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2012 40: 539Psychology of MusicDavid J. Hargreaves

Musical imagination: Perception and production, beauty and creativity

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Musical imagination: Perception andproduction, beauty and creativity

David J. HargreavesApplied Music Research Centre, Roehampton University, UK

Abstract

In our recently-published book Musical Imaginations (Hargreaves, Miell, & MacDonald, 2012), Isuggest that the creative aspects of music listening have been neglected, and that putting theseat the centre of musical creativity (which is usually seen as being manifested in the activities of

composition, improvisation and performance) can lead to a more fundamental view of imaginationas the cognitive basis of musical activity. I consider different approaches to the concept of musical

beauty in experimental aesthetics and neuroscience, and also different views of the concept of

imagination, which declined in psychology in favour of studies of creativity. I propose that we should

redress this balance by orienting the study of musical activity around the musical imagination, such

that the concept of musical creativity can be seen to be much more restricted in scope. I suggest

that musical imagination involves different networks of association, and consider the existence of

a creative general executive function for music. This leads to a revised and simplified reciprocal-

feedback model of music processing, which exists at the core of both musical perception and musical

production.

Keywords

beauty, creativity, imagination, music, neuroscience, perception, production

Introduction

Our recently-published book Musical Imaginations (Hargreaves, Miell, & MacDonald, 2012)

argues for a rethinking of several big concepts in music psychology, and in particular of thoseassociated with musical creativity. We suggest that the creative aspects of music listening havebeen neglected, and that putting these at the centre of musical creativity (which is usually seenas being manifested in the activities of composition, improvisation and performance) can lead

to a more fundamental view of imagination as the cognitive basis of musical perception andproduction. Imagination is also the essence of the creative perception of music, and there isnew research interest in the emotion-arousing properties of music as well as in the nature of

musical beauty. Recent advances in neuroscience appear to confirm the functional similarities

Corresponding author:

David J. Hargreaves, Applied Music Research Centre, Roehampton University, Southlands College, Roehampton Lane,London, SW15 5SL, UK.

Email: [email protected]

444893 POM0010.1177/0305735612444893HargreavesPsychology of Music

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540 Psychology of Music 40(5)

between these different areas of creative activity in music, and this paper seeks to clarify and

redefine some of these existing concepts.I start by looking at different views of the concept of imagination, which was considered to

be of central importance in human life by such disparate figures as David Hume, Albert Einstein,and Aaron Copland, but which was declined in psychology in favour of the massive predomi-

nance of studies of creativity. I propose that we should reorient the study of musical perceptionand production, both of which are creative activities, around the concept of musical imagina-tion, and start with a consideration of Humes views on imagination, which were central to his

whole philosophy. I next consider the definition of musical beauty, and its investigation andtheorization in experimental aesthetics, and revisit the socio-cultural approach which gave riseto our proposal of a reciprocal-feedback model of the response to music (Hargreaves,

MacDonald, & Miell, 2005). My colleagues and I also previously proposed a reciprocal-feedbackmodel of musical performance which runs parallel to the response model, and we then com-bined the two models so as to formulate a further model of musical communication. The revised

and simplified view which I present in the final section of this paper is that musical imagina-tion, which consists of internal cognitive representations, is at the core of both musical percep-tion and musical production, and that this revised model deals with music processing ratherthan communication.

If we define imagination as the cognitive basis of both musical perception and production inthis way, the concept of musical creativity can be seen to be much more restricted in scope, andthis is another central argument in this paper. I look at the suggestion that musical creativity

involves different networks of association, and go on to consider the study of the general execu-tive function, which has been investigated in relation to general IQ in a musical context bySchellenberg (2011). I consider its relationship with music cognition as manifested in theoreti-

cal models such as Ockelfords (2007) proposed music module in working memory, and inDietrichs (2004) (non-musical) propositions concerning the neuroscientific origins of creativ-ity, which also exist in working memory. I consider the extent to which Dietrichs four proposed

basic types of creativity might relate to a general musical executive function and suggest, fol-lowing Ockelford (2012), that this phenomenon within working memory might exhibit thecharacteristics of imagination or creativity. This leads to a reformulation and simplification ofthe original reciprocal-feedback models of response and performance, as mentioned earlier,

since the new conception of a creative music executive function underlies both perception andproduction, such that there is no need to propose separate models of each.

1. ImaginationThe Scottish philosopher David Hume (17111776) was well known as a sceptic, as well as forhis empiricism: in A Treatise of Human Nature (1739; see Wikipedia, n.d.) he strove to establish anaturalistic science of man that investigated the psychological basis of human nature. Hisstrict empiricism was expressed in the view that knowledge can only be derived from direct per-ceptions of the world, which he called impressions:

Since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions, and since all ideas are derivd from some-

thing antecedently present to the mind, it follows, that tis impossible for us so much as to conceive or

form an idea of anything specifically different from ideas and impressions. Let us fix our attention out

of ourselves as much as possible; let us chace [sic] our imagination to the heavens, or to the utmostlimits of the universe; we never really advance a step beyond ourselves, nor can conceive any kind of

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Hargreaves 541

existence, but those perceptions, which have appeard in that narrow compass. This is the universe of

the imagination, nor have we any idea but what is there producd. (pp. 6768)

Streminger (1980), in his essay on Humes Theory of Imagination, suggests that Humes con-cept of imagination (fancy) is of paramount significance for the understanding of his entire phi-

losophy, even though until quite recently the problem of imagination has hardly even belongedto the marginal topics of modern philosophy (p. 91). It is based on the important distinctionbetween what Hume called realities, which are also ideas, and the universe of the imagination:

Beliefor assent, which always attends the memory and senses, is nothing but the vivacity of those per-ceptions they present; and that this alone distinguishes them from the imagination. To believe is in this

case to feel an immediate impression of the senses, or a repetition of that impression in the memory.

Tis merely the force and liveliness of the perception, which constitutes the first act of the judgement,

and lays the foundation of that reasoning, when we trace the relation of cause and effect. (p. 86)

The vital distinction between realities, which arise immediately and directly from the object ofperception, and ideas which emerge from the imagination, are largely made on the basis of thecoherence of the former:

As to those impressions, which arise from the senses, their ultimate cause is, in my opinion, perfectlyinexplicable by human reason, and twill always be impossible to decide with certainty, whether they

arise immediately from the object, or are producd by the creative power of the mind, or are derivd

from the author of our being. Nor is such a question in any way material to our present purpose. We

may draw inferences from the coherence of our perceptions, whether they be true or false; whether

they represent nature justly, or be mere illusions of the senses. (p. 84)

All this, and everything else which I believe, are nothing but ideas, tho, by their force and settlled [sic]order, arising from custom and the relation of cause and effect, they distinguish themselves from the

other ideas, which are merely the offspring of the imagination. (p. 108)

Hume distinguished between three different functions (faculties) of the imagination themetaphysical faculty, the artistic faculty and the scientific faculty, and imagination was central

to the explanation of the products of all three. He saw metaphysical approaches as the productof blind imagination, giving rise to trivial suggestions of the fancy which could only ratio-nally be investigated by that the use of the experimental method. The basic assumption thatonly empirical propositions are justifiable led Hume to propose that the products of the meta-

physical faculty were changeable, weak, and irregular, whereas those of the scientific facultywere permanent, irresistable [sic], and unchangeable (p. 225).

It is the artistic faculty of the imagination that concerns us most here, and its essence is the

capacity to produce new ideas by reorganizing or simplifying past impressions; that is, the abil-ity to place known impressions into new relationships with one another. This has a lot in com-mon with some of the associative theories which we will consider in section four, and Hume

saw this faculty as the origin of creativity:

Nothing is more admirable, than the readiness, with which the imagination suggests its ideas, and

presents them at the very instant, in which they become necessary or useful. The fancy runs from one

end of the universe to the other in collecting those ideas, which belong to any subject. One could think

the whole intellectual world of ideas was at once subjected to our view, and that we did nothing butpick out such as were most proper for our purpose (p. 24).



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In spite of its central importance in Humes work, imagination seems to be of marginal

interest in contemporary philosophy, although Streminger pointed out in 1980 that this maybe changing. The concept also had some early currency in the psychological literature: the RevH. L. Hargreaves (1927), for example, wrote a Monograph Supplement of the British Journal ofPsychology entitled The faculty of imagination: this adopted a psychometric approach in devis-ing tests of imagination which resemble current tests of divergent thinking. Hargreaves wasinfluenced by Spearmans (1927, 1930) two-factor theory of intelligence, in which differentabilities were seen as deriving from a mixture of peoples general intelligence (g) and their

content-specific talents in different domains of creative activity. In spite of a revival of interestin the relationship between creativity and intelligence in the 1960s and 1970s, however, andan isolated book by Peter McKellar on Imagination and Thinking: A Psychological Analysis in1957, which covered topics including mental imagery, sleep, wakefulness and dreaming,abnormal and pathological thinking, the conditions of creativity, cognition and the arts, andthe supernatural, there was little further interest in imagination in psychology: in the rest of

this paper, I shall attempt to show why it is time to redress the balance, and why the field ofmusic psychology is a very good place to start.

2. Beauty and aesthetics

Discussions of the nature of beauty often take place within the context of the arts, althoughthere is no reason why this should necessarily be the case: beauty also exists in science, in archi-

tecture, and in the environment, for example (see, e.g., de Botton, 2007). Beauty in the arts isusually associated with positive feelings and happiness, although art also has the power toshock, disturb or offend, and painters including Goya, Caravaggio, and more recently Francis

Bacon and Tracey Emin have exploited this power to dramatic effect. One of the many viewsthat William Shakespeare expressed about beauty is that it is self-evident, needing no explana-tion: when you see or hear it, you recognize it immediately. He voices this view in The Rape ofLucrece:

Beauty itself doth of itself persuade

The eyes of men without an orator.

What needeth then apologies be made,

To set forth that which is so singular?

Nevertheless, the origins and explanation of beauty have been extensively studied, mainly intwo quite distinct branches of the field of aesthetics. Speculative aesthetics deals with abstract

questions including the nature and meaning of art, and is to be found within the disciplines ofphilosophy, art history and art criticism. Empirical aesthetics, on the other hand, is the scien-tific study of the nature of beauty and its appreciation, and this is the approach on which I

focus in this paper. Most of the research has been carried out on either visual art or music: andgiven that music is our main focus here, I will largely restrict myself to research in the experi-mental aesthetics of music.

Empirical aesthetics began in 1876 when Gustav Theodor Fechner published his Vorschuleder esthetik (Introduction to Aesthetics): this means that experimental aesthetics is one of the

oldest topics in experimental psychology, which itself was in its early stages at that time. Fechnerinvestigated peoples responses to simple shapes, colours, sounds, geometrical forms and so on,characterizing this approach as aesthetics from below: his view was that this would eventually



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Hargreaves 543

lead to an aesthetics from above; that is, to explanations of more general aesthetic questions.

Fechners aesthetics from below implicitly adopted the objectivist view that aesthetic phe-nomena such as beauty lay in the properties of the art works concerned; and, although thisfield of study declined in the years following Fechners early work, its revival in the 1960s in theform of Daniel Berlynes new experimental aesthetics (e.g., Berlyne, 1974) was also concerned

to a large degree with the aesthetic properties of the stimuli themselves, such as their balance,proportion, symmetry and complexity.

Hargreaves and North (2010) have written a comprehensive review of research on the

experimental aesthetics of music which covers not only research on the properties of the musicitself, but also that which takes the contrasting view that beauty is in the eye of the beholder,or, in the case of music, in the ear of the listener. We review the research literature on indi-

vidual differences in responses to music, looking in particular at the effects of age, the factorwhich has been studied most extensively, and also at that on the effects of social class, gender,personality, and musical training.

The next stage of the argument is to suggest that the perception of beauty is best explainednot by eitherthe properties of the perceived object or by the characteristics of the beholder, butrather by the interaction between them, and Reber, Schwarz and Winkielmans (2004) expres-sion of this viewpoint has been widely quoted. Reber et al. suggest that beauty is grounded in

the processing experiences of the perceiver that emerge from the interaction of stimulus prop-erties and perceivers cognitive and affective processes (p. 365). They also use the wordsbeauty and aesthetic pleasure interchangeably, although this is not always a straightforward

equation, as some researchers (e.g., Schubert, 1996) suggest that people can also enjoy nega-tive emotions in music.

Since the publication ofThe Social Psychology of Music (Hargreaves & North, 1997), AdrianNorth and I have argued that the social and cultural context in which the perception of musictakes place is a vital concern, and one which is now reflected in a great deal of the researchliterature in music psychology: our own research has investigated responses to music in various

real-life listening situations including shops, banks, restaurants and bars, gymnasia and on-hold phones, as well as considering broader cultural factors such as social class, and otheraspects of peoples beliefs and lifestyles (see, e.g., North & Hargreaves, 2007). This view clearlysuggests that any comprehensive explanation of musical beauty should go one stage further

still by proposing that aesthetic perception derives from a three-way interaction between the artwork, the beholder, and the situation. This might be described as a socio-cultural point of view,and its Vygotskian origins and other ramifications are explored in The Social and AppliedPsychology of Music (North and Hargreaves, 2008), a book which followed up our 1997volume.

This approach was used in a quite specific, situational sense in our formulation of the recip-

rocal-feedback model of the response to music (see Hargreaves et al., 2005). We describe thisas a reciprocal-feedback model because any one of the three main determinants of musicalresponse can simultaneously influence the other two, and these influences can work either

way. This model is shown in Figure 1, and a simplified version of it appears in Hargreaves,North and Tarrant (2006).

The contents of the boxes containing the three main determinants include brief references toall the research that we have reviewed on different properties of the music, the listener and the

listening situation, which we updated in chapter 3 ofThe Social and Applied Psychology of Music,and we also explained the nature of the reciprocal-feedback relationships between these threemain determinants in terms of some of the broad patterns of research findings in this field.



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Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the model in the present context, however, is the contentsof the central box labelled response. We include three main categories of response, which we

label as physiological, cognitive and affective, respectively, and we detail the different behaviouralfactors which have been investigated in each category. Each one of these three categories isinvolved in our discussion of the aesthetic response to music, but the interaction between cogni-tive and affective factors in particular is perhaps critical in its determination. People make (cog-

nitive) discriminations between and evaluations of different pieces and genres: but these piecesand genres also elicit different affective states (emotions and moods), and it is the combinationsof these effects that underlie aesthetic preference and the perception of beauty.

Elvira Brattico and her associates in Helsinki have made some promising advances not onlyin the definition of different aspects of aesthetic responses to music but also in investigatingsome of the possible underlying neural mechanisms. They propose (e.g., Brattico & Jacobsen,

2009) that its three main components are affective responses (the power to induce or modulateemotions or mood states), hedonic responses (likes or dislikes), and aesthetic responses, morenarrowly defined with reference to cultural or artistic standards (e.g., beauty or other proper-

ties such as symmetry, elegance, or coherence). The new field of neuroaesthetics aims to deter-mine the neural foundations of art appreciation, although its focus is largely on visual artrather than music.

Situational appropriateness

of g of genres and styles

Musical fit

Constant evolution and changein individual preferences and taste

Individual use of music as aresource in different situations:

goals in specific environments

Situations and contexts

Social and cultural contexts

Everyday situations: work, leisure, consumer,education, health, media, entertainment

Presence/absence of others

Other ongoing activities

ResponsePhysiological: arousal level

level of engagement

active/passive control of listening

Cognitive

attention, memory, perceptualcoding, expectation

discrimination, evaluation

Affective: emotional responses, like/dislike,mood

Music

Reference systems, genres, idioms, styles,pieces.

Collative variables: complexity, familiarity,orderliness

Prototypicality

Performance contexts: live, recorded, non-musical

Listener

Individual difference variables: gender, age, nationality

Musical knowledge, training, literacy, experience

Immediate and short-term preference patterns:medium/long term taste patterns

Self-theories: musical identities

Figure 1. Reciprocal-feedback model of musical response



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Hargreaves 545

Although neuroscientific research has been able to identify some of the neural processes

which are linked with the objective properties of music, these researchers have as yet beenunable to identify specific neural correlates of listeners experiences of musical liking or beauty(Brattico & Jacobsen, 2009). They have nevertheless been able to demonstrate differencesbetween the event-related potentials (ERP) of musically trained and untrained listeners when

making aesthetic judgements (Mller, Hfel, Brattico, & Jacobsen, 2009), and have also shownthat the ERP responses which are recorded when listeners make cognitive (correctness) judge-ments about tonal chord sequences are dissociated from those which are recorded for their

affective (liking) judgements about the same sequences (Brattico, Jacobsen, De Baene, Glerean,& Tervaniemi, 2010). They also concur with our own view of the importance of the socio-cultural context as a relevant variable to study when considering music as an aesthetic domain

(Brattico & Jacobsen, 2009, p. 308).

3. Musical creativity

The study of musical creativity has largely been concerned with the activities of composition,improvisation and performance. Creativity is a huge topic which has been studied for manyyears in disciplines including philosophy, psychology, and education, and two central questions

in all of these are those of definition how can creativity be defined? and explanation whatare the relative strengths and weaknesses of the many theories that have been advanced toexplain creativity? The second question is way beyond us here I would simply refer the readerto Sternberg and Lubarts (1999) review of the main theoretical approaches as they saw them

in Sternbergs (1999) Handbook of Creativity over a decade ago, and also to Kozbelt, Beghettoand Runcos (2010) more recent account in the updated version of that Handbook (Kaufman &Sternberg, 2010).

The question of definition is important here, however, as it is closely bound up with my ear-lier proposal that we should define imagination as the source of the internal cognitive processesinvolved in musical perception and production, such that the concept of musical creativity is

seen as much more restricted in scope. There is an inherent difficulty in trying to define creativ-ity because its essence is to go beyond the bounds of what is already given. Plato illustrated thispoint as follows: How will you set about looking for that thing, the nature of which is totally

unknown to you? Which among the things you do not know is the one you propose to look for?And if by chance you should stumble upon it, how will you know that it is indeed that thing,since you are in ignorance of it? (from Meno, cited by Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 371).

This view suggests that the definition of creativity needs to be much more context-specific:

rather than being seen as a generalized capacity of individuals which can be deployed by themin different situations, it should refer to producing solutions to specific problems in specific situ-ations. When creativity is not grounded in this way, the term becomes over-used and abused:

and this is exactly what has happened in the research literature. Hudson (1966) suggested thisover four decades ago: In some circles creative does duty as a word of general approbation meaning, approximately, good . . . [it] covers everything from the answers to a particular kind

of psychological test, to forming a good relationship with ones wife (p. 119).Dietrich (2007) not only makes a similar argument from the neuropsychological point of

view that the main focus should be on the specific cognitive mechanisms and neural sub-

strates which are involved in particular types of creative activity, rather than on a monolithicview of creativity but also argues, in an outspoken and polemical article, that the psychologi-cal study of creativity has been stuck in a rut for decades:



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The study of creativity is, quite unfortunately, still dominated by a number of rather dated ideas that

are either so simplistic that nothing good can possibly come out of them or, given what we know about

the brain, factually mistaken. As cognitive neuroscience is making more serious contact with the

knowledge base of creativity, we must, from the outset, clear the ground of these pernicious fossil

traces from a bygone era. (p. 22)

Dietrich identifies four central ideas which still persist in creativity research as targets fordemolition, as follows: creativity is divergent thinking (it also involves convergent thinking,

and divergent thinking is in any case far too broad a construct to be of much predictive value);creativity is in the right brain (simplistic ideas of leftright hemispheric specialization are out-dated; creativity involves many different functions, and the idea of functional specialization of

such a complex mental process is in any case misguided); creativity occurs in a state of defo-cused attention (it also occurs in a focused state, and different forms of creativity may occur infocused and unfocused states); altered states of consciousness facilitate creativity (manyaltered states of consciousness, such as those that occur in mental illness, do not give rise to

creativity, and creativity often occurs in the normal waking state).Once again the basic problem in all these issues is that ofovergeneralization: since actual cre-

ativity exists in so many different forms, activities and contexts, giving rise to an infinitely vari-

able range of products, any attempt to formulate a unitary description or explanation is doomedto failure. The same seems to apply to musical creativity: as Cook (2012) points out in his con-cluding afterword in Musical Imaginations, the term refers to an indefinite number of relatedconcepts or behaviours, such that it may be better instead to speak of multiple creativities, asdo several other authors in the book. Far from the traditional view of creativity as a specialindividual gift which is conferred on rare geniuses such as Mozart, it revolves round social

interaction, and is embedded and embodied in the practices of everyday life (p. 451). This point

is developed by the sociologist Simon Frith (2012) in chapter 4 of the book, who contrasts whathe calls the romantic view of the individual genius with the sociological view that creativity isa kind of business behaviour: people are creative because it is their job to be so, and they need

to be productive in order to earn a living. In doing so they need to be aware of the social andcultural context of their creative work which may, for example, involve ideas such as spottinggaps in the market. This view leads Frith to the same conclusion that others have reached,

albeit for a different set of reasons: . . . the concept of musical creativity is more of a hin-drance than a help in understanding music-making practice, hence my conclusion: we shouldcease to use the term altogether, even if it remains the sociologists task to explain why the

concept matters so much (p. 71).

I can conclude this section by reiterating that creativity is only one facet of a much broaderphenomenon, the central core of which is imagination. We need more precise distinctions

between the internal mental processes and the behavioural manifestations of creativity;between these behavioural manifestations and the socialenvironmental influences involved;and between creative production and creative perception.

4. Networks of association

In chapter 10 of Musical Imaginations, my colleagues and I consider the notion of imaginativelistening as a creative activity which is inextricably linked with and influenced by the social and

cultural environments in which it takes place (Hargreaves, Hargreaves, & North, 2012). Weconsider different styles of listening, looking in particular at the distinction between the styles



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Hargreaves 547

of expert listeners, such as critics and music theoreticians, and those of non-expert listeners:

finer-grained discrimination in expert listening can give rise to perceptions of musical mean-ing and implication which are specific enough to appear to be qualitatively different from thoseemerging from lower-grained discrimination. The reciprocal-feedback model of responses tomusic, which I described in the first section of this paper, deals with the interacting effects of

three determinants of these responses music, listening situation and listener: and in chapter10 we take this further by suggesting that listeners create their own personal networks of asso-ciation which act as reference points for their mental representations of their musical worlds.

There are three types of network, one based on each of the three main determinants of theresponse to music. The first type exists within musical pieces themselves at the structural level,and we consider how musical reference is involved in their creation. This idea has a great deal incommon with Folkestads (2012) proposal of an individualspersonal inner music library, whichcomprises all previous musical experiences of that individual, all the music ever heard, col-lected and stored in the mind and body of that person (p.198). In this view composers are seen

as being in dialogue with their personal inner music libraries, as well as making contact withthose of their listeners.

The second type of network links pieces of music with their cultural associations with thetypical situations and contexts in which they are typically heard; these are very similar to the

networks of cognitive units proposed by Martindale and Moore (1988) in their preference forprototypes model of musical likes and dislikes. This leads on to the idea of musical fit, whichhas been investigated in consumer psychology as well as in music psychology. The associations

between, for example, different products in a shop and particular styles of music playing in theshop can be used to predict which products customers will actually buy because the music

primes certain cognitions (see North & Hargreaves, 2008). Third, individuals combine theirnetworks of musical and cultural associations to include their corresponding associations withthe people, situations and events that they have experienced in their lives: these are effectively

personal networks of association, which are subject to constant change as new pieces or stylesare experienced in different social-cultural situations.

In chapter 8 ofMusical Imaginations, Emery Schubert (2012) sets out his spreading activa-tion theory of creativity, which is also based on the idea of networks of associations in thiscase, between small, discrete units of information called nodes, which are associated with oneanother by means of links. Schubert suggests that creativity is then defined, in part, as thespontaneous creation of a new pathway (link) to solve a . . . problem (p. 124). However, thecreative solution of a musical (e.g., compositional) problem involves not only the formation of

new, meaningful links between nodes but also the inhibition of other links that can cause pain/avoidance behaviours; and Schubert invokes the principle of dissociation to account for the lat-ter phenomenon. To put this simply, creativity involves switching pleasurable musical connec-

tions on, and painful ones off. He also uses dissociation in a more general sense to refer to theeveryday phenomenon of focusing to such an extent upon a favourite piece of music (gettinglost in the music) that one becomes dissociated from ones surroundings. Schubert also sug-

gests that the activation of certain networks of nodes is inherently pleasurable, whilst dissocia-tion serves to deactivate other painful networks such that aesthetic pleasure derives from thecomplementary operation of both of these processes.

It is no accident that our own three-fold division between musical, cultural and personal

networks runs parallel with Hargreaves, Marshall and Norths (2003) model of the potential

outcomes of music education, which we described as musical-artistic, personal, and social-cultural outcomes. This model was based on our international review of the aims of music



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education in different countries world-wide (Hargreaves & North, 2001), and also on our psy-

chological analysis of the functions of music (Hargreaves & North, 1999). There is also a clearparallel with the three main human needs which form the basis of Deci and Ryans (2002)widely-quoted self-determination theory of well-being: this holds that, when the basic psycho-logical needs ofrelatedness, competence and autonomy are satisfied, peoples motivation and well-being are enhanced. Relatedness refers to a persons activities taking place within a socialnetwork, and thereby being influenced by the social-cultural context: competence refers to theskills and abilities which are required for engagement in creative activities, which links directly

with musical-artistic skills: and autonomy means that our creative activities are likely to bemost highly motivated when they are generated by ourselves, rather than by external demandsor by other people that is, by our personal motivation.

5. Musical executive functioning: Memory and creativity

Schellenberg (2011) recently published a provocative study of the relationships between executivefunction, IQ, and the presence or absence of music lessons. He compared the performances ofmusically trained and untrained 9- to 12-year-olds on a measure of IQ and on five measures ofexecutive function and found that the musically trained group had higher IQs than their untrained

counterparts, which supports the findings of several previous studies. However, he also found verylittle association between the membership of one or other of the two groups and executive func-tion, even though IQ and executive function were positively correlated. Schellenbergs conclusionwas that these results provide no support for the hypothesis that the association between music

training and IQ is mediated by executive function but suggest, rather, that children with higher IQsare more likely than their lower-IQ counterparts to take music lessons, and to perform well on avariety of tests of cognitive ability except for those measuring executive function (p. 283).

Aleksandar Aksentijevic and I wrote a peer commentary on this article which was publishedalongside the original article (Hargreaves & Aksentijevic, 2011). We raised several issues concern-ing the causal relationships between the variables involved, including that of the relationship

between IQ and executive function. The intelligence quotient (IQ) has a very long history as well asa very bad reputation in some disciplines, perhaps as a result of the ways in which IQ tests havebeen used as much as of the concept of intelligence on which they are based. Executive function

(sometimes also described as cognitive control, or the supervisory attentional system), on the otherhand, is described by Schellenberg as a loose construct that allows for conscious, goal-directedproblem solving and, when impaired, leads to failures to make wise judgements, cognitive inflex-ibility, poor planning of future actions, and difficulty inhibiting inappropriate responses (Zelazo,

Carlson, & Kesek, 2008, p. 553). As noted by Hannon and Trainor (2007), small but widespreadeffects of musical training on cognitive processing might occur because music lessons train atten-tional and executive functioning, which benefits almost all cognitive tasks (p. 470) (quoted in

Schellenberg, 2011, p. 287). Aksentijevic and I questioned the extent to which IQ and executivefunction are conceptually and empirically distinct, especially since, in Schellenbergs study, one test(digit symbol-coding) was the same in the measures of both IQ and executive function.

Consideration of a general executive function and its relationship to general IQ in a musicalcontext leads naturally on to the question of whether or not there might be a musical equivalent:is there a general executive function in music? Something very much like this was proposed a few

years ago by my Roehampton colleague Adam Ockelford (Ockelford, 2007), as a result of some ofhis well-known work with the blind musical savant Derek Paravicini. Dereks ability to immedi-ately reproduce, on the keyboard, large chunks of recorded music played to him is a remarkable



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ability which has been witnessed by many: the task would be well beyond most professional pia-

nists. In the Researching Exceptional MUsical Skill (REMUS) project which Ockelford describes,one of the four tasks which the researchers devised in order to investigate how Derek learnspieces, and is able to show such prodigious levels of skill, was the listen and play task in which hefirst listens to a piece in its entirety, and then attempts to reproduce it: this was repeated on 13

different occasions in all, over a period of two years. The piece in question was a jazz piece called

Chromatic Blues which Ockelford specially composed so as to fulfil four criteria, namely: (1) thatthe style should be broadly familiar to Derek; (2) that it should possess certain specific, salient

features that were unusual within the style; (3) that it should be technically undemanding; and(4) that The piece should be of sufficient difficulty to be found challenging, though possible forParavicini to learn after a number of hearings, given its length and complexity (p. 8).

Since it did exceed Dereks short-term memory capacity to a considerable degree, he was forcedto combine his accurate renditions of those parts of the piece that he could remember with his owninventions of material that made musical sense, and was consistent with the style. Ockelford

undertook a detailed musicological analysis of Dereks changing renditions of the piece over the 13attempts, using his own zygonic theory (Ockelford, 2006), which enabled him to investigate thedegree to which the elements of one rendition bear musical similarity to those of another. Theresults of this detailed analysis led Ockelford to the conclusion that Derek achieved musical and

stylistic coherence in his part-accurate renditions of the piece by borrowing material from otherworks in the same style: that he was drawing on abundle of musical fragments and attributes fromvarious locations in the original piece, of varying lengths, types and degrees of abstraction (p. 13)

which was held in his short-term memory. The elements which appeared in this bundle were deter-mined by their salience in relation to the surrounding musical context: by their structure, in termsof their ease of encoding; by their resilience that is, the degree to which they retained their identityin relation to the surrounding musical context; and by reinforcement, through repetition.

Ockelford suggests that the process of creative reconstruction might be explained as beingconducted by an executive function such as that we discussed in relation to general intelligence

earlier; specifically, his proposal is that the results of his study suggest the existence of a musi-cal executive which uses not only the auditory information presented in the recording of

Chromatic Blues, but also Dereks memories of other pieces, fragments, attributes and style-systems. This is illustrated in Figure 2: the musical executive draws on the music bundle in

short-term memory as described earlier, as well as on the contents of the long-term memorystore. Ockelford describes this whole system as a music module in working memory, followingBaddeleys (1986) original model of a central executive in working memory linked to the two

slave systems of the phonological loop and the visuo-spatial sketchpad, and on Berzs (1995)subsequent proposal of a music module which is seen as a third slave system acting alongsidethe other two.

Of particular interest in the present context is Ockelfords use of the adjective creative inrelation to what was going on in Dereks short-term memory: the notion of creative recon-struction is very much in tune with the way in which my colleagues and I describe the cogni-

tive basis of music listening in chapter 10 ofMusical Imaginations (Hargreaves, Hargreaves, &North, 2012). We suggest that Listening to music is an active, creative process which exists atdifferent levels of engagement; that all music processing involves centrally-stored personalnetworks of association . . . or schemata, which mediate all musical activities, and not just the

act of listening itself: these include composition, improvisation, and performance; and that

the active processes of revision which our minds perform are most usefully described as musi-cal imagination (p. 169).



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Figure 2. The possible disposition of a music module in working memory (reproduced by permission ofAdam Ockelford and Sage Publications Ltd.)

In a more recent paper, Ockelford (2012) has reinforced this particular feature of his pro-

posed music processing module, suggesting that memory and creativity are indeed differentsides of the same coin in musical improvisation. He postulates seven ways in which this process

of creative reconstruction takes place in working memory which include, for example, the mod-ules ability to select fragments or features from the available bank that would fit with each



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other . . . within the evolving style system, to synthesize the selected elements, integrating

them horizontally (melodically) and . . . vertically (harmonically) within the unfoldingmatrix of pitch and perceived time, and to track and direct the musical narrative simultane-ously at different architectonic and hierarchical levels to ensure both short and longer-termcoherence.

In the third section I mentioned Dietrichs (2007) critique of the last few decades of researchon creativity, and his view that cognitive neuroscience is making more serious contact with theknowledge base of creativity (p. 22). Three years earlier he published a paper in which he made

some concrete proposals about some of the neural mechanisms that may underlie creativity(Dietrich, 2004), proposing four different types of creative insight, each mediated by a distinc-tive neural circuit. Although these do not apply specifically to music, they are nevertheless of

clear relevance to our interests here. Dietrich conceptualizes information processing as beinghierarchically structured, such that the most sophisticated mental operations (including cre-ative functioning) are localized in the prefrontal cortex, which deals with processing at the

highest levels of the functional hierarchy. One hierarchy of neural systems exists which extractsemotional information from the environment, allowing the individual to assess the biologicalsignificance of a given event, and a second hierarchy exists which performs the feature analysiswhich forms the basis of cognitive processing. These two functional systems appear to exist

within different anatomical brain structures, and although these structures are connected atvarious levels, the reintegration of emotional and cognitive information processing only occursat the higher levels of the functional hierarchy: this takes place in the prefrontal cortex, which

is concerned with executive functioning.The prefrontal cortex is functionally divided into two units the ventromedial (VMPFC) and

the dorsolateral (DLPFC). The research literature suggests that the VMPFC is primarily respon-

sible for social functioning, dealing with the personal consequences of ones behaviour in soci-ety, and the emotions with which these are associated, whereas the DLPFC is associated withattention and working memory. In particular, the working memory buffer of the DLPFC appears

to be concerned with cognitive flexibility, abstract thinking, and strategic planning: Dietrichsuggests that this may therefore be the central structure involved in creative thinking. Damasio(2001) had previously suggested that a working memory buffer is a critical prerequisite forcreative thinking because of its involvement in the ability to sustain attention to one source of

information whilst simultaneously processing another. Dietrich concludes that creativityrequires cognitive abilities, such as working memory, sustained attention, cognitive flexibility,and judgement of propriety, that are typically ascribed to the prefrontal cortex (p. 1014).

Dietrich proposes that the PFC has three main functions in creativity, namely: (1) gainingconsciousness of novel thoughts, which become insights when represented in working mem-ory; (2) recruiting higher cognitive functions in developing the insight, including central exec-

utive processing such as the direction of attention, retrieving relevant memories, andconsidering the appropriateness of the insight to the problem; and (3) implementing the expres-sion of the insight, which involves recruiting task-specific skills, techniques and knowledge.

Dietrich further proposes that creative insights can occur in one of two processing modes

spontaneous and deliberate and that either of these can direct operations in one or both of twostructures emotional or cognitive giving rise to four basic types of creativity in all. Examplesof creative insights which employ the deliberate mode of processing for cognitive structures are

those which involve high levels of knowledge and expertise, and the methodical, systematic

linking of different pieces of information so as to create an overall pattern such as might occurin scientific breakthroughs like Crick and Watsons decoding of the structure of DNA. Creativity



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which employs the deliberate mode of processing for emotional structures is also seen by

Dietrich as methodical and systematic, and this is applied to af fective memories, such as insightsachieved during psychotherapy. The third type, insights in which a spontaneous processingmode is applied to cognitive systems, are those in which sudden illumination or Eureka experi-ences are reported, such as in Newtons insights into the nature of gravity when watching an

apple falling from a tree, or indeed Archimedes original Eureka experience when he displacedthe water in his own bathtub. Finally, when the spontaneous processing mode is used on emo-tional structures, the creative insights involve intense emotional experiences, such as in the

creation of Picassos Guernica, or of Stravinskys The Rite of Spring.I have ranged over several different interrelated topics and issues in this section, and it is use-

ful at this point to summarize the arguments and try to evaluate the status of the notion of

musical executive functioning, and consider how it relates to working memory and creativity.Schellenberg (2011) proposes that the general executive function (EF) plays little part in theassociation between taking music lessons and gaining high IQ scores, suggesting that this sim-

ply occurs because children with high IQs are more likely to take music lessons than those withlower scores. Apart from the question of the relationship between IQ and EF, which I raisedearlier, there is also the troublesome question of the possible influence of musical aptitude: isthis a variable that should have been controlled for in Schellenbergs study?

If our focus is now upon the relationships between general IQ, general EF, and musical apti-tude, the obvious next step is to consider the possible existence of a musical EF and this isprecisely what Ockelford (2007) has done. He proposes a music module in working memory

with a musical EF at its core, which also draws on general EF as well as on the short-term andalso long-term musical memory stores. Ockelford does not deal directly with the issue of musi-cal aptitude, but we can assume that the functioning of the music module is likely to be far more

advanced and active in people with high levels of aptitude. Ockelford (2012) also concurs withmy own view, expressed elsewhere in this paper, that musical processing in working memory isessentially creative in its operation, and I suggest that there may be some kind of neural basis

for this which leads directly on to the consideration of Dietrichs proposal of four distinct typesof creativity, each of which is rooted in a distinct system of neural processing.

The consideration of a possible neural basis for the musical EF, if indeed it does exist, is beyondus at this stage, but the evidence for it is growing. Aleksandar Aksentijevic and I suggested that:

There is a great deal of evidence that certain aspects of music are indeed cognitively unique. For

instance, unlike language, music is uniquely a spatio-temporal domain of activity, which engages

both hemispheres, which are differentially attuned to processing structural and temporal information.

This perhaps explains the close relationship between musical training and general intelligence. Thenon-semantic nature of musical information demands the involvement of both hemispheres, such

that music could act as a regulator of the general cognitive function, maintaining a dynamic equilib-

rium between the hemispheric biases towards linguistic and visuo-spatial abilities. (Hargreaves &

Aksentijevic, 2011, p. 307)

Returning to my original theme, I can now propose somewhat more specifically that musi-cal imagination is a term that might be used to apply to the activities of the musical EF; that is,

to the cognitive processing underlying music perception and production, which is essentiallycreative in character. This leads to a reconsideration of the original reciprocal-feedback mod-

els of musical response, performance and communication which were originally proposed byHargreaves et al. (2005), and I will conclude the paper with this.



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Hargreaves 553

6. Musical imagination and a revision of the reciprocal-feedback

model

The original reciprocal-feedback models were first presented in the opening chapter of ouredited book Musical Communication (Miell, MacDonald, & Hargreaves, 2005), which was

reviewed by Lamont (2006) in Musicae Scientiae. Lamont took us to task on a number of differ-ent issues: perhaps the most serious, concerning the book as a whole, was that she felt that wehad included too many different theoretical approaches to and formal diagrammatic models ofthe process of musical communication, and had failed to provide any overall perspective on all

of these. Although this point is well taken, I suspect that any attempt to impose an overallscheme on these disparate approaches would have been doomed to inevitable failure, princi-pally because the use of the term musical communication covers so many different phenom-

ena (rather like musical creativity; see third section). As Lamont points out, these include notonly communication within music (e.g., between performers), but also the communication ofinformation by means of music. She further suggests that this distinction runs parallel to our

own earlier distinction between identities in music and music in identities (in MacDonald,Hargreaves, & Miell, 2002), and that perhaps we should have organized this book, like our ear-lier one, around this distinction.

Lamont also criticizes our reciprocal-feedback model from two main points of view: first,

that our proposal that communication can be conceptualized as the spark that occurswhen a performance event gives rise to a response: this is only one of a number of differentapproaches to musical communication. The second objection lies in our conceptualization

of the listening situation as one of the three main sources of variation that make up themodel: that we conceive of situations and contexts as a (set of) variables. She contraststhis with those approaches which conceive of culture as a medium rather than as a variable,

and considers that the latter approach is more successful in explaining the true essence andcomplexity of musical communication. She takes this argument further elsewhere (Lamont,2011) in characterizing our approach as static, and rejecting it in favour of what she callsa diachronic process, with the cyclical interactions between listener and music continuing

across the life span (p. 59), and presents her own formal diagrammatic model of thelatter.

On reflection, the first criticism is justified: as our book makes clear, there are indeed many

different approaches to the explanation of musical communication, and the link between perfor-mance events and listener responses is only one of them. But the second criticism entirely missesthe point of the notion of the reciprocal-feedback relationships between the three main sets of

variables, and between each one of them and the set of response or performance variablesinvolved in our two initial models: that the reciprocity of these relationships, and thefeedback thatoccurs between them (as represented by the arrowheads at each end of each link in the model)

mean that the mutual influences of each one on all of the others are in a constant state of transi-tion, evolving over time such that the model is never static. Far from being in a vacuum, asLamont alleges, the music, the listener and the context are in a constant state of mutual interac-tion such that, for example, that between the music and the listener represents the constant

evolution and change in individual preferences and taste, to quote the labelling of that particu-lar feedback loop in the original model. The separate three-way reciprocal-feedback models ofresponse and performance can deal perfectly well with Lamonts second criticism, as well as with

all the features of her own diachronic model: their basic format does not need to change.



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What does need to be revised, however, is the combination of these two constituent models

into our previous model of communication. The arguments that I have developed in this paperlead to an obvious synthesis of the response and performance models to form a single modelwith musical imagination; that is, the creative musical EF at its core. If we redefine this as amodel of musical processing, rather than of communication, most of the suggestions made

throughout this paper can be incorporated. The specific factors represented in the music andsituations and contexts boxes of the model need no change: listener and performer need tobe combined, with the inclusion of composer and improviser: and if imagination now forms

the central core of the model, and is seen to incorporate both perception and production, themodel can be recast as shown in Figure 3.

In this revised model we can see that the main contents of the previous response and per-

formance factors are combined in the central box, and that each is determined by the cognitiveprocesses involved in imagination. The reciprocal-feedback aspects of the model remain, suchthat it is diachronic rather than static: and what also becomes apparent is that creativity, in

the sense of musical production, is only part of creative musical processing as a whole. It is alsopossible to see how several of the main concepts that have been discussed in this paper can be

PRODUCTION

performance: interpretation, expression

composition, improvisation

IMAGINATION

internal mental representations

schemas and cultural frames; scripts

neural basis

PERCEPTION

physiological, cognitive, affective responses

aesthetic preferences

Situations and

contextsMusic

Listener/composer/

improviser/performer

Figure 3. Revised reciprocal-feedback model of music processing



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Hargreaves 555

loosely mapped on to this. For example, the reciprocal-feedback loop linking the music with the

listener was described in the original response model as representing the constant evolutionand change in individual preferences and taste: this is directly relevant to the questions of theperception of beauty and the determinants of individual musical likes and dislikes, both ofwhich are of central concern here. Similarly, the reciprocal-feedback loop linking production

in the new version of the model and the music is where musical creativity, more strictly defined,can now be seen; and the reciprocal-feedback loop linking imagination and situations and con-texts represents the domain of socio-cultural approaches to creativity which were discussed in

the second sections, and which are dealt with in depth in the third part ofMusical Imaginations.I will finish with the views of three eminent thinkers who would undoubtedly have approved

of the emphasis on imagination. The first is John Dewey, the American philosopher, psycholo-

gist, and educator, who said that Every great advance in science has issued from a new audac-ity of imagination (Dewey, 1929, p. 294). The second is Albert Einstein, the originator ofseveral such advances who, in trying to explain his working methods in an interview published

in the Philadelphia Saturday Evening Post in October 1929, said that Im enough of an artist todraw freely on my imagination, which I think is more important than knowledge. Knowledge islimited. Imagination encircles the world. The third is the American composer Aaron Coplandwho wrote that The more I live the life of music, the more I am convinced that it is the freely

imaginative mind that is at the core of all vital music making and music listening . . . Imaginationin the listener in the gifted listener is what concerns us here (Copland, 1952, p. 17).

Acknowledgements

I should like to thank Linda Hargreaves, Jon Hargreaves, Adrian North, Adam Ockelford, and Emery

Schubert for their valuable comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

FundingThis research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-

profit sectors.

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Biography

David Hargreaves is Professor of Education and Froebel Research Fellow at RoehamptonUniversity. He has been Editor of Psychology of Music, Chair of the Research Commission of theInternational Society for Music Education (ISME), and is a Fellow of the British PsychologicalSociety. His books in psychology, education, the arts, and music have been translated into 15languages. He has appeared on BBC TV and radio as a jazz pianist and composer, and is organ-

ist on his local village church circuit, but really ought to do more jazz playing than he currentlyhas time for.

Psychology of Music 2012 Hargreaves 539 57_Imagination

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