DIGESTED CASES in Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code of the Philippines

Property Regime of Unions without Marriage

1. Mallilin v. Castro (G.R. No. 136803, 16 June 2000)

2. Valdes v. RTC (260 SCRA 221)

3. Francisco v. Master Iron Works Construction Corp. (G.R. No. 151967, 16 February 2005)

4. Agapay v. Palang (276 SCRA 341)

5. Juaniza v. Jose (89 SCRA 306)

6. Tumlos v. Fernandez (G.R. No. 137650, 12 April 2000)

Prepared by:

JONA ADDATU-CAMBRILLB - 1

SUMMARY OF THE PROVISIONS ON ARTICLES 147 AND 148Article 147Article 148

Applicability

1. No legal impediment to marry;

2. Void marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.Presence of legal impediment:

1. Adulterous relationships

2. Bigamous/polygamous marriages

3. Incestuous void marriages under Art 37

4. Void marriages by reason of public policy (Art. 38)

Salaries & wages

Owned in equal sharesSeparately owned by the parties. If any is married, his/her salary pertains to the CPG of the legitimate marriage.

Property exclusively acquired

Belongs to party upon proof of acquisition through exclusive fundsBelongs to such party

Property acquired by both through their work or industry

Governed by rules of co-ownershipOwned in common in proportion to their respective contributions

Presumption

Property acquired while living together presumed obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry and owned by them in equal shares.If one party did not participate in acquisition: presumed to have contributed through care and maintenance of family and household.No presumption of joint acquisition. Actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common proportion.However, their contributions are presumed equal, in the absence of proof to the contrary

Forfeiture

When only one is in GF, share of party in BF in the co-ownership beforfeited in favor of:

1. their common children

2. innocent party in default of / waiver by any/allcommon children, or by their descendantsIf one of the parties is validly married to another, his/her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the ACP or CPG existing in the marriage.If the party who acted in BF is not validly married to another or if both parties are in BF, such share be forfeited in manner provided in last par of Art. 147

Proof of actual contribution

Not necessaryNecessary

MALLILIN JR. vs CASTILLOG.R. No. 136803 June 16, 2000EUSTAQUIO MALLILIN, JR., petitioner, vs. MA. ELVIRA CASTILLO, respondent.

FACTS:

Mallilin and Castillo cohabited together while their respective marriage still subsisted. During their union, they set up Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation. The business flourished and the couple acquired real and personal properties which were registered solely in Castillo's name. Due to irreconcilable differences, the couple separated. Mallilin filed a complaint for partition and/or payment of Co-ownership share, accounting and damages against Castillo. Castillo, in her answer, alleged that co-ownership could not exist between them because according to Article 144 of the Civil Code, rules on co-ownership shall govern the properties acquired by a man and a woman living together as husband and wife but not married, they are not capacitated to marry each other because of their valid subsisting marriage. She claimed to be the exclusive owner of all real and personal properties involved in Mallilin's action of partition on the ground that they were acquired entirelyout of her own money and registered solely in her name.

ISSUE:

Whether or not co-ownership exists between them.

RULING:

Yes. Co-ownership exists between Mallilin and Castillo even though they are incapacitated to marry each other. Article 144 of the Civil Code does not cover parties living in an adulterous relationship. Their property regime falls under Article 148 of the Family Code where co-ownership is limited, properties acquired by them through their joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal.

VALDEZ vs. RTC

260 SCRA 221

ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ,petitioner,vsREGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDEZ,respondents.

FACTS:

Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while the other 3 siblings are free to choose whom they prefer.

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation of common property in unions without marriage. During the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said partys efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.

FRANCISCO vs. MASTER IRON WORKS CONSTRUCTION CORP.

G.R. No. 151967, 16 February 2005

JOSEFINA C. FRANCISCO,petitioner, vs.MASTER IRON WORKS & CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION,respondents.

FACTS:

Josefina Castillo, married to Eduardo Francisco, bought two parcels of residential land and a house thereon. The Register of Deeds issued TCTs in the name of Josefina Castillo Francisco married to Eduardo G. Francisco. Eduardo had written an Affidavit of Waiver stating that before his marriage to Josefina, the latter purchased two parcels of land, including the house constructed thereon, with her own savings and that he was waiving whatever claims he had over the property. The property was mortgaged to Leonila Cando with marital conformity of Eduardo.

When Eduardo failed to pay for the 7,500 bags of cement worth P768,750.00 from Master Iron Works, the court issued a writ of execution levying the two parcels of land owned by Josefina. Before Josefina could commence presenting her evidence against MIWCC, Josefina filed a petition to annul her marriage to Eduardo on the ground that the latter had a subsisting marriage to one Carmelita Carpio when the two were married. Said annulment was granted by the RTC.

ISSUE:

WON the subject property is the conjugal property of Josefina and Eduardo.

RULING:

The Court ruled that petitioner failed to prove that she acquired the property with her personal funds before her cohabitation with Eduardo and that she was the sole owner. The Deed of Absolute Sale on record showed it was issued after her marriage. Their case fall under Article 148 and since they got married before the Family Code, the provision, pursuant to Art 256, can be applied retroactively if it does not prejudice vested rights. Petitioner likewise failed that she had any vested right.

Where the parties are in a void marriage due to a legal impediment that invalidates such marriage, Art 148 should be applied. In the absence of proof that the wife/husband has actually contributed money, property, or industry to the properties acquired during such union the presumption of co-ownership will not arise.

The petition was denied for lack of merit. The decision of CA that the property was conjugal was affirmed.

AGAPAY vs. PALANG

276 SCRA 341G.R. No. 116668.July 28, 1997

ERLINDA A. AGAPAY,petitioner, vs.CARLINA (CORNELIA) V. PALANG and HERMINIA P. DELA CRUZ,respondents.

FACTS:

Miguel Palang contracted marriage with Carlina in Pangasinan on 1949. He left to work in Hawaii a few months after the wedding. Their only child Herminia was born in May 1950. The trial court found evident that as early as 1957, Miguel attempted to Divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he returned for good in 1972, he refused to lived with Carlina and stayed alone in a house in Pozzorubio Pangasinan.

The 63 year old Miguel contracted a subsequent marriage with 19 year old Erlinda Agapay, herein petitioner. 2 months earlier, they jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at Binalonan Pangasinan. A house and lot in the same place was likewise purchased. On the other hand, Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement and agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels of land to their child Herminia.

Miguel and Erlindas cohabitation produced a son named Kristopher. In 1979, they were convicted of concubinage upon Carlinas complaint. 2 years later, Miguel died. Carlina and her daughter instituted this case for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against petitioner. They sought to get back the land and the house and lot located at Binalonan allegedly purchase by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner. The lower court dismissed the complaint but CA reversed the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether the agricultural land and the house and lot should be awarded in favor of Erlinda Agapay.

RULING:

The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. However, their marriage is void because of the subsisting marriage with Carlina. Only the properties acquired by both parties through their actual joint contribution shall be owned by them in proportion to their respective contributions. It is required that there be an actual contribution. If actual contribution is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.

Erlinda established in her testimony that she was engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store. However, she failed to persuade the court that she actually contributed money to buy the subjected riceland. When the land was acquired, she was only around 20 years old compared to Miguel who was already 64 years old and a pensioner of the US Government. Considering his youthfulness, its unrealistic how she could have contributed the P3,750 as her share. Thus, the court finds no basis to justify the co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Hence, the Riceland should, as correctly held by CA, revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased and Carlina.

It is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate their conjugal property in favor of Herminia. Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order or without judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation in the marriage settlements. The judgment resulted from the compromise was not specifically for separation of property and should not be so inferred.

With respect to the house and lot, Atty Sagun, notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property revealed the falsehood of Erlindas claim that she bought such property for P20,000 when she was 22 years old. The lawyer testified that Miguel provided the money for the purchase price and directed Erlindas name alone be placed as the vendee.

The transaction made by Miguel to Erlinda was properly a donation and which was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of the law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code, expressly provides that the prohibition against donation between spouses now applies to donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage,for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.

JUANIZA vs. JOSE

89 SCRA 306GR. No. L50127-28, March 30, 1979

VICTOR JUANIZA, Heirs of Josefa P. Leus etc., et al.,plaintiffs and appellees,vs.EUGENIO JOSE, THE ECONOMIC INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., and ROSALIA ARROYO,defendants and appellants.

FACTS:

Eugenio Jose, a registered owner and operator of the passenger jeepney involved in an accident of collision with a freight train of the PNR that took place in November 1969 resulted in the 7 deaths and 5 physical injuries of its passengers. That time, Eugenio was married to Socorro but had been cohabiting with Rosalia Arroyo, defendant-appellant for 16 years as husband and wife. Trial court decision rendered them jointly and severally liable to pay damages to the heir of the deceased, Victor Juaniza. A motion was prayed for by Rosalia for the decision to be reconsidered.

ISSUE:

WON Eugenio and Rosalia are co-owners of the jeepney.

RULING:

The co-ownership provided in Article 147 applied only when the parties are not incapacitated to marry. Hence, the jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership with the lawful wife. The common-law wife not being the registered owner cannot be held liable for the damages caused by its operation. There is therefore no basis for her liability in the damages arising from the death of and physical injuries suffered by the passengers.

TUMLOS vs. FERNANDEZ

G.R. No. 137650, 12 April 2000

GUILLERMA TUMLOS,petitioner, vs. SPOUSES MARIO FERNANDEZ and LOURDES FERNANDEZ,respondents.

FACTS:

Mario and Lourdes Fernandez were plaintiffs in an action for ejectment filed against Guillerma, Gina and Toto Tumlos. In the complaint, spouses Fernandez alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment building that through their tolerance they allowed the Tumlos to occupy the apartment for the last 7 years without payment of any rent. It was agreed that Guillerma will pay 1,600 a month while the other defendants promised to pay 1,000 a month which was not complied with. Demand was made several times for the defendants to vacate the premises as they are in need of the property for the construction of a new building.

Defendants appealed to RTC that Mario and Guillerma had an amorous relationship and that they acquired the property in question as their love nest. It was likewise alleged that they lived together in the said apartment building with their 2 children for about 10 years and that Gullerma administered the property by collecting rentals from the lessees until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of their marriage.

ISSUE:

WON Guillerma is a co-owner of the said apartment under Article 148.

RULING:

SC rejected the claim that Guillerma and Mario were co-owners of the subject property. The claim was not satisfactorily proven by Guillerma since there were no other evidence presented to validate it except for the said affidavit. Even if the allegations of having cohabited with Mario and that she bore him two children were true, the claim of co-ownership still cannot be accepted. Mario is validly married with Lourdes hence Guillerma and Mario are not capacitated to marry each other. The property relation governing their supposed cohabitation is under Article 148 of the Family Code. Actual contribution is required by the said provision in contrast to Art 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions to the acquisitions of common property by one who has no salary, income, work or industry. Such is not included in Art 148. If actual contribution is not proven then there can be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.

The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.7 Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void

Article 147 of the Family Code provides:

Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.

For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:

1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void

VALDES v. RTC

260 SCRA 221. July 31, 1996

ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ,petitioner,REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDEZ,respondents.

Petition on a pure question of law

Facts:1. Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on January 5, 1971 and later had 5 kids.2. On June 22, 1992, Antonio sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Art. 36 of the FC.3. The RTC of Quezon City rendered judgment and declared the marriage null and void under Art. 36 of the FC on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity to comply with their essential marital obligations and ordered the liquidation of their common properties as defined by Art. 147 of the FC and to comply with the provisions of Art. 50, 51 and 52 of the FC4. Consuelo sought a clarification of the order of the court and asserted that the FC did not have provisions for the liquidation of common property in unions without marriage5. The court explained in an order dated May 5, 1995 that the property including the family home acquired during their union are presumed to have been obtained through joined efforts and the property would be owned by them in equal shares and the liquidation and partition of property would be governed by the regime of co-ownership6. The court also explained that Art 102 does not apply since it refers to the procedure for liquidation of conjugal partnership property. Art 129 also does not apply because it refers to procedures for liquidation of the absolute community of property 7. Antonio moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was denied.

Issues:WON Art 147 is the correct law governing the disposition of property in the case at barWON Art 147 applies to marriages declared null and void pursuant to Art. 36

Ruling:WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October 1995, of the trial court are AFFIRMED

Ratio:1. In void marriages, the property relations of the parties during the cohabitation period is governed by the provisions of Art. 147 or Art. 1482. In the case at bar, Art. 147 applies because there was no legal impediment to their marriage and they were capacitated wherein the word capacitated refers to legal capacity of a party to contract marriage

Notes: Potential conflict between Art. 129 and Art. 147 Trial courts decision The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdes and respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes is hereby declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity to comply with their essential marital obligations; The three older children, Carlos Enrique III, Antonio Quintin and Angela Rosario shall choose which parent they would want to stay with. "Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in the custody of their mother, herein respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes. "The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over the children who are in the custody of the other. The petitioner and respondent aredirected to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common propertiesas defined byArticle 147of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions ofArticles50, 51 and 52of the same code, within thirty (30) days from notice of this decision. Alleged Errors: "Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are psychological incapacitated. "Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared voidabinitio, including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses. "Assumingarguendothat Article 147 applies to marriages declared voidab initioon the ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with Article 129. "It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the children wish to stay."