CONCEPT OF OWNERSHIP

1. HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II vs. REINO ROSETE

G.R. No. L-48050. October 10, 1994

BELLOSILLO, J.

FACTS: Veridiano instituted a complaint for forcible entry against Ben Babol before the City Court of Olongapo City (Civil Case No. 926). In that case, petitioner alleged that Ben Babol “without express consent of plaintiff and without lawful authority, through scheme, strategy and stealth, forcibly entered a portion on the southwestern part of Lot No. 1641, Ts-308, with the assistance of hired helpers, started construction of riprap along the Kalaklan River perimeter of said portion of land; said entry was further augmented by removing plaintiff's chain link, fence with galvanized iron posts embedded in concrete, likewise destroying plants introduced by plaintiff by removing existing BL (Bureau of Lands) monuments thereon, and by these actions, defendant started exercising illegal possession of said portion of land which contains an area of 200 sq.m., more or less.” City Court of Olongapo City dismissed the case for forcible entry because the “area in question to be outside Lot 1641 of the plaintiff." CFI dismissed the appeal and affirmed the findings of the City Court.

Meanwhile, Babol (defendant in the complaint for forcible entry) had sold the property he was occupying, including the portion of about 200 sq.m. in question, to a certain Reino Rosete. Thus petitioner demanded the surrender of the same area in dispute from Reino Rosete who repeatedly refused to comply with the demand.

After about 4 yrs. from the finality of the dismissal of forcible entry case, petitioner instituted a complaint for quieting of title and recovery of possession with damages(Civil Case No. 2203-0) against Babol and Rosete. CFI dismissed the case for quieting of title on the ground of res judicata. Hence, this case.

VERIDIANO ARGUES THAT res judicata cannot apply since there is no identity of parties and causes of action between her complaint for forcible entry and her subsequent petition for quieting of title. While ROSETE SUBMITS THAT there is identity of parties in the two cases since he is a successor in interest by title of the defendant in the first case after the commencement of the first action. On the issue of identity of causes of action, he simply states that neither of the two cases, i.e., the complaint for forcible entry and the subsequent petition for quieting of title, alleges a cause of action.

ISSUE: WON the prior forcible entry case can bar the subsequent action for quieting of title.

HELD: NO. Civil Case No. 926 is a complaint for forcible entry, where what is at issue is prior possession, regardless of who has lawful title over the disputed property. Thus, the only issue in an action for forcible entry is the physical or material possession of real property, that is, possession de facto and not possession de jure. The philosophy underlying this remedy is that irrespective of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence or terror." And, a judgment rendered in a case for recovery of possession is conclusive only on the question of possession and not on the ownership. It does not in

any way bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building.

On the other hand, while inaccurately captioned as an action for "Quieting of Title and Recovery of Possession with Damages" is in reality an action to recover a parcel of land or an accion reivindicatoria under Art. 434 of NCC, and should be distinguished from Civil Case No. 926, which is an accion interdictal. From the averments of the complaint in Civil Case No. 2203-0, plaintiff therein (petitioner herein) clearly sets up title to herself and prays that respondent Rosete be ejected from the disputed land and that she be declared the owner and given possession thereof. Certainly, the allegations partake of the nature of an accion reivindicatoria.

In Civil Case No. 926 petitioner merely claimed a better right or prior possession over the disputed area without asserting title thereto. It should be distinguished from Civil Case No. 2203-0 where she expressly alleged ownership, specifically praying that she be declared the rightful owner and given possession of the disputed portion. Thus, this Court has ruled that a judgment in forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no other issue than possession and declares only who has the right of possession, but by no means constitutes a bar to an action for determination of who has the right or title of ownership.

[NB: There was identity of parties since what is required is not absolute but only substantial identity of parties and Rosete is a successor in interest of Babol by title subsequent to the commencement and termination of the first action. Hence, there is actual, if not substantial, identity of the parties

between the two actions. BUT STILL NO RES JUDICATA BEC. THERE’S NO IDENTITY OF CAUSE OF ACTION.]

2. [G.R. Nos. 120784-85. January 24, 2001]

SPOUSES WARLITO BUSTOS and HERMINIA REYES-BUSTOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES VENANCIO VIRAY and CECILIA NUNGA-VIRAY, respondents.

PARDO, J.:

FACTS: Paulino Fajardo died intestate and had four (4) children, namely: Manuela, Trinidad, Beatriz and Marcial, all surnamed Fajardo. The heirs executed an extra-judicial partition of the estate of Paulino Fajardo. On the same date, Manuela sold her share to Moses G. Mendoza, husband of Beatriz by deed of absolute sale.

Trinidad was in physical possession of the land. She refused to surrender the land to her brother-in-law Moses, despite several demands. Moses filed with the Court of First Instance, Pampanga a complaint for partition claiming the share of Manuela which was sold to him. During the pendency of the case for partition, Trinidad Fajardo died. Her heirs executed an extra-judicial partition of the estate of Trinidad Fajardo. Lucio Fajardo Ignacio, son of Trinidad sold part of the subject property to spouses Viray.

RTC finally rendered a decision in favor of Moses G. Mendoza. Moses sold the subject land to spouses Butos.

Spouses Viray filed with the MTC an action for unlawful detainer against spouses Bustos, the buyers

of Moses G. Mendoza, who were in actual possession as lessees of the husband of Trinidad, Francisco Ignacio, of the subject land.

The municipal circuit trial court decided the case in favor of spouses Viray. Subsequently, the trial court issued writs of execution and demolition, but were stayed when spouses Bustos filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction.

In time, the spouses Bustos appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. Ca affirmed the decision of RTC that Manuel is the owner of land, but with modification that premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the Virays.

ISSUE: whether petitioners (Bustos) could be ejected from what is now their own land.

HELD: No. Placing petitioners in possession of the land in question is the necessary and logical consequence of the decision declaring them as the rightful owners of the property. One of the essential attributes of ownership is possession. It follows that as owners of the subject property, petitioners are entitled to possession of the same. “An owner who cannot exercise the seven (7) “juses” or attributes of ownership--the right to possess, to use and enjoy, to abuse or consume, to accessories, to dispose or alienate, to recover or vindicate and to the fruits--is a crippled owner.”

In this case, the issue of possession is intertwined with the issue of ownership. In the unlawful detainer case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court as to possession on the ground that the decision has become final and executory. This means that the petitioners may be

evicted. In the accion reinvindicatoria, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ownership of petitioners over the subject land. Hence, the court declared petitioners as the lawful owners of the land.

Admittedly, the decision in the ejectment case is final and executory. However, the ministerial duty of the court to order execution of a final and executory judgment admits of exceptions. In Lipana vs. Development Bank of Rizal, the Supreme Court reiterated the rule “once a decision becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the court to order its execution, admits of certain exceptions as in cases of special and exceptional nature where it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice to direct the suspension of its execution; whenever it is necessary to accomplish the aims of justice; or when certain facts and circumstances transpired after the judgment became final which could render the execution of the judgment unjust.”

In the present case, the stay of execution is warranted by the fact that petitioners are now legal owners of the land in question and are occupants thereof. To execute the judgment by ejecting petitioners from the land that they owned would certainly result in grave injustice. Besides, the issue of possession was rendered moot when the court adjudicated ownership to the spouses Bustos by virtue of a valid deed of sale.

3. Heirs of Roman Soriano vs CA

Facts:

The case involves a parcel of land originally owned by Adriano Soriano but passed the property on to his heirs who leased the property to Sps. David de Vera and Consuelo Villasista for a period of 15 yrs with Roman Soriano, one of the heirs, acting as caretaker of the property during the period of the lease. After an extrajudicial settlement, the lot was divided into 2. Lot No. 60052 was assigned to Lourdes, Candido and the heirs of Dionisia while Lot No. 8459 was assigned to Francisca, Librada, Elocadio and Roman. Lot No. 60052 was sold by Lourdes, Candido and the heirs of Dionisia to petitioner spouses Braulio and Aquilina Abalos (hereinafter referred to as petitioners), while, Elocadio, Francisca and Librada sold their three-fourths shares in Lot No. 8459 also to petitioners.

The de Vera spouses ousted Roman Soriano as caretaker and appointed Isidro & Vidal Versoza as his subs. Roma filed for reinstatement. The agrarian court authorized the ejectment of Roman but on appeal, the decision was reversed by the CA which became final and executory. Prior to execution, the parties entered into a post-decisional agreement whereby the de Vera sps allowed Roman to sublease the property until the termination. Agreement was approved by agrarian court.

Petitioners filed an application for registration of title over Lot No. 60052 and 3/4 of Lot No. 8459. Application was granted by the trial court acting as registration court. On appeal, the CA affirmed. Petition for review filed by Roman was denied for lack of merit. It appeared that a day before the promulgation of the Land registration court's decision, Roman, together with Elocadio and Librada, filed with the RTC of Lingayen an action for

annulment of document and/or redemption, ownership, and damages. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata, pendency of another action, laches, misjoinder of parties, and lack of jurisdiction which was later denied by trial court.

11 years after the approval of the post-decisional agreement between Roman Soriano and the spouses de Vera for reinstatement and reliquidation, petitioners filed with the agrarian court a motion for execution of said post-decisional agreement which allowed Roman Soriano to sub-lease the property. The motion prayed that petitioners be placed in possession of the subject property, jointly with Roman Soriano.

Issue:

WON the respondents, as owners, can compel the lawful possessor of the land to turn over possession

Held:

Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. There is ownership when a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of others. Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, among which are the right to enjoy the thing owned and the right to exclude other persons from possession thereof. On the other hand, possession is defined as the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or without right. Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession of a holder. A person may be

declared owner but he may not be entitled to possession. The possession may be in the hands of another either as a lessee or a tenant. A person may have improvements thereon of which he may not be deprived without due hearing. He may have other valid defenses to resist surrender of possession. A judgment for ownership, therefore, does not necessarily include possession as a necessary incident.

There is no dispute that private respondents’ (petitioners below) title over the land under litigation has been confirmed with finality. As explained above, however, such declaration pertains only to ownership and does not automatically include possession, especially so in the instant case where there is a third party occupying the said parcel of land, allegedly in the concept of an agricultural tenant.

While the issue of ownership of the subject land has been laid to rest in the final judgment of the land registration court, the right of possession thereof is, as yet, controverted. This is precisely what is put in issue in the security of tenure case filed by petitioners (private respondents below) before the DARAB.

It is important to note that although private respondents have been declared titled owners of the subject land, the exercise of their rights of ownership are subject to limitations that may be imposed by law. The Tenancy Act provides one such limitation. Agricultural lessees are entitled to security of tenure and they have the right to work on their respective landholdings once the leasehold relationship is established. Security of tenure is a

legal concession to agricultural lessees which they value as life itself and deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of their only means of livelihood. The exercise of the right of ownership, then, yields to the exercise of the rights of an agricultural tenant.

4. Garcia v. CA

G.R. No. 133140

Facts:

Atty. Pedro V. Garcia sold a parcel of land to their daughter Ma. Luisa Magpayo and her husband Luisito Magpayo. The Magpayos mortgaged the land to PBCom to secure a loan. Days later, the title was issued in favor of the Magpayos and a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was registered and annotated in their title.

The Magpayos failed to pay their loan and the mortgage was foreclosed and auctioned with PBCom as the highest bidder. The redemption period of the foreclosed mortgage expired without the Magpayos redeeming the same, hence, title over the land was consolidated in favor of PBCom which cancelled the Magpayo’s title.

The Magpayos then filed a complaint with the RTC seeking the nullification of the foreclosure and the auction which was dismissed for failure to prosecute. PBCom then filed a petition for a writ of possession which was granted. Upon service of the writ of possession, Mrs. Magpayo’s brother, Jose Ma. T. Garcia (Garcia), who was in possession of the land, refused to honor it and filed a motion or Intervention which was denied.

Garcia the filed a suit against PBCom, the Magpayos and the Sheriff for recovery of realty alleging that he inherited the land as one of the heirs of his mother and that PBCom had no right over the property. In its summary judgment, the lower court held that the mortgage executed by the Magpayo spouses in favor of PBCom was void explaining that at the time that the defendants Magpayo spouses executed the mortgage in favor of the defendant PBCom, the said spouses were not yet the owners of the property. The Magpayo spouses could not have acquired the said property merely by the execution of the Deed of Sale because the property was in the possession of the plaintiff. The vendor, Pedro V. Garcia, was not in possession and hence could not deliver the property merely by the execution of the document.

The CA reversed the decision o the RTC ruling that at the time o the issuance of the Deed of Sale, Garcia was not in possession of the property. Also, the vendor Atty. Garcia had control of the property which was registered in his name and that the deed of sale was likewise registered, then the sale was consummated and the Magpayos were free to exercise the attributes of ownership including the right to mortgage the land.

Issue:

Whether Garcia’s possession is in a concept of an owner

Ruling:

No. Garcia’s possession which started only in after the issuance of the writ of possession in favor o PBCom could not ripen into ownership. He has no valid title thereto. His possession in fact was that of

an intruder, one done in bad faith (to defeat PBCom's Writ of Possession). His possession is certainly not in the concept of an owner.

Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. Ownership exists when a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of others. Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, one of which is the right to dispose of the thing by way of sale.

Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession of a holder. "A possessor in the concept of an owner may be the owner himself or one who claims to be so." On the other hand, "one who possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong.

5. RODIL ENTERPRISES V. CA

[G.R. No. 129609. November 29, 2001]

RODIL ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CARMEN BONDOC, TERESITA BONDOC-ESTO, DIVISORIA FOOTWEAR and CHUA HUAY SOON, respondents.

[G.R. No. 135537. November 29, 2001]

RODIL ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner, vs. IDES O'RACCA BUILDING TENANTS ASSOCIATION, INC., respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioner Rodil Enterprises is the lessee of the Ides O’Racca building (ORACCA) since 1959. It was a former alien property over which the Republic acquired ownership by virtue of RA 477. Rodil entered into a sublease contract with respondents Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footware and Chua Huay Soon, members of Oracca Building Tenants Association, Inc. (ASSOCIAION).

• On January 8, 1987, Rodil offered to purchase the property.

• On July 22, 1998, the Association also offered to lease the same building through Department of General Services and Real Estate Property Management ( (DGSREPM) Pending action on the purchase offer of Rodil, the Republic granted Rodil’s request for the renewal of the lease contract on Sept. 23, 1987 for 5 more years. The renewal contract however was disapproved by the DGSREPM secretary.

• On October 1987, Rodil filed an action to enjoin the Association from collecting rentals from the occupants of Oracca. This was granted by the trial court and upheld by CA.

• On May 18, 1992 Rodil signed a renewal contract for 10 more years of lease , which was approved by the DENR Secretary. The Association filed a case to set aside the renewal contract, but the same was denied by the trial court. Rodil then filed an action for unlawful detainer against herein respondents. The MTC upheld Rodil’s right to eject, which was then upheld by the RTC. While the consolidated appeals were pending, the CA 2nd Division declared the renewal contract between

Rodil and the Republic as null and void. Rodil moved for reconsideration but the same was denied which prompted it to file an action for certiorari. The CA 4th division likewise set aside the MTC and the RTC’s decision and dismissed the action of Rodil for unlawful detainer.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the renewal contract between Rodil and the Republic is valid.

2. Whether or not Rodil may validly eject herein respondents even though the former is not in actual possession of the property

HELD:

1. Yes. The Owner has a right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law. Every owner has the freedom of disposition over his property. This is an attribute of ownership. The Republic being the owner of the disputed property enjoys the prerogative to enter into a lease contract with Rodil in the exercise of its jus disponendi.

2. Yes. In an action for unlawful detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession. Respondents have admitted that they have not entered into any lease contract with the Republic and that their continued occupation of the subject property was merely by virtue of acquiescence. Since the occupation of respondents was merely tolerated by the Republic, the right of possession of the latter remained uninterrupted. It could therefore alienate the same to anyone it choose. Unfortunately for respondents, the Republic chose to alienate the

subject premises to Rodil by virtue of a contract of lease entered into on May 18, 1992. Resultantly, the petitioner had the right to file the action for unlawful detainer against respondents as one from whom possession of property has been unlawfully withheld.

6. Isaguirre vs. De Lara

FACTS:

Apolonio and Rodolfo de Lara, respondents, obtained several loans from the Philippine National Bank. When she encountered financial difficulties, respondent approached petitioner Cornelio M. Isaguirre for assistance. A document denominated as “Deed of Sale and Special Cession of Rights and Interests” was executed by respondent and petitioner, whereby the former sold a 250 square meter portion of Lot No. 502, together with the two-story commercial and residential structure standing thereon, in favor of petitioner, for and in consideration of the sum of P5,000.

Apolonio and Rodolfo de Lara filed a complaint against petitioner for recovery of ownership and possession of the two-story building. However, the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner filed a sales application over the subject property on the basis of the deed of sale. His application was approved, resulting in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title, in the name of petitioner.

Due to the overlapping of titles, petitioner filed an action for quieting of title and damages against respondent. After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment, in favor of petitioner, declaring him to be the lawful owner of the disputed property.

However, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that the transaction entered into by the parties, as evidenced by their contract, was an equitable mortgage, not a sale. It was an equitable mortgage because of the fact that there was inadequacy of the consideration agreed upon by the parties, and that petitioner did not take steps to confirm his rights or to obtain title over the property for several years after the execution of the deed of sale. As a consequence of its decision, the appellate court also declared Original Certificate issued in favor of petitioner to be null and void. This Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, we denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration

Respondent prays for the immediate delivery of possession of the subject property, which motion was granted. Respondent moved for a writ of possession. Petitioner opposed the motion, asserting that he had the right of retention over the property until payment of the loan and the value of the improvements he had introduced on the property.

Issue: Whether or not Petitioner has the right to retain the property in questioned despite remaining balanace is unpaid and that there were improvements made?

Held: No. A mortgage is a contract entered into in order to secure the fulfillment of a principal obligation.[17] It is constituted by recording the document in which it appears with the proper Registry of Property, although, even if it is not recorded, the mortgage is nevertheless binding between the parties.[18] Thus, the only right granted by law in favor of the mortgagee is to demand the execution and the recording of the document in

which the mortgage is formalized.[19] As a general rule, the mortgagor retains possession of the mortgaged property since a mortgage is merely a lien and title to the property does not pass to the mortgagee.[20] However, even though a mortgagee does not have possession of the property, there is no impairment of his security since the mortgage directly and immediately subjects the property upon which it is imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted.[21] If the debtor is unable to pay his debt, the mortgage creditor may institute an action to foreclose the mortgage, whether judicially or extrajudicially, whereby the mortgaged property will then be sold at a public auction and the proceeds therefrom given to the creditor to the extent necessary to discharge the mortgage loan. Apparently, petitioner’s contention that "[t]o require [him] … to deliver possession of the Property to respondent prior to the full payment of the latter’s mortgage loan would be equivalent to the cancellation of the mortgage" is without basis. Regardless of its possessor, the mortgaged property may still be sold, with the prescribed formalities, in the event of the debtor’s default in the payment of his loan obligation..

A simple mortgage does not give the mortgagee a right to the possession of the property unless the mortgage should contain some special provision to that effect." Regrettably for petitioner, he has not presented any evidence, other than his own gratuitous statements, to prove that the real intention of the parties was to allow him to enjoy possession of the mortgaged property until full payment of the loan.

7. CUSTODIO vs CA

[G.R. No. 116100. February 9, 1996]

SPOUSES CRISTINO and BRIGIDA CUSTODIO and SPOUSES LITO and MARIA CRISTINA SANTOS, petitioners,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF PACIFICO C. MABASA and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, BRANCH 181, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

Facts:

the original plaintiff Pacifico Mabasa died during the pendency of this case and was substituted by Ofelia Mabasa, his surviving spouse [and children].

1.The plaintiff owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected thereon situated at Interior P. Burgos St., Palingon, Tipas, Taguig, Metro Manila. Said property may be described to be surrounded by other immovables pertaining to defendants herein. Taking P. Burgos Streetas the point of reference, on the left side, going to plaintiff’s property, the row of houses will be as follows: That of defendants Cristino and Brigido Custodio, then that of Lito and Maria Cristina Santos and then that of Ofelia Mabasa. On the right side (is) that of defendant Rosalina Morato

and then a Septic Tank. As an access to P. Burgos Street from plaintiffs property, there are two possible passageways. The first passageway is approximately one meter wide and is about 20 meters distan(t) from Mabasa’s residence to P. Burgos Street. Such path is passing in between the previously mentioned row of houses. The second passageway is about 3 meters in width and length from plaintiff Mabasa’s residence to P. Burgos Street; it is about 26 meters. In passing thru said passageway, a less than a meter wide path through the septic tank and with5-6 meters in length has to be traversed.

2.When said property was purchased by Mabasa, there were tenants occupying the premises and who were acknowledged by plaintiff Mabasa as tenants. However, sometime in February, 1982. one of said tenants vacated the apartment and when plaintiff Mabasa went to see the premises, he saw that there had been built an adobe fence in the first passageway making it narrower in width. Said adobe fence was first constructed by defendants Santoses along their property which is also along the first passageway. Defendant Morato constructed her adobe fence and even extended said fence in such a way that the entire passageway was enclosed. And it was then that the remaining tenants of said apartment vacated the area. Defendant Ma. Cristina Santos testified that she constructed said fence because there was an incident when her daughter was dragged by a bicycle pedalled by a son of one of the tenants in said apartment along the first passageway. She also mentioned some other inconveniences of having (at) the front of her house

a pathway such as when some of the tenants were drunk and would bang their doors and windows. Some of their footwear were even lost. x x x[

3. RTC ordered defendants Custodios and Santoses to give heirs permanent access - ingress and egress, to the public street, and heirs to pay Custodios (P8,000) as indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway.

4. the heirs went to CA raising the sole issue of whether or not the lower court erred in not awarding damages in their favor. CA affirmed RTC.

ISSUE:

1. whether or not the grant of right of way to the heirs is proper

2. whether or not the award of damages is in order

HELD:

1. No. heirs are already barred from raising the same. they did not appeal from the decision of the court a quo granting private respondents the right of way, hence they are presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication therein. With the finality of the judgment of the trial court as to heirs, the issue of propriety of the grant of right of way has already been laid to rest.

For failure to appeal the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, heirs cannot obtain any affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision of the trial court. That decision of the court below has become final as against them and can no longer be reviewed, much less reversed, by this Court. The rule in this jurisdiction is that whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case, an appellee who has not himself appealed may not obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than what was granted in the decision of the lower court. The appellee can only advance any argument that he may deem necessary to defeat the appellant’s claim or to uphold the decision that is being disputed, and he can assign errors in his brief if such is required to strengthen the views expressed by the court a quo. These assigned errors, in turn, may be considered by the appellate court solely to maintain the appealed decision on other grounds, but not for the purpose of reversing or modifying the judgment in the appellee’s favor and giving him other affirmative reliefs.

2. No. CA erred in awarding damages in favor of heirs. The award of damages has no substantial legal basis. The damages was based solely on the fact that the original plaintiff, Pacifico Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated the leased premises by reason of the closure of the passageway.

However, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong

inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.

There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria. in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff - a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be the breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; it is not sufficient to state that there should be tort liability merely because the plaintiff suffered some pain and suffering)

Many accidents occur and many injuries are inflicted by acts or omissions which cause damage or loss to another but which violate no legal duty to such other person, and consequently create no cause of action in his favor. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone. The law affords

no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong.

In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria. If, as may happen in many cases, a person sustains actual damage, that is, harm or loss to his person or property, without sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act or omission which the law does not deem an injury, the damage is regarded as damnum absque injuria.

In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the claim of private respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. In order that the principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is essential that the following requisites concur: (1) The defendant should have acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff.

The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law. It is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that “(e)very owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon.”

At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes. There was no easement of way existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or by contract. The fact that private respondents had no existing right over the said passageway is confirmed by the very decision of the trial court granting a compulsory right of way in their favor after payment of just compensation. It was only that decision which gave private respondents the right to use the said passageway after payment of the compensation and imposed a corresponding duty on petitioners not to interfere in the exercise of said right.

Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute right over their property and their act of fencing and enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully perform in the employment and exercise of said right. To repeat, whatever injury or damage may have been sustained by private respondents by reason of the rightful use of the said land by petitioners isdamnum absque injuria.

A person has a right to the natural use and enjoyment of his own property, according to his pleasure, for all the purposes to which such property is usually applied. As a general rule, therefore, there is no cause of action for acts done by one person upon his own property in a lawful and proper manner, although such acts incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss to another, as such damage or loss is damnum absque injuria. When the owner of property makes use thereof in the general and ordinary manner in which the property is used, such as fencing or enclosing the same as in this case, nobody can complain of having been injured, because the inconvenience arising from said use can

be considered as a mere consequence of community life.

The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action will lie,although the act may result in damage to another, for no legal right has been invaded. One may use any lawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose and though the means adopted may cause damage to another, no cause of action arises in the latter’s favor. Any injury or damage occasioned thereby is damnum absque injuria. The courts can give no redress for hardship to an individual resulting from action reasonably calculated to achieve a lawful end by lawful means.

erein petitioners are already barred from raising the same. Petitioners did not appeal from the decision of the court a quo granting private respondents the right of way, hence they are presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication therein. With the finality of the judgment of the trial court as to petitioners, the issue of propriety of the grant of right of way has already been laid to rest.

For failure to appeal the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, petitioners cannot obtain any affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision of the trial court. That decision of the court below has become final as against them and can no longer be reviewed, much less reversed, by this Court. The rule in this jurisdiction is that whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case, an appellee who has not himself appealed may not obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than what was granted in the decision of the lower court. The appellee can only advance any argument that he

may deem necessary to defeat the appellant’s claim or to uphold the decision that is being disputed, and he can assign errors in his brief if such is required to strengthen the views expressed by the court a quo. These assigned errors, in turn, may be considered by the appellate court solely to maintain the appealed decision on other grounds, but not for the purpose of reversing or modifying the judgment in the appellee’s favor and giving him other affirmative reliefs.

8. PACENCIO ABEJARON vs. FELIX NABASA and the CA

PUNO, J.:

Petitioner Abejaron filed this petition for review on certiorari to annul the respondent court's Decision and Resolution reversing the trial court's decision and declaring respondent Nabasa the owner of the subject lot.

Facts: Petitioner Abejaron avers that he is the actual and lawful possessor and claimant of a 118-square meter portion of a 175-square meter residential lot in Silway, General Santos City described as Block 5, Lot 1. In 1945, petitioner Abejaron and his family started occupying the 118-square meter land. At that time, the land had not yet been surveyed. They fenced the area and built thereon a family home with nipa roofing and a small store. In 1949, petitioner improved their abode to become a two-storey house .This house, which stands to this day, occupies a portion of Lot 1, Block 5 and a portion of the adjoining Lot 2. Lot 2 belongs to petitioner’s daughter, Conchita Abejaron-Abellon. In 1950, the small store was destroyed and in its stead, petitioner

Abejaron built another store which stands up to the present. In 1951, he planted five coconut trees on the property in controversy. Petitioner's wife, Matilde Abejaron, harvested coconuts from these trees. Petitioner Abejaron also planted banana and avocado trees. He also put up a pitcher pump. All this time that the Abejarons introduced these improvements on the land in controversy, respondent Nabasa did not oppose or complain about the improvements. Knowing that the disputed land was public in character, petitioner declared only his house, and not the disputed land, for taxation purposes. In 1955, respondent Nabasa resided on the remaining 57-square meter portion of Lot 1, Block 5.

Before 1974, employees of the Bureau of Lands surveyed the area in controversy. Abejaron merely watched them do the survey and did not thereafter apply for title of the land on the belief that he could not secure title over it as it was government property. Without his knowledge and consent, however, Nabasa "clandestinely, willfully, fraudulently, and unlawfully applied for and caused the titling in his name" of the entire Lot 1, Block 5, including petitioner Abejaron's 118-square meter portion. Petitioner imputes bad faith and fraud on the part of Nabasa because in applying for and causing the titling in his name of Lot 1, Nabasa represented himself to be the actual and lawful possessor of the entire Lot 1, Block 5, including petitioner Abejaron's 118-square meter portion despite knowledge of Abejaron's actual occupation and possession of said portion.

On September 24, 1974, Nabasa was issued Original Certificate of Title pursuant to Free Patent covering

Lot 1, Block 5. As the title included petitioner Abejaron’s 118-square meter portion of the lot, his son, Alejandro Abejaron filed a protest with the Bureau of Lands which was dismissed for their failure to attend the hearings.

On March 12, 1982, petitioner Abejaron filed against respondent Nabasa an action for reconveyance with damages seeking reconveyance of his 118-square meter portion of Lot 1, Block 5; which was ruled in favor of him. Respondent Nabasa's motion for reconsideration having been denied, he appealed to the Court of Appeals. On April 26, 1988, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of respondent Nabasa. Petitioner Abejaron filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision which was denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari

Issue 1: Does petitioner Abejaron has satisfied the conditions specified in Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. No. 1942?

Held 1: No. Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as further amended by P.D. No. 1073, now reads:

"(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled

to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter."

In the present case, as petitioner Abejaron's 30-year period of possession and occupation required by the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. 1942 ran from 1945 to 1975, prior to the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073 in 1977, the requirement of said P.D. that occupation and possession should have started on June 12, 1945 or earlier, does not apply to him.

Petitioner's evidence does not constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence necessary to acquire title through possession and occupation of the disputed land at least since January 24, 1947 as required by Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. 1942. The basic presumption is that lands of whatever classification belong to the State and evidence of a land grant must be "well-nigh incontrovertible." As petitioner Abejaron has not adduced any evidence of title to the land in controversy, whether by judicial confirmation of title, or homestead, sale, or free patent, he cannot maintain an action for reconveyance.

Issue 2: WON petitioner can ask for reconveyance?

Held 2: No. An action for reconveyance of a property is the sole remedy of a landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name after one year from the date of the decree so long as the property has not passed to an innocent purchaser for value The action does not seek to reopen the registration proceeding and set aside the decree of registration but only purports to show that the person who secured the registration of the property in controversy is not the real owner

thereof. Fraud is a ground for reconveyance. For an action for reconveyance based on fraud to prosper, it is essential for the party seeking reconveyance to prove by clear and convincing evidence his title to the property and the fact of fraud.

In the case at bench, petitioner does not claim to be the owner of the disputed portion. Admittedly, what he has is only a "preferential right" to acquire ownership thereof by virtue of his actual possession since January 1947. . . Title to alienable public lands can be established through open, continuous, and exclusive possession for at least thirty (30) years. . . Not being the owner, petitioner cannot maintain the present suit.

Persons who have not obtained title to public lands could not question the titles legally issued by the State. In such cases, the real party in interest is the Republic of the Philippines to whom the property would revert if it is ever established, after appropriate proceedings, that the free patent issued to the grantee is indeed vulnerable to annulment on the ground that the grantee failed to comply with the conditions imposed by the law. Not being an applicant, much less a grantee, petitioner cannot ask for reconveyance."

PRINCIPLE OF SELF-HELP AND STATE NECESSITY

9. GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC.

vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO VILLEZA

G.R. No. L-76216 September 14, 1989

GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC.

vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ORLANDO GERNALE

FERNAN, C.J.:

FACTS:

Spouses Cynthia Cuyegkeng and Manuel Rene Jose (Sps. Jose) were residents of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA who own a 232, 942 square meters of land in Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal. They executed a special power of attorney (SPA) authorizing German Management Services (GMS) to develop their property into a residential subdivision. Consequently, GMS obtained a Development Permit from the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission for said development. Finding that part of the property was occupied by Villeza and Gernale (private respondents) and 20 other persons, GMS advised the occupants to vacate the premises but the latter refused. Nevertheless, GMS proceeded with the development of the subject property which included the portions occupied and cultivated by private respondents. (Note: GMS acted without a court order.)

Private respondents filed an action for forcible entry against GMS before MTC Antipolo, Rizal. They are mountainside farmers of Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal and members of the Concerned Citizens of Farmer's Association. Among others, they allege that GMS deprived them of their property without due process of law by: (1) forcibly removing and destroying the barbed wire fence enclosing their farmholdings without notice; (2) bulldozing the rice, corn fruit bearing trees and other crops of private respondents by means of force, violence and

intimidation, in violation of P.D. 1038 and (3) trespassing, coercing and threatening to harass, remove and eject private respondents from their respective farmholdings in violation of P.D. Nos. 316, 583, 815, and 1028.

MTC dismissed private respondents' complaint for forcible entry. On appeal, RTC sustained the dismissal. Private respondents then filed a petition for review with the CA which reversed the decisions of the MTC and RTC. It held that since private respondents were in actual possession of the property at the time they were forcibly ejected by GMS, private respondents have a right to commence an action for forcible entry regardless of the legality or illegality of possession. GMS filed an MR but it was denied. Hence, this recourse.

ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of self-help is applicable in the instant case? ( Art. 429, CC)

HELD: NO, the doctrine of self-help is not applicable in the instant case.

In the case at bar, it is undisputed that at the time GMS entered the property, private respondents were already in possession thereof . There is no evidence that the spouses Jose were ever in possession of the subject property. On the contrary, private respondents' peaceable possession was manifested by the fact that they even planted rice, corn and fruit bearing trees 12-15 years prior to GMS's act of destroying their crops.

Although admittedly GMS may validly claim ownership based on the muniments of title it presented, such evidence does not responsively address the issue of prior actual possession raised in

a forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.

Both the MTC and RTC have rationalized GMS's drastic action of bulldozing and destroying the crops of private respondents on the basis of the doctrine of self-help enunciated in Article 429, CC. Such justification is unavailing because the doctrine of self-help can only be exercised at the time of actual or threatened dispossession which is absent in the case at bar. When possession has already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of property. This is clear from Article 536 of the Civil Code which states, "(I)n no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or right to deprive another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing."

10. Caisip v People

G.R. No. L-28716 November 18, 1970

Facts: The complainant Gloria Cabalag is the wife of Marcelino Guevarra who cultivated a parcel of land

known as Lot 105-A of Hacienda Palico situated in sitio Bote-bote, barrio Tampisao, Nasugbu, Batangas. The said parcel of land used to be tenanted by the deceased father of the complainant. Hacienda Palico is owned by Roxas y Cia. and administered by Antonio Chuidian. The overseer of the said hacienda is Felix Caisip, one of the accused herein.

On May 17, 1958 Roxas y Cia filed a forcible entry case against Guevarra. The court decided in favour of Roxas y Cia and issued a writ of execution. The return of the writ showed that possession of Lot 105-A was turned over to the owner thru Caisip and that Guevarra and Cabalag were given 20 days from June 6, 1959 to vacate the premises.

On June 15, 1959, some trouble occurred between the complainant and Caisip regarding the cutting of sugar cane on Lot 105-A. The following day June 16, 1959, the complainant allegedly again entered the premises of Lot 105-A and refused to be driven out by Felix Caisip. It further appears that due to the tenacious attitude of Gloria Cabalag to remain in the premises, Caisip sought the help of the chief of police of Nasugbu who advised him to see Deputy Sheriff Aquino about the matter. The latter, however, informed Caisip that he could not act on the request to eject Gloria Cabalag and to stop her from what she was doing without a proper court order. The chief of police assigned the accused (police officers) Ignacio Rojales and Federico Villadelrey.

On June 17, 1959, at about 5:00 p.m., Gloria Cabalag was seen weeding the portion of Lot 105-A which was a ricefield. Appellant Caisip approached her and bade her to leave, but she refused to do so, alleging

that she and her husband had the right to stay there and that the crops thereon belong to them. She having stuck to this attitude, even when he threatened to call the police, Caisip went to his co-defendants, Sgt. Rojales and Cpl. Villadelrey. Rojales told Gloria, who was then in a squatting position, to stop weeding. As Gloria insisted on her right to stay in said lot, Rojales grabbed her right hand and, twisting the same, wrested therefrom the trowel she was holding. Thereupon, Villadelrey held her left hand and, together with Rojales, forcibly dragged her northward - towards a forested area, as Caisip stood nearby, with a drawn gun.

Issue: Whether Article 429 of the Civil Code applies in the present case.

Held: NO. For having been given 20 days from June 6, 1959, within which to vacate Lot 105-A, complainant did not, on June 17, 1959 - or within said period - invade or usurp said lot. She had merely remained in possession thereof, even though the hacienda owner may have become its co-possessor. Appellants did not "repel or prevent in actual or threatened ... physical invasion or usurpation." They expelled Gloria from a property of which she and her husband were in possession even before the action for forcible entry was filed against them on May 17, 1958, despite the fact that the Sheriff had explicitly authorized them to stay in said property up to June 26, 1959, and had expressed the view that he could not oust them therefrom on June 17, 1959, without a judicial order therefore.

It is urged, that, by weeding and refusing to leave Lot 105-A, Gloria had committed a crime in the presence of the policemen, despite the aforementioned 20-

day period, which, appellants claim, the sheriff had no authority to grant. This contention is manifestly untenable, because: (1) said period was granted in the presence of the hacienda owner's representative, appellant Caisip, who, by not objecting thereto, had impliedly consented to or ratified the act performed by the sheriff; (2) Gloria and her husband were thereby allowed to remain, and had, in fact, remained, in possession of the premises, perhaps together with the owner of the hacienda or his representative, Caisip; (3) the act of removing weeds from the ricefield was beneficial to its owner and to whomsoever the crops belonged, and, even if they had not authorized it, does not constitute a criminal offense; and (4) although Gloria and her husband had been sentenced to vacate the land, the judgment against them did not necessarily imply that they, as the parties who had tilled it and planted thereon, had no rights, of any kind whatsoever, in or to the standing crops, inasmuch as "necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor," (5) and the cost of cultivation, production and upkeep has been held to partake of the nature of necessary expenses.

11. People of the Philippines vs. Pletcha

G.R. No.19029. June 27, 1977.

Bison, J.

Doctrine: The use of such necessary force to protect proprietary or possessory rights constitutes a justifying circumstance under our penal laws.

Facts: Tito Pletcha is a farmer who owns a land which he has been cultivating for 19years. A private corporation sought to take over the aforementioned

land by fencing 4 hectares of his property. Such fencing was without authority or court order. Because of this, Pletcha fought-off the take over and resisted the company. This forced the company to file a case for grave coercion against Pletcha in the Municipal Court of Murcia, Negros Occidental.

Pletcha invokes the protective mantle of Article 429 of the Civil Code which gives him the right to use reasonable force to exclude any person threatening his exclusive ownership over the land.

The People asks for affirmance on the ground that the appellant should not have taken the law into his own hands but rather have the courts decide the case.

Issue: Whether or not Pletcha can properly invoke Article 429.

Held: Yes. The principle of self-help authorizes the lawful possessor to use force not only to prevent a threatened unlawful invasion or usurpation thereof; it is sort of self-defense. It is lawful to repel force by force. He who merely uses force to defend his possession does not possess by force. The use of such necessary force to protect proprietary or possessory rights constitutes a justifying circumstance under our penal laws.

The appellant need not rush to court to seek redress before reasonably resisting the invasion of property. The situation required immediate action and Article 429 gave him the self-executory mechanics of self-defense and self-reliance.

USE INURING RIGHTS TO THIRD PERSONS AND SURFACE RIGHTS

12. G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990

NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO and EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO, petitioners, vs.

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (First Civil Cases Division) and MISSIONARIES OF OUR LADY OF LA SALETTE, INC., respondents.

FERNAN, C.J.:

FACTS:

1. Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga, Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.

2. Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.

3. In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action before RTC against officers and directors of herein respondent corporation (Musngi, Sapuay and Mallillin), for destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.

4. Subsequently, on February 22, 1983, petitioners filed another action against respondent corporation for damages with prayer for the

issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before the same court.

5. Hearings were conducted including ocular inspections on the land. The trial court issued an order suspending further hearings in Civil Case No, TG-748 until after judgment in the related Criminal Case.

6. The trial court issued on the disputed order dismissing Civil Case for lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still unresolved. Said order was anchored on the provision of Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of Court which provides that "criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action.”

7. Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court. Appellate Court promulgated a decision affirming the questioned order of the trial court.

8. Petitioners contend that the trial court and the Appellate Court erred in dismissing Civil Case since it is predicated on a quasi-delict.

ISSUE: whether a corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case can proceed independently of the criminal case.

HELD: YES.

A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.

Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages.

It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual

and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.