Psychological Incapacity Brion

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CIVIL LAW

PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36

Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a]marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of

the celebration, was psychologically incapacitatedto comply with the essential marital obligations ofmarriage, shall likewise be void even if such

incapacity becomes manifest only after itssolemnization."[50] The concept of psychological

incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage isnovel in our body of laws, although mentalincapacity has long been recognized as a ground forthe dissolution of a marriage.

The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited fromcontracting marriage persons "who are not in the

full enjoyment of their reason at the time ofcontracting marriage."[51] Marriages with such

persons were ordained as void,[52] in the same class

as marriages with underage parties and personsalready married, among others. A party's mental

capacity was not a ground for divorce under theDivorce Law of 1917,[53] but a marriage where"either party was of unsound mind" at the time of its

celebration was cited as an "annullable marriage"under the Marriage Law of 1929.[54] Divorce on

the ground of a spouse's incurable insanity waspermitted under the divorce law enacted during theJapanese occupation.[55] Upon the enactment of the

Civil Code in 1950, a marriage contracted by a partyof "unsound mind" was classified under Article 85

of the Civil Code as a voidable marriage.[56] Themental capacity, or lack thereof, of the marryingspouse was not among the grounds for declaring amarriage void ab initio.[57] Similarly, among themarriages classified as voidable under Article 45 (2)

of the Family Code is one contracted by a party ofunsound mind.[58]

Such cause for the annulment of marriage isrecognized as a vice of consent, just like insanity

impinges on consent freely given which is one ofthe essential requisites of a contract.[59] The initial

common consensus on psychological incapacityunder Article 36 of the Family Code was that it didnot constitute a specie of vice of consent. Justices

Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of theFamily Code revision committee that drafted the

Code, have opined that psychological incapacity is

not a vice of consent, and conceded that the spousemay have given free and voluntary consent to a

marriage but was nonetheless incapable of fulfillingsuch rights and obligations.[60] Dr. Tolentinolikewise stated in the 1990 edition of his

commentaries on the Family Code that this"psychological incapacity to comply with the

essential marital obligations does not affect theconsent to the marriage."[61]

There were initial criticisms of this originalunderstanding of Article 36 as phrased by the

Family Code committee. Tolentino opined that"psychologically incapacity to comply would not be

juridically different from physical incapacity ofconsummating the marriage, which makes themarriage only voidable under Article 45 (5) of the

Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have been acause for annulment of the marriage only."[62] At

the same time, Tolentino noted "[it] would bedifferent if it were psychological incapacity tounderstand the essential marital obligations, because

then this would amount to lack of consent to themarriage."[63] These concerns though were

answered, beginning with Santos v. Court ofAppeals,[64] wherein the Court, through JusticeVitug, acknowledged that "psychological incapacity

should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive

of the basic marital covenants that concomitantlymust be assumed and discharged by the parties tothe marriage."[65]

The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to

the inability to understand the obligations ofmarriage, as opposed to a mere inability to complywith them, was further affirmed in the Molina[66]case. Therein, the Court, through then Justice (nowChief Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he

evidence [to establish psychological incapacity]must convince the court that the parties, or one of

them, was mentally or psychically ill to such extentthat the person could not have known theobligations he was assuming, or knowing them,

could not have given valid assumption thereto."[67]Jurisprudence since then has recognized that

psychological incapacity "is a malady so grave andpermanent as to deprive one of awareness of theduties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond

one is about to assume." [68]


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importance of the family and the constitutional

protection accorded to the institution of marriage.

But the Constitution itself does not establish theparameters of state protection to marriage as a socialinstitution and the foundation of the family. It

remains the province of the legislature to define alllegal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy

and the modalities to protect it, based on whateversocio-political influences it deems proper, andsubject of course to the qualification that such

legislative enactment itself adheres to theConstitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the

case, it also falls on the legislature to put intooperation the constitutional provisions that protectmarriage and the family. This has beenaccomplished at present through the enactment ofthe Family Code, which defines marriage and the

family, spells out the corresponding legal effects,imposes the limitations that affect married and

family life, as well as prescribes the grounds fordeclaration of nullity and those for legal separation.While it may appear that the judicial denial of a

petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of theconstitutional mandate to protect marriage, such

action in fact merely enforces a statutory definitionof marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decreeof what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances

warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not bethe only constitutional considerations to be taken

into account in resolving a petition for declarationof nullity.

Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, inclassifying marriages contracted by a

psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity,should be deemed as an implement of thisconstitutional protection of marriage. Given theavowed State interest in promoting marriage as thefoundation of the family, which in turn serves as the

foundation of the nation, there is a correspondinginterest for the State to defend against marriages ill-

equipped to promote family life. Void ab initiomarriages under Article 36 do not further theinitiatives of the State concerning marriage and

family, as they promote wedlock among personswho, for reasons independent of their will, are not

capacitated to understand or comply with theessential obligations of marriage.

These are the legal premises that inform us as wedecide the present petition.

Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case

As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelinespresently recognized in the judicial disposition ofpetitions for nullity under Article 36. The Court has

consistently applied Molina since its promulgationin 1997, and the guidelines therein operate as the

general rules. They warrant citation in full:

1) The burden of proof to show the nullity

of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Anydoubt should be resolved in favor of the

existence and continuation of the marriageand against its dissolution and nullity. Thisis rooted in the fact that both ourConstitution and our laws cherish thevalidity of marriage and unity of the family.

Thus, our Constitution devotes an entireArticle on the Family, recognizing it "as the

foundation of the nation." It decreesmarriage as legally "inviolable," thereby

protecting it from dissolution at the whim of

the parties. Both the family and marriageare to be "protectedby the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict onmarriage and the family and emphasizes their

permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

2) The root cause of the psychologicalincapacity must be: (a) medically orclinically identified, (b) alleged in the

complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by expertsand (d) clearly explained in the decision.

Article 36 of the Family Code requires thatthe incapacity must be psychologicalnot

physical, although its manifestations and/orsymptoms may be physical. The evidencemust convince the court that the parties, or

one of them, was mentally or psychically illto such an extent that the person could not

have known the obligations he wasassuming, or knowing them, could not havegiven valid assumption thereof. Although

no example of such incapacity need begiven here so as not to limit the application

of the provision under the principle ofejusdem generis, nevertheless such rootcause must be identified as a psychological

illness and its incapacitating nature fullyexplained. Expert evidence may be given by


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Te [29] simply suggested the relaxation of its

stringent requirements. We also explained thatSuazo [30] that Ngo Te [31] merely stands for a

more flexible approach in considering petitions fordeclaration of nullity of marriages based on

psychological incapacity. [32]

The Present Case

In the present case and using the above guidelines,we find the totality of the respondent's evidence -

the testimonies of the respondent and thepsychologist, and the latter's psychological report

and evaluation -insufficient to prove Juvy'spsychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 ofthe Family Code.

a. The respondent's testimony

The respondent's testimony merely showed that

Juvy: (a) refused to wake up early to preparebreakfast; (b) left their child to the care of theirneighbors when she went out of the house; (c)

squandered a huge amount of the P15,000.00 thatthe respondent entrusted to her; (d) stole the

respondent's ATM card and attempted to withdrawthe money deposited in his account; (e) falsified therespondent's signature in order to encash a check;

(f) made up false stories in order to borrow moneyfrom their relatives; and (g) indulged in gambling.

These acts, to our mind, do not per se rise to thelevel of psychological incapacity that the law

requires. We stress that psychological incapacitymust be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or

"neglect" in the performance of some maritalobligations. In Republic of the Philippines v.

Norma Cuison-Melgar, et al., [33] we ruled that itis not enough to prove that a spouse failed tomeet his responsibility and duty as a married

person; it is essential thathe or she must be shownto be incapable of doing so because of some

psychological, not physical, illness. In other words,proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor inthe person - an adverse integral element in the

personality structure that effectively incapacitatesthe person from really accepting and thereby

complying with the obligations essential to marriage- had to be shown. [34] A cause has to be shownand linked with the manifestations of the

psychological incapacity.

The respondent's testimony failed to show that

Juvy's condition is a manifestation of a disorderedpersonality rooted in some incapacitating or

debilitating psychological condition that renderedher unable to discharge her essential maritalobligation. In this light, the acts attributed to Juvy

only showed indications of immaturity and lack ofsense of responsibility, resulting in nothing more

than the difficulty, refusal or neglect in theperformance of marital obligations. In Ricardo B.Toring v. Teresita M. Toring, [35] we emphasized

that irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity orperversion, emotional immaturity and

irresponsibility, and the like do not by themselveswarrant a finding of psychological incapacity, asthese may only be due to a person's difficulty,refusal or neglect to undertake the obligations ofmarriage that is not rooted in some psychological

illness that Article 36 of the Family Code addresses.

In like manner, Juvy's acts of falsifying therespondent's signature to encash a check, of stealingthe respondent's ATM, and of squandering a huge

portion of the P15,000.00 that the respondententrusted to her, while no doubt reprehensible,

cannot automatically be equated with apsychological disorder, especially when theevidence shows that these were mere isolated

incidents and not recurring acts. Neither can Juvy'spenchant for playing mahjong and kuwaho for

money, nor her act of soliciting money fromrelatives on the pretext that her child was sick,warrant a conclusion that she suffered from a mental

malady at the time of the celebration of marriagethat rendered her incapable of fulfilling her marital

duties and obligations. The respondent, in fact,admitted that Juvy engaged in these behaviors(gambling and what the respondent refers to as"swindling") only two (2) years after their marriage,and after he let her handle his salary and manage

their finances. The evidence also shows that Juvyeven tried to augment the family's income during

the early stages of their marriage by putting up asari-sari store and by working as a manicurist.

b. The Psychologist's Report

The submitted psychological report hardly helps therespondent's cause, as it glaringly failed to establishthat Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to

perform her essential marital duties at the material


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time required by Article 36 of the Family Code.

To begin with, the psychologist admitted in her

report that she derived her conclusions exclusivelyfrom the information given her by the respondent.Expectedly, the respondent's description of Juvy

would contain a considerable degree of bias; thus, apsychological evaluation based on this one-sided

description alone can hardly be considered ascredible or sufficient. We are of course aware ofour pronouncement in Marcos [36] that the person

sought to be declared psychologically incapacitatedneed not be examined by the psychologist as a

condition precedent to arrive at a conclusion. If theincapacity can be proven by independent means, noreason exists why such independent proof cannot beadmitted to support a conclusion of psychologicalincapacity, independently of a psychologist's

examination and report. In this case, however, nosuch independent evidence has ever been gathered

and adduced. To be sure, evidence fromindependent sources who intimately knew Juvy

before and after the celebration of her marriage

would have made a lot of difference and could haveadded weight to the psychologist's report.

Separately from the lack of the requisite factualbasis, the psychologist's report simply stressed

Juvy's negative traits which she consideredmanifestations of Juvy's psychological incapacity

(e.g., laziness, immaturity and irresponsibility; herinvolvement in swindling and gambling activities;and her lack of initiative to change), and declared

that "psychological findings tend to confirm that thedefendant suffers from personality and behavioral

disorders x x x she doesn't manifest any sense ofresponsibility and loyalty, and these disordersappear to be incorrigible." [37] In the end, the

psychologist opined - without stating thepsychological basis for her conclusion - that

"there is sufficient reason to believe that thedefendant wife is psychologically incapacitated to

perform her marital duties as a wife and mother totheir only son." [38]

We find this kind of conclusion and report grosslyinadequate. First, we note that the psychologist did

not even identify the types of psychological testswhich she administered on the respondent and theroot cause of Juvy's psychological condition. We

also stress that the acts alleged to have beencommitted by Juvy all occurred during the

marriage; there was no showing that any mental

disorder existed at the inception of the marriage.Second, the report failed to prove the gravity or

severity of Juvy's alleged condition, specifically,why and to what extent the disorder is serious, andhow it incapacitated her to comply with her marital

duties. Significantly, the report did not evencategorically state the particular type of personality

disorder found. Finally, the report failed toestablish the incurability of Juvy's condition. Thereport's pronouncements that Juvy "lacks the

initiative to change" and that her mental incapacity"appears incorrigible" [39] are insufficient to prove

that her mental condition could not be treated, or ifit were otherwise, the cure would be beyond hermeans to undertake.

c. The Psychologist's Testimony

The psychologist's court testimony fared no better in

proving the juridical antecedence, gravity orincurability of Juvy's alleged psychological defectas she merely reiterated what she wrote in her

report - i.e., that Juvy was lazy and irresponsible;played mahjong and kuhawo for money; stole

money from the respondent; deceived people toborrow cash; and neglected her child - withoutlinking these to an underlying psychological cause.

Again, these allegations, even if true, all occurredduring the marriage. The testimony was totally

devoid of any information or insight into Juvy'searly life and associations, how she acted before andat the time of the marriage, and how the symptoms

of a disordered personality developed. Simply put,the psychologist failed to trace the history of Juvy's

psychological condition and to relate it to anexisting incapacity at the time of the celebration ofthe marriage.

She, likewise, failed to successfully prove the

elements of gravity and incurability. In theserespects, she merely stated that despite the

respondent's efforts to show love and affection,Juvy was hesitant to change. From this premise, she

jumped to the conclusion that Juvy appeared to be

incurable or incorrigible, and would be very hard tocure. These unfounded conclusions cannot be

equated with gravity or incurability that Article 36of the Family Code requires. To be declaredclinically or medically incurable is one thing; to

refuse or be reluctant to change is another. To harkback to what we earlier discussed, psychological


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incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of

personality disorders clearly demonstrative of anutter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and

significance to the marriage. [40]

The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and

strengthening the family as the basic socialinstitution, and marriage is the foundation of the

family. Marriage, as an inviolable institutionprotected by the State, cannot be dissolved at thewhim of the parties. In petitions for the declaration

of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to showthe nullity of marriage lies with the plaintiff. [41]

Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals asituation where the parties, or one of them, couldnot have validly entered into a marriage by reasonof a grave and serious psychological illness existingat the time it was celebrated, we are compelled to

uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie. [42]

WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, weGRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Decisionand the Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated

November 25, 2004 and May 9, 2005, respectively,in CA-G.R. CV No. 70004. Accordingly, we

DISMISS respondent Nestor Galang's petition forthe declaration of nullity of his marriage to JuvySalazar under Article 36 of the Family Code. Costs

against respondent Nestor Galang.

[ G.R. No. 170729, December 08, 2010 ]ENRIQUE AGRAVIADOR Y ALUNAN,PETITIONER, VS. ERLINDA AMPARO-

AGRAVIADOR AND REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

BRION, J.:

xxx

The Petition and Issues

The petitioner now comes to us via the presentpetition to challenge and seek the reversal of the CAruling, based on the following arguments:

THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY [HIM] WAS

MORE THAN SUBSTANTIAL TO ESTABLISHTHE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THERESPONDENT[;]

THE GUIDELINES SET FORTH IN REPUBLIC

V. MOLINA [HAD BEEN] SATISIFIED[;]

THE ADMISSIBILITY XXX OF THEPSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION REPORT XXXSTILL STANDS FOR NOT HAVING BEEN

CONTESTED XXX BY THE STATE AND/THERESPONDENT[; and]

THE DEGREE OF PROOF REQUIRED IN CIVILCASES HAD BEEN SATISIFIED[.]

The issue in this case essentially boils down to

whether there is basis to nullify the petitioner'smarriage to the respondent on the ground of

psychological incapacity to comply with theessential marital obligations.

The Court's Ruling

We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit,and hold that no sufficient basis exists to annul themarriage, pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code

and its related jurisprudence.

The totality of evidence presented failed to establishthe respondent's psychological incapacity.

The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage isanchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which

provides that "[a] marriage contracted by any partywho, at the time of the celebration, was

psychologically incapacitated to comply with the

essential marital obligations of marriage, shalllikewise be void even if such incapacity becomes

manifest only after its solemnization." It introducedthe concept of psychological incapacity as a groundfor nullity of marriage, although this concept eludesexact definition.

The initial common consensus on psychologicalincapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was

that it did not involve a species of vice of consent.Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members ofthe Family Code revision committee that drafted the

Code, conceded that the spouse may have given freeand voluntary consent to a marriage but was,

nonetheless, incapable of fulfilling such rights andobligations. Dr. Arturo Tolentino likewise stated inthe 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family

Code that this "psychological incapacity to comply


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with the essential marital obligations does not affect

the consent to the marriage."[17]

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[18] the Court firstdeclared that psychological incapacity must becharacterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical

antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to"no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that

causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basicmarital covenants that concomitantly must beassumed and discharged by the parties to the

marriage."[19] It must be confined to the mostserious cases of personality disorders clearly

demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability togive meaning and significance to the marriage.

We laid down more definitive guidelines in theinterpretation and application of Article 36 of the

Family Code in Republic v. Court of Appeals[20](the Molina case) where we said:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullityof the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any

doubt should be resolved in favor of theexistence and continuation of the marriage

and against its dissolution and nullity. Thisis rooted in the fact that both ourConstitution and our laws cherish the

validity of marriage and unity of the family.Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire

Article on the Family, recognizing it "as thefoundation of the nation." It decreesmarriage as legally "inviolable," thereby

protecting it from dissolution at the whim ofthe parties. Both the family and marriage

are to be "protected" by the state.



(2) The root cause of the psychological

incapacity must be (a) medically orclinically identified, (b) alleged in thecomplaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts

and (d) clearly explained in the decision.Article 36 of the Family Code requires that

the incapacity must be psychological - notphysical, although its manifestations and/orsymptoms may be physical. The evidence

must convince the court that the parties, orone of them, was mentally or psychically ill

to such an extent that the person could not

have known the obligations he wasassuming, or knowing them, could not have

given valid assumption thereof. Althoughno example of such incapacity need begiven here so as not to limit the application

of the provision under the principle ofejusdem generis, nevertheless such root

cause must be identified as a psychologicalillness and its incapacitating nature fullyexplained. Expert evidence may be given by

qualified psychiatrists and clinicalpsychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to beexisting at "the time of the celebration" ofthe marriage. The evidence must show thatthe illness was existing when the parties

exchanged their "I do's." The manifestationof the illness need not be perceivable at

such time, but the illness itself must haveattached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown tobe medically or clinically permanent or

incurable. Such incurability may be absoluteor even relative only in regard to the otherspouse, not necessarily absolutely against

everyone of the same sex. Furthermore,such incapacity must be relevant to the

assumption of marriage obligations, notnecessarily to those not related to marriage,like the exercise of a profession or

employment in a job. x x x

(5) Such illness must be grave enough tobring about the disability of the party toassume the essential obligations ofmarriage. Thus, "mild characteriological

peculiarities, mood changes, occasional

emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted asroot causes. The illness must be shown as

downright incapacity or inability, not arefusal, neglect or difficulty, much less illwill. In other words, there is a natal or

supervening disabling factor in the person,an adverse integral element in the

personality structure that effectivelyincapacitates the person from reallyaccepting and thereby complying with the

obligations essential to marriage.


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(6) The essential marital obligations must be

those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 ofthe Family Code as regards the husband and

wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 ofthe same Code in regard to parents and theirchildren. Such non-complied marital

obligation(s) must also be stated in thepetition, proven by evidence and included in

the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National

Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of theCatholic Church in the Philippines, while

not controlling or decisive, should be givengreat respect by our courts. x x x

(8) The trial court must order theprosecuting attorney or fiscal and the

Solicitor General to appear as counsel forthe state. No decision shall be handed down

unless the Solicitor General issues acertification, which will be quoted in thedecision, briefly stating therein his reasons

for his agreement or opposition, as the casemay be, to the petition. The Solicitor

General, along with the prosecutingattorney, shall submit to the court suchcertification within fifteen (15) days from

the date the case is deemed submitted forresolution of the court. The Solicitor

General shall discharge the equivalentfunction of the defensor vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095.

These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements

we established in Santos. A later case, Marcos v.Marcos,[21] further clarified that there is norequirement that the defendant/respondent spouseshould be personally examined by a physician or

psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the

declaration of nullity of marriage based onpsychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no

longer necessary to introduce expert opinion in apetition under Article 36 of the Family Code if thetotality of evidence shows that psychological

incapacity exists and its gravity, juridicalantecedence, and incurability can be duly

established.

A later case, Ngo Te v. Yu-Te,[22] declared that it

may have been inappropriate for the Court toimpose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in

resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. We

stated that instead of serving as a guideline, Molinaunintentionally became a straightjacket, forcing all

cases involving psychological incapacity to fit intoand be bound by it, which is not only contrary to theintention of the law but unrealistic as well because,

with respect to psychological incapacity, no casecan be considered as on "all fours" with another.

Ngo Te, therefore, put into question theapplicability of time-tested guidelines set forth inMolina.

Ting v. Velez-Ting[23] and the fairly recent case of

Suazo v. Suazo[24] squarely met the issue and laidto rest any question regarding the applicability ofMolina. In these cases, we clarified that Ngo Te didnot abandon Molina; far from abandoning Molina, itsimply suggested the relaxation of its stringent

requirements. We also explained in Suazo that NgoTe merely stands for a more flexible approach in

considering petitions for declaration of nullity ofmarriages based on psychological incapacity.

Under these established guidelines, we find thetotality of the petitioner's evidence insufficient to

prove the respondent's psychological incapacity.xxx

These exchanges during trial significantly

constituted the totality of the petitioner's testimonyon the respondent's supposed psychological or

mental malady. We glean from these exchanges thepetitioner's theory that the respondent'spsychological incapacity is premised on her refusal

or unwillingness to perform certain maritalobligations, and a number of unpleasant personality

traits such as immaturity, irresponsibility, andunfaithfulness.

These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level ofpsychological incapacity that the law requires, and

should be distinguished from the "difficulty," if notoutright "refusal" or "neglect," in the performance

of some marital obligations that characterize somemarriages.[26] The intent of the law has been toconfine the meaning of psychological incapacity to

the most serious cases of personality disorders -existing at the time of the marriage - clearly

demonstrating an utter insensitivity or inability togive meaning and significance to the marriage.[27]The psychological illness that must have afflicted a

party at the inception of the marriage should be amalady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of


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awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the

matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.[28]

In the present case, the petitioner's testimony failedto establish that the respondent's condition is amanifestation of a disordered personality rooted on

some incapacitating or debilitating psychologicalcondition that makes her completely unable to

discharge the essential marital obligations. If at all,the petitioner merely showed that the respondenthad some personality defects that showed their

manifestation during the marriage; his testimonysorely lacked details necessary to establish that the

respondent's defects existed at the inception of themarriage. In addition, the petitioner failed todiscuss the gravity of the respondent's condition;neither did he mention that the respondent's maladywas incurable, or if it were otherwise, the cure

would be beyond the respondent's means toundertake. The petitioner's declarations that the

respondent "does not accept her fault," "does notwant to change," and "refused to reform" areinsufficient to establish a psychological or mental

defect that is serious, grave, or incurable ascontemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code.

In a similar case, Bier v. Bier,[29] we ruled that itwas not enough that the respondent, alleged to be

psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty incomplying with his marital obligations, or was

unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of anatal or supervening disabling factor - an adverseintegral element in the respondent's personality

structure that effectively incapacitated him fromcomplying with his essential marital obligations -

had to be shown.

b. Dr. Patac's Psychiatric Evaluation Report

The Court finds that Dr. Patac's Psychiatric

Evaluation Report fell short in proving that therespondent was psychologically incapacitated to

perform the essential marital duties. We emphasizethat Dr. Patac did not personally evaluate andexamine the respondent; he, in fact, recommended

at the end of his Report for the respondent to"undergo the same examination [that the petitioner]

underwent."[30] Dr. Patac relied only on theinformation fed by the petitioner, the parties'second child, Emmanuel, and household helper.

Sarah. Largely, the doctor relied on the informationprovided by the petitioner. Thus, while his Report

can be used as a fair gauge to assess the petitioner's

own psychological condition (as he was, in fact,declared by Dr. Patac to be psychologically capable

to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage), thesame statement cannot be made with respect to therespondent's condition. The methodology employed

simply cannot satisfy the required depth andcomprehensiveness of the examination required to

evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from apsychological disorder.[31]

We do not suggest that a personal examination ofthe party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated

is mandatory. We have confirmed in Marcos v.Marcos that the person sought to be declared

psychologically incapacitated must be personallyexamined by a psychologist as a condition sine quanon to arrive at such declaration.[32] If a

psychological disorder can be proven byindependent means, no reason exists why such

independent proof cannot be admitted and givencredit.[33] No such independent evidence appearson record, however, to have been gathered in this

case.

In his Report, Dr. Patac attempted to establish thejuridical antecedence of the respondent's conditionby stating that the respondent manifested "inflexible

maladaptive behavior" before marriage, pointing outhow the respondent behaved before the marriage -

the respondent defied her parents and lived alone;rented a room for herself; and allowed the petitionerto sleep with her. These perceived behavioral flaws,

to our mind, are insufficient to establish that theincapacity was rooted in the history of the

respondent antedating the marriage. Dr. Patac failedto elucidate on the circumstances that led therespondent to act the way she did, for example, whyshe "defied her parents" and decided to live alone;why she "neglected her obligations as a daughter;"

and why she often slept with the petitioner. This isan area where independent evidence, such as

information from a person intimately related to therespondent, could prove useful. As earlier stated, nosuch independent evidence was gathered in this

case. In the absence of such evidence, it is notsurprising why the Psychiatric Report Evaluation

failed to explain how and why the respondent's so-called inflexible maladaptive behavior was already

present at the time of the marriage.


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Dr. Patac's Psychiatric Evaluation Report likewise

failed to prove the gravity or seriousness of therespondent's condition. He simply made an

enumeration of the respondent's purportedbehavioral defects (as related to him by thirdpersons), and on this basis characterized the

respondent to be suffering from mixed personalitydisorder. In the "Background History" portion of his

Psychiatric Evaluation Report, Dr. Patac mentionedthat the respondent employed one of her siblings todo the household chores; did not help in

augmenting the family's earnings; belittled thepetitioner's income; continued her studies despite

the petitioner's disapproval; seldom stayed at home;became "close" to a male border; had an affairwith a lesbian; did not disclose the actual date ofher departure to Taiwan; threatened to poison the

petitioner and their children; neglected and

ignored their children; used her maiden name atwork; and consulted a witch doctor to bring bad

fate to the petitioner. Except for the isolated andunfounded statement that "Erlinda's lack ofmotivation and insight greatly affected her

capacity to render love, respect and support to thefamily,"[34] there was no other statement regarding

the degree of severity of the respondent'scondition, why and to what extent the disorder isgrave, and how it incapacitated her to comply with

the duties required in marriage. There waslikewise no showing of a supervening disabling

factor or debilitating psychological condition thateffectively incapacitated the respondent fromcomplying with the essential marital obligations. At

any rate, the personality flaws mentioned above,even if true, could only amount to insensitivity,

sexual infidelity, emotional immaturity, andirresponsibility, which do not by themselves warranta finding of psychological incapacity under Article36 of the Family Code.

Interestingly, Dr. Patac's Psychiatric EvaluationReport highlighted only the respondent's negative

behavioral traits without balancing them with herother qualities. The allegations of infidelity andinsinuations of promiscuity, as well as the claim that

the respondent refused to engage in sexualintercourse since 1993, of course, came from the

petitioner, but these claims were not proven. Evenassuming ex gratia argumenti that these accusationswere true, the Psychiatric Evaluation Report did not

indicate that unfaithfulness or promiscuousnesswere traits that antedated or existed at the time of

marriage. Likewise, the accusation that the

respondent abandoned her sick child whicheventually led to the latter's death appears to be an

exaggerated claim in the absence of any specificsand corroboration. On the other hand, the

petitioner's own questionable traits - his flirtatious

nature before marriage and his admission that heinflicted physical harm on the respondent every

time he got jealous - were not pursued. From thisperspective, the Psychiatric Evaluation Reportappears to be no more than a one-sided diagnosis

against the respondent that we cannot consider areliable basis to conclusively establish the root

cause and the degree of seriousness of hercondition.

The Psychiatric Evaluation Report likewise failed toadequately explain how Dr. Patac came to the

conclusion that the respondent's personality disorderhad "no definite treatment." It did not discuss the

concept of mixed personality disorder, i.e., itsclassification, cause, symptoms, and cure, and failedto show how and to what extent the respondent

exhibited this disorder in order to create a necessaryinference that the respondent's condition had no

definite treatment or is incurable. A glaringdeficiency, to our mind, is the PsychiatricEvaluation Report's failure to support its findings

and conclusions with any factual basis. It simplyenumerated the respondent's perceived behavioral

defects, and then associated these traits with mixedpersonality disorder. We find it unfortunate that Dr.Patac himself was not called on the witness stand to

expound on the findings and conclusions he made inhis Psychiatric Evaluation Report. It would have

aided petitioner's cause had he called Dr. Patac totestify.

Admittedly, the standards used by the Court inassessing the sufficiency of psychological

evaluation reports may be deemed very strict, butthese are proper, in view of the principle that any

doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity ofthe marriage and the indissolubility of the maritalvinculum.[35] Marriage, an inviolable institution

protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at thewhim of the parties, especially where the prices of

evidence presented are grossly deficient to show thejuridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of thecondition of the party alleged to be psychologically

incapacitated to assume and perform the essentialmarital duties.


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The petitioner's marriage to the respondent mayhave failed and appears to be without hope of

reconciliation The remedy, however, is not alwaysto have it declared void ab initio on the ground of

psychological incapacity. We stress that Article 36

of the Family Code contemplates downrightincapacity or inability to assume and fulfill the

basic marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglector difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of theerrant spouse. It is not to be confused with a

divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the timethe grounds for divorce manifest themselves. The

State, fortunately or unfortunately, has not seen it fitto decree that divorce should be available in thiscountry. Neither should an Article 36 declaration ofnullity be equated with legal separation, in whichthe grounds need not be rooted in psychological

incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure,moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction,

sexual infidelity, abandonment, and the like.[36]Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals asituation where the parties or one of them, by reason

of a grave and incurable psychological illnessexisting at the time the marriage was celebrated,

was incapacitated to fulfill the obligations of maritallife (and thus could not then have validly enteredinto a marriage), then we are compelled to uphold

the indissolubility of the marital tie.

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, weDENY the petition and AFFIRM the Decision andthe Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated May

31, 2005 and December 6, 2005, respectively, inCA-G.R. CV No. 75207. Costs against the

petitioner.

[ G.R. No. 165321, August 03, 2010 ]RICARDO P. TORING, PETITIONER, VS.TERESITA M. TORING AND REPUBLIC OF

THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

BRION, J.:

xxx

THE PETITION AND THE PARTIES'

ARGUMENTS

Ricardo faults the CA for disregarding the factual

findings of the trial court, particularly the experttestimony of Dr. Albaran, and submits that the trial

court - in declaring the nullity of the marriage - fully

complied with Molina.

In its Comment,[8] the OSG argued that the CAcorrectly reversed the RTC's decision, particularlyin its conclusion that Ricardo failed to comply with

this Court's guidelines for the proper interpretationand application of Article 36 of the Family Code.

Reiterating its earlier arguments below, the OSGasserts that the evidence adduced before the trialcourt failed to show the gravity, juridical

antecedence, or incurability of the psychologicalincapacity of Teresita, and failed as well to identify

and discuss its root cause. The psychiatrist,likewise, failed to show that Teresita wascompletely unable to discharge her maritalobligations due to her alleged NarcissisticPersonality Disorder.

Ricardo's Reply[9] reiterated that the RTC decision

thoroughly discussed the root cause of Teresita'spsychological incapacity and identified it asNarcissistic Personality Disorder. He claimed that

sufficient proof had been adduced by thepsychiatrist whose expertise on the subject cannot

be doubted. Interestingly, Ricardo further arguedthat alleging the root cause in a petition forannulment under Article 36 of the Family Code is

no longer necessary, citing Barcelona v. Court ofAppeals.[10]

These positions were collated and reiterated in thememoranda the parties filed.

THE COURT'S RULING

We find the petition unmeritorious, as the CAcommitted no reversible error when it set aside theRTC's decision for lack of legal and factual basis.

In the leading case of Santos v. Court of Appeals, etal.,[11] we held that psychological incapacity under

Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterizedby (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)incurability, to be sufficient basis to annul a

marriage. The psychological incapacity should referto "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity

that causes a party to be truly incognitive of thebasic marital covenants that concomitantly must beassumed and discharged by the parties to the

marriage."[12]


15/38

We further expounded on Article 36 of the Family

Code in Molina and laid down definitive guidelinesin the interpretation and application of this article.

These guidelines incorporate the basic requirementsof gravity, juridical antecedence and incurabilityestablished in the Santos case, as follows:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity

of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Anydoubt should be resolved in favor of theexistence and continuation of the marriage

and against its dissolution and nullity. Thisis rooted in the fact that both our

Constitution and our laws cherish thevalidity of marriage and unity of the family.Thus, our Constitution devotes an entireArticle on the Family, recognizing it "as thefoundation of the nation." It decrees

marriage as legally "inviolable," therebyprotecting it from dissolution at the whim of

the parties. Both the family and marriageare to be "protected" by the state.



(2) The root cause of the psychological

incapacity must be (a) medically orclinically identified, (b) alleged in the

complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by expertsand (d) clearly explained in the decision.Article 36 of the Family Code requires that

the incapacity must be psychological - notphysical, although its manifestations and/or

symptoms may be physical. The evidencemust convince the court that the parties, orone of them, was mentally or psychically illto such an extent that the person could nothave known the obligations he was

assuming, or knowing them, could not havegiven valid assumption thereof. Although

no example of such incapacity need begiven here so as not to limit the applicationof the provision under the principle of

ejusdem generis (Salita v. Magtolis, 233SCRA 100, 108), nevertheless such root

cause must be identified as a psychologicalillness and its incapacitating nature fullyexplained. Expert evidence may be given by

qualified psychiatrists and clinicalpsychologists.

(3)The incapacity must be proven to beexisting at "the time of the celebration" of

the marriage. The evidence must show thatthe illness was existing when the partiesexchanged their "I do's." The manifestation

of the illness need not be perceivable atsuch time, but the illness itself must have

attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to

be medically or clinically permanent orincurable. Such incurability may be absolute

or even relative only in regard to the otherspouse, not necessarily absolutely againsteveryone of the same sex. Furthermore,such incapacity must be relevant to theassumption of marriage obligations, not

necessarily to those not related to marriage,like the exercise of a profession or

employment in a job. Hence, a pediatricianmay be effective in diagnosing illnesses ofchildren and prescribing medicine to cure

them but may not be psychologicallycapacitated to procreate, bear and raise

his/her own children as an essentialobligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough tobring about the disability of the party to

assume the essential obligations ofmarriage. Thus, "mild characteriological

peculiarities, mood changes, occasional

emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted asroot causes. The illness must be shown as

downright incapacity or inability, not arefusal, neglect or difficulty, much less illwill. In other words, there is a natal orsupervening disabling factor in the person,an adverse integral element in the

personality structure that effectivelyincapacitates the person from really

accepting and thereby complying with theobligations essential to marriage.

(6)The essential marital obligations must bethose embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of

the Family Code as regards the husband andwife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 ofthe same Code in regard to parents and their

children. Such non-complied maritalobligation(s) must also be stated in the


16/38

petition, proven by evidence and included in

the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the NationalAppellate Matrimonial Tribunal of theCatholic Church in the Philippines, while

not controlling or decisive, should be givengreat respect by our courts.[13]

Subsequent jurisprudence on psychologicalincapacity applied these basic guidelines to varying

factual situations, thus confirming the continuingdoctrinal validity of Santos. In so far as the present

factual situation is concerned, what should not belost in reading and applying our established rulingsis the intent of the law to confine the application ofArticle 36 of the Family Code to the most seriouscases of personality disorders; these are the

disorders that result in the utter insensitivity orinability of the afflicted party to give meaning and

significance to the marriage he or she contracted.Furthermore, the psychological illness and its rootcause must have been there from the inception of

the marriage. From these requirements arise theconcept that Article 36 of the Family Code does not

really dissolve a marriage; it simply recognizes thatthere never was any marriage in the first place

because the affliction - already then existing - was

so grave and permanent as to deprive the afflictedparty of awareness of the duties and responsibilities

of the matrimonial bond he or she was to assume orhad assumed.[14]

In the present case and guided by these standards,we find the totality of the petitioner's evidence to be

insufficient to prove that Teresita waspsychologically incapacitated to perform her dutiesas a wife. As already mentioned, the evidence

presented consisted of the testimonies of Ricardoand Dr. Albaran, and the latter's psychological

evaluation of Ricardo and Richardson from whereshe derived a psychological evaluation of Teresita.

a. Dr. Albaran's psychological evaluation andtestimony

Dr. Albaran concluded in her psychological

evaluation that Teresita suffers from NarcissisticPersonality Disorder that rendered her

psychologically incapacitated to assume essential

marital obligations. To support her findings andconclusion, she banked on the statements told to her

by Ricardo and Richardson, which she narrated in

her evaluation. Apparently relying on the samebasis, Dr. Albaran added that Teresita's disorder

manifested during her early adulthood and is graveand incurable.

To say the least, we are greatly disturbed by thekind of testimony and evaluation that, in this case,

became the basis for the conclusion that no marriagereally took place because of the psychologicalincapacity of one of the parties at the time of

marriage.

We are in no way convinced that a mere narration ofthe statements of Ricardo and Richardson, coupledwith the results of the psychological testsadministered only on Ricardo, without more,already constitutes sufficient basis for the

conclusion that Teresita suffered from NarcissisticPersonality Disorder. This Court has long been

negatively critical in considering psychologicalevaluations, presented in evidence, derived solelyfrom one-sided sources, particularly from the

spouse seeking the nullity of the marriage.

In So v. Valera,[15] the Court considered thepsychologist's testimony and conclusions to beinsufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to

warrant the finding of respondent's psychologicalincapacity because the facts, on which the

conclusions were based, were all derived from thepetitioner's statements whose bias in favor of hiscause cannot be discounted. In another case,

Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua,[16] the Courtdeclared that while the various tests administered on

the petitioner-wife could have been used as a fairgauge to assess her own psychological condition,this same statement could not be made with respectto the respondent-husband's psychologicalcondition. To our mind, conclusions and

generalizations about Teresita's psychologicalcondition, based solely on information fed by

Ricardo, are not any different in kind fromadmitting hearsay evidence as proof of thetruthfulness of the content of such evidence.[17]

To be sure, we have recognized that the law does

not require that the allegedly incapacitated spousebe personally examined by a physician or by apsychologist as a condition sine qua non for the

declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36of the Family Code.[18] This recognition, however,


17/38


18/38

only proves our point that a complete personality

profile of the spouse, alleged to be psychologicallyincapacitated, could not be determined from meager

information coming only from a biased source.

b. Ricardo's testimony

Ricardo testified in court that Teresita was a

squanderer and an adulteress. We do not, however,find Ricardo's characterizations of his wifesufficient to constitute psychological incapacity

under Article 36 of the Family Code. Article 36contemplates downright incapacity or inability to

take cognizance of and to assume basic maritalobligations. Mere "difficulty," "refusal, or "neglect"in the performance of marital obligations or "illwill" on the part of the spouse is different from"incapacity" rooted on some debilitating

psychological condition or illness.[21]

Ricardo's testimony merely established that Teresitawas irresponsible in managing the family's finances

by not paying their rent, utility bills and other

financial obligations. Teresita's spendthrift attitude,according to Ricardo, even resulted in the loss of the

house and lot intended to be their family residence.This kind of irresponsibility, however, does not riseto the level of a psychological incapacity required

under Article 36 of the Family Code. At most,Teresita's mismanagement of the family's finances

merely constituted difficulty, refusal or neglect,during the marriage, in the handling of fundsintended for the family's financial support.

Teresita's alleged infidelity, even if true, likewise

does not constitute psychological incapacity underArticle 36 of the Family Code. In order for sexualinfidelity to constitute as psychological incapacity,the respondent's unfaithfulness must be establishedas a manifestation of a disordered personality,

completely preventing the respondent fromdischarging the essential obligations of the marital

state;[22] there must be proof of a natal orsupervening disabling factor that effectivelyincapacitated her from complying with the

obligation to be faithful to her spouse.[23]

In our view, Ricardo utterly failed in his testimonyto prove that Teresita suffered from a disordered

personality of this kind. Even Ricardo's added

testimony, relating to rumors of Teresita's dateswith other men and her pregnancy by another man,

would not fill in the deficiencies we have observed,

given the absence of an adverse integral elementand link to Teresita's allegedly disordered

personality.

Moreover, Ricardo failed to prove that Teresita's

alleged character traits already existed at theinception of their marriage. Article 36 of the Family

Code requires that the psychological incapacitymust exist at the time of the celebration of themarriage, even if such incapacity becomes manifest

only after its solemnization.[24] In the absence ofthis element, a marriage cannot be annulled under

Article 36.

Root cause of the psychological incapacity needs tobe alleged in a petition for annulment under Article36 of the Family Code Citing Barcelona,[25]

Ricardo defended the RTC decision, alleging thatthe root cause in a petition for annulment under

Article 36 of the Family Code is no longernecessary. We find this argument completely atvariance with Ricardo's main argument against the

assailed CA decision - i.e., that the RTC, in itsdecision, discussed thoroughly the root cause of

Teresita's psychological incapacity as NarcissisticPersonality Disorder. These conflicting positions,notwithstanding, we see the need to address this

issue to further clarify our statement in Barcelona,which Ricardo misquoted and misinterpreted to

support his present petition that "since the newRules do not require the petition to allege expertopinion on the psychological incapacity, it follows

that there is also no need to allege in the petition theroot cause of the psychological incapacity."[26]

In Barcelona, the petitioner assailed the bid forannulment for its failure to state the "root cause" ofthe respondent's alleged psychological incapacity.The Court resolved this issue, ruling that the

petition sufficiently stated a cause of action becausethe petitioner - instead of stating a specific root

cause - clearly described the physical manifestationsindicative of the psychological incapacity. This, theCourt found to be sufficiently compliant with the

first requirement in the Molina case - that the "rootcause" of the psychological incapacity be alleged in

an Article 36 petition.

Thus, contrary to Ricardo's position, Barcelona does

not do away with the "root cause" requirement. Theruling simply means that the statement of the root


19/38

cause does not need to be in medical terms or be

technical in nature, as the root causes of manypsychological disorders are still unknown to

science. It is enough to merely allege the physicalmanifestations constituting the root cause of the

psychological incapacity. Section 2, paragraph (d)

of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity ofVoid Marriages and Annulment of Voidable

Marriages (Rules)[27] in fact provides:

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity

of void marriages.

x x x x

(d) What to allege. - A petition under Article 36 ofthe Family Code shall specially allege the completefacts showing that either or both parties were

psychologically incapacitated from complying withthe essential marital obligations of marriages at the

time of the celebration of marriage even if suchincapacity becomes manifest only after itscelebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical

manifestations, if any, as are indicative ofpsychological incapacity at the time of thecelebration of the marriage but expert opinion need

not be alleged.

As we explained in Barcelona, the requirementalleging the root cause in a petition for annulmentunder Article 36 of the Family Code was not

dispensed with by the adoption of the Rules. Whatthe Rules really eliminated was the need for an

expert opinion to prove the root cause of thepsychological incapacity. The Court further heldthat the Rules, being procedural in nature, applyonly to actions pending and unresolved at the timeof their adoption.

To sum up, Ricardo failed to discharge the burden

of proof to show that Teresita suffered frompsychological incapacity; thus, his petition forannulment of marriage must fail. Ricardo merely

established that Teresita had been remiss in herduties as a wife for being irresponsible in taking

care of their family's finances - a fault or deficiencythat does not amount to the psychological incapacitythat Article 36 of the Family Code requires. We

reiterate that irreconcilable differences, sexualinfidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and

irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves

warrant a finding of psychological incapacity, as thesame may only be due to a person's difficulty,

refusal or neglect to undertake the obligations ofmarriage that is not rooted in some psychologicalillness that Article 36 of the Family Code

addresses.[28]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY thepetition and AFFIRM the decision of the Court ofAppeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71882. Costs against

the petitioner.

[ G.R. No. 164493, March 10, 2010 ]JOCELYN M. SUAZO, PETITIONER, VS.ANGELITO SUAZO AND REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

BRION, J.:

xxx

THE PETITION

Jocelyn now comes to us via the present petition to

challenge and seek the reversal of the CA rulingbased on the following arguments:

1. The Court of Appeals went beyond what the lawsays, as it totally disregarded the legal basis of the

RTC in declaring the marriage null and void -Tuason v. Tuason (256 SCRA 158; to be accurate,should be Tuason v. Court of Appeals) holds that

"the finding of the Trial Court as to the existence ornon-existence of petitioner's psychological

incapacity at the time of the marriage is final andbinding on us (the Supreme Court); petitioner hasnot sufficiently shown that the trial court's factualfindings and evaluation of the testimonies of privaterespondent's witnesses vis--vis petitioner's

defenses are clearly and manifestly erroneous";

2. Article 36 of the Family Code did not definepsychological incapacity; this omission wasintentional to give the courts a wider discretion to

interpret the term without being shackled bystatutory parameters. Article 36 though was taken

from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law,which gives three conditions that would make a

person unable to contract marriage from mental

incapacity as follows:


20/38

"1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:

(1) who lack the sufficient use of reason;

(2) who suffer from grave lack of discretion ofjudgment concerning essential matrimonial rights

and duties which are to be mutually given andaccepted;

(3) who are not capable of assuming the essentialobligations of matrimony due to causes of a psychic

nature."

The decision of the RTC, Jocelyn claims,intelligently conforms to these criteria. The RTC,

being clothed with discretionary functions, appliedits finding of psychological incapacity based onexisting jurisprudence and the law itself which gave

lower court magistrates enough latitude to definewhat constitutes psychological incapacity. On the

contrary, she further claims, the OSG relied ongeneralities without being specific on why it isopposed to the dissolution of a marriage that

actually exists only in name.

Simply stated, we face the issue of whether there isbasis to nullify Jocelyn's marriage with Angelitounder Article 36 of the Family Code.

THE COURT'S RULING

We find the petition devoid of merit. The CA

committed no reversible error of law in setting asidethe RTC decision, as no basis exists to declare

Jocelyn's marriage with Angelito a nullity underArticle 36 of the Family Code and its related

jurisprudence.

The Law, Molina and Te

Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a

marriage contracted by any party who, at the time ofthe celebration, was psychologically incapacitatedto comply with the essential marital obligations of

marriage, shall likewise be void even if suchincapacity becomes manifest only after its

solemnization.

A unique feature of this law is its intended open-

ended application, as it merely introduced anabstract concept - psychological incapacity that

disables compliance with the contractual obligations

of marriage - without any concrete definition or, atthe very least, an illustrative example. We must

therefore apply the law based on how the concept ofpsychological incapacity was shaped and developedin jurisprudence.

Santos v. Court of Appeals[9] declared that

psychological incapacity must be characterized by(a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c)incurability. It should refer to "no less than a mental

(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to betruly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that

concomitantly must be assumed and discharged bythe parties to the marriage." It must be confined to"the most serious cases of personality disordersclearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity orinability to give meaning and significance to the

marriage."[10]

The Court laid down more definitive guidelines inthe interpretation and application of the law inRepublic v. Court of Appeals[11] (Molina) as

follows:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullityof the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Anydoubt should be resolved in favor of the

existence and continuation of the marriageand against its dissolution and nullity. This

is rooted in the fact that both ourConstitution and our laws cherish thevalidity of marriage and unity of the family.

Thus, our Constitution devotes an entireArticle on the Family, recognizing it "as the

foundation of the nation." It decreesmarriage as legally "inviolable," thereby

protecting it from dissolution at the whim ofthe parties. Both the family and marriageare to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on

marriage and the family and emphasizes theirpermanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychologicalincapacity must be (a) medically or

clinically identified, (b) alleged in thecomplaint, (c) sufficiently proven by expertsand (d) clearly explained in the decision.

Article 36 of the Family Code requires thatthe incapacity must be psychological - not


21/38

physical, although its manifestations and/or

symptoms may be physical. The evidencemust convince the court that the parties or

one of them was mentally or psychically illto such an extent that the person could nothave known the obligations he was

assuming, or knowing them, could not havegiven valid assumption thereof. Although

no example of such incapacity need begiven here so as not to limit the applicationof the provision under the principle of

ejusdem generis, nevertheless such rootcause must be identified as a psychological

illness and its incapacitating nature fullyexplained. Expert evidence may be given byqualified psychiatrists and clinical

psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to beexisting at "the time of the celebration" of

the marriage. The evidence must show thatthe illness was existing when the partiesexchanged their "I do's." The manifestation

of the illness need not be perceivable atsuch time, but the illness itself must have

attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to

be medically or clinically permanent orincurable. Such incurability may be absolute

or even relative only in regard to the otherspouse, not necessarily absolutely againsteveryone of the same sex. Furthermore,

such incapacity must be relevant to theassumption of marriage obligations, not

necessarily to those not related to marriage,like the exercise of a profession oremployment in a job. x x x

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to

bring about the disability of the party toassume the essential obligations of

marriage. Thus, "mild characteriologicalpeculiarities, mood changes, occasionalemotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as

root causes. The illness must be shown asdownright incapacity or inability, not a

refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less illwill. In other words, there is a natal orsupervening disabling factor in the person,

an adverse integral element in thepersonality structure that effectively

incapacitates the person from really

accepting and thereby complying with theobligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must bethose embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of

the Family Code as regards the husband andwife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of

the same Code in regard to parents and theirchildren. Such non-complied maritalobligation(s) must also be stated in the

petition, proven by evidence and included inthe text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the NationalAppellate Matrimonial Tribunal of theCatholic Church in the Philippines, whilenot controlling or decisive, should be given

great respect by our courts x x x

(8) The trial court must order theprosecuting attorney or fiscal and theSolicitor General to appear as counsel for

the state. No decision shall be handed downunless the Solicitor General issues a

certification, which will be quoted in thedecision, briefly stating therein his reasonsfor his agreement or opposition, as the case

may be, to the petition. The SolicitorGeneral, along with the prosecuting

attorney, shall submit to the court suchcertification within fifteen (15) days fromthe date the case is deemed submitted for

resolution of the court. The SolicitorGeneral shall discharge the equivalent

function of the defensor vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095.[12]

Molina, subsequent jurisprudence holds, merelyexpounded on the basic requirements of Santos.[13]

A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[14] further clarified

that there is no requirement that thedefendant/respondent spouse should be personallyexamined by a physician or psychologist as a

condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullityof marriage based on psychological incapacity.

Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduceexpert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of theFamily Code if the totality of evidence shows that

psychological incapacity exists and its gravity,


22/38

juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly

established.[15]

Pesca v. Pesca[16] clarifies that the Molinaguidelines apply even to cases then already pending,under the reasoning that the court's interpretation or

construction establishes the contemporaneouslegislative intent of the law; the latter as so

interpreted and construed would thus constitute apart of that law as of the date the statute is enacted.It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds

itself later overruled, and a different view isadopted, that the new doctrine may have to be

applied prospectively in favor of parties who haverelied on the old doctrine and have acted in goodfaith in accordance therewith under the familiar ruleof "lex prospicit, non respicit."

On March 15, 2003, the Rule on Declaration ofAbsolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment

of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 08-11-10 SC,Rules) promulgated by the Court took effect.Section 2(d) of the Rules pertinently provides:

(d) What to allege. - A petition under Article 36 ofthe Family Code shall specifically allege thecomplete facts showing that either or both parties

were psychologically incapacitated from complyingwith the essential marital obligations of marriage at

the time of the celebration of marriage even if suchincapacity becomes manifest only after itscelebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical

manifestations, if any, as are indicative ofpsychological incapacity at the time of thecelebration of the marriage but expert opinion neednot be alleged.

Section 12(d) of the Rules requires a pre-trial briefcontaining all the evidence presented, including

expert opinion, if any, briefly stating or describingthe nature and purpose of these pieces of evidence.Section 14(b) requires the court to consider during

the pre-trial conference the advisability of receivingexpert testimony and such other matters as may aid

in the prompt disposition of the petition. UnderSection 17 of the Rules, the grounds for thedeclaration of the absolute nullity or annulment of

marriage must be proved.

All cases - involving the application of Article 36 of

the Family Code - that came to us were invariablydecided based on the principles in the cited cases.

This was the state of law and jurisprudence onArticle 36 when the Court decided Te v. Yu-Te[17](Te) which revisited the Molina guidelines.

Te begins with the observation that the Committee

that drafted the Family Code did not give anyexamples of psychological incapacity for fear that

by so doing, it would limit the applicability of the

provision under the principle of ejusdem generis;that the Committee desired that the courts should

interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,guided by experience, by the findings of experts andresearchers in psychological disciplines, and bydecisions of church tribunals that, although not

binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive

effect since the provision itself was taken from theCanon Law.[18] Te thus assumes it a basic premise

thatthe law is so designed to allow some resiliencyin its application.[19]

Te then sustained Santos' doctrinal value, sayingthat its interpretation is consistent with that of the

Canon Law.

Going back to its basic premise, Te said:

Conscious of the law's intention that it is the courts,

on a case-to-case basis, that should determinewhether a party to a marriage is psychologicallyincapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower

court's judgment of annulment in Tuason v. Court ofAppeals, ruled that the findings of the trial court are

final and binding on the appellate courts.

Again, upholding the trial court's findings anddeclaring that its decision was not a judgment on the

pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,

explained that when private respondent testifiedunder oath before the lower court and was cross-

examined by the adverse party, she therebypresented evidence in the form of testimony.Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel decisions

of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that thesenseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties

to fulfill the marital obligation of procreatingchildren is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

With this as backdrop, Te launched an attack onMolina. It said that the resiliency with which the


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concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis

by which the provision should be interpreted, as sointended by its framers, had, somehow, been

rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set ofstrict standards in Molina. Molina, to Te, has

become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into

and be bound by it; wittingly or unwittingly, theCourt, in conveniently applying Molina, has

allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics,nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, tocontinuously debase and pervert the sanctity of

marriage.

Te then enunciated the principle that each case mustbe judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,predilections or generalizations, but according to itsown facts. Courts should interpret the provision on acase-to-case basis, guided by experience, the

findings of experts and researchers in psychologicaldisciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

As a final note though, Te expressly stated that it isnot suggesting the abandonment of Molina, but that,

following Antonio v. Reyes, it merely looked atother perspectives that should also govern the

disposition of petitions for declaration of nullityunder Article 36. The subsequent Ting v. Velez-Ting[20] follows Te's lead when it reiterated that Te

did not abandon Molina; far from abandoningMolina, it simply suggested the relaxation of its

stringent requirements, cognizant of the explanationgiven by the Committee on the Revision of theRules on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of

Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulmentof Voidable Marriages:[21]

To require the petitioner to allege in the petition theparticular root cause of the psychological incapacityand to attach thereto the verified written report of anaccredited psychologist or psychiatrist have proved

to be too expensive for the parties. They adverselyaffect access to justice of poor litigants. It is also a

fact that there are provinces where these experts arenot available. Thus, the Committee deemed itnecessary to relax this stringent requirement

enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for theexamination of a party or parties by a psychiatrist or

clinical psychologist and the presentation ofpsychiatric experts shall now be determined by thecourt during the pre-trial conference.

Te, therefore, instead of substantially departing

from Molina,[22] merely stands for a more flexibleapproach in considering petitions for declaration of

nullity of marriages based on psychologicalincapacity. It is also noteworthy for its evidentiaryapproach in these cases, which it expounded on as

follows:

By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despitehaving the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must

consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion onthe psychological and mental temperaments of the

parties.

x x x x

Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the

importance of presenting expert testimony toestablish the precise cause of a party's psychological

incapacity, and to show that it existed at theinception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcosasserts, there is no requirement that the person to be

declared psychologically incapacitated bepersonally examined by a physician, if the totality

of evidence presented is enough to sustain a findingof psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidencemust show a link, medical or the like, between the

acts that manifest psychological incapacity and thepsychological disorder itself.

This is not to mention, but we mention neverthelessfor emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof

presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment ofthe parties by the psychologist or expert, for a

conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe andincurable presence of psychological incapacity.[23][Underscoring supplied]

This evidentiary approach is repeated in Ting v.

Velez-Ting.[24]

Under this evolutionary development, as shown bythe current string of cases on Article 36 of theFamily Code, what should not be lost on us is the

intention of the law to confine the application ofArticle 36 to the most serious cases of personality

disorders, clearly demonstrative of an utterinsensitivity or inability to give meaning andsignificance to the marriage; that the psychological

illness that must have afflicted a party at theinception of the marriage should be a malady so


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grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness

of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonialbond he or she is about to assume.[25] It is not

enough that the respondent, alleged to bepsychologically incapacitated, had difficulty incomplying with his marital obligations, or was

unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of anatal or supervening disabling factor - an adverse

integral element in the respondent's personalitystructure that effectively incapacitated him fromcomplying with his essential marital obligations -

must be shown.[26] Mere difficulty, refusal orneglect in the performance of marital obligations or

ill will on the part of the spouse is different fromincapacity rooted in some debilitating psychologicalcondition or illness; irreconcilable differences,sexual infidelity or perversion, emotionalimmaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not

by themselves warrant a finding of psychologicalincapacity under Article 36, as the same may only

be due to a person's refusal or unwillingness toassume the essential obligations of marriage.[27]

If all these sound familiar, they do, for they are butiterations of Santos' juridical antecedence, gravity

and incurability requisites. This is proof of Santos'continuing doctrinal validity.

The Present Case

As the CA did, we find Jocelyn's evidenceinsufficient to establish Angelito's psychologicalincapacity to perform essential marital obligations.

We so conclude based on our own examination ofthe evidence on record, which we were compelled

to undertake because of the differences in the trialcourt and the appellate court's appreciation andevaluation of Jocelyn's presented evidence.

a. The Expert Opinion Evidence

Both the psychologist's testimony and the

psychological report did not conclusively show theroot cause, gravity and incurability of Angelito'salleged psychological condition.

We first note a critical factor in appreciating or

evaluating the expert opinion evidence - thepsychologist's testimony and the psychologicalevaluation report - that Jocelyn presented. Based on

her declarations in open court, the psychologistevaluated Angelito's psychological condition only in

an indirect manner - she derived all her conclusions

from information coming from Jocelyn whose biasfor her cause cannot of course be doubted. Given

the source of the information upon which thepsychologist heavily relied upon, the court mustevaluate the evidentiary worth of the opinion with

due care and with the application of the more rigidand stringent set of standards outlined above, i.e.,

that there must be a thorough and in-depthassessment of the parties by the psychologist orexpert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a psychological

incapacity that is grave, severe and incurable.

In saying this, we do not suggest that a personalexamination of the party alleged to be

psychologically incapacitated is mandatory;jurisprudence holds that this type of examination isnot a mandatory requirement. While such

examination is desirable, we recognize that it maynot be practical in all instances given the oftentimes

estranged relations between the parties. For adetermination though of a party's complete

personality profile, information coming from

persons intimately related to him (such as the party'sclose relatives and friends) may be helpful. This is

an approach in the application of Article 36 thatallows flexibility, at the same time that it avoids, ifnot totally obliterate, the credibility gaps spawned

by supposedly expert opinion based entirely ondoubtful sources of information.

From these perspectives, we conclude that thepsych`ologist, using meager information coming

from a directly interested party, could not havesecured a complete personality profile and could not

have conclusively formed an objective opinion ordiagnosis of Angelito's psychological condition.While the report or evaluation may be conclusivewith respect to Jocelyn's psychological condition,this is not true for Angelito's. The methodology

employed simply cannot satisfy the required depthand comprehensiveness of examination required to

evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from apsychological disorder. In short, this is not thepsychological report that the Court can rely on as

basis for the conclusion that psychologicalincapacity exists.

Other than this credibility or reliability gap, both thepsychologist's report and testimony simply provided

a general description of Angelito's purported anti-social personality disorder, supported by the


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characterization of this disorder as chronic, grave

and incurable. The psychologist was conspicuouslysilent, however, on the bases for her conclusion or

the particulars that gave rise to the characterizationshe gave. These particulars are simply not in theReport, and neither can they be found in her

testimony.

For instance, the psychologist testified thatAngelito's personality disorder is chronic orincurable; Angelito has long been afflicted with the

disorder prior to his marriage with Jocelyn or evenduring his early developmental stage, as basic trust

was not developed. However, she did not supportthis declaration with any factual basis. In herReport, she based her conclusion on the

presumption that Angelito apparently grew up in adysfunctional family. Quite noticeable, though, is

the psychologist's own equivocation on this point -she was not firm in her conclusion for she herself

may have realized that it was simply conjectural.The veracity, too, of this finding is highly suspect,for it was based entirely on Jocelyn's assumed

knowledge of Angelito's family background andupbringing.

Additionally, the psychologist merely generalizedon the questions of why and to what extent was

Angelito's personality disorder grave and incurable,and on the effects of the disorder on Angelito's

awareness of and his capability to undertake theduties and responsibilities of marriage.

The psychologist therefore failed to provide theanswers to the more important concerns or

requisites of psychological incapacity, all of whichare critical to the success of Jocelyn's cause.

b. Jocelyn's Testimony

The inadequacy and/or lack of probative value ofthe psychological report and the psychologist's

testimony impel us to proceed to the evaluation ofJocelyn's testimony, to find out whether she

provided the court with sufficient facts to support a

finding of Angelito's psychological incapacity.

Unfortunately, we find Jocelyn's testimony to beinsufficient. Jocelyn merely testified on Angelito'shabitual drunkenness, gambling, refusal to seek

employment and the physical beatings she receivedfrom him - all of which occurred after the marriage.

Significantly, she declared in her testimony that

Angelito showed no signs of violent behavior,assuming this to be indicative of a personality

disorder, during the courtship stage

Psychological Incapacity Brion

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