G.R. No. 169956 January 19, 2009SPOUSES JONEL PADILLA and SARAH PADILLA, Petitioners, vs.ISAURO A. VELASCO, TEODORA A. VELASCO, DELIA A. VELASCO, VALERIANO A. VELASCO, JR., IDA A. VELASCO, AMELITA C. VELASCO, ERIBERTO C. VELASCO, JR., and CELIA C. VELASCO, Respondents.D E C I S I O NNACHURA, J.:Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision1 dated February 11, 2005 and the Resolution2 dated October 4, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 69997 entitled Isauro A. Velasco, Teodora A. Velasco, Delia A. Velasco, Valeriano A. Velasco, Jr., Ida A. Velasco, Amelita C. Velasco, Eriberto C. Velasco, Jr. and Celia C. Velasco v. Spouses Jonel Padilla and Sarah Padilla.The factsThe facts of the case are as follows:Respondents are the heirs of Dr. Artemio A. Velasco (Artemio), who died single and without any issue on January 22, 1949. During his lifetime, Artemio acquired Lot No. 2161 consisting of 7,791 square meters situated at Barangay Pinagsanjan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, covered by Tax Declaration No. 4739. Artemio acquired the lot from spouses Brigido Sacluti and Melitona Obial, evidenced by a deed of sale dated February 14, 1944.In October 1987, petitioners entered the property as trustees by virtue of a deed of sale executed by the Rural Bank of Pagsanjan in favor of spouses Bartolome Solomon, Jr. and Teresita Padilla (Solomon spouses).Respondents demanded that petitioners vacate the property, but the latter refused. The matter was referred to the barangay for conciliation; however, the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. Thereafter, petitioners caused the cutting of trees in the area, fenced it and built a house thereon. They harvested the crops and performed other acts of dominion over the property.On October 14, 1991, respondents filed a complaint for accion publiciana, accounting and damages against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santa Cruz, Laguna. They asked the court to order petitioners to vacate the property and to pay moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and cost of suit.Isauro A. Velasco (Isauro), the brother of the deceased Artemio, as administrator of the property, was presented as a witness. He testified that Artemio owned the property. As evidence thereof, he presented the Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan executed by spouses Brigido Sacluti and Melitona Obial in favor of Artemio, and declared that he (Isauro) was present during the signing of the instrument. He offered in evidence tax declarations and tax receipts covering Lot No. 2161 which were all in the name of Artemio. A certification from the Land Registration Authority (LRA) was likewise presented by Isauro which states that based on the records of the LRA, Decree No. 403348 was issued on October 10, 1930 covering Lot No. 2161.3Rolando R. Flores, a geodetic engineer, also testified that on January 16, 1993, upon prior notice to petitioners, he conducted a survey of the land based on the technical description of the property and the map from the Bureau of Lands. The purpose of the survey was to verify if the area occupied by petitioners was Lot No. 2161. Upon his examination and based on his survey, he concluded that the land occupied by petitioners was Lot No. 2161.4On the other hand, petitioners averred that the Solomon spouses owned the property; that the said spouses bought it from the Rural Bank of Pagsanjan as evidenced by a deed of sale dated September 4, 1987; that the land was identified as Lot No. 76-pt, consisting of 10,000 square meters, located at Pinagsanjan, Pagsanjan, Laguna; and that the spouses authorized petitioners to occupy the land and introduce improvements thereon.Petitioners further claimed that subsequent to the sale of the property to the Solomon spouses, Lot No. 76-pt. was levied on in Civil Case No. 320 under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Pagsanjan, Laguna. The case was entitled Rural Bank of Pagsanjan, Inc. v. Spouses Hector and Emma Velasco, Valeriano Velasco and Virginia Miso. Petitioners alleged that Valeriano Velasco obtained a loan from the Rural Bank of Pagsanjan, with Hector Velasco as co-maker, and the land was mortgaged by Valeriano as collateral. Valerianos failure to pay the loan caused the foreclosure of the land, and on September 17, 1980, Lot No. 76-pt was sold at a public auction by the Provincial Sheriff. The Rural Bank of Pagsanjan was the highest bidder.Pedro Zalameda Trinidad, Jr. (Pedro), as a witness for the petitioners, testified that he was born in Barangay Pinagsanjan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, and had been residing there since birth. He said that based on his knowledge, the land belonged to Nonong (Valeriano) Velasco because he used to buy coconuts harvested from the said land and it was Nonong Velasco who caused the gathering of coconuts thereon.5Petitioner Jonel Padilla also took the witness stand. He testified that Pedro was occupying the land when he initially visited it. A representative of the Rural Bank of Pagsanjan disclosed to him that the land previously belonged to Valeriano. He verified from the Municipal Assessor the technical description of the land, but no longer verified from the Bureau of Lands because he trusted the bank. Upon his recommendation, his sister and his brother-in-law purchased the property after verifying the supporting documents. It was his brother-in-law who went to the Bureau of Lands and found that it was Lot No. 2161.6On July 27, 1999, the RTC rendered a Decision,7 the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [respondents] ordering the [petitioners] to vacate the land presently occupied by them and restore possession thereof to the [respondents], to render an accounting of the proceeds from the crop harvested therefrom starting September 1987 up to the time the property is returned to the [respondents], and to remove at their expense all the structures they constructed thereon.8Petitioners filed an appeal before the CA, but on February 11, 2005, the CA issued the assailed decision affirming the decision of the RTC. They consequently filed a motion for reconsideration. However, the same was denied in the assailed resolution dated October 4, 2005.Hence, the instant petition.The IssuesPetitioners anchor their petition on the following grounds:I. The alleged sale executed between Brigido Sacluti and Melitona Obial as seller and Dr. Artemio [Velasco] as buyer was never established, respondents having failed to present the original copy thereof during the trial despite their clear and categorical commitment to do so. Furthermore, the purported Original Certificate of Title issued in the name of Brigido Sacluti and Melitona Obial was never presented in evidence, thus, creating the presumption that had it been presented, the same would have been adverse to respondents.9II. The spouses Solomon acquired the subject property from its lawful owner in good faith and for value.10III. The spouses Solomon acquired the subject property at the public auction sale conducted by the provincial sheriff of Laguna based on the judgment and writ of execution issued by the Municipal Trial Court of Laguna against respondent Valeriano Velasco for non-payment of a loan considering that (1) the issuance of Tax Declaration No. 4624 in the name of respondent Valeriano Velasco is entitled to the presumption of regularity especially since respondents have not explained how and why it was wrongly issued in the name of their own brother, respondent Valeriano Velasco and without any of them taking any action to correct the alleged mistake; and (2) by their failure to assert their alleged ownership of the property and their inaction [by not] questioning the legal action taken by the bank against their co-respondent Valeriano Velasco and the subject property despite their full awareness since 1980, respondents are barred by estoppel from denying the title of the bank and the Solomon spouses.11IV. The action a quo was barred by prescription considering that respondents filed their legal action against the petitioners only on October 14, 1991, more than ten (10) years after the bank had acquired the subject property on September 17, 1980 at the public auction conducted by the Provincial Sheriff of Laguna.12V. At the very least, respondents are guilty of laches, they having slept on their rights for an unreasonable length of time such that to dispossess petitioners of the property after they had introduced substantial improvements thereon in good faith would result in undue damage and injury to them all due to the silence and inaction of respondents in asserting their alleged ownership over the property.13VI. The evidence proves that Lot no. 2161 and Lot no. 76-pt are one and the same.14VII. The failure of Atty. Asinas to present other witnesses, additional documents and to respond to certain pleadings brought about by his serious illnesses constitutes excusable negligence or incompetency to warrant a new trial considering that the Supreme Court itself had recognized negligence or incompetency of counsel as a ground for new trial especially if it has resulted in serious injustice or to an uneven playing field.15 VIII. The overwhelming testimonial and documentary evidence, if presented, would have altered the result and the decision now appealed from.16IX. The petitioners should be awarded their counterclaim for exemplary damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses.17The arguments submitted by petitioners may be summed up in the following issues:I. Who, as between the parties, have a better right of possession of Lot No. 2161;II. Whether the complaint for accion publiciana has already prescribed; andIII. Whether the negligence of respondents counsel entitles them to a new trial.The Ruling of the CourtWe deny the instant petition.First. The instant case is for accion publiciana, or for recovery of the right to possess. This was a plenary action filed in the regional trial court to determine the better right to possession of realty independently of the title.18 Accion publiciana is also used to refer to an ejectment suit where the cause of dispossession is not among the grounds for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, or when possession has been lost for more than one year and can no longer be maintained under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership.19Based on the findings of facts of the RTC which were affirmed by the CA, respondents were able to establish lawful possession of Lot No. 2161 when the petitioners occupied the property. Lot No. 2161 was the subject of Decree No. 403348 based on the decision dated October 10, 1930 in Cadastre (Cad.) Case No. 11, LRC Record No. 208. The Original Certificate of Title to the land was issued to Brigido Sacluti and Melitona Obial. On February 14, 1944, the original owners of the land sold the same to Artemio. From the date of sale, until Artemios death on January 22, 1949, he was in continuous possession of the land. When Artemio died, Isauro acted as administrator of the land with Tomas Vivero as caretaker. In 1987, petitioners occupied the property by virtue of a deed of sale between the Rural Bank of Pagsanjan and the Solomon spouses. The land bought by the Solomon spouses from the Bank is denominated as Lot No. 76-pt and previously owned by Valeriano. However, it was proved during trial that the land occupied by petitioners was Lot No. 2161 in the name of Artemio, whereas the land sold by the bank to the petitioners was Lot No. 76-pt.Given this factual milieu, it can readily be deduced that respondents are legally entitled to the possession of Lot No. 2161.It is a long-standing policy of this Court that the findings of facts of the RTC which were adopted and affirmed by the CA are generally deemed conclusive and binding. This Court is not a trier of facts and will not disturb the factual findings of the lower courts unless there are substantial reasons for doing so.20 In the instant case, we find no exceptional reason to depart from this policy.Second. The case filed by respondents for accion publiciana has not prescribed. The action was filed with the RTC on October 14, 1991. Petitioners dispossessed respondents of the property in October 1987. At the time of the filing of the complaint, only four (4) years had elapsed from the time of dispossession.Under Article 555(4) of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the real right of possession is not lost till after the lapse of ten years. It is settled that the remedy of accion publiciana prescribes after the lapse of ten years.21 Thus, the instant case was filed within the allowable period.Third. Petitioners put in issue that Lot No. 2161 and Lot 76-pt are one and the same, and that the land was owned by Valeriano when it was foreclosed by the bank. This, in effect, is a collateral attack on the title over the property which is registered in the name of Artemio.We cannot countenance this stance of the petitioners, and perforce, must strike it down. Title to a registered land cannot be collaterally attacked.22 A separate action is necessary to raise the issue of ownership.In accion publiciana, the principal issue is possession, and ownership is merely ancillary thereto. Only in cases where the possession cannot be resolved without resolving the issue of ownership may the trial court delve into the claim of ownership. This rule is enunciated in Refugia v. CA,23 where the Court declared, viz.:Where the question of who has prior possession hinges on the question of who the real owner of the disputed portion is, the inferior court may resolve the issue of ownership and make a declaration as to who among the contending parties is the real owner. In the same vein, where the resolution of the issue of possession hinges on a determination of the validity and interpretation of the document of title or any other contract on which the claim of possession is premised, the inferior court may likewise pass upon these issues. This is because, and it must be so understood, that any such pronouncement made affecting ownership of the disputed portion is to be regarded merely as provisional, hence, does not bar nor prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the land.Fourth. Petitioners aver that they are entitled to a new trial due to the failure of their counsel in the proceedings before the RTC to present testimonial and documentary evidence necessary for them to obtain a favorable judgment. They maintain that the failure of their counsel to present these other evidence was due to counsels lingering illness at that time, and therefore, constitutes excusable negligence.It may be reiterated that mistakes of counsel as to the competency of witnesses, the sufficiency and relevancy of evidence, the proper defense, or the burden of proof, as well as his failure to introduce certain evidence or to summon witnesses and to argue the case, are not proper grounds for a new trial, unless the incompetence of counsel be so great that his client is prejudiced and prevented from fairly presenting his case.24In this case, the illness of petitioners counsel and his alleged failure to present additional evidence during the trial of the case do not constitute sufficient ground for a new trial. The Order25 issued by the trial court in its denial of the motion for new trial filed by petitioners aptly explains the reason why a new trial is unnecessary, viz.:Assuming that Atty. Asinas failed to perform the imputed acts by reason of his ailments, still, the same is insufficient ground to grant a new trial. The evidence on record established the fact that [respondents] and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject realty for a long time. Their possession was interrupted by [petitioners] who entered the property in [1987] pursuant to a deed of sale between the Rural Bank of Pagsanjan and spouses Bartolome C. Solomon and Teresita Padilla. Considering that this is an accion publiciana and [respondents] earlier rightful possession of the subject parcel of land has been adequately established, the testimonial and documentary evidence sought to be adduced in a new trial would not adversely affect the findings of the Court. The ownership and possession of the property purchased by the Solomon spouses from the Rural Bank of Pagsanjan could be the subject of an appropriate action.WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 162288 April 4, 2007MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, and AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE, Petitioners, vs.MILAGROS URGELLO, Respondent.D E C I S I O NCARPIO MORALES, J.:Respondent, Milagros Urgello, was the owner of Lot No. 913-E of the Banilad Estate in Cebu City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 10873.1 Lot No. 913-E was subdivided into four parcels, Lot No. 913-E-1, Lot No. 913-E-2, Lot No. 913-E-3, and Lot No. 913-E-4.2 Sometime in the 1950s, the then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) filed a complaint before the then Court of First Instance of Cebu to expropriate Lot No. 913-E-3 for the projected expansion of the Lahug Airport. The case reached the Court of Appeals in which, on joint motion of the parties, a judgment based on a compromise agreement was rendered on July 27, 1964.3 In that agreement, the CAA agreed to purchase Lot No. 913-E-3 for P3,105.00, subject to the resolutory condition that in the event that the Republic of the Philippines would no longer use it as an airport, its title or ownership would revert to respondent or her heirs upon reimbursement of the purchase price of P3,105.00.4 Respondent thus executed a Conditional Deed of Sale incorporating the resolutory condition, which deed was annotated on respondents TCT No. 10873.5 It appears that on April 27, 1966, the Mactan Airport commenced its operations and the Philippine Airlines stopped using the Lahug Airport. Filipinas Airways and Air Manila ceased too to use the Lahug Airport at the end of 1966 and thereafter used the Mactan Airport. 6On August 2, 1983, the Bureau of Air Transportation (BAT) by which the CAA was later known, and the Bureau of Equipment of the then Ministry of Public Works and Highways (MPWH), entered into a Memorandum of Agreement whereby the BAT was to lease several parcels of land, including Lot No. 913-E-3, to MPWH for 25 years to be used as the site of the latters Seventh Regional Base Shop Complex.7 The MPWH soon started building fences along the perimeters of Lot No. 913-E-3.8 After the dismantling of the hangars and taxiways from the Lahug Airport and putting up of a repair shop of the Bureau of Equipment of the MPWH, the BAT erected a fence, over the objection of respondent, enclosing portions of her Lot Nos. 913-E-2 and 913-E-4.9 Respondent thus filed on June 5, 1983 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu a Complaint for Injunction with Damages against the BAT and the G.M. Tiongco Construction Company (Tiongco Construction), docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-3908. Tiongco Construction in turn impleaded the MPWH as third-party defendant.10 Subsequently, respondent, by letter of July 8, 1985, requested the BAT for the reconveyance to her of Lot No. 913-E-3 and tendered RPB Demand Draft No. 148284 in the amount of P3,105.00.11 The BAT received the draft, but it did not reconvey the lot, prompting respondent to file on August 9, 1985 a Complaint12 for Reconveyance with Damages against it before the RTC of Cebu City, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-4115. In the meantime or on December 20, 1985, the MPWH filed a Complaint13 for Eminent Domain against respondent and four others, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-4541, for the expropriation of Lot No. 913-E-4, among other lots. Branch 6 of the Cebu RTC later rendered judgment14 in Civil Case No. CEB-4115 (respondents Complaint for Reconveyance of Lot No. 913-E-3), by Decision of January 3, 1989, holding that the resolutory condition stipulated in the Compromise Agreement forged between the then CAA and respondent basis of the July 27, 1964 judgment of the Court of Appeals had taken place. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: Wherefore, judgment is rendered, ordering the defendant Bureau of Air Transportation to reconvey to the plaintiff Milagros E. Urgello that parcel of land, Lot No. 913-E-3, subject of the conditional Deed of Sale, after payment [sic] by the latter of the sum of P3,105.00 as repurchase price. The plaintiffs claim for damages as well as the defendants counterclaims are dismissed. No costs.15 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)On November 29, 1989, then President Aquino issued a Memorandum16 directing the transfer of the general operations of Lahug Airport to the Mactan International Airport before the end of 1990 and the closure of the Lahug Airport thereafter. On July 31, 1990, Republic Act No. 6958,17 the Charter of herein petitioner Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA), was signed into law. On January 21, 1991, Branch 6 of the RTC Cebu rendered a decision18 in Civil Case No. CEB-3908 (respondents Complaint for Injunction against the BAT and Tiongco Construction questioning the enclosure of portions of her Lot Nos. 913-E-2 and 913-E-4, in which complaint MPWH impleaded Tiongco Construction as a third-party defendant) approving a Compromise Agreement entered into on January 17, 1990 by respondent on one hand, and the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the BAT which later became known as Air Transportation Office (ATO), and the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) and Tiongco Construction on the other. The pertinent provisions of the Compromise Agreement read:1. DPWH obligates itself to immediately demolish at its own expense the concrete wall which it built traversing plaintiffs Lot [No.] 913-[E]-2 and Emerald Street in order to provide access to plaintiffs properties.x x x x2. Plaintiff hereby agrees to sell and DPWH agrees to purchase Lot No. 913-E[-4] . . . covering an area of One Thousand One Hundred Ninety Nine (1,199) square meters of plaintiffs lot, particularly Lot No. 913-E-4-A, at the agreed price of Six Hundred Fifty Pesos (P650.00) per square meter or a total of Seven Hundred Seventy Nine Thousand Three Hundred Fifty Pesos (P779,350.00).x x x x3. It is understood that DPWH and ATO will comply with the Decision rendered on January 3, 1989 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch VI, Cebu City in Civil Case No. CEB-4115 entitled "Milagros Urgello vs. Republic of the Philippines" for reconveyance of Lot No. 913-E-3.4. In view of the Decision of January 3, 1989, plaintiff agrees to sell and the DPWH agrees to purchase Lot [No.] 913-E-3 consisting of One Thousand Thirty Five (1,035) square meters at the agreed price of Six Hundred Fifty Pesos (P650.00) per square meter or for the total amount of Six Hundred Seventy Two Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Pesos (P672,750.00).5. To avert future litigations, the parties hereby waive all their respective demands, claims, counterclaims, and third-party claims against one another with respect to the matters treated in this Agreement.6. The DPWH hereby agrees to withdraw its complaint for eminent domain [covering Lot No. 913-E-4, among other lots] filed against plaintiff in Civil Case No. 4541 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch XVII, Cebu City entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Milagros Urgello, et. al." Public defendant likewise agrees to withdraw the appeal it had filed in Civil Case No. 4115 entitled "Milagros Urgello vs. Republic of the Philippines" (BAT, now ATO) [for reconveyance of Lot No. 913-E-3].19 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)On March 11, 1991, the Republic of the Philippines filed a Manifestation20 in Civil Case No. CEB-4541 (the eminent domain case filed by the then MPWH covering, among other lots, Lot No. 913-E-4) signifying its conformity to the January 17, 1990 Compromise Agreement.Respondent, relying on the Manifestation in open court of Atty. Agustino Hermoso of the DPWH Regional Office about the availability of funds already appropriated for her properties, demanded the payment for Lot Nos. 913-E-3 and 913-E-4, and the demolition of the concrete wall around Lot No. 913-E-2, as agreed upon in the January 17, 1990 Compromise Agreement.21 The DPWH ignored respondents demands, however, prompting her to file on June 18, 1993 in her complaint for Injunction (Civil Case No. CEB-3908) a Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Execution against the DPWH to enforce its obligation under the said Compromise Agreement.22 The motion was granted and a Writ of Execution23 was issued on July 28, 1993 and served upon the DPWH, but it was unenforced per Sheriffs Return of Service24 dated November 17, 1993.The DPWH having failed to comply with its undertakings under the January 17, 1990 Compromise Agreement which was approved on January 21, 1991 in Civil Case No. CEB-3908 (respondents Complaint for Injunction), respondent filed on October 15, 1996 before the Cebu RTC a Complaint25 for Reconveyance26 with damages and attorneys fees against herein petitioners DPWH and ATO,27 docketed as CEB-19418, the subject of the present petition, praying that judgment be rendered1. Ordering defendants jointly and severally to immediately reconvey to plaintiff Milagros A. Urgello:a. Lot No. 913-E-4-A without any condition;b. Lot No. 913-E-3 upon plaintiffs payment [sic] to the defendants of the sum of P3,105.00 as repurchase price;2. Directing defendant DPWH to immediately demolish at its own expense the concrete wall which it built traversing plaintiffs Lot No. 913-E-2 and Emerald Street, Lahug, Cebu City, which has obstructed plaintiffs access to her other properties;3. Enjoining defendants to solidarily pay plaintiff reasonable rent for their unlawful occupation of Lot No. 913-E-3 since 1950 and of Lot No. 913-E-4-A since 1990 which deprived plaintiff of any beneficial enjoyment thereof;4. Alternatively, requiring defendants to solidarily and immediately pay plaintiff the amount of P1,452,100.00 (plus interest computed at 12% per annum from 1990) by way of just compensation for Lot Nos. 913-E-3 and 913-E-4-A pursuant to the judgment based on the Compromise Agreement;5. Commanding defendants to solidarily pay plaintiff:c. Moral damages of P1,000,000.00;d. Actual damages of P100,000.00;e. Attorneys fees of P300,000.00;6. Affording plaintiffs such other reliefs just and equitable in the premises.28 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)In its Answer,29 petitioner DPWH questioned respondents failure to exhaust administrative remedies and to serve upon the Office of the Solicitor General a copy of the complaint, and the jurisdiction of the trial court.As for petitioner ATO, it posited in its Answer30 that only the DPWH should be held liable for non-compliance with the Compromise Agreement dated January 17, 1990 basis of the January 21, 1991 RTC Decision in respondents Complaint for Injunction claiming that:. . . [T]his Compromise Agreement dated January 17, 1990 is, as cited by plaintiff[-herein respondent] in paragraph 20 of her complaint, the one [which was] entered into by and between her and defendants DPWH and ATO in Civil Cases Nos. 3908 (RTC Br. VI), 4115 (RTC Br. VI) and 4541 (RTC Br. VII) involving Lot Nos. 913-E-2, 913-E-3, and 913-E-4-A, and whatever is the reason behind co-defendant DPWHs neglect or failure to undertake what it assumed as its sole obligation under this Compromise Agreement, which is all that has given rise to the present suit, defendant ATO is not privy to it, has no knowledge about it and should not be made to answer for it;. . . [T]he obligation of defendant ATO under the Compromise Agreement dated 17 January 1990, above cited, ceased when, in that same document, . . . co-defendant [DPWH] assumed as its sole obligation the following: 1) to demolish at its own expense a concrete wall which it built traversing plaintiffs Lot No. 913-[E]-2 and Emerald Street to provide access to plaintiffs properties; and 2) to unconditionally pay plaintiff for the lots sold by plaintiff to the former, to wit: P779, 350.00 as payment for Lot No. 913-E-4-A (1,199 sq. m.); and P672,750.00 as payment for Lot No. 913-E-3 (1035 sq. m.);x x x x. . . [F]or plaintiff[-herein respondent] to pursue her old cases against defendant after the parties in those cases covered by the Court-approved Compromise Agreement dated January 17, 1990 are supposed to have already waived all their respective demands, claims, counterclaims and third-party claims is for her to drag all the defendants there into an absurdity: the revival of those demands, claims, counterclaims and third-party claims so needless when all plaintiff needs to do is focus her attention on the one party defendant which reneged on what it assumed as its sole obligation under the same compromise agreement.31 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)1vvphi1.ntIn support of its claim, the ATO argued that:. . . ATO Mactan, as now established and constituted, is one of the nine (9) airport cluster centers or area offices of defendant Air Transportation Office created and established pursuant to DOTC Department Order No. 92-569 dated January 21, 1992, and was actually established only sometime January 1993, some two years, more or less, after the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) was formally and officially constituted on December 18, 1990 pursuant to Republic Act No. 6958 (the MCIAA charter);. . . [B]y virtue of RA 6958, MCIAA became the airport operating authority in Cebu, to the exclusion of defendant ATO, and the role of defendant ATO in Cebu has since been confined only to the operation and maintenance of air-traffic-service and air-navigation-service facilities at Mactan International Airport, although it does exercise a separate role in supervising the management, operation and maintenance of the following satellite airports: Dumaguete Airport in Negros Oriental, Tagbilaran Airport and Ubay Airport in Bohol and Siquijor Airport in Siquijor;32x x x x. . . [I]t is clear from the . . . provisions of RA 6958 (the MCIAA Charter) that the judgment prayed for by plaintiff in her complaint, including reconveyance by defendant ATO, jointly and severally with co-defendant Department of Public Works and Highways, of Lot Nos. 913-E-3 and 913-E-4-A, cannot be done anymore insofar as defendant ATO is concerned, at least not without the inclusion of MCIAA as a proper party, if it is not [sic], in fact, as defendant believes, an indispensable party, since "all assets, powers, rights, interests and privileges relating to airport works or airports" both at Mactan International Airport and at the old Lahug Airport have already been assumed in ownership and/or administration by MCIAA, to the exclusion and substitution of defendant ATO, by virtue of MCIAAs authority and missions under RA 6958 creating it;33 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)Respondent later filed with leave and approval of the trial court an Amended Complaint34 impleading herein petitioner MCIAA as a party defendant35 and incorporating a prayer for the payment of rentals should reconveyance of her properties (Lot Nos. 913-E-3 & 913-E-4-A) be denied.36MCIAA, in its Answer with Counterclaim to the Amended Complaint,37 raised the following defenses:Plaintiff[-herein respondent] merely seeks the enforcement of [the January 17, 1990] Compromise Agreement of which defendant MCIAA is not a party thereto. Defendant is a total stranger and is a separate and distinct personality from its co-defendants DPWH and ATO. Defendant MCIAA should not therefore be made solidarily liable for the non-fulfillment of the terms of the compromise agreement including those that may arise therefrom. As can be gleaned from the complaint, Lot [No.] 913-E-3 was no longer possessed by co-defendant ATO when RA 6958 took effect. In fact, co-defendant ATO did not make any formal turn over of this lot and its obligations in the alleged Compromise Agreement to defendant MCIAA. Defendant MCIAA could not therefore be compelled to assume the liabilities and obligations of co-defendant ATO in said compromise agreement.Granting arguendo that defendant MCIAA assumed the obligations and liabilities of co-defendant ATO by virtue of RA 6958, the only obligation of co-defendant ATO is to comply with the Decision rendered on January 3, 1989 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch VI, Cebu City in Civil Case No. Ceb-4115 entitled "Milagros Urgello vs. Republic of the Philippines" for reconveyance of Lot No. 913-E-3. By virtue of said decision, the said lot was [sic] already reconveyed to the plaintiff were it not for the obligation of co-defendant DPWH to purchase the same as stipulated in the Compromise Agreement. This being the case, ownership over Lot No. 913-E-3 was never acquired nor transferred to defendant MCIAA.38 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)By Decision of March 10, 1999, Branch 22 of the RTC Cebu disposed as follows:39 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:1. Ordering defendants DPWH, MCIAA, and ATO to solidarily reconvey Lot No. 913-E-3 to plaintiff without anymore need of paying the repurchase price of P3,105.00 as it was paid already;2. Ordering the defendants DPWH, MCIAA, and ATO to solidarily return to plaintiff Lot No. 913-E-2 and Lot No. 913-E-4 (including Lot No. 913-E-4-A);3. Ordering defendants DPWH, MCIAA, and ATO to solidarily pay rentals on Lot No. 913-E-3 at the rate of P20.00 square meter per month from July 8, 1985 to the present; however, for defendant MCIAA, payment hereof shall be reckoned from August 15, 1990 only;4. Ordering defendants DPWH, MCIAA, and ATO to solidarily pay rentals on Lot No. 913-E-2 and Lot No. 913-E-4 at the rate of P20.00 per square meter per month from January 1, 1985 to the present; however, in the case of defendant MCIAA, payment hereof shall be reckoned from August 15, 1990 only;5. Directing defendants DPWH, MCIAA, and ATO to solidarily demolish the fence traversing Lot No. 913-E-2 at their own expense;6. Ordering defendants DPWH, MCIAA, and ATO to solidarily pay plaintiff attorneys fees in the amount of P300,000.00.No costs.40 (Emphasis, italics, and underscoring supplied)In holding petitioners solidarily liable, the trial court explained:[T]his Court hereby declares that the reconveyance of Lot [No.] 913-E-3 is a solidary obligation of all three (3) defendants DPWH, MCIAA, and ATO. Defendant DPWH is obliged to reconvey because as the evidence of the case would show, said defendant is the one presently in possession and occupation of the property being the lessee thereof by virtue of the questionable Memorandum of Agreement it entered into with BAT.Defendant MCIAA is also obligated to reconvey on the ground that it is the legal custodian of the lot by virtue of R.A. 6958 creating the MCIAA and transferring to it all the assets of the Lahug Airport. While it may be seriously argued that based on the evidence on record, there was no turnover of any facilities to defendant MCIAA yet, under the express provision of Sec. 15 R.A. 6958, defendant MCIAA is constituted as the legal transferee of all facilities, lands, buildings, and other properties of the Lahug Airport, a division of ATO. It provides, "All existing public airport facilities, runways, lands, buildings and other properties, movable or immovable, belonging to or presently administered by the airportsare hereby transferred to the Authority." Construing the letter of this provision, there is no denying that legally and technically, defendant MCIAA is the present administrator-custodian of all the assets, facilities, and properties (including Lot No. 913-E-3) of the Lahug Airport.Moreover, upon the transfer to and acceptance by MCIAA of these assets, facilities, properties, etc., it likewise assumed the liabilities and obligations of ATO which includes the reconveyance of Lot No. 913-E-3 to its owner her resolutory condition [sic]. This assumption of liabilities and obligations of ATO is specifically provided in Section 17 of the same law, which says:Sec. 17. Transfer of Liabilities and Debts. Upon the transfer to and acceptance by the authority of the existing physical facilities, intangible assets and completed projects referred to in the preceding sections, all debts, liabilities, and obligations of government agencies or entities concerned, intangible assets and completed project within the airports shall likewise be assumed by the authority.The language of the aforecited provision is very clear, and there can never be doubt that MCIAA is obligated technically to reconvey plaintiffs lot. This Court likewise believes that defendant ATO has also an obligation (jointly and severally with the other defendants) to effect the reconveyance of the property to the plaintiff. This is anchored on the fact that considering that there was no turnover of any facilities, properties, lands, buildings, etc. by it to defendant MCIAA, defendant ATO is still the open exercising custody and administration over the properties. On the demand for the return of Lot No. 913-E-[2] and Lot No. 913-E-4 to plaintiff, this Court finds the same to be meritorious. As shown in the records, the aforementioned lots were never included in the expropriation proceedings over Lot No. 913-E-3. These lots, without the plaintiffs consent, were unilaterally taken by the government when BAT fenced the same.1awphi1.nt Such an act violates the constitutional mandate that "[Private] property shall [not] be taken for public use without just compensation" (Section 9, Art. III, Constitution). Likewise, it is deprivation of property without due process of law. [Is it] not that justice and equity demand that what is not yours should be returned to its rightful owner?Corollary to this, the return of Lot No. 913-E-4 necessarily includes Lot No. 913-E-4-A that was the subject of another expropriation complaint (Civil Case No. 4541) which ended up in a compromise agreement and a Decision based thereon. . . .To recall, one of the provisions of the said compromise agreement was the sale of Lot No. 913-E-4-A to the government at P779,350.00. However, as the evidence would show, the government did not pay the said amount for unexplained reasons. Said failure consequently abrogated the whole compromise agreement; and there is now created an obligation on the part of the government to return the property to its owner, plaintiff herein.As in the case of Lot No. 913-E-3 (expropriated), the reconveyance/return of Lot No. 913-E-2 and Lot No. 913-E-4 is a solidary obligation of all the defendants for the same reasons as already discussed earlier.For the unauthorized use of Lot No. 913-E-3 after the Lahug Airport was abandoned and after plaintiff tendered her repurchase price, and for the illegal encroachment and occupation of Lot No. 913-E-2 and Lot No. 913-E-4 by the government, this Court likewise finds as valid the demand of plaintiff for rentals on the aforementioned lots.It is an undenial fact that the government has benefited from the use, occupation, and possession of these lots; while on the other hand, the plaintiff herein has suffered from the deprivation thereof. Again, if we are to live by the sway and dominance of justice, it would thus be equitable that plaintiff be compensated by the government in the form of rentals, at least, for after all, no one, not even the government, is exempted in the eyes of the law.Payment of [the] rentals should be a joint and several obligation of all the defendants. . . .The liability of defendant DPWH rests on the facts [sic] that it is the one which has been in possession and occupation of these properties. Whereas in the case of defendant ATO, said defendant through the then BAT was the one which illegally constructed the fence enclosing the properties. Besides, because it failed to turnover its facilities, properties, lands, buildings, etc. to defendant MCIAA, it is still the administrator and custodian of all these litigated lots.Upon the other hand, the obligation of defendant MCIAA finds its basis in R.A. 6958, wherein under this law, specifically Sections 15 and 17 thereof, defendant MCIAA is supposed to be administering and managing all the facilities, lands, buildings, and other properties of defendant ATO. The fact that it has not received even a single property from defendant ATO does not relieve it from such obligation because the law (R.A. 6958) is quite specific. Besides, defendant MCIAA should be doing its job.x x x xOn plaintiffs demand for the abolition of the fence traversing her Lot No. 913-E-2, the Court hereby directs defendants DPWH, MCIAA, and ATO to jointly and severally demolish the same at their own expense. The illegal construction of said fence has made the government a builder in bad faith under Article 450 of the Civil Code . . . .41 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)On appeal,42 the Court of Appeals, by Decision43 dated February 17, 2004, affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari44 filed by MCIAA, DPWH, and ATO positing that:I. RESPONDENTS MONEY CLAIM MUST BE FILED WITH THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA).II. PETITIONER MCIAA IS NOT OBLIGED TO RECONVEY LOT NOS. 913-[3]-2, 913-E-3, AND 913-E-4. III. PETITIONER MCIAA IS NOT OBLIGED TO PAY RENTALS FOR THE USE OF THE LOTS.IV. PETITIONER MCIAA IS NOT OBLIGED TO DEMOLISH THE FENCE TRAVERSING LOT [NO.] 913-E-2.45 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)It bears emphasis that in rendering the appealed judgment, all that the trial court did was find petitioners liable, providing the bases therefor. Contrary to petitioners DPWHs and ATOs undertakings in the January 17, 1990 Compromise Agreement, they failed to reconvey Lot No. 913-E-3 to respondent despite her return of the purchase price therefor. Such failure amounts to expropriation without just compensation.DPWH and the ATO should thus be held solidarily liable to reconvey Lot No. 913-E-3 to respondent and pay rentals therefore effective July 8, 1985 when she tendered/returned the P3,105.00 purchase price.46 Since respondents cause of action against the ATO with regard to Lot No. 913-E-3 refers to its retention of title thereto despite the occurrence of the resolutory condition stipulated in the Conditional Deed of Sale, MCIAAs liability would depend on whether it is ATOs successor-in-interest with respect to the said lot. Both the trial court and the appellate court held in the affirmative on the basis of Republic Act 6958, Section 15 which reads: SECTION 15. Transfer of Existing Facilities and Intangible Assets. All existing public airport facilities, runways, lands, buildings and other properties, movable or immovable, belonging to or presently administered by the airports, and all assets, powers, rights, interest and privileges relating to airport works or air operations, including all equipment which are necessary for the operation of air navigation, aerodrome control towers, crash, fire, and rescue facilities are hereby transferred to the Authority: Provided, however, That the operational control of all equipment necessary for the operation of radio aids to air navigation, airways communication, the approach control office, and the area control center shall be retained by the Air Transportation Office. No equipment, however, shall be removed by the Air Transportation Office from Mactan without the concurrence of the Authority. The Authority may assist in the maintenance of the Air Transportation Office equipment,and of Section 17 which is requoted for convenience, viz: SECTION 17. Transfer of Liabilities and Debts. Upon the transfer to and acceptance by the Authority of the existing physical facilities, intangible assets and completed projects referred to in the preceding sections, all debts, liabilities, and obligations of government agencies or entities concerned in respect of such physical facilities, tangible assets and completed projects within the airports shall likewise be assumed by the Authority. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)Petitioners claim, however, as follows: . . . The provision is clear that it is only upon the transfer to and acceptance by petitioner MCIAA of a particular physical facility or property that petitioner MCIAA will assume the obligations of petitioner ATO over the facility or property.x x x x[I]t is only upon the transfer to and acceptance by petitioner MCIAA of the lots can it be said that it assumed the obligations of petitioner ATO over the lots.47 (Underscoring in the original; emphasis supplied)To MCIAA, the phrase "upon transfer to and acceptance by" means that a formal turnover to it of a particular facility by the ATO and a formal acceptance by it are required before it assumes the obligations of the ATO thereover. It argues that since ATO never turned over Lot No. 913-E-3 to it, it cannot be compelled to assume ATOs obligation to reconvey the same.48Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6958 is clear, however, that upon its passage, all existing airport facilities and other properties were thereby transferred to MCIAA, viz: All existing public airport facilities, runways, lands, buildings and other properties, movable or immovable, belonging to or presently administered by the airports, and all assets, powers, rights, interest and privileges relating to airport works or air operations, including all equipment which are necessary for the operation of air navigation, aerodrome control towers, crash, fire, and rescue facilities are hereby transferred to the Authority: (Emphasis supplied)It is a settled rule in statutory construction thatThe law must not be read in truncated parts; its provisions must be read in relation to the whole law. It is [a] cardinal rule in statutory construction that a statutes clauses and phrases must not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts in order to produce a harmonious whole. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with other parts of the statute and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.49Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6958 must thus be read vis a viz Section 15 as well as the other provisions of the said law. In Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Hon. Ferdinand J. Marcos, et al.,50 this Court, passing on Sec. 15 of Republic Act No. 6958, held:The "airports" referred to [in Section 15] are the "Lahug Air Port" in Cebu City and the "Mactan International Airport in the Province of Cebu," which belonged to the Republic of the Philippines, then under the Air Transportation Office (ATO). It may be reasonable to assume that the term "lands" refer to "lands" in Cebu City then administered by the Lahug Air Port and includes the parcels of the land the respondent City of Cebu seeks to levy on for real property taxes. This section involves a "transfer" of the "lands," among other things, to the petitioner and not just the transfer of the beneficial use thereof, with the ownership being retained by the Republic of the Philippines. This "transfer" is actually an absolute conveyance of the ownership thereof because the petitioners authorized capital stock consists of, inter alia, "the value of such real estate owned and/or administered by the airports." Hence the petitioner is now the owner of the land in question. . . . "51 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)Thus, Republic Act No. 6958 transferred Lot No. 913-E-3 to MCIAA. In another vein, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 6958 states:Primary Purposes and Objectives The [Mactan-Cebu International Airport] Authority shall principally undertake the economical, efficient, and effective control, management and supervision of the Mactan International Airport in the Province of Cebu and the Lahug Airport in Cebu City hereinafter collectively referred to as airports, and such other airports as may be established in the Province of Cebu. In addition, it shall have the following objectives:(a) To encourage, promote, and develop international and domestic air traffic in the central Visayas and Mindanao regions as a means of making the regions centers of international trade and tourism, and accelerating the development of the means of transportation and communications in the country; and (b) To upgrade the services and facilities of the airports and to formulate internationally acceptable standards of airport accommodation and service. (Emphasis supplied)If formal transfer and acceptance of the assets mentioned in Section 15 were needed before MCIAA could assume the obligations arising therefrom, the "economical, efficient and effective control, management and supervision" of the Mactan International Airport and the Lahug Airport could be impeded by ATO refusing to turn over, and by MCIAA refusing to accept such assets. MCIAA is thus bound, as ATOs successor-in-interest, to reconvey Lot No. 913-E-3. And it is solidarily liable with its co-petitioners to pay rentals in arrears over the said lot. In light of petitioners argument that: . . . While it is true that R.A. 6958 was signed into law on July 31, 1990, it is equally true that Section 21 of the law provides for its effectivity fifteen (15) days after its publication in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation, and not fifteen (15) days from its approval. It was wrong for both courts to assume, without supporting evidence, that R.A. 6958 was published in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation on the same day it was signed into law. (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied),52this Court fixes the effectivity date of the said law to November 13, 1990, 15 days after it was published in the Official Gazette.53MCIAA may not be solidarily liable with DPWH and ATO, however, for the return of Lot Nos. 913-E-2 and 913-E-4 and for the payment of rentals thereon. These obligations of the DPWH and the ATO arose from their illegal physical possession of the said lots up to the present. What Republic Act No. 6958 transferred from the ATO to MCIAA are the properties owned or administered by the ATO, not those physically possessed by the ATO. Finally, since the acts and omissions of the ATO and the DPWH are what compelled respondent to litigate, only they should be held liable for the payment of attorneys fees.WHEREFORE, the petition is in PART GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the trial court, is MODIFIED. As modified, the dispositive portion of the decision reads:1. Petitioners Department of Public Works and Highways, Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority, and Air Transportation Office are ordered to solidarily reconvey Lot No. 913-E-3 to respondent;2. Petitioners DPWH, MCIAA, and ATO are ordered to solidarily pay rentals on Lot No. 913-E-3 at the rate of P20 per square meter per month from July 8, 1985 up to the present. Payment of rentals on the part of MCIAA shall, however, be reckoned from November 13, 1990;3. Petitioner DPWH is ordered to demolish the fence traversing Lot No. 913-E-2; 4. Petitioner DPWH is ordered to return to respondent Lot Nos. 913-E-2 and 913-E-4; 5. Petitioner DPWH and ATO are ordered to solidarily pay rentals on Lot Nos. 913-E-2 and 913-E-4, from January 1, 1985 up to the present; and 6. Petitioners ATO and the DPWH are ordered to solidarily pay attorneys fees in the amount of P300,000.00.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-48612 January 27, 1983CRESENCIO ESPEJO, petitioner, vs.MARTINO MALATE and COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF LEYTE, BRANCH I, respondents. Carlos Mendigo for petitioner. Teodoro E. Atianza for respondents. VASQUEZ, J.:This is a petition for review on certiorari of the order of the Court of First Instance of Leyte in Civil Case No. 5036, dismissing the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction after the parties had rested their respective cases. On January 31, 1974, the plaintiff Cresencio Espejo filed said civil case against defendant Martino Malate entitled "Quieting of Title to and Possession of Real Property and Cancellation of Tax Declaration" before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch I then presided by Judge Gregorio Collantes. The complaint alleged, among others, "that the plaintiff is the absolute owner and actual possessor of a parcel of coconut land containing an area of 14 hectares, more or less, and assessed at P14,250.00, situated in Barrio New Kawayan, Tacloban City, which is a portion of Lot No. 5329, Tacloban Cad. No. 220 ... "that the plaintiff acquired said parcel of land by purchase on May 13, 1963 from the brothers Amando and Saturnino Saosas and since then and up to the present time he has been in possession thereof in good faith and with just title, in concept of owner, uninterruptedly and adversely against the claims of any individual person or persons whomsoever, paying land taxes due thereon, and planting coconut trees and introducing thereon other improvements"; "that the plaintiff's Possession tacked to that of his predecessors-in-interest over the said land has been more than forty (40) years, and to proclaim this possession, the plaintiff had this land declared in his name under Tax Declaration No. 18316 (which starts with the year 1962) on May 15, 1963"; "that the defendant Martino Malate, a former tenant of the plaintiff over the land, with evident bad faith, without-the knowledge, much less consent, of the plaintiff, on December 29, 1964, had a portion of the land declared in his name under Tax Declaration No. 19484 (which starts with the year 1963); that the above-cited tax declaration of the defendant, embracing as it does a portion included within the limits of the land described in paragraph 3 of the complaint, coupled with the defendant's claim of ownership of 9.8 hectares therein as described in tax declaration and his attempt to assume possession thereof by clearing the land and gathering the coconut therefrom, the latest of which was in December, 1973, has cast a cloud upon the ownership and possession by the plaintiff of the lot described in paragraph 3 of the complaint"; "that plaintiff's Tax Declaration No. 18316, being based on a bona fide claim of ownership and actual possession which started on May 13, 1963, and being the older tax declaration, should prevail over Tax Declaration No. 19484 of the defendant; the cancellation of the latter tax declaration is in order"; "that a judicial declaration as to who is the owner and entitled to possession of the parcel of land is imperative to forestall breaches of the peace, bodily injury to persons, mayhem or perhaps even loss of life"; and "that the plaintiff is entitled to have the cloud cast upon his ownership and lawful possession of the land by the defendant removed thru a judicial declaration that the plaintiff is the owner thereof and legally entitled to the possession thereto." (Rollo, page 27, Record on Appeal, pp. 2-5.) The defendant Martino Malate, on February 20, 1974, answered the complaint denying specifically all the allegations therein and counter-alleged "that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the land and had been in actual and physical possession thereof, in the concept of an owner since 1926 introducing improvement thereon." He also alleged affirmative special defenses and counterclaims. On November 4, 1974, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground: "(a) that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject of the action or suit; and (b) that the court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action or suit. With respect to the first ground, the defendant argued "that the subject matter of the above-entitled case is a portion of Lot No. 5329, Tacloban Cad. No. 220, which is a public land hence, its disposition is governed by the Public Land Act. Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, provides that 'subject to said control, the Director of Lands shall have direct control of survey, classification, lease, sale or any other form of concession or disposition and management of the lands of the public domain, and his decision as to questions of facts shall be conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.' It is clear that the Director of Lands has the jurisdiction over said subject matter, being a public land. " (Rollo, p. 27, Record on Appeal, pp. 16-17.) The defendant further concluded that the plaintiff had not exhausted the administrative remedy available to him of filing the claim in the Bureau of Lands. As to the second ground, the defendant argued that the action of the plaintiff was for forcible entry, and was not properly filed, because when the plaintiff filed the case in January, 1974, it was only one year from the accrual of the cause of action, which was in December, 1973, as may be gleaned from the complaint; and that being a forcible entry case, it must be brought in the proper municipal or city court, and not in the court of first instance. On November 18, 1974, the plaintiff filed an opposition to motion to dismiss arguing that the respondent Court has jurisdiction over the land in dispute in the matter of deciding as to who, between the plaintiff or the defendant, has the better right of possession. Plaintiff points out that the question of who has prior possession of the land is alleged in paragraphs 4 to 9 of the complaint, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the answer and paragraph 2 of the affirmative defenses; that he has alleged that his possession tacked to that of his predecessors-in-interest has been for more than forty years, while on the other hand, the defendant has averred that he has been in possession of the land in question for more than forty- seven years; that the question presented, therefore, is as to who of them has prior possession over the controverted land; and that the action, therefore, is an accion publiciana over which the respondent Court has jurisdiction, as ruled by the Supreme Court in Rallon vs. Ruiz, 28 SCRA 332. The respondent Court, on December- 5, 1974, denied the motion to dismiss. On July 16, 1975, it issued an order requiring the plaintiff to amend the complaint in order to conform with their claim of possession regarding the property. On July 31,1975, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint eliminating therefrom the allegations as to his claim of ownership, and emphasizing instead his claim of possession. The defendant filed his opposition to the motion to admit amended complaint on the following grounds. A. That the amendment sought to be made is a complete change of the theory of the case both in the complaint and the evidence so far adduced; B. That the amended complaint conferred jurisdiction on the Honorable Court but before the said amendment the Honorable Court did not have jurisdiction to try the case as envisioned on the original complaint and the evidence so far adduced; and C. That court cannot admit the said amended complaint for having no jurisdiction to act on it and that the amended complaint does not conform to the evidence so far adduced by the plaintiff. On August 11, 1975, the Court issued an order admitting the amended complaint reasoning out as follows: ... This court believes that the plaintiff wanted to emphasize who has the prior possession of the land in question, the plaintiff or the defendant. It is admitted that the land in question is a public land, and that the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources have jurisdiction over the disposition of the public land conformably with Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 141. The question of ownership will not be decided by this court. The only question that will be decided by this court in this case is, who has the prior possession of the public land in question. Over this question as to who has prior possession of the land in question and, therefore, entitled to the exclusion of the other, this court has jurisdiction as shown by the decision of the Supreme Court ... (Rollo, p. 27, Record on Appeal, pp. 45-46.) For the second time, on September 27, 1975, another motion to dismiss was filed by the defendant on the ground "that the Honorable Court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the case as the plaintiff has not exhausted the administrative remedies afforded." It was argued that "there is a pending administrative investigation of the subject-matter of the case at bar between the plaintiff and defendant and, therefore, the instant case should await the resolution of the administrative case." The defendant was referring to a case wherein he is a protestant, in the administrative proceeding entitled Cresencio Espejo vs. H. A. No. 206783 (E-121507) Felipe Mendiola Pastor( transferee), Delia Pastor (transferee). The plaintiff filed his opposition to the motion to dismiss, arguing "that the second motion to dismiss filed by the defendant was based on the same ground as that of the first motion to dismiss as well as his opposition to the motion to admit amended complaint; and that the pendency of the case in the Bureau of Lands is no bar to the present action involving merely the question of who has prior possession of the land in question. " The court a quo denied the second motion to dismiss in an order dated December 16, 1975. On June 18, 1976, after the plaintiff had rested his case, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss on demurrer to evidence reiterating the grounds raised in his two previous motions to dismiss. The respondent Court, thru Judge Jesus N. Borromeo (temporarily presiding the sala vacated. by the retirement of Judge Collantes), on September 10, 1976, issued an order denying the defendant's motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence. After the defendant presented his evidence, the court, thru respondent Judge Jose P. Arro ,issued an order dated January 23, 1978 dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and declaring the proceedings taken therein as null and void. In this appeal, the plaintiff-petitioner raises the following assignment of errors: I. The trial court erred in holding that, when the court issued an order to amend the complaint so that the issue of ownership is deleted from the original complaint and for the amended complaint to substantially alter the theory of the' tile complaint from- recovery of the amended complaint does violence to the provision of Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court. II. The trial court erred in holdieng that it is without jurisdiction and declaring the proceeding in the case null and void. The defendant-respondent commented that what was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the court a quo was an action for reinvindicatoria or action for ownership; that the action being for ownership or accion reinvindicatoria is shown by the contents of the prayers of the complaint itself; and that since the original complaint failed to allege prior possession, the lower court has no power to place in the original complaint the theory of prior possession by a mere stroke of an order to amend the complaint. Both parties were required to submit their respective memoranda. Only the petitioner did, and the case was submitted for decision without any memorandum for the respondents. We agree with the petitioner that the question of who had prior possession of the land was brought out in the original complaint. An examination thereof would reveal that there it contained enough allegations of facts constitutive of the issue of prior possession The allegations relating to the length and nature of possession by the plaintiff of the land in question, the tacking of the plaintiff's possession to that of his predecessors-in-interest; the adverse claim by the defendant; and as to whose tax declaration should prevail, support the contention of the petitioner that the question of "who has prior possession over the controverted land and is, therefore, entitled to such possession to the exclusion 'of the other, is contained in the original complaint. While the said complaint had categorically alleged a claim of ownership, this Court had had the occasion to declare such kind of a complaint as an accion publiciana, and to regard the allegation of ownership therein as a "mere surplusage." In Molina vs. De Bacud 19 SCRA 956, "(i)n her complaint before the Court of First Instance of the province (Isabela), respondent alleged that she was the absolute owner and possessor of these lands, having inherited them from her mother, Catalina Siccuan; that in her lifetime her mother was in 'continuous, public, quiet and adverse possession' of the lands, in the concept of an owner, and that in 1944 Julian Molina, employing violence, force, strategy and intimidation,' seized possession of Lot 1 and a part of Lot 2 and cut the trees found therein. As relief, she asked the Court to declare her the owner of the lands and to order Molina to deliver to her the lands and products and pay her damages. The petitioners therein contended "that after finding that the lands in question are public lands, the trial Court should have dismissed this case because under Section 4 of the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141), the authority to dispose of public lands is vested exclusively in the Director of Lands. We struck down said argument as without merit because "the authority given to the Land Department over the disposition of public land does not exclude the courts from their jurisdiction over possessory actions, the public character of the land notwithstanding. This is such an action and the fact that on her complaint respondent claimed the lands in ownership did not change the nature of her action. The allegation of ownership should be regarded as a mere surplusage.In Diaz vs. Macalinao, 102 Phil. 999, involving substantially similar facts, this Court ruled that ... (t)he action presented is not one of ownership, although plaintiffs allege ownership and pray that the land be declared in their favor... The allegation of ownership and the prayer therefor may, therefore, be considered as a mere surplusage and this case be considered as an action for possession. In Reyes vs. Sta. Maria, 91 SCRA 164, an action to quiet title and to recover possession, it was held that ... (s)uch an action was clearly an accion publiciana for the recovery of the right to possess (possession de jure (if not an accion reivindicatoria) falling within the lower court's jurisdiction....The lower court was clearly in error in issuing its dismissal order on its mistaken notion 'that the allegations of facts are merely constitutive of an action for unlawful detainer' since the complaint shows on its face that respondents' refusal to deliver possession of the property was due to their adverse claim of ownership of the same property and their counter allegation that they bought the same ... and, therefore, petitioners' jurisdiction was clearly one for recovery of their right to possess the property (possession de jure ... .)' (See also Medina vs. Valdellon, 63 SCRA 278; Ledesma v Marcos, 9 Phil. 618.) Scrutinizing the allegations in the original complaint in the light of foregoing pronouncements of this Court, the conclusion comes easy that while the question of ownership was raised in the original complaint, the said pleading likewise placed at issue the question of who had the better or prior right of possession. It has been a recognized principle of law in our jurisdiction that the courts have jurisdiction to determine who has prior possession of public land and entitled to be protected in such possession. (Rallon vs. Ruiz, Jr., 28 SCRA 332; Pitargue vs. Sorella, 92 Phil 5; Molina vs. De Bacud 19 SCRA 956; Villaflor vs. Reyes, 22 SCRA 385; Madamba vs. Araneta, 106 Phil. 103; Bueno vs. Patanao, 9 SCRA 794: Angcao vs. Punzalan, 12 SCRA 706; and Aguilon vs. Bohol, 79 SCRA 482.) Section 15 of Rule 6 of the Rules of Court provides that "all pleadings shall be liberally construed so as to do substantial justice." The original complaint of the petitioner, entitled, "Quieting of Title to and Possession of Real Property and Cancellation of Tax Declaration" could properly be construed as a plenary action to recover possession or an accion publiciana in addition to its being one for recovery of ownership. As the petitioner correctly argued, "there were two (2) issues brought out in the original complaint the principal one, the issue of ownership over the land in dispute, and the secondary but no less important one, the issue of who has prior possession thereof. Over the first issue, the trial court undoubtedly has no jurisdiction, the land in question being a public land, but over the second, the trial court undoubtedly has jurisdiction. The lower court, therefore, erroneously held that it is devoid of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action in declaring that the petitioner's action is solely to quiet title or to recover ownership of real property.1wph1.t The issue of who has the prior possession being unmistakably alleged in the original complaint, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case insofar as said issue is concerned. Jurisdiction of the courts is conferred and governed by law (Leoquinco vs. Canada Dry Bottling Co., 37 SCRA 535), and is determined by the pleadings (Pineda vs. CFI of Davao, 1 SCRA 1020), whether it be jurisdiction over the subject, matter or jurisdiction over the nature of the action. "Jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter ... should not be made to depend on the literal averments of the complaint-indirectly on the ability of the parties to word or phrase their pleadings where the actual issues are evident from the record of the case." (Leoquinco vs. Canada Dry Bottling Co., supra). The trial court having acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter as well as over the nature of the action on the original complaint, it could validly issue an order to amend the original complaint. The deletion of the issue of ownership from the original complaint and the amended complaint having limited the issue to prior possession did not substantially alter the theory of the complaint. In determining whether a different cause of action is introduced by amendments to the complaint, what is to be ascertained is whether the defendants shall be required o answer for a liability or legal obligation wholly different from that which was stated in the original complaint. Any amendment will not be considered as stating a new cause of action if the fact alleged in the amended complaint show substantially the same wrong with respect to the same transaction, or if what is alleged refer to the same matter but are more fully and differently stated, or where averment which were implied and made in express, and the subject of the controversy or the liability sought to be enforced remains the same. (Rubio vs. Mariano, 49 SCRA 319.) Besides, a superficial examination of the original complaint, and the amended complaint would show that both pleadings are virtually Identical. The only difference was that the words "absolute owner" were delete from the original complaint, and "prior right of possession" emphasized and particularized in the ammended complaint. As a matter of fact, notwithstanding the new reglementary period given to the defendant within, which to answer the amended complaint, he opted not to file a new answer and instead relied on his original answer. ACCORDINGLY, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby granted. The order dated January 23, 1978 of the respondent Judge is hereby annulled and set-aside, and the trial court is ordered to render judgment on the merits of the case. Costs against private respondent. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 171277 February 15, 2007ALMARIO BEJAR (Deceased), as substituted by his heirs - CARMELITA BEJAR, ALFREDO BEJAR, GREGORIA B. DANCEL, BRENDA B. MIANO, LOURDES B. BENDIJO, and SUSANA B. CAMILO, Petitioners, vs.MARICEL CALUAG, Respondent.D E C I S I O NSANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:Before us is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated May 23, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 85430. The factual backdrop of the case is as follows:On August 2, 2002, the late Almario Bejar, substituted by his heirs, herein petitioners, filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 12, Manila, a complaint for illegal detainer and damages against Maricel Caluag, herein respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 173262-CV. The allegations therein are partly reproduced hereunder:x x x4. Plaintiff is the owner of a residential house made of light materials consisting of wood and galvanized iron roof built on government-owned land located at 777 Coral Street, Tondo, Manila.5. On December 21, 1981, plaintiff sold one-half (1/2) portion of the said residential house with an area of twenty-two feet in length and fifteen feet in width to Fernando Mijares in the amount of Eleven Thousand (P11,000.00) Pesos x x x6. Subsequently, plaintiff became the owner in fee simple of the government land where his residential house was built including the one-half portion he sold to Fernando Mijares, located at 777 Coral Street, Tondo, Manila, evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 156220 registered and entered in the Register of Deeds of Manila on August 30, 1983 x x x7. On September 2, 1991, Fernando Mijares, sold his residential house to Maricel Caluag with residence address at 1391 R.A. Reyes St., Tondo, Manila to be used as a warehouse for her business x x x8. Plaintiff badly needs the portion of his land occupied by the defendant to build a residential house for use of his family;9. On April 9, 2002, plaintiff through counsel sent a formal demand letter to defendant for the latter to vacate the portion of the property situated at 777 Coral Street, Tondo, Manila within ten (10) days from receipt of the demand letter x x x10. Despite formal demand from the plaintiff on April 19, 2002, defendant failed and refused and still fails and refuses to vacate said portion of the property owned by the plaintiff located at 777 Coral Street, Tondo, Manila to the damage and prejudice of plaintiff. x x xOn October 15, 2002, respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the MeTC has no jurisdiction over the case as it involves the issue of ownership. On February 10, 2003, respondent filed a supplement to her motion to dismiss alleging that pursuant to the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Bahay," Almario Bejar sold to Fernando Mijares both his house and the entire lot on which it was constructed, citing paragraph 4 of the "Kasulatan" which reads:Na alang alang sa halagang LABING ISANG LIBO PISO (P11,000.00) kuartang Filipino na kasasalukuyang gastahin na aking tinanggap ng buong kasiyahang loob kay FERNANDO MIJARES x x x ay aking ipinagbili, ibinigay, isinulit at inilipat ng buo kong pagaari na kalahating harapan ng bahay ko naipaliwanag sa itaas at ang pagbibili kong ito ay kasama ang lahat kong karapatan sa lupa kung may karapatan ako na kinatitirikan ng bahay.2 On June 16, 2003, the MeTC issued an Order dismissing Civil Case No. 173262-CV for want of jurisdiction, holding that the actual issue between the parties is the enforceability of the subsequent sale by Fernando Mijares to respondent of the subject property; and that, therefore, jurisdiction properly lies with the Regional Trial Court (RTC). On appeal, the RTC, Branch 47, Manila, on January 5, 2004, rendered its Decision reversing the Order of dismissal of the MeTC. The RTC held that the issue in Civil Case No. 173262-CV is who has better possession of the disputed property. The RTC then directed the MeTC to hear the case on the merits.Respondent seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Respondent then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 85430.In its Decision dated May 23, 2005, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC judgment, thus:WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 47, Manila, in Civil Case No. 03-107631 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The order, dated 16 June 2003, of the Metropolitan Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 12. Manila in Civil Case No. 173262-CV, dismissing Almario Bejars complaint for lack of jurisdiction is hereby REINSTATED.Let this case be remanded to the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 47, Manila for further proceedings pursuant to Section 8, Rule 40 of the Revised Rules of Court.SO ORDERED.The appellate court held that the allegations of the complaint do not make out a case for illegal detainer or forcible entry.Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the above Decision but in its Resolution dated January 27, 2006, the Court of Appeals denied the same.Hence, the instant petition.For our resolution is the issue of whether the MeTC has jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 173262-CV for illegal detainer.There are four (4) remedies available to one who has been deprived of possession of real property. These are: (1) an action for unlawful detainer; (2) a suit for forcible entry; (3) accion publiciana; and (4) accion reinvidicatoria. In unlawful detainer and forcible entry cases, the only issue to be determined is who between the contending parties has better possession of the contested property.3 Pursuant to Section 33 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7691, it is the Municipal Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts in Cities, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts that exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over these cases. The proceedings are governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure, as amended. By contrast, an accion publiciana, also known as accion plenaria de posesion,4 is a plenary action for recovery of possession in an ordinary civil proceeding in order to determine the better and legal right to possess, independently of title.5 There are two distinctions between the summary ejectment suits (unlawful detainer and forcible entry) and accion publiciana. The first lies in the period within which each one can be instituted. Actions for unlawful detainer and forcible entry must be filed within one year from the date possession is lost, while an accion publiciana may be filed only after the expiration of that period but within the period prescribed in the statute of limitations. The second distinction involves jurisdiction. An accion publiciana may only be filed with the RTC, while a complaint for unlawful detainer or forcible entry may only be filed with the first level courts earlier mentioned.1awphi1.netAn accion reinvidicatoria, unlike the three remedies previously discussed, involves not only possession, but ownership of the property. The plaintiff in this action sets up title in him and prays that he be declared the owner and be given possession thereof.6 Otherwise put, the plaintiff alleges ownership of real property and prays for recovery of such ownership. Under Article 434 of the Civil Code, two things must be alleged and proven in an accion reinvidicatoria: (1) the identity of the property and (2) plaintiffs title to it. Sole and exclusive jurisdiction over cases for accion reinvidicatoria is vested in the RTC.We are guided by the elementary principle that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought.7 To make out a suit for illegal detainer or forcible entry, the complaint must contain two mandatory allegations: (1) prior physical possession of the property by the plaintiff; and (2) deprivation of said possession by another by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.8 This latter requirement implies that the possession of the disputed property by the intruder has been unlawful from the very start. Then, the action must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry to the property or, in cases where stealth was employed, from the date the plaintiff learned about it.9 An examination of the allegations in the complaint in Civil Case No. 173262-CV does not show that Almario Bejar was deprived of his possession of the property by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. Here, the case is for unlawful detainer. The complaint clearly alleges that Almario Bejar sold one-half portion of his house to Fernando Mijares; that the latter, in turn, sold the same portion of the house to respondent; that eventually, Almario Bejar became the owner in fee simple of the entire lot where his house was built; that he needs the portion of the lot occupied by respondent for the construction of a house for the use of his family; and that despite demand, respondent failed and still fails to vacate the premises. From the records, it appears that Almario Bejar filed his complaint within one year from the date of his last demand upon respondent to vacate the contested portion of the land.A suit for unlawful detainer will prosper if the complaint sufficiently alleges that there is a withholding of possession or refusal to vacate the property by a defendant.10 The cause of action arises from the expiration or termination of the defendants right to continue possession which is upon plaintiffs demand to vacate the premises. The complaint for unlawful detainer must then be instituted within one year from the date of the last demand.11 All these incidents are present in the instant case.Considering that the allegations in Almario Bejars complaint in Civil Case No. 173262-CV show that it is one for illegal detainer, hence, it is the MeTC, Branch 12, Manila which has jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 173262-CV.WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and REVERSE the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals. The RTC Decision is AFFIRMED. Let the records of this case be remanded to the MeTC, Branch 12, Manila, for further proceedings with dispatch. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 116192 November 16, 1995EUFEMIA SARMIENTO, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and GENEROSA S. CRUZ, respondents.REGALADO, J.:The judgment promulgated on February 28, 1994 by respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R SP No. 32263 1 reversing the decision of the regional trial court, as well as its resolution of June 29, 1994 denying herein petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are assailed in this petition for review on certiorari.This case originated from a complaint for ejectment with damages filed by herein private respondent Generosa S. Cruz, as plaintiff, against herein petitioner Eufemia Sarmiento, as defendant, in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Bataan as Civil Case No. 899, which complaint alleges these material facts:xxx xxx xxx2. That the plaintiff acquired by purchase a parcel of land known as Lot No. 2-A of the subd. plan, Psd-03-0345 being a portion of Lot 2, covered by TCT No. T-147219, located at Bo. Mabuco, Hermosa, Bataan, containing as area of 280 square meters, xerox copy of the title is hereto attached as Annex "A" hereof and for taxation purposes, the same is declared in the name of the plaintiff, xerox copy of the tax declaration is hereto attached as Annex "B" of this complaint;3. That the adjacent lot of plaintiff is still owned by the family of Atty. Gonzalo Nuguid but the same is being used and occupied by the defendant where a house was constructed thereon;4. That when the plaintiff caused the relocation of her lot herein mentioned, it was found out by the Geodetic Engineer that the defendant is encroaching on her lot for about 71 square meters, copy of the relocation sketch by said surveyor is hereto attached as Annex "C" hereof;5. That when the plaintiff talked to the defendant that she would like to remove the old fence so that she could construct a new fence which will cover the true area of her property, the defendant vehemently refused to let the plaintiff remov(e) the said fence and menacingly alleged that if plaintiff remove(d) the said fence to construct a new one, she would take action against the plaintiff legally or otherwise;6. For fear that plaintiff may be charged in court should she insist on removing the fence encroaching on her property, plaintiff now seeks judicial relief;7. That plaintiff refer(red) this matter to the Katarungang Pambarangay of Mabuco for settlement, however, the efforts of the Lupon Tagapamayapa turned futile, as evidenced by a certification to file action issued by the Lupon secretary and attested by the Lupon Chairman, copy of the certification to file action is hereto attached as Annex "D" hereof;8. Plaintiff as much as possible would like to avoid court litigation because she is poor but nevertheless she consulted the undersigned counsel and a demand letter was sent to the defendant for conference and/or settlement but the defendant stood pat that she will not allow the removal of the fence, thus depriving the plaintiff of the use and possession of the said portion of her lot (71 square meters) which is being occupied by the defendant for several years, xerox copy of the demand letter is hereto attached as Annex "E" of this complaint;9. That by virtue of the willful refusal of the defendant to allow the plaintiff to have the fence dismantled and/or to be removed, the plaintiff is deprived of the possession and she was forced to hire the services of counsel for which she contracted to pay the sum of P2,000.00 plus acceptance of P1,000.00 until the termination of this case before this Honorable Court. 2xxx xxx xxxOn January 21, 1993, the trial court, on motion, issued an order giving the defendant to file her answer to the complaint. 3 This was opposed by the plaintiff therein on the ground that Section 15(e) of the Rule on Summary Procedure does not allow the filing of motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other papers. 4 Nonetheless, defendant filed on January 29, 1993 her "Answer with Motion to Dismiss." 5 Plaintiff filed and ex-parte motion reiterating her contention that the filing by defendant of her aforesaid answer with motion was barred for reason that her preceding motion for extension of time to file an answer is a prohibited pleading. 6 On February 4, 1993, the trial court, finding merit in plaintiff's ex-parte motion, ordered that defendant's answer be stricken from the records for having been filed out of time. 7 The case was then submitted for decision.On February 18, 1993, the trial court rendered its decision with the following decretal portion:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, ordering the latter:1. To vacate the area being encroached (upon) by the defendant and allowing the plaintiff to remove the old fence permanently and (to) make the necessary enclosure of the area pertaining to the herein plaintiff containing an area of 280 square meters, more or less;2. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,500.00 as attorney's fees. No pronouncement as to damages;3. To pay the cost(s) of this suit. 8 (Corrections in parentheses supplied.)Defendant filed a motion for the reconsideration of said judgment, but the same was denied by the trial court for lack of merit in its order dated March 2, 1993. 9On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Dinalupihan Bataan, Branch 5, in Civil Case No DH-121-93, defendant assailed the jurisdiction of the court a quo. On June 21, 1993, said lower appellate court rendered judgment, stating in part as follows:A perusal of the records of the case and the memorandum of appeal of the adversaries led this court to the opinion that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction to hear, try and decide the instant appealed case based on (the) reason that the said case should be one of question of ownership or accion rei(vin)dicatoria rather than that of forcible entry as the(re) was no allegation of prior possession by the plaintiff (of) the disputed lot as required by law and jurisprudence. Absence of allegations and proof by the plaintiff in forcible entry case of prior possession of the disputed lot (sic) cannot be said that defendant dispossesses her of the same, thus, the legal remedy sought by the plaintiff is not the proper one as it should have been accion publiciana or accion rei(vin)dicatoria, as the case may be, and the forum of which is the Regional Trial Court.This Court declines to venture into other issues raised by the defendant/appellant considering that the resolution on jurisdiction renders the same moot and academic. 10 (Corrections in parentheses ours.)Therein plaintiffs motion for reconsideration having been denied in said lower court's order dated August 12, 1993, 11 she elevated the case to the Supreme Court through a petition for review on certiorari, purportedly on pure questions of law. This Court, treating the petition as a special civil action for certiorari, referred the case to respondent Court of Appeals for proper determination and disposition pursuant to Section 9(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. 12On February 28, 1994, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment in CA-G.R. SP No. 32263 13 reversing the decision of the regional trial court and reinstating that of the municipal circuit trial court, hence the present petition.The chief issue for our resolution is whether or not the court of origin had jurisdiction over the ejectment case. Well-settled is the rule that