PSC/IR 106: Economic Sanctions
Transcript of PSC/IR 106: Economic Sanctions
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PSC/IR 106: Economic Sanctions
William Spaniel
williamspaniel.com/pscir-106-2015
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Outline
• What do sanctions do?
• Learning from observation/selection problem
• Data on sanctions
• Costly signaling
• Removing leaders from power
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Outline
• What do sanctions do?
• Learning from observation/selection problem
• Data on sanctions
• Costly signaling
• Removing leaders from power
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Sanctions Basics
• Sanctions restrict trade in some way
– Broadly (Cuba)
– Narrowly (Russia)
• Aimed to win some policy concession, often completely unrelated to the sanctions
• More effective with more sanctioners
– But harder to keep everyone together
• Have become more popular over time
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Sanctions Basics
• Shrink budget constraint
• They are inefficient
– Trade is efficient
– If they weren’t, we’d always impose them
– So why sanction and not resolve the problem through efficient bargaining?
• Are difficult to appreciate observationally
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Outline
• What do sanctions do?
• Learning from observation/selection problem
• Data on sanctions
• Costly signaling
• Removing leaders from power
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Data Problems
• IR data do not come from randomized experiments
• We (usually) only have observational data
• Makes it way to easy to reach unjustifiable conclusions
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Lies My Cable News Channel Told Me
• Economic sanctions never, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, work
– North Korea
– Iraq
– Cuba
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Awful Research Methodology
• Selecting on the dependent variable
– Inferring the effect of x by looking exclusively at instances of x
• Proper comparison: x versus not x
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Would you study the effectiveness of water by looking at death rates
among everyone in a hospital who drank water?
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Sender
Give Up
Sanction
-12
-9
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Target Acquiesces
Sender Capitulates
Stalemate Negotiated Settlement
33.1% 30.1% 12.8% 24.0%
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Lies (By Omission) My Cable News Channel Told Me
• The sanctions crisis that never occurred
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Target Sender
Back Down Give Up
Escalate Sanction
100, -∞
-x, x
0, 0
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Target Sender
Back Down Give Up
Escalate Sanction
x < 0 => Escalate, Sanction
100, -∞
-x, x
0, 0
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Target Sender
Back Down Give Up
Escalate Sanction
x < 0 => Escalate, Sanction x > 0 => Back Down, Sanction
100, -∞
-x, x
0, 0
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It’s Super Effective
• How does target respond to super effective sanctions?
• Are the sanctions that we observe the strongest sanctions in theory?
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Selection Problem
• When strategic actions determine whether outcomes appear in a dataset
– Target’s strategic decision whether to back down determines whether we observe sanctions
• Biases estimates on causal relationships
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Escalation Game
Target Sender Sender
Quit Back Down Give Up
Threaten Escalate Sanction
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Outline
• What do sanctions do?
• Learning from observation/selection problem
• Data on sanctions
• Costly signaling
• Removing leaders from power
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TIES
• Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions database
• Created to address the selection problem
– Threat and imposition
• Covers 1412 cases from 1945-2005
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Target Acquiesces
Sender Capitulates
Stalemate Negotiated Settlement
Totals
During Threat Stage 19.7% 18.4% 2.2% 5.9% 46.2%
During Sanctions Stage 17.8% 16.2% 6.9% 12.9% 53.8%
Totals 37.5% 34.6% 9.2% 18.8% 100.0%
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Takeaway
• Sanctions sometimes work
– They sometimes don’t
– But no foreign policy tool that is actually implemented is completely effective
– Certainly cheaper than other (not perfectly effective) alternatives
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Lies My Cable News Channel Told Me
• Economic sanctions never, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, end
– North Korea
– Iraq
– Cuba
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Takeaway
• Do not generalize from the salient cases
– North Korea, Cuba, and Iraq are in American consciousness precisely because they are so abnormal
– Same reason we shouldn’t base all our foreign policy strategy on World War I or World War II
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Lies (By Omission) My Cable News Channel Told Me
• Sanctions are only about military matters
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Portion of All Episodes
Sanctions Imposed Target Wins Sender Wins
Negotiated Settlement
Security 27.3% 63.9% 48.5% 39.7% 11.8%
Human Rights 5.9% 54.8% 52.9% 37.1% 10.0%
Economics 55.0% 60.1% 38.6% 32.5% 28.9%
Environment 3.3% 53.2% 11.6% 55.8% 32.6%
Other 8.5% 51.7% 57.8% 42.2% 0.0%
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Takeaway
• Sanctions usually aren’t about security issues
• Economic disagreements account for a majority of sanctions episodes
– We never hear about them because trade issues involving thimble production isn’t sexy enough to make it on the evening news
Tonight, thimble crisis in India, as politicians in New
Delhi threaten to shutdown garment production. For
more, we go to NBC News’ Andrea Mitchell.
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Outline
• What do sanctions do?
• Learning from observation/selection problem
• Data on sanctions
• Costly signaling
• Removing leaders from power
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Incentives to Misrepresent
• Weak actors want to pretend they are strong
• If easy to do, impossible to communicate actual preferences
– Talk is cheap
• Leads to inefficient behavior
– Good outcomes for weaker types
– Bad outcomes for stronger types
– Bad outcomes for opponents
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Costly Signals
• Not all means of communication are easy
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Costly Signals
• Not all means of communication are easy
• A costly signal is a signal that some types can’t or are unwilling to pay
– Credibly reveals types
– Allows opponent to properly calibrate its decision
– Only useful when there is incomplete information
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Sanctions as Signals
• Uncertainty about sender’s resolve?
• Sanctions are costly for sender
• Reveals that sender cares about the issue
– An actor that does not care about the issue would not be willing to pay the cost
– Allows opponent to update its belief about opponent’s resolve
• Sanctions are inefficient but less inefficient
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Outline
• What do sanctions do?
• Learning from observation/selection problem
• Data on sanctions
• Costly signaling
• Removing leaders from power
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More Uncertainty
• Uncertainty goes both ways
– Sender’s resolve?
– Target’s ability to weather sanctions?
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Targeting Leaders
• Sanctions often target leader’s winning coalition
– Switch loyalties, topple from power
– Assassinate?
– Pressure leader to give up before those outcomes
• When do we know more about a leader’s winning coalition and vulnerabilities?
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Targeting Leaders
• Is it easier to identify winning coalitions and vulnerabilities in democracies or autocracies?
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