Protecting Telecom Core with Intel® SGXSomnath Chakrabarti - Security & Privacy Research/Intel Labs

SGX Day 2020

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Why Mobile Core ?

Source: IHS Markit ™ SDN & NFV Intelligence Service; Update 2H 2018

Source: IHS Markit ™ SDN & NFV Intelligence Service; Update 2H 2018

Business Intersect Interest

$37.5Bn investment target only on Network Function Virtualization (NFV) with an aggressive 64% roll out by 2020

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Telco Networks and Security Risk…

“…security vulnerabilities can be overcome but with a heavy compromise on performance” – 5g-ppp.eu

“…the weak isolation and security vulnerabilities attached with containers pose an impediment for its use in multi-tenant environments in 5G” – 5g-ppp.eu

Attacks are happening on telco networks – csiag.org

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Goal of ONF/OMEC - Open Mobile Evolved Corehttps://www.opennetworking.org/omec

Mobile Network Core

(EPC)

DATACENTERS

Access Network Network

Backhaul

Can we securely run Telco core infrastructure on high volume servers to deliver operational capacity?

Build

BaseStation

(eNB)

Control

User Data

InternetMME Service

Gateway(SGW)

HSS PCRF

MME: Mobility Management Engine (Control)HSS: Home Subscriber Services (Authentication)PCRF: Policy and Charging Rules FunctionS-GW: Service Gateway (Charging, services, …)P-GW: Packet Gateway (Router)

①②

③④

Packet Gateway

(PGW)

Charging

6

Router

Firewall

Load Balancer

Deep Packet Inspection/ IDS

Router EPC VPN Firewall LoadBalancer DPI/IDS

N-tupleLookup

Filters

StateMachines

KeyManager

Hash Table

PolicyManager …

…

Software Building Blocks

EPC

VPN

Virtual network functions on commodity hardwareFixed network functions on proprietary hardware

VS.

Virtual Network Function – Software Building Blocks

Can SGX help protect these VNFs ?

Build

Design choices : Packet processing inside SGX enclave

• Enclave packet access mechanisms

• 1 core - Calling into enclave to transfer every packet or burst of packets – (wouldn’t help)

• ~14 million packets appear on the interface every second

• Enclave can only spend ~200 cycles per packet – The packet budget

• Just one enclave Entry/Exit roundtrip is around ~8000 cycles

• 1 core - Calling into enclave everytime to transfer pointers to packets (still wouldn't help)

• 2 cores – I/O core outside the enclave. Packet processing core inside the enclave

• Call into enclave just once to initialize Rx and Tx ring pointers – exitless pattern for high performance

• Other researchers have also reached the same conclusion that - This is the most effective pattern for high speed

network packet processing !!

• But can we do exitless with just 1 core ?7

Build

SGX Billing Dealer In

Msg Router

SGX Billing Dealer Out

SGX enabled Secure and Auditable Billing

Key Store

CDR

8

Service Gateway Control(SGW-C)

Packet Gateway Control(PGW-C)

Service Gateway User Data(SGW-U)

Packet Gateway User Data(PGW-U)

Forwarding Policy Control (FPC) SDN Controller

Mobility Management Entity(MME)

Home Subscription Server (HSS)

Policy Charging Rules Function(PCRF)

Subscriber Data Base

CTF

CDF

Internet

Offline Charging Service(OFCS)

Mobile Network Core orEvolved Packet Core (EPC)

Data

Control

Opensourced vEPC in 2018 - Released OMEC 1.0 in collaboration with Sprint

Access Network

①

② ③

⑤

④

⑥

SharedStorage

⑦Data

Build

MME: Mobility Management Engine (Control)HSS: Home Subscriber Services (Authentication)PCRF: Policy and Charging Rules FunctionSGW-C: Service Gateway ControlSGW-U: Serving Gateway UserPGW-C: Packet Gateway ControlPGW-U: Packet Gateway UserSubscriber DatabaseFPC: Forwarding Policy Control (IETF)SDN: Software Defined Network ControllerOFCS: Offline Charging ServiceCTF: Charge Trigger FunctionCDF: Charge Data FunctionVNF: Virtual Network Function

E2E Comprehensive EPC Infrastructure (with guidance from Sprint) :

• Distributed architecture decoupling events form packet processing i.e. 5G CUPS

• Secured, Distributed & Auditable SGX based billing system. Provides confidentiality and integrity of Charge Data Records

• Cross platform deployment orchestration, provisioning and network configuration tools ready- KVM, AWS, Docker, K8, …

• Operationally deployable single instance enabling micro-service architecture

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OMEC – SGX based Charge Data and Billing Record Transfer

Charge TriggerFunction

CDR

Service Gateway User Data

(SGWU/SGWC)

KeyGen

Dealer Enclave measurements

OperatorServer Cert

IntelIAS Cert

Dealer Enclave measurements

IntelIAS Cert

Billing Dealer In

KeyGen Enclave measurements

IntelIAS Cert

OperatorCA Cert

Billing Dealer Out

KeyGen Enclave measurements

IntelIAS Cert

OperatorCA Cert

TLSClient Auth

+ SGX Attestation

RA-TLS

RSA 3072 + SHA256

With

SGX

Mutual Atte

statio

n

RA-TLS

RSA 3072 + SHA256

With SGX

Mutual Attestation

Dealer Enclave measurements

OperatorServer Cert

IntelIAS Cert

TLSClient Auth

+ SGX Attestation

RA-TLS - https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.05863.pdf ; https://github.com/cloud-security-research/sgx-ra-tls

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Q4 2019 – T-Mobile’s New Fixed Mobile Service (FMS) Deployment

Key Points:- 3GPP release 13 compliance with full Control User Plane Separation (CUPS)

- Full interoperation with incumbent equipment CISCO aggregation routers, Ericsson MME on TMOPL production network

- SGX Secured CDR system with conformant interfaces for TMOPL’s current billing system

- Commercial grade operational stability… i.e. 24 x 7 x 365 operation with near 0.99999 Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF)

SGX enabled Secure and Auditable Billing

SGX Billing Dealer In

SGX Billing Dealer OutSGX Key Store

Service Gateway Control(SGW-C)

Packet Gateway Control(PGW-C)

Service Gateway User Data(SGW-U)

Packet Gateway User Data(PGW-U)

Mobility Management Entity(MME)

Home Subscription Server (HSS)

Policy Charging Rules Function(PCRF)

Subscriber Data Base

CDF

CTF

Internet

Offline Charging Service(OFCS)

Mobile Network Core orEvolved Packet Core (EPC)

Data

Control

Access Network

MME: Mobility Management Engine (Control)HSS: Home Subscriber Services (Authentication)PCRF: Policy and Charging Rules FunctionSGW-C: Service Gateway ControlPGW-C: Packet Gateway ControlSGW-U: Serving Gateway UserPGW-U: Packet Gateway UserSubscriber DatabaseOFCS: Offline Charging ServiceCTF: Charge Trigger FunctionCDF: Charge Data FunctionVNF: Virtual Network FunctionFMS: Fixed Mobile Service

Data

Legend- TMOPL FMS Infrastructure ---- Incumbent Equipment (CISCO,E///) --

FTP/SSL

ASN.1/SSL

Build

11

European Telecom Standard based LI interfaces on gateways – X1, X2 and X3

ETSI Technical Specification:ETSI TS 103 221-1ETSI TS 103 221-2 V1.1.1

Picture Source : https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_ts/103200_103299/10322102/01.01.01_60/ts_10322102v010101p.pdf 11

Control Plane (SPGW-C)Data Plane (SPGW-U)

POI - Point of InterceptNF – Network Function

TargetInformation

ContentContent

A.2 X2 Security requirements A.2.1 Authentication and Authorization The X2 architecture and message exchange technique shall provide authentication and authorization of end points. A.2.2 Accounting and Audit The X2 architecture and message exchange technique shall provide Accounting and Auditing. A.2.3 Integrity Protection The X2 message exchange technique shall provide integrity protection for all messages exchanged between nodes in the X2 architecture. Use of Integrity protection shall be mandatory. A.2.4 Confidentiality Protection The X2 message exchange technique shall provide confidentiality protection for all messages exchanged between nodes in the X2 architecture. A.2.5 Replay Protection The X2 message exchange technique shall provide replay protection for all messages exchanged between nodes in the X2 architecture. A.2.6 Standalone interface The X2 architecture and message exchange technique shall be designed as a standalone physically dedicated LI interface. The design and selection of the protocol shall where possible ensure that vulnerabilities in non-LI interfaces on the same node shall not impact LI interfaces and security. A.2.7 Minimum Security Level The X2 architecture and message exchange techniques shall provide a minimum level of security (including cypher suites and key length), which shall be supported by all nodes. At least two algorithms shall be specified. The protocol and algorithms shall be resistant to bid down attack. A.2.8 Underlying Infrastructure Trust The X2 architecture and message exchange techniques shall assume by default that the underlying network communication links and infrastructure are untrusted.

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Regulatory Compliance (LI) interfaces Security Requirements and Intel® SGXETSI Technical Specification:ETSI TS 103 221-1 Section A.2, A.3ETSI TS 103 221-2 V1.1.1 Section A.3

Picture Source : https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_ts/103200_103299/10322102/01.01.01_60/ts_10322102v010101p.pdf

Build

✓ SGX

✓ SGX

✓ SGX

✓ SGX✓ SGX

✓ SGX

✓ SGX

Original OMEC Packet Gateway T-Mobile’s SGX based Packet Gateway

OMEC code re-factored for SGX based Packet gateway and Regulatory compliance

Build

Future - OMEC with SGX secured functions and containers – 2020+

Service Gateway Control(SGW-C)

Service Gateway User Data(SGW-U)

Mobility Management Entity(MME)

Home Subscription Server (HSS)

Policy Charging Rules Function(PCRF)

Subscriber Data Base(Cassandra DB)

CDF/CTF

Internet

Telco Offline Charging/Billing Service(OFCS)

Future Mobile Network Core orEvolved Packet Core (EPC)

Data on IPSec

Control

Access Network

Data

CDR

GW GWData

For Securing -• SPGW-U and SPGW-C• Charging and Billing Systems• Subscriber databases• Transient databases• MME• GTP-C/U links and slices• LI Interfaces

SGX Dealer IN/OUT

Thank YouQuestions ?

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