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objects and dangers with which to cope. Couldthose words not apply to the accession by theFederal Republic to the German Democratic Re-public in 1989? Although there have not beenany wars on the Continent recently, neither theWarsaw Pact nor the North Atlantic Treaty Orga-nization is operative in a traditional Cold Warmilitary-political sense. Indeed, new influences,unknown objects, and dangers abound.

Spring 1998 / JFQ 67

Over the past two or three decades,scholars on both sides of the Atlantichave lionized both the Prussian mili-tary system and its premier theoreti-

cian, Carl von Clausewitz. American militaryacademies have made Clausewitzs On War re-

quired reading. Much research has been done tovalidate Prussian operational and tactical precepts,and Prussian-German commanders from Erich Lu-dendorff to Erich von Manstein continue to enjoytheir places in the pantheon of great captains.

The reason for this enthusiasm can be readilyidentified: victories over Napoleon at Leipzig andWaterloo; the Kriegsschule and general staff; thewritings of Clausewitz; quick and decisive mid-19th century triumphs over Denmark, Austria, andFrance (fought with total effort for limited goals);the demand for German advisors amid the almostglobal emulation of the Prussian military educa-

tion system prior to 1914; a near victory againstoverwhelming odds1 in World War I; the profes-sionalism and surreptitiousness of the Reichswehrin the 1920s; Blitzkrieg in 193941; and the tragiclost victories of 194245 (attributed to interfer-ence by Adolf Hitler in purely military matters).2

From Thomas Carlyle to Martin van Creveld,Prussian-German prowess has attracted more thanits share of homage from soldiers and military his-torians alike.

Army and State

Is it possible to extract lessons for our policy-makers from the Prussian diplomatic-military sys-

tem of Otto von Bismarck and William II? Arethere similarities in contemporary politics? Oneingredient remains constant: the German prob-lem. In 1871 Benjamin Disraeli warned the Houseof Commons that the Iron Chancellors wars hadtotally destroyed the European balance ofpower. You have a new world . . . and unknown

Holger H. Herwig is professor of history at the University of Calgary

and the author of The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary,

19141918.

THE PRUSSIAN MODELand Military Planning TodayBy H O L G E R H. H E R W I G

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160 of the best and brightest.Once selected the students found

their studies demanding and dis-missals frequent. Annual fitnessreports were harshly direct.

Noncommissioned officerswere also subjected to regular edu-cation and routine evaluation.They served for twelve years afterwhich they were guaranteed jobsin the civilian sector by means ofa special certificate known as the

Zivilversorgungsschein. Special schools trained andretrained 300,000 noncommissioned officers infortifications, artillery, supply, communications,and related skills. Distinct medals further built es-

prit de corps. The effort was highly successful:Germany probably had the best noncommis-sioned officers on the eve of World War I.

In the realm of intelligence officers were ex-pected to be proficient in languages, regularly ap-pointed to missions abroad, and urged to trans-late or at least review foreign military literature.From Alfred Thayer Mahan to William (Billy)Mitchell, American authors were routinely ana-lyzed by the general staff in Berlin. Foreign news-papers, military journals, and parliamentary de-bates were evaluated. Synopses of such material

were circulated to division and district comman-ders for their information and comment.5 In

short, officers, especially those on the generalstaff, were at the cutting edge of international de-velopments at all times.

Tactics reigned supreme in Prussia. The sys-tem concentrated on the nuts and bolts of themilitary profession. Its members were drilled inthe theory and practice of the latest weapons,their implications for operations, and their ad-vantages and limitations. Every new invention ormodest refinement was thoroughly studied,tested, and adopted if deemed effective. Severalgeneral staff departments as well as testing siteswere established to scrutinize foreign advancesand rule on their applicability. Field Marshal Paul

von Hindenburg remembered the motto Keep itsimple from his early days in the army. Thus thePrussian military, though not big on technologi-cal innovation (witness the lack of tanks, trucks,and anti-tank guns in World War I), was never-theless expert at assessing technological advancesand determining their applicability.6

Maneuvers and games were rigorous. To thedegree permitted in the pre-computer era, the

German troops in

Vienna, 1938.

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Prussian army did everything within its power tosimulate military conditions. Since the days ofthe soldier-king, Frederick William I (171340),the Prussians annually (and later biannually)went through formal maneuvers. In either springor autumn, these exercises began with staff work

and concluded with a formal review usually bythe chief of the general staff. Often involving di-visions and armies, the maneuvers were intendedto simulate battlefield conditions, test the applic-ability of existing doctrine and weapons, and as-sess the suitability of officers and noncommis-sioned officers for leadership. And tough fitnessreports followed each maneuver.

Theoretical exercises served to test the mindof future commanders within the general staff.Under General Alfred von Schlieffen, they werecustomarily handed out on New Years Eve to try

the dedication of a

candidate and wereimmediately evalu-ated on the highestlevel.7 The best pa-pers were publishedin service journals.

Spring staff rides enhanced military geographyand formed the basis for final class standingandthus a rung on the critical seniority (Anciennitt)ladder.

Combined arms operations were in voguewell before 1914. The Prussian army stressed theinterdependence of various combat arms in itsregulations. In 1870, for example, the support ac-

corded infantry by the new Krupp breech-loadingsteel cannons was crucial in storming French po-sitions in Alsace and Lorraine. Moreover the armyfully appreciated reconnaissancebe it fromhorseback, dirigibles, or aircraft. Within person-nel constraints, Prussian forces attached stafffrom one service branch to another to facilitatethe exchange of information.

Finally, there was the intangible impact ofwork ethic and dedication. The vast majority ofofficers saw their careers as spanning a lifetime.While most knew they would probably not passthe majors corner, they worked as though theywould. Early transfer to civilian (and especially

military-industrial) corporations was not encour-aged or rewarded. Sacrifice was expected and hardwork taken for granted. Frederick William I, thefather of Frederick the Great, stated it best whenhe said that the watchword for his (or any other)period was simple: Nothing more than effortand work. Certainly the fact that the ElderMoltke began planning for the contingency of a

two-front war against France and Russia late in1870at a time when he was about to defeat theformer and was on friendly terms with the lat-terdemonstrates the intellectual dexterity of thegeneral staff.8 So did the fact that the momentthe Franco-Prussian War concluded the military

history section of the staff began a critical studyof the campaign.

Choosing the Most Opportune

Next in importance came flexibility of plan-ning. The Elder Moltke, not Schlieffen, should bestudied in detail by American military planners.Moltke always maintained that war was at best ashot in the dark and at worst a cynical roll of thedice over the nations future. The brightest staffplanner could only seek to mobilize as manytroops as possible, equip them as well as possible,and marshal them expeditiously at the decisive

point. If extremely competent (and lucky), hecould deploy his forces against those of an enemyas opportunely as possible by using communica-tions and geography to his advantage.

But once the first shot was fired, Moltkenever tired of warning general staff officers, thestrategist had to think ad hocon his feet. Noplan of operations can look with any certainty be-yond the first meeting of the major forces of theenemy. The intangibles such as interaction, fric-tion, moral factors, and the infamous fog of warthen took over: orders were not understood, com-manders went separate ways, information was lostor garbled, and the enemy, endowed with an in-

dependent will, improvised and reacted. After all,warfare was a clash between two highly unpre-dictable bodies; neither would have entered theconflict without some assurance of victory.9

Even later, basking in well-deserved glory,the Elder Moltke remained open to change. Heunderstood the geopolitical chessboard of the1890s and appreciated that the location of theReich between France and Russia defied simpleoperational-tactical resolution. Limited victorieswere all that could be hoped for. It must be leftto diplomacy, Moltke concluded, to see if it canachieve a peace settlement in a future waramong the great powers. Thus his prophetic

farewell speech in the Reichstagin 1890: Woe tohim that sets Europe on fire. Under Schlieffen atimetable for the rigid mobilization of the armywould rob it of that very flexibility.

Perhaps the most important lesson of thePrussian way of war is the relationship betweenpolitical and military planners, namely, Bismarckand Moltke. Whatever the discord over stormingthe Dppel in 1864 or bombarding Paris in1870both men understood that in peacetimecivilians needed to provide soldiers with clear,unambiguous instructions. Bismarck regretted

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that On War was the one great book he neverread; but nonetheless he grasped the political na-ture of war.

Bismarck, like Clausewitz, recognized thatthe stream of time constituted nothing more or

less than an unceasing clash of contradictoryforces. No such outcome as complete certaintyand definitive results existed. Politics was not in-trinsically an exact and logical science butrather the ability to choose in each transitorysituation that which is least harmful or most op-portune. Patience, careful timing, accurate eval-uation of potential adversaries, and intuitiverecognition of the correct path were critical tosuccess. So was the need at all times to preservefreedom of choice between opposed interests,minimize risk, and reserve options, not as bluffsbut rather as practical threats one was prepared tocarry out. After the wars of unification, Bismarck

offered eloquent testimony to Clausewitzs princi-ple of interaction:

In chess, one should never base a move on the positiveassumption that the other player will in turn make acertain move. For it may be that this will not happen,and then the game is easily lost. One must alwaysreckon with the possibility that the opponent will atthe last moment make a move other than the one ex-pected. . . . In other words, one must always have twoirons in the fire.10

The famous retreat to Bad Kissingen inJune 1877, where an isolated Bismarck sought toadjust to a changed world, provides a convenientcase study of realpolitik, the art of the possible.It is a model in clarity and reason.

The Iron Chancellor first assessed the poten-

tial threat: a nightmare of coalitions as facedFrederick the Great in 1756. Thereafter he definedthe national policy: no expansion, no push forhegemony in Europe. Instead Bismarck acceptedwhat the historian Ludwig Dehio termed semi-hegemony. Germany was to be the strongestpower in Europe but without being a hegemon.Realistically, Bismarck sought to maintain onepercent of the population under arms to buttressthat posture. Next he identified a potentialenemy: France. From that followed his course ofaction: to create a political situation in which allthe powers except France need us. His basic ax-

ioms were first, no conflict among major powersin Central Europe and, second, German securitywithout German hegemony. Finally, there wasimplementation of those conclusions reached: al-liances with Austria (1879), Italy (1882), and Rus-sia (1887). There was even a fall-back position: IfAustria-Hungary makes unreasonable demandson us, we can come to an understanding withRussia. It was devious; and it was diplomacy atits best.

What commander, one may well ask, wouldnot envy Moltke for receiving clear political in-structions? The goal of national policy was estab-lished, the probable enemy was identified, and

the potential of allies was achieved. Little wonderthat Moltke was untroubled by the nightmaresthat plagued his successor, Schlieffen.

Conversely, the Schlieffen plan and the deci-sion for war in 1914 again attest to the validity ofthese lessonsalbeit when they are forgotten.Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollwegproudly recalled after World War I that it hadnever been his business to comment upon grandstrategy. He cheerily noted that there nevertook place during my entire period in office a sortof war council at which politics were broughtinto the military for and against. It would be dif-ficult to find a greater abrogation of political re-

sponsibility.Indeed, Imperial Germany undertook nei-

ther joint nor allied planning. The army andnavy developed separate strategies without refer-ence to each other. Army and navy appropria-tions bills were submitted to the Chancellor forapprovalwithout reference to each other.Throughout much of this period the chief of thegeneral staff was not consulted by the war minis-ter in the compilation of the military budget.11

Yet the chief of the general staff, without ei-ther legal or constitutional authority and solely as

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the first advisor of the Imperial Supreme Com-mander, tied the nation to a desperate strategy in190506 simply by the prestige of his office. TheSchlieffen plan was not revealed to the Germangovernment, its Austro-Hungarian allies, or eventhe navy. Thus the war minister could forecast re-

ductions in forces in thisperiod, while the generalstaff knew that it lackedfully eight army corpsfor a right wheelthrough Belgium alone.12

Most revealingly, on Au-gust 1, 1914, the Ger-

man military attach at Vienna, Colonel KarlCount von Kageneck, would call for the coordina-tion of effort (with absolute frankness) betweenBerlin and Viennathree days after Austria-Hun-gary had gone to war with Serbia and on the very

day Germany declared war on Russia.13

In sum, the business of war is a two-edgedsword. As Clausewitz stated, it is absurd tobring the military into the process of war plan-ning so that they can decide purely militarilywhat the cabinets must do; but he warned, itis even more absurd for theoreticians to demandthat available war resources can be turned overto the military commander so that he can makea military war plan accordingly. 14 Obviously,each segment of the national polity must coor-dinate its own strategy.

The Goddess Efficiency

One also must consider the Achilles heel ofthe Prussian systemareas in which it did notserve the nation well. Having gotten much ofwhat the late German historian Gerhard Rittercalled Kriegshandwerk (the mechanics of war)right, the Prussian system failed on the strategicand especially grand strategiclevels.

Victory breeds arrogance; defeat drives re-form. Mid-19th century Prussian victories turnedmany regular officersand especially young gen-eral staff officersinto what Bismarck derided asdemigods. Theirs became the only solution,the only way to success. Why change a victori-ous system? Preserve it and denounce its critics.

This was certainly the case with critics as gentleas Hans Delbrck, whose wise counsel concern-ing the nature of warfare in the industrial agewas blithely ignored.15 Confidence is one thing,arrogance another.

Moreover there is no substitute for intellec-tual rigor and honesty. Wargames, especiallyunder William II, turned into grand theater. Thegarbage in, garbage out phenomenon existedlong before the computer age. Maneuvers orgames can prove anything their organizers wisheven the superiority of cavalry over machine

guns, howitzers, and trench mortars. The Kaiserwon many a fall maneuver on the last day witha dashing chargeat times by having well en-trenched enemy machine gunners change thecolor of their armbands so charging friendly cav-alry could pass by to victory unharmed. Accord-

ingly, even the model Prussian army maintainedthe lance as a mobile assault weapon until 1927.

What of the much-revered Alfred vonSchlieffen? One of the sternest taskmasters pro-duced by the general staff system, he neverthelessjettisoned intellectual honesty to prove his the-ory about the centrality of battles of encirclementand annihilation (Kesselschlacht). It was after allSchlieffen who read Delbrcks analysis of thebattle of Cannae prior to devising the great planthat bears his nameapparently without beingtroubled by the obvious lesson that althoughwinning the battle, Hannibal lost the war; and

that Carthage, primarily a landpower, succumbedto Roman seapower.Planners also must avoid the blinkered pro-

fessionalism (Fachidiotie) of the technocrat. In thefinal analysis, win or lose, men fight wars. Thereis more to war than understanding the range orrate of fire of certain weapons. Strategy is morethan ordnance delivered on target. Limiting theplanning horizon to ones serviceor a special-ized arm within a serviceusually invites disaster.One would do well to remember General ErichLudendorffs revealing reprimand to a generalstaff colonel who dared inquire about the objec-tive of Operation Michael in France during spring

1918 when the nations fate hung in the balance:I object to the word strategy. We will punch ahole in their line. For the rest, we shall see.

In post-1871 Prussia, both soldiers andpoliticians worshipped the goddess efficiency asthe natural culmination of 19th century rational-ism and positivism. The precision of technologi-cal marvels sufficed to guarantee victory. Hence,they asked, why bother with the great philosoph-ical issues that the Elder Moltke had pondered?Was it really necessary to coordinate the diplo-matic, economic, political, and psychological ele-ments of national polity? Most thought not.Schlieffens successor, Helmuth von Moltke (the

Younger) encouraged his son to read the opera-tional history of Cannae by Schlieffen in prepara-tion for the war academy, not Clausewitzs trea-tise on the nature of war. Wilhelm Groener, whosucceeded Ludendorff in 1918 as the first quarter-master-general, proudly recalled that as a subal-tern he had read books of the practical servicerather than on high strategy. Kaiser William IIas well as Field Marshals Paul von Hindenburg



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and Colmar Baron von der Goltz mined fromClausewitz the nugget that politics must not in-terfere with the conduct of war. In fact, asWerner Hahlweg has indicated, in 1853 the Ger-mans even tampered with the second edition(and subsequent editions) ofOn Warby attribut-

ing to Clausewitz the statement that a generalshould attend cabinet meetings so the cabinetcould have a voice in military issues. The revisionstated that a general needed to attend to partici-pate directly in national decisionmaking.16

In addition, it is imperative that plannersunderstand the domestic fabric of the society thatthey are about to lead into war. After 1871 Pruss-ian planners were bedeviled by the dual functionof the army as guarantor of domestic stability andexecutor of national policy. The former calls for asmall, reliable conscript force of mainly rural re-cruits, the latter for a mass formation of industrial

workers as well. One reflects an agrarian, semi-ab-solutist state, the other an industrialized, semi-de-

mocratic nation-state. Prussias inability to recon-cile these functions and to structure and educateits army accordingly was revealed in budget de-bates prior to and during World War I.

In 1913, when the Younger Moltke and thenColonel Ludendorff discovered that Germany waseight army corps short for Schlieffens rightwheel through Belgium and northern France,they at once demanded a 33 percent increase in

strength. General Josias von Heeringen brusquelydismissed the request for 300,000 men, arguingthat such an expansion would lead to a detrimen-tal democratization of the officer corps. ThePrussian war minister reminded the general staffthat creating a modern mass army in the indus-trial era would jeopardize the armys primaryfunction as guarantor of domestic stability. Oneof Heeringens bureau chiefs, General Franz Wan-del, bluntly apprised Ludendorff: If you con-tinue with these demands, then you will drivethe German people to revolution. The debate

eventually ended with Ludendorffs theoreticalnotion of total war as implemented by AdolfHitler after 1941.

Hand in glove with the last point is the needfor economic preparation in warfare. Prussiawould never form an economic general staffde-

spite repeated calls by General August Keim andField Marshal von der Goltz as well as by the his-torian Dietrich Schfer. Army planners simplywere confident that the sinews of war wouldsomehow fall into place. What Martin van Crev-eld has termed Schlieffens ostrich-like refusal toaddress this issue was probably the single greatestcause for the German collapse on the Marne inSeptember 1914.17 No George C. Marshall everemerged from the Prussian military system.

In addition, it is essential to understand eco-nomic capabilities and priorities. Despite hismanagerial skills and talent for propaganda, Ad-

miral Alfred von Tirpitz performed no service byconstructing a mammoth fleet that eventually

bankrupted the state, drained the army of des-perately needed funds, and brought about Ger-manys self-imposed diplomatic encirclementin Europe.18

The Big Picture

Another critical point is that there is no sub-stitute for planning on the grand strategic level.No matter how well one may fire a howitzer,

plant a mine, maneuver a tank, pilot an aircraft,shape a ships course, or even plan a complexfield operation, if the equation is wrong at thetop it will eventually fail to produce the desiredresults. When the Prussian army analyzed thecampaigns of 1864, 1866, and 1871, it dug intooperations and tactics with a vengeance. Unfortu-nately, it also conveniently overlooked the factthat Bismarck prepared the path to victory

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through alliances and calling indiplomatic markers. Moreover,psycho-babble about Austro-Ger-man Nibelungen loyalty and Teu-tonic racial brotherhood whichabounded on the eve of WorldWar I obscured the desperateplight of the Central Powers. Ahollow alliance with Italy wasmaintained (no one in either

Berlin or Vienna expected Rometo honor its commitment) and nonew allies were recruited. As Win-

ston Churchill put it, the only thing worse thanfighting with allies is fighting without them.

The German historian Andreas Hillgruber of-fered a cogent if complex formula for strategic ef-fectiveness. National leaders on all levels must co-ordinate and integrate domestic and foreignpolicy, strategic and psychological war planning,and economic and armaments production inorder to arrive at a coherent concept of nationalstrategy. As stated earlier, Prussia-Germanys fail-ure to do so was the Achilles heel of its national

strategy and military policy.Finally, planners must appreciate the impli-

cations of war as a political act and the fact thatthey are political players by definition. The long-standing Prussian myth of the apolitical officervaliantly struggling to protect the nation againstdevious diplomats or scheming politicians re-mains just thata myth. Whether one wins orloses a war should no longer be a puzzle: the pur-pose of war is not to inflict military defeat on anenemy but rather, in the words of Clausewitz, tocompel your enemy to do your [political] will.

Hence, the title of General Erich von Mansteinsbook, Lost Victories, is absurd according to Clause-witzs definition of the purpose of war.19 Likewise,popular notions of surgical strikes and shortcleansing thunderstorms should be excised fromthe American military (and political) lexicon.

Conversely, the military planner should notturn Clausewitz on his head by suggesting thatthe political branch must remain silent in time ofwar. This reductionism of Clausewitzs famous

phrase that war is but politics conducted by othermeans reached its zenith with Ludendorffs bookTotal War in 1935, wherein he proclaimed thatwarfare is the highest expression of the nationalwill to live, and that politics must therefore besubservient to the conduct of war. However fer-vently some planners may wish that to be thecase, it certainly is not with regard to what Rus-sell Weigley has aptly termed the American wayof war. As Winston Churchill said:

Let us learn our lessons. Never, never, never believethat any war will be smooth and easy, or that anyonewho embarks on that strange voyage can measure the

tides and hurricanes he will encounter. The statesmanwho yields to war fever must realise that once the sig-nal is given, he is no longer the master of policy butthe slave of unforeseeable and uncontrollable events.Antiquated war offices, weak, incompetent or arro-gant commanders, untrustworthy allies, hostile neu-trals, malignant fortune, ugly surprises, awful miscal-culationsall take their seats at the council board on



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the morrow of a declaration of war. Always remem-ber, however sure you are that you can easily win,that there would not be a war if the other man didnot think he also had a chance.20

In the last analysis, the art of the possiblewill always rest not on bluff but rather on theability to defend ones position, if need be withan appeal to force. Bismarcks dictum shouldserve as a reminder to all civilian and militaryplanners: The influence of a power in peace de-pends upon the strength that it can develop inwar and on the alliances with which it can enterinto the conflict. JFQ

N O T E S

1 On World War I, see Timothy T. Lupfer, The Dy-namics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doc-trine During the First World War (Fort Leavenworth,

Kans.: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Commandand General Staff College, 1981), and Bruce I. Gud-mundsson, Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the GermanArmy, 19141918 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1989);for the 1920s see David N. Spires, Image and Reality: TheMaking of the German Officer, 19211923 (Westport,Conn.: Greenwood, 1984), and James S. Corum, TheRoots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German MilitaryReform (Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas,1992); on World War II, see especially Martin van Crev-

eld, Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performances,19391945 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1982).

2 For an overview see The Problem of German Mil-

itary Effectiveness, 190045, in Williamson Murray,

German Military Effectiveness (Baltimore: Nautical and

Aviation Publishing, 1992), pp. 138.3 Holger H. Herwig, Strategic Uncertainties of a

Nation State: Prussia-Germany, 18711918, in

Williamson Murray, Macgregor Knox, and Alvin Bern-

stein, The Making of Strategy(New York: Cambridge Uni-versity Press, 1994), pp. 24277.

4 See the analysis by Wilhelm Deist, Kaiser Wil-

helm II in the context of his military and naval en-

tourage, in John C.G. Rhl and Nicolaus Sombart, eds.,

Kaiser Wilhelm II: New Interpretations: The Corfu Papers(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982),pp. 16992.

5 Holger H. Herwig, Imperial Germany, in Ernest

R. May, ed., Knowing Ones Enemies: Intelligence Assess-ment Before the Two World Wars (Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1984), pp. 6297.6 Holger H. Herwig, The Dynamics of Necessity:

German Military Policy During the First World War, in

Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, eds., MilitaryEffectiveness, vol. 1, The First World War (Boston: Allenand Unwin, 1988), pp. 80115. Also Lupfer, The Dynam-ics of Doctrine; and Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics.

7 Still valid is the incisive analysis by Gordon A.

Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 16401945 (NewYork: Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 277 ff.

8 See, for example, Dennis E. Showalter, The East-

ern Front and German Military Planning, 18711914

Some Observations, East European Quarterly, vol. 15,no. 1 (March 1981), pp. 167 ff; and Holger H. Herwig,

Disjointed Allies: Coalition Warfare in Berlin and Vi-enna, 1914, The Journal of Military History, vol. 54,

no. 3 (July 1990), pp. 26580.9 See Gunther E. Rothenberg, Moltke, Schlieffen,

and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment, in Peter

Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli tothe Nuclear Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1986), pp. 296311.

10 Cited in Otto Pflanze, Bismarck and the Develop-ment of Germany, vol. 1, The Period of Unification,18151871 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1990), p. 83.

11 See Holger H. Herwig, From Tirpitz Plan to Schli-

effen Plan: Some Observations on German Military

Planning, The Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 9, no. 1(March 1986), pp. 5363.

12 The standard work remains Gerhard Ritter, The

Schlieffen Plan: Critique of a Myth (New York: Praeger,1958).13 Found in Gordon A. Craig, The World War I

Alliance of the Central Powers in Retrospect: The Mili-

tary Cohesion of the Alliance, Journal of ModernHistory, vol. 37, no. 3 (September 1965), p. 338. See alsoHolger H. Herwig, The First World War: Germany andAustria-Hungary 19141918 (New York, St. Martins,1997), chapters 1 and 2.

14 A slightly different translation is rendered by

Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds., in Carl von

Clausewitz, On War (Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, 1976), p. 607.

15 See especially chapters 2 and 3 in Arden Bucholz,

Hans Delbrck and The German Military Establishment:

War Images in Conflict (Iowa City: University of IowaPress, 1984).16 See Jehuda L. Wallach, The Dogma of the Battle of

Annihilation: The Theories of Clausewitz and Schlieffen andTheir Impact on the German Conduct of Two World Wars(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1986), pp. 14, 19698.

17 Martin van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics fromWallenstein to Patton (New York: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1977), pp. 113 ff.

18 For naval developments see Holger H. Herwig,

Luxury Fleet: The Imperial German Navy 18881918 (At-lantic Highlands, N.J.: Ashfield Press, 1987), pp. 33 ff.

19 Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories (Chicago: HenryRegnery, 1958).

20 Winston S. Churchill, My Early Life: A Roving Com-mission (London: Thornton Butterworth, 1930), p. 246.

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