Projecting the State:

Path Dependence, Ideology, and the Territorial Reach of

the State in 20th Century Iran and Afghanistan

Ryan Brasher Forman Christian College Lahore, Pakistan

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1. Introduction:

Both Afghanistan and Iran faced considerable turmoil in the 1970s. In both cases revolutionary

movements overthrew the traditional monarchy and sought to radically restructure society, but only the

revolutionary government in Iran was successful. The Afghan revolutionaries soon found themselves

overwhelmed by a widespread rebellion that resulted in complete state breakdown after the Soviet

invasion, from which the country continues to suffer to this day. It is clear that the Afghan regime could

not rely on the same centralized and sprawling bureaucratic apparatus that was at the disposal of the

Islamic revolutionaries in Iran. Why this divergence? Rather than typical current explanations that focus

on unchangeable geopolitical, structural or cultural forces, I argue that the stunted development of the

Afghan state was rooted in the institutional setting encountered by central elites in the early 20th

Century.

In fact, both Afghanistan and Iran belong to a small sub-set of cases, called post-imperial buffer

states, which faced largely similar conditions at the turn of the 20th Century. I argue that these states

experienced institutional development in a manner distinct from both colonizing and colonized states,

on which most of the state-building literature has heretofore focused. This institutional development

followed a path-dependent trajectory. Ruling elites had control of the central capital, but no presence in

the periphery and therefore no means to implement policy-making within the entire territory. At a

critical juncture, however, political leaders coming to power after a relatively open contestation for

power made different institutional choices rooted in distinct worldviews to consolidate their rule. These

then led to divergent state-building trajectories for the next few decades. Specifically, modernist rulers

sought to transform state-society relations by removing all historically autonomous regional elites and

creating a large and powerful bureaucracy whose presence was felt throughout its territory. Instead,

traditionalist rulers sought to extend the reach of the state only to remove traditional rivals, while they

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delegated power to their regional allies, thus creating only a patchwork state with relatively little

authority in the country side. Later on, in conjunction with the impact of Cold War politics, the nature of

these institutional patterns helped determine popular mobilization against ruling elites, as well as the

chances successful revolutionaries had in consolidating their rule and implementing their radical

policies.

In the following pages, I first outline why ideology might play a crucial role in post-imperial buffer

states like Afghanistan and Iran, focusing specifically on the importance of individual actors during

critical junctures. Secondly, I discuss different kinds of path-dependent processes, focusing particularly

on the self-reinforcing mechanisms of power and legitimation that help constrain institutional pathways

even when more efficient alternatives might be available. In the main section, I apply the main path-

dependent elements to the two cases, showing that rather than unmovable structural or cultural forces,

contingent choices taken at particular moments help launch institutional processes that persist for

different reasons than they were originally chosen for. In the conclusion, I briefly consider how these

long-term institutional patterns interacted with internal resistance and mobilization against the state.

Specifically, where Cold War politics resulted in considerable leftist mobilization, successful

revolutionary consolidation was possible if strong and centralized institutional patterns existed

beforehand, as in Iran. Revolutions resulted in state breakdown, as in Afghanistan, were pre-existing

state structures were weak.

Before moving on, I would like to clarify the main outcome under consideration, state strength,

and to distinguish it from other related concepts. Following Bunch, I take particular care to distinguish

between state and regime.1 A regime can be defined as a particular system of governance, like

democracy or authoritarianism. It can also refer to a particular ruler, a ruling clique, or even a dynasty.

However, even if constructed by a particular regime, the administrative structures of the state acquire a

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life of their own, often outlasting regimes, and therefore must be distinguished from them. For instance,

in the case of Iran, the Islamic revolution ushered in a completely new regime, but largely co-opted the

preexisting Pahlavi bureaucratic apparatus and expanded it.2 Conversely, state structures may fail while

a regime continues to stay in power. In the well-known case of Afghanistan after 1978, the Communist

regime endured until 1992, but the Afghan bureaucracy, which was weak to begin with, lost all of its

ability to implement policy in the provinces and largely ceased to exist.

In this study, I focus on concrete ways that new rulers or regimes have attempted to extend the

reach of political institutions associated with the modern state into the periphery, a measure of the

strength of the central state. For that purpose, I engage Michael Mann’s concept of ‘infrastructural

power’. According to Mann political entities throughout history have utilized despotic power to battle

threats to their rule, but modern states are unique in their extensive accumulation of infrastructural

power, that is their ability to penetrate society and consistently implement decisions through a

bureaucratic apparatus.3 In a more recent discussion of Mann’s concept, Soifer argues that

infrastructural power consists of three separate sub-dimensions:4 the resources available to central

state actors,5 the extent to which state actors shape society and social actors through policy

implementation,6 and the uneven reach of the state.7 While all three sub-dimensions represent crucial

aspects of state strength, I focus particularly on the last aspect, the territorial reach of the state, as it

best captures the process by which state-makers engage with traditional resistance to their rule in post-

imperial buffer states.

2. Post-Imperial Buffer States and the Importance of Ideology:

Standard explanations of state formation, such as the role of competitive military pressures, 8 the

expansion of trade networks,9 or ruling elite’s cost-benefit analysis,10 derive from Western European

experience. These Europeanists have been criticized for positing an impossibly autonomous and capable

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state that simply does not exist in most of the world.11 Tilly himself acknowledged that his theory of the

interplay of military threat and bureaucratic expansion only applies to early European state-builders, not

the post-colonial late-comers.12 On the other hand, much of non-Western state formation theory

focuses on the impact of various foreign imperial footprints.13 Some scholars largely ignore the historical

legacy of colonial institutions14 or argue for the primacy of pre-existing social and geographic structures

and processes.15 Nevertheless, they all assume a basic dichotomy between Western and post-colonial

states.16

I propose a third category of non-colonized and non-European states, originating and surviving as

imperial buffers, that need to be explicitly studied as an alternative with a distinct set of contextual

factors and incentives.17 A state is generally categorized as a buffer when it sits between or adjacent to

at least two rival states with vastly superior military capabilities, but nevertheless retains formal

sovereignty over its territory.18 Here, it is important to distinguish between what Fazal calls continental

and imperial buffer states.19 Continental buffer states are situated between the two homelands of

enduring rivals, whereas imperial buffers separate territory of rival colonial powers that are far removed

from the colonial homeland. Because continental buffer states have existed either only in Europe or as

independent post-colonial states, the development of infrastructural power in their territories has

already been addressed by existing theories. Imperial buffer states also did not experience protracted

internal colonial domination and institution-building, even though their boundaries were largely drawn

by these external rivals vying for regional supremacy. Admittedly, the population of modern states that

originated as imperial buffers and survived is not large. In addition to Afghanistan and Iran, the list

includes Thailand, Ethiopia, and Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, these states are highly relevant for theory

development in comparative politics. Specifically, I argue that in imperial buffer states, where colonial

institutions are absent and the intense military competition of the European continent is far removed,

the role of individual state-building elites in determining state development outcomes is magnified. This

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is especially true at critical junctures when existing institutions are weakened and structural constraints

on decision-making are temporarily removed.

I limit the current study of infrastructural power in imperial buffer states to Afghanistan and Iran,

although conclusions drawn from this study could be tested on the other large imperial buffers as well. I

do so because most of my research has heretofore been limited to them. Furthermore, empirical

evidence suggests that geographic, structural and cultural conditions in early 20th-century Iran and

Afghanistan were rather similar. According to Jeffrey Herbst’s geographic categorization, Afghanistan

and Iran both have geographies unfavorable for extensive state-building, with several non-contiguous

population centers separated by unpopulated and difficult to traverse terrain, such as mountain ranges

and vast desert plains.20 Despite some analyses that emphasize the importance of class identity and

conflict to state development in both countries,21 neither of them had any significant urban working

class.22 Furthermore, despite primordial arguments to the contrary,23 Afghanistan and Iran share a

similar cultural heritage and structure. For instance, Afghanistan-based dynasties, like the Ghaznavids

and the Hotaki Ghilzais, ruled much of what today is Iran, while Iran-based dynasties, such as the

Safavids, ruled most of what today is Afghanistan.24 In the pre-modern era, territorial boundaries were

continually in flux and dynasties did not legitimize themselves based on a shared national history or

culture with their subjects. Most of the territory comprising today’s Iran, Afghanistan, as well as parts of

Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, were part of a grand Turco-Persian civilization that did not coincide with any

political entity. The Afghan kings and their administrators communicated in Persian, and urban life had

little to do with the Afghan tribal code of conduct so heavily emphasized in the literature and later

Afghan nationalist discourse.25 Both societies exhibit very similar levels of ethnic heterogeneity

according to one prominent indicator commonly used.26 Additionally, in the early 20th Century, Iran was

just as dominated by tribalism as was Afghanistan.27 Tapper has argued that both Afghanistan and 19th

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Century Qajar Iran could be considered empires based on a particular tribal identity, rather than states

representing an imagined primordial nation.28

Lastly, and most importantly, both exhibited very similar levels of infrastructural power at the

start of the 20th Century, but then diverged fairly dramatically following the 1920s. I capture this

variation across a number of indicators focusing on infrastructure, education, and the military, over time

in table 1 below. While no census was carried out in either country at the time, the UN statistical

yearbook of 1953 estimated Iran’s population to be about 16 million in 1937, whereas Afghanistan’s

population was about two-thirds of that, at 11 million.29 Before the relevant leaders came to power in

both countries, these countries had virtually no paved roads or railroads, few public school and no post-

secondary students, and relatively small militaries. In the space of a few decades, these indicators

increased markedly in Iran, while they did so to a far lesser degree in Afghanistan.

Table 1: Comparative Indicators of Infrastructural Power at the National Level

Paved or gravel

Roads30

Railroad31 Primary& Secondary pupils in

public schools32

University

Students33

Afghanistan 1929 0-200km 0km <40,000 0

Afghanistan 1953 0-3700km 0km 111,503 611

Iran – 1921 0km-325km 12km 44,819 0

Iran – 1941 15,000-24,000km ~1500km 315,355-457,236 ~3300

Why this divergence? Current dominant theories of state formation that favor large structural

forces cannot adequately explain the divergent trajectory of state development in these countries. The

classic literature on European state formation focuses far too much on territorial sovereignty and

central state capacity, as opposed to the reach of the state within a given territory.34 The literature on

non-Western state formation, on the other hand, is pre-occupied with the legacy of colonial institutions,

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35 the overriding nefarious influence of natural resources,36 or the challenge of culturally heterogeneous

societies.37 More recent scholarship on state-building in non-Western polities has left more space for

individual agency in the state-building process. In these accounts structural conditions indirectly shape

state-building outcomes through profit-maximizing or power-seeking state-building elites. But even

there, it is either profit-maximizing or power-seeking elites who devise state-building strategies

primarily in response to prospects for economic exploitation or the threat of political rebellions in the

provinces.38 The assumption is that all elites would react the same way given similar conditions.

I generate a causal argument that accounts for the different political ideas of individual elites,

independent of their office- and rent-seeking motives. I frame ideology in terms of Weber’s types of

legitimate domination, tradition and legal-rationality. I leave out Weber’s third type, charisma, because

it is primarily a temporary phenomenon, often characterizing revolutionary leaders who then need to

institutionalize the state either along traditional or legal-rational lines.39 While ideology is inherently

difficult to test, Weber himself provides several concrete ways to ascertain how elites legitimize their

own rule, including elite attitudes towards social transformation. Elites driven by legal-rational ideology

would be expected to express a strong desire for swift social transformation, such as urbanization,

detribalization, secularization, and military modernization, whereas traditionalists would be more

inclined towards gradual, if any, development. In fact, the emphasis on personalistic ties between ruler

and staff in traditional legitimation would preclude any efforts for change. According to Weber, legal-

rationality works towards the “leveling” of traditional hierarchies and loyalty networks, in order to

create the largest possible pool of highly qualified and functionally interchangeable recruits.40

However, the dichotomy between traditional and legal-rational ruling ideologies does not

consider elites’ affinity for democratic accountability and popular participation.41 This distinction is often

missed by regional specialists leading to discussions that conflate the question of democratization and

regime type with that of state-building. In order to more satisfactorily capture the available range of

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ideological choices in these two countries, I rely on Thomas Ertman’s four-fold typology distinguishing

between regime type (absolutist vs. constitutionalist) and levels of administrative modernization

(patrimonial vs. bureaucratic). 42 Here, patrimonialism corresponds with Weber’s tradition, whereas

Ertman’s bureaucratic category is equivalent to legal-rationality. Of course, Ertman analyzes institutional

outcomes and not elite ideologies, but his categories are nevertheless useful to distinguish between key

political figures in my cases. As a result, we can distinguish between four different types of potential

leaders at the outset of the 20th Century. I argue that their political ideology, and not simply the

underlying conditions, helped determine state-building outcomes in each of the cases under

consideration. Table 2 below summarizes the general vision that one would expect each of these

ideological types to exhibit.

Table 2: Categorization of Political Ideology

Bureaucratic Absolutism Bureaucratic Constitutionalism

no formal institutional constraints on executive authority

no avenue for popular participation

rationalization and centralization of state

rapid socio-economic modernization

formal constraints on executive authority

some avenue for popular participation

rationalization and centralization of state

rapid socio-economic modernization

no formal institutional constraints on executive authority

no avenue for popular participation

Indirect governance, local autonomy

no or gradual socio-economic modernization

formal constraints on executive authority

some avenue for popular participation

indirect governance, local autonomy

no or gradual socio-economic modernization

Patrimonial Absolutism Patrimonial Constitutionalism

3. Path Dependence in Post-Imperial Buffer States:

I argue that the trajectory of state development in these two cases was determined by

particular institutional strategies of newly empowered elites with different ideological perspectives.

Their rise to power was not predetermined by structural factors, as a number of other alternative

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leaders were waiting in the wings and could have conceivably come to power if contingent events had

turned out slightly differently. However, once the new ruling dynasties established themselves in the

capital, they set in motion institutional processes that could not easily be changed by subsequent rulers,

even if they had different ideological preferences from their predecessors.

This causal narrative essentially follows a path dependent trajectory. Path dependency has been

defined in a variety of ways in the literature, but they all revolve around at least two key elements. First,

path dependency describes a process or sequence of events, which, due to a one or more of a variety of

potential constraining and self-reinforcing mechanisms at work, dramatically reduce the availability of

alternate pathways and inexorably move toward a particular outcome or institutional equilibrium.43

Second, this sequence is initiated by a contingent event serving as a critical juncture, such as a natural

disaster, political conflict, or individual choices, which is unrelated to and cannot be explained by the

feedback mechanism that ensues. Multiple pathways are available at the onset of the juncture, but all

but one option are closed off at the end of it. The element of time is absolutely crucial in path-

dependency. Events and choices that occur early on in the process are far more important to the

eventual outcome than those that come later. 44 Furthermore, the element of contingency is absolutely

crucial: outcomes are not determined simply by structural conditions or cost-benefit calculations of

rational actors. Rather, more often than not, they represent the unintended consequences of

idiosyncratic choices or events at particular moments in time.

Good path dependent analyses generally include a discussion of the antecedent conditions that

shape the options available at the moment of choice, the critical juncture itself, subsequent institutional

patterns that constrain actors on a particular pathway, and the long-term outcome.45 There are

essentially two types of mechanisms that help explain institutional constraint. First, self-reinforcing

mechanisms constrain actors to continue on a pathway, despite potentially preferable or more efficient

alternatives. 46 Different types of these mechanisms are commonly used to explain the positive feedback

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loop of self-reinforcing mechanisms. The economic logic of learning and coordination effects, for

instance, may drive the costs of switching to better alternatives too high to make it worthwhile, as was

the case with the adoption and persistence of the QWERTY keyboard. Alternatively, power may drive

persistence: elites empowered by new institutions work to strengthen these, and as a result entrench

themselves even more. Additionally, newly institutions legitimize particular practices and processes,

which are then subsequently reproduced because actors believe them to be compatible with their

values, even though potential alternatives available early on may have provided a better fit.47 It is these

latter two explanations based on power and legitimization that are particularly well suited to explain

institutional persistence in post-imperial buffer states like Afghanistan and Iran.

In addition to self-reinforcing mechanisms, institutional constraint can by driven by what are

called reactive sequences in the literature. A reactive sequence can be defined as a series of separate,

dissimilar, and at times even contradictory events, which are sparked by an initial critical juncture and

that unavoidably lead to a particular outcome.48 Self-reinforcing mechanisms and reactive sequences

can at times be present in the same major process. Conjunctures, for instance, describe two unrelated

processes that collide to produce a third path-dependent process.49 In Goldstone’s analysis of early

modern England, the industrial revolution came about due to the fortunate and well-timed convergence

of an environmental reactive sequence that resulted in heavy reliance on underground coal and a

cultural positive feedback mechanism, where relative political and religious freedom and technological

ingenuity and openness mutually reinforced one another. The outcome of this convergence, the

invention of and improvement on the steam engine, started yet another reactive sequence leading to

industrialization.50

Rather than simply colliding with them, reactive sequences can also follow as a reaction to

newly entrenched institutional patterns. In this case, the kind of self-reinforcing mechanism shapes the

type of reaction to it. In Mahoney’s analysis of Central American regimes, it is the form and content of

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late 19th Century liberalizing agricultural reforms, leading to particular types of landholding patterns and

military strength, which shaped the way the wider public fought for greater democratic rights, and then

in turn led entrenched elites to acquiesce to democratization or to violently suppress it. Reactive

sequences can also be affected by external events and conditions. In the case of Central America, the

presence of large American fruit companies made it impossible for either repressive dictatorships based

on military coercion, as in Guatemala and El Salvador, or liberal democracy, as in Costa Rica, to develop

in Honduras and Nicaragua.51

In this study, I employ all of the path-dependent elements used in Mahoney’s analysis of Central

America. I analyze antecedent conditions in Afghanistan and Iran to explain structural conditions and the

relative availability of the four ideological alternatives. I then describe the critical juncture at which

power elites with particular ruling ideologies came to power. This did not simply happen as a result of

pre-existing structural conditions, but to a large degree due to highly contingent events and choices

made within a limited period of time. Thirdly, I focus on the ruling strategies employed by these new

elites and the institutional patterns that followed as a result. Traditionalist rulers generally delegated

power to regional allies, but developed a greater state presence in regions dominated by rivals.

Modernist rulers, on the other hand, viewed all regional power figures as obstacles to their state-

building project, and sought to remove them. Either decentralized or centralized institutional patterns

emerged as a result of these strategies.

In the conclusion, I briefly discuss how a reactive sequence developed in response to the

institutional environment created in these countries and led to particular outcomes. Specifically,

because of Soviet support for indigenous Marxist groups, and the country’s relative geographic

proximity to the Soviet Union, largely leftist groups were able to undermine and overthrow existing

regimes, either alone or in conjunction with radical religious movements. In Iran, where local

authoritarian rulers had helped establish extensive infrastructural power, leftist and nationalist groups

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helped topple regimes in large popular movements, after which revolutionary governments quickly re-

established control. In Afghanistan, leftist revolutionaries mobilized successfully due to extensive

educational, organizational, and financial support from the Soviet Union. However the anemic state

structures disintegrated rapidly when the revolutionary government came to power and sought to bring

about rapid change

4. Antecedent Conditions: Ideological Landscape in Afghanistan and Iran in the early 20th Century

Antecedent conditions shape the type and number of choices that are available during the critical

juncture, but generally do not determine the choice itself.52 It is thus important to ascertain how these

conditions shaped the ideological landscape in similar as well as different ways in both countries. One

cannot claim that Iran and Afghanistan are completely identical twin cases. Iran experienced a higher,

but still modest, degree of economic penetration by the imperial powers in the late 19th Century that

predated the discovery of oil.53 A nascent modern ‘intelligentsia’ developed also as a result of an

increasing number of aristocratic scions continuing their studies in Europe.54 This modern, but rather

small, group of intellectuals figured prominently in the drafting of the 1906 constitution and the creation

of the new parliament.55 In Afghanistan, an equivalent intellectual class appeared only several decades

later, and while a small coterie of secret constitutionalists developed around the same time, they were

far smaller and less influential than their counterparts in Iran, and were easily crushed by Habibullah in

1909.56 Political elites were mainly divided between bureaucratic and patrimonial absolutists. In Iran,

notwithstanding greater European economic penetration, the vast majority of the population remained

geographically isolated, rural, and self-sufficient well into the 20th Century, just like in Afghanistan.57 The

relatively early emergence of a small stratum of middle class intelligentsia did shape part of the

ideological context into which Reza Khan later stepped. In Iran patrimonial constitutionalists dominated

the political scene up until 1921, and they represented Reza Khan’s biggest opposition once he came

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power and sought to implement his bureaucratic absolutist vision for the country. I have described the

ideological context in Afghanistan and Iran in the early 20th Century in far more detail elsewhere, but

provide a brief sketch below.58

By 1920, contenders and factions from all four ideological perspectives were realistic contenders for

power in Iran, although the main fault line lay between patrimonial constitutionalists and bureaucratic

absolutists and their stance on whether rapid modernization should be embarked upon and how it

should look like.59 Along with a few royalist politicians and some Shi’a ‘ulema, the Qajar monarchy was

the main representative of the patrimonial absolutist world view. The Shah, and his immediate advisors,

had always had complete control over government policy and appointment of officials in the center, and

sought to undermine the gains of 1906 through a counter-revolution. The Qajar monarchy did not build

seek to build up a centralized administrative or coercive apparatus and therefore had little ability to

govern regions at some distance from the capital.60 The monarchy gradually lost its hold on power due

the constitutional revolution of 1906, the chaos brought about by World War I and concomitant British,

Russian, and Ottoman occupation of its territories, as well as numerous domestic tribal uprisings.61

Patrimonial constitutionalists probably represented the largest section of Iranian political elites up until

1921. They favored a constitutional monarch, limited executive power, democratic elections, civil rights

and liberties, and particularly the rule of law. They were generally satisfied with the old Qajar indirect

system of administration, did not see the need for a massive expansion and centralization of state

power, did not think it necessary to greatly alter the way of life in the rural periphery, and favored an

important role for the ‘ulema in social life, if not necessarily in public politics.

Most prominent among the more conservative constitutionalists was the clerical leader Sayyed

Hassan Mudarris, who as main parliamentary opponent to Reza Khan attempted to slow down the

latter’s modernization agenda, including a universal conscription bill, the abolition of aristocratic titles,

and a national sugar tax. He was eventually imprisoned in 1929, and then killed in 1938.62 Other more

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progressive constitutionalists, largely from aristocratic families, also did not express much enthusiasm

for major social transformation. Perhaps the most famous of these was Musaddiq al-Saltanah, better

known as Dr. Muhammad Musaddiq, the nationalist prime minister of Iran who defied Britain and

nationalized the oil industry in the early 1950s. While known today as a populist, nationalist, and anti-

imperialist leader, he consistently expressed his nostalgia for the old Qajar administration, which he

thought far more suitable for Iran than modern reforms instituted during the constitutional revolution

and the Pahlavi years. He argued that attempts to introduce uniform and direct national taxation had

proved far too inefficient to justify the large number of civil servants taking salaries. Musaddiq held that

the old tax farming system represented a far more sustainable system, where the government did not

incur debt, and was attuned to local social structures, as taxes would be collected from landlords and

not peasants directly.63 Furthermore, unlike Reza Khan, Mosaddiq also did not view tribal elements as

inherently antagonistic toward the central state, but maintained excellent ties with both major Bakhtiari

and Qashqai tribal chiefs into the 1920s as governor of Fars province.64

In the end, however, the modernists won out. While a small number of bureaucratic

constitutionalists had played an important role in Iranian politics, it was the bureaucratic absolutists

who managed to come to power with Reza Khan. 65 Bureaucratic absolutism was propagated primarily

by a coterie of nationalist intellectuals who had studied abroad and spent much of World War I in

European exile. They had been encouraged by the German government to mobilize Iranian intellectuals

and public figures to oppose the entente powers in Iran through the publication of Persian-language

periodicals. Even after German support ceased at the end of the war, they continued publishing until

financing problems and finally Reza Shah’s clampdown on the press in the late 1920’s forced them to

stop. Together, these journals spoke of the need to reform Iranian society by creating a strong central

state that would crack down on tribal uprisings, provincial revolutionaries, and general banditry in the

countryside, and by cultivating a culturally homogenous sense of nationalism and repressing regional

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ethnic identifications.66 While little is known about Reza Khan’s views before 1921, he aligned himself

with these nationalist elements early on, striving to transform Iranian society, but in a top-down

authoritarian manner that maintained a dominant role for the military.67

In Afghanistan, patrimonial absolutism and bureaucratic absolutism were the two main

ideological alternatives in the early 20th Century. Two key families, returning from exile shortly after

Amir Habibullah’s accession in 1901, shaped the ideological landscape of Afghan politics of the early 20th

Century. The Yahya Khel clan, alternately referred to as the Peshawar Sardars or the Musahiban-i-Khas

or simply Musahiban,68 returned from twenty years in Dehradun, India. They quickly established

themselves as key players in the military administration of Habibullah and Amanullah Khan, none more

so than Muhammad Nadir Khan, the future king of Afghanistan.69 During Habibullah’s reign until 1919,

Nadir and his brothers rose up quickly in the military ranks, established a strong support structure in the

Afghan army, and developed close ties among Pashtun tribesmen along the British Indian border. 70

During Amanullah’s reign beginning in 1919, Nadir and his brother served as a rallying point for

traditionalists opposed to Amanullah’s rapid modernization endeavors. However, after a falling out with

Amanullah, Nadir left for France in 1924, first as ambassador, and then as a private citizen. Their chance

to rule arrived in October 1929, when they finally managed to capture the capital Kabul after nine

months of civil war that had ensued when Amanullah was toppled in a popular uprising. Nadir himself

was assassinated in 1933, but his brothers continued to govern on behalf of Nadir’s son Zahir Shah with

the same traditionalist mindset until they were replaced by the second generation in 1953.

The other returnee family was that of the poet Ghulam Muhammad Khan “Tarzi”, exiled by Amir

Abdur Rahman in 1882 for conspiring against his rule.71 His son, Mahmud, pursued education in

Damascus as well as Istanbul, and was strongly influenced by the ideas of Muslim modernists such as

Muhammad Abdu and Jamaluddin Al-Afghani, whom he personally met and interacted with. After the

death of his father and the general amnesty proclaimed by Habibullah, Mahmud Tarzi returned to

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Afghanistan filled with reformist zeal for his country. He immediately took a leading role in the nascent

intellectual circles in Kabul, taking charge of education in the country and founding Afghanistan’s first

regular newspaper.72 Whereas the Musahiban family represented traditionalism in elite political circles,

Mahmud Tarzi served as the main rallying point for those who wanted to transform Afghanistan into a

modern Western-style nation-state.

Tarzi’s most important disciple came to be Amanullah Khan, who came to power in 1919 and

appointed Tarzi as his most important advisor. He pursued an ambitious top-down modernization

project that clearly fits in the bureaucratic absolutist mold. He sought to bring about sweeping social

changes in Afghanistan through a rationalized state apparatus, but avoided creating any institutional

checks on his monarchical powers. In a series of top-down decrees between 1919 and 1923, he

abolished child marriage and discouraged polygamy, prohibited extensive wedding celebrations and

funerals, stripped the local mullahs and religious judges of their traditional discretionary powers of legal

interpretation, opened girls’ schools, and even sent some young women overseas to study in Turkey.73

In the constitution of 1923, which codified the previous set of nizamnamah, he sought to promote a

more inclusive religious atmosphere by giving non-Muslims full citizenship rights and to avoid sectarian

discrimination by referring to Islam in general as the official religion of the country, as opposed to the

more specific Sunni Hanafi school of thought.74 His efforts to raise the status of women in Afghan society

culminated most famously in the unveiling incident in 1928, when he proposed abolishing the traditional

Afghan veil, or chaduri.75 Even after he was toppled in early 1929, it was still possible that bureaucratic

absolutism could make a come-back, either through his own efforts to regain the throne, or through one

of his close associates. I now turn to the critical juncture in both cases, which effectively closed off

alternative pathways for a long time to come.

5. Critical Juncture: Reza Khan and Nadir Khan’s rise to power

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Choice and contingency are the key features of a critical juncture. First of all, there need to be

viable alternative options to the actual course taken. Secondly, the cause for a particular choice being

made should be separate from the mechanism that keeps the process on a particular path. There has to

be an element of contingency at the critical juncture, so that other options could have easily won the

day if events had run their course just slightly differently. If one overarching theory or explanation can

account for both the choice at the critical juncture, and the feedback mechanisms during institutional

reproduction, then the process is not path-dependent, but purely structurally determined. 76 In the

following pages, I describe the contingent events that led to the patrimonial absolutist Nadir Shah of

Afghanistan in 1929 and the bureaucratic absolutist Reza Shah of Iran in 1921. I show that in both

countries ideological alternatives could have prevailed. The divergent state-building processes after the

critical juncture are evidence for the fact that the choice at the critical juncture was a crucial one that

actually made an impact on events during the turbulent 1970s and afterwards.

The critical juncture in Iran lasted from the end of World War I, till 1925, after Reza Khan had

eliminated most of his internal rivals and decided to end the Qajar monarchy by having himself declared

king and start the Pahlavi dynasty. Based on the historical record, I argue that Reza Khan’s path to power

was not foreordained, and that just small changes made by particular actors at particular times could

have led to alternative political outcomes. Here I discuss two particular episodes in which small changes

could have easily led to a trajectory by-passing Reza Khan. First of all, I describe events leading up to and

following the coup d’etat of February 1921. Much of the British foreign policy establishment was pre-

occupied with alternative options at the time, but one enterprising British general, charged with

organizing the removal of British forces in Iran, helped get the coup underway. And secondly, I discuss

the Republican crisis of 1924, in which Reza Khan, now prime minister, found himself in a precarious

situation that could have easily led to his disappearance from the political scene.

18

Some have claimed that Reza was simply a creation and tool of the British to control Iran and its

resources.77 This perspective grossly underestimates the lack of unanimity within the British foreign

policy bureaucracy itself. To begin with, the British foreign secretary Lord Curzon had pushed hard for

the creation and implementation of the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919, which would have extended

a massive loan to help build up Iran’s military and political institutions, albeit under the supervision of

British advisors. Curzon was particularly keen on seeing the main negotiator of the deal hailing from an

aristocratic Qajar family, Hassan Vosuq al-Dowleh, firmly ensconced in power.78 In addition to a

combination of domestic and international outrage at the agreement, and resistance from the British

War Office to commit the considerable funds necessary, Curzon’s stubbornness was the most important

factor that sunk the agreement. Crucially, he consistently insisted on the exclusivity of British-Iranian

relations, refusing to allow his Iranian clients to negotiate directly with the new Soviet government,

which might have forestalled the Soviet invasion of northern Iran in 1920 in pursuit of White Russian

elements. That invasion forced Vosuq to resign as Prime Minister and set the stage for the military coup

one year later. Curzon never forgave those individuals, both Iranian and English, who effectively sunk

that initiative, including the British minister in Tehran Herman Norman, who realized that the main

British clients in Iran lacked legitimacy, and that the Anglo-Persian agreement would have to be

jettisoned.79

Had Vosuq remained in power, it would seem highly unlikely that he and his associates would

have wanted to implement the same centralization policies that fundamentally altered center-periphery

relations during the Pahlavi regime. All of them were members of the Qajar elite, more or less closely

related to the Shah, and as significant landowners outside of Tehran would not have been interested in

much government interference in the periphery.80 They were all known as generally anglophile

politicians, who sought an active British role in the country to help it restore stability and order.81 The

British, however, had concluded security and financial agreements with a number of regional and tribal

19

leaders in southwestern Iran, giving the latter a fair amount of autonomy in governing local affairs.

British oil interests were located in the territory of the Sheikh of Muhammarah, the traditional ruler of

the Arab tribes in southwestern Iran, who had not paid taxes to Tehran in decades, intended to rule his

region autonomously, and even had hopes that the British would appoint him king of the newly created

Iraq.82 Even though Vosuq aimed to restore external sovereignty to Iran, he would have been hard-

pressed to move against British clients in the south, and certainly would not have been advised to do so

by the British financial and military advisors that would have been employed under the Anglo-Persian

agreement. Reza Khan did move to eliminate autonomous actors in the periphery, including the Sheikh,

upon coming to power. He could do so, because he had fired all remaining British military advisors, and

had opposed all efforts to hire other British experts and bureaucrats. In lieu of a British financial adviser,

the American Millspaugh now governed Iranian financial affairs, and he actively supported Reza’s effort

to make regional magnates accountable to Tehran.83

Once it became clear that the Anglo-Persian agreement would fail and that Vosuq’s government

would fall in 1920, British policy-makers in London looked for alternate means to secure their interests

against the looming Bolshevik threat in the north. Curzon and some close advisers suggested moving the

capital to southern Iran and empowering various tribal confederations in order to protect British oil

resources against the Soviet threat.84 Others, including Norman, opposed the idea of dividing up Iran,

and instead suggested forming a strong conservative government in Tehran headed by other royalist

Qajar candidates.85 All of the options considered by the British establishment would have empowered

traditionalists, whether democratically inclined or not, in Tehran or in the southern part of a divided

Iran.

In the end, an initiative by Gen. Ironside, his military aides within the British legation, a number

of sympathetic Iranian nationalists, and the ambitious Reza Khan, to empower the Russian-trained

Cossack brigade,86 stage a coup, and install a new government, carried the day.87 British troops, already

20

present in the southern Iranian oil fields, had provided a significant military force in the north, albeit

somewhat unwillingly, to compensate for Russia’s exit from the war after the 1917 revolution.88 When

Soviet Bolshevik troops invaded northern Iran in 1920, the British administration decided to pull out of

the north, while still maintaining a pro-British and anti-Bolshevik government, even if it meant moving

the capital south and empowering Iran’s tribal groups.89 Ironside’s main task, set out by a frugal War

Office in London, was to extricate British troops from Iranian soil as quickly as possible without leaving it

vulnerable to the Soviets. According to him, the best way to achieve this was to put the heretofore

Russian-commanded Cossacks under Iranian control and encourage its leadership to stage a coup and

create a strong and centralized military dictatorship.90 He seems to have settled on Reza Khan only by

January 1921, and was forced to rush the coup because his planned departure in April had been moved

up to February.91 Having convinced himself of Reza Khan’s character as an honorable soldier and a

selfless patriot, like himself, who would not turn against the British troops as they were withdrawing,

Ironside came to the conclusion that he was the only one capable of governing the country.92 The coup

that brought Reza to power thus turned on a number of contingent events. The British war office could

have sent a less enterprising general to Iran, who would conceivably have been more amenable to the

wishes of the British diplomatic representatives in Tehran as well as the foreign secretary Curzon.

Several officers senior in rank to Reza Khan in the Cossack brigade could have agreed to stage the coup,

but they refused. 93 The other candidates would have been more deferential towards the civilian

government in Tehran compared to the ambitious Reza. Once the coup got underway, the

gendarmerie94 stationed in Tehran, could have resisted the Cossack force advancing on the city. In fact,

the prime minister at the time was seriously considering sending out the gendarmerie to meet the

approaching Cossacks, but was dissuaded from doing so by a British official involved in the plot.95 The

resulting bloodshed would surely have affected Reza Khan’s legitimacy from the very beginning, as few

people were familiar with him before then.

21

Even after coming to power, Reza Khan still faced serious threats to this authority, most

importantly so in 1924, when he, now prime minister, started a movement to end the Qajar monarchy

and institute a republic. He faced considerable opposition from the conservative Reformer’s Party,

which was led by the cleric Sayyed Hassan Mudarris and supported by the bazaar networks, the artisanal

guilds, and lower-ranking ‘ulema.96 Mudarris and his allies already were opposed to Reza’s emerging

reform agenda, in particular the conscription bill that would force most young men to spend two years

under the secularizing influence of the army, as well as take away valuable agricultural labor from

wealthy landowners. Even after Reza Khan managed to elect a majority of supporters to the fifth session

of the majles in 1924, Mudarrris repeatedly managed to keep Republicanism from coming to a vote

through multiple parliamentary tactics. Furthermore, he was far more effective at mobilizing royalist

supporters in the streets, particularly in the bazaar, compared to his pro-Republican opponents.97 About

the same time, Mudarris got in touch with various tribal leaders in southern Iran, most importantly

Sheikh Khazal of the largely autonomous province of Arabistan and client of the Anglo-Persian Oil

Company. He planned to enlist these tribal elites, who were keen to retain their traditional autonomy,

to foment a rebellion and oust the energetic centralizing military leader. He also hoped to enlist Sheikh

Khazal’s support in getting Ahmad Shah to return from his lengthy stay in Europe and fight the attempt

to end the Qajar dynasty.98 When Mudarris was assaulted by a deputy from the modernist pro-Reza

Renewal party in 1924, massive crowds gathered in front of the parliament for days, protesting against

Reza Khan. After overstepping his authority by attempting to use parliamentary guards to disperse

protestors, Reza was in real danger of facing a parliamentary vote of no-confidence. Seeing his political

capital ebbing away, Reza offered to resign and withdrew from Tehran.99

At this point in time, leadership would have reverted back to the traditionalists and liberal

notables loyal to the constitutional framework and hesitant towards the idea of political centralization

and change. Reza Khan, however, managed to salvage the situation by reversing his stance on

22

Republicanism, and going to Qom to assure the leading ‘ulema of his devotion to Islam. When he

declared his intention to leave the country, an orchestrated pro-Reza propaganda campaign ensued,

including pledges of devotion by the reformist press and a multitude of telegrams pouring in from

provincial capitals, which were largely controlled by the army. The majles deputies were confronted

with the possibility of an outbreak of lawlessness and violence in the provinces if military officers went

on strike, and decided to reinstate Reza in April of 1924.100 By the end of 1925, after a successful military

campaign to depose Sheikh Khazal in Arabistan and establish the writ of the central state there, he had

rallied enough support, including from conservatives, to depose the Qajar dynasty and install himself as

the new monarch.101 As new Shah, Reza continued to face challenges to his rule in response to his

aggressive modernization agenda, and particularly the harsh as well as corrupt means his regime used to

implement it.102 However, none threatened his hold on power and his legitimacy in the new Iranian

army to the extent of the Republican crisis of 1924.103 The period between the end of World War I and

1925 thus represents a true critical juncture in Iranian history during which multiple trajectories,

described above, were likely.

In contrast to Iran, the critical juncture in Afghanistan during which the Musahiban regime

managed to overcome its rivals and take Kabul lasted only from late 1928 to late 1929. Alternatives to

Nadir Khan and his brothers’ patrimonial absolutist ideology existed, most notably in the person of the

previous king Amanullah and his supporters. It is quite plausible that Amanullah’s modernist views could

have remained dominant in Afghan governance if a small number of events had turned out differently.

Three factors ultimately doomed these prospects. First of all, Amanullah did not follow Reza Shah’s

model in combating tribal resistance, particularly by failing to develop an effective military force.

Secondly, he made a series of hasty decisions from January to May 1929 that hurt his chances to first

keep and then regain his throne. And thirdly, Nadir Khan and his brothers adroitly managed to create

the erroneous impression among pro-Amanullah circles in British India that they supported the former

23

king, while assuring their tribal allies on the Afghan side of the border that they would not return the

king to the throne. Some have argued that a British colonial collusion with Nadir against the anti-

colonialist Amanullah led to his downfall.104 It cannot be denied that the British were generally less

favorably inclined towards Amanullah, partly because of his popularity among anti-colonial Muslims in

India,105 and generally viewed Muhammad Nadir Khan in a much more favorable light, although British

hostility was not as great as is sometimes claimed.106 But existing diplomatic records indicate that British

officials in London and Kabul were in fact clearly taken by surprise and alarmed when the anti-

Amanullah uprising happened, and feared that British lives and property, particularly in the legation,

might be endangered.107 And during the ensuing internal conflict, the British were committed to a policy

of strict neutrality, which allowed combatants to enter Afghanistan from India only once, even denying

Nadir’s brother Hashim to re-enter Afghanistan after he had fled Kalakani’s forces in September of

1929.108

The question arises why Amanullah’s reform efforts failed, whilst the bureaucratic absolutist

Reza Shah succeeded in giving the army a near monopoly on the use of force in a territory historically

dominated by tribal powers. Most commentators have argued that Amanullah’s renewed zeal for far-

reaching reforms on his return from on European tour in 1920 sealed his fate by inflaming Afghanistan’s

religious and tribal elite against him.109 Some argue that corruption in Amanullah’s administration

served as the underlying cause of his ultimate downfall,110 although Reza Shah’s military-based

administration was certainly no less corrupt, but still managed to stave off major social resistance. The

key is that Amanullah prematurely broke his ties with Pashtun tribal groups by cutting financial aid and

by pushing out tribal elders from the military. He did so before having established a force strong enough

to deal with tribal discontent.111 In November of 1928 a tribal rebellion against Amanullah in the Eastern

province was set off, not by opposition against his decision to push for the unveiling of women or other

social reforms, but instead by government interference in the collection of informal customs duties, or

24

extortion for safe passage, in the Khyber pass, which the Afghan state had heretofore left to the tribes.

It was only then that Amanullah’s religious opponents were successful in connecting their grievances to

the uprising and making it a threat to the central government.112 Rather than simply immovable

structural and cultural opposition to reform efforts, which clearly existed in Iran as well, a confluence of

contingent events and ill-timed policies led to the success of the rebellion.

Nevertheless, even as Amanullah faced armed uprisings, he still had the opportunity to hold on

to power. In November 1928 a large force of Pashtun Shinwaris besieged the eastern city of Jalalabad in

response to the government’s attempts to take over customs collection. Amanullah negotiated with

them while also calling their internal Shinwari rivals to come to the government’s aid in Kabul. They did

start to trickle in to Kabul, but their questionable loyalty toward the Afghan government proved to a

destabilizing factor when the city was threatened from the north.113 In the mountainous region north of

Kabul inhabited largely by non-Pashtun Tajiks, Habibullah Kalakani, a former soldier in one of the army’s

newly formed battalions under Turkish command, had managed to gather a band of disgruntled men

unhappy with the increasingly centralized government. Sensing the Afghan government’s weakness in

dealing with the Shinwari uprising in the east, Kalakani’s band stepped up its anti-government activity.

Apparently, Amanullah made a major tactical error at this stage, according to most Afghan historians. He

attempted to co-opt Kalakani’s irregular force into existing state structures in order to help put down

the Shinwari rebellion. But Kalakani refused the overture as he suspected that Amanullah would turn on

him as soon as the uprising in the Eastern province had been calmed.114 Subsequently, he had himself

declared ‘Amir’ by local religious officials and with a substantial force assaulted Kabul. However,

Kalakani’s first assault on Kabul was met with defeat and he was pushed back to north in late

December.115

In the meantime, Amanullah made an attempt to conciliate his conservative opponents by

freeing prominent religious figures, publically rescinded all of the social reforms that had aroused

25

religious opposition. But he did not make effective military preparations to deal with a renewed push by

Kalakani to take Kabul in January 1929.116 The army in Kabul, under pressure from Kalakani’s forces,

lacked strong central leadership, and the capital was filled with tribal militias with uncertain loyalties. On

January 14th, Amanullah lost his nerve and turned over the throne to his older brother Inayatullah, who

through the mediation of a number of religious authorities rather quickly agreed to abdicate in favor of

Kalakani. Even though under pressure from a number of directions, Amanullah could have conceivably

stayed in power if he had at first not underestimated the northern threat early on, and then secondly

not made a hasty retreat to Kandahar in January 1929, which made it possible for Kalakani to come in

and take over.117

Even after fleeing to Kandahar, he still managed to put together a serious bid to oust Kalakani in

the following months. While reviled in Afghanistan’s tribal areas, Amanullah still possessed considerable

support among the Hazara Shi’a population of Afghanistan for abolishing slavery and working towards

ethnic and sectarian equality. And the Pashtun tribes in British India, as well as most Indian Muslims in

general, still revered the king for daring to fight a holy war against the almighty British Empire in 1919.

Furthermore, one of his loyal advisors and ambassador to the Soviet Union, Ghulam Nabi Charkhi,

organized a force of Central Asians and sympathetic Afghans, invaded northern Afghanistan, occupied

the major northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif, and was moving on south towards Kabul.118 Amanullah

quickly rescinded his abdication and managed to rally the royal Durrani Pashtun tribal khans in Kandahar

to his cause. In March 1929 he gathered a force of about 10,000 made up of leftover regular army

troops and irregular Pashtun tribal militias and was joined by Hazara forces numbering several thousand

on his way to engage Kalakani’s forces in Ghazni, the main town between Kandahar and Kabul. Afghan

historians Ghubar and Farhang make out three key factors that led to the failure of this campaign. First

of all, a militia of Ghilzai Pashtun tribes around Ghazni, who were bitterly opposed to the ex-king on

account of his campaign against them in 1924, attacked Amanullah’s troops from the rear, forcing him

26

to temporarily retreat. Secondly, Amanullah seemed to face considerable dissension within his own

advisory staff, which probably led him to make a number of tactical errors. And lastly, Amanullah,

although still in a position to press his attack on Kabul, again lost his nerve after the initial set-back at

Ghazni and decided to evacuate the field and leave for Italy via British India. When Charkhi heard the

news, he abandoned his attempt to march on Kabul and returned across the Soviet border.119

As a result, the conflict in Afghanistan was narrowed down to the struggle between Kalakani and

the Musahiban brothers. They had returned to India in March 1929 upon hearing the news of

Amanullah’s abdication, and were busy mobilizing Afghan and Muslim Indian moral and financial

support for their endeavor to fight Kalakani. Nadir never publically staked his claim to the Afghan throne

in order to receive the support of Amanullah’s well-wishers in India. But he declined to obey

Amanullah’s call to join him in Kandahar.120 The Musahiban brothers also sought permission from the

British government to mobilize the trans-border Pashtun tribes, but while the British government looked

favorably on their bid for power, they were politely denied.121 Nadir and his brothers did not make much

headway either, and by May were driven back close to the border with British India by Kalakani’s forces

and his Ghilzai Pashtun allies. Not until they managed to mobilize Pashtun Wazir tribes from British India

in September did the Musahiban brothers possess a large enough force to march on Kabul and occupy it,

forcing Kalakani to flee. Had Amanullah stayed in the field in May 1929, it is exceedingly likely that Nadir

would have had to cooperate with the ex-king. As it was, he himself was proclaimed king in October in

Kabul by an impromptu gathering of tribal leaders. He lured Kalakani back to Kabul on a promise of

leniency, but then had him and his associates executed. Nadir also quickly sought to coopt Amanullah’s

supporters in Kabul, and he moved to eliminate those who proved to be resistant.122 At this point,

Amanullah’s window of opportunity to regain the throne closed indefinitely, and Afghanistan’s new

regime embarked on a very different path from the previous regime’s bureaucratic absolutist trajectory.

6. Institutional Reproduction: Ideology, Power, and the Territorial Reach of the State

27

In path-dependent processes, particular mechanisms constrain institutional pathways and close

of potential alternatives that were available at the earlier choice point. In the case of Afghanistan and

Iran, a positive feedback loop based on power and ideology123 kept both on distinctive pathways that

still characterized them both by the 1970s. The critical juncture happened to empower two leaders with

distinctive visions on how the future polity should be structured. However, as discussed earlier, they did

not rise to power because of their belief structure, but as a result of a series of contingent and thus

preventable events. Once in power, their ideology shaped the way they sought to consolidate

themselves vis-a-vis regional elites. The modernist Reza Shah viewed all traditional regional elites as

threats to his state-building project and proceeded to either remove them to the center or eliminate

them completely. Based on his traditionalist ideology, Nadir Shah only viewed some elites as rivals,

while giving considerable autonomy to others with which his family had pre-existing personal, social, or

clientelistic ties. As a result, in Iran, the bureaucratic presence of the state spread relatively evenly

across all provinces. In Afghanistan, however, the state maintained only a patchwork presence in the

periphery. Once new rulers succeeded Reza Shah and Nadir Shah, they also inherited the same

institutionalized center-periphery relationship. In absence of another critical juncture, they were not

able to greatly alter this relationship even if they wanted to, as may have been the case with Daoud

Khan in the 1950s, as both their own power base in the center as well as in the provinces was embedded

in and dependent on it. Due to space constraints, I start by illustrating how Reza Shah and Nadir Shah

dealt with peripheral challenges in one or two exemplary cases.124 I then trace the medium to long-term

consequences of these actions on the territorial reach of the state in both Iran and Afghanistan.

In Iran, Reza Shah ultimately viewed all provincial elites as threats to his rule. In some cases, he

sought to ally with traditional power-brokers by bringing tribal elites to the capital and giving them

prestigious positions. Whether through violent coercion or not, however, he always made sure to sever

the political links with their traditional homeland. Instead, military commanders from Reza’s newly

28

developed and hierarchically structured army came to dominate provincial politics. Furthermore, in the

past aristocratic notables had sought provincial gubernatorial posts in order to increase their prestige

and economic base. During Reza Shah’s reign, however, civilian governors increasingly served only as

bureaucratic officials tasked with implementing central state policy, and no longer as autonomous rulers

with an independent power base. I describe the process by which Reza confronted, replaced, or

eliminated provincial elites by using the example of the region of Kurdistan. Based on the logic of the

rent-seeking or office-keeping arguments so prevalent in the literature, it would have made little sense

to extend the reach of the state here, as it was sufficiently distant from Tehran so as not to represent a

significant threat to the regime itself, and possessed little in the way of agricultural productivity or

natural resources for extraction. Nevertheless, by the end of his rule, Reza Shah had effectively ended

political autonomy of tribal leaders there.

By the late 19th Century, Kurdish tribes in northwestern Iran enjoyed broad autonomy from the

Qajar state, which used to send provincial and district governors from Tehran. These governors,

however, had little power beyond exploiting tribal rivalries for their own benefit. The tenuous link

between the region and the central state was destroyed during World War I.125 The war further

empowered the tribes vis-à-vis the Iranian state, because the Russians, Ottomans, and even the British,

attempted to use the Kurdish tribes for their own purposes, leading to a great influx of arms.126 During

this time, a young entrepreneurial scion of the Kurdish Shakak tribal confederation, Ismail Aqa Simitqu

or Simko, established himself as a successful raider as well as a useful client for the warring parties,

thereby ensuring his tribe’s autonomy and a steady stream of income. As a result, he was able to gain

the allegiance of an increasing number of tribes, and had a formidable force at his disposal by the end of

the war.127

Even though faced with occasional attempts by the government in Tehran to subdue him, by

1922 his force of fighters had grown from 1500 to over 10,000, and he managed to stablish suzerainty

29

over a large area that included non-Kurdish towns in the region.128 As new military commander, Reza

Khan made some limited forays into the region to subdue the Kurds, but his forces were defeated and

he was still unwilling to commit more troops due to an ongoing military campaign battling autonomy-

seeking rebels in northern Gilan province.129 By the summer of 1922 the rebels in Gilan had been

defeated, allowing Reza to mobilize a larger and better organized military force to face Simko’s tribal

coalition. In a well-executed campaign the army repeatedly defeated Simko in a series of battles, which

led to the desertion of many of his tribal allies and his forced withdrawal into Turkey. Simko, who

unsuccessfully attempted to mobilize support in the Kurdish areas of Turkey and the new Iraq, returned

to Iran after being pardoned by Reza, and then promptly organized another rebellion against the

government. He was forced to flee again, and subsequently pardoned and invited to return as well.

When he did return again in 1929, however, the government organized an ambush and killed him.130

With the removal of Simko, Reza pursued his modernization scheme by enforcing the

abandonment of the tribal way of life, including traditional Kurdish dress. In response, in late 1928, a

religious leader called on the tribes to resist this encroachment and 15,000 tribal fighters mobilized and

besieged and defeated the local garrison force at Mahabad. The military governor in Tabriz, aware of the

tenuous position of the army in the province and beyond, initially responded in a conciliatory manner in

order to buy some time. The fighting continued until the summer of 1929, at which point tribal forces

were no longer able to sustain their forces, and the movement disintegrated. This marked the end of

Kurdish tribal resistance to the government during Reza Shah’s reign.131 In addition to moving to quash

tribal customs, Reza enforced the use of Persian at the local level and forbade the publishing of books

and newspapers in Kurdish regional language. 132 Reza’s drive to eradicate a separate Kurdish identity

found expression in the provincial reorganization of 1937, when the administration ensured that the

Kurdish population constituted a minority across three different provinces in northwestern Iran.133

Resistance to the central state again emerged after 1941, but this time it was not based on a desire for

30

tribal autonomy, but it was a modern Kurdish nationalist movement largely driven and led by the non-

tribal Kurdish population in the cities.134

Reza Shah proceeded in a similar manner against recalcitrant tribal leaders in all other regions of

Iran, whether Persian-speaking or from ethnic minorities, often enticing them to come to the center and

then soon after imprisoning and sometimes killing them. He also did not tolerate peripheral challenges

from non-tribal actors, including the Soviet-supported rebel Mirza Kuchek Khan and his Caucasian

Communist allies in Gilan province,135 as well as the modernist gendarmerie colonel Muhammad Taqi

Khan Pasyan. The latter revolted in Mashhad in the summer of 1921 in response to the corruption and

venality of the civilian administration governing the remote north-eastern Khorasan province. Reza

managed to crush Pasyan’s rebellion with the help of local tribal allies, but then turned on them later.136

Reza Shah also did not spare his own home region, the northern province of Mazanderan adjacent to

the Caspian Sea, where his Turkish-speaking ancestors had emigrated to escape the encroaching

Russians in the 19th Century.137 Unlike his Musahiban counterparts in Afghanistan, Reza was not even

inclined to give local elites here a measure of autonomy, but he sidelined a number of high profile

landowners, expropriated their property and amassed huge tracts of land of land for the state, and

thereby also for himself.138

In Afghanistan, the patrimonial absolutist Musahiban brothers were content to grant autonomy

to those provincial elites that it considered allies, whilst seeking to oust other elites it considered rivals.

Here I describe two crucial examples of how they dealt with uprisings in the Southern province and the

Kohistan region north of Kabul province shortly after coming to power. In Kabul province, the regime

ruthlessly suppressed resistance to its rule, whereas in the tribal areas in the south and east of the

country, the regime resorted to negotiations and compromise. The Southern province comprised what is

generally called “Greater Paktya” or paktyawal, and includes today’s Paktya, Khost, and northern

Paktika provinces. The major Pashtun tribes here included the Jaji, the Mangal, the Jadran, Khostwal, as

31

well as Mehsud and Wazir tribes that span both sides of the border with today’s Pakistan. In addition,

some Ghilzai tribes were located at the Western edges of the province, and other nomadic Ghilzai tribes,

particularly the Sulaiman Khel and Ahmadzai tribes, regularly traversed through the province on their

way to and from their winter quarters in British Indian territory.139 Throughout his political and military

career, Nadir had always been closely associated with the tribes of the Southern province, and his

approach to disturbances in this region remained remarkably consistent from his first major operation

as an army general in 1913 until his assassination in 1933. He mobilized available military forces while at

the same time engaging the offending tribe’s major local rivals. Violent confrontation, however, was

generally avoided beforehand by both sides, and peace generally restored by pledges from the tribe to

recognize the authority of the Afghan state in return for government promises to respect the autonomy

of the local tribe.

Nadir had built his initial reputation by quelling a rebellion of Mangal Pashtuns in the Southern

province in 1913, during which he managed to avoid major violent confrontations and quell the uprising

through the distribution of gifts, the removal of a heavy-handed governor, and the promise to address

their grievances.140 His reputation with the Southern tribes was enhanced during the 3rd Anglo-Afghan

war of 1919, in which his southern frontline was the only one to record some success against British

fortifications along the frontline, managing to occupy the town of Thal in the settled areas of British

India. Eventually, the British Indian troops managed to push Nadir’s forces back into Afghan territory,

but his ability to create unrest in their tribal region had impressed the British government enough to

agree to peace-talks with the Afghan government, leading to Afghanistan’s full independence in external

affairs.141 After this conflict, Nadir was again appointed commander in chief by Amanullah, and

subsequently held the position of minister of war through which he was also directly responsible for

frontier and tribal affairs. But in 1924 he was shipped off as ambassador to France, due to his

disagreement with Amanullah’s confrontational and ultimately successful approach in dealing with yet

32

another uprising in the Southern province, this time in response to a new military conscription

initiative.142

When Nadir returned to Afghanistan in March 1929 to wrest the throne away from Habibullah

Kalakani, he immediately made his way to the Southern Province, a clear sign that he expected a

considerable degree of loyalty from the tribes on account of his past interactions with them. Nadir

managed to put together a coalition of Pashtun tribes, including Jaji, Jadran, and Mangal, numbering at

least 6000.143 Nevertheless, he was not able to overcome Kalakani’s forces until September 1929, when

mobilized Wazir tribesmen from British Indian territory provided enough manpower and momentum to

move on Kabul successfully.144 Once he came to power, Nadir clearly viewed this tribal coalition as the

foundation of his rule, and used it to help quell resistance to the regime in other parts of the country in

the early 1930s. In the course of his speech to the first session of the newly established national

assembly in 1931, Nadir Shah referred to the Southern tribes by name to reemphasize his debt to

them.145 While the government regularly announced an imminent enforcement of both military

conscription and disarmament in the Southern province, the regime explicitly forbade its military

governor there from initiating military operations against, or seeking to collect weapons from,

recalcitrant tribes.146

Serious threats to Kabul emanating from particular tribes in the Southern province were met

with an initial and brief military response, usually by drumming up the support of rival tribes, and quickly

moving to a negotiated settlement, underscored by promises of tribal leaders to submit to government

rule, which they invariably did not keep. The most serious disturbance in the Southern province

occurred in the fall of 1932, when Nadir’s fierce rival Ghulam Nabi Khan Charkhi sought to instigate a

rebellion amongst a section of the Jadran tribe, the Dare Khel, with the ultimate aim of bringing down

the Musahiban regime. The plot was uncovered, Charkhi and a few others were quickly, and extra-

judicially, executed, and most of his associates as well as the entire Charkhi family residing in Kabul were

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imprisoned. The regime also mobilized a coalition of local rivals against the rebellious Dare Khel Jadran,

who subsequently submitted to the government and laid down their arms. In striking contrast to its

campaigns in the north, but in keeping with Nadir’s pattern in the Southern province going back to 1913,

the government refrained from brutally subjugating the offending tribe and pushed for a peaceful

settlement.147 In 1933 another uprising among the Dare Khel Jadran Pashtuns occurred and in response,

the Afghan government again attempted to persuade them to peacefully submit to the government.

With the help of major tribal rivals of the Jadran as well as a propaganda campaign directed at them, the

uprising subsided much as the previous ones had. The language the regime used during this episode is

telling in general of its lenient attitude towards the tribes of the Southern province. In a speech, the

Afghan king described the Dare Khel Jadran as his “woeful and ignorant children”, rather than criminals

or enemies of the state.148 His brother called on the Dare Khel to repent much like a wayward and

ignorant child.149 The Afghan government’s response to subsequent uprisings by the Jadran, including

one in 1944, followed the same pattern of counter-mobilization of rival tribes and then negotiation and

conciliation.150 In summary, the historical record shows that the regime sought to strategically manage

the tribes in the Southern province, gave them considerable autonomy, exemption from taxes and

military service, and special access to the royal court.151 In some publications, the government even

officially admitted to the independent status of the Southern tribes.152

In stark contrast to the Southern province, the Musahiban government viewed local elites in

the central Kabul province as their rivals that needed to be suppressed, whether they were Pashtuns or

not. In the mountainous terrain to the immediate north of Kabul, also referred to as the Kohistan, the

predominantly Sunni and Persian-speaking Tajik population had formed the bedrock of support for

Habibullah Kalakani’s brief rule in 1929.153 Obviously the new regime harbored grave concerns about the

region’s elites, given the fact that Amanullah’s reign had been toppled by Kalakani. However, the

brutality of the regime’s response to local uprisings far exceeded understandable efforts to safeguard its

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own existence, and stands in stark contrast to the way it interacted with rebellious tribes in the

Southern province. In the wake of Nadir’s conquest of Kabul in October 1929, he had Kalakani and his

immediate circle of advisers executed, but could not yet defeat the remnant of Kalakani’s forces, which

retreated into the mountains. In two early uprisings in November 1929 and April 1930, government

forces captured and imprisoned large numbers of combatants, and in the latter event even had eight

leaders blown from guns in Kabul.154

The most serious threat from the region emerged in July 1930, when the local population rose

up and killed the district governor, who had apparently not only vigorously pursued disarmament of

locals but also engaged in extortion and appropriation of local property. Several thousand Kohistanis

mobilized thereafter and marched south toward Kabul, defeating an unprepared regular government

force dispatched from Kabul and killing its commander. In response, the Kabul government sent out

urgent pleas to its tribal allies in the Southern province, calling on them to defend the capital and the

regime it had only just brought to power the year before. Given the fact that the government had little

financial resources, it was clear that these irregular levies would be rewarded through loot. Thousands

of tribesmen responded and started pouring into Kabul, and the government was hard-pressed to

organize transport north to the Kohistan region quickly enough before the impatient irregulars had time

to raze the lucrative Kabul bazaars. All together over 16,000 Mangal, Jaji, as well as trans-border Wazir

tribesmen, in conjunction with about 4000 regular army troops, responded to the call to defeat the

Kohistani forces, which were estimated to have been around 2000.155

This punitive campaign into the Kohistan region was characterized by great brutality and

destruction, which was clearly sanctioned by the central government. The government bombed a

number of offending villages with their fledgling air force, and the army burned down a good number of

other towns, including large parts of Charikar, on their march through the region. According to British

reports the government was offering Jaji and Mangal tribesmen 100 Afghan rupees for each Kohistani

35

head they brought back. These tribesmen made good on their opportunity to collect booty, returning

with raided cattle, other movable property, and a considerable number of Kohistani women.156 In

addition, the government took hundreds of prisoners, which included a large number of young boys as

permanent hostages in Kabul. In early August 21 ringleaders of the rebellion, many of them former

generals in Kalakani’s army, were either blown from guns or executed by hanging, with their dead

bodies left in the streets to serve as a warning to potential sympathizers.157 Apparently, executions

continued on till the end of the month, with some estimates at a total of 700 by the end of the affair.158

According to the Afghan historian Ghubar, who was in Kabul when these events were taking place, the

government also condemned thousands of Kohistanis to hard labor building roads, and gave some of

their best land away to Pashtun tribal leaders from the Southern province.159

The regimes initial strategies of consolidating their respective rules crystallized into distinctive

institutional relationships between center and periphery. In Iran, the government made a concerted

effort to centralize authority in the provinces by sending officials from the capital and setting up an

extensive bureaucratic presence, whereas in Afghanistan the regime was content to let some peripheral

regions and localities manage their own affairs, with a minimum of oversight. In her work on state

development in West Africa, Catherine Boone discusses the concentration or de-concentration of the

central bureaucracy, which is the extent to which the central state expands its bureaucratic presence

into the periphery. This is distinct from the relative centralization of state power, which refers to in how

far this bureaucracy is controlled from the center or the regions.160 The key difference between Iranian

and Afghan rulers would therefore hinge on the concentration or de-concentration of the bureaucratic

presence of the state. In both countries this can be readily observed by the delineation of internal

administrative boundaries, particularly at the sub-provincial level.

Reza engaged in far-reaching alteration of the internal administrative divisions of Iran during his

two decades in power. These boundaries had remained relatively unchanged under the Qajar monarchy

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before the 1906 revolution, when most political power in the hands of provincial governors largely

unaccountable to the center.161 After the revolution, constitutional reformers passed an act to legally

define Iran’s internal administrative structure for the first time, but the names, numbers, and

boundaries of both minor provinces and districts were not precisely delineated in the act, a task left to

the interior ministry to work out. As a result, provincial and sub-provincial boundaries continued to

change frequently. At times there were 4 major provinces and 12 minor ones, and at other times 8

major provinces and 8 minor ones. After some initial administrative reforms, Reza Shah implemented a

more radical change in 1937 through which he hoped to streamline provincial governance, create clear

hierarchical relationships between the various levels of government and avoid overlapping and ill-

defined jurisdictions of the various governors. He was also keen on eliminating provincial names that

evoked any ethno-linguistic or tribal identities and that did not fit into his grand narrative of an ancient

and homogenous Iran. As a result, the country was divided into 10 provinces each containing a clearly

defined number of major and minor districts as well as counties 162

The old Arabic- and Turkish-derived administrative nomenclature, was replaced by terms

deemed more authentically Persian, and an additional administrative layer was added just above the

village level, signifying the increasing reach of the central state into the periphery. The old ethno-

linguistic and tribal provincial names were eliminated, the new provinces or ostan were now simply

designated by a number between 1 and 10, and great care was taken to drastically alter the boundaries

of old provinces that had previously been dominated by one major ethno-linguistic or tribal group.163

Each official in charge of an administrative unit was regarded as a representative of the central state,

rather than a representative of the local people. Only at the very bottom, the village headman, or

kadkhuda, was officially recognized as the representative of the state as well as the local elite.164

Reza’s ruthlessly functional provincial boundaries and designations did not long survive his own

removal from power. Beginning in the 1950s, minor provinces, referred to as farmandari-ye kul, which

37

were directly responsible to the central government in Tehran, were carved out of the original ten major

provinces. By the 1960s, the number of provinces had increased to over 20, and most of the old

provincial names had been restored. However, Reza’s Persian sub-provincial boundary delimitations and

nomenclature remained, and they remained in a clearly defined hierarchical relationship with one

another, instead of reverting back to the ambiguous conditions of the Qajar era. In fact, sub-provincial

units continued to proliferate. In 1937, ten provinces, 49 shahristan, and 290 bakhsh were created. By

1971, there were 23 provinces, 14 major and 9 minor, 151 Shahristan, and 459 bakhsh. At the lowest

level, the number of dehistan increased from 371 to 1543.165

In contrast to Iran, the first generation Musahiban regime did not engage in any radical

alteration of the provincial and sub-provincial administration from the time of Amanullah Shah.166 The

number of provinces remained relatively constant until 1964, with the addition of only five minor

provinces, Badakhshan, Sheberghan, Gereshk/Helmand, Parwan, and Ghazni, bringing the total to 14

provinces. In 1964, the number of provinces was increased substantially to 28. However, this did not

signify a concomitant extension of the central state into local affairs. In 1934, the total number of

alaqadaris, the lowest administrative unit, was 165. In 1953, the year first-generation Musahiban rule

ended, it was 161, and in 1964, the year of provincial reorganization, it was only 139.167 By 1975, three

years before the Communist coup that set the stage for over three decades of internal warfare in

Afghanistan, the total number of ‘minor civil divisions’, that is administrative units below the provincial

level, 168 came to 325, compared to a total of 280 in 1934, indicating the fact that the Musahiban regime

had never been interested in penetrating society down to the local level.169 Furthermore, unlike Iran, the

lowest level units, the countries or alaqadaris, were not integrated into a fully rationalized

administrative hierarchy. Out of the 165 alaqadaris in 1934, only 66 were located in a three-tiered

hierarchy. Instead, many alaqadaris were directly administered through the provincial capital. In fact,

only in Kabul province were more than half of all administrative units incorporated in the full-fledged

38

three-tiered system of minor civil divisions.170 Table 3 below shows that disparity in the territorial reach

of the state, which was already significant in the 1930s, continued to increase even after Reza Shah was

ousted in 1941. The concentration of the Iranian bureaucratic presence even managed to keep up with

the rapidly increasing population, while in Afghanistan local minor civil divisions remained static, despite

the massive increase in the number of provinces.

Table 3: National-Level Comparison of Minor Civil Divisions in Afghanistan and Iran

Country / Year Population (in millions)171

Area (in square km)

Total Number of Minor Civil Divisions172

Population / MCD

Area / MCD

Afgh. 1934-35 ~10.9 652,626 280 ~39000 2331 Afgh. 1952-53 ~12 286 ~42000 2282 Afgh. 1964 ~13.2 273 ~48300 2391 Afgh. 1975 ~13.7 325 ~42100 2008

Iran 1937 ~ 16.2 1,648,000 778 ~21000 2118 Iran 1956 ~ 18.9 1689 ~11200 976 Iran 1971 ~ 25.8 2153 ~12000 765

Even Daoud Khan, Nadir Shah’s nephew, who took over power in 1953 as prime minister, and

held more modernist beliefs than his predecessors, did not dramatically change the relationship

between center and periphery. The support basis of the Afghan regime under Daoud did not allow for

the same kind of radical change that might have been possible in 1929. During Daud’s ten year tenure as

prime minister, power remained a prerogative of the royal clan. Rather than broadening the base of the

Afghan state by creating increased avenues for popular participation, Daoud cultivated the support of

one faction of regime insiders vis-à-vis others. The main source of opposition to Daoud Khan’s position

originated from his cousin, the king. In 1963, Zahir Shah compelled Daoud to resign and assumed full

executive powers for the first time since his accession thirty years earlier. Zahir Shah did institute some

reforms to loosen the authoritarian structure of the Afghan state, including the constitution of 1964 and

the reorganization of Afghanistan’s provinces. Nevertheless, he did not alter the traditionalist structure

of Afghan governance. Although the king endowed the Afghan parliament with more powers, and

barred members of the royal family from serving in the cabinet, major political decisions still remained

39

the prerogative of the king and his inner circle. Furthermore, parliamentary members were not elected

on the basis of free and fair elections, but simply represented the choice of rural elites who wished to

preserve their autonomous power vis-à-vis the central government.173

By contrast, in Iran the Anglo-Soviet invasion of 1941 did provide a clean break with the past,

just as Reza Shah’s coup had in 1921. However, by this time Reza Shah’s regime had already wrought

radical change on Iranian society, particularly by eliminating the threat of traditional tribal elements to

the central state and by instituting far-reaching administrative reforms, which precluded a radical shift

back to the past. After 1941, tribal uprisings Iran did not threaten the Iranian central government as

they had in the past, and they were put down fairly quickly.174 In Iranian Kurdistan, Kurdish mobilization

against the state no longer took on a tribal form, as it had during Simko’s rebellion in the early 1920s,

but was characterized by modern ethnic-secessionist rhetoric against the dominant nationalist Persian

narrative of the Pahlavi state.175 The greatest threat to the Iranian regime no longer emanated from the

periphery, but from mass movements in the cities with strong leftist and later on Islamic revolutionary

overtones.176 Thus Reza’s intrusive administrative reforms that had increased the presence of the state

in the periphery had been accepted by most Iranian elites as normative.

7. Conclusion: State Development and Regime Change

As noted above, reactive sequences can describe particular institutional pathways that follow

directly from critical junctures, they can collide with other processes characterized by positive feedback

loops to create different outcomes, or they can themselves be reactions to these more stable feedback

mechanisms.177 In this comparative case study, it is a mix of the latter two. The relatively stable

reproduction of institutional pathways in both countries collided with the reactive sequence, anti-

regime mobilization, which itself was a creation of the Cold War context of both countries, the support

for domestic leftist organizations by the Soviet Union, as well as the non-democratic nature of both

40

regimes. While in both cases revolutionary movements were able to topple the regimes, the

institutional context shaped the extent to which they could put their revolutionary goals into practice

and stay in power.

When the Islamic Revolution finally toppled the Pahlavi regime in 1979, revolutionary leaders

did not have to greatly concern themselves with consolidating their hold on power outside of Tehran.

Khomeini had successfully built a coalition of Islamists, bazaar merchants, leftists, and democrats that

gave him broad popular in Iran’s major cities, most importantly Tehran. However, Khomeini could also

rely on pre-existing administrative structures that dominated the periphery. After eliminating the top

bureaucracy layer that had been closely identified with the Shah, he simply co-opted, and subsequently

expanded, these pre-existing state structures, almost tripling the size of the Iranian bureaucracy from

1979 to 1982.178

On the other hand, when Afghan communists took control of the government in 1978 following

a military coup, they could not rely on a similarly expansive administrative structure to carry out their

ambitious project of socio-economic modernization. When the government still attempted to

implement rapid and sweeping change despite this handicap, a decentralized resistance movement

quickly sprung up in rural areas of various Afghan provinces, particularly those areas that had never

been fully incorporated into the state apparatus.179 After the Soviet invasion in late 1979, the regime

was completely delegitimized in the eyes of the population and the resistance wrested control of almost

the entire countryside from the Afghan government. The anti-government insurgency came to be

increasingly co-opted and coordinated by Islamist opposition parties headquartered in neighboring

Pakistan, which set the stage for more than thirty years of unrest and violence.180

What are some conclusions that can be drawn for comparative political research elsewhere?

First of all, the path-dependent process examined here in the case of Iran and Afghanistan would in its

basic contours be true in particular for the other major post-imperial buffer states Thailand, Ethiopia,

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and Saudi Arabia. First of all, they were shaped by a similar set of antecedent conditions. Up until the

late 19th Century, rulers had control of their respective capitals and the immediate vicinity, but generally

relied on indirect tributary relationships or tribal alliances to govern areas they could not access on a

regular basis. Furthermore, they faced modern imperialist powers encroaching on their territory, a

nascent intelligentsia influenced by Western political thought, as well as newly independent and

modernizing post-colonial neighbors. Secondly, in most of these traditional polities, new rulers came to

power at a critical juncture after a period of uncertainty where a range of ideological alternative existed.

Thirdly, after a long period of institutional stability, all of them faced popular mobilizations as reactive

sequences that threatened their regime. Only in Thailand and Saudi Arabia did these not result in an end

of the monarchy, which may have well been a consequence of an early turn to constitutional

governance in the 1932 revolution in Thailand, as well as the complete absence of relations with the

Soviet Union in Saudi Arabia during the entire Cold War time period.

In addition to these, the path-dependent analysis also emphasizes the importance of the

interaction between agency and structure in the context of developing the state. The example of state-

building in Afghanistan illustrates that while larger structural conditions are not irrelevant, particular

choices at particular moments in time do make a major difference. One might take the choice of Hamid

Karzai as interim leader since 2001. His government seems to have followed a broadly traditionalist

path, one I would describe as patrimonial constitutionalist. The Afghan constitution provides for a broad

set of rights for its citizens, and from the beginning the president was formally limited by a raucous bi-

cameral parliament as well as a high court.181 The president himself was characterized as the “mayor of

Kabul”, powerless to make an impact on the environs beyond the capital city.182 This assessment may

have underestimated Karzai’s influence in the country, however. Karzai managed to deploy family and

clan-based relationships in order to augment his power in the Afghan periphery.183 Nevertheless, he did

not appear to be as interested in rationalizing state institutions and establishing the writ of formal state

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institutions in the periphery as his international partners.184 Notwithstanding the immense structural

constraints he faced during his reign, it makes one wonder whether a choice of a bureaucratic

constitutionalist leader might not have led to more stable institutions, while still preserving the

democratic character of the state.

1 Bunch (1999) Subversive Institutions p.11-15. Bunch, however, defines the state primarily in reference to external territorial sovereignty, not internal bureaucratic strength. 2 Abrahamian (2008) A History of Modern Iran p.169. 3 Mann (1984 p.188-190)”The Autonomous Power of the State”; Mann defines despotic power mainly as the range of actions elites engage in that are non-routine and not institutionalized, that is based on the whim of the ruler. 4 Soifer (2008) “State Infrastructural Power: Approaches to Conceptualization and Measurement.” 5 Skocpol (1979) States and Social Revolutions, Tilly (1990) Coercion, Capital, and European States, Slater (2010) Ordering Power, and much of the realist literature in international relations take this approach. 6 Migdal (2001) State in Society, Scott (1998) Seeing Like a State, and some of the constructivist literature on nationalism, e.g. Anderson (1983) Imagined Communities, Brubaker (1996) Nationalism Reframed. 7 See Herbst (2000) States and Power in Africa, Ziblatt (2006) Structuring the State and Soifer (2009) The Sources of Infrastructural Power. 8 See for instance Charles Tilly’s (1990) Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990. 9 See for instance Hendrik Spruyt’s (1994) The Sovereign State and its Competitors. 10 See for instance Margaret Levi’s (1980) “A Predatory Theory of Rule”. 11 See for instance Joel Migdal’s (2001) State in Society, Peter Evans’ (1995) Embedded Autonomy 12 see Tilly (1985) “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime”; p.182-186: States emerging out of decolonization or through reallocation of territory did not have to develop their military through negotiation with and coercion of various internal and external elements, but acquired a military apparatus as a colonial heritage or through massive foreign aid. Tilly thus presents us with a dichotomous categorization: states with a healthy balance between military and police capabilities and public accountability, and those with a vastly more powerful security apparatus leading to chronic instability. 13 See for instance Mamdani’s (1996) Citizen and Subject, where he discusses the colonial origin of urban direct and rural indirect rule in Africa; post-colonial state stability in Anderson’s cases (1987 “The State in the Middle East and North Africa”) is largely dependent on colonial-era institution-building; according to Mahoney (2010 Colonial and Postcolonial Development: Spanish America in Comparative Perspective; p.20-34), the interaction of imperial institutional composition, pre-colonial structures of the indigenous population, and the concrete colonial experience help explain post-colonial levels of socio-economic development. 14 For instance political economy approaches focusing on the rentier state (Beblawi and Luciani (1987) The Rentier State) or Gerschenkronian development theory (Waldner (1999) State Building and Late Development). 15 See Jeffrey Herbst (2000) States and Power in Africa and Ghassan Salame (1990) “Strong and Weak States: a Qualified Return to the Muqaddimah.”

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16 For Ole Holsti (1996 the State, War, and the State of War), those non-Western states that are generally characterized by authoritarian rule and heterogeneous populations are subject to the “state-strength dilemma”: states need to extract resources to build up their coercive apparatus, but generally do so only from rival social groups who in turn are tempted to rebel, thus increasing the likelihood of internal conflict. 17 In essence, I am working towards what George and Bennett (Case Studies and Theory Development, p.235-239 2004) would refer to as a typology of state formation: a categorization of cases on the basis of different configurations of a set of variables. 18 See Mathisen (1971) The functions of small states in the strategies of great powers; Partem (1983) “The Buffer System in International Relations.” 19 Fazal (2007) p.117. 20 Herbst (2000) States and Power in Africa p.145-159. 21 Parsa (1989 Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution p.32-38) develops the most explicitly marxist-structuralist interpretation of early 20th-century Iran, in which he highlights how the Iranian upper classes moved to seek greater state centralization in response to threatening leftist movements (p.33). However, from his account, it is clear that the Iranian working class developed as a result of Reza Shah’s state-led industrialization, rather than inspiring it in the first place (p.34,35). Hanifi (2001 “Inter-regional trade and colonial state formation” p.290-292) argues that importation of small-scale factories into Afghanistan from British India in the late 19th Century helped develop a nascent working class and thus transformed state-society relations. However, 4000 to 5000 factory workers in and around Kabul hardly constitute a transformative working class. 22 In Iran, industrialization and oil production was too limited early on to have created much of a working class; see Ferrier (1991) p.692. Even by 1978, rural peasants in Afghanistan reacted violently to land reforms by the Communist government meant to emancipate them; see Grevemeyer 1987 Afghanistan: sozialer Wandel und Staat im 20. Jahrhundert p.120-127. 23 On Afghanistan: Roberts (2003 The Origins of Conflict in Afghanistan p.xi-xvii) provides a good overview of the literature on the presumed Afghan national character to support his own primordial assumptions. Goodson (2001) argues that local tribal identification and ethnic heterogeneity are two key factors responsible for Afghanistan’s historically weak state (p.12-22). Haag (2012 Die Pashtunen und ihre Bedeutung für regionale und internationale Konflikte p.42-45) makes the argument that the unique Pashtun tribal system, the largest one in the world at 40 million, has defeated every attempt at state-building in the region. In addition to suffering from an inherent primordialism, this fairly common argument fails to take a comparative angle. On Iran: Ghani (1998) Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah p.1; Afkhami (1988, p.41) summarizes this primordial conception of Iranian national identity in the following way: “Iran regained its national consciousness in the latter part of the nineteenth century, in a world dominated by colonialism.” See also Towfighi (2009) From Ancient Persia to Islamic Iran.century. 24 Magnus and Naby (2000) Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx, and Mujahid p.31. 25 Hanifi (2012) “Shah Shuja’s Hidden History”, paragraphs 39-43. 26 Alesina et al.’s (2003 p.184,186) somewhat primordialist fractionalization index assigns Iran and Afghanistan almost identical measures of ethno-linguistic diversity. Similarly, according to Banuazizi and Weiner (1986 p.78,178), Persians and Pashtuns only represent a plurality, not a majority, in their respective countries. 27 Abrahamian estimates that around 25-30% of the Iranian population was organized tribally in 1900 (Abrahamian 2008 p.6,18). According to Beck, 30-50% of the population could have been characterized as tribal in 1800 (Beck 1986 The Qashqai p.199,203). 28 Tapper (1983) “Introduction” p.67. 29 Statistical Office United Nations (1953) Statistical Yearbook. 30 For Afghanistan: According to the Afghan Ministry of Planning (1962) no paved roads existed in Afghanistan until after 1956. About 3700km of all-weather roads, presumably graveled, had been constructed by 1953. Most of the secondary roads were not all-seasonal. British military sources do list over 100 miles of ‘metaled’ roads as early as 1927, but these were gravel roads built by King Amanullah to his summer getaway at Paghman as well as the electric power plant at Jabal-us-siraj just outside of Kabul. They were generally unfit for travel during the winter months or after rain. For Iran: According to British intelligence reports (1918) Iran did not possess any all-weather roads by the end of World War I. Abrahamian (2008) p.6 states that the country had 325km in paved roads in 1906. This probably refers to the road link between Russian territory and the northern city of Tabriz, in addition to Tehran city streets. According to Clawson (1993 “Knitting Iran together: the land-transport revolution” p.246), British government officials reckoned that about 23,000km of road were constructed during the Reza Khan period,

44

but only about 5000km of that ‘roughly’ metalled – in other words, gravel roads. According to Clawson’s own calculations, about 15000-17000 km of all-weather roads (again, gravel) were constructed. According to Schayegh (2009 Who is knowledgeable is strong p.96), 24,000km of ‘metaled’ roads had been constructed by 1938. 31 Abrahamian (2008) p.6: data for 1906; British intelligence files, late 1930s. 32 For Afghanistan in 1929, see Vartan Gregorian (The Making of Modern Afghanistan 1969) p.242. The Afghan ministry of education (1966) and Maxwell Fry (The Afghan Economy 1974 p.14,15) list only 1350 primary and secondary students in 1932. The drastic decline in numbers could reflect the rather tenuous state of the new government following the fall of Amanullah and the reign of Habibullah Kalakani. It could also reflect the desire on the part of the new dynasty to exaggerate the regime’s own accomplishments. For Iran, see Menashri (1992) Education and the Making of Modern Iran p.110); Matthee (1993 “Transforming Dangerous Nomads into Useful Artisans, Technicians, Agriculturists: Education in the Reza Shah Period” p.140,141). Abrahamian (2008 A History of Modern Iran p.84) says that there were 12,000 primary and secondary students in 1924, and 221,000 in 1941. 33 For Afghanistan: Afghanistan Ministry of Education (1966); For Iran: David Menashri (1992) Education and the Making of Modern Iran p.151 and Abrahamian (1982) Iran Between Two Revolutions p.145. Menashri estimates that there were about 2000 university students, while Abrahamian estimates the figure at about 3300 in 1941. 34For example: Perry Anderson (1973) Lineages of the Absolutist State; Levi (1989) Of Rule and Revenue; Tilly (1990) Coercion, Capital, and European States; Spruyt (1994) The Sovereign State and Its Competitors; Ertman (1997) Birth of the Leviathan; Bunce (1999) Subversive Institutions. 35 For instance Lisa Anderson (1986) “The State in the Middle East and North Africa”; Mamdani (1996) Citizen and Subject. 36 Beblawi and Luciani (1987) The Rentier State; Karl (1997) The Paradox of Plenty. 37 Linz and Stepan (1996) Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation p.23,24; Marx (2003) Faith in Nation p.7; Easterly et al (2006) “Artificial States”. 38 In Catherine Boone’s account of West Africa (Topographies of the African State 2003 p.33), profit-seeking West African leaders only built up a state presence in those areas that could be economically exploited, while ignoring less attractive regions. On the other hand, Hillel Soifer (2008 “The Institutional Origins of State Infrastructural Power” p.29-31 ) and Dan Slater (2010 Ordering Power p.33-44) argue that state builders are primarily power-seeking. According to Slater, strong southeast Asian states only developed in response to a combination of leftist and secessionist threats. Soifer on the other hand says that Latin American leaders sought to avoid state-buiding in areas threated by indigenous rebellions. 39 Becker and Goldstone (2005) “How fast can you build a state?” p.192. 40 Weber (2006) Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft p.226; ‘leveling’ as a translation of Weber’s term Nivellierung. 41 Weber himself never fully incorporated participatory government into his broader scheme – he barely experienced Germany’s first experiment with democracy before passing away in 1919. 42 See Ertman (1997) p.34. 43 Bennett and Elman (2006) “Complex Causal Relations” p.256 44 Mahoney (2000) “Path Dependence in Historical Sociology” p.513-515. 45 These factors are included in the following exemplary study of Central American politics: Mahoney (2001) “Path-Dependent Explanations of Regime Change: Central America in Comparative Perspective.” 46 Bennett and Elman (2006) “Complex Causal Relations” p.256 47 Mahoney (2000) “Path Dependence in Historical Sociology” p.516-525. The other two are utility, a mechanism resulting from rational cost-benefit analysis by individuals, and functionality. 48 Pierson (2000) “Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes” p.76. Mahoney (2000) “Path Dependence in Historical Sociology” p.511,526. 49 Pierson (2000) “Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes” p.87. 50 As interpreted in Mahoney (2000) “Path Dependence in Historical Sociology” p.533-535. 51 Mahoney (2001) “Path-Dependent Explanations of Regime Change: Central America in Comparative Perspective” p.122. 52 Mahoney (2001) “Path Dependent Explanations of Regime Change” p.116. 53Many thanks to Khalid Nadiri for emphasizing this point. 54 Banani (1961) The Modernization of Iran p.28. 55 Abrahamian (1982) Iran Between Two Revolutions p.58-69.

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56 See the following authors on this nascent constitutionalist movement: Nawid (1997) “The State, the Clergy, and British Imperial Policy in Afghanistan during the 19th and early 20th Centuries” p.598; Farhang (1992) Afghanistan Dar Panj Qarn-i Akhir p.453; Tarzi (2012) “Islam and Constitutionalism in Afghanistan” p.207,208; Gregorian (1969) The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan p.212; Arjomand (2004,2005) “Constitutional Developments in Afghanistan” p.945; Farhang (1992) Afghanistan Dar Panj Qarn-i Akhir p.457. 57 Abrahamian (1982) Iran Between Two Revolutions p.11-14. 58 Brasher (2014) State Development and Infrastructural Power. 59 See Boroujerdi’s chapter (2003 “The Ambivalent Modernity of Iranian Intellectuals”) on this hesitancy and conflict within Iran’s political elite. 60 Abrahamian (1982) Iran Between Two Revolutions p.41,48. 61 Abrahamian (1982) Iran Between Two Revolutions p.41,48. 62 Martin (2003) “Mudarris, Republicanism and the Rise to Power of Riza Khan” p.73,74; Katouzian (2000) State and Society in Iran p.299,311-312. 63 Musaddiq (1988) Musaddiq’s Memoirs p.101-103, 108-109, 111, 130-131. 64 Musaddiq (1988) Musaddiq’s Memoirs p.211, 214-227. 65 The most famous bureaucratic constitutionalist was probably Sayyed Hasan Taqizadeh, whose political career has been analyzed by Katouzian (2012 “Seyyed Hasan Taqizadeh”) among others. He was a key figure during the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 as a young man, and remained involved in politics during Reza Shah’s reign as well as after the joint British-Soviet invasion of 1941. 66 Ghahari (2001) Nationalismus und Modernismus in der Periode zwischen dem Zerfall der Qagaren-Dynastie und der Machtfestigung Reza Schahs p.45-49; Ghahari refers to their worldview as “Nationalmodernismus“, or national-modernism. 67 Cronin (1997) The Army and the Creation of the Pahlavi State p.108-114. 68 Persian for “special companions” of the Amir. I refer to the family as Musahiban from here on. 69 IOR/L/MIL/17/14/15/2 “Final Report on Afghanistan” Malik Talib Mehdi Khan, British Agent at Kabul, 1910-1913, p.20,24-25. 70 See an early reference to Nadir Khan as an able general in the army in the British agent’s report of 1910: IOR/L/MIL/17/14/15/1 “Final Report on Afghanistan” Fakir Saiyid Iftikharuddin, British Agent at Kabul, 1907-1910, p.23; the next report in 1913 refers to Nadir’s successful efforts at quelling a rebellion of Mangal Pashtuns through skillful negotiations, and argues that he already, now in his mid-30’s, virtually controlled the Afghan army: IOR/L/MIL/17/14/15/2 “Final Report on Afghanistan” Malik Talib Mehdi Khan, British Agent at Kabul, 1910-1913, p.14,25. 71 Gregorian (1969) The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan p.163; he wrote under the pen name “Tarzi”, or stylist. 72 Gregorian (1967) “Mahmud Tarzi and Saraj-ol-Akhbar” p.346,347. 73 Shahrani (2005) “King Aman-Allah’s Failed Nation-Building Project” p.669. 74 See Articles 2 and 8 of the 1923 Constitution (in Yunas 2001 The Constitutions of Afghanistan, 1923-1990). He was forced to amend the constitution by the grand council he convened to ratify it, which insisted on the insertion of the reference to the Hanafi jurisprudence. 75 Adamec (1974) Afghanistan’s Foreign Affairs to the Mid-Twentieth Century p.137. 76 Pierson (2000) “Not just What But When” p.75; Bennett and Elman (2006) “Complex Causal Relations and Case Study Methods” p.256. There is some debate in the literature on whether choice at the critical juncture needs to be completely contingent, or whether there simply needs to be a separate explanation for it compared to the subsequent feedback mechanism. 77 This included many of his contemporaries, incuding Musaddiq himself (Azimi (1988) “The Political Career of Muhammad Musaddiq” p.51). Majd is the most vociferous proponent of this view among contemporary historians (Majd (2001) Great Britain and Reza Shah pp.61,71-73). 78 Abrahamian (1982) Iran Between Two Revolutions p.122; Amirahmadi (2012) The Political Economy of Iran under the Qajars p.229,230. 79 Ghani (2000) Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah p.144. 80 Ghani (2000) Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah p.32,33. 81 Bast (2013 “Duping the British and Outwitting the Russians?” p.273. 82 Ghani (2000) Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah p.258,259.

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83 Ghani (2000) Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah p.274-277. Millspaugh, however, also sought to create greater financial oversight over the ministry of war under Reza Khan, which the latter resented and resisted. 84 Ghani (2000) Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah p.127-128, 132-133, 188, 255. 85 Ghani (2000) Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah p.136, 219-221. 86 Ostensibly established as a body guard for the Qajar Shah in the late 19th Century but generally used to further Russian interests in northern Iran before the October Revolution. 87 There is some disagreement about who set the coup in motion. Ironside claimed he chose Reza, whereas the pro-British nationalist Sayyed Zia Tabatabai later said that he, in conjunction with two gendarmerie officers, decided to approach Reza with the idea of a coup. Edmond (2010 East and West of Zagros p.xiv, 309-317), an eye-witness of the events within the British military, also believes Zia to have been a primary mover. 88 Millman (1998) “The Problem with Generals: Military Observers and the Origins of the Intervention in Russia and Persia, 1917-18” p.298-301. 89 Ghani (2000) Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah p.127,128; Katouzian (2000) State and Society in Iran p.214,215 90 Ghani (2000) Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah p.144-146. 91 Katouzian (2000) State and Society in Iran p.230-238. 92 Ghani (2000) Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah p.154,158. 93 Katouzian (2000) State and Society in Iran p.231,232. 94 A security and police force initiated by constitutionalists before World War I and advised and organized by Swedish officers. 95 Katouzian (2000) State and Society in Iran p.243. 96 Martin (2003) “Mudarris, Republicanism, and the Rise to Power of Riza Khan” p.66-68. 97 Martin (2003) “Mudarris, Republicanism, and the Rise to Power of Riza Khan” p.68-75. 98 Mustawfi (1997) The Administrative and Social History of the Qajar Period p.1149-1152. Mustawfi here includes a letter written to Sheikh Khazal by Mudarris, encouraging him to act against Reza, and thereby regain his reputation in Tehran, which had been tarnished by his lack of regard for the central government and Iranian sovereignty. 99 Ghani (2000) Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah p.314. 100 Ghani (2000) Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah p.315-319. 101 Abrahamian (1982) Iran Between Two Revolutions p.131-135. 102 See for instance Cronin (1998) “Conscription and Popular Resistance in Iran, 1925-1941. 103 Cronin (2003) “Riza Shah and the Paradoxes of Military Modernization in Iran” p.50. 104 Ghubar (2001) Afghanistan dar Masir-e Tarikh pp.25,28,29: according to him, 4 generations of this family dating back to Sultan Muhammad, brother of Amir Dost Muhammad in the mid-19th Century, were all instruments of British imperialism. According to the available evidence, however, Yahya Khan, Sultan Muhammad’s son, was exiled from Afghanistan by the British for his hostile attitude. 105 The British acknowledged Amanullah’s popularity among Indian Muslims, particularly former Khilafatists (FO/402/13579, Government of India to India Office, 22 January 1929: “A remarkable outburst of feeling has occurred in favor of royal family, and against Habibullah”). 106 Humphrys, the target of most anti-British conspiracy theories and the British Minister in Kabul from 1922 to 1929, still reported to his superiors in 1926 that Amanullah was “one of the few really patriotic Afghans I have met, … the King is probably the only man in Afghanistan today who is able by his personality and influence to keep the country from disintegration. IOR/L/P&S/10/1051 Dispatch 104, Humphrys, October 21st, 1926. “Summary of the Course and Tendency of Afghan internal Events during the Period 16th January 1926 to 15th October 1926.” 107 FO 402/10 Chamberlain to Tyrell, 18 January 1929: The British Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, Chamberlain, refers to the situation in Afghanistan, after Amanullah’s overthrow by Kalakani while British officials decide whether and how to evacuate their mission, as ‘inauspicious’. 108 Fraser-Tytler (1950) Afghanistan: A Study of Political Developments in Central Asia p.220,221; Fayz Muhammad and McChesney (1999) Kabul under Siege p.273. Apparently, the British political officer in Parachinar, Kurram agency, gave Hashim Khan the choice of returning to Afghanistan by the shortest route, or be removed to Quetta, from where he would be moved to a foreign country. As a return to the Eastern province would have meant his capture by Kalakani’s forces, Hashim Khan refused to do so. One month later, his brother’s conquest of Kabul led to his release and return via Kandahar. See “Summary of Events in Afghanistan 1st July 1929 to 30th June 1930”. General Staff, Simla, Government of India Press. p.24.

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109 Fraser-Tytler (1950) Afghanistan: A Study of Political Developments in Central Asia p.200; see also Gregorian (1969) The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan p.269; Rubin (1995) The Fragmentation of Afghanistan p.57,58. 110 Shahrani (2005) “King Aman-Allah’s Failed Nation-Building Project” p.669,673. 111 Poullada (1973) Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan p.154-156. 112 Poullada (1973) Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan p.161-166. 113 Poullada (1973) Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan p.170-172. Fayz Muhammad and McChesney (1999) Kabul under Siege p.35,36. 114 According to Poullada (1973 Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan p.173,174) and Fayz Muhammad & McChesney (1999 Kabul under Siege p.33-35), Kalakani called the king while pretending to be a government official claiming to have captured the Tajik bandit. Amanullah, assuming he was talking with his envoy Ahmad Ali Khan, gave instructions to have Kalakani executed, which then resulted in Kalakani’s vow to oust Amanullah. 115 Ghubar (1980) Afghanistan Dar Masir-i Tarikh p.821,822; Farhang (1992) Afghanistan Dar Panj Qarn-i Akhir p.561-564; Fayz Muhammad & McChesney (1999) Kabul under Siege p.36-39. Fayz Muhammad here claims that Kalakani was encouraged by a number of traitors in Amanullah’s government, including Muhammad Wali Khan. Ghubar, on the other hand, absolves Muhammad Wali of any wrongdoing. 116 Historians do not quite agree on how the government handled Kalakani. Poullada states that Amanullah sent out a pursuit too hastily, and these troops were ambushed and handily defeated leaving Kabul wide open for Kalakani’s return. Poullada (1973) Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan p.174. Ghubar, on the other hand, argues Amanullah made a tactical error in not pursuing Kalakani’s forces to ensure they could not regroup and make another attempt on the capital. Ghubar (1980) Afghanistan Dar Masir-i Tarikh p.824. 117 Fayz Muhammad and McChesney (1999) Kabul under Siege p.39-44; Poullada (1973) Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan p.175-178; Ghubar (1980) Afghanistan Dar Masir-i Tarikh p.824,825. 118 Ghubar (1980) Afghanistan Dar Masir-i Tarikh p.831; Farhang (1992) Afghanistan Dar Masir-i Tarikh p.573,574; Fayz Muhammad and McChesney (1999) Kabul under Siege p.128,129; according to Farhang, a Red Army unit under Colonel Primakoff participated as well. 119 For an overview over Amanullah’s campaign from Kandahar see: Poullada (1973) Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan p.180-181, 184-186; Ghubar (1980) Afghanistan Dar Masir-i Tarikh 832-834; Farhang (1992) Afghanistan Dar Panj Qarn-i Akhir p.569-571; see also Fayz Muhammad and McChesney (1999 Kabul under Siege p.64-80) for a Kabuli perspective on the campaign; one of Amanullah’s advisors bitterly complained to the British military assistant to the royal Afghan party in India that it was Amanullah’s lack of courage, which had sunk a very promising campaign. (see FO 402/11 No.16 “Letter from Major E.T.R. Wickham, Officer on Special Duty, dated Quetta July 17, 1929.”) 120 Gregorian (1969 The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan p.290,293-294) believes that Nadir genuinely did not expect to become king after his return from France. 121 IOR/L/P&S/20/B305 “Precis on Afghan Affairs, Volume II, from the Middle of 1927 to the end of 1936.” Compiled by A.D.F. Dundas. p.52,53. 122 Poullada (1973) Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan p.190-195; Fayz Muhammad and McChesney (1999) Kabul under Siege p.87-113; for a partisan pro-Nadir view of his campaign, see Muhammad Ali (1933) Progressive Afghanistan p.103-166 123 Ideology roughly equates with Mahoney’s mechanism of legitimation (2000 “Path Dependence in Historical Sociology” p.521-525). As mentioned earlier, he also refers to power, in addition to utility and functionality. 124 I have described how Reza Shah and Nadir Shah dealt with peripheral challenges to their rule in more detail in my dissertation (Brasher 2014 “State Development and Political Ideology” p.231-324). 125 Vali (2011) Kurds and the State in Iran p.6-12. 126 Van Bruinessen (1983) “Kurdish Tribes and the State of Iran” p.270-275. 127 He seems to have allied himself with Ottoman forces against the Western-supported Assyrian Christian community of Urumiyah, and then plundered the town after the Christians fled. See Van Bruinessen (1983) “Kurdish Tribes and the State of Iran” p.282-286. 128 Van Bruinessen (1983) “Kurdish Tribes and the State of Iran” p.386-388. 129 Arfa (1964) Under Five Shahs p.114-126. General Hassan Arfa, who later served as ambassador under Muhammad Reza Shah, provides a firsthand account of the Kurdish campaigns, which he took part in himself. 130 Van Bruinessen (1983) “Kurdish Tribes and the State of Iran” p.388-390. 131 Cronin (2010) Soldiers, Shahs, and Subalterns in Iran p.184-185.

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132 Vali (2011) Kurds and the State in Iran p.18-20. 133 Vali (2011) Kurds and the State in Iran p.161. 134 Most English-language scholarship agrees on this: see Van Bruinessen (1983 “Kurdish Tribes and the State of Iran” p.390-392), Koohi-Kamali (2003 The Political Development of the Kurds in Iran p.83-87), and Vali (2011 Kurds and the State in Iran p.6-8). 135 See for instance Afary (1995) “The Contentious Historiography of the Gilan Republic in Iran” p.6. 136 Cronin (1997) The Army and the Creation of the Pahlavi State in Iran p.96-103; Katouzian (2000) State and Society in Iran p.275-276. 137 Wilber (1975) Reza Shah Pahlavi p.5,6. 138 This included Muhammad Vali Khan Khalatbari, one of the most powerful figures of the constitutional time period, who had protected parliamentary governance from the reactionary forces of the Qajar monarchy. In the end Muhammad Vali Khan committed suicide in response to losing his influence and positions. Rabino (1913) “A Journey in Mazanderan” p.441; Ghani (2000) Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah p.10; Niyazmand (2004) Reza Shah: Az tavallud ta saltanat p.682. 139 See Tapper (1983) The Conflict of State and Tribe in Iran and Afghanistan p.120; Ruttig and Trives (2009) “Loya Paktia’s Insurgency” p.63. 140 See both the official British report and that of the Afghan historian Ghubar: IOR/L/MIL/17/14/15/2 “Final Report on Afghanistan” Malik Talib Mehdi Khan, British Agent at Kabul, 1910-1913, p.14; Ghubar (1980) Afghanistan Dar Masir-i Tarikh p.711-713. 141 Based on the summary of events chronicled by the British diplomat Maconachie: IOR/L/P&S/20/B285 “A Precis on Afghan Affairs, From February 1919 to September 1927”, R.R. Maconachie, Foreign and Political Department, Government of India. 1928 p.14-17. 142See IOR/ L/MIL/17/14/16/3: “Summary of Events in Afghanistan :1st July 1923 to 30th June 1924”; Compiled by General Staff; Delhi Government Central Press 1924. According to Haroon (2007 Frontiers of Faith p.118) Amanullah also managed to mobilize militias from the Afridi, Mohmand, and Wazir tribes in British Indian territory. 143 See McChesney (1999) Kabul under Siege p.95,96; Muhammad Ali (1933) Progressive Afghanistan p.106-111 144 McChesney (1999) Kabul under Siege p.272,273 145 The speech has been digitized online by the Afghanistan Digital Library (http://hdl.handle.net/2333.1/tmpg4fs0). In several places, he described how sections of the Jaji, Mangal, and even Ahmadzai Ghilzai helped him in his struggle against Habibullah Kalakani. 146 According to the British legation in Kabul, the Afghan government forbade the military governor from military operations against the recalcitrant Dare Khel Jadran in May 1931: L/P&S/12/1637C: Summary of Events in Afghanistan 1st July 1930 to 30th June 1931; Compiled by General Staff; Government of India Press, Simla 1931. 147 IOR/L/P&S/20/B305 “A Precis on Afghan Affairs, Volume II: From the middle of 1927 to the end of 1936.” p.61-65. 148 In the original Persian: “Ay farzandan-i badbakht wa jahel-i man.” The speech was published in Islah on January 3rd, 1933. 149 In the same speech, Shah Mahmud emphasized the loyalty of the other Southern tribes to the Afghan government and their devotion to the Afghan king. Islah January 2nd, 1933. 150 Haroon (2007) Frontiers of Faith p.173. 151 Newell (1972) The Politics of Afghanistan p.77; Ghubar (2001) Afghanistan in the Course of History p.66,67. 152 Afghanistan Dar 50 Sal-i Akhir (1968) p.36. This publication commemorating the 50th anniversary of Afghanistan’s independence describes how Nadir Shah established nine provinces, four minor and five major ones, and one independent district (hokumat) of Urgun, a town located within the Southern province 153 This area includes today’s Parwan, Kapisa, and Panjsher provinces. 154 L/P&S/12/1637B: “Summary of Events in Afghanistan 1st July 1929 to 30th June 1930”; Compiled by General Staff; Government of India Press 1930. 155 The details of the Koh-i-Daman uprising are found in the following file in the India office records dedicated to the incident: IOR: R/12/34; File Nr.361; Part I. For a summary of events see the following document in the file: “Dispatch from his majesty’s minister, Kabul, to his majesty’s secretary of state for foreign affairs, No.53, dated the 16th, August 1930.” 156 On July 27th alone, over 100 head of cattle and a dozen women were brought into Kabul by Pashtun fighters heading back south: Precis of reports by Oriental Secretary dated 25-28.7.1930.

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157 Extract from reports by Oriental Secretary dated 2-4.8.1930. 158 Ghubar (2001) Afghanistan in the Course of History p.54,55. 159 Ghubar (2001) Afghanistan in the Course of History p.56,57 160 Boone (2003) Political Topographies of the African State p.33. 161 Mohammadi (2008) Judicial Reform and Reorganization in 20th Century Iran: State-Building, Modernization, and Islamicization p.33. 162 For the above discussion see Faridi-Majid et al (2009) Sarguzashte-Taqsimat-e-Keshvar-i-Iran (2009/2010) p.33,34. See also Kashani-Sabet (1999 Frontier Fictions p.111,112) and Amir Ahmadiyan (2004 Taqsimat-i Kishwari p.82). 163 Field (1939) Contributions to the Anthropology of Iran p.251; Faridi-Majid et al (2009) Sarguzashte-Taqsimat-e-Keshvar-i-Iran (2009/2010) p.35. 164 The administrative reorganization act of 1937 can be found in its entirety on the following website: http://www.dastour.ir/brows/?lid=%20%20%20%20%2024519. 165 Jahrudi (1975) Entwicklung und Zukunft des Ostan Gilan p.23. 166 Nursai (1963) Materialien und Wege für eine Reform der staatlichen Verwaltungsstruktur in Afghanistan p.24-25, 44-49. 167 See Afghanistan Dar 50 Sal-e Akhir (1968). 168 The Arabic-based Persian term Hokumat was renamed into the Pashto uluswali in the course of the 1940s. 169 See Provisional Gazetteer of Afghanistan (1975). 170 See Kabul Almanach (1934-1935) p.18-33. 171 Iran: The figure from 1937 is from the UN statistical year Book, 1953. The total figure for 1956 is from the first national census carried out in that year. Afghanistan: the figure for 1937 and 1953 are from the UN statistical year book 1953. The figure for the 1960s is from the Afghan Central Statistics Office, 1967, and the figure for the 1980s is from Grötzbach (1990 Eine Geographische Landeskunde p.375 172 The figure for Iran’s MCD’s is from Jahrudi (1975) “Die Entwicklung und Zukunft des Ostan Gilan“ p.23. The MCD figures for Afghanistan are from the Kabul Almanach (1934-35 and 1952-1953), an Afghan government publication from 1969 celebrating the 50-year anniversary of Afghanistan’s independence (Afghanistan Dar Panjah Sal-e Akhir p.39-40), and the Provisional Gazetteer of Afghanistan (1975). 173 Arjomand (2004-2005) Constitutional Developments in Afghanistan p.952-955; for a contemporary account, see Weinbaum (1971) “Afghanistan: Nonparty Parliamentary Democracy”. 174 Lambton (1953) Landlord and Peasant in Persia p.285-292; Oberling (1974) The Qashqai Nomads of Fars p.169-182. 175 Van Bruinessen (1983) “Kurdish Tribes and the State of Iran” p.390-396; Vali (2011) Kurds and the State in Iran p.19,20. 176 See Abrahamian (1969) The Social Bases of Iranian Politics: the Tudeh Party, 1941-53. 177 The latter is the case in Mahoney’s analysis of regime type outcome in Central America (Mahoney (2001) “Path-Dependent Explanations of Regime Change: Central America in Comparative Perspective” p.122). 178 Abrahamian (2008) A History of Modern Iran p.169. 179 The uprising started in Kunar province, which had originally been part of the Eastern province, which the Musahiban brothers had given considerably autonomy to. See Edward’s description of the Nuristani and Safi uprising in Kunar through the eyes of his interlocutor Samiullah Safi (2002 Before the Taliban Chapter 5). In Paktya province, formerly incorporated in the Southern province, portions of the Jadran tribe rose up to fight the Soviets early on, none more famou than Jalaluddin Haqqani, whose family continues to make life hard for the Afghan government and its Western allies today. See Roy (1986) Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan p.99-106. 180 See Kakar (1995) Afghanistan: the Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response p.126; Halliday (1980) “War and Revolution in Afghanistan.” 181 The parliament itself, however, is hampered by an ill-suited single non-transferable vote (SNTV) electoral system that discourages the development of political parties, and thus undermines the effectiveness of the parliament. Reynolds (2006) The Curious Case of Afghanistan p.108-111. 182 See Seymour Hersh’s article in the New Yorker on the Bush government’s Afghanistan policy (2004) "The Other War: Why Bush's Afghanistan Problem Won't Go Away."

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183 His now deceased brother Ahmad Wali, for instance, was widely regarded as the main power broker in Kandahar even though he did not hold any official office in the provincial government. See “Karzai’s Kin Use Ties to Gain Power in Afghanistan”, by James Risen. New York Times, October 5, 2010. 184 Maley (2011) Challenges of Political Development in Afghanistan p.34,35. The activities and interests of international governmental and non-governmental organizations, of course, also have served to undermine the development of state strength in Afghanistan in the last 10 years. In a private conversation with me, a social science advisor embedded with US troops in the Afghan Pashtun tribal belt argued that Afghan government officials in the provinces view themselves as ambassadors and intermediaries, rather than implementers of a central state strategy.