, meaning they actually undermine Westerninterests by increasing the power base for Vladimir Putin and making it more likely that he will pursue an aggressiveforeign policy.

CONTENTION:

I. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE – MORE LIKELY UNDERMINING THAN ADVANCING

WESTERN INTERESTS.

A. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS HAVE INCREASED THE POLITICAL POWER OF VLADIMIR PUTIN.

Richard Connally, (Prof., Political Economy, U. Birmingham), WESTERN ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND RUSSIA’SPLACE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, May 7, 2015. Retrieved Dec. 2, 2015 from http://www.e-ir.info/2015/05/07/western-economic-sanctions-and-russias-place-in-the-global-economy/.

Sanctions may thus serve to entrench the current system of governance rather than weaken elite support for Putin.This could happen because sanctions have specific distributional effects in oligarchic societies like Russia, and can serveto bolster the state and enrich politically important individuals and organizations. The leadership may use the opportunitypresented by the deterioration in relations with the West to transfer economic resources to key political allies.

Andrei Kolesnikov, (Chair, Political Institutions Program, Carnegie Moscow Center), JAPAN TIMES, Apr. 1, 2015.Retrieved Dec. 2, 2015 from http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2015/04/01/commentary/world-commentary/economic-sanctions-russia-dont-work/#.Vl-JRMqNf-k.

Meanwhile, the thinking goes, military pressure — in the form of potential lethal aid to Ukraine — will similarlymobilize ordinary Russians against Putin. Unwilling to see their boys die for the Donbas, they will form an anti-warmovement that will force him to rein in his territorial ambitions. Pressed at once from above and from below, the Kremlinwill be have to change its policies, and perhaps even begin to democratize. What Western policymakers fail tounderstand is that such an approach is less likely to undermine the regime than to cause Russians to close ranks behindit. Opinion polls show that Russians perceive Western pressure and sanctions to be aimed not at Putin and his cronies,but at Russia and its citizens. In January, 69 percent of Russians supported the Kremlin’s policy in Ukraine, according toa poll by the independent Levada Center.


It is in this context that Putin has been able to use Western pressure as a tool to regain the support of manyRussians, who only a few years ago would have felt detached from, if not alienated by, his government. Presented with areal or imagined threat to the fatherland, the average Russian supports the country’s leaders. Nor is the Russian middleclass, which makes up some 20 to 30 percent of the population, likely to pose much of a threat to Putin. With many of itsmembers owing their recent wealth to high oil prices and the economic recovery of the 2000s, loyalty to the Putin regimeis one of the Russian middle class’s abiding characteristics. Russian opinion polling and sociological research tends toshow that the higher one’s position in society, the more likely one is to vote for the incumbents. The motives behind suchvoting patterns may vary — some voters made a fortune during the economic recovery, while others are simply satisfiedwith the status quo. But the bottom line is that such voters demonstrate a fundamental loyalty to the state and the regime.

B. AFTER SANCTIONS, PUTIN’S POPULARITY IS AT AN ALL-TIME HIGH.


After all, in the US, the approval of the Obama administration and the Congress is about 40% and 15%, respectively,according to public polls and Gallup. In other words, president Obama's support in the US is barely half of that of Putin'sin Russia. Even worse, the support of the parliament in Russia is three times higher than that of Congress in the US. Yet,the West continues to rely on the idea that "Putin is the problem, Russia is with us." In reality, Putin's actions reflect thewishes of the Russian people, including the moderate majority and the emerging middle classes. Before the global crisis,the latter accounted for almost fifth of the population; today, only a half or a third of that. Months of sanctions havehardened sentiments across-the board and on all sides. In Russia, moderate centrists have turned into assertivenationalists and informed social-democrats into passionate communists.


Both Western and Russian opponents of sanctions argue that the measures have consolidated support for Putin:First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov said at the World Economic Forum in Davos that Russians would never give uptheir leader: “We will tighten our belt, eat less food, suffer any privations”. Putin’s sky-high approval ratings, which soaredto 86 per cent following the annexation of Crimea, buttress his argument. Western leaders must face the uncomfortablefact that for now sanctions are failing to shake Vladimir Putin’s position in the Kremlin.

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When it comes to inflicting economic pain on Russia, the Kremlin may be doing a better job than Western sanctions.Just don’t tell that to the Russian people, who overwhelmingly blame the West for a deepening recession that has parts ofcentral Moscow starting to look like a ghost town. Prices are soaring. The ruble is dropping. And Russian living standardsare falling a year after the annexation of Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula. Many economists say that problems would haveerupted even if there were no sanctions. But the wave of Western penalties against the Russian economy hasinadvertently given the Kremlin political cover with its own people, analysts say.

C. NONE OF THE ANNOUNCED GOALS OF THE SANCTIONS REGIME HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED.

Oleg Ivanov, (Chair, Political Science Department, Diplomatic Academy in Moscow), GLOBAL TIMES, Jan. 19, 2015.Retrieved Dec. 1, 2015 from Nexis.

Today Russia is going through hard times to a great extent because of the sanctions imposed by the West. What isthe purpose of the Western policy and what consequences will it have for Russia? The Western policy has a short-termand a long-term goal. The short-term goal is to make current Russian foreign policy so costly that the government willhave to change its course and make it more amenable to Western interests and aims. In this case President VladimirPutin will stay in office. The long-term goal is to split Russian society. On the one hand, it is aimed at breaking bondsbetween the government and the people, and on the other hand, to drive a wedge between the government and topRussian businessmen. In the first case, Western leaders hope that the declining living standards of the majority of thepopulation will cause discontent among the public at large and will make people take to the streets without waiting for thegeneral elections of 2018. This sort of scenario will play into the hands of opposition parties and groups in Russia. Thedesire of Western leaders is either to inflict damage on Russian businesses at best or to make business as usual justimpossible at worst. The rationale behind such steps is to put pressure on the Russian leadership, not making it changeits policies but by replacing the leadership thus repeating the Ukrainian scenario. Will these plots work? I tend to believethat they will not work in the way they are designed in the West for a number of reasons. First, public support for Putin isas high as about 80 percent. President Barack Obama, with his rating of about 40 percent, can only envy his Russiancounterpart's popularity. The majority of the Russian people view Western sanctions as a price must be paid for Russia'sindependent policy.

Peter Feaver, (Prof., Political Science, Duke U.), NATIONAL INTEREST, Aug. 2015. Retrieved Dec. 1, 2015 from Nexis.Second, the political effects of these sophisticated sanctions are also difficult to predict. In the Russian case, U.S.

policy makers developed the sanctions in order to target Vladimir Putin's inner circle. If his henchmen were hurt, it wasbelieved, they would pressure the Russian president to adopt a different course in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. And whilethe sanctions have damaged the economic interests of these individuals, the result has been the opposite of what policymakers intended. Instead of pulling out of Crimea and ceasing Russian support for the rebel forces in Ukraine, Putinrequisitioned property of more liberal oligarchs and consolidated the position of hard-liners within the political, military andeconomic sectors. For example, in late 2014, Russian authorities seized Russian businessman Vladimir Yevtushenkov'soil company, Bashneft, and effectively nationalized the company in what was seen as an attempt to secure resources forthe Russian government and to reallocate the company to Putin's allies. Likewise, Putin has reportedly sidelined eventhose conservative oligarchs who have supported him thus far during the crisis in favor of relying on the advice of a smallgroup of military and security officials. These officials have further encouraged Russian support of separatists in easternUkraine and a generally confrontational approach to the United States and the European Union. In effect, the sanctionsmay have made it more difficult for the United States to achieve its goals in the conflict; by isolating Putin and damagingthe Russian economy, the sanctions have caused Putin to consolidate his power and limit his inner circle to thoseadvisers who advocate policies at odds with U.S. interests.

Richard Werner, (Prof., International Banking, Southampton U.), ARE SANCTIONS SAVING RUSSIA?, Oct. 13, 2015.Retrieved Dec. 2, 2015 from https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/are-sanctions-helping-russia-by-richard-a--werner-and-vladimir-i--yakunin-2015-10.

The economic sanctions imposed on Russia by the West in March 2014 have undoubtedly been painful. But theyhave so far failed to achieve the goal of weakening Russian President Vladimir Putin’s position. In fact, they may have theopposite effect, leaving Russia – and its president – even stronger than before.

D. RUSSIAN DEFENSE SPENDING IS INCREASING.


Output in the defence industry rose in 2014, despite sanctions, due to growing demand from abroad (in 2014, Russiawas the world’s second largest exporter of armaments) and from at home (i.e. due to the rise in procurement that wasplanned as part of the State Armaments Programme to 2020. Although Russia had some important defence ties withsome Western countries, the vast majority of its exports go to countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Consequently,such sanctions should only have an impact over a longer period if military-use technology transfers from the West toRussia are suppressed, and if this then results in a degradation of the Russian armaments industry.

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E. PUTIN IS MORE LIKELY TO BE AGGRESSIVE AS A RESULT OF THE SANCTIONS.

Peter Feaver, (Prof., Political Science, Duke U.), NATIONAL INTEREST, Aug. 2015. Retrieved Dec. 1, 2015 from Nexis.In the case of Russia, for example, Putin has used the economic impact of the sanctions to diminish the influence of

political and economic elites who oppose many of his policies. The result may be that Russia becomes moreauthoritarian--and less likely to act in ways that further Western interests.


The Western approach to Russia is predicated on the supposition that continued pressure on the country will causePresident Vladimir Putin’s regime to make concessions or even crumble. Nothing could be further from the truth.

Benjamin Jensen, (Prof., American University of International Service), USNEWS.COM, Feb. 6, 2015. Retrieved Dec. 2,2015 from Nexis.

Prospect theory, a behavioral economic model explaining how people deal with risk, shows that when facingeconomic loses leaders like Putin will make increasingly risky bets. They act like gamblers trying to win back their losses.With respect to Russia, waiting for economic sanctions to work may serve to embolden further aggression, rather thandeter it. The fact that Putin uses nationalism to limit the impact of the current sanctions on his popularity only deepens thisdilemma. Russia can go broke and still escalate the crisis by threatening the Baltic States or pulling out of theIntermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty.

Edward Royce, (Chair, House Committee on Foreign Affairs), UKRAINE UNDER SIEGE, House Hearing, Mar. 4, 2015,2.

To date, the actions taken by the U.S. and our EU allies, including economic sanctions and aid and diplomaticisolation, have not checked Putin. Indeed over the past year he has become bolder, even menacing NATO countries ashe seeks to divide the alliance.

Edward Walker, (Prof., Political Science, U. California, Berkeley), STATES NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 1, 2014. RetrievedDec. 1, 2015 from Nexis.

If Putin is backed into a corner politically, or if he feels Russia's national security interests are sufficiently threatened,he may well decide to invade eastern Ukraine. If that happens, Latvia and Estonia will be at great risk -- both of these verysmall NATO countries share a border with Russia, have significant Russian-speaking populations, have tense relationswith Moscow, and are virtually defenseless against a Russian ground invasion.


Politically, U.S. and European economic sanctions did not prevent Russia from annexing Crimea. Nor did theyimpede its intervention in eastern Ukraine. As one newspaper put it, "Sanctions have hurt the Russian economy, but theyhave had no discernible effect on Mr. Putin's military strategy." Instead, Putin has mounted counter-sanctions against theWest, banning its food exports to Russia. Clearly economic sanctions can be a double-edged sword. Policymakersshould recognize that some sanctions can backfire and others can even turn out to be counterproductive to their intendedgoals.


A year after the annexation, the West has been able to do little to alter President Vladimir Putin’s battlefield calculus.Russia is still fueling a bloody conflict in eastern Ukraine that has cost more than 6,000 lives, U.S. officials say. Putindenies involvement in Ukraine, and he shows little sign of backing down. His popularity at home is sky high even as hisnation’s economy is in turmoil.

F. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS MAY RE-START THE COLD WAR.


The more complex question is whether Russia's new contraction is even desirable; even to those Western intereststhat support sanctions. This presumes that the purpose of the Western sanctions is to use sticks and carrots to limitMoscow policy directions in ways that serve Western interests and those of Russian people. In contrast, some critics ofthe sanctions argue that the ultimate objective is not to encourage pro-market policies in Russia but to clip Russia'seconomic future. These skeptics include Stephen F. Cohen, a leading Russia expert who warned already in 2006 that"US-Russian relations had deteriorated so badly they should now be understood as a new Cold War - or possibly as acontinuation of the old one." Today, most economic and geopolitical evidence points toward the decreasing probability ofdÈtente and increasing likelihood of a new Cold War.

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G. ATTEMPTS TO ISOLATE RUSSIA INCREASE THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR.

Samuel Charap, (Sr. Fellow, International Institute for Strategic Studies), CONSEQUENCES OF A NEW COLD WAR,Mar. 25, 2015. Retrieved Dec. 2, 2015 from https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/survival/sections/2015-1e95/survival--global-politics-and-strategy-april-may-2015-96a3/57-2-04-charap-and-shapiro-cm-8ce2.

Gratuitously seeking confrontation with Russia could lead to Armageddon, after all. More to the point, the US needsRussian cooperation on any number of global priorities: particularly Iran’s nuclear programme, but also the Syrian civilwar, the Middle East peace process, the stability of Afghanistan and counter-terrorism. As long as Russia is willing to playball on those issues, the US has every reason to continue to do so as well.

Jim Zarroli, (Staff), NPR MORNING EDITION, Dec. 31, 2014. Retrieved Dec. 2, 2015 from Nexis.Meanwhile, some in Congress have called for ratcheting up sanctions against Moscow, but [Professor Sergei]

Guriev, who fled his homeland for political reasons, warns against pushing Russia too far. A country with nuclearweapons is now facing what he says is nothing less than an existential crisis and cornering its government, can onlymake the world a less stable place.


Washington cannot afford to underestimate Russia's strategic power and its popular unity. Russia remains the thirdbiggest military spender in the world, right after the US and China. In the US, military expenditure fell by 7 percent lastyear, whereas in Russia the figure increased by 8 percent. While Putin remains committed to upgrade the Russianmilitary at the cost of $600 billion through 2020, the US-EU sanctions have fostered support to these objectives amongRussian people. Most importantly, Russia is a nuclear superpower. While the US has an estimated 2080 deployedwarheads, Russia's corresponding figure is 1780 and the number of total warheads is actually greater in Russia (7,500)than in the US.

Dmitri Simes, (CEO, Center for the National Interest), THE PERILS OF A NEW COLD WAR, Oct. 21, 2015. RetrievedDec. 2, 2015 from http://www.cfr.org/russian-federation/perils-new-cold-war/p37132.

Sanctions clearly do work in terms of damaging the Russian economy. It’s difficult to say how much because thereare a lot of other factors involved, starting with Russia’s own economic mismanagement, pervasive corruption, and, ofcourse, low oil prices. But there is no question that sanctions have some negative impact on the Russian economy. Sowe are doing damage to the Russian economy and some damage to the Russian geopolitical standing. If it is ourambition to punish Russia, we are succeeding to some extent. If our objective, on the other hand, is to shift the Russianbehavior in a desirable direction, to make Russia more moderate, more cooperative, then what we are witnessing so far isquite counterproductive. We see that Putin is making very assertive—some say aggressive—moves in Syria, and thathe’s making it clear that he’s prepared to act as a global spoiler. And my concern is when you have a situation involvinggreat powers, tremendous nuclear arsenals, and groups with agendas of their own that would not mind exploiting thisconfrontation, you have a very dangerous mix.


The dilemma that may face the West at some point is whether the Russian economy is in such a bad state that itrisks a collapse on the scale of the Soviet economy in the late 1980s (also a time of low oil prices and high defenceexpenditure). Political leaders will be susceptible to arguments that Russia is ‘too big (and dangerous) to fail’, and that theworld cannot afford a failed state with nuclear weapons.

Jeremy Shapiro, (Fellow, Brookings Institution), REALLY, ACTUALLY AVOIDING A NEW COLD WAR, Oct. 20, 2015.Retrieved Dec. 2, 2015 from http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/10/20-really-avoiding-new-cold-war-shapiro-charap.

Elsewhere we have described the specific consequences of this new confrontation and they are not small: instabilityand tensions throughout Eastern Europe; paralysis of multilateral diplomacy; and outright Russian spoiling of U.S. effortsto address global challenges (e.g., in Syria). A new Cold War would also dramatically raise the risk of thermonuclearannihilation, which however unlikely is a very bad outcome indeed. If our society has, in its post-Cold War comfort,forgotten this possibility and the sense of terror this threat conveyed on a daily basis, that is all to the good. But weremember that we lived under this threat as children, and it is not something we want for our children.

H. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE FUELING ANTI-WESTERN SENTIMENTS AMONG THE RUSSIAN

PEOPLE.


Some opposition leaders say mounting economic woes will eventually turn Russians against Putin. But so far, themain anger the sanctions seem to have fueled here is anti-Americanism, which is reaching heights not seen since Stalin,some observers say.

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CON CASE #2: FREE ENTERPRISE IN RUSSIA

The thesis of this case is that the economic sanctions are hurting Russia, but this undermines Western interests bypushing Russia to China and Iran.

OBSERVATION:

I. RUSSIA’S STRENGTHENING OF ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA AND IRAN UNDERMINE WESTERN

INTERESTS.

A. STRONGER RUSSIA-CHINA TIES UNDERMINE WESTERN INTERESTS.

Jeremiah Jacques, (Staff, The Trumpet), THE RUSSIA-CHINA AXIS IS HERE, Jan. 2015. Retrieved Dec. 5, 2015 fromhttps://www.thetrumpet.com/article/12244.24.170.0/asia/china/the-russia-china-axis-is-here?preview.

The Russia-China axis is no longer merely a forecast. It is here, and it is changing the world. The world now facesthe most serious crisis since World War ii, and it is thanks in part to America’s broken will and mismanaged power. Intheir book, Schoen and Kaylan argue that “only a rebirth of American global leadership can counter the corrosive impactof this anti-democratic alliance, which may soon threaten the peace and security of the world.”

Polina Tikhonova, (Journalist specializing in Russian affairs), RUSSIA, CHINA THREATEN GLOBAL ORDER, Nov. 10,2015. Retrieved Dec. 5, 2015 from http://www.valuewalk.com/2015/11/russia-china-threaten-global-order/.

Dr. Paul Craig Roberts, the former U.S. assistant secretary of the Treasury for economic policy, warned that Russiaand China will never accept U.S. hegemony, which will likely bring more conflicts and confrontations between the twosides, including a nuclear war.

B. STRONGER RUSSIA-IRAN TIES UNDERMINE WESTERN INTERESTS.

Iran News Update, PUTIN’S TEHRAN VISIT STRENGTHENS IMAGE OF IRAN-RUSSIA COOPERATION, Nov. 24,2015. Retrieved Dec. 5, 2015 from http://irannewsupdate.com/news/middle-east/2455-putin-s-tehran-visit-strengthens-image-of-iran-russia-collaboration.html.

On the other hand, if the alliance continues to grow stronger, there is considerable danger that it will not be limited tointeractions between Iran and Russia. Iran News Update has repeatedly called attention to analysis and concernregarding the possible emergence of an Asian bloc consisting of these two nations as well as China and other, smallerpartners, all of which could challenge Western interests across the globe while undermining the dominance of UScurrency.

CONTENTION:

I. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS HAVE PUSHED RUSSIA TO A CLOSER ALLIANCE WITH CHINA.

A. RUSSIA IS TURNING TO CHINA FOR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.

Birgit Hansl, (Lead Economist, World Bank), RUSSIA ECONOMIC REPORT, Apr. 2015, iv.The impact of sanctions is likely to linger for a long time. As lessons from international experience demonstrate,

sanctions could well alter the structure of the Russian economy and the ways in which Russia integrates with the rest ofthe world. Early glimpses of changes in the Russian economy are already visible, notably a shift in orientation away fromEurope and the West and efforts at closer integration with East Asia, Latin America, and former Soviet Union republics.


The sanctions against Russia are working; but not for Russia, Ukraine, the EU, or even the US. In the Secondquarter, Russia's GDP contracted 4.6 percent from a year earlier, following a 2.2 percent contraction in the First quarter.A severe contraction was expected after the selloff in oil, currency crisis and the consequent plunge of consumerdemand. But the plunge was worse than anticipated and most since 2009. As Moscow has struggled to speed up thediversification of its industrial structure and to defuse the repercussions of the plunging energy prices, it has also soughtto shift its economic relationships from the transatlantic axis to the East. Nevertheless, in the past 12 months, the rublehas depreciated over 43 percent against the dollar. In Washington, the consensus is that "the sanctions are working."However, the question is, for whom?

Elina Kyselchuk, (Legal Counsel, Ukrainian Business Centre, London), THE SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA, Aug. 2015, 10.This may create a potential threat to the West if Russia continues to develop its alliance with the BRICS, and China

in particular. If BRICS countries continue to replace Western exports to Russia, which are banned - albeit at higher costsfor Russian consumers - sanctions will be less effective. On the other hand, it is possible that China is using Russia’spolitical need of support as well as Russia’s willingness to find a new trading partner as an alternative to the West. In May2014, during a meeting between Vladimir Putin and the Chinese president Xi Jinping, Russia had agreed on a number oftrade and energy matters which were previously discussed for many years, on terms that are far more favourable toChina.

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The final element of Russia’s reaction to Western economic statecraft is its stated aim of intensifying its economicand political relations with Asia, especially China. Even before the Ukraine crisis, Putin, apparently taking a leaf out of USPresident Barack Obama’s book, announced a new ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy, in the hope that Russia will be able toleverage the perceived economic dynamism of countries like China and South Korea to its advantage. Many within theRussian elite feel that Asia, and especially China, is a more dynamic economic region than the West, and one that comeswith less political baggage.

B. CHINA HAS DEMONSTRATED ITS WILLINGNESS TO HELP RUSSIA MANAGE THE IMPACT OF THE

SANCTIONS.

Elina Kyselchuk, (Legal Counsel, Ukrainian Business Centre, London), THE SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA, Aug. 2015, 9.In the geopolitical sense, sanctions led to a noticeable shift in the Russian economy orientation from the West to the

BRICS countries and former Soviet Union republics. Shortly after the second round of sanctions, Russia signed avaluable natural gas agreement with China worth $400 billion, in order to lessen its economic dependence on the EU.20As a result of this agreement, Russia will, from 2018, have an alternative market in China for its natural gas. Russia hasalso received a political support from the Chinese vice premier, Wang Yang, who expressly stated on 11 October thatChina “strongly opposes” sanctions against Russia.


Russia still has a number of avenues open to it, not to mention a wealthy neighbor, China, whose foreign ministerrecently said that his country was willing to help Russia if it needed it.

C. PUSHING RUSSIA TO A CLOSER ALLIANCE WITH CHINA UNDERMINES WESTERN INTERESTS.

Business Monitor International, BMI TRANSPORT REPORT, Jan. 1, 2015. Retrieved Dec. 1, 2015 from Nexis.If the US prioritizes the “Russia threat,” then the costs will be very high. Chief among these would be a new

diplomatic coldness in Europe, which would make Moscow more likely to challenge Western interests in future. Therewould also be a likelihood that the US (and possibly EU) would end up driving Russia into a closer alliance with China. Amore cooperative relationship between Moscow and Beijing could significantly frustrate Washington's interests in Centraland East Asia. Meanwhile, US alienation of Russia could break the unity of great powers pressuring Iran to curtail itsnuclear programme. Thus, one of Barack Obama's boldest gambits so far -- the attempted rapprochement with Iran --could be jeopardised, as Moscow and Tehran would find their anti-American views more closely aligned.

II. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE PUSHING RUSSIA TO A CLOSER ALLIANCE WITH IRAN.

A. RUSSIA IS SELLING SENSITIVE MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO IRAN IN ORDER TO BOLSTER ITS OWN

ECONOMY.

M.K. Bhadrakumar, (Staff), FINANCIAL DAILY, Apr. 23, 2015. Retrieved Dec. 1, 2015 from Nexis.To cap it all, President Vladimir Putin cleared the deal for the S-300 missile defence system for Iran. Evidently,

Russia hopes to establish a key presence in Iran in the energy and military sphere. But the strategic dimension will bethat Russia is encouraging Iran to preserve its independent foreign policies and "strategic autonomy" and is challengingthe West's aspirations to transform Iran into a citadel of western interests in a pale image of what it used to be till the 1979Islamic Revolution rewrote regional politics and current history in that region.

Moscow Times, BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Aug. 21, 2014. Retrieved Dec. 1, 2015 from Nexis.But Russia has never been fully on board with the move to isolate Iran, and Moscow has already warned the West

that it could play the "Iran card". Speaking in March about Western sanctions after a P5+1 meeting in Geneva, DeputyForeign Minister Sergey Ryabkov said: "We wouldn't like to use these talks as an element of the game of raising thestakes ... but if they force us into that, we will take retaliatory measures here as well."

Moscow Times, BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Aug. 21, 2014. Retrieved Dec. 1, 2015 from Nexis.The Iranians are well aware that the Ukraine crisis could strengthen Iran's negotiating position. Hossein Mousavian,

a former spokesman for Iran's nuclear negotiators, recently wrote: "Logic follows that Russia will play Iran's nuclear card[against the West]. Great economic rewards may also result from Russia cultivating closer relations with Iran." Moscowhas now taken concrete steps to play Mousavian's "nuclear card", signing a memorandum of understanding with Tehranto implement a 20bn-dollar "oil for goods" accord. While the details of the memorandum are still vague, previous reportsnoted that Iran would supply Russia up to 500,000 barrels a day of Iranian oil, and in exchange Iran would import Russianpower and pump equipment, steel products such as pipes, machinery for its leather and textile industries, wood, wheat,pulses, oilseeds and meat.

Zalmay Khalilzad, (Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations), INTERNATIONAL NEW YORK TIMES, Mar. 26,2014, 7.

Russia's deputy foreign minister, Sergei Ryabkov, has warned that Moscow might ''raise the stakes'' on Iran sincethe ''historic importance'' of the Crimea situation is ''incomparable'' to the nuclear issue. Russia could, for example, defendIran in the Security Council or even complicate Western military planning by offering enhanced air defense or othercapabilities to Iran in violation of United Nations sanctions.

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B. CLOSER RUSSIAN TIES TO IRAN UNDERMINE WESTERN INTERESTS.

Moscow Times, BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Aug. 21, 2014. Retrieved Dec. 1, 2015 from Nexis.But perhaps the most damaging step Putin could take against Western interests would be to undermine the P5+1

[the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany] negotiations aimed at limiting Iran'snuclear programme.

Moscow Times, BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Aug. 21, 2014. Retrieved Dec. 1, 2015 from Nexis.The oil-for-goods deal is not the only way Russia could undermine Western interests in Iran. Russia and Iran have

had ongoing discussions about the construction of additional nuclear reactors for Iran by Rosatom, the Russian stateenergy company. This pact strengthens Iran's case against the West that it should be permitted to enrich more uraniumon its own soil, as the construction of additional reactors would increase the amount of fuel Iran needs.

III. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE PUSHING RUSSIA TO ABANDON A FREE ENTERPRISE ECONOMY.


The Ukraine crisis and the imposition of economic sanctions by Western powers and their allies have the potential tocause a radical shift in economic policy in Russia, with important implications for Russia’s future place in the globaleconomy. This is because Western economic sanctions and Russia’s response to those sanctions have set Russia on acourse towards greater isolation from the Western parts of the global economy, and towards greater state control ofeconomic activity at home.


As should now be clear, Western economic sanctions are moving Russia away from a model of economicdevelopment approximating the Western model, i.e. based on the primacy of the market and openness to the globaleconomy, or at least the Western-dominated parts of the global economy. In its place, policy-makers are slowlyconstructing a system that eschews market-based solutions to economic development problems, and which favoursselective integration with the global economy, with a preference for other state-driven political economies. The leadershipin Russia is, in line with many previous Russian governments throughout history, using the presence of an external threatto justify centralisation of the model of political economy at home. This model is beginning to take shape, and involves thesuppression of economic competition, state control over the ‘commanding heights’ of the economy, especially finance,energy, and defence, and the deterioration of the business environment for the market-based portions of the Russianeconomy. In short, such a model threatens to roll back many of the more positive elements of Russian economictransformation that have taken place since 1991.


Furthermore, Russia’s leadership has accelerated cooperation with the other BRICS economies (Brazil, India, China,and South Africa), and Putin recently announced ambitious plans to boost domestic demand. The West’s sanctionsagainst Russia may not only fail to change the Ukraine situation; they may well spur the country’s long-awaited structuraltransformation. If Russia successfully replicates the credit-guidance regime used by East Asia’s economies, whileincreasing managerial efficiency, yet another economic miracle is possible.

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CON CASE #3: WE NEED RUSSIA’S HELP IN SYRIA

The thesis of this case is that economic sanctions undermine Western interests by undermining cooperation in thefight against ISIS. Economic sanctions unnecessarily force Russia into the role as an enemy of the U.S. and risk doingmuch more harm than good.

OBSERVATION:

I. MANAGING THE THREAT FROM ISIS IS VITAL TO WESTERN INTERESTS.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE, Sept. 3, 2015. Retrieved Dec. 4, 2015 from http://geopame.com/the-islamic-state-and-the-redistribution-of-power-in-the-middle-east/.

In other words, it [ISIS] committed to spread its supranational ideology at any cost to the regional system of theMiddle East or the international system elsewhere. This disregard for international order is causing deepening strategicinstability in the volatile Middle East region. Consequently, the West not only encounters a formidable threat to the MiddleEast state system, but also to Western interests all over the world.

Betsy Hiel, (Staff), PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE REVIEW, Feb. 8, 2015. Retrieved Mar. 1, 2015 from Nexis.ISIS controls an area about the size of Belgium, despite recent defeats and a U.S.-led coalition’s bombing campaign.

Other terrorist or Islamist groups have pledged allegiance to it ““ Ansar Beit al Maqdis in Egypt’s Sinai, for example, andsome of the insurgents behind Libya’s civil war. Meanwhile, the flow of foreign fighters to ISIS has not stopped. Tamimipredicts it will last for “at least a decade.” That is especially worrisome to Western and Middle Eastern governments thatexpect some fighters to return home and carry out attacks – a strategy encouraged in ISIS propaganda.

David Wallis, (Staff), NEW YORK OBSERVER, Dec. 24, 2014. Retrieved Mar. 1, 2015 from Nexis.The conquest of Iraq and Syria and of a few other countries in the Levant is a big deal as far as the West is

concerned, but it pales in comparison to ISIS’ true objectives, which is no less than conquering the entire world and toconverting it into an Islamic society. The West has yet to comprehend that.

Dianne Feinstein, (U.S. Senator, California & Chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee), USA TODAY, Sept. 8, 2014,10A.

In the ghastly video showing the beheading of American journalist Steven Sotloff, an Islamic State in Iraq and Syriaterrorist declares to President Obama, “Our knife will continue to strike the necks of your people.” In the earlier videoshowing the beheading of James Foley, another U.S. journalist, the ISIS executioner says directly into the camera:“You’re no longer fighting an insurgency. We are an Islamic army.” Another recent video, also directed at Americans: “Wewill drown all of you in blood.”

Dianne Feinstein, (U.S. Senator, California & Chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee), USA TODAY, Sept. 8, 2014,10A.

These are ISIS’ true colors. Unlike other terrorist groups, ISIS has grown into a sophisticated military force and isestimated to have between 10,000 and 20,000 fighters. The group now firmly controls large swaths of territory in bothSyria and Iraq. The threat ISIS poses cannot be overstated. This is the most vicious, well-funded and militant terroristorganization we have ever seen, and it is very quickly consolidating its power.

Geoff Earl (Staff), NEW YORK POST, Sept. 24, 2014. Retrieved Mar. 1, 2015 from http://nypost.com/2014/09/27/us-military-chief-15000-ground-troops-need-to-destroy-isis/.

“This is about psychopathic terrorists that are trying to kill us, and we do have to realize that, whether we like it or not,they have already declared war on us,” said British Prime Minister David Cameron. “There isn’t a ‘walk on by’ option.There isn’t an option of just hoping this will go away.”

John McCain, (U.S. Senator, Arizona), NEW YORK TIMES, Aug. 30, 2014, A21.ISIS is now one of the largest, richest terrorist organizations in history. It occupies a growing safe haven the size of

Indiana spanning two countries in the heart of the Middle East, and its ranks are filled with thousands of radicals holdingWestern passports, including some Americans. They require nothing more than a plane ticket to travel to United Statescities. This is why the secretary of homeland security has called Syria ‘‘a matter of homeland security.’’ His warningsabout ISIS have been echoed by the attorney general, the director of national intelligence and, now, the secretary ofdefense. Americans need to know that ISIS is not just a problem for Iraq and Syria. It is a threat to the United States.Doing too little to combat ISIS has been a problem. Doing less is certainly not the answer now.

Lawrence Haas, (Sr. Fellow, American Foreign Policy Council), DESERET MORNING NEWS, July 20, 2014. RetrievedMar. 1, 2015 from Lexis.

ISIL represents a particularly dangerous threat to the United States, one that grows as the radical group conquersmore territory and – with such success – more easily recruits members and acquires more weapons and money. Citingmultiple U.S. intelligence sources, NBC News labeled the ISIS threat against U.S. targets “extremely high.” Its leader,Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who has declared an Islamic caliphate in the territory ISIL controls, warned America earlier thisyear, “Soon we will be in direct confrontation, and the sons of Islam have prepared for such a day. So watch, for we arewith you, watching.” The United States learned the hard way not to take warnings from terrorist leaders lightly, for Osamabin Laden had issued similar threats against the United States before al-Qaida carried them out on September 11, 2001.

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CONTENTIONS:

I. RUSSIA’S ASSISTANCE IS NEEDED TO DEFEAT ISIS.

A. RUSSIA IS SERVING WESTERN INTERESTS BY JOINING THE FIGHT AGAINST ISIS.

IRISH DAILY MAIL, Nov. 27, 2015, 41.In Syria, Russia is serving Western interests by fighting against the Sunni Islamist groups, including ISIS, which was

responsible for the Paris outrage.

B. RUSSIA HELPED REMOVE CHEMICAL WEAPONS FROM SYRIA.

John Mearsheimer, (Prof., Political Science, U. Chicago), FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Oct. 2014. Retrieved Dec. 2, 2015 fromhttps://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-18/why-ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault.

Sticking with the current policy would also complicate Western relations with Moscow on other issues. The UnitedStates needs Russia’s assistance to withdraw U.S. equipment from Afghanistan through Russian territory, reach anuclear agreement with Iran, and stabilize the situation in Syria. In fact, Moscow has helped Washington on all three ofthese issues in the past; in the summer of 2013, it was Putin who pulled Obama’s chestnuts out of the fire by forging thedeal under which Syria agreed to relinquish its chemical weapons, thereby avoiding the U.S. military strike that Obamahad threatened. The United States will also someday need Russia’s help containing a rising China. Current U.S. policy,however, is only driving Moscow and Beijing closer together.

C. RUSSIAN ASSISTANCE IN FIGHTING ISIS SHOULD BE WELCOMED.

Business Monitor International, BMI TRANSPORT REPORT, Jan. 1, 2015. Retrieved Dec. 1, 2015 from Nexis.Washington's prioritization of challenging Russia would also mean that less attention is paid to an even more anti-

Western threat, namely the “Islamic State” in Iraq and Syria, and the Taliban in Afghanistan. The former could pose amajor terrorist threat to Western states, judging by reports that many EU nationals have joined the ranks of IS fighters.

II. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE DOING MORE HARM THAN GOOD.

A. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE DRIVING A WALL BETWEEN RUSSIA AND WESTERN NATIONS.


There are real disagreements between US and Russia, and Russia and EU. But sanctions will only amplify thesedifferences, not reduce them. Shouldn't the ultimate objective be to foster economic growth and minimize geopoliticalfriction?

B. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE DOING TOO MUCH DAMAGE TO THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY – THE

COLLAPSE OF THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY WOULD BE DISASTROUS TO GLOBAL STABILITY.

Peter Feaver, (Prof., Political Science, Duke U.), NATIONAL INTEREST, Aug. 2015. Retrieved Dec. 1, 2015 from Nexis.In the case of Russia, the macroeconomic impact of U.S. and EU sanctions--combined with the drop in international

oil prices and actions taken by Russian regulators--has undercut the country's economy to a far greater extent than wasexpected or desired. For example, by March 2015, inflation in Russia had risen to 16.9 percent. This followed on thefootsteps of a near run on the country's currency, which was supposedly triggered by the Central Bank of Russiapromising to effectively print money to prop up certain companies owned by Putin's confederates and hurt by Westernsanctions. By the spring of 2015, Russia had spent approximately $130 billion of its precious currency reserves in anattempt to defend the value of the ruble and prevent it from sliding even further. In addition, by raising interest rates to 17percent in an attempt to stabilize the ruble, the central bank has likely stymied consumer spending in the near term.

Peter Feaver, (Prof., Political Science, Duke U.), NATIONAL INTEREST, Aug. 2015. Retrieved Dec. 1, 2015 from Nexis.While these economic impacts have been profound, U.S. policy makers did not anticipate them. Nor did they intend

to create them. It is fair to say that the collapse of Russia's economy would cause many more problems in the region thanit would solve, and if the Obama administration wanted to seriously undermine the Russian economy, it could have easilydone so by designating a number of Russian banks and directly freezing them out of the U.S. and European financialsectors. This action would have been a far simpler and more direct way to cause Russia economic pain and bring it to thenegotiating table over the Ukraine issue. These new, sophisticated sanctions were instead designed to hurt a specificsubset of Russian companies, namely those that are owned or controlled by Putin's inner circle or directly run by theRussian government. Yet, despite the fact that these sanctions are narrowly tailored, they could end up causing economicdamage to the Russian economy that would be similar to what would result from a wholesale ban on transacting withcertain industries, such as the financial sector.

Peter Feaver, (Prof., Political Science, Duke U.), NATIONAL INTEREST, Aug. 2015. Retrieved Dec. 1, 2015 from Nexis.While the use of economic statecraft has become more sophisticated in the last decade, tailoring these tools to

achieve the desired political effects remains exceedingly difficult, and U.S. policy makers should not be lulled intobelieving that these new forms of coercion can be perfectly calibrated to address every foreign-policy challenge. Andthough they may be more effective than the "comprehensive" sanctions of the 1990s or the "smart" sanctions of the early2000s, these new levers present a new set of complications for policy makers, such as being significantly more powerfuland difficult to control than anticipated.

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Peter Feaver, (Prof., Political Science, Duke U.), NATIONAL INTEREST, Aug. 2015. Retrieved Dec. 1, 2015 from Nexis.In targeting a number of Russia's financial institutions, for example, the administration believed that it had found a

way to threaten Russian companies' ability to service their massive debt, as well as the health of the Russian economy inthe medium and long term. While such damage seems probable, U.S. policy makers did not anticipate that the sanctionswould nearly cause the Russian currency to collapse or lead Vladimir Putin to consolidate his authoritarian rule, makingthe achievement of U.S. objectives more difficult.

C. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE HARMING UKRAINE – THE VERY NATION WE SAY WE ARE TRYING TO

HELP.


In March 2014, Washington and Brussels initiated sanctions against Russian individuals and interests in response todevelopments in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. For 1.5 years, the hope has been that sanctions and the Ukraine crisiswould quash President Putin's popularity. In reality, Ukraine has been pushed close to default, while the sanctions haveunited Russians behind Putin. Before the Ukraine crisis, diminished economic prospects caused Putin's approval rating toplunge to 61 percent; the lowest since 2000. In 2014, the sanctions and the annexation of Crimea galvanized publicopinion behind Moscow. Today, Putin's approval ratings remain at 87 percent, according to Levada Center. Currently,some 56 percent of Russians support Putin's "Unified Russia" Party, while communists, militant and nationalists, andsocial-democrats together have about 15 percent, according to the Russian Public Opinion Research Center.

D. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE HARMING EUROPEAN ECONOMIES.


In the past year and a half, the sanctions have further deepened stagnation in Europe, while reducing the impact ofeuro economies' fiscal policies and the effectiveness of the European Central Bank's quantitative easing. Therepercussions are reflected in diminished global growth, thus reducing growth prospects in the US as well, whilecontributing to rising anti-US and anti-EU sentiments in Russia.


The EU has more at stake in its economic relationship with Russia than any other Western actor that has imposedsanctions on Russia. A number of European countries are entirely or almost entirely dependent on Russia for gassupplies. Overall, the EU gets around one third of its oil and gas from its eastern neighbour, and does 12 times moretrade with Russia than the United States does.

Max Marioni, (Regulatory Analyst, Institute for Cultural Diplomacy, Berlin), THE SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA, Aug. 2015.Retrieved Dec. 4, 2015 from http://www.bowgroup.org .

The sets of economic sanctions imposed on Russia by the US and EU (including the UK) in collaboration with otherwestern countries targeting Russian individuals and assets have had adverse consequences for European and Americanbusinesses, and if they are prolonged and increased in scope, they will have even more deleterious effects in the future.This in turn can affect growth prospects for economies in Europe, which are the most exposed due to significant businessties with Russia, and to a lesser extent in the US.

Max Marioni, (Regulatory Analyst, Institute for Cultural Diplomacy, Berlin), THE SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA, Aug. 2015.Retrieved Dec. 4, 2015 from http://www.bowgroup.org .

The EU is Russia's economic partner of choice, according to Eurostat, with business with the single marketaccounting for the largest share of total trade. The economic relationship is reciprocal, with half of Russian total exportsgoing to EU countries in 2013, and 47% of Russian imports coming from Europe. Three quarters of Foreign DirectInvestment into Russia originated in the EU4 and in 2013 Russia invested €8 billion into EU economies. Economicinterdependence has been growing between the two, reaching an unprecedented peak in 2012. According to differentestimates, Russia is the third largest business partner for the EU.

Oleg Ivanov, (Chair, Political Science Department, Diplomatic Academy in Moscow), GLOBAL TIMES, Jan. 19, 2015.Retrieved Dec. 1, 2015 from Nexis.

Russia is an important player in the interdependent economic system. Sanctions have a boomerang effect hurtingthe opposite side. Under current circumstances the question is who will suffer more and is capable of bearing the paincaused by sanctions longer. Such a situation when both sides compete in hurting each other is detrimental to all sidesinvolved and is absurd. It is advisable to remember the proverb "burn not your house to rid it of the mouse."


European Union countries are estimated to have lost about $100 billion in trade with Russia, hitting the likes ofBavarian dairy farmers and eastern German industrial exporters.

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III. THE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IMPOSED ON RUSSIA ARE UNJUSTIFIED.

A. RUSSIA HAS A RIGHT TO REGARD CRIMEA AND UKRAINE AS PART OF ITS SPHERE OF INFLUENCE.

Elina Kyselchuk, (Legal Counsel, Ukrainian Business Centre, London), THE SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA, Aug. 2015, 6.It may be worth mentioning that Crimea joined the Russian Empire in 1783, when it was conquered by Russian

Empress Catherine the Great. In the Soviet era, Crimea was actually part of Russia until 1954, when Nikita Khrushchev,First Secretary of the USSR’s Communist Party, symbolically transferred it to Ukraine’s jurisdiction as a giftcommemorating 300 years of union between Ukraine and Russia. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Crimeawas part of newly independent Ukraine and remained so until March 2014 when it was reunified with Russia.

Elina Kyselchuk, (Legal Counsel, Ukrainian Business Centre, London), THE SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA, Aug. 2015, 6.In that regard, we can confidently say that Ukraine is, and always has been, within Russia’s ambit. Indeed Russia

has had a direct and profound cultural link with both the Russian and Ukrainian speaking populations in the south and theeast of Ukraine, as an imperial power under the Tsars and later, in Soviet times. Significantly, Orthodox Christianity wasoriginally brought to Russia by the Kievan Prince Vladimir Sviatoslavich the Great who was baptized in KhersonesusTaurica (now Kherson), Crimea.


Washington may not like Moscow’s position, but it should understand the logic behind it. This is Geopolitics 101:great powers are always sensitive to potential threats near their home territory. After all, the United States does nottolerate distant great powers deploying military forces anywhere in the Western Hemisphere, much less on its borders.Imagine the outrage in Washington if China built an impressive military alliance and tried to include Canada and Mexico init. Logic aside, Russian leaders have told their Western counterparts on many occasions that they consider NATOexpansion into Georgia and Ukraine unacceptable, along with any effort to turn those countries against Russia -- amessage that the 2008 Russian-Georgian war also made crystal clear.


The United States and its European allies now face a choice on Ukraine. They can continue their current policy,which will exacerbate hostilities with Russia and devastate Ukraine in the process -- a scenario in which everyone wouldcome out a loser. Or they can switch gears and work to create a prosperous but neutral Ukraine, one that does notthreaten Russia and allows the West to repair its relations with Moscow. With that approach, all sides would win.

B. THE U.S. HAS NO VITAL INTERESTS IN UKRAINE.

Jeremy Shapiro, (Fellow, Brookings Institution), REALLY, ACTUALLY AVOIDING A NEW COLD WAR, Oct. 20, 2015.Retrieved Dec. 2, 2015 from http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/10/20-really-avoiding-new-cold-war-shapiro-charap.

There is nothing in international law, U.S. treaty commitments, or the Ten Commandments that obligates the UnitedStates to fight a new Cold War in order to defend Ukraine’s right to choose alliances. Ukraine, of course, can and shoulddo whatever it feels is in the interests of its people, but the United States has the choice about whether and how tosupport its decisions, particularly if such support has the potential to do grievous harm to U.S. interests. More to the point,the NATO alliance is not prepared to grant Ukraine's choice for membership and we should stop pretending otherwise.

Business Monitor International, BMI TRANSPORT REPORT, Jan. 1, 2015. Retrieved Dec. 1, 2015 from Nexis.Russia's efforts to maintain geopolitical dominance over Ukraine by supporting pro-Russian rebels there have widely

been seen as a form of aggression, but they arguably do not fundamentally threaten US or Western interests, becauseMoscow has for many years dominated the Ukrainian polity.

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