PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS (ATTY. AMPIL) 14th week Imperial Sia Plazo Noel De Los Santos BlezaCimagalaBedural| 2D 2012| " 1. SITCHON, ET AL. v. AQUINO FACTS : Thisdecisionstemsfromsix(6)differentsuits.Allofthe petitionersimpleadAquino(theCityEngineerofManila)as respondentsothathemaybeenjoinedfromcausingthe demolitionoftheirrespectivehousessituatedindifferent areasalongpublicstreetsinManilainasmuchasthese constitutepublicnuisances.Allofthepetitionersoccupied the subject parcels of land initially entirely without consent. However,allofthemsubsequentlypaidconcessionfeesor damages for the use of the land with the agreement that such paymentandconsentshallbewithoutprejudicetoanorder to vacate. The time came when the City Engineer demanded thatpetitionersvacatetheoccupiedstreets.Unheeded,he threatenedtodemolishthehouses.Petitionerscontendthat byvirtueofarts.700and702,thepowertoremovepublic nuisancesisvestedintheDistrictHealthOfficer,notinthe City Engineer. ISSUES:Isthereapublicnuisance?DoestheCityEngineer have authority to cause the abatement of the nuisance? HELD: There is a public nuisance. This case falls on art. 694 4, classifying as a nuisance the obstruction of free passage of any public highway or street. It is public because it affects a communityorneighbourhood.Theconstructionsinfact constitutenuisancesperse,obstructingatalltimesthe streets.Assuch,thesummaryremovalofthesemaybe authorized by statute or ordinance. Aquino,asCityEngineer,isvestedwithauthoritytoeffect the abatement of the nuisances through demolition. By virtue oftheRevisedCharterofManila,suchduty,amongothers, wasplaceduponhim.Arts.700and702mustyieldtothis provision not only because it is later law but also because of theprinciplethatspecialprovisionsprevailovergeneral ones. Moreover, an ordinance authorized the action sought to be taken by respondent. 2. VELASCO v. MANILA ELECTRIC CO. FACTS: Velascoboughtthree(3)adjoininglots.Hesoldtwo(2)of thesetoMeralcoandmaintainedthelastoneashis residence.Meralcoconstructedontheirlotsasub-stationat a distance of 10-20 meters away from appellants house. The companyalsobuiltaconcretewallatthesidesalongthe streetsbutputuponlyaninterlinkwirefence(previouslya sawaliwall)ontheboundarywithappellant.Anunceasing sound emanates from the substation, caused by transformers (probablydecepticons).Such,appellentcontends,constitute anuisancewhichhasworsenedhishealthconditionandhas loweredthevalueofhisproperty.Severalwitnessescame forth but their testimonies were vague and imprecise. Resort wasmadetoasoundlevelmeter.Theaudiblesoundfrom different areas in Velasos property was measured in terms of decibels.Itwasfoundthatthesoundexceededtheaverage intensity levels of residences. ISSUE: Can there be a nuisance caused by noise or sound? HELD: Yes. Several American decisions are cited showing that noise is an actionable nuisance. In fact, Kentucky v. Anderson dealtwithnoiseemanatingfromelectricalmachineryand appliances. Thedeterminingfactor,however,isnot justintensityorvolume.Itmustbeofsuchcharacterasto produceactualphysicaldiscomfortandannoyancetoa personofordinarysensibilities.However,appellants testimonyistooplainlybiased.Norarethewitnesses testimoniesrevealingonaccountofdifferentperceptions. Consequently,soundlevelmeterswereused.Asstated above,thesoundexceedsaverageresidentialdecibels.Also, thetestimoniesofappellantsphysicians(whichweremore reliablesincetheyactuallytreatedhim,unlikethe appellees) point to the noise as having caused appellant loss ofsleep,irritationandtensionweakeninghisconstitution. NotablelastlyisthefactthatintheKentuckycase,where the nuisance was ordered abated, the average reading was 44 decibels while in the instant, the readings include 52, 54, and 55.Thedecisiongoesontodiscusstheproperawardof damages.ButMeralcowasorderedeithertotransferthe facilities or reduce the produced sound to around 3. ILOILO COLD STORAGE CO. v MUNICIPAL COUNCIL City Council cannot, by a mere resolution or motion, declare anyparticularthinganuisancewhichhasnottheretofore beenpronouncedtobesuchbylaw,orsoadjudgedby judicial determination. FACTS:Plaintiff is the owner of an ice and cold storage plant. Nearby residentsmadecomplaintsregardingthesmokethatthe plantemitssayingthatitwasveryinjurioustotheirhealth and comfort. The defendant made investigations and later on passedaresolutionwhichdemandsthatthesmokestacksof thesaidfactorybeelevatedorelsethefactoryoperations willbeclosedorsuspended.Plaintiffopposedbyfilingfor injunction. ISSUES:W/Ntheresolutionaloneissuedbythemunicipal council is sufficient to label and abate the supposed nuisance in this case? RULING: NO.Therearetwokindsofnuisances:nuisancesperseandper accidens.Theformerarerecognizedasnuisancesunderany andallcircumstances.Thelatteraresuchonlybecauseof thespecialcircumstancesandconditionssurroundingthem.Theformermaybeabatedevenbyprivateindividuals howeverthelatterisdifferent;itneedsadeterminationof the facts which is a judicial function. The question of nuisance can conclusively be decided, for all legaluses,bytheestablishedcourtsoflaworequityalone, and that the resolution of officers, or of boards organized by forceofmunicipalcharters,cannot,toanydegree,control The duties vested in the district health officer in case of nuisances may be placed upon other officers as may be designated by special provision of law.Noisemayconstituteanuisancebutitmustbeofsuch characterastoproduceactualphysicaldiscomfortand annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities. PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS (ATTY. AMPIL) 14th week Imperial Sia Plazo Noel De Los Santos BlezaCimagalaBedural| 2D 2012| # such decision.City Council cannot, by a mere resolution or motion,declareanyparticularthinganuisancewhichhas not theretofore been pronounced to be such by law, or so adjudged by judicial determination. Inthepresentcaseitiscertainthattheicefactoryofthe plaintiffisnotanuisanceperse.Itisalegitimateindustry, beneficialtothepeopleandconducivetotheirhealthand comfort. The resolution is obviously not enough to abate the property of the plaintiff. 4. HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC. v BALANDAN, et al. Attractivenuisancedoctrinegenerallyisnotapplicableto bodiesofwater,artificial(e.g.watertanks)aswellas natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its location. FACTS:GuillermoBalandanandhiswifeisclaimingdamagesinthe sum of P2,000 for the death of their son, Mario. PetitionerwastheownerofanIceplant,whohadintheir premises 2 tanks filled of water, 9 feet deep. The factory was fencedbutIngressandegresswaseasilymadebecausethe gateswerealwaysopenandtherewasnoguardassignedin thesaidgate.Alsothetanksdidnthaveanybarricadeor fence. One day when Mario was playing with his friend, they sawthetankinsidethefactoryandbeganplayingand swimminginsideit.Whilebathing,Mariosanktothebottom of the tank, only to be fished out later, already as a cadaver, havingdiedofasphyxiasecondarytodrowning.Thelower decided in the favor of the parents saying that the petitioner isliablefordamagesduetothedoctrineofattractive nuisance. ISSUE: W/Nthe doctrine of attractive nuisance is applicable in this case? RULING: NO.ThedoctrineofattractivenuisancestatesthatOnewho maintainsonhispremisesdangerousinstrumentalitiesor appliancesofacharacterlikelytoattractchildreninplay, andwhofailstoexerciseordinarycaretopreventchildren fromplayingtherewithorresortingthereto,isliabletoa child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child istechnicallyatrespasserinthepremises.American Jurisprudenceshowsusthattheattractivenuisance doctrinegenerallyisnotapplicabletobodiesofwater, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual conditionorartificialfeatureotherthanthemerewater anditslocation.Inthecasebar,thetanksthemselves cannot fall under such doctrine thus the petitioners cannot be held liable for Marios death. 5. Tamin vs. CA Apulicplazaisoutsidethecommerceofmanand constructionsthereoncanbeabatedsummarilyby the municipality. FACTS:Petitionermunicipalityrepresentedbyitsmayor RealfiledintheRTCacomplaintfortheejectmentof respondents.It is alleged that the municipality owns a parcel of residential land located in Zamboanga del Sur and the said parcel of land was reserved for public plaza under PD 365 and thatduringthemayor,themunicipalityleasedtheareato thedefendantssubjecttotheconditionthattheyshould vacate the place in case it is needed for public purposes and thedefendantspaidtherentalsreligiouslyuntil1967.They refusedtovacatethesaidlanddespitetheeffortsofthe government since money is allocated for the construction of a municipalgymnasiumwithinthepublicplazaandsuch constructioncouldnotcontinuebecauseofthepresenceof the buildings constructed by the defendants. ISSUE: whether or not the municipality has a cause of action for the abatement of public nuisance under Article 694 of the CC. Held:Yesbasedonthedefinitionofanuisanceprovidedfor in the CC which states that Art. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission,establishment,business,conditionofpropertyor anythingelsewhich:hindersorimpairstheuseofthe property.Article695.Nuisanceiseitherpublicorprivate.Apublicnuisanceaffectsacommunityorneighborhoodor anyconsiderablenumberofpersons,althoughtheextentof theannoyance,dangerordamageuponindividualsmaybe equal. Article 699 provides for the following remedies against public nuisance: 1.Aprosecutionunderthepenalcodeoranylocal ordinance 2.civil action 3.abatement without judicial proceedings Inthepresentcase,themunicipalitychosetofileacivil actionfortherecoveryofpossessionoftheparcelofland occupied by the PR.Under the Local Government Code, the SangguniangBayanhastofirstpassanordinancebefore summarily abate a public nuisance. Considering the facts in the complaint is true then the writ of possessionandwritofdemolitionwouldhavebeenjustified.Awritofdemolitionwouldhavebeensufficienttoejectthe PR. 6. Subido vs. Ozaeta FACTS:PetitionerwastheeditoroftheManilaPostwho soughttheinspectionofrealestatessoldtoaliensand registered with the RD who was given the authority thru DOJ Circulartoexaminealltherecordsintherespondents custody relative to the said transactions. ISSUE:WhatistheextentofthediscretionoftheRDto regulatetheaccessibilityofrecordsrelatingtoregistered lands in its office. HELD: What the law expects and requires from the RD is the exerciseofanunbiasedandimpartialjudgmentbywhichall PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS (ATTY. AMPIL) 14th week Imperial Sia Plazo Noel De Los Santos BlezaCimagalaBedural| 2D 2012| $ persons resorting to the office, under the legal authority and conducting themselves with the motives, reasons and objects of the person seeking access to the records. Exceptwhenitisclearthatthepurposeoftheinspectionis unlawful,itisnotthedutyoftheregistrationofficersto concernthemselveswiththemotives,purposes,andobjects ofthepersonseekingtoinspecttherecords.Itisnottheir prerogativetoseethattheinformationwhichtherecords contain is not flaunted before the public gaze. 7. FRUIT OF THE LOOM V. CA I FRUIT FOR EVE FACTS: Petitioneristheregistrantofatrademark,FRUITOFTHE LOOM,inthePhilippinesPatentOfficeandwasissuedtwo CertificatesofRegistration.Theclassesofmerchandise coveredbyRegistrationCertificateNo.6227are,among others,men's,women'sandchildren'sunderwear,which includes women's panties and which fall under class 40 in the Philippine Patent Office's classification of goods. Registration CertificateNo.6680coversknitted,nettedandtextile fabrics. Privaterespondent,adomesticcorporation,istheregistrant of a trademark FRUIT FOR EVE in the Philippine Patent Office andwasissuedaCertificateofRegistrationNo.10160,on January10,1963coveringgarmentssimilartopetitioner's products like women's panties and pajamas. In1965petitionerfiledbeforethelowercourt,acomplaint for infringement of trademark and unfair competition against thehereinprivaterespondent.Petitionerprincipallyalleged inthecomplaintthatprivaterespondent'strademarkFRUIT FOR EVE is confusingly similar to its trademark FRUIT OF THE LOOMusedalsoonwomen'spantiesandothertextile products.Furthermore,itwasalsoallegedthereinthatthe colorget-upandgeneralappearanceofprivaterespondent's hang tag consisting of a big red apple is a colorable imitation to the hang tag of petitioner. Private respondent stated that the trademark FRUIT FOR EVE isbeingusedonladies'pantiesandpajamasonlywhereas petitioner'strademarkisusedevenonmen'sunderwearand pajamas. Atthepre-trialonMay5,1965,thefollowingadmissions were made:(1)ThatthetrademarkFRUITOFTHELOOMhasbeen registeredwiththeBureauofPatentsanditdoesnot bear the notice 'Reg. Phil. Patent Off.', and(2)ThatthetrademarkFRUITFOREVEhasbeen registeredwiththeBureauofPatentsanditbearsthe notice "Reg. Phil. Patent Off." and(3)Thatatthetimeofitsregistration,plaintifffiledno opposition thereto. ISSUE: W/NthewordFRUIT,beingagenericword,iscapableof exclusive appropriation by petitioner W/N there is no confusing similarity in sound and appearance between the two trademarks in question. RULING: No.Incasesinvolvinginfringementoftrademarkbroughtbefore thisCourtithasbeenconsistentlyheldthatthereis infringement of trademark when the use of the mark involved would be likely to cause confusion or mistake in the mind of the public or to deceive purchasers as to the origin or source of the commodity Standingbyitself,FRUITOFTHELOOMiswhollydifferent fromFRUITFOREVE.WEdonotagreewithpetitionerthat thedominantfeatureofbothtrademarksisthewordFRUIT forevenintheprintingofthetrademarkinbothhangtags, thewordFRUITisnotatallmadedominantovertheother words. Astothedesignandcoloringschemeofthehangtags,We believe that while there are similarities in the two marks like theredappleatthecenterofeachmark,Wealsofind differences or dissimilarities which are glaring and striking to the eye such as: 1. The shape of petitioner's hang tag is round with a base that looks like a paper rolled a few inches in both ends; whilethatofprivaterespondentisplainrectangle without any base. 2. The designs differ. Petitioner's trademark is written in almostsemi-circlewhilethatofprivaterespondentis written in straight line in bigger letters than petitioner's. Privaterespondent'staghasonlyanappleinitscenter butthatofpetitionerhasalsoclustersofgrapesthat surround the apple in the center. 3. The colors of the hang tag are also very distinct from eachother.Petitioner'shangtagisfightbrownwhile thatofrespondentispinkwithawhitecoloredcenter piece.Theappleswhicharetheonlysimilaritiesinthe hangtagaredifferentlycolored.Petitioner'sappleis coloreddarkred,whilethatofprivaterespondentis light red. Theordinarypurchasermustbethoughtofashaving,and creditedwith,atleastamodicumofintelligencetobeable to see the obvious differences between the two trademarks in question. Incasesinvolvinginfringementoftrademarkbrought before this Court it has been consistently held that there isinfringementoftrademarkwhentheuseofthemark involvedwouldbelikelytocauseconfusionormistakein the mind of the public or to deceive purchasers as to the origin or source of the commodityPROPERTY CASE DIGESTS (ATTY. AMPIL) 14th week Imperial Sia Plazo Noel De Los Santos BlezaCimagalaBedural| 2D 2012| % 8. DEL MONTE V. CA I SUNSHINE SAUCE FACTS: PetitionerDelMonteCorporationisaforeigncompany organizedunderthelawsoftheUnitedStatesandnot engagedinbusinessinthePhilippines.BoththePhilippines andtheUnitedStatesaresignatoriestotheConventionof Paris of September 27, 1965, which grants to the nationals of thepartiesrightsandadvantageswhichtheirownnationals enjoyfortherepressionofactsofinfringementandunfair competition. PetitionerPhilippinePackingCorporation(Philpack)isa domesticcorporationdulyorganizedunderthelawsofthe Philippines.DelMontegrantedPhilpacktherightto manufacture,distributeandsellinthePhilippinesvarious agriculturalproducts,includingcatsup,undertheDelMonte trademarkandlogo.DelMonteauthorizedPhilpackto registerwiththePhilippinePatentOfficetheDelMonte catsupbottleconfiguration,forwhichitwasgranted CertificateofTrademarkRegistrationNo.SR-913bythe Philippine Patent Office under the Supplemental Register. Del Montealsoobtainedtworegistrationcertificatesforits trademark "DEL MONTE" and its logo. RespondentSunshineSauceManufacturingIndustrieswas issued a Certificate of Registration by the Bureau of Domestic Tradetoengageinthemanufacture,packing,distribution andsaleofvariouskindsofsauce,identifiedbythelogo SunshineFruitCatsup.Theproductitselfwascontainedin variouskindsofbottles,includingtheDelMontebottle, which the private respondent bought from the junk shops for recycling. Havingreceivedreportsthattheprivaterespondentwas usingitsexclusivelydesignedbottlesandalogoconfusingly similartoDelMonte's,PhilpackandDelMontefileda complaint against the private respondent for infringement of trademark and unfair competition. Sunshine alleged that its logo was substantially different from theDelMontelogoandwouldnotconfusethebuyingpublic to the detriment of the petitioners. 6 ISSUE:W/Ntherewasinfringementoftrademarkandunjust competition. RULING: YES. Section22ofR.A.No.166,otherwiseknownasthe Trademark Law, provides: Anypersonwhoshalluse,withoutthe consentoftheregistrant,any reproduction,counterfeit,copyor colorableimitationofanyregisteredmark ortrade-nameinconnectionwiththesale, offeringforsale,oradvertisingofany goods,businessorservicesonorin connectionwithwhichsuchuseislikelyto causeconfusionormistakeortodeceive purchasersorothersastothesourceor originofsuchgoodsorservicesoridentity of such business... Sec. 29 of the same law states as follows: Anypersonwhoshallemploydeceptionoranyother meanscontrarytogoodfaithbywhichheshallpass offthegoodsmanufacturedbyhimorinwhichhe deals, or his business, or services for those of the one having established such goodwill... To arrive at a proper resolution of this case, it is important to bear in mind the following distinctions between infringement of trademark and unfair competition. (1) Infringement of trademark is the unauthorized use of atrademark,whereasunfaircompetitionisthepassing off of one's goods as those of another. (2)Ininfringementoftrademarkfraudulentintentis unnecessarywhereasinunfaircompetitionfraudulent intent is essential. (3) In infringement of trademark the prior registration of the trademark is a prerequisite to the action, whereas in unfair competition registration is not necessary. Indeterminingwhethertwotrademarksareconfusingly similar, the two marks in their entirety as they appear in the respective labels must be considered in relation to the goods towhichtheyareattached;thediscerningeyeofthe observermustfocusnotonlyonthepredorninantwordsbut also on the other features appearing on both labels. Theordinarybuyerdoesnotusuallymakesuchscrutinynor doesheusuallyhavethetimetodoso.ThequestionisNOT whetherthetwoarticlesaredistinguishablebytheirlabel whensetsidebysidebutwhetherthegeneralconfusion made by the article upon the eye of the casual purchaser who is unsuspicious and off his guard, is such as to likely result in hisconfoundingitwiththeoriginal.Thecourttherefore shouldbeguidedbyitsfirstimpressionbecausetheimitator willalwaystrytocreateenoughdifferencestoconfusethe Courtbutenoughsimilaritytoconfusethepublic.Here, althoughthereareparticulardifferences,suchareonly manifest when you conduct a thorough comparison. Wealsonotethattherespondentcourtfailedtotakeinto considerationseveralfactorswhichshouldhaveaffectedits conclusion,towit:age,trainingandeducationoftheusual purchaser,thenatureandcostofthearticle,whetherthe articleisboughtforimmediateconsumptionandalsothe conditions under which it is usually purchased. It has been aptly observed that the ultimate ratio in cases of gravedoubtistherulethatanydoubtshouldberesolved againstthenewcomerinasmuchasthefieldfromwhichhe can select a desirable trademark to indicate the origin of his product is obviously a large one. Inmakingthecomparisontodeterminesimilarity,the questionisNOTwhetherthetwoarticlesare distinguishablebytheirlabelwhensetsidebysidebut whetherthegeneralconfusionmadebythearticleupon theeyeofthecasualpurchaserwhoisunsuspiciousand off his guard, is such as to likely result in his confounding it with the original. The court therefore should be guided by its first impression because the imitator will always try tocreateenoughdifferencestoconfusetheCourtbut enough similarity to confuse the public.PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS (ATTY. AMPIL) 14th week Imperial Sia Plazo Noel De Los Santos BlezaCimagalaBedural| 2D 2012| & AsSunshine'slabelisaninfringementoftheDelMonte's trademark,lawandequitycallforthecancellationofthe privaterespondent'sregistrationandwithdrawalofallits products bearing the questioned label from the market. With regard to the use of Del Monte's bottle, the same constitutes unfaircompetition;hence,therespondentshouldbe permanently enjoined from the use of such bottles. 9.ASIABREWERYV.COURTOFAPPEALSANDSANMIGUEL CORP. Nobodycanacquireanyexclusiverighttomarketarticles supplying the simple human needs in containers or wrappers ofthegeneralform,sizeandcharactercommonlyand immediately used in marketing such articles. FACTS: San Miguel Corp. (SMC) filed a complaint against Asia Brewery Inc.(ABI)forinfringementoftrademarkandunfair competition.RTCdismissedthecomplaintfindingthatABI hasnotcommittedtrademarkinfringementorunfair competition. The CA reversed the decision finding that ABI is guilty of trademark infringement and unfair competition thus the case at bar. ISSUE:W/NABIinfringesSMCstrademarkandassuch constitutes unfair competition HELD:NO Infringementisdeterminedbyatestofdominancy.Ifthe competingtrademarkcontainsthemainoressentialor dominant features of another and confusion and deception is likely to result, infringement takes place. A closer look at the trademarkofbothcompanieswillshowthatthedominant featuresofeachabsolutelybearnosimilaritytoeachother. SMCsdominanttrademarkisthenameoftheproduct,San MiguelPalePilsenwritteninwhiteGothicletterswith elaborateserifsatthebeginningandendofthelettersS andMonanamberbackgroundwhileABIsisthename Beer Pale Pilsen with the word Beer written in large amber letters, larger than any of the letter found in SMC label. Also there are other dissimilarities:SanMiguelPale Pilsen (SMC) BeerPalePilsen (ABI) Slendertapered neck bottleFat, bulging neck Printedinbold andlacedletters alongadiagonal band Formatofthe pale pilsen Halfthesizeand printedinslender blocklettersona straighthorizontal band BottledbySan MiguelBrewery, Philippines Nameof manufacturer Especiallybrewed andbottledbyAsia Brewery Incorporated, Philippines No sloganSloganatthe backofthe bottle BeernaBeer printedinbig,bold lettersunderarow offlowerbudsand leaves SMC logoLogoatthe backofthe bottle No logo Stampedw/a coatofarmsand thewordsSan MiguelBrewery Philencircling the same Designofthe bottle cap StampedwithBeer inthecenter surroundedbythe wordsAsiaBrewery Incorporated, Philippines P7/bottlepriceP4.25/bottle ThewordpalepilsenonABIstrademarkdoesnot constitutetrademarkinfringementforitisagenericword descriptiveofthecolorofatypeofbeer.Noonemay appropriategenericordescriptivewordsfortheybelongto the public domain. ABIislikewisenotguiltyofunfaircompetitionforunfair competitionistheemploymentofdeceptionoranyother means contrary to good faith by which a person shall pass off the goods manufactured by him for those of another who has alreadyestablishedgoodwillforhissimilargoods.The universaltestforthisiswhetherthepublicislikelytobe deceived. Actual or probable deception and confusion on the partofthecustomersbyreasonofdefendantspractices must appear. However, this is unlikely to happen in the case at bar for consumers generally order beer by brand. Also, the factthatABIalsousesamber-coloredsteiniebottlescannot constituteunfaircompetitionforABIdidnotcopySMCs bottle.SMCdidnotinventbutmerelyborrowedthesteinie bottlefromabroad.Likewise,amberisthemosteffective colorinpreventingtransmissionoflightthusproviding maximum protection to beer. 320 ml is likewise the standard prescribedunderMetricationCircularNo.778.Thefactthat itisthefirsttousethesteiniebottledoesnotgiveSMCa vestedrighttouseittotheexclusionofeveryoneelse. Nobodycanacquireanyexclusiverighttomarketarticles supplyingthesimplehumanneedsincontainersorwrappers ofthegeneralform,sizeandcharactercommonlyand immediately used in marketing such articles. There is no confusing similarity between the competing beers thereforeABIneitherinfringedSMCstrademarknordidit commit unfair competition. Dissenting Opinion of J. Cruz: Side-by-sidecomparisonisnotthefinaltestofsimilarity because average buyers do not make minute scrutiny of label details.Theaverageshopperisusuallyinahurryanddoes not inspect every product on the shelf is if he were browsing in a library. 10. PHILIPS EXPORT B.V. V. COURT OF APPEALS A corporations right to use its corporate and trade name is a propertyright,arightinrem,whichitmayassertand protect against the whole world. FACTS PhilipsExportB.V.(PEBV)filedwiththeSECforthe cancellationofthewordPhilipsthecorporatenameof StandardPhilipsCorporationinviewofitspriorregistration withtheBureauofPatentsandtheSEC.However,Standard PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS (ATTY. AMPIL) 14th week Imperial Sia Plazo Noel De Los Santos BlezaCimagalaBedural| 2D 2012| ' Philips refused to amend its Articles of Incorporation so PEBV filedwiththeSECapetitionfortheissuanceofaWritof Preliminary Injunction, however this was denied ruling that it can only be done when the corporate names are identical and they have at least 2 words different. This was affirmed by the SEC en banc and the Court of Appeals thus the case at bar. ISSUE W/N Standard Philips can be enjoined from using Philips in its corporate name RULING YES A corporations right to use its corporate and trade name is a propertyright,arightinrem,whichitmayassertand protect against the whole world. According to Sec. 18 of the CorporationCode,nocorporatenamemaybeallowedifthe proposed name is identical or deceptively confusingly similar tothatofanyexistingcorporationortoanyothername alreadyprotectedbylaworispatentlydeceptive,confusing or contrary to existing law. For the prohibition to apply, 2 requisites must be present: (1) the complainant corporation must have acquired a prior right over the use of such corporate name and(2) the proposed name is either identical or deceptively or confusingly similar to that of any existing corporation or to anyothernamealreadyprotectedbylaworpatently deceptive, confusing or contrary to existing law. Withregardtothe1strequisite,PEBVadoptedthename Philips part of its name 26 years before Standard Philips. As regardsthe2nd,thetestfortheexistenceofconfusing similarityiswhetherthesimilarityissuchastomisleada personusingordinarycareanddiscrimination.Standard Philipsonlycontainsoneword,Standard,differentfrom thatofPEBV.The2companiesproductsarealsothesame, orcoverthesamelineofproducts.AlthoughPEBVprimarily dealswithelectricalproducts,ithasalsoshippedtoits subsidiariesmachinesandpartswhichfallunderthe classificationofchains,rollers,belts,bearingsandcutting saw,thegoodswhichStandardPhilipsalsoproduce.Also, amongStandardPhilipsprimarypurposesaretobuy,sell tradexxxelectricalwiringdevices,electricalcomponent, electricalsupplies.Giventhese,thereisnothingtoprevent StandardPhilipsfromdealinginthesamelineofbusinessof electricaldevices.TheuseofPhilipsbyStandardPhilips tendstoshowitsintentiontorideonthepopularityand established goodwill of PEBV. 11. LYCEUM OF THE PHILS. v. CA FACTS Petitionerisaneducationalinstitutiondulyregisteredwith theSECsinceSept1950.Beforethecaseatbar,Petitioner commencedaproceedingagainstLyceumofBaguiowiththeSECtorequireittochangeitscorporatenameandadopta newonenotsimilaroridenticaltothePetitioner.SEC grantednotingthattherewassubstantialbecauseofthe dominant word Lyceum. CA and SC affirmed. Petitionerfiledsimilarcomplaintagainstotherschoolsand obtainafavorabledecisionfromthehearingofficer.On appeal,SECEnbancreversedthedecisionandheldthatthe wordLyceumhavenotbecomesoidentifiedwiththe petitionerandthattheusethereofwillcauseconfusionto the general public. ISSUE Whetherornotthecorporatenamesoftheprivate respondentsareidenticalwithordeceptivelysimilartothat of the petitioner WhetherornottheusebythepetitionerofLyceuminits corporatenamehasbeenforsuchlengthoftimeandwith suchexclusivityastohavebecomeassociatedoridentified withthepetitionerinstitutioninthemindofthegeneral public (Doctrine of Secondary meaning) RULING: NO to both. Trueenough,thecorporatenamesofthepartiescarrythe word Lyceum but confusion and deception are precluded by the appending of geographic names. Lyceum generally refers toaschooloraninstitutionoflearninganditisnaturalto usethiswordtodesignateanentitywhichisorganizedand operating as an educational institution Doctrine of Secondary meaning is a word of phrase originally incapable of exclusive appropriation, might nevertheless have beenusedsolongandsoexclusivelybyoneproducerwith referencetohisarticlethat,intradeandtothatbranchof the purchasing public, the word or phrase has come to mean that the article was his product. LyceumofthePhilippineshasnotgainedexclusiveuseof Lyceumbylongpassageoftime.Thenumberaloneofthe private respondents suggests strongly that the use of Lyceum hasnotbeenattendedwiththeexclusivityessentialforthe applicability of the doctrine. It may be noted that one of the respondents Western Pangasinan Lyceum used such term 17 years before the petitioner registered with the SEC. Moreover, there may be other schools using the name but not registeredwiththeSECbecausetheyhavenotadoptedthe corporate form of organization 12. PEARL & DEAN (PHIL) INC. v. SHOEMART, INC. Trademark,copyrightandpatentsaredifferentintellectual property rights that cannot be interchanged with one another. A trademark is any visible sign capable of distinguishing the goods orservicesofanenterpriseandshallincludeastampedor marked container of goods. The scope of a copyright is confined toliteraryandartisticworkswhichareoriginalintellectual creationsintheliteraryandartisticdomain.Patentable inventionsrefertoanytechnicalsolutionofaprobleminany field of human activity which is new, involves an inventive step and is industrially applicable. Doctrineofsecondarymeaningcanbeextendedto corporationnamebutmustcomplywiththerequirement thatithasbeenusedsolongandsoexclusivelybyone andthatthesaidnamehascometomeanthatitis referred to as that corporation.PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS (ATTY. AMPIL) 14th week Imperial Sia Plazo Noel De Los Santos BlezaCimagalaBedural| 2D 2012| ( FACTSPearlandDeanisacorporationinthemanufactureof advertisingdisplayunitsalsoknownaslightboxes,which weremanufacturedbyMetroIndustrialServices.Acopyright Registrationwasobtainedin1981.Theseweremarketedin the name of "Poster Ads". They also applied for a registration oftrademarkwiththeBureauofPatentsin1983,butwas only approved in 19988. In 1985, petitioner had an agreement withrespondentShoemartInc(SMI)toinstalltheselight boxesintheirMakatiandCubaobranch,OnlytheMakati branch was able to sigh the agreement. In 1986, the contract wasrescindedunilaterallybySMI,andinsteadcontracted with Metro Industrial Services. They installed these lightboxes indifferentSMcitybranches,includingCubaoandMakati, withassociationwithNorthEdsaMarketingInc(NEMI),SMI's sistercompany.PetitionerrequestedSMIandNEMItoput downtheirinstallationsofthelightboxes,andpaymentof compensatorydamagesworthP20M.Claimingthat respondentsfailedtocomply,theyfiledacasefor infringementoftrademarkandcopyright,unfaircompetition anddamages.RTCruledinfavorofpetitioner,butCA reversed. ISSUES (1) Whether there was a copyright infringement (2) Whether there was a patent infringement (3) Whether there was a trademark infringement (4) Whether there was unfair competition HELD (1)Copyrightisastatutoryright,subjecttothetermsand conditionsspecifiedinthestatute.Therefore,itcanonly covertheworksfallingwithinthestatutoryenumerationor description. Since the copyright was classified under class "O" works,whichincludes"prints,pictorialillustrations, advertising copies, labels, tags and box wraps," and does not include the light box itself. A lightbox, even admitted by the presidentofpetitionercompany,wasneitheraliterarynor andartisticworkbutanengineeringormarketinginvention, thus not included under a copyright. (2)Petitionerwasnotabletosecureapatentforits lightboxes,andcannotlegallypreventanyonefrom manufacturingorcommerciallyusingthesame.Patenthasa three-foldpurpose:a)tofosterandrewardinvention;b) promotesdisclosuresofinventionandpermitpublictouse thesameuponexpiration;c)stringentrequirementsfor patentprotectiontoensureinthepublicdomainremain there for free use of the public. Since petitioner was not able togothroughsuchexamination,itcannotexcludeothers from manufacturing, or selling such lightboxes. No patent, no protection. (3)ThecertificateofregistrationissuedbytheDirectorof Patents gives exclusive right to use its own symbol only to the descriptionspecifiedinthecertificate.Itcannotprevent otherstousethesametrademarkwithadifferent description. (4)"PosterAds"isageneraltermthatcannotbeassociated specificallytoPearlandDean,thusitcannotbeconsidered tousesuchtermtobeunfaircompetitionagainstthe petitioner.