Project Responder National Technology Plan - Illinois Fire Service

April 2004

Prepared by

Hicks and Associates, Inc.

for

The National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorismand the United States Department of Homeland Security

Project Responder

ProjectResponder:N

ation

alTech

no

logy

Planfo

rE

mergen

cyR

espon

seto

Catastro

phic

Terrorism

National Technology Plan for EmergencyResponse to CatastrophicTerrorism

Ap

ril2004

Supported under Award Number MIPT106-113-2000-002, Project Responder from the Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT)

and the Office of Domestic Preparedness, Department of Homeland Security.

Points of view in this document are those of the editors and/or authors and do not necessarily represent the official position of MIPT or the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

Edited by

Thomas M. Garwin, Neal A. Pollard, and Robert V. Tuohy

April 2004

Prepared by

Hicks and Associates, Inc.

for

The National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorismand the United States Department of Homeland Security

Project Responder

National Technology Planfor Emergency Response toCatastrophic Terrorism

i i

P R O J E C T R E S P O N D E R

Purpose and Vision – Project Responder

The National Memorial Institute for thePrevention of Terrorism (MIPT) in OklahomaCity focuses on “preventing and deterring terror-ism or mitigating its effects.” Since April 2001,MIPT has supported Hicks & Associates, Inc. indeveloping a National Technology Plan forEmergency Response to Catastrophic Terrorism,pursuant to a guiding vision:

Emergency responders should have the capability toprevent or mitigate terrorist use of chemical, biolog-ical, radiological, nuclear, or high explosive/incen-diary (CBRNE) devices and emerging threats.

In addition to the specifics of CBRNE devicesand emerging threats, responders need to be pre-pared to deal with the catastrophic scale of effectsthat these threats may produce; thus a need fortechnologies to rapidly coordinate and integrateresponse capabilities from multiple local,regional, state, and federal organizations and dis-ciplines is implicit in this vision.

The plan focuses on technology investment toimprove capabilities within twelve NationalTerrorism Response Objectives (NTROs) thatcover the anticipated scope of emergency respon-ders’ requirements for dealing with chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological, and explosive/incendiary attacks on the homeland:1

• Personal Protection and Equipment

• Detection, Identification, and Assessment

• Unified Incident Command, DecisionSupport and Interoperable Communications

• Response and Recovery

• Emergency Management Preparation andPlanning

• Medical Response

• Public Health Readiness for Biological AgentEvents

• Logistics Support

• Crisis Evaluation and Management

• All-Source Situational Understanding

• Criminal Investigation and Attribution

• Mitigation and Restoration for Plant andAnimal Resources

Strategy for Responder CapabilityImprovement

Developing a technology plan to fill gaps inresponder capability is important but it will notbe enough by itself to actually increase emergencyresponder capability across the nation. In manyareas, responder capabilities are limited more byresources and gaps in organizational capabilitythan by technology.

Organizations responsible for improving respon-der readiness for catastrophic events need todevelop a strategy for implementing the technol-ogy plan and assuring the successful transition ofnew technology into the hands of emergencyresponders. Those organizations should considerthe lessons learned by other agencies who have

i i i


Executive Summary

Executive Summary

1 The National Terrorism Response Objectives resulted from a series of eight workshops and dozens of field interviews with over 125 emergencyresponders, a number of related groups established to focus on terrorism response, and 135 experts in key technology fields from across govern-ment, industry, and academia.

managed similar activities, together with theunique characteristics of responder organizations.

The following ten imperatives capture the mainelements of an implementation strategy thatempowers responders and meshes the need for aresearch and development program led by the federalgovernment with the decentralized nature of respon-der procurement decision-making:

• Establish and exploit appropriate respondercollaborative environments.

• Focus federal, industrial, and non-profitinvestment on the most pressing needs articu-lated by responders.

• Insist on affordable end-products.

• Leverage existing federal, state, and local gov-ernment investment and infrastructure.

• Where possible, include terrorism responsecapability into upgrades of normal duty cloth-ing and equipment.

• Achieve continual improvement through spiraldevelopment and evolutionary deployment.

• Emphasize open architecture, interoperability,and proactive involvement in establishingappropriate standards and testing.

• Identify existing commercial and governmentadvanced technologies for integration intoinnovative solutions to meet responder needs.

• Quicken the maturation and deployment ofadvanced technology products, innovativeconcepts and eventual capabilities throughmodeling and simulation, demonstrations andeffective commercialization.

• Focus investment in strategic research areas toprovide future opportunities.

Furthermore, although the vision and resultantplan are for response to catastrophic terrorism,technology development to increase respondercapability should aim, when possible, forincreases in “all-hazards” capability. That is,

technology development should improve respon-ders’ capabilities to deal with all types of catastro-phes, whether man-made, natural, or accidental.

Response Technology Objectives – ANational Agenda for Research andDevelopment

Each NTRO chapter in this plan presents tech-nology roadmaps made up of new initiatives toclose gaps in responder capabilities. The buildingblocks for the roadmaps are Response TechnologyObjectives (RTOs). The RTOs recommend pro-grams for the federal government to adopt (inaddition to current efforts), and most are linkedto the prioritized needs of emergency responders.The 48 RTOs described herein include descrip-tions of the objective and its goals, the payoffsthat will result from the RTO, challenges thatwill be encountered while pursuing the RTO,and milestones and metrics by which developerscan structure a program and gauge its progress.Taken as a whole, the 48 RTOs may be consid-ered a research and development agenda forimproving emergency response capabilities.

Each RTO also includes rough budget estimatesand a programmatic timeline. The differentbudgets represented in the 48 RTOs sum to atotal of nearly $3.5 billion, over six years.However, these totals are neither definitive norcomprehensive. The cost and schedule estimatesassume the continuation of currently pro-grammed efforts in related areas and assumeeffective leveraging of those programs.Furthermore, the estimates are based on top-down expert judgment rather than a detailed bottom-up plan. More precise estimates wouldrequire knowledge of the actual budgetary andinstitutional environment in which the work is tobe carried forward. Finally, these estimates con-centrate on needed technology research anddevelopment: they do not include costs forestablishing standards, third party testing andevaluation, acquisition, training, maintenance,and the myriad other actual costs that will beencountered in increasing the capabilities of stateand local responders. What these estimates doprovide is a minimum threshold investment in

i v


research and development that the nation mustpursue, if it is to have the option of increasingresponse capabilities consistent with the goals,needs, priorities, and technology objectivesdescribed herein.

The RTOs, grouped by National TerrorismResponse Objective, are:

Personal Protection and Equipment (PPE)

• Body Protection – Devise new concepts forimproved body protection and create the basisfor prototypes. The ultimate goal is to pro-vide the basis for a one-suit-meets-all-goalssystem.

• Respiratory Protection - Oxygen Available –Discover and demonstrate new materials andfilter and mask designs to achieve longer dura-tion, lighter weight, with effectiveness againstall toxins, low breathing resistance, and a costof less than $300 per unit.

• Respiratory Protection - Oxygen Deficient –Discover new air storage concepts andimproved materials for self-contained breath-ing apparatus. Increase in-service time fromless than one hour to four hours.

• Decontamination – Discover and demonstratenew ways to neutralize toxins on respondersclothing and gear. Explore more environmen-tally friendly chemical wash systems that arequick and thorough. Find means of determin-ing the completeness of decontamination.

• Escape Respiratory Protection – Develop animproved version of escape hood: more com-pact, lighter, with a shelf-life of five years, andeffective against all hazards.

Detection, Identification, and Assessment(DIDA)

• Wearable Integrated CBR Sensors – Developminiature, integrated CBR detectors and collection devices for use on responders, and eventually the general population.Provide rapid (timely) alert to the wearer ofdanger and type of attack, e.g., proceed to

decontamination, administer prophylaxis, takeantibiotic, “suit up” or don mask.

• Stand-off Radiation Detection and Identification –Develop affordable, robust radiation detectorsfor stand-off discrimination and identificationof nuclear weapons and dirty bombs. Sensorsmust be capable of networked operation anddetecting unshielded nuclear weapons in vehi-cles moving at highway speeds.

• Integrated Remote Detection of CB Agents –Develop and demonstrate compact, low-cost,reliable sensor technologies and/or systems forwide area, remote detection of airborne cloudsand plumes of biological and chemical agents.Such systems should be able to reliably detectand accurately characterize threat aerosolclouds at ranges of up to 1 kilometer.

• Portable Stand-off Container Inspection –Develop and demonstrate compact, non-contact, non-intrusive sensor technologiesand/or systems for detection of biological andchemical agents in sealed containers. Suchsystems should be able to reliably detect andpotentially characterize threat agents in con-tainers at distances of 1-2 meters.

• Integrated Networked Sensors for CBRNEDetection – Develop two or more large-scaleurban networked sensor testbeds to supportthe full spectrum of DIDA functions. Employarrays of static, mobile, and remote sensors forintercepting nuclear and radiological weapons,detecting and characterizing aerosolized CBagents, and mapping the attack and ensuingeffects. Integrate sensor networks with infor-mation networks for flow of raw data, indica-tions, and warning.

• Combined Effects Modeling for Urban Canyons –Integrate CBRNE effects models and simula-tions for complex urban canyons. The modelsshould provide inputs and outputs to help inmedical and population monitoring data, aswell as provide inputs to models associatedwith injury and casualty assessment.

v


Executive Summary

• Research for On-Scene Assessment of Low-DoseExposure to Chemical Agents – Research anddevelop the feasibility of sensor systems thatcan reliably determine at the scene of anattack whether an individual has symptomscaused by low-dose exposure to a chemicalwarfare agent.

• Real-Time Structural Stress Measurement –Develop a portable, real-time stress measure-ment sensor for continuous onsite assessmentof structural safety. After a blast associatedwith terrorist event, responders may need toenter structures or rubble without knowingwhether collapse is imminent. During rescueand response, the safety of the structure orrubble may change.

• Stand-off Automatic Choke Point Screener –Develop sensor systems that can find andintercept terrorists at choke points (buildingentrances, airports, etc.) prior to theirintended attack, or after an attack as theyattempt to escape.

Unified Incident Command Decision Supportand Interoperable Communications (UIC)

• Point Location and Identification – Develop asystem for the location of responder personnelin three dimensions in the incident area (i.e.,in buildings and rubble piles).

• Seamless Connectivity and InformationAssurance – Develop a “Responder C3 System”that can seamlessly and dynamically intercon-nect multiple interagency users, who havemultiple functions, multiple information andcommunications systems. The systems mustoperate the first time and every time andremain operational through the incident.

• Incident Command Information Managementand Dissemination – Provide incident com-mand decision support, situation and resourcestatus management, communications systemmanagement and mission/task tracking. Thiscapability should include information visuali-zation and fusion tools as well as modelingand simulation capability.

• Multimedia Supported Telepresence – Adapt cur-rent Web-based technologies to the responderenvironment in order to obtain multimediainformation (i.e., enhanced teleconferencing)on a timely basis.

Response and Recovery (R&R)

• Contaminated Victim Knowledge Base –Develop a tool for emergency responders touse in determining how to respond to a masschemical, biological or radiation contamina-tion event. Using data provided by availablesensors and information stored before theevent the, tool will provide responders withthe best course of action to begin the deconta-mination of large numbers of victims.

• Protective Coatings for Critical Equipment –Develop materials and appliqués that willresist contamination or facilitate rapid decont-amination without degrading sensitive equip-ment such as electronics, such that criticalequipment can be rapidly returned to servicewithin the contaminated zones in less thanone hour.

• Ground Penetrating Radar for SpecializedSearch and Rescue – Develop and demonstratean affordable ground penetrating radar systemto assist search and rescue operations, in orderto rapidly locate, assess, and rescue, injuredand/or contaminated victims.

• Irradiation and Gaseous Decontamination forMass Fatalities – Adapt irradiation and gaseousdecontamination technologies and methods(e.g., food irradiation and concepts used onpostal facilities after October 2001 anthraxattacks, etc.), for mobile use in a mass fatalityincident.

Emergency Management Preparation andPlanning (EMPP)

• Risk Awareness and Assessment Decision SupportTechnology Demonstration – Integrate existingtechnology to develop a system that will pro-vide automated decision aides for thosecharged with assessing the vulnerability and

v i


protective course of action for potential targetswithin their jurisdictions.

• Electronic Transcript Smart Card –Demonstrate, for standardization and accept-ance, a digital smart card/chip “electronictranscript” system that securely verifies ID,levels of training/certification, and currency,for the multitude of responders that convergeon the scene of a catastrophic event.

• Alternate/Mobile Hospital ContingencyManagement – Develop standards based oncase studies, benchmarking, and best practicesin use for managing hospital/medical contingencies.

• Course-of-Action Development System – AComputer-based decision support and infor-mation management tool that can assist theemergency planner/response community inachieving higher levels of sophistication ininformation assessment, integration andmanipulation.

Medical Response (MR)

• Mass Prophylaxis Knowledge Base and Decision Aid – Develop a tool for emergencyresponders to use in determining the “at-risk”population in a mass chemical, biological orradiation contamination event and developinga mass prophylaxis course of action.

• Mass Prophylaxis Delivery System – Develop atool that allows responders to significantlyincrease the throughput of individuals who are receiving prophylactic treatment.

• Casualty Management System – Develop a toolfor emergency responders to use to managepotentially tens of thousands of victims from amass casualty event. The systems should beable to positively track each patient eitherthrough tagging (i.e., bar code) or throughbiometrics. The system should provide themedical/syndromic and treatment records aswell as the physical location of the patient.

• Telemedicine Test Bed – Establish a telemedi-cine testbed where research on new concepts

of operation and new enabling technology canbe explored to support disasters and masscasualty incidents. Conduct research on howquickly doctors can screen patients viatelemedicine.

• Novel Decontamination – Conduct research todevelop new ways to effectively decontaminatelarge number of victims in the event of achemical or biological attack, especially in coldweather. It should significantly increase thethroughput of people being contaminated andwill probably save lives.

Public Health Readiness for Biological AgentEvents (PHRBAE)

• Health Surveillance for Early Detection ofBiological Agent Events – Develop a compre-hensive surveillance system that ensures initialrecognition of an emergent illness at the earli-est point in the progress of a biological agentevent. This system would be based in metro-politan areas and the states but would allowfully transparent data aggregation up to thenational level.

• Rapid High-Throughput Clinical Assessmentand Testing – Develop a system that can screenpatients through minimally invasive tech-niques to improve the speed, throughput,comprehensiveness, and convenience of fieldclinical assessment and testing for biologicalagent exposure and disease status.

• Models for Re-dissemination and Contagion ofBio-agents – Develop improved models for there-dissemination and contagion of biologicalagents. The models must be integrated withsurveillance information to help get a startingpoint for the model.

Logistics Support (LS)

• Integrated Logistics Information System (ILIS) –Develop an evolutionary Integrated LogisticsInformation System capable of connecting all echelons of command (including regionaland national) and all types of suppliers andother logistics nodes. The functions of thisinformation system include planning and

v i i


Executive Summary

providing the appropriate initial logisticsresponse to support emergency response todisasters, tracking inventories and items intransit (across jurisdictions), projecting needsfor consumables and other support itemsincluding transportation, providing informa-tion and decision support for transportationoptimization, and providing information rele-vant to the rapid assessment of safe bases ofoperation.

• Many-to-Many DNA Matching of Body Parts –Develop the capability to recover, track, andidentify using DNA comparisons of bodilyremains from mass casualty events.

Crisis Evaluation and Management (CE)

• Non-Lethal Safe Seizure of Perpetrators –Develop non-lethal technologies to instantlyimmobilize perpetrators with weapons orhostages, such that explosive devices or otherweapons are not setoff.

All-Source Situational Understanding (ASU)

• All-Source Information Fusion and AnalysisSystem – Develop a prototype tool and doctri-nal template for an information and analysiscell to support Incident Command. Theobjective is to collect, fuse, analyze and pres-ent information from all sources, includingsensitive intelligence information.

Mitigation and Restoration for Plant andAnimal Resources (MRPA)

• Plant and Animal Responder’s Decision Aid –Allow plant and animal responders to applycodified knowledge and to reach back to spe-cialists so that they will act to most efficientlyassess and identify damage, limit onward con-tamination, and embark on the correct mitiga-tion strategy where plants and animals are thetargets or initial indicators of terrorism.

• Field Screening and Assessment Tests – Developa cost-effective set of rapid screening and iden-tification tests for plant and animal diseaseand the presence of CBR agents in plant andanimals.

• Overhead Imaging for Wide-Area Surveillanceand Assessment – Exploit existing imagingtechnology involving earth orbit satellite andunmanned surveillance aircraft to remotelysurvey agricultural terrain for the presence ofcrop plant disease, down livestock, andwildlife remains.

• Trace-Back Capabilities Using InformationSystems and Tags – Design and implement asystems approach to using miniaturized chiptechnology for tracking plant, animals andfood products back to points-of-origin withdata updating at critical control points.

• Threat Analysis Critical Control Points Programfor the Food Chain – Use systems analysis toidentify the key points in the food chain atwhich detection is to be attempted and thedetection techniques and technologies (includ-ing visual inspection) that would be most costeffective.

• Modeling of Plant and Animal Outbreaks,Surveillance, and Response – Develop modelingtools for use by cognizant agencies and inci-dent commanders that can aid in optimizingplant and animal surveillance and responsestrategies.

• Improved Irradiation Methods – Find quick,effective and inexpensive prophylactic andpost-exposure treatment countermeasures forcontaminations and infestations in food andfeed through different forms of irradiation.

• Enhanced Fumigation Technology – Codify thestate of the art in using fumigation to decon-taminate food processing and storage facilitiesand transportation carriers and find cheaperand more efficient ways to perform this function.

• Digesters and Plasma Burners – Evaluate thestate of the art of portable systems for carcassdisposal and develop a program for ascertain-ing the relative strengths and weaknesses ofthe individual systems and their operational

v i i i


capacities, limitations, and costs of procure-ment and operation in representative field set-tings. The purpose is to understand ourdomestic capability to destroy animal carcassescontaminated with threatening diseases.

• Prototype Prefabricated Animal CrematoriumFacility – A prefabricated system that could beerected and made operational in a matter ofseveral days should be developed to preventcontagion from animal carcasses.

The Long View – Strategic Research forEmergency Response

Within many of the NTROs, responders identi-fied desired capabilities that technologists assessedto be not achievable within the current state ofbasic science and technology. The project iden-tified five strategic research areas that hold thepotential to provide the understanding and tech-niques that may permit breakthroughs in capabil-ities. At the basic level envisioned for theseresearch areas, specific research projects are atmost loosely connected to specific responderneeds; rather the goal is to increase the pool ofknowledge that may be drawn upon by develop-ment activities in the future.

The five Strategic Research Areas are:

Nanotechnology – Building structures at themolecular level to meet desired goals in the per-formance of materials for personal protection andequipment. Potential improvements in PersonalProtection and Equipment motivated the defini-tion of this SRA. However, its benefits will alsocontribute to capability increases in Detection,Identification, and Assessment; Unified IncidentCommand Decision Support and InteroperableCommunications; and Response and Recovery.

Surface Science – Central to capability increases inpersonal protective materials is strategic researchand development in the chemistry and physics ofsurfaces, especially modified surfaces. SurfaceScience is also relevant to decontamination andto many advanced detector technologies.

Observables and Sensing for Stand-off Inspection ofContainers with Chemical or Biological Agents –

Discovery and development of revolutionaryapproaches to rapid, non-intrusive stand-offdetection and identification of chemical and bio-logical agents in packages and containers, witheffective ranges of a few feet in unconstrainedgeometry. Strategic research and development inthis area will also benefit numerous functionalcapabilities, described in other NTROs, thatrequire indication or assessment of the presenceof chemical or biological agents.

Ultra Wideband (UWB) Communications –Achieving communications penetration throughwalls, in high rise buildings and underground orin tunnels. Research in this field will supportfunctional capabilities in Unified IncidentCommand Decision Support and InteroperableCommunications, as well as functional capabili-ties in other NTROs that require communica-tions or telemetry, especially through mass suchas collapsed rubble or in areas where commercialwireless communications cannot function today.

Biomarkers of Agent Induced Disease and SystemicInjury in Humans, Plant and Animals – Thisresearch area is central to Public Health Readinessfor Biological Agent Events and MedicalResponse, and also to Mitigation and Restorationfor Plant and Animal Resources. However, itsbenefits are also generally important to theDetection, Identification, and AssessmentNTRO, and specifically to functional elements inseveral NTROs that require the identificationand assessment of biological and chemical agents.The central thrust is better understanding ofchanges in living systems under assault by chemi-cal and biological attack, to permit more rapidassessment, agent identification, and treatmentselection.

This National Technology Plan is intended to bea draft of a living document. Federal technologyplanners should not simply fund and implementthe plan as written because:

• it needs to be interrelated to other capabilityareas for efficient application of resources;

• it needs to be iterated as new informationbecomes available; and

i x


Executive Summary

• the appropriate mechanisms for involvingcommercial vendors in developing technolo-gies and deploying the resulting products todisparate responders have not been workedout.

Thus these technology plans, and the needs that underlie them, will not be the final word onresponders’ needs and capabilities. Capabilitiesand needs continually change, and the plan must evolve in response to new R&D results aswell as to operational innovations. The goals

and objectives of this and subsequent documentsshould be considered just that—goals—notthreshold or exit criteria for capability develop-ment. As capabilities are built and fielded, thisplan will change. As new threats emerge, needswill change, requiring further changes to theplan. Thus, this plan should be considered thefirst contribution in an iterative process to thecontinual improvement of responders’ capabilitiesvia an evolutionary development and deploymentprocess that will work in the dispersed respondermarketplace.

x


• Medical Response (MR)

• Public Health Readiness for Biological AgentEvents (PHRBAE)

• Logistics Support (LS)

• Crisis Evaluation and Management (CE)

• All-Source Situational Understanding (ASU)

• Criminal Investigation and Attribution (CI)

• Mitigation and Restoration for Plant andAnimal Resources (MRPA)

The National Terrorism Response Objectives arethe result of a series of eight workshops anddozens of field interviews with over 125 emer-gency responders and a number of related groupsestablished to focus on terrorism response. Theobjectives cover the anticipated scope of emer-gency responders’ requirements for dealing withchemical, biological, nuclear, radiological, andexplosive/incendiary attacks on the homeland.The technology plans for each of the NTROswere developed from a common philosophy thatmeshes the decentralized nature of responder pro-curement decision-making with the need for aresearch and development program led by thefederal government.

This draft National Technology Plan is intendedto be a living document. Federal technologyplanners could not simply fund and implementthe plan as written because:

• it needs to be interrelated to other capabilityareas for efficient application of resources;

x i


The National Memorial Institute for thePrevention of Terrorism (MIPT) in OklahomaCity focuses on “preventing and deterring terror-ism or mitigating its effects.” Since April 2001,MIPT has funded Project Responder, an effort byHicks & Associates, Inc. and the TerrorismResearch Center, Inc., aimed ultimately atimproving local, state and federal emergencyresponders’ capabilities for mitigating the effectsof chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear orexplosive/incendiary (CBRNE) terrorism. ProjectResponder will achieve this aim by producingtwo tools: a National Technology Plan forEmergency Response to Catastrophic Terrorism,and a Web-based Responder Knowledge Base ofcurrent and emerging systems and technologiesfor response to terrorism.

This document builds upon the foundation laidby the first Project Responder Interim ReportEmergency Responders’ Needs, Goals, and Priorities(March 2003)2, which presented priorities fortechnology-enabled improvements in responsecapability, described in twelve National TerrorismResponse Objectives (NTROs):

• Personal Protection and Equipment (PPE)

• Detection, Identification, and Assessment(DIDA)

• Unified Incident Command, DecisionSupport and Interoperable Communications(UIC)

• Response and Recovery (R&R)

• Emergency Management Preparation andPlanning (EMPP)

Preface

2 Neal A. Pollard, Robert V. Tuohy, and Thomas M. Garwin, Emergency Responders’ Needs, Goals, and Priorities, (March 2003, Updated) an Interim Reportof Project Responder, prepared by Hicks and Associates, Inc., for The Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorismand the National Institute of Justice of the U.S. Department of Justice, at the request of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

• it needs to be iterated as new informationbecomes available; and

• the appropriate mechanisms for involvingcommercial vendors in developing technolo-gies and deploying the resulting products todisparate responders have not been workedout.

These three reasons are elaborated in the follow-ing paragraphs.

Need for Interrelationship with Other Program Areas – The plan’s focus on the needs of emer-gency responders, while crucial, is not complete.It was very important to discipline the process byaddressing the needs of this crucial user commu-nity that is on the front line of our national effortagainst terrorism, and that traditionally has notbeen intensively supported by new technologydevelopment. However, even with a flexible defi-nition of “emergency responder” (for example, toinclude public health specialists and various typesof medical personnel, in some cases of biologicalattack), important areas of technology develop-ment for deterring and preventing terrorism andmitigating its effects are not within the currentscope of this plan. Thus, much of port, border,and aviation security, as well as the developmentof vaccines and medical treatments, is notaddressed in the current planning effort.

Moreover, there are important overlaps and syn-ergies between some technologies identified asimportant for emergency response and those inthese other areas. Thus the Project Responderdraft National Technology Plan needs to be syn-chronized with technology planning efforts inthese other areas, as well as with other agencies,for maximum efficiency and effectiveness in anoverall investment strategy. The Department ofDefense already has a number of technologiesthat address responders’ needs. For example, theCombatting Terrorism and Force Protection tech-nologies and demonstrations of DefenseDepartment’s Joint Warfighting Science andTechnology Plan are relevant to some of the criti-cal needs of emergency responders, and theTechnical Support Working Group has produced

prototype technologies that would be useful toemergency responders.

Need for Iteration – The experience of federal gov-ernment and industry best-practice technologyplanning efforts strongly suggests that technologyplanning needs to be an iterated, participativeprocess. Detailed budgets can only realistically bedeveloped through a dialog with a selected exe-cuting agency, and the amount of money to beallocated to a particular project in a particularperiod can only be decided in the context of theoverall resources that are made available. Theplanning process itself develops additional infor-mation and understanding over time as researchand technology programs proceed.

Technology Transfer and Commercialization –Concepts for technology transfer and commer-cialization are central to any federal strategy fordeveloping and deploying new capabilities tostate and local responders. Many issues inherentin successful diffusion of new technology toresponders are not technological, but rather rangefrom issues of training, logistics and budgets tobasic issues of federalism. Nevertheless, technol-ogy transfer, primarily through commercializa-tion, will be important to bring mature technolo-gies into responder-oriented applications ordemonstrations, to guarantee to vendors a mar-ketplace sufficient to induce full production oftechnologies, and to field technologies on a wideenough scale to meet responders’ needs.Commercialization strategies – whether throughregional purchasing arrangements, public/privatepartnerships, direct federal acquisition, tied grantprograms or other approaches – will be crucialfor bringing down costs of new capabilities suffi-ciently for medium- and smaller-size jurisdictionsto procure them.

Another important set of judgments that willaffect how technology will be deployed, and thushow it should be developed, relates to the distri-bution of capabilities at different levels ofresponse. Federal officials and their state andlocal counterparts will have to determine themost effective distribution and organization of capabilities across the country and at various

x i i


Preface

levels (i.e., local, state, federal or regional). Forexample, some specialized capabilities would bemost effective and efficient deployed and oper-ated as a regional resource, while other capabili-ties must be available at the local city or countylevel. Even within local forces, some capabilitieswill be given to every responder, while others willbe reserved to special units.

Judgments of what capabilities belong at whichlevels cannot be made a priori. Rather they arethe result of a set of balancing considerations that are in many ways dependent on technology.Typically, specialized capabilities are unique tospecialized organizations because of high cost and difficult training requirements. In someinstances technology can reduce cost and trainingrequirements or improve safety to the point thata hitherto specialized capability can be widely distributed. Experiments (technical and opera-tional, aimed at learning) and demonstrations(aimed at determining feasibility) involving inno-vative concepts, products, advanced technology,systems, and “systems of systems” will be usefulin arriving at appropriate, affordable operationalapplications of new technology, and will stimu-late both vendor supply and responder demandfor these solutions.

A process to improve responder capabilities mustrecognize the realities of the decentralized natureof responder procurement and the limitedresources available. Compared to corporate prod-uct development or federal government acquisi-tion, there are many more significant players inthe process. The process must encompass a myr-iad of state and local agencies; strategic leveragein the process can be provided by Federal money,

national standards, federal government and inde-pendent testing, and focused (and typically com-petitive) commercialization activities involvingvendors of responder equipment.

Finally, to be maximally effective, new technolo-gies and new operational procedures must bedeveloped together, in an iterative process. Forthis reason, many of the technology plansdescribed below include processes like theDefense Department’s Advanced ConceptTechnology Demonstrations (ACTDs), whichcombine technology developers and operationalusers to integrate relatively mature technologiesinto innovative operational capabilities.Moreover, the rese arch and development processitself will provide new opportunities and proveothers to be less promising than initially thought.

These technology plans, and the needs thatunderlie them, will not be the final word onresponders’ needs and capabilities. Capabilitiesand needs continually change, and the plan mustevolve in response to new R&D results as well asto operational innovations. The goals and objec-tives of this and subsequent documents should beconsidered just that – goals, not threshold or exitcriteria for capability development. As capabili-ties are built and fielded, this plan will change.As new threats emerge, needs will change, requir-ing further changes to the plan.

For all these reasons, this plan should be consid-ered the first contribution in an iterative processto the continual improvement of responders’capabilities via an evolutionary development anddeployment process that will work in the dis-persed responder marketplace.

x i i i


Preface

x i v


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III

PREFACE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

I. INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

A. VISION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

B. STRATEGY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

C. STRATEGIC RESEARCH AREAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

D. PLANNING PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

II. PERSONAL PROTECTION AND EQUIPMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

III. DETECTION, IDENTIFICATION, AND ASSESSMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

IV. UNIFIED INCIDENT COMMAND DECISION SUPPORT AND INTEROPERABLE

COMMUNICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

V. RESPONSE AND RECOVERY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

VI. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PREPARATION AND PLANNING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

VII. MEDICAL RESPONSE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

VIII. PUBLIC HEALTH READINESS FOR BIOLOGICAL AGENT EVENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

IX. LOGISTICS SUPPORT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

X. CRISIS EVALUATION AND MANAGEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

XI. ALL-SOURCE SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189

XII. CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION AND ATTRIBUTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207

XIII. MITIGATION AND RESTORATION FOR PLANT AND ANIMAL RESOURCES . . . . . . . 215

APPENDICES

A. SPIRAL DEVELOPMENT AND COMMERCIALIZATION OF AFFORDABLE

ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243

B. ACRONYMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249

C. HOME AGENCIES OF PROJECT PARTICIPANTS AND INTERVIEWEES. . . . . . . . . 259

D. ABOUT THE AUTHORS AND EDITORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263

E. INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269

Contents

1


Each National Terrorism Response Objective(NTRO) chapter below presents technologyroadmaps made up of new initiatives to closegaps in responder capabilities. The buildingblocks for the roadmaps are Response TechnologyObjectives (RTOs), located at the end of eachchapter. The RTOs recommend programs for thefederal government to adopt (in addition to cur-rent efforts), and most are linked to the priori-tized needs of emergency responders. The RTOsinclude descriptions of the objective and its goals,the payoffs that will result from the RTO, chal-lenges that will be encountered while pursuingthe RTO, and milestones and metrics by whichdevelopers can structure a program and gauge itsprogress. Each RTO also includes rough budgetestimates. The following discussion describes thefoundation and process used to link needs totechnology, and derive these building-blockRTOs.

A. Vision

The vision guiding the strategy to improve thecapabilities of our emergency responders is:

Emergency responders should have the capability toprevent or mitigate terrorist use of chemical, biolog-ical, radiological, nuclear, or high explosive/incen-diary (CBRNE) devices and emerging threats.

In addition to the specifics of CBRNE devicesand emerging threats, responders need to be pre-pared to deal with the catastrophic scale of effectsthat these threats may produce; thus a need fortechnologies to rapidly coordinate and integrateresponse capabilities from multiple local,regional, state, and federal organizations and dis-ciplines is implicit in this vision.

Furthermore, although this vision and resultantplans envision response to catastrophic terrorism,

technology development should aim, when possi-ble, for increases in “all-hazards” capability. Thatis, technology development should improveresponders’ capabilities to deal with all types ofcatastrophes, whether man-made, natural, oraccidental.

B. Strategy

Developing a technology plan to fill gaps inresponder capability is important but it will notbe enough by itself to actually increase emergencyresponder capability across the nation. This willbe a new undertaking on the part of the federalgovernment. Organizations responsible forimproving responder readiness for catastrophicevents need to develop a strategy for implement-ing the technology plan and assuring the success-ful transition of new technology into the handsof emergency responders. Those organizationsshould consider the lessons learned by otheragencies who have managed similar activities.Some of those lessons are including in the follow-ing ten imperatives we believe should be includedin such a strategy:

• Establish and exploit appropriate responder col-laborative environments – Project Responderhas established a network of responders, fromall the emergency response disciplines in orderto understand their needs as they themselvesarticulate them. The best way to assure thatthe products that result from the technologyplans are useable by the constituents who needthem is to continue to listen to them through-out the process. A broad-based representationof users (responders et al.) should be involvedin the development process. The IntegratedProject Team approach used in the DoD andother agencies may be a useful model, butmaking it work in the fragmented responder

Chapter I

Introduction

2


Chapter I

universe will require significant adjustmentsand probably the regular use of distance-collaboration technologies.

• Focus federal, industrial, and non-profit invest-ment on the most pressing needs articulated byresponders – This plan offers a prioritized listof needs. This prioritization should continueto be explored with responders and those whoare responsible for preparing the nation forterrorism to ensure that resources are appliedto the highest priorities and payoffs.Influencing non-federal investment is crucialbecause of the decentralized nature of theresponder community and the reliance oncommercial vendors; these influence mecha-nisms need more attention and focus.

• Insist on affordable end-products – The Directorof the Homeland Security Advanced ResearchProjects Agency recently said that affordabilitymust be a performance specification for home-land security systems. State and local govern-ments are and will always be resource limited.Responders buy their gear from commercialfirms who must compete on price as well astechnical performance. Affordability must beaddressed at every step of the developmentprocess.

• Leverage existing federal, state, and local govern-ment investment and infrastructure –Governments have substantial preexistinginvestments in response capabilities—there is alarge capital stock in use and responders arefamiliar with established operational patterns.Systems developed for use by local respondersmust take advantage of and integrate well withcurrent equipment and infrastructure.Systems that require the wholesale replace-ment of existing equipment and infrastructurewill be doomed to stay on the shelf becauseresponse agencies simply can’t afford them.

• Where possible, include terrorism response capa-bility into upgrades of normal duty clothing andequipment – Responders can not afford and donot want specialized terrorism response equip-ment. It is clear from our research that, wherepossible, the best way to increase our country’s

ability to respond to terrorism is to increaseresponders’ ability to respond to all events—the so-called all hazards approach. Whilesome capabilities will remain the province ofspecialized units, the first response will almostalways be by non-specialized, front-line per-sonnel with day-to-day equipment. The onlyway first responders will be equipped to dealwith the situation is if the materiel is widelydispersed throughout the force. Thisapproach also may achieve affordabilitythrough economies of scale.

• Achieve continual improvement through spiraldevelopment and evolutionary deployment – Forreasons of affordability and interoperability,new responder capability will often need to beimplemented through evolutionary upgradesof existing systems. Spiral development alsooffers the opportunity to maximize improve-ments by taking advantage of experience withthe earlier deployed version of equipment.Costs are lower, too, compared to multiplenew system developments.

• Emphasize open architecture, interoperability,and proactive involvement in establishing appro-priate standards and testing – Open architec-tures are critical to being able to make evolu-tionary improvements in capability. Thisapproach also lowers cost and increases per-formance by lowering barriers to entry intothe market and creating more effective compe-tition. Open architectures also help to defineand enforce interoperability. Multiple juris-dictions and levels of government must be ableto work together to respond to catastrophicterrorism. Current gaps in interoperabilityamong their various systems have stymied thatability. Interoperability must be a absoluterequirement for new systems. Standards andtesting to those standards will be an importantenabler of interoperability.

• Identify existing commercial and governmentadvanced technologies for integration into inno-vative solutions to meet responder needs – A sig-nificant amount of technology that has thepotential of dramatically increasing respondercapability appears to be available in the

Introduction

3


commercial world (primarily in the informa-tion technology industry) and in the federalgovernment (especially in the Department ofDefense). It has not yet been focused onresponder needs. Leveraging this investmentwill enable early improvements in respondercapability sooner and probably save money.Early investments should be made to adaptthis technology for use by the responder com-munity and to facilitate its adoption.

• Quicken the maturation and deployment ofadvanced technology products, innovative con-cepts and eventual capabilities through modelingand simulation, demonstrations and effectivecommercialization – Modeling and simulation(M&S) has proven to be a very useful tool indetermining how systems will work togetherbefore they are built. Both the systems thatare being considered, as well as the environ-ment they will be operating in can be modeledin most cases. This allows the testing of howsystems will work before committing to build-ing expensive prototypes. M&S is also scala-ble so that new response concepts (the combi-nation of new operational concepts with newtechnical capability) can be tested at the tacti-cal unit level as well as the incident command,regional and even national levels. In combina-tion with exercises and demonstrations, M&Scan prevent or mitigate false starts, help assurethat the systems will work in the intendedenvironments, and help develop new conceptsof operation that can increase the capability ofnew systems even before they are deployed.M&S will not obviate testing the actual sys-tems. It can, however inform the trade-offprocess throughout the development process,saving money in the long run.

Unlike the military, responders buy theirequipment in the commercial marketplace and each local jurisdiction, for the most part,buys separately resulting in a highly frag-mented market. Any technology developed by the federal government must eventuallymake its way to the responders via commercialvendors. Commercialization of governmentdeveloped technology must be addressed from

the beginning and throughout the develop-ment cycle. Commercial vendors should beinvolved at the earliest possible opportunity.

• Focus investment in strategic research areas toprovide future opportunities – Although thereappears to be a great deal of technology thatcan help responders available in the near-term,the solutions to some of the response commu-nity’s most vexing problem are not on thehorizon and the chance to develop leap-aheadcapability must not be ignored. Therefore,any prudent R&D portfolio must includeinvestment in fundamental research to solvethose problems. We have recommended sev-eral areas where investment in basic andapplied research is needed to provide theanswers to needs across many responder capa-bility areas.

In addition to these imperatives, a strategy toimplement a successful responder R&D programshould consider a few other elements beginningwith how the R&D portfolio is managed. A dia-log between opportunity and risk lies at the heartof any technology investment decision; where toinvest along the risk continuum is a tough ques-tion. One must make “trade-offs” between thelevel of desired capability and the likely cost ofand time to get to the eventual product. For allexcept the least risky, near-term investments, allR&D activities have learning at their core. Alongthe way discoveries will be made, unexpectedobstacles may impede progress, and new knowl-edge may provide unexpectedly easy paths toimproved capability. Although investment toreduce uncertainty is an important element ofany well-planned R&D effort, it is impossibleand imprudent to reduce overall risk to zero.

Therefore, at least some of all but the lowest-riskprojects should be expected to fail. Some num-ber parallel efforts (e.g., different research paths tothe same goal) should be pursued, even to theextent that projects might seem to be duplicative.Individual failures should be expected and shouldnot be cause for indictment of the overall pro-gram. Sponsoring agencies must understand theneed for flexibility as R&D goes forward.

4


Chapter I

In theory at least, planners should weigh theprospective value of any technology investment,discount this value by the assessed probability ofsuccess (technical risk), subtract any non-mone-tary costs and risks, and then divide by the pro-jected R&D investment. This notionalbenefit/cost ratio would allow a comparison of“bang for the buck” across different proposedtechnology investments, providing an indicationof how efficient the R&D program will be.

In practice, of course, such arithmetical exercisesfrequently fail to give a definitive indicationbecause it is too hard to assess the projected bene-fits in numerical terms, and because it is hard toaccount for important second-order benefits ofR&D. Moreover, the calculus needs to take intoaccount the interaction among various projects.For example, the value of a four-hour protectivesuit would be limited if the mask that goes withit only protects for thirty minutes. While theNTRO chapters were prepared with this oppor-tunity/risk calculus in mind, and the suggestedinvestments were checked with a crude version ofthis calculus, expert judgment was viewed assuperior to arithmetic in arriving at a coherentoverall plan. Thus the technology effort must beviewed as an investment portfolio, in whichopportunities and risks are balanced and spreadacross multiple projects.

One key to managing technical risk is to ensurethat the level of integrated development does notget ahead of the maturity of the component andsystem technologies being integrated.Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs), developedoriginally by NASA and endorsed by the DefenseDepartment, provide a systematic approach tothis management process and should be consid-ered for adoption by the Department ofHomeland Security for its R&D activities. Forexample, no developmental technology should beslated for inclusion in a developmental systemuntil it has had the equivalent of a successful“technology demonstration” (TD) that demon-strates the maturity of the technology and readi-ness to move to the next level of development.3

A combination of component-oriented TRLs and

system-oriented Integration Readiness Levels(IRLs) can be used to manage risk in complexdevelopment and integration programs. Thereadiness levels used by the DoD and others aredescribed in Appendix A.

In addition to the risks of technology develop-ment, successful implementation of an R&Dprogram has other risks as well. Technologydevelopment has its own equivalent of “the oper-ation was successful but the patient died.” Oftenan apparently successful technology developmentfails to find users because the specification wasbased on an inadequate understanding of userneeds and operational context. Requirements forinteroperability, user-friendliness, and cost areobvious examples of areas that need to be workedout in advance. In other words, the technologytransfer process has important risks that must beassessed and managed in addition to the risks oftechnical development per se.

There are proven ways to manage and reducethese technology transfer risks. The DefenseDepartment has been successful in its AdvancedConcept Technology Demonstrations (ACTD),which integrate mature (and often commerciallyavailable) technologies and products in a noveloperational concept to demonstrate the value ofnew capabilities or new technology-supportedoperational approaches. By involving users fromthe outset and producing a small “leave-behind”capability, the ACTD process focuses attentionon real user needs and enforces attention to thereal operational environment. This sort of mech-anism is proposed in a number of the ResponderTechnology Objectives in the NTRO chapters.

Finally, creating a technology plan for improvingcapabilities to prevent and mitigate catastrophicterrorism is to some extent addressing the second-ary needs of responders. In many areas, respon-ders view their capability shortfalls as not beingprimarily solved by technology; resources andproblems of integration across different govern-mental organizations are a more immediate con-cern. These vital responder concerns should beaddressed by the United States Department of

3 The Defense Department equivalent is the Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD).

Introduction

Homeland Security and other responsible govern-ment organizations. Although the plan does notspeak directly to policy and financing issues it isnonetheless understood that they will play animportant role in increasing the nation’s capabil-ity to respond to terrorism.

C. Strategic Research Areas (SRAs)

Research in basic science and advanced technol-ogy offers the potential for leaps in capability.Investment planning tends to short-change theselonger-term efforts because the pay-off is less cer-tain than low-risk development projects usingnearer-term technology. This is especially thecase in an area as urgent as improving respondercapabilities for catastrophic terrorism. An appro-priate overall investment strategy should provideopportunities for investment in basic and earlyapplied research relevant to the key problems andin promising approaches that are off the beatentrack.

Five such areas are described below. They arestrategic in three ways. First, they address tech-nology development at the strategic level – thatis, a long-term, risky commitment to developingsolutions that are yet to be discovered, where suc-cess is only likely to be achieved beyond the time-line of near-term or existing technology solutions.In this sense, it also requires “strategic” funding,beyond the normal programmatic timeline of twoto five years.

Second, they are strategic in impact: the resultingincrease in capability from successful research willbe more than incremental. Rather, successfulstrategic research will revolutionize responders’systems, giving responders a discontinuousimprovement in capability.

Third, they are strategic in breadth. Although aStrategic Research Area may be central to a spe-cific functional capability, successful research inthese areas will benefit responders across manydomains of capability and even across NTROs.

Many other areas of research—especially basicresearch—could also have been identified as

important for dealing with catastrophic terrorismin the future. The areas identified here combinethe promise of basic research with a more focusedemphasis on responder needs.

Nanotechnology

Potential improvements in Personal Protectionand Equipment motivated the definition of thisSRA. However, its benefits, together with thoseof Surface Science (discussed immediately below),will also contribute to capability increases inDetection, Identification, and Assessment(DIDA.1 On-Scene Detection); Unified IncidentCommand Decision Support and InteroperableCommunications (UIC.1 Point Location andIdentification); and Response and Recovery(R&R.2 Rapid Decontamination of High-Valueand Critical Response Equipment, R&R.6Specialized Search & Rescue, and R&R.8 ResidualHazards Assessment and Mitigation).

Objectives:

Building structures at the molecular level to meetdesired goals in the performance of materials forpersonal protection and equipment.

Thrusts:

• Creating fibers and cage structures,

• Characterizing them,

• Studying their performance vis-a-vis several ofthe goals in PPE.

Applications:

• Fabrics with improved and controllable per-meability for uniforms.

• Fabrics with chemically reactive substituentsfor self-decontamination properties.

• Porous materials perhaps based on nanotubesor bucky-balls and capable of storing largequantities of air at modest pressures.

Surface Science:

Also central to capability increases in personalprotective materials is strategic research and

5


6


Chapter I

development in the chemistry and physics of sur-faces, especially modified surfaces.

Objectives:

Learn how to create and chemically modify sur-faces to enhance material performance for per-sonal protection goals.

Thrusts:

• Create materials with very high surface areas.

• Modify those surfaces chemically to providereactivity with toxins, either stoichiometric orcatalytic.

• Synthesize molecular cage or tube structuresand evaluate their ability to absorb large vol-umes of air.

Applications:

• Self-decontaminating materials.

• Improved filter elements useful against all toxins.

• Storage of large volumes of air in SCBAbreathing tanks at moderate pressures.

Observables and Sensing for Stand-offInspection of Containers with Chemical orBiological Agents

The requirements of Detection, Identification,and Assessment merit a national-level strategicinvestment in research and development in thisarea. Strategic research and development in thisarea will also benefit numerous functional capa-bilities, described in other NTROs, that requireindication or assessment of the presence of chem-ical or biological agents.

Objectives:

• Discovery and development of revolutionaryapproaches to rapid, non-intrusive stand-offdetection and identification of chemical andbiological agents in packages and containers,with effective ranges of a few feet in uncon-strained geometry.

Thrusts:

• Candidate phenomenology and signatures.

• Theoretical detection and identification limits.

• Sensing concepts.

• Practical limitations and potential countermeasures.

Research should focus on those problems forwhich no potential solution is being considered,or for which a near-term solution does not seempossible. For example, the DoD is experimentingwith contact sensing of chemical agents, withsome good results; this research objective shouldlook for phenomenology and concepts that donot require physical contact with the package.Such concepts may be extensions of current workto non-contact approaches as well as entirely newconcepts and observables. Both active and pas-sive sensing strategies should be studied: directedenergy beams, optical, acoustic resonance, back-scatter, and telltale residue detection should beconsidered.

Chemical agents in fluid state may have reso-nances that can be excited at short range byenergy pulses or acoustic waves. Biological pow-ders will pose the most serous and difficult threatsince they may be shipped in very small quanti-ties and may be in solid form. Based on currentunderstanding, it is likely that some threats in themost difficult scenarios will not yield to a solu-tion. The research program should identify thesolution space for techniques developed, developdetection models, and define limits of perform-ance. This will permit sensor developers to pro-ceed in applications to provide useful devices forthe responders.

Applications:

• Chemical and biological agents hidden inproperly sealed containers and vessels pose aserious threat from terrorists. Such threats areimpossible to detect with current technology;thus responders plan for detect-to-treat ratherthan detect-to-stop for CB attacks. Unlike

Introduction

airport luggage screeners that force bagsthrough a sensor system, responders may con-front a nearly limitless variety of packages inunconstrained geometries. They may not havethe time or access to more than one view orperspective, and the scenario may not be con-ducive to physical contact with containers.The discovery of new sensor phenomenologysuited to this problem and the development offield sensors would provide a major tool indefeating CB attack before it occurs.Depending on the resultant sensor concepts, awide variety of sensor types may be possible:handheld, suitcase, networked, automatic.

• Direct applications for the responder of thisdevelopment would include on-scene analysisof suspicious packages, choke point screeningof luggage and mail, screening of shipping andtrucking containers, and warehouse and stor-age facility screening.

Ultra Wideband (UWB) Communications

Research in this field will support functionalcapabilities in Unified Incident CommandDecision Support and InteroperableCommunications, as well as functional capabili-ties in other NTROs that require communica-tions or telemetry, especially through mass suchas collapsed rubble or in areas where commercialwireless communications cannot function today.

Objectives:

Achieve communications penetration throughwalls, in high rise buildings and underground.

Thrusts:

• Improve characterization of radio frequencypropagation through buildings and rubble.

• Develop understanding of theoretical limits ofUWB performance.

• Characterize and bridge gaps between currentand theoretical performance in prototype systems.

Applications:

• Point Location and Identification.

• Communications in areas that cannot beaccommodated by wireless.

• Covert communications.

• Short-range, high-bandwidth wireless communications.

Biomarkers of Agent Induced Disease andSystemic Injury in Humans, Plant and Animals

This research area is central to Public HealthReadiness for Biological Agent Events andMedical Response, and also to Mitigation andRestoration for Plant and Animal Resources.However, its benefits are also generally importantto the Detection, Identification, and AssessmentNTRO, and specifically to functional elements inseveral NTROs that require the identificationand assessment of biological and chemical agents.

As a complex homeostatic system, the humanbody reacts in complex ways to insult. Focusingon the disease and trauma processes, and thebody’s responses to them, this Strategic ResearchArea will identify useable markers of exposure,disease and systemic injury. These markers canbe used for screening individuals and makingtreatment decisions. Some of these markers ofchemical or biological exposure or infection maybe detectable without invasive sample collection.

Accurate assessment of chemical poisoning andphysical injury or burns has benefits for triage invarious contexts. In the case of physical injuryand burns, one would hope to detect early stagesof major organ failure that might not be obviousotherwise.

In the case of attack by an infectious agent whichreplicates in the body, the body provides its ownculture medium and amplifying systems fordetection and identification of agent. The soonera biological attack can be detected and character-ized and the victims identified, the better the

7


8


Chapter I

chances that a disease outbreak can be containedand that exposed individuals will survive. Inmany instances the threat agent will not bedetected in the environment and the earliest pos-sibility for detecting and characterizing the agentwill be through testing specimens from exposedindividuals. The hypothesis is that early stages ofthe disease process and the body’s initial responseto a pathogen produce measurable signatures thatwould be useful for early identification ofexposed individuals and at least preliminary char-acterization of the agent. Such testing will alsobe useful to distinguish contagious individualsfrom those who are not dangerous to others.

Aside from its value in preparedness for a terroristattack, this research has the potential to revolu-tionize the practice of internal medicine.Moreover, the required machinery and consum-ables are only likely to be effectively available insufficient quantities (and with sufficient reliabil-ity) if they are in routine use in medical practice.Therefore this strategic research area should beconducted or at least overseen by an organizationwith broad medical responsibilities such as theNational Institute of Allergy and InfectiousDisease.

The benefits from research on plant and animalbiomarkers are as significant in agriculture andanimal husbandry. These fields are important tohuman health as well, because animals and plantscan be vectors for human disease. The payoff inthese fields would appear earlier because of thelower threshold for regulatory approvals for testsand assessments applied to animals.

Objectives:

• Developing knowledge of signatures of expo-sure, injury, poisoning, and disease process,and the body’s response; understanding theavailability of these signatures for sensing andfor testing of specimens; and understandinghow these signatures change during the courseof chemical exposure or disease induced bybiological agents.

• Assessing the usefulness of these indicators asdiscriminators between different threat agents

and between the infected and non-infectedstates, and between severe and less severeinjuries and illnesses.

• Understanding the value of alternative rapidclinical testing systems for accurately readingand assessing these indicators.

• Expand basic knowledge of plant and animalgenomic structures and functional genomics.

• Characterize and assess biomarkers of plantand animal disease.

• Develop the substantive information underly-ing databases that can be provided to “firstdetectors” and emergency responders to dis-criminate between normal conditions of plantcrops and other plants vs. the presence of con-taminants or pathogens of concern in nationalagricultural defense.

Thrusts:

• Understanding biomarkers of exposure anddisease progression in human and animalbreath, saliva, mucous, sweat, blood, excreta,and retinal scans.

• Calibrating the wide range of “normal” valuesto be expected in humans, animals, andplants.

• Physiological markers and signatures of disease.

• Plant and animal genomic and proteomic vari-ability and systems.

• Drawing conclusions from field observablephysiological symptoms.

• Assessing the potential of methods of rapidlyand reliably “reading” biomarkers.

Applications:

• Screening for injury or illness.

• Identification of disease agent.

• Distinguishing contagious from non-contagious individuals.

Introduction

• Triage for agriculture, animal husbandry.

• Understanding of wild animal disease vectors.

D. Planning Process

Project Responder has identified key areas whereadditional investment in technology developmentand commercialization could provide high pay-offs in response capability in both the near andlonger terms. It has done this by involvingresponders and technologists in a disciplinedprocess that takes current and emerging technolo-gies and advanced products into account. Withinthese key areas, it has been able to suggest mecha-nisms by which these payoffs can be achieved.

For example, one of the key capabilities of inter-est to responders is for squad, departmental, andincident commanders to be able know the posi-tion, and, if possible, health status and cumula-tive agent exposure status of all responders at anincident scene. Inexpensive radio-frequency tech-nologies are available to perform at least the loca-tion function in open environments, but technol-ogists are not sure how or even whether thesecapabilities could be provided within buildings,underground, or in the rubble that could resultfrom a building collapse. The technology planfor unified incident command thus includes twothrusts in this area: first,evaluation of operational andsystem concepts that integratecurrent technologies anddemonstration to facilitatecommercialization of a near-term solution; and, second,strategic research into thepropagation of UltraWideband Radio Frequencysignals underground, inbuildings, and in rubble, toprecede the system design ofa more capable, longer-term,solution.

The following chapters con-tain technology plans for the

twelve National Terrorism Response Objectives(NTROs) identified by this nation’s emergencyresponders as documented in the ProjectResponder March 2003 report. The twelveNTROs provide a structure whereby the breadthof emergency responder capabilities, required tosuccessfully respond to a catastrophic terrorismevent, can be divided into manageable pieces forthe technology planning process.

These plans assume that, whereas emergencyresponders will have the responsibility to deployand use equipment and technologies in responseto terrorist acts, the federal government will haveprimary responsibility for investing in researchand development of technologies for terrorismresponse not currently available and not underdevelopment commercially.

The technology plans result from a six-stepprocess designed to develop a “capabilities-based”national technology plan for terrorism response.Although the steps in the process are depicted assequential, in practice they overlap and were con-ducted iteratively. The steps in the process aredepicted below.

Each NTRO chapter contains five elements: adefinition of the needed capability, a set of oper-ational environments for evaluating capability

9


1. Establish Scope of Effort and Framework for RDT&E Plan(Vision and National Terrorism Response Objectives)

PROGRESS:National Terrorism

Response Capability Increase

2. Identify Capabilities Needed by Responders:(1) Operational (2) Functional (Supporting)

3. Identify Capability Gaps and Possible Technology Solutions

4. Establish Technology Goals to Focus RDT&E on Closing Gaps(Reponse Technology Objectives)

5. Identify Opportunities for Supporting Demonstrations

6. Track Progress with RDT&E Roadmap

Six-Step National Terrorism Response Technology Planning Process

1 0


Chapter I

needs and shortfalls, a number of functional capa-bilities that together define the operational needin more detail, a discussion of current capabilitiesand shortfalls for each of the functional capabili-ties, and the technology plan itself, made up of asummary technology roadmap and a set ofResponse Technology Objectives, structured toguide technology investments in order to producea relatively efficient and orderly improvement incapabilities available to responders.

Operational Environments

Operational environments represent the variety ofcontexts in which the functional capabilities areassessed. The operational environments definedin this process have been deliberately kept broadand simple. There is infinite variation in theoperational environments emergency respondersmay face. However, it was clear from the work-shops that emergency responders automaticallycalibrate in their minds the type and magnitudeof events about which they need to be concerned.Asking responders to work through detailed sce-narios to arrive at requirements did not appear toimprove the process and seemed in someinstances to constrain thought by focusing tootightly on the details of the particular scenariopresented. The responders were comfortable withthe level of detail and variation the current struc-ture provides. While this level of detail has beenchosen to appropriately represent responder per-spectives, it is possible that a higher level of dis-crimination will prove necessary in some specificcases as detailed technology planning proceeds.

Functional Capabilities

The functional capabilities represent the tasks orfunctions that must be accomplished in order toachieve mission success within the overall defini-tion of the NTRO. If responders cannot cur-rently accomplish these functional elements asthey have defined them, then the elementsinclude unmet needs—gaps that must be bridgedif responders are to be prepared for terrorism.

The functional elements in this document havebeen vetted in dozens of field interviews with

responders and technologists at the local, state,and federal levels, reviewed by senior experts onthe Senior Advisory Group, and further tested indepth and refined in eight workshops. Theseinterviews and workshops reflect the expertinsight and advice of over 125 emergency respon-ders across all disciplines, and over 135 technolo-gists and planning experts from government, laboratories, universities, and industry.

Within each NTRO, functional capabilitiesappear in order of priority (i.e., importance as aneeded response capability). In interviews andworkshops, the responders were asked to priori-tize among the marginal or unavailable capabili-ties: “which ones are most important to havesoonest?” However, one must keep in mind thata response objective (e.g., a NTRO) will not bemet without some level of capability present fromall of the functional elements. Moreover, thefunctional capabilities are defined at a sufficientlyhigh level of generality that some needs in a high-priority functional capability may actually be lessurgent than some of the most important needs ina lower-ranked functional capability.

Current Capabilities and Shortfalls

The analytical bridge between a statement ofneeds and a technology plan is an understandingof the gaps between capabilities available todayand the prioritized goals of responders. To sup-port this analysis, the operational environmentsand supporting functional capability elements arearrayed on a matrix, with operational environ-ments along the horizontal axis and functionalcapability elements on the vertical axis. At eachintersection in the matrices, three nested boxesappear, with each box colored either green, yel-low, or red. The colors within each nested boxindicate the availability of capabilities and tech-nologies, as illustrated in the sample chart on thenext page.

The color of the outermost box indicates theavailability of the functional capability to theresponder. That is, for this box, the Project askedparticipants “does this functional capability existtoday for the operational environment?” The

Introduction

results of that assessment are expressed in thematrices by assigning a color to the outermostbox: green if the functional capability existstoday; yellow if the capability is marginal orunevenly available among responders; and red ifthe functional capability does not yet exist.

If the availability of a functional capability ele-ment was judged to be limited or non-existent,participants were asked to consider why this is so(e.g., is it a cost issue for all or some jurisdictions,or is the technology just not there?). Theresponses to that question are noted in the dis-cussion of the Current Capabilities for each func-tional capability element.

For functional capabilities where the respondersindicated marginal or no availability, ProjectResponder brought together technologists andresponders in workshops to recommend technol-ogy programs to close those gaps. To lay thefoundation for these recommended programs, theNTRO chapters summarize existing technologyprograms and areas of development that haveapplication to the functional element, and char-acterize what technology limitations and barriersare in the way of achieving the needed capability.

The NTRO chaptersalso summarize “GapFillers.” The discussionin these sections gener-ally describes technol-ogy and non-technologymeasures that could betaken to close the gapsbetween what respon-ders need and what theyhave. Where specifictechnology developmentprograms are recom-mended, the Gap Fillersare more fully describedat the end of the chap-ter, in the Response

Technology Objectives. However, the Gap Fillerdiscussion also includes some options for technol-ogy transfer that can improve capability withouta development program, as well as non-materialsolutions (e.g., changes or increases in funding fortraining, doctrine, organization, etc.).

Based on this information, the project asked thetechnologists and responders “what is the near-term availability of the technologies needed to fill the gaps in capability?” The answer to thisquestion provides the color for the second nested box in each matrix cell. The box is green if technology is available in the near-term(i.e., less than five years). The box is yellow iftechnology is marginally available in the near-term. The box is red if technology does not seemto be in the R&D pipeline.

Technologists were asked to assess the overalltechnological risk of the R&D effort required tosurmount the gaps identified. This level of risk isrepresented by the color of the third, innermostnested box in each matrix cell. For this issue,technologists were asked “what is the technologi-cal risk for developing technology to close thesegaps?” The box is colored green if the risk wasconsidered low, yellow if the risk was considered

1 1


4 Note that if an outer box is green, the subsequent issues are irrelevant and thus not addressed. Thus, areas where capability is availablewould be represented by a single green box. Furthermore, if a box is gray, responders believed that the functional capability was not appli-cable to that specific operational environment.

1. Body Protection From All Hazards

2. Long-Term Respiratory Protection – Oxygen Available

3. Long-Term Respiratory Protection – Oxygen Deficient

4. Escape Respiratory Protection

5. Responder Decontamination

Personal Protection and EquipmentOperational Environment

Functional Capabilities NuclearRadiologicalBiologicalChemicalHigh Explosive/

Incendiary

Green – Available Yellow – Uneven ormarginal capability

Red – Capabilityabsent

12

3

3. What are the technology risks of developing this functional capability?LOW / MEDIUM / HIGH

1. Do emergency respondershave the functional capabilityin this operational environment?YES / MARGINAL / NO

2. Are technologies available in the near-term to provide this functional capability?YES / MARGINAL / NO

Sample NTRO with Color-Coding Legend4

1 2


Chapter I

moderate and red if the risk was considered high.Because of the level of aggregation at which thesejudgments were made, they must be treated as anoverall characterization of the technical difficultyof achieving all of the responders’ goals, ratherthan the level of technical risk associated eitherwith each goal.

One purpose for providing these data points in asimplified color-coding schema is so that readersinterested in the forest more than the trees caneasily orient themselves to the overall pattern ofgaps in capability and the likely role of currentand additional technology investments in bridg-ing these gaps. Thus, towards the beginning ofeach NTRO chapter below, the entire NTROand its constituent functional capabilities are rep-resented in a single matrix with the color-codedboxes. This matrix helps the reader identify at aglance three important facts: those areas whereimproved capabilities are needed, the degree offocus and likely success of existing technologyprograms in providing the full set of capabilitieswanted by responders, and the significance of thetechnological obstacles that stand in the way ofdelivering those capabilities.

Areas with red in the outer boxes (that is, withsevere shortfalls in capability available to emer-gency responders) but with a green middle boxare areas where existing technology programs willprovide solutions, or in some instances where theneeded solutions are primarily not technologicalin nature. (The needed solutions may be organi-zational or budgetary.)

If the middle box is red or yellow but the inner-most box is green, that means that current pro-grams are not adequately focused on responderneeds but that low-risk technology solutions areavailable. In this case the appropriate recommen-dation is for a technology integration (low-riskdevelopment) program or even simply a programfor encouraging the commercial integration ofcommercial-off-the-shelf technology (COTS)through a testing and certification program. Onthe other hand, matrix cells that are all red repre-sent a needed functional capability element thatposes significant technological challenges to

achieve the ultimate desired level of capability.For some capabilities, it will be important to pur-sue both near-term and longer-term developmentefforts, with some attention to transition betweenthe two, to maximize important responder capa-bilities in all time periods.

Technology Roadmaps – Goals to CloseCapability Gaps

Each of the NTRO chapters presents technologyroadmaps that describe the development path togreater capability. The building blocks for theroadmaps are Response Technology Objectives(RTOs). The RTOs represent recommended pro-grams for the federal government to adopt, inaddition to current efforts. For some neededfunctional capabilities, it is natural to define acoherent technology effort to remedy all the tech-nologically-determined capability shortfalls in asingle program. In these cases, there will be aone-to-one mapping between the RTOs andfunctional capabilities. In other instances, keytechnologies may enable more than one func-tional capability, or a functional capability mayrequire a heterogeneous set of technologies to fillthe identified shortfalls.

As presented in the NTRO matrices, the assessedlevel of technological risk in meeting key capabil-ity objectives plays a key role in determiningwhat sort of technology effort is proposed. Hightechnological risk generally implies a need forapplied or even basic research to develop infor-mation about the feasibility of novel technicalapproaches. A high degree of parallelism indevelopment would also be desirable. An inter-mediate level of risk suggests that the basic tech-nical knowledge is available but that the imple-mentation of this knowledge pushes the currentstate of the art, requiring a significant engineer-ing development effort.

Low technological risk implies that the short-fall can be remedied through straightforwardcombinations of known technologies that arealready available in the military or commercialspheres, whether they are already combined incommercial-off-the-shelf products or not. Low

1 3


Introduction

technological risk should not be taken to indicatethat little effort or ingenuity is required; the com-bination of significant unmet needs and lowassessed technological risk often suggests the pres-ence of thorny technology integration issues (forexample between multiple existing and novel sys-tems) or significant organizational roadblocks totechnology adoption; effort required in theseinstances may in fact exceed that needed todevelop some previously unavailable widget thaton its own solves a capability problem.

In some functional capability areas, improvedcapability is urgently needed yet the ultimatetechnological solutions require extensive researchand development. This situation generallyprompted technologists to recommend a multi-pronged approach in which a relatively low-riskdevelopment program can be aimed at a set ofmeaningful intermediate capability goals whilehigher-risk and longer-term activities are begunthat are oriented toward the ultimate levels ofcapability desired.

There is considerable art in defining technologyobjectives to close capability gaps. One wantsobjectives and interim milestones that are con-crete enough to enable easy assessment ofprogress, but that are broad and flexible enoughso that technology development programs cantake advantage of learning during the R&Dprocess. R&D programs with similar contentneed to be managed together, so that cross-fertil-ization is easy and so that budgets can adapt assome paths become more or less promising thanoriginally thought. Thus the structure of the

RTOs may need to be adjusted to the organiza-tion that ends up responsible for their execution.

The RTOs describe technology objectives andmilestones, and provide rough estimates of costand schedule. The cost and schedule estimatesassume the continuation of currently pro-grammed efforts in related areas and assumeeffective leveraging of those programs. The esti-mates are based on top-down expert judgmentrather than a detailed bottom-up plan. Moreprecise estimates would require knowledge of theactual budgetary and institutional environmentin which the work is to be carried forward.Thus, the next step would be to choose a respon-sible federal agency and an execution strategy foreach RTO, and determine the appropriate degreeof risk and parallel development for each pro-gram, as well as the institutional context in whichvarious research and development tasks would beperformed. Even with this context firmly estab-lished, several planning iterations will be requiredto achieve stable and accurate cost and scheduleestimates.

Because of the current rapid rate of evolution inthe federal government’s mechanisms for con-ducting homeland security R&D, the ResponseTechnology Objectives do not identify specificagencies for program execution. However, thediscussion in each chapter identifies some agen-cies that are participating in key areas of technol-ogy development: in such cases, it is importantthat current programs and expertise be leveragedin whatever new arrangements are developed inthe Department of Homeland Security.

1 4


Chapter I

1 5


Definition

Personal Protection and Equipment (PPE) is thecapability to protect responders, via gear from theeffects of chemical, biological, and radiologicalagents as well as blast and incendiary effects.


The capabilities required of emergency respon-ders and the needed protections will vary by thetype of incident. Chemical, biological, nuclear,radiological, and explosive/incendiary eventsplace different requirements on protective equipment. Within these distinct operationalenvironments, there is a near infinite number ofvariations in terms of size, severity, specific agent,geographic area, and so on. However, respondersbelieve that they need to be prepared for the fullrange of effects, and that these variations wouldmean little in terms of the protection they wouldneed. Thus the discussion here deals largely withthe four major types of threat agent that respon-ders needed to be protected from: chemical, bio-logical, radiological, and the heat and kineticinsult from explosive/incendiary events. Theassessments in the tables are at this level. (Theeffects of nuclear explosions were resolved intocombinations of explosive, incendiary, and radio-logical effects.)

In discussing Personal Protection and Equipment,responders have typically focused primarily onscenarios that can be handled locally; there hasnot been much discussion of nuclear holocausts,for example. Disasters involving large parts ofstates or regions, as would be the case for aerialdispersion of chem/bio agents, have not been discussed much, although such scenarios loomlarge at the national level. The responders in

discussing Personal Protection and Equipmenthave stayed “close to their home turf.”Nonetheless, responders believe that large eventswould affect the amount of protective gearneeded, more than the nature of the gear needed.

Chemical and biological incidents are in between a strictly local problem and a national-level catastrophe – partly because of relativelycommon HAZMAT incidents; partly because ofthe special teams being formed at the nationallevel, as well as recent anthrax incidents.

It should be noted that the responders want tominimize the number of sets of protective gearrequired. Therefore they want any proposed setof new gear to be effective, not only for the majorterrorist disasters, but also for everyday events.(This means that the new gear must have all thedifferent new features thoroughly integrated inthe design.) This is not just a matter of limitinginventory or even saving time in turning out foran incident, although these are also very impor-tant. Many responders will arrive on an inci-dent scene, often equipped only with everydaygarments, before the incident has been fully characterized; in addition, there is a danger thatterrorists will employ secondary devices at anincident scene that could add additional hazardsto an ongoing incident. For these reasons, mov-ing in the direction of an all-hazard protectioncapability will sometimes be a matter of life anddeath, not just convenience.

Needed Functional Capabilities andPriorities

Protecting emergency responders is a top priority;keeping them in the best physical and mentalcondition is essential to maintain the vital

Chapter II

Personal Protection and Equipment (PPE)Chapter Chair: Dr. John LyonsChapter Coordinator: Michelle Royal

1 6


Chapter II

services they must provide. This NTRO isfocused on gear such as clothing and masks forthe individual.

Responders and technologists considered a set offive functional capabilities to handle the opera-tional context describedabove. These capabilitiesare presented below inorder of priority:

• Body Protection fromAll Hazards

• Long-Term Respira-tory Protection – O2

Available

• Long-Term Respira-tory Protection – O2

Deficient

• ResponderDecontamination

• Escape RespiratoryProtection

Responders’ top priority is protecting the body,primarily through protecting the skin (i.e., rang-ing from firefighter turnout suits to the full protection of HAZMAT uniforms) and then,protecting the lungs (i.e., masks of various kinds).The discussion did not deal with preventing fallsand other physical injuries.

Finally, the responders are concerned about thethoroughness of decontamination. This becamepart of the separate functional capability ondecontamination in this NTRO, and also part ofthe sensor plan presented in Chapter III (DIDA).

Overall State of Technology forPersonal Protection

The matrix to the right shows a mix of moderateto high technological challenges in raising thelevel of capabilities for emergency response. Thechart shows relatively few green assessments,mainly for decontamination for radiological and high-explosive/incendiary, where respondersfeel they have acceptable procedures. The key

technology challenges will be in body and respira-tory protection, where (especially in respiratoryprotection) little research is going on and thetrade-offs between weight and duration will bedifficult.

PPE.1 – Body Protection from All Hazards.The ability to have full-body protection for respon-ders from all hazards: not only CBRE, but also toxic industrial chemicals and other hazardous materials.

This element includes not only terrorists’ use ofCBRE but also industrial chemicals and otherhazardous materials. The rationale is that respon-ders need to minimize the number of differentsuits, masks, and the like they must carry. Thismakes a one-suit-fits-all-needs solution veryattractive. In this way the same protective systemworks for everyday hazards as well as terrorist disasters. As mentioned above, given the likeli-hood that responders will arrive at an incidentbefore it is fully characterized, and the possibilityof secondary devices with additional threat agentsaimed at responders, the all-hazards suit will be alifesaver as well as a convenience.

Goals:

The responders set the following goals for thiselement. These goals were used to assess the

12

3

1. Do emergency responders have the functional capability in this operational environment? YES / MARGINAL / NO

2. Are technologies available in the near-term to provide this functional capability? YES / MARGINAL / NO


Gray coloration signifies ‘Not Applicable.’

Personal Protection and Equipment

1. Body Protection from All Hazards

2. Long-term Respiratory Protection – Oxygen Available

3. Long-term Respiratory Protection – Oxygen Deficient

4. Responder Decontamination

5. Escape Respiratory Protection


Functional Capabilities NuclearRadiologicalBiologicalChemical

HighExplosive/Incendiary


1 7


current capabilities and provide the target capa-bilities for the plan.

• Lightweight: <15 lbs for the full ensemble(gloves, boots, suit, helmet) but not includingadd-ons such as microclimate cooling or com-munications gear – current bunker gear forfirefighters is heavy when dry, and worse whenwet.

• Rapid donning and doffing. Velcro hasimproved this a lot but donning essentially air-tight gear against hostile atmospheres generallyrequires a second person to assist.

• Comfortable; microclimate conditioning – theairtight, watertight suits need climate controland ventilation for any extended period. It islikely that semi-permeable fabrics will requirethis too.

• Capable of being used with existing gear. Ifnew items are to be used with existing items,old and new must be compatible. For lawenforcement, the new suit must have a pocketfor ballistic vests, etc.

• Improved dexterity, especially for gloves.

• Waterproof.

• Able to self-decontaminate – this suggestsreactive chemicals in the material that willneutralize the hostile agents.

• Exceeds current standards. Capable of meet-ing anticipated future standards as they areproduced and adopted.

• Built-in extraction handle. This will enableone responder to pull another out of a tightspot without taking off protective gear.

• Non-conductive electrically.

• A base suit that works for all missions withappropriate add-ons for different situations.This is a great challenge with a great cost pay-off as well as simplifying logistics.

• Variable visibility of suits. Most of the timeresponders want to be visible but SWAT teamsmay want to have low visibility.

• Provide protection against thermal, ballistic,CBRE. These are the basic needs.

• Durable against tearing, puncture, and impact.

• Designed to fit. One-size-fits-all is not goodenough.

• Hearing protection.

• Laser vision protection. Law enforcementofficers, often first on the scene, are concernedabout encountering terrorists using laserweapons.

Current Capabilities:

There are no ensembles that meet all of thesegoals. HAZMAT and bomb squad gear come theclosest. Bunker gear for firefighters is heavy,becomes waterlogged, and is not designed forchem/bio or radiological hazards. It does a goodjob against thermal, impact and puncture threats.The military have suits designed primarily forchemical attack (though it turns out they areeffective against biological attack as well). TheArmy has bomb fragmentation shields that areput under their uniforms, but they are heavy andcannot be worn routinely. The Army’s battledress overgarment and the Joint ServicesLightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST)are both based on a charcoal interlayer to absorbthe toxic agents. The JSLIST suit is a newerdesign, lighter and is claimed to be more comfortable.

Law enforcement officers have ballistic protectionand little else. Emergency medical personnel cur-rently do not make much use of special gear.

Radioactive sources may emit various kinds of injurious radiation. Some are either non-defensible with lightweight materials (gamma,neutron, and x-rays,) or they are charged particles with limited ability to penetrate the

1 8


Chapter II

skin or clothing (alphas, betas). The alphas andbetas can attach to larger dust particles and findtheir way into the lungs or through breaks in theskin into the blood stream. Ingestion sometimesis possible. However the usual chemical suitsprovide excellent protection and the particles areeasily washed off.5 While exposure to known,low levels of gamma, x-ray, or neutron radiationcan be limited by time to relatively safe levels,high levels require very dense metals such as leadfor effective shielding. Specialized suits and,preferably, robots should be used for clean up andfor insertion of high-level radiation sources into ashielded container.

All of the goals are desirable but most importantamong them are: lightweight protection, durableagainst tearing, puncture, and impact, good fit tothe wearer, improved glove dexterity, waterproof,and compatible with other gear used by the serv-ice. The concept of a single base suit for all withadd-ons for particular scenarios has great appealbut is regarded as very difficult technically toachieve. Cost savings from having one suit ratherthan many different suits would be substantial.There has, as yet, been no movement toward thisgoal. A possible exception is in the military asexemplified by the Army’s work on semi-perme-able fabrics. They are designed for chem/bio use;they may or may not be suitable for firefighting.

State of the Art:

There is a new research alliance at the Institutefor Soldier Nanotechnology (ISN) at MIT that isconducting a basic and early applied research pro-gram covering some of the goals of this func-tional capability. Other efforts are underway atthe Army’s Natick laboratories. The focus of theArmy’s FFW program is similar to other goals ofthis functional capability.

At the Army’s Natick laboratories, the focus is shifting from layered suits with a charcoalinterlayer to a lighter suit with controlled orsemi-permeable fabric. There is just enough permeability to allow water molecules to pass

through (i.e., sweat) but nothing larger. Thisconcept is in late applied research wherein addi-tional polymers are being evaluated. Whereas thecurrent Land Warrior program in the Army isbased on the JSLIST technology, the semi-permeable membrane technology is planned tocome to fruition by 2010. The Future ForceWarrior effort (fielded by 2015-2020 with thefirst units deployed by 2010) is planned to relyon semi-permeable fabric composites with active,self-decontaminating properties.

The DoD is supporting a significant universityresearch effort to see what new benefits may beachieved through the use of nanomaterials andnanotechnology (see additional discussion ofthese technologies in Chapter I (Introduction) as(Strategic Research Areas)).

Technology Limitations and Barriers:

The challenge is not so much in designing a sys-tem to meet one or another goal but rather tomeet all the priority goals in one system.Reducing weight will be a challenge. Powersources for cooling the suit will be a limiting fac-tor as it is in nearly all military applications forthe individual war-fighter. A particular challengeis providing seals at zippers and other closures.

There are many schemes with good performanceagainst one or several hazards but they are notlightweight, easy to use, comfortable, or they fallshort of other needs and goals described above.Resistance to chem/bio agents might be achievedby reactive agents in the material and by reducedor near-zero permeability. The effectiveness ofreactive agents needs to be tested carefully todetermine how much toxin specific fabric coat-ings can handle; to see if there is a possibility, oreven a necessity, of a catalytic effect rather than astoichiometric one; what the shelf life of the coat-ing will be, and how responders can know if theactive agent(s) are still active. These propertieswill not necessarily be useful in firefighting – andmay be degraded by heat and water encounteredin typical firefighting situations.

5 See “Medical Management of Radiobiological Casualties Handbook” Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute, Bethesda, MD (April 2003).


1 9


What is needed is a combination of the latest inmaterials science and system engineering andergonomics. The one-suit-meets-all goal is themost intriguing idea. Reaching agreementamong the various groups of responders will bedifficult and will require patience and skill inconsensus building. This skill will be requiredboth in defining performance requirements andin developing the necessary purchase standardswhen the technical barriers have been overcome.

All scenarios are rated yellow for adequacy of current technical programs. They have smallbudgets, the market is relatively small, and thetest and certification capability is not adequate.

Gap Fillers:

The degree of risk for delivering these capabilitiesdepends upon how ambitious the future R&Dprogram objectives will be. For the one-suit-meets-all goals, the risks are very high. This is astretch goal that may very well not be met in theearly years but the fallout along the way shouldmeet many of the goals. The chem/bio risks aremoderate given the military’s high priorities.Radiological risks are low for alpha and beta par-ticles but high for gammas, x-rays, and neutrons.Ordinary protective garments will not address thelatter three forms of radiation hazards. The risksfor R&D on the high explosives and incendiaryscenario are rated high because this is where thenormal hazards of fire fighting, HAZMAT, andEMS fall along with the WMD high explosivesand incendiaries. Most of the current federalR&D is aimed at chem/bio hazards.

The priority goals for protective garments are:reduced weight for the thermal barriers, resistanceto tearing, puncture and impact, comfort, abilityto breathe, suppleness, self-decontamination,cooling systems and power sources, and provisionfor integrated communications. The basic suitshould contain as many of these as possible.However it is reasonable to mount separateresearch programs on some of these goals andthen integrate the various pieces into a finalproduct.

National nanotechnology research programsshould be integrated into an overall plan so thatresults flow smoothly into the overall programoutlined below. Integration of all the pieces mustbe planned. The acquisition strategy should beto involve all relevant research entities from theoutset by forming integrated advisory bodiesmade up of suppliers, R&D activities, the ulti-mate fielding entity, and the users. Similarly,R&D alliances should be formed among the per-formers. This way the work can be kept on trackand optimized easily.

The overall program might look like this:

• A basic and exploratory effort on self-decontamination, cooling systems and powersources, and sealing zippers and closures.

• An applied research program on fabrics tocombine resistance for all scenarios using thevarious schemes now either commercial or inadvanced development as starting points (i.e.,semi-permeable fabrics, products of nanotech-nology research programs, and cooling systemson the military drawing boards).

• Development work to build prototypes first ofindividual technologies for separate goals andthen of integrated systems; evaluate in the lab-oratory and in the field.

• Cost reduction via developmental engineeringwork to adapt military technology for emer-gency responder products.

PPE.2 – Long-Term Respiratory ProtectionWhere Oxygen is Available (i.e., AirPurification). The ability to have long-term respi-ratory protection in an oxygen-available environ-ment (air purification).

Goals:

• Duration: >12 hours.

• Weight: <10 ounces.

• Very low breathing resistance (400 liters/min.peak inhalation rate) and with positive pressure.

2 0


Chapter II

• Comfortable especially for the prolonged useanticipated in these goals.

• Vision – Full peripheral field of view (>120degrees) to include both lateral and vertical.No fogging.

• Integrated communications capability toinclude back to incident command center and to other responders.

• Residual life indicators for expendable components.

• Affordable: <$300 each.

• Interchangeable components with other man-ufacturers’ models.

• Capable of handling all hazards.

• Exceeds current standards and meets antici-pated new standards as they are adopted.

• Resistance to heat and cold and flash protection.

• Serviceable at the home base as opposed tohaving to return to the manufacturer.

• Useful for health care providers as well.

• Low physical profile; non-snagging.


The responders would like to have a single systemwith interchangeable components such as filters,face pieces, etc. The components should beinterchangeable with systems from all manufac-turers. This is not the case today but some of thegoals are met by currently available systems. Thisfunctional capability is rated today as overall mar-ginal and much work will be necessary to meetthe all-in-one goal. There are different filters fordifferent threats raising the possibility of the userselecting the wrong one, an action that could befatal. Breathing resistance is too high, makingthe user work too hard to breathe and shorteningthe length of time the user can wear the gear.Communications are difficult, if not impossible,lenses fog easily and the equipment is too heavy.The manufacturer must service most current systems.

State of the Art:

There are programs under way addressing someof the goals but not in an integrated fashion.


The most difficult challenge is to reduce weightsubstantially while increasing the capacity of thesorbents. (The current capability is that itrequires 11 oz. of sorbent to achieve six hours ofprotection.) Improved sorbents will help, butthis is likely going to be a trade-off in design.Improved communication through the mask isvery important and will be a challenge both tech-nically and to the weight limitation.

The risks for most of the goals are not high; an exception is the weight-capacity trade-off.Solving this trade-off satisfactorily will require a breakthrough in materials and in design.

Gap Fillers:

The following kinds of R&D are needed: mate-rials research; design of the mask assembly; designand performance of the filter elements.

• The materials work includes the sorbentsthemselves and should include new sorbents;e.g., nanoparticles based on carbon nanotubeswith additional molecules inside – caged struc-tures – with a very high capacity. CurrentR&D results should be integrated with theseprojects.

• Additional material work should be devoted tolens materials, antifogging technologies, lighterweight mask materials and improved sealants.

• Construction and evaluation of performanceshould include various combinations of filterelements with the goal of increasing capacityper unit weight and thereby lengthening time in service; also layering in various combinations to achieve performance againstthe broadest possible spectrum of toxins.Reduced resistance to breathing is a must, andwill be achieved from both new filter materialsand designs; possibly some form of the power-assisted air purifier respirators might supply ananswer.


2 1


PPE.3 – Long-Term Respiratory Protection inan Oxygen-Deficient Environment. The ability to have long-term respiratory protection in an oxy-gen-deprived environment with unknown hazards.

Goals:

• Long-term: >4 hours under stress.

• Heads-up display capability.

• Weight except mask: <10 lbs. (Current is 20 lbs without the mask.)

• Integrated communications to command cen-ter and other responders.

• Comfortable, ergonomically designed.

• Fragmentation/shrapnel/crush protection.

• Status indicator for consumable parts.

• Ability to withstand thermal loads, both hotand cold.

• Serviceable at the responders’ home bases.

• Durable.

• Affordable: <$3000 each. (Currently $5000-6000.)

• Integrated environmental monitoring(addressed in Chapter III (DIDA), under “sensors”).

• Full peripheral field of view, 120 degrees bothlateral and vertical. No fogging.

• Integrated personal alert device to indicate distress emergency.

• Interchangeable components (especially theface piece) with other breathing apparatus.

• Meets appropriate and anticipated emergingfuture standards.

• Low physical profile; no snagging.

Current Capability:

Current systems include principally self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA). Today’sSCBAs are typically rated up to one-hour serviceat 4500 psi in the tank. They cost between$5,000 and $6,000 (cf the goals of four hoursand $3000). The responders discussedrebreathers – systems that remove carbon dioxideand generate fresh oxygen. These were pioneeredby the Navy submarine rescue programs and areused for deep-sea diving even today. They wereused by fire departments (based on potassiumsuperoxide, a hazardous material) before thenewer, lighter weight SCBAs were introduced.Given that many years have passed and muchnew chemistry has appeared, it would be worthan R&D investment to see what new conceptsmay be possible. Tethered systems are not beingaddressed because of the entanglement problem.There is a new system available that claims utilityas a rebreather for up to four hours. The makeralso claims it has the potential to be adapted as aone-hour SCBA. It weighs somewhat more thanthe current SCBAs.

The SCBAs of today are heavy and have a name-plate lifetime of up to one hour. In practice, thewearer can only stay in the hazardous atmosphereabout twenty minutes because of the need foringress and egress time plus a good safety margin.This is enough time for a rescue but little work-ing time otherwise.

State of the Art:

There is not much cutting-edge activity in thisarea. There is some new work on rebreathers in the Navy. The current posture was given bythe Boston FD; namely, they abandonedrebreathers in 1978 when the improved SCBAsbecame available.


Reducing weight to reach the above goals whileincreasing duration of service is another difficulttrade-off, similar to that for filter masks. Thecurrent fiberglass-wound aluminum tank was

2 2


Chapter II

developed by NASA thirty years ago. In thefuture there may be materials developments thatpermit higher air pressures. Alternative means ofstoring the gas (air) can possibly be had by novelsorbents within the tank to obviate the need forhigh pressures.

Other challenges for the masks are similar tothose for filter masks.

The technological risks of achieving these goalsare significant. Achieving much higher pressuresin the air tank will be difficult and would requiresubstantial advances in strength of materials. Onthe other hand, developing a solid sorbent systemto hold large quantities of sorbed air wouldrequire both very different sorbents for air, and asystem to release the sorbed gas. These are newdepartures and have inherent development risks.

Gap Fillers:

The R&D for the mask itself will be similar tothat for filter masks (PPE.2 (Long-TermRespiratory Protection – O2 Available)). There is aneed for electronic communication from withinthe mask. The communication piece is a func-tion described in Chapter IV, as an element ofthe Unified Incident Command DecisionSupport and Interoperable Communications(UIC) NTRO, but the integration of micro-phones, headphones, or speakers and controlsand displays into protective equipment will needto be done as the suits and masks are developed.The same is true for power supplies for systemsin the mask or garments, which are a part ofChapter IX (Logistics Support).

The air supply requires substantial exploratoryand applied research to address the weight andduration goals. The assumption is that we cannotsimply increase the pressures in the existing orsimilar tank systems to reach greater than 4 hourslifetime in service use and a weight for the stor-age system of under 10 lbs. What is needed is alow-pressure tank filled with a new air sorbentthat will hold the requisite air weight in a modestvolume at a modest pressure. This requirement issimilar to that faced by the hydrogen-fueled carengineers, only much less hazardous.

PPE.4 – Responder Decontamination. The ability to decontaminate response personnel,including law enforcement and medical person-nel, and their personal equipment on scene andin all weather conditions.

Goals:

• Environmentally benign.

• Benign to equipment.

• On-scene real-time detection of any residualhazards – decontamination assurance.

• Dry decontamination.

• Speed – fast as a baggage conveyor.

• Ability of the garments and personal equip-ment to self-decontaminate.

Current Capability:

Most methods in use today begin with drenchingwater showers. If chemicals or biological agentsare suspected then the most common reagent ischlorine as solutions of sodium hypochlorite(common laundry bleach) in concentrated ordilute forms. These solutions are relatively slow –fifteen minutes exposure is recommended todestroy some biologicals; e.g., anthrax spores.The concentrated form (5% – 6% for laundrybleach) is hazardous to the skin and eyes andshould be used with caution.

A Canadian company has developed a foamedproduct that is said to be effective in bomb suppression as well as in decontamination applications.

The Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Insti-tute has issued a report that states that decontam-inating particulates containing alpha or beta par-ticles (the only long-lived radiation hazards) isnot difficult and the present techniques should beadequate – the particles are readily washed away.(Decontamination of wounds is somewhat morecomplicated.) In addition radiacs or geiger coun-ters are effective sensors for residual radiationhazards.


Responders lack reliable sensors to determinewhether chem/bio decontamination has beeneffective. They therefore are reluctant to reusedecontaminated garments. They prefer to discardthem. There is a serious psychological barrier toreuse. (Responders are less wary of decontami-nated solid surfaces; e.g., tools and the like. SeeChapter V (Response and Recovery).)

State of the Art:

There are two approaches at present: improveddecontamination chemicals for use in showersetc., and self-decontaminating fabrics whereinreactive entities are built into the fabric. This is arelatively untested concept (see discussion underPPE.1 (Body Protection From All Hazards)) nowin research funded by DoD. Chlorine-containingwashes are hard on the environment and on thefibers. Substitute chemicals are being studied.The Army’s Edgewood Arsenal has several proj-ects under way including enzymatic decontami-nation, ultraviolet light decontamination for bio-logics, and high-pressure steam or evensupercritical steam. There is no R&D on thepsychological problem of reusing contaminatedequipment such as garments. Sensors responsiveat low concentrations on surfaces are required butnot yet available. (See Chapter III (DIDA) forsensor development.)

Technology Limitations and Barriers:There are two primary challenges: chem/bio sen-sors effective at low levels of surface contamina-tion, and the psychological resistance to reuse ofdecontaminated garments. (See discussion above.)

The technological risk of developing these capa-bilities is moderate to low. There are a numberof possibilities for destroying chemical or biologi-cal residues, and one can be optimistic thatimprovements over straight chlorine systems will be fielded. On the other hand, developingthe low-level sensors capable of relieving the psychological barriers to reuse will be much more difficult. Given the concern over contami-nation from terrorist acts, the sensors are likely to be developed. Successful research into the psychology of emergency responders is moreproblematic.

Gap Fillers:

The several decontamination efforts currentlyunderway should be coordinated and new fund-ing for research coupled to these efforts. Currentfunding sources should continue their sponsor-ship. The self-decontaminating fabric concept isa good one; it is currently being looked into bythe military. DoD is also looking at nano-fabricsengineered to detect as well as neutralize haz-ardous chemicals and biologics. Reliable sensorswill be required to assure that the agents in thefabric have done their job. (See Chapter III(DIDA).)

Beyond maintaining or enhancing current R&Dprograms, the principal needs here are coordina-tion and integration followed by field testing. Ofconcern is the completeness of the destruction ofthe toxins; this in turn means introduction ofanalytical techniques and sensors effective atdetecting very low levels of toxins. Testing willinvolve trials with individuals in full field uni-form exposed to a surrogate chemical, followedby a standard decontamination wash and then evaluation.

PPE.5 – Escape Respiratory Protection.Protection for escape from contaminated areas butnot used for entry and rescue operations.

Goals:

• Duration – 15 minutes.

• Easily deployed with safe packaging.

• Easily portable – on belt or in vehicle.

• Compact size: 4" by 3" by 1/2"; weight: 8 ounces.

• Extended shelf life – minimum five years.

• Lens – full peripheral vision (lateral and verti-cal) 120 degrees; no fogging.

• Nondegradable, environmentally stable;ruggedized.

• Disposable.

2 3


2 4


Chapter II

• Carrying case (designed to wear on the belt).

• All hazards.

• Status indicator.

• Resistant to thermal loads (hot and cold) andflash protection.

• Affordable (<$100).

• Integrated communications.

Current Capability:

The utility of the escape mask is to enhance thelikelihood of escape from hazardous areas, not toperform tasks. Capability is marginal for rescuemasks. They are not universally used, many incurrent fire service stocks are years past the expi-ration dates. Available products are not conven-ient to wear, need to be more compact, and aredeficient in the same ways as air filtration masks(see PPE.2 (Long-Term Respiratory Protection – O2Available)). They are being distributed in somevenues – the Pentagon recently distributed some20,000 commercial products within the building.The Department of Defense Technical SupportWorking Group (TSWG) has recently had severalhoods evaluated using a draft NIOSH standard.Large numbers of these have been purchasedrecently by the Departments of State andDefense. The Interagency Board for EquipmentStandardization and Interoperability (IAB) urgesmore priority and funding for these masks. TheIAB’s requirements are similar to the goals listedabove. Given that the fire service is more likelyto require SCBAs in such environments, the userswill tend to be law enforcement and the EMSplus civilians in certain venues.

State of the Art:

Some R&D is being done in industry; little inthe military. The effort is probably sub-critical toachieving the goals described above.


Meeting the weight, size and duration goals willrequire a difficult trade-off. The result should fiton the responder’s belt. Adding communications

beyond, perhaps, voice enhancers (no powerrequired) will not be possible. Because of theweight and size restrictions it is probable that thefilter elements will be lighter and smaller thanthose in PPE.2 (Long-Term Respiratory Protection– O2 Available). Thus the elements must be atleast as effective as those required for PPE.2(Long-Term Respiratory Protection – O2 Available)filter masks, even though the time of use will bemuch less.

Gap Fillers:

Research and development for escape masks hasgoals that are so similar to those for ordinary filter masks that the research program for the former ought to derive from the program for the latter. Thus lighter mask materials, more effi-cient sorbents, better designs for the filter, voiceenhancement and so on should arise in the PPE.2(Long-Term Respiratory Protection – O2 Available)program and simply be adapted for PPE.5(Escape Respiratory Protection).

Personal Protection and EquipmentResponse Technology Objectives(PPErto)

The roadmap shows the recommended programswith their proposed funding as a function ofelapsed time. Even with the overlaps in timingthe chart tends to look linear. Yet R&D is sel-dom linear; rather, it is usually carried out withmany starts and stops, recursive loops and so on.Furthermore, the expenditures appear to besteady across each bar when, in fact, there will beramp-ups and ramp-downs within each bar.Separate RTOs are recommended for each of the five functional capabilities; however, as noted below, extensive coordination among thefirst three will be necessary. For the first three,the programs begin with exploration of new con-cepts going beyond what is currently in use or inactive R&D already. This exploration is basicresearch; it should produce new concepts to meetthe goals. There follows a period of appliedresearch, beginning while the basic work is stillgoing on. This research is to shape the basic concepts into working constructs that will solve one or more goals. This work will lead to


development of ideas into prototype workingmodels suitable for test, evaluation and demon-stration (T&E). Since cost is a significant barrieralready for emergency responders and since newtechnology often comes at a higher cost than thatwhich it replaces, engineering work for both costreduction and easier producibility is a separatebar.

Finally, there must be integration across most ofthe functional capabilities. To express this prop-erly would require another dimension. In partic-ular the results of PPErto.1 (Body Protection –Basic and Applied Research), PPErto.2 (RespiratoryProtection – O2 Available) and PPErto.3(Respiratory Protection – O2 Deficient) must becompatible with one another. The most effectivemeans of assuring this integration is to have itgoing on continually from the outset. Some sortof coordinating committee should be set up withrepresentatives from the R&D performers, themanufacturers, and the ultimate users.

For PPErto.1 (Body Protection – Basic andApplied Research), the current academic work andbasic research in nanotechnology should producenew materials technology for fabrics that willhave a degree of “smartness.” This work willcombine with explorations of other concepts toachieve the one-suit-fits-all goal. Appliedresearch will develop the new designs needed to incorporate the new concepts and will provide the basis for constructing prototypes for development work. Integration is for bothbackward compatibility with existing suits andmasks and for compatibility with new masks inPPErto.2 (Respiratory Protection – O2 Available)and PPErto.3 (Respiratory Protection – O2

Deficient).

For PPErto.2 (Respiratory Protection – O2

Available), the work will focus on lighter weightand more effective removal of toxins for longertime periods. This means materials research forlighter mask polymers and research on new sor-bents with higher capacities and effective over abroader range of toxins. There will be studies ofvarious designs for the filter packs, as well as forthe mask/filter combination. The mask must be

integrated into the suit mask combination of thefuture.

For PPErto.3 (Respiratory Protection – O2

Deficient), weight and duration of use are the key goals. Materials research on the maskpolymers and on the tank should provide someimprovement. Finding means of absorbing largequantities of air in a bed of sorbents especiallycreated for air absorption should allow storage of much more air at only moderate pressures.The results must be integrated with PPErto.1(Body Protection – Basic and Applied Research).

For PPErto.4 (Decontamination), there are twotechnical routes to be pursued. One is to finddecontaminating solutions that are less harmfulto equipment, suits and the like and to the envi-ronment. The other is to discover and make intoproducts, self-decontaminating fabrics such thattoxins are rendered harmless on contact and lessexternal decontamination is necessary. The latterapproach is included in PPErto.1 (Body Protection– Basic and Applied Research).

For PPErto.5 (Escape Respiratory Protection) theonly technical work that should be needed is toadapt the results of PPErto.2 (Respiratory protec-tion – O2 Available). The escape mask is essen-tially a downgrade of the new filter masks. Thebiggest challenge here is the size and weight lim-its. One expects that the higher effectiveness ofthe new filter agents as well as the lighter weightmask materials – both coming from PPErto.2(Respiratory Protection – O2 Available) – willenable meeting the weight and size goals.

PPErto.1 – Body Protection – Basic andApplied Research

Objectives:

Devise new concepts for improved body protec-tion and create the basis for prototypes. The ultimate goal is to provide the basis for a one-suit-meets-all-goals system. Research findingsfrom the DoD’s large investment in this area willbe fed into this activity, as will be results fromStrategic Research Areas described in Chapter I.The costs below are in addition to existing pro-grams and fundings.

2 5


2 6


Chapter II

Payoffs: The results will provide the basis for prototypesto be used for development and commercializa-tion of an advanced system of body protectionthat meets all threats with a minimum of special-ized add-ons. There will be more protection atan overall reduced cost to the responders.

Challenges: Obtaining improved performance for all threatsat reduced weight will involve trade-offs betweensets of mutually opposing requirements. Meetingthe one-suit-meets-all goals requirement may be astretch that cannot be completely met.

Milestones/Metrics:FY2005: Basic and exploratoryresearch to define the fundamentalconcepts to be used. Review the bestof ongoing work in the federal labs anduniversities to lay the base for further new con-cepts. Launch a coordination committee.

FY2006: Continue the basic and exploratorywork and begin applied research on the com-bined goals of the one-suit-fits-all-needs concept.Emphasize microclimate cooling, ballistic andbomb fragment protection, and new fabric con-structs.

FY2007: Complete the basic research. Beginintegration of findings from all programs andbegin work on prototypes.

FY2008: Continue applied research and beginadvanced development of the prototypes. Workon manufacturability and cost challenges.

FY2009-2011: Continue development workthrough FY2011. Final product is a field-demonstrated technology for a one-suit-fits-all-needs protective suit.

The proposed program in this plan is to comple-ment the DoD efforts, not duplicate it. It should begin with basic and exploratorywork apart from nanotechnology for three years.Beginning a year and a half into the basic pro-gram (see PPE Roadmap) applied research willconvert the new concepts into materials and

designs suitable for development work. Principaloutcomes will be: scientific and engineeringreports describing the new concepts and designsalong with appropriate patent disclosures. Theapplied work will produce the basis for proto-types used in the development phase.

This work will explore new fabrics and assem-blages of fabric types with the goals of preventingtoxins from entering, providing strength andtoughness, reducing weight, increasing comfortand dexterity. Some ideas include controlled permeability, microclimate control, fibers fromnanotechnology, and reactive substituents to neu-tralize the toxins.

PPErto.2 – Respiratory Protection – OxygenAvailable

Objectives:

Discover and demonstrate new materials and fil-ter and mask designs to achieve longer duration(>12 hrs), lighter weight (<10 oz.), effectiveagainst all toxins, low breathing resistance (at apeak breathing volume of 400 liters/min), andmeets the cost target of less than $300 per unit.The mask should be serviceable at the responders’home station rather than at the factory.

Payoffs:

Present filter masks suffer from the need tochange filter packs for different toxins and fromhigh breathing resistance. The new filter maskwill provide much longer time in use, be lighter,and have less breathing resistance, be effectiveagainst all toxins, as well as meet the cost goal.The responder will be able to wear the masklonger and be much more comfortable in it.

Challenges: Improving effectiveness and lengthen service life,while at the same time reducing mask weight,will involve some difficult trade-offs. To meetthe weight objectives will require new sorbents inthe filters that take up much larger quantities of

Body Protection Research

$2 $9 $10 $64$18 $10 $15

Thrust 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Totals

PPErto.1 – Budget in Millions


toxins than heretofore. This means new materi-als, perhaps from developments in nanotechnol-ogy. This will make use of results from StrategicResearch Areas in Chapter I (Introduction).

Milestones/Metrics:FY2005: Basic and exploratory research, search-ing for a universal filter element effective againstall hazards. Study and evaluate candidates fromnanotechnology research across the nation.

FY2006: Continue basic work including workon new lens systems with better antifoggingproperties, communications systems within themask and begin applied work on most promisingcandidates.

FY2007: Continue exploratory research and startformulation of one or two prototypes. Conductintegration work of proposed prototypes withresults of the other functional capabilities’research.

FY2008: Complete exploratory work on second-ary characteristics. Continue applied work onprototypes. Make sure the prototypes can bemanufactured at reasonable cost.

FY2009: Continue construction and laboratory testing of prototypes. Begin fielddemonstrations.

FY2010: Continue work on manufacturabilityand cost. Carry on field demonstrations, recycleto lab and back to field.

PPErto.3 – Respiratory Protection – OxygenDeficient

Objectives:

Discover new air storage concepts and improvedmaterials for self-contained breathing apparatus.Increase in-service time from less than one hourto four hours. Meet weight and cost goals,design ergonomically for function and comfort.

Improve seals and face pieces, communications,and indicators of remaining useful life.

Payoffs:

The much longer in-service time (up to twelve hours) will mean that responders canaccomplish much more in the hot zone, andtrapped or isolated personnel can await rescuemore safely. Effectiveness will be aided by thereduced weight (10 oz.) and improved materials,seals, and comfort. The mask will be effectiveagainst all hazards and have a shelf- or on-the-belt life of five years. The result should bedesigned so as to be compatible with the new suitdeveloped in PPErto.1 (Body Protection – Basicand Applied Research).

Challenges:

Technology for absorbing large volumes of air atrelatively low pressures does not exist. New sor-bent materials based on nanotechnology arebeing discovered now. Decreasing weight whileimproving performance represents a difficulttrade-off.

Milestones/Metrics:

FY2005: Basic research on new sorbents for airto increase life without increasing tank pressure.Look at cage structures, nanotubes and buckey-balls, compare with research findings in hydrogenfuel storage.

FY2006: Continue basic research.Investigate new rebreather concepts.Begin applied work to build new tankstorage.

FY2007: Complete basic work and rec-ommend one or two concepts for appli-

cation research. Begin development work on newconcepts. Integrate as many of the goals as possi-ble and integrate with results of the other RTOsin this NTRO. Begin manufacturing and costcontrol studies.

FY2008: Begin test and evaluation studies onevolving prototypes. Continue building proto-types and evaluating in the laboratory and field.

2 7


Respiratory Pro-tection Materials and Designs – O2 Available

$3 $4.5 $7.5 $10.5 $6 $9 $40.5

ThrustPPErto.2 – Budget in Millions

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Totals

2 8


Chapter II

FY2009: Complete all work. Results are one or two fully demonstrated and field evaluatedbreathing apparatus suitable for use when oxygen is deficient.

PPErto.4 – Decontamination

Objectives:

Discover and demonstrate new ways to neutralizetoxins on responders clothing and gear. Exploremore environmentally friendly chemical wash sys-tems that are quick – <1 minute exposure – andthorough. Find means of determining the com-pleteness of decontamination. Devise reactivechemical substituents on clothing to neutralize alltoxins.

Payoffs:

Current methods do not have the confidence ofresponders; they are loath to reuse decontami-nated clothing. The cost savings from reuse willbe considerable.

Challenges:

Developing techniques for determining the com-pleteness of decontamination will be difficult.Removing the present psychological block toreusing the decontaminated clothing will requirestudy into the phenomenon and education com-bined with reliable new technology.

Milestones/Metrics:

FY2005: Applied research on new systems pro-posed elsewhere. Consider new chemical con-cepts and compare and contrast with the currentchlorine-based approaches. Review results ofwork on self-decontaminating fabrics work beingdone in the DoD as well as elsewhere.

FY2006: Continue studying proposals from ear-lier work. Select one or two systems for proto-type development.

FY2007: Develop prototypes and evaluate in the laboratory. Begin test and evaluation in field demonstrations.

FY2008: Complete field demonstrations. Carryout manufacturing and cost studies.

FY2009: Complete manufacturing and coststudies.

PPErto.5 – Escape Respiratory Protection

Objectives:

Develop an improved version of escape hood:more compact, lighter, with a shelf-life of fiveyears, and effective against all hazards and at aunit cost of about $100.

Payoffs:

The hood will fit on the responder’s belt and will be especially useful for law enforcement offi-cers first on-scene.

Challenges:

To be at once smaller, lighter, and more effectivepresents a severe difficulty and must entail a newmuch more effective filter element and lightermask materials.

Milestones/Metrics:

(Since the technology will be the same as for thenew filter masks (PPErto.2 (Respiratory Protection– O2 Available), the same basic and appliedresearch will be needed. Using the results ofPPErto.2, only development work and adaptingthe results will be required. The developmentwork will begin after the fourth year of PPErto.2and run for three years.)

FY2005: None

FY2006: None

FY2007: None

Decontamination Technologies

$2 $3 $4 $7 $6 $22


2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Totals

Respiratory Pro-tection Materials and Designs – O2 Deficient

$1.5 $3 $4.5 $15 $16 $40


2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Totals


FY2008: Adapt technology from PPErto.2(Respiratory Protection – O2 Available) to escape masks. Build prototypes. Begin develop-ment work on prototypes.

FY2009: Continue development work.Conduct demonstrations.

FY2010: Complete development work with fieldexperiments.

2 9


• Environmentally Benign• All Weather

• Effective Against All Hazards

• Affordable ($100)

• Longer Duration (12 hrs)• Lighter Weight (10 oz.)• Affordable ($300)

• Longer Duration (4 hrs)• Lighter Weight (10 lbs)• Affordable ($3000)

• Prototype Suite• Integrate Respiratory

Protection• Test & Evaluate

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

PPErto.1 – Body Protection –Applied Research & Development

PPErto.2 – Respiratory Protection –Oxygen Available

PPErto.4 – Responder Decontamination

PPErto.5 – Escape Respiratory Protection

PPErto.3 – Respiratory Protection –Oxygen Deficient

Personal Protection and Equipment Technology Roadmap

Escape Respira-tory Protection

$2 $4 $6


2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Totals

$0 $0 $0 $0

3 0


Chapter II

3 1


Definition

Detection, Identification, and Assessment (DIDA)is the capability to quickly detect, locate, charac-terize and assess a potential or ongoing terroristattack. DIDA consists of sensor and relatedinformation technologies and capabilities that canprovide responders with knowledge to deal aseffectively as possible with terrorist events involv-ing weapons of mass destruction.


In considering DIDA, responders focused on pre-and post-attack capabilities against five categoriesof terrorist attack: chemical, biological, radiologi-cal, nuclear, and explosive/incendiary. In practice,they divided these five into two groups. The firstgroup, consisting of the chemical, biological, andradiological (CBR) attacks, requires some meansof dispersal in air, food, water, or other mediaand causes injury or death through inhalation,ingestion, or bodily contact. By contrast,nuclear, explosive, and incendiary devices (NE)have their primary effects through blast, pressure,and fire. Responders are also concerned thatmore than one type of device might be used in anattack.

DIDA can be hindered by terrorist use of decoys,deceptive techniques, secondary devices, andcountermeasures that shield, hide, saturate sen-sors, hinder discrimination, or disguise theweapon. These countermeasures are obviouslyrelevant prior to release or detonation. However,the use of post-release countermeasures must beconsidered in order to avoid surprise from more

sophisticated compound attacks that could comein the future.

In DIDA, responders considered all stages andlevels of the threat spectrum, but with primaryemphasis on response:

• Prevention – pre-release, pre-event defensivemeasures to prevent, reduce vulnerability, andminimize consequences prior to terrorist useof the weapon. The prevention stage may spanminutes to years. Upon warning of animpending event, responders will attempt todetect, locate, identify, assess potential dam-age, isolate, and disarm a weapon of massdestruction. This NTRO deals with thedetection through assessment portions of theoperation. Note that many of the sensors usedto accomplish this are also useful in the longperiods of vigilance leading up to the tip-offor emergence of an impending threat.

• Response – capabilities needed following releaseor detonation, during the period in whichpeople are in danger. Response may last fromminutes to days, depending on the severity ofthe attack and the nature of the weapon.Here DIDA may provide the initial detectionthat an attack has occurred. It would also beused to rapidly provide on-site informationabout the weapon, the victims, and the extentof damage. This information is needed so thatresponders may also protect themselves if pos-sible as they proceed to help the victims andavert further damage. The response phase alsoincludes the prevention of further damagefrom secondary devices by detecting theirpresence and facilitating their deactivation.

Chapter III

Detection, Identification, andAssessment (DIDA)Chapter Chair: Dr. Jasper LupoChapter Coordinator: Michelle Royal

3 2


Chapter III

• Consequence management – post-event sensorand information capabilities that facilitaterecovery, aid cleanup, and improve treatmentof victims. At some point in time, responsewill become consequence management, restora-tion and recovery. This may happen overhours to days, weeks, or much longer if theevent is severe. In recovery, DIDA providescritical information needed to prevent furtherinfection or exposure to residual agents, aid incleanup, define quarantine and keepout zones,assess structural integrity, and determine hab-itability of buildings.

Responders and technologists discussed differ-ences among the five attack modes and what theymean to DIDA; their findings are summarizedbelow.

Chemical Agents – Chemical weapons can be bro-ken up into three classes: toxic industrial chemi-cals such as phosgene, injurious chemical warfareblister agents such as mustard gas, and lethalchemical warfare agents such as nerve gas.Dispersal is a key parameter in the use of chemi-cal weapons. Detection and identification of dis-persed chemical agents has received a lot of atten-tion for both industrial and anti-terroristpurposes. Sensor technology tends to be rela-tively mature, although there is an issue with falsealarm rates if there are similar, confusing chemi-cals (interferents) in the environment. Volatilityand persistence of various chemical agents canalso dramatically affect detection strategy.Inexpensive, rapid field sensors that can handle aspectrum of agents are in development. Stand-off and remote detection of chemical agents incontainers is very difficult, but progress has beenmade with sensing schemes that involve contactor very close proximity with the reservoir. TheDoD R&D activities are making good progressin the detection of chemical aerosol plumes.

Biological Agents – the Poor Man’s Nuke.Biological weapons and agents are quite diverse:DIDA must handle a wide range of threat agents,

including bacteria, viruses, spores, and bio-toxins,both those occurring in nature and those thatmight be altered or engineered in the laboratory.Bio-toxins are not living organisms and behavemore like chemical agents. Some bioagents arecontagious, complicating containment and track-ing of the attack. Some are intended to disableand others to kill. The lethal doses vary dramati-cally by agent type and the age and health of thevictim. As with chemical agents, bioagents arenearly impossible to detect until they are used.They are even more easily concealed than chemi-cal weapons because extremely small containersmay contain enough agent to affect tens of thou-sands of people – biological agents can be 100 to1000 times more lethal than chemical agents.DIDA of released bioagents is also relativelymature in the laboratory and in controlled envi-ronments. However, rapid, affordable detectionand identification in the field is more difficultthan in the case of chemicals due to the fact thatlethal agents may be virtually indistinguishablefrom harmless counterparts.

There is generally more time to deal with theeffects of a BW attack than with chemical andbomb threats. The exposed population may notbegin to exhibit symptoms for seventy two hoursor more. This typical delay produces a dangerand also an opportunity. The danger, especiallyin the case of contagious agents, is that the delaywill impede the identification of carriers of infec-tion who have dispersed from the attack sitebefore the existence of an attack has been recog-nized. The opportunity is that detection of anattack can provide an opportunity for contain-ment and treatment efforts that may preventonset of the disease or reduce its effects.6

Radiological Agents – A so-called dirty bomb ismade of radioactive materials dispersed by con-ventional explosives. A small quantity can con-taminate a large area and affect a large number ofpeople. These agents are not well suited to pro-ducing large numbers of fatalities but they cancause panic, long-term illness, and deny use of

6 Many bacterial diseases can be treated effectively with antibiotics if the exposure and nature of the agent is recognized in time. Even whereno effective specific treatment is available (as in the case of most viruses today), non-specific medical care and preventing secondary infec-tions can contribute importantly to survival.

3 3


Detection, Identification, and Assessment (DIDA)

key facilities or neighborhoods. Depending onthe isotopes used, danger may persist from hoursto centuries. Unlike CB agents, radiological sub-stances can be detected before release becauseradioactive materials emit gamma rays and neu-trons that can be detected at useful stand-offranges (tens of meters for unshielded devices).Sensor technology is relatively mature and com-pact. Portable radiation detectors in pager andcell-phone-sized packages are commercially avail-able and used by some responders. However, nohandheld, compact device is now available thatcan identify isotopes in the field. Field ID is pos-sible in fixed, vehicle, and man-portable hardwarethat tends to be too expensive for widespread use.Although DIDA at modest ranges is possible,shielding can dramatically reduce the effectivenessof sensors and their range. On the other hand,shielding is heavy and makes concealment moredifficult than with chemical and biologicalagents. Cleanup is conceptually easy because theagents radiate, thus facilitating delimitation ofcontaminated areas and equipment.

Nuclear Weapons – Because of the enormouspower of nuclear weapons, and the devastatingnature of their effects, time is the critical factor inthe prevention phase of an event. Prior to deto-nation, it is possible to tell the difference betweenlegal radioactive materials, a dirty bomb, and anuclear bomb. Unshielded weapons can bedetected at tens of meters. Nuclear weapons arelarge and heavy when compared to CBR agents;they are much harder to carry and conceal. Ifextra shielding is used to conceal the weapon, theadded weight makes it even more difficult totransport these weapons, and the shielding itselfmay be subject to detection. Although an indi-vidual can carry a technologically advanced low-yield weapon, vehicles are the more desirablemeans of moving them around. If nuclear detonation is achieved, simple detection is nolonger an issue. Assessment for nuclear weaponscombines all the capabilities for radiological plus explosives and incendiary devices, and

identification/attribution would use very special-ized capabilities possessed by the Department ofEnergy and its National Laboratories.

Explosive and Incendiary Devices – Bombs like theOklahoma City and Khobar Towers devices arelarge, vehicle-transported weapons. Stand-offdetection of the explosives in bombs and incendi-aries is difficult, but progress has been made andresponders consider this a manageable DIDAproblem. Detection usually relies on stand-offand proximity sniffing for nitrogen compounds.Suicide bomb vests may be detectable throughclothing with imaging or acoustic systems that donot detect the explosive material itself, but rathera visual shape or indication of unusual densitythat may help intercept the carrier.


Responders and technologists considered a set ofFunctional Capabilities to handle the operationalcontext described above. The capabilities are pre-sented below in order of priority, the first beingthe highest. They are grouped into four cate-gories reflecting break-points between the degreeof priority as judged by responders. These rank-ings were provided in workshops and interviews.

• On-Scene Detection

• Remote and Stand-off Detection• Classification and Mitigation• Non-Intrusive Stand-off Inspection• Detector Arrays and Networks

• CBRNE Effects Modeling and Simulation• Collection and Dissemination of Weather and

Environmental Conditions• Pre-Triage/Differentiation Among Levels of

Exposure

• Rapid Assessment of StructuralIntegrity/Other Risks

• Remote Detection of Deception

3 4


Chapter III

Overall State of Technology forDetection, Identification, andAssessment

The matrix on the next page shows a mix ofmoderate to high technological challenges in rais-ing the level of capabilities for emergencyresponse. The section that follows lays out anumber of Response Technology Objectives thatwill address key areas for high-payoff technologydevelopment.

Detection, Identification andAssessment

DIDA.1 – On-Scene Detection. The ability todetect danger to self (responder) and others. Thiscapability, ranked as the highest priority byresponders, focuses especially on initial detectionbefore an attack, or, after agent release but before the onset of symptoms. It includes:

characterization of suspicious objects; detectionin the presence of decoys and countermeasures;detection of secondary devices; and the post-attack location of the source of an agent releaseor a device that may be continuing to release theagent. Wearable, man-portable, and vehicle-mounted devices are needed.

Distinction was made between systems that areexpensive or that require highly trained users and

inexpensive and easy-to-use systems. The formerare likely to be used by afew specialized responseunits that are unlikely tobe first on the scene andthat therefore areunlikely to contribute toinitial detection; the lat-ter could be proliferatedthroughout public safetyforces and thus mightprovide a real possibilityof affording initial detection. Even amongcapabilities that can bewidely proliferated, thereis an important distinc-tion between wearablesensors that are carried at all times by policeofficers and firefighters,and bread-box sized orlarger units that wouldnormally remain in avehicle.

Great emphasis wasgiven to wearable sen-sors. The workshop also

noted that it would be burdensome or unaccept-able to require emergency responders to carrymultiple sensors to span the sensing needs for fullspectrum CBRNE on-scene detection, even ifeach were the size of a cell phone. It was sug-gested that an integrated device is needed. This is the subject of a suggested developmentprogram.

12

3





Detection, Identification and Assessment

1. On-Scene Detection

2. Remote and Stand-off Detection

3. Classification and Mitigation

4. Non-Intrusive, Stand-off Inspection

5. Detector Arrays and Networks

6. CBRNE Effects Modeling andSimulation

7. Collection and Dissemination of Weather and Environmental Conditions

8. Pre-Triage/Differentiation Among Levels of Exposure

9. Rapid Assessment of Structural Integrity/Other Risks

10. Remote Detection of Deception/Intent




3 5



Goals:

• Accurate, rapid, reliable, affordable.

• Minimum logistics tail (power requirementsand consumables).

• Wearable, man-portable, and vehicle-mounteddevices.

• Ability to detect presence of decoys, counter-measures and secondary devices.

• Ability to locate source, vessel or vector.

• Communication link to command center –potentially allowing alerting and subclinicalinformation to be integrated without operatorintervention.

• Adaptable for use on robotic platforms forpenetration into hot zones too dangerous forimmediate entry byunprotected responders.


Responders are aware of thewide variety of sensors on themarket and pointed out inthe workshop that they donot have or use them becausethey are too expensive anddifficult to use.

• Emergency respondersrely almost completely oninformation from callsreceived at the dispatch center, with noinitial on-scene information.

• Patrol officers have nosensors at all.

• Chemical detectors existbut are too large (usefulfor specialized units only).

• Radiological dosimeterpagers are not widelydeployed.

• There is no capability available to localresponders for pre-release nuclear detection,although federal responders may have thecapability.

• Biological sensor capability is very limited orunavailable; known commercially available equipment is costlyand somewhat delicate, making it suitableonly for personnel with specialized skills andtraining.

State of the Art:

Technologists noted that much has and is beingdone to support the goals for on-scene detection.They noted that nearly all existing systems are theresult of past and current military R&D. See thechart below for a detailed survey of CB detectionprograms from the April 2003 IntegratedChemical and Biological Defense Research,

Genetic Detection PCR for genetic detection of bacterial and viral agents

• HANAA B• Auto Genetic ID B• APDS B• PCR DTB B• Field Sample Extractor B

Detector on a Chip Microchip platform for detection

• Argonne MAGIChip B• Advanced Multi-function Biochip B• Gene Chip Biosensor B• Activity Based Detection and Diagnostics B

Mass Spectrometry Mass spectroscopy methodologies for sample handling/analysis

• BSPS-ESI/MS B• SESI IR MS B• Bio-ToF MS B• Advance Ion Trap MS B• Real-Time Bio MS B

Immature technologies not yet fully defined; will eventually contribute to the bio point detection technologies listed above

• Ambient Background Characterization B• Aerosol Sampler Development B• Threat Agent Characterization B

Other N/A – Each platform is unique• Immunobead Force Differentiation Assay B• Amplifying Fluorescent Polymer CB• Pyrolysis-GC/Ion Mobility Spectrometry B• Optical Particle Classifier B• CB ID in Water CB• Integrated CB Point CB• DCASTS C

Handheld Systems Systems optimized for handheld use

• CADB C• µChemLab/CW C• µChemLab/BW B• µChemLab/CB CB• Personal Alarm Monitor-BW B• Personal Alarm Monitor-CW C• UCPHHA B• SMALLCAD C• Handheld Low-level CAD C• Maritime TICD C

Goal of programs is shared, but the nucleic acid-based program differs from the antibody programs

• Biocontaminant Detect/ID Strategies B• Nucleic Acid-based Assays B• Reagent Development (antibodies and

alternatives) B• Immunoassays B• Protein Signatures B

Technology Group Programs Shared Technology PlatformDetection and Identification

Reagent/Assay Development

Supporting Technologies

Ongoing CB Detection Programs as of 2003

3 6


Chapter III

Development and Acquisition Plan: Chem-BioPoint Detection (p.11). This plan outlines themajor efforts by the DoD, DoE, and TSWG.

Chemical – A number of chemical detectiondevices and technologies are emerging and shouldbecome available for commercial transition;JCAD, Gas Chromatography Surface AcousticWave (GCSAW), IMS, traffic light sensor, SMO(metal oxides), enzyme based devices, tissue basedsensors, activity based sensors, cell based sensors,Raman spectroscopy, dual GC, aerosol gel (C&B),Smart Card, miniature Flame Ionization Detector(FID), Flame Photometric Detector (FPD),LPOSS, Polychromator chip, Iontrack, mass spec-trometry; and combinations such as SAW/IMS.

Biological – Immunoassay (manual, automated),genetic assay (manual, automated polymerasechain reaction (PCR)), particle detection/classifi-cation, multiple optical approaches, capillaryelectrophoresis, pyrolysis/ion mobility spectrome-try, cell-based sensors, mass spectrometry, laserinduced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS), auto-mated sample collection and preparation, hostexpression of genetic markers, synthetic ligands,and bio-detectors on a chip, such as Canary – aLincoln Laboratory development which maysoon be ready for application.

Radiation – As mentioned earlier, there are commercially available handheld gamma raydetectors. However, there is no discriminationcapability, and the devices do not detect neu-trons. A handheld, combined gamma ray andneutron detector with built-in discriminationcapability is needed to reduce false alarms associ-ated with normally occurring medical and indus-trial sources. Work toward this end is underwayat Department of Energy (DoE) laboratories.While alpha and beta radiation may be less of athreat to produce mass casualties (particles mustbe inhaled or ingested or enter the skin throughwounds to be dangerous, and thus efficient dispersal and control of particle size would benecessary), responders need detectors sensitive

to emitters of this sort of radiation, as well to beprepared against all hazards and to ensure fulldecontamination of radiation sources.7

A major gap was noted: responders need an inte-grated wearable CBRNE sensor suite that is easyto use, nearly automatic, and requires little or notraining to use properly. It was noted that almostall sensor work is concentrated into specific sensorstove pipes such as chemical or biological. Eachcommunity has its own expertise and technicalissues that consume resources and challenge thelimits of detection science. Thus there has been little motivation or funding available to pursue integrated devices. See the chart on page35 (Ongoing CB Detection Programs as of 2003).


The most prominent limitations are the false neg-atives and positives associated with the detectorsfor all threats. Most reliable CB detectors requirecontact with the agent, and in fact, collect andintensify the agent to get enough to bedetectable. This is complicated by the fact thatthe environment has substances that may be con-fused with threats or add to the noise of the sen-sor. There is a need to characterize, and thenrapidly and accurately adjust to fluctuations inthe background produced by these ambient substances. Certain biodetection technologies areagent specific; there is the possibility that newagents may be rapidly engineered that do notexist in any library or detection inventory. Onthe other hand, more general detection strategiesmay fail to provide a clear picture of the agentand what to do about it. It is likely that a layeredapproach will be needed, and that the handhelddevices will only be able to provide capabilityagainst a limited set of known agents.

Handheld and wearable chemical and nucleardetectors exist in separate packages. Algorithmsfor the discrimination of radioactive isotopesusing sodium iodide detectors also exist buthandheld devices do not currently offer

7 Fortunately, most alpha and beta emitters also emit detectable levels of gamma radiation; otherwise they would be hard to detect at a distancethrough the air unless present in very large quantities. Detectors and procedures are available that, at least in skilled hands, allow the rapid charac-terization of all radiological hazards and assessment of the degree of decontamination. Packaging these capabilities for use by personnel with less-specialized training is still something of a challenge.

3 7



discrimination capability. Bioagent detectiontechnology for wearable sensors is not as mature.PCR technology cannot be packaged to fit in ahandheld device. Immunoassay systems mightprovide capability for a small number of bioa-gents, although sensitivity would be limited tohigh-level attacks. Emerging biochips offer thebest hope for combined sensitivity, speed, costand multi-agent handling. Technologists assertthat biochips are now ready for commercial appli-cation. Hence, the goals of DIDA.1 pose amajor engineering and packaging challenge tocombine all in one wearable unit, but no funda-mental science issues.

Current biological detectors are slow and takeanywhere from twelve minutes to one hour toproduce reliable results in the field; other limita-tions include poor portability, the need for costlyreagents that must be replenished whether usedor not, sample collection and preparation, andcost of reagents and processing fluids. It wasnoted that genetic engineering of agents poses alimitation on our ability to recognize new bioa-gents; it is currently easier to quickly design anew agent than to figure out how to detect it inthe environment, and commercialize the reagentsand processing needed for on-scene detection.There is also growing but limited knowledge ofvirulence factors that may be useful for character-ization and assessment of organisms.

The vast majority of responders do not have on-scene radiation detection and discriminationcapability; although the underlying technology isconsidered mature by many technologists.Radiation pagers and dosimeters do exist but theycannot generally distinguish between isotopes inthe body from medical procedures and terroristthreats. On-scene radiation discrimination forthe responder simply does not exist.

It was noted that little is being done to combinesensor types into multi-sensor packages. Ease oftraining and ease of use were cited as deficiencieswith current sensors; there is a need for devicesthat require little, easy or no training. Electro-magnetic interference was cited as a factor thatcould degrade sensor processor performance. Inthe case of a nuclear attack, the electromagnetic

pulse could damage sensitive electronic compo-nents outside the blast zone.

Finally, with regards to wearable sensors, the abil-ity to package a full CBRNE detection and dis-crimination suite in something the size of a per-sonal digital assistant (PDA) will requiresignificant R&D. Currently, the weights andsizes of individual handheld devices (with theirknown limitations) for each threat are all some-what larger than a single PDA.

Gap Fillers:

An integrated handheld, PDA sized, CBRNEsensor would fill the major gap noted duringresponder discussions. Combination of existingand emerging sensors in one handheld device willbe a significant challenge. Ease of use and train-ing will be a necessity since this device wouldprobably be issued at the scene to responders whohave had little or no prior opportunity to use it.If possible, the detectors should rely on tech-niques that do not use expensive or perishableconsumables and reagents. The device will needto be rugged, environmentally hardened, and eas-ily decontaminated. Even if such a device can bemade, an important issue will be the concept ofoperations for its use. For example, will thewearer get an immediate alarm or will data becollected for use by leadership? Some expertsexpress concern about public panic or hysteria,but this may be less of an issue for devicesdesigned for use by responders rather than anuntrained populace. See the associated technol-ogy objective, DIDArto.1, (Wearable IntegratedCBR Sensors), and the DIDA roadmap for details.

DIDA.2 – Remote and Stand-off Detection.The ability to identify and assess the severity of anattack, and define keep-out areas from outside thehot zone, remotely examine clouds for agents andother harmful particles, and assess the levels of radi-ation in an area. Stand-off ranges of up to onekilometer are desired. This may be accomplishedthrough the use of true remote sensors and/orpoint sensors on mobile robotic ground and airvehicles; currently even trained dogs and otheranimals are used to carry sensors. Sensors thatactually enter the hot zone are in fact point or

3 8


Chapter III

embedded sensors and rely on close-in detectionmethods or exposure to the agent; the sensingmechanisms for these are covered in other capa-bilities. See DIDA.1 (On-Scene Detection),DIDA.5 (Detector Arrays & Networks), andDIDA.7 (Collection and Dissemination of Weatherand Environmental Conditions) for discussion ofsuch detector technologies.

Goals:

• Responders want aerosol plume, cloud assess-ment and identification from stand-off rangesof up to one kilometer.

• Detection of harmful CB agents and radiationlevels with low false alarm rates.

• Compact, easily operated, automatic systemsare needed for use by responders who deployto a scene in a vehicle.


• No remote chemical detection is used byresponders even though the military has haditems in the field for over ten years; theNational Guard Civil Support Team has avehicle mounted threat sensor. There are noconvenient man-portable sensors.

• Radiological remote sensors such as gammaray imaging systems for nuclear plants andassociated accidents exist. However, they workat ranges of a few meters and are slow, evenagainst very high levels of radiation encoun-tered in spills of nuclear waste or meltdownsituations.

• Biological plumes: no current operationalcapability for remote sensing exists for civilianuse. Military devices are developmental.Some concepts rely on penetration of theplume with robots to collect samples for later analysis. Chem/bio plume tracking iscurrently a priority in military R&D.

• Explosives sniffing robots are useful but tooexpensive for wide proliferation, although theydo provide a means for getting sensors intoareas that may be too dangerous for theresponder. Dogs are often used by civilian

responders to detect explosives. Several breedsare used, depending on the task and prefer-ence of the user. Sense of smell varies from100 to 1000 times better than human beings.Hound dogs and beagles are the most sensi-tive, whereas collies and German shepherds aresmarter. Attention span is an issue; smarterdogs tend to get bored more quickly. Dogscan be trained to detect a wide variety of sub-stances. One drawback with dogs is that theyrequire care and feeding whereas robots can bestored until needed.

State of the Art:

Remote and stand-off detection of chemicalclouds has been in the military inventory since1990 and was deployed in the 1991 Gulf War.However, these military units are not designedfor civilian use. Civilian needs for wide area surveillance could best be met by a network ofpermanent sensors that measure spectral trans-mission over modest path lengths.

There are a number of existing programs withapplicable technology for chemical sensors.Fourier Transform Infrared spectroscopy (FTIR)is deployed in military fielded instruments; it isexpensive, detects nerve agents and toxic indus-trial chemicals (TICs) but is not very usefulagainst mustard gas. FTIR is passive and can seeup to 5 km in ideal conditions. Active laser tech-nology is in military R&D; it holds promise tomake maps of cloud density but issues of eyesafety as well as effectiveness need to beaddressed. There are various concepts for usingcoated fiber optics either in passive or activestand-off sensors or in robots that penetrate thecloud. Hyperspectral imaging in various spectralregions can detect absorption lines of certainchemical agents and is being considered forChem/Bio and other aerosol detection jobs aswell as civilian environmental monitoring. Thereis significant industrial interest in this technology.In certain bands, its sensitivity is limited to day-light only; shadows in urban canyons may reduceeffectiveness.

For sensing biological agents, ultraviolet (UV)sensing is currently limited by the availability of

3 9



powerful, UV laser diodes at wavelengths ofinterest. This technology may provide useful dis-crimination out to a few hundred meters. Laserdiode technology is under development atDARPA. Currently there are no credibleapproaches for mid- and near-infrared (IR) detec-tion. DoD is investigating medium waveinfrared (3-5 microns) LIDAR systems capable ofremote bioagent cloud detection at up to a kilo-meter. Commercial systems exist (e.g., for remotesensing of gas pipeline leaks), but further researchis needed to assess their potential for stand-offdetection of bioagent clouds.

For sensing radiation and high explosives/incen-diary weapons, Sandia National Laboratory’sSecond Line of Defense (SLD) Program has beendeployed in the Former Soviet Union, to preventthe smuggling of nuclear devices and materialthrough key choke points. DTRA has installed avariety of radiation and bomb detection testbedsat four military bases in the U.S. as part of theUnconventional Nuclear Weapons DefenseProgram. The sensors used on these bases are toolarge and expensive for easy use by responders.There are very large systems that can imagethrough container walls to give the responder apicture of the contents, including people. Onesystem uses x-ray scanning in a large van and theother uses gamma rays. These systems are verycostly and best used at loading areas and weigh-ing stations. Millimeter wave imaging has beendeveloped for short-range imaging through non-metallic walls. Researchers at Los AlamosNational Laboratory have demonstrated the feasi-bility of using naturally occurring muons in cos-mic rays for detecting high-atomic weight materi-als (fissionable material or shielding) for vehicleinspection, but dwell times on the order of oneminute are needed.


The availability of high-energy UV laser diodescurrently limits the range of biological plumedetection. The optical transmission of UV isinherently limited to a few hundred meters in theatmosphere, depending on wavelength.Wavelength agile and higher power lasers areneeded in general for improved stand-off ranges

in CB detection. Sensitivity is poor and limitedto dense clouds containing 1800 agent-bearingparticles per liter of air. This equates to verydense clouds and does not allow accurate map-ping of the lethal boundaries of the plume.Detection of biological clouds from a distance isa topic of military R&D.

True remote radiological and nuclear sensorsexist, but are too large, heavy, and expensive fornearly all emergency responders. Range is a fewmeters, dependent on shielding and whether ornot the object is moving. This limit is funda-mental and based on background radiation anddetector sensitivity. It is very unlikely that anyamount of funding will improve the range ofthese sensors. Physics does not support detectionof radioactive isotopes at ranges greater than afew tens of meters, or a hundred meters in idealconditions. Thus detection of the cloud from adirty bomb or the fallout from a nuclear weaponwould depend primarily on detection of theobscuration using optical, lasers, and or thermalimaging. It would not be possible to identify thecloud as radioactive without prior information orpenetrating sensors.

Gap Fillers:

A gap was identified highlighting the need for smaller, proliferable, network oriented radiation sensors with built-in discriminationcapability. See DIDArto.2 (Stand-off RadiationID), and the DIDA roadmap.

Suitcase size detection suites would providedetection ranges of a few hundred meters,depending on the agent. Responders noted theneed for a relatively compact, affordable solutionto on-scene cloud mapping that would combineboth chemical and biological detection in oneeasy to deploy and use package. Technologistssuggested that easing up on tough military, combat-driven specifications such as rapid alerttime, extended ranges, and detect-on-the-movecapability could enable such a development forurban use this decade. Static installation of bi-static designs could improve sensitivity and allow continuous sampling; e.g., transmitter on onebuilding and receiver on another. See DIDArto.3

4 0


Chapter III

(Integrated Remote Detection of CB Agents) and the DIDA roadmap.

DIDA.3 – Classification and Mitigation. Theability to integrate sensor data with symptoms andpathology and provide mitigation guidelines fordealing with contamination and injury. Focus ison the local information tools available to theresponder and the ability to correlate observationswith a particular event. Responders need a sim-ple tool that walks them through a decision treeand leads to recommended action. It is related toDIDA.8 (Pre-Triage/Differentiation Among Levelsof Exposure), which focuses more on the sensingof subtle physiological phenomena associatedwith pre-triage conditions that cannot be dis-cerned by a busy responder who must deal withthe obvious cases.

Goals:

• Comprehensive: All hazards should be covered.

• Immediately available – the responder shouldnot have to wait for input.

• User-friendly, expert system.

• Small, compact PDA size.

Current Capability:

• Responders indicated that they have a widechoice of emerging tools that they could purchase.

• Components exist for each threat of somecombinations, but a full threat spectrum needsto be integrated into a system that is immedi-ately available to responders.

State of the Art:

There are many programs that are addressing cer-tain threats. A modest effort is needed to inte-grate them.

The Automated Decision Aid System forHazardous Incidents (ADASHI™) is an Army-sponsored, portable, computer-based integrateddecision-aid support system for improving the

response to a hazardous incident by military andcivil responders. ADASHI™ can be used at thesite by the Incident Commander (IC) or at oper-ation centers. The tool supports individual andcollective training at a responder’s home.ADASHI™ is designed to function on laptopsand desktop computers.

A number of chemical risk assessment tools andrelated environmental tools are in development.These decision aids will allow the user to assessthe transport of toxic chemicals. They aredesigned primarily for use by engineers.

Lightweight Epidemiology and AdvancedDetection, Emergency Response System (LEADERS) is a medical surveillance tool provid-ing real-time analysis of medical data to identifythe presence of a covert or naturally occurringbio-event. Clinical data is collected using specificmedical applications and laboratory identificationtools.

Sandia National Laboratory developed probabilis-tic risk assessment (PRA) as a tool for evaluatingthe risks associated with high-consequence sys-tems such as nuclear weapons and nuclear powergeneration plants. This tool is used for riskassessments for critical infrastructures such asdams, water utilities, chemical plants, and powerplants and might be adapted for responder use(especially for planning before an incident).

The Chemical Biological Response Aide(CoBRA) software contains pre-loaded accreditedoperating procedures and on-scene checklistsdesigned to address chemical identification, evi-dence collection, decontamination and generalresponse to terrorist use of a weapon of massdestruction.

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency(DARPA) has developed a set of tools, includingThe Global Response Incident Planner (GRIP)and the Field Inventory Survey Tool (FIST). The program has also created the PlaybookManager. DARPA also developed a program toaddress the weaknesses in current crisis manage-ment systems—the Enhanced ConsequenceManagement Planning and Support System

4 1



(ENCOMPASS). This product is an integratedsuite of software tools that uses Web-based andstandalone software to collect and distributedynamic data to and from multiple sources innear real-time. ENCOMPASS has two primarysubsystems: the Incident Command Manage-ment System (ICMS) and the DARPA Syn-dromic Surveillance System (D-S3). ICMS cen-ters on the functions of the Incident Commanderat various levels, including the emergency respon-der, scene commander, operations center, and/orstate/national emergency center. The D-S3 is abiosurveillance capability that tracks patients’signs and symptoms to alert epidemiologists ofany new trends, such as the possible release of abiological agent.


There are neither technology barriers to meetingthe performance goals nor to meeting cost andsize goals. A host of products and programs exist,and there are even federally funded efforts inplace to help sort through them. This is prima-rily an information and software integration task.The biggest challenges involve a friendly userinterface for the responder and orderly treatmentof all the databases and information needed tolink knowledge to action.

Gap Fillers:

Responders would like to see the integration ofmilitary and civilian programs and processes.Technologists, although appreciative of the need,felt that the maturity level of this capability andongoing programs is too high to warrant creationof a gap filler technology effort within DIDA.However, it is recommended that the governmentconsolidate its own programs, take steps to main-tain a current catalog of available tools, andensure that responders have adequate informationon the value of these tools either through an offi-cial or semi-official standards/testing process orthrough a voluntary responder evaluation processsimilar to that found on some commercial inter-net sites. This functional capability overlaps withthe requirements for R&Rrto.1.

DIDA.4 – Non-Intrusive, Stand-off Inspection.The ability to detect pre-release CBRNE materialsin packages, vehicles, and on people, withoutrequiring packages or vehicles to be opened. For useat portals for special events, limited areas, con-tainers and at traffic stops. More broadly, theinspection of packages includes mail in the postalsystem, shipping containers, crates, luggage, cargoin ships and trains, aircraft, and trucks, so therewill be overlaps between responder needs andthose of various federal agencies and the postalservice. Stand-off may be from one meter to afew meters. Although this kind of inspection isgenerally accomplished using controlled geome-try, a relaxation of this constraint would be useful and permit wider use of the equipment.The detection of shielding for nuclear devices is needed for dealing with radiological counter-measures.

Goals:

• Useful ranges from one meter to severalmeters.

• Accurate, portable, rapid, reliable, affordable.

• Minimum logistics tail (power requirementsand consumables).

• Man-portable, and vehicle-mounted devices(less pressing).

• Ability to detect presence of decoys, counter-measures and secondary devices.

• Rapid detection on the order of a few minutesat most depending on range and agent beingdetected.

• Nuclear/Radiological: Detect unshieldeddevices and shielding for further inspection.

Current Capability:

• Special event teams have portal magnetome-ters, imagers, and explosive residue sniffers.

• Responders have no stand-off inspection capa-bility for biological agents and would like anintegrated CB capability.

4 2


Chapter III

• Radiation pagers exist but are not generallydeployed. See DIDA.1 (On-Scene Detection).

• Crowd surveillance/traffic stop systems(unconstrained geomentry) not available.

State of the Art:Remote detection and identification of radioac-tive materials is a solved problem for ranges that do not exceed physical limits. Shielding can reduce those ranges but with great weightpenalty to the terrorist. At present, non-intrusivedetection of chemicals in vessels requires physicalcontact with the vessel: this includes currentapplications of ultrasonic technology to detectliquid in containers. Noncontact detection ofchemical agents in vessels is a focus of militaryR&D. There are no known techniques that canprovide reliable detection of biological agents invessels.

The Technical Support Working Group (TSWG)has supported a variety of programs in stand-offexplosives detection. They have created aDefense Technology Objective to detect 100pounds of explosives at ten feet. This programgoes to FY2005. UV and X-ray fluorescence pro-grams may also offer solutions to detect, on sur-faces, secondary or tell-tale substances associatedwith threat agents. Other technologies in exis-tence with application to stand-off detection ofexplosives include acoustic (including dielectricand thermal), prompt gamma ray neutron activa-tion analysis (which does not require contact withcontainer), and laser trace explosives detection.


• Currently there is no non-contact method forinspection of CB containers in unconstrainedscenarios; there are very few concepts thathave a credible theoretical basis for solving theproblem.

• Responders consider the affordability of lim-ited available products to be a significant barrier.

• There are no responder tools for detectingdangerous solids within well-sealed containers.

Gap Fillers:

Technologists and responders identified the needfor a program for close-in, non-contact, nonde-structive stand-off inspection of containers thatmight contain CB agents. Technologists thinkthat this is a very difficult capability to achieveand that the barriers are formidable. SeeDIDArto.4 (Portable Stand-off ContainerInspection), the DIDA roadmap, and the list ofissues discussed below.

• Acoustic programs should be extended to non-contact scenarios.

• Radiation detectors should be made morepractical: reduced size and cost are needed.See DIDA.1 (On-Scene Detection) andDIDA.2 (Remote and Stand-off Detection).

• Acoustic detection technology should beexplored for detection and identification ofsolids in containers.

DIDA.5 – Detector Arrays and Networks.Sensor arrays that can be networked to providealerts, identification, localization of CBRNEthreats; linked to command data centers; to provideenvironmental monitoring in urban centers, build-ing interiors and sensitive areas. Although rankedfifth in part because they do not fit into existingresponder concepts of operations, probably onethe most important developments will be sensorarrays that can be networked to provide alerts,identification, and localization of CBRNEthreats. There is a growing need for compact,low-cost, minimal care, automatic detectors toenable the fielding of widely distributed, hetero-geneous sensor arrays and networks. These sen-sor webs should be tied to command data centersthrough wireless and/or wired communicationslinks. Data derived from the arrays will localizesource and project danger areas using physicalmodels and 3-D GIS. They will provide environ-mental monitoring in urban centers, buildinginteriors, and mobile nodes with the capabilityfor automatic alarms. Distributed data collectionwill enable event tracking and characterization.Sensors should adhere to standard outputs andinput commands through commercial interfaces

4 3



such as Universal Serial Bus (USB) to ensureinteroperability and rapid insertion into the network.

Goals:

• To the fullest extent possible, sensor networksshould be populated by compact, low-cost,minimal care, automatic detectors.

• The network software should be capable ofeffectively assessing events with heterogeneousarrays of sensors.

• Communications should be able to withstandthe peak loads associated with a crisis.

• Computing assets should be distributedand/or embedded, and linked to combinedeffects, microclimate, and weather/modelingtools for automatic, seamless assessments asevents unfold.

• Automatic alarms should be backed up byonline modeling and confidence measures.

• Standardized, common lexicon and data for-mats to afford universal access.

• The network should provide a space-time mapof the event, to include parameters such asseverity, duration, and population exposure.

Current Capability:

• There are really no operational responder net-works for homeland defense. Some experi-mental networks have been implemented formilitary force protection by the U.S. Army atCECOM. Although there is much to learnfrom these efforts, they must be adapted tocivilian emergency responders’ operations.Furthermore, they need to be expanded to thefull CBRNE threat spectrum and scaled up todeal with large urban settings.

• Few commercial buildings have any type of CBRNE sensors and associated networkinfrastructure.

• Most COTS and GOTS sensors require someadaptation to make them suitable for flexibleinsertion into networks.

State of the Art:

Technologists have identified many relevant pro-grams, although at this time none will meet theneeds of civilian responders without significantscaling and expansion to the full threat spectrum.

Biowatch is a new federal program that involvesthe DHS and Environmental Protection Agency(EPA). It will modify and use the EPA environ-mental sampler network to monitor urban envi-ronments for aerosol bio-attack. At least 25 citieswill be involved.

For the Unconventional Nuclear WeaponsDefense (UNWD) program, DTRA has installedexperimental, operational nuclear protection net-works at four DoD bases. Though limited inscale, they have identified the essential ingredi-ents needed for defense against both nuclearweapons and dirty bombs. The network atCamp Lejeune, NC has also shown how civilianand military responders can be unified to combatthis threat.

The DHS successor to the Bio-Defense Initiative,the Bio Threat Consequence Management(BTCM) effort, will fund R&D in a variety ofsensor and network integration issues; BTCMresults will be useful to the ultimate goals ofDIDA.5.

NASA has created a Smart HealthcareManagement System, a network of sensors andcomputers which monitors both environmentand personnel status.

NSOF (Network Sensors for the Objective Force)is an Army CECOM R&D effort to supportdeployments of Unattended Ground Sensors(UGS) networks. The purpose of this project isto develop, provide, and demonstrate communi-cations networks that can successfully intercon-nect with UGS networks within a sensor fieldand also connect the UGS network field back tohigher-level data fusion and Command andControl (C2) elements.

Smart SensorWeb, a DoD program, pioneeredthe concepts of complex integrated networks forthe individual combatant. This lower echelon

4 4


Chapter III

perspective makes it a useful case study for theresponder.

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory isinvolved in two programs of interest: the Wide-Area Tracking System (WATS) for detecting andtracking a ground-delivered nuclear device; andthe Joint Biological Remote Early WarningSystem (JBREWS) for alerting U.S. field troopsof an attack with biological agents. Both systemsconsist of a network of sensors and communica-tions links with information continuously evalu-ated by unique data-fusion algorithms. The sensors can be permanently deployed at chosenlocations or mounted in vans for deployment ondemand to protect specific areas for specific situa-tions or events.

The Joint Warning and Reporting Network(JWARN) consists of software and hardwarecomponents that link NBC detectors to tacticalcommunications for NBC warning, reporting,and battlefield management. This network isbeing designed for dynamic combat operations.

Finally, the Joint Service Installation Pilot Project(JSIPP), is a DoD program managed by theDefense Threat Reduction Agency; it is designedto upgrade nine military installations to be modelsites for biological and chemical safety. JSIPPwill be linked with existing responder networksand ESSENCE – The Electronic SurveillanceSystem for the Early Notification of Community-based Epidemics. Ultimately, up to 200 basesmay be outfitted with similar equipment underthe more comprehensive Project Guardian man-aged by the military Joint Project Office for CBDefense.


The construction of large sensor networks is anengineering problem. No particular barrier existsthat must be overcome in order to meet the goalsof this element.

Although there are many laudable efforts under-way to evolve toward a unified CBRNE sensornetwork, these efforts do not provide a completepackage suitable for homeland defense.

• Military efforts concentrate on defense withinthe confines of military bases or dynamiccombat and do not normally address the needsof large population centers. But some of theresults may be scalable to urban scenarios.Furthermore, funding constraints have limitedefforts to single threat or small experimentalefforts that do not cover the full threat spectrum.

• Modeling software for embedded networkingis not seamless. Combined effects modeling isnot available, and the outputs from singlemodels are usually fed by hand to anothermodel. Microclimate predictions are neededbut are not mature; this problem must bestudied in the context of large sensor arrays.

• Current networks and associated software tendto be rigid, hardware specific, and difficult(expensive) to upgrade to new sensor hard-ware. Networks are susceptible to cyberterror-ism, but also fail on their own.

• Communications become overloaded easily.

Gap Fillers:

A major integrated approach to CBRNE net-works was recommended by the technologists’workshop. Some of the design considerations foran integrated regional network are listed below.Although some of the pieces of an integrated net-work are mature, the scale of this capability war-rants a major initiative. See DIDArto.5(Integrated Networked Sensors for CBRN Detection)and the DIDA roadmap for additional detail.This technology objective stimulated a great dealof discussion about a wide-range of issues, themost important of which are discussed below:

• Standard sensor, communications, and dataformats are needed.

• Self-configuring networks with flexible archi-tecture should be adopted from the military.

• The network should be designed to deal witha wide-range of existing and future sensors toinclude integration with other sensors – intru-sion detection, traffic management, public sur-veillance, and security systems.

4 5



• Data fusion and information managementover the network.

• The network must use simulation and physicalmodels (buildings, structures) and have areachback to CDC, medical surveillance, andother databases.

• All methods of bandwidth management andcommunications stability should be explored.For example, a low-band width, cell phone-based architecture may be a useful layer if itcan maintain effective service during peakdemand periods associated with a crisis.Smart detectors and sensors will reduce band-width. Surge capacity and scalability will beimportant design considerations.

• Resistance to countermeasures is going tobecome increasingly important as terroristsbecome better equipped and more technicallyastute.

• Data management and archiving will need tobe flexible and easily adjusted to deal withchanging policies, laws, and operational needs.

• Perhaps one of the most powerful capabilitiesof the network will be Global Positioning sys-tem (GPS)/GIS tracking of dynamic networkelements and possibly victims after the event.

DIDA.6 – CBRNE Effects Modeling andSimulation. The ability to rapidly produce vali-dated dispersal and effects models for urban terrainand building interiors. Modeling and simulationcan provide an effective extension of individualsensors and spatial-temporal analysis of sensorwebs data for event discovery or false alarm miti-gation. Models may greatly reduce the complex-ity of response to combined effects resulting fromexplosions and associated dispersal of agents.Models must include incendiary, radiation, chem-ical corrosion, blast, shock, and other effects.

Goals:

• High confidence description of hazard disper-sal and effects.

• User friendly.

• Reduction in the complexity of response tocombined effects.

• Includes: incendiary, radiation, blast, shockand other effects.

• High quality descriptions in an urban environment.


• Military models exist to an extent, but are notavailable to or fully adapted for civilianresponders.

• Many mature models exist for blast and shockbut are only invoked when a crisis occurs andthe military comes in to provide post-attackanalysis.

State of the Art:

Individual models exist for all agents and alllikely methods of agent dispersion. Some com-bined effects models exist for subsets of theCBRNE spectrum. There is, however, no fullyintegrated, combined effects model for all theagents/threats.

DTRA’s Hazard Prediction and AssessmentCapability (HPAC) is an example of existingplume models that predict hazards from CBRNweapons and facilities. It predicts exposure infor-mation for military and/or civilian populationsattacked with CBRN weapons. HPAC also pro-vides exposure information for populations in thevicinity of accidents involving nuclear powerplants, chemical and biological production facili-ties, and CBRN storage facilities/transportationcontainers. DTRA also developed theConsequence Assessment Tool Set (CATS) thatcan help field personnel assess the effects of ter-rorist and natural catastrophes. Finally, theNational Atmospheric Release Advisory Center(NARAC) at Los Alamos National Laboratoryhas a plume modeling for all hazards. A laptopversion exists for use by responders.

4 6


Chapter III

Similarly, the SPAWARSYSCOM sponsoredVapor, Liquid and Solid Tracking (VLSTRACK)simulates the release and downwind hazard froma chemical or biological warfare (CBW) attack.

DoD has also developed a sophisticated array ofblast effects models and associated 3-D structuralmodels that can be used to assess damage tobuildings and structures. These models havebeen used to estimate the details of well-knownterrorist bombings (e.g., Khobar Towers,Oklahoma City, the USS COLE) and haveresulted in greatly revised and/or more accurateestimates of bomb size.

For interior dispersion modeling, there are com-mercial air flow models that can predict air flowinside buildings. Another example comes fromthe Environmental Protection Agency’s Office ofResearch and Development, which is attemptingto develop accurate models for use in urban set-tings (e.g., “urban canyons”; emphasis is on dis-persion of TIC and CB aerosols).


The technologists determined that there is a needto combine the existing and emerging models forthe separate CBRNE effects into a system ofmodels that can seamlessly provide the bestmodel for the particular scenario at hand. Theyalso noted that there are competing models forthe individual threat domains.

• Models are stove-piped into specialty fieldsdue to the limited budgets, difficulty of thescience, and missions of developers.Integrated, seamless modeling and simulationof the full range of CBRNE requires thepatching together of several massive computercodes.

• Fixed and dynamic sensor networks androbotic sensors are needed to provide informa-tion necessary to get reliable results on limitedspace and time scales (e.g., microclimate data)that can support responders. Results will behighly dependent on the size and latency ofsensors.

• Much effort is focused on aerosol models,however some models are needed for indoor,fire/incendiary, structural analysis, and waterdistribution (DoD and DoE are working onthese issues).

• The aerodynamic flow around buildings andin urban canyons may pose a significant chal-lenge to current physical models and scientificunderstanding of the problem.

The speed of processing and sensor array densitywill determine accuracy and relevancy for respon-der use. Modeling of aerosol dispersion in com-plex urban environments is a matter of currentresearch. Without dense weather sensing andlarge sensor arrays, the outputs of the individualand combined models may be of little use to theresponder on the scene (although responders athigher echelons may find coarse information use-ful in planning). Accurate pictures of cloud dis-persal may not be possible until the weather andsensor infrastructure can support it.

Gap Fillers:

A host of important considerations were identi-fied by responders and technologies. SeeDIDArto.6 (Combined Effects Modeling for UrbanCanyons) and the DIDA roadmap for additionaldetails.

• Validation is an essential ingredient. Theworkshop recommended that greater emphasisand adequate funding be devoted to validationexercises; this includes more simulant releasesor live testing in controlled environments.Validation in situ is a credible option. DoDand DHS need to closely coordinate valida-tion efforts.

• Models must incorporate 3-D inputs and out-puts for cities.

• Microclimate modeling is needed down tometers and five minutes. Compute timeshould be an important design consideration.If a model needs more time than the phenom-enon it is predicting then it will be generallyless useful to the responder.

4 7



• Responders would like the outputs to be interms that are familiar to responders, ratherthan scientists and engineers.

• Responders are very interested in ease of train-ing and certification, and would like to havevirtual training capabilities built in.

• Models of operational effects and virtual pro-totyping can be included, which show theimpact of increased capability on overallresponse.

• Technologists suggested that sensor array den-sity may be an effective way to offset modelcomplexity (e.g., climate sensors vs. climatemodel, or building stress sensors vs. modelcomplexity). Sensors could track micro-weather or directly measure agent dispersion.(See DIDA.7 (Collection and Dissemination ofWeather and Environmental Conditions) andDIDA.5 (Detector Arrays and Networks).)

DIDA.7 – Collection and Dissemination ofWeather and Environmental Conditions.Responders need automatic collection and dissemi-nation of real-time weather information so that theycan understand and assess the extent of contamina-tion by airborne agents and bombs. The collectionand ubiquitous availability of accurate weatherinformation is essential to the understanding andassessment of outdoor release of agents. Theweather information and associated predictivemodels should include terrain and buildingeffects. Weather data and models should beembedded in all response systems.

Goals:

• Allows responders to establish and shift perimeter(s).

• Linked to predictive modeling (sunlight, tem-perature, humidity, wind effects on particularagents).

• Includes interior and exterior micro climates –terrain and building effects.

• Embedded in all response systems.


• Weather and pollutant sensor networks existbut are not fine-grained enough for urban settings.

• They are not integrated with agent characteris-tics and predictive effects modeling.

• Deployable networks for forest fires exist butare not widely proliferated and not oriented toCBRNE.

State of the Art:

Technologists noted that there were already largeinvestments in weather effects modeling; it wasdetermined that the technology is relativelymature. The DoD alone invests about $160Mper year in environmental monitoring, models,climate, and microclimate R&D.

Weather simulations are becoming increasinglyaccurate and DoD uses weather predictions as akey part of its combat planning for both long-and short-term decisions. Large computers arebeing networked and employed to provide localweather on demand around the nation.

DTRA has developed a prototype of its aerosoldispersion model for urban scenarios, calledUrban HPAC, which uses meteorological inputs.NOAA has efforts to provide microclimate data sensing and modeling including urbanmicroclimes.


This is an engineering problem. The cities must determine what weather monitoring infrastructure will best suit their needs and pro-vide the level of weather knowledge and timeli-ness within their budget. They will need toweigh this against their needs to detect andunderstand terrorist attacks that depend onweather effects. Some of the effects of weathermay be offset by operational plans that minimizethe uncertainties associated with understandingweather.

Generally, except for microclimate scale predic-tions in urban scenarios, this technology is quite

4 8


Chapter III

mature. Predicting scales below 1 km will requirefiner sensor grids and computer simulations thathandle the associated increase in data. It isunlikely that the National Weather Service orother civilian needs will rapidly move in thisdirection.

Gap Fillers:

Since the weather is essential to predicting thedispersal and effects of the agents, the technolo-gists determined that the microclimate gap in thisDIDA should be incorporated in DIDArto.6(Combined Effects Modeling for Urban Canyons),and that the sensors for fine scale meteorologicaldata would best be covered in DIDArto.5(Integrated Networked Sensors for CBRNEDetection). Further, the need for integratedeffects modeling was felt to be a compellingumbrella that would support a healthy invest-ment in microclimate modeling. See the DIDA roadmap for details.

DIDA.8 – Pre-Triage/Differentiation AmongLevels of Exposure. The ability to integrate sensorinformation, personal history (pre-exposure andlocation during event), and physiological symptomsto provide on-scene assessment of low-dose exposureand assists responders in predicting near-term healthstatus and treatment modalities for victims andinvolved responders. While at the complex sceneof an ongoing or recent event, responders need toguide the removal, expedient decontamination,and preliminary treatment for most criticallyinjured/exposed. They must determine the dis-position of the injured and the apparentlyunharmed. This capability will integrate on-scene sensor readings and any available informa-tion on victims’ history to determine near-termhealth status. For example, smart cards carriedby the responders would be useful in assessingtheir condition. Handheld devices may detectwhether a victim is in shock or is exhibitingsymptoms associated with low-dose exposure tochemical weapons or other toxins and agents.

Goals:

• Remote bio-systems analysis (e.g., responderoutside hot zone assessing victim inside).

• Handheld sensors for noninvasive assessmentof patient shock (thermal imaging may allowrapid screening of shock and other injury).

• Smart cards with responder health history.

• Linked to sensor readings.

• Non-contact methods are preferred.

• Integration with UIC.1 (Point Location andIdentification) for responder location historyand perhaps physiological status.


• Some laptop data is available, providing infor-mation on symptomology and course of illnessfollowing exposure, but it is not widelydeployed and does not integrate sensor infor-mation or personal history.

• Some fire/EMS vehicles carry medical careprotocols, but they are in hard copy and cumbersome.

• There are no sensors or instruments coupleddirectly to computers to provide automaticassessment. Responders must have consider-able skill in interpreting data.

State of the Art:

There are pieces of this that are quite mature.For example, diagnosing burn severity in the fieldis a well developed discipline. However, under-standing non-lethal exposure to CB threats andcombined effects is still a matter of research. Itwill take years to develop field deployable protocols and sensing tools that can permit aresponder to rapidly distinguish triage cases fromothers, and act with confidence on the assess-ment. This element is complicated by legal and privacy issues, which may pose fundamentalbarriers to the technical solutions. For example,it may be years before the general populace iscomfortable with a smart card that contains per-sonal medical history.

The DoD is developing technologies for militarymedical use that have application to responders’missions: these technologies are being geared for

4 9



early detection and assessment of pathogens inthe patient’s body. For example, the DARPAAdvanced Diagnostics Program is developingtechnology to detect the presence of infection by any pathogen in the body or in prepared samples—in real-time and in the absence of rec-ognizable signs and symptoms, when pathogennumbers are still low. The Army TelemedicineProgram has been investing for years in on-scenetechnology for assessment and treatment ofinjuries in combat scenarios. This work hasestablished centers, software, sensors and toolsthat can help field medics rapidly treat certaininjuries in the field. The effort has focused onWMD as a major objective. Furthermore,Digital Area Thermography is being studied as ameans to assess the effects of blister agents, andgene chips are being developed for rapid analysisof saliva, blood, and sweat.


• The physiological observables have not beendefined. Are they unambiguous? Can sensorsdetect them?

• There is a major psychological issue that mustbe addressed – does shock negate the feasibil-ity of such diagnostics?

• Affordability.

Gap Fillers:

The technologists and responders identified a setof important features that this capability wouldneed in order to be useful:

• Demonstrable physiologic changes – basicresearch program.

• Non-invasive.

• Capable of detecting early stages.

• Ability to recommend treatment commensu-rate with level of exposure.

• Must be able to handle many cases rapidly.

• Physiological sensors.

Achieving these was considered very high risk.Thus a research program is recommended; seetechnology objective DIDArto.7 (On-sceneAssessment of Low-Dose Exposure to ChemicalAgents – Research) and the DIDA roadmap.

DIDA.9 – Rapid Assessment of StructuralIntegrity/Other Risks (e.g., gas lines). The abil-ity to rapidly assess and integrate structural infor-mation and measurements to allow responders toassess the structural integrity of buildings in thewake of explosions, fires and or impact. A signifi-cant cause of casualties in terrorist events is col-lapse of damaged structures and buildings.Responders need to know if it is safe to enter andconduct search and rescue. Responders need toconduct post blast/fire/impact assessment ofstructures and to assess corrosion damage follow-ing chemical release. Ideally, tools are needed tomake emergency responders act like fast build-ing/structural engineers. This capability will benefit from knowledge of details of specificbuildings in advance.

Goals:

• Assists responders in making go/no-go deci-sions about entering structures.

• Allows responders to act as structural engineers.

• Rapid, compact.

• User-friendly.

• Reliable.


• Motion detectors exist for use in determiningstructural stability.

• Not everyone has specialized USAR (urbansearch and rescue) or TSR (technical searchand rescue team) equipment and training.

• Data on individual buildings is not availableor not rapidly accessible.

5 0


Chapter III

State of the Art:

A number of programs exist that provide solu-tions for various elements of detecting, assessing,or modeling structural integrity or hazards; how-ever, no common suite of tools integrates theminto a single capability.

Structural sensors are employed widely in thecivilian sector to measure and monitor stress inbuildings. Structural vibrometry has become amajor development in the aftermath of the WorldTrade Center collapse. The National Institute forStandards and Technology Fire Research Lab isdeveloping vibrational technologies, used to assessstructural integrity under the stress associatedwith intense heat and fire. Another example ofassessment technology is the Multi-ZonalBlowdown Model (MBLM), which calculates thepropagation of vapor from a source within abuilding, described using the Building ModelGenerator (BMG), with damage described byMunitions Effectiveness Vulnerability Assessment(MEVA), and includes the capability for model-ing the release of gas from a vent or aperture inthe building.

Radar technology is being developed to assiststructural integrity assessment. Los AlamosNational Laboratory has developed microimpulseradar that could be used at close range to assessstress and incremental movement of structuresafter a blast has occurred. This technology holdspromise for penetrating a few feet of dry rubble,and walls of standing structures. Also, groundpenetrating radar is being looked at by industryfor oil exploration, and by the military for minedetection and underground structure assessment.

Other approaches exist for using modeling tech-nology to assess structural integrity and theeffects of various stresses. For example, IdahoNational Engineering Laboratory has created a large test facility for testing structures in earthquakes; it is a shake table for large struc-tures. Also, as mentioned earlier, DTRA hasinvested for 50 years in blast modeling and blastmitigation technology. There are numerous toolsavailable through this work. The Bomb DamageAssessment (BDA) Programs within DoD have

extended modeling and sensor ideas in recentyears as deep, hard targets have become a targetof interest.

3-D laser imaging has become a preferred tool forboth commercial and military in the measure-ment and modeling of buildings and vehicles. Itcan be used to create 3-D wire frame models ofstructures. Comparisons are easy using changedetection software, thus enabling rapid and accu-rate structural change assessment.


This is a very difficult problem but many aspectsof it have been studied persistently throughoutseveral decades. Rapid assessment of existing,standing, instrumented structures and buildingsis mature, but understanding severely compro-mised structures and collapsed structures requiresmore advanced technology. Providing these tech-nologies will require several years of R&D tocombine real-time sensing with modeling, to giveresponders a capability by which they can confi-dently decide whether a structure is safe to enter.Operational necessity may of course override therecommendations of the technology. Sensors andmodels exist, but combining them into an on-scene capability will require a sequence of fieldexperiments and model validation cycles to makea useable package.

• There is a lack of high resolution models andsensors and modeling in 3-D for tall and deepstructures and ruins.

• Real-time imagery through rubble and walls isa major challenge; viable techniques shouldlook for alternatives to such sensors until theycan be made workable.

Gap Fillers:Technologists noted the existence of many capa-ble models and simulations that are continuallyundergoing improvement. They also noted thatthere are excellent sensing techniques that providestatic and dynamic stress readings for buildingsand structures. They suggested an integration of such sensors and software in a field portable or vehicle mounted package for use by respon-ders. See technology objective DIDArto.8

5 1



(Real-Time Structural Stress Measurement) and theDIDA roadmap.

DIDA.10 – Remote Detection ofDeception/Intent. The ability to conduct non-invasive, non-contact, detection of human deceptionand hostile intent at security checkpoints.Responders may encounter terrorists prior to orduring an event. They need noninvasive, non-contact, tools for screening at security check-points where they may use sensors and naturalprocedures to elicit measurable response associ-ated with deception and hostile intent.

Goals:

• Rapid decisions to avoid congestion at choke points.

• Low false alert rate.

• Reasonable probability (80%) of detecting terrorist.

• Independent of culture and language.

• Based on unambiguous physiological observables.

• Capability of learning and in situ validation.

Current Capability:

• There is no sensor augmented capability.

• Responders use intuition and simple interro-gation. (Israelis use observation rooms.)

State of the Art:

This capability is in its infancy. DoD is conduct-ing research on close range detection of decep-tion, but the work is in the phenomenologicalphase.


Lie detectors require physical contact.Physiological monitoring of certain humanresponses (e.g., face temperature profile or eyemovement) can be done at useful ranges buttying the observations to an understanding of aperson’s intent or mental state is a matter ofresearch. Such a capability will need to pass the

privacy test, which may pose insurmountable bar-riers if the general populace places privacy abovesecurity. Variability of human response may alsodoom this element if it is found that there are noreliable indicators, in any combination, that canprovide reliable screening. Drugs and condition-ing may also defeat the concept. Until unam-biguous physiological indicators can be proven toconnote hostile intent, this capability will beunachievable.

Gap Fillers:

Technologists and responders could not see thisas a credible capability in the near future, butthey felt it would be important if the goals couldbe achieved. An initiative is suggested to developan experimental data collection and field researchcapability by 2010. Because this was deemed tobe a very high risk effort, it was determined thatcurrent DoD efforts should be monitored until2007; assuming adequate progress, this effortwould proceed at that time. See technologyobjective DIDArto.9 (Stand-off Automatic ChokePoint Screener) and the DIDA roadmap.

Detection, Identification, andAssessment Response TechnologyObjectives (DIDArto)

DIDArto.1 – Wearable Integrated CBR Sensors

Objectives:

Develop miniature, seamlessly integrated CBRdetectors and collection devices for use onresponders, and eventually the general popula-tion. Provide rapid (timely) alert to the wearer ofdanger and type of attack, e.g., proceed to decon-tamination, administer prophylaxis, take antibi-otic, “suit up” or don mask. Provide wirelessreadout of exposure information, date, time, and location for use in epidemiological analysis,command response, and treatment. The devicemay be the size of a cell phone and carried in aconvenient place that does not hinder free move-ment, or the sensors may be embedded in head-gear and/or clothing and uniforms. The devicemust have onboard storage and some processingfor recording, analyzing, and retaining history ofindividual’s exposure. Also should be capable of

5 2


Chapter III

being connected to or integrated with the loca-tion/communication devices developed underUICrto.1 (Point Location and Identification).

Payoffs:

Wearable sensors will save lives and help respon-ders and leadership understand the extent andseverity of population exposure. This will greatlyreduce casualties and enable accurate responsewith minimum panic and confusion.

Challenges:

The detection technologies for CBR are in differ-ing levels of maturity and no programs exist thatintegrate the three modes. Miniature biologicalsensors suitable for wearing are in their infancy.The most likely robust solutions involve the useof micro arrays of bio-receptors on electronicreadout chips. They are years away from practi-cal field application. Challenges include collec-tion and sampling, receptor design, field life, costof receptors and associated solutions/reagents,and environmental hardening of the receptors.Developmental chip-sized chemistry labs are nowbeing tested at DoE laboratories. Their falsealarm rates and accuracy in complex, “dirty” envi-ronments are still in need of R&D. Radiologicaldetectors for wearable sensors are relativelymature, although the device must detect gammarays and neutrons, and be able to distinguishlikely threats from industrial and medical sources.Integration of the three detection modes (CBR)will be a power, size and weight challenge.Reliable alerting, discrimination, and identifica-tion are a challenge in this size package.

Milestones/Metrics:

FY2004: Develop and demonstratebiochip technology scalable to unambiguousdetection of four agents with consumable costs of$5/day, overall sensitivity (including collector) of100-10000 (10000 threshold, 100 objective forlong-term) organisms for an exposure time of 10 minutes. The limit of detection for biotoxinsshould be 10-100 nanograms. For handheldchemical detectors, performance goals are a fewparts per billion (ppb) sensitivity for nerve agents

and 10 ppb for blister agents with a detectiontime of one minute. Radiation detectors shouldbe improved to incorporate discrimination capa-bility to distinguish common medical isotopesfrom those used in nuclear weapons.

FY2005: Transition work from DoD and DoEto begin design and development of wearableintegrated CBR sensors. Metrics include: totalweight of integrated sensor less than 1 pound,battery life of 24 hours, maximum biochip detec-tion cycle of 15 minutes. Demonstrate aerosolsampler with minimum volume collection rate of12 liters per minute.

FY2006: Verify performance in laboratory andcontrolled field trials. Show CB modes able towithstand full environmental range. Demon-strate 72 hour operating life of biochip. Neutronand gamma ray detectors should be capable ofidentifying unshielded nuclear weapon within 10feet of sensor.

FY2007: Demonstrate integrated devices inresponder exercises. Measure false alarm rates ofless than 1 per month for each mode in variedurban terrain and conditions. Show effective sen-sor decontamination process or low-cost to per-mit disposal of after event.

FY2008: Transition to limited industrial produc-tion and deployment with unit cost of $7500 orless in quantities of 1000. Verify transition planfor full rate production price of less than $3500in quantities of 10,000.

DIDArto.2 – Stand-off Radiation ID

Objectives:

Develop affordable, robust radiation detectors for stand-off discrimination and identification of nuclear weapons and dirty bombs. Processingand sensor must be capable of nearly unattendedoperation 24/7, and must distinguish betweenrelatively harmless, legitimate sources and terrorist devices. Sensors must be capable of

Integrated Wearable CBR Sensors

$20 $10$15 $30 $75

ThrustDIDArto.1 – Budget in Millions

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Totals

$0

5 3



networked operation and detecting unshieldednuclear weapons in vehicles moving at highwayspeeds. Deployable nationwide.

Payoffs:

Provides immediate alert to respondersand security forces to intercept suspicious con-tainers, vehicles, or objects.

Challenges:

Current radiation detectors are costly, large, andnot designed for production quantities suitablefor network deployment on a national scale.Primary challenges are: discrimination of threatsfrom legitimate domestic sources and the abilityto detect both gamma rays and neutrons in acompact package.

Milestones/Metrics:

FY2005: Transition work from DoD and DoEto begin design and development of combinedneutron/gamma ray detector for networkednationwide security applications. Design criteria:range of 10-50 meters; discrimination capabilityfor threat vs. non-threat; physical size <0.3 sqmile area, environmental hardening againstweather and temperature extremes; output fornetwork and wireless data transmission; inputsfor remote control; and built-in diagnostics.

FY2006: Verify performance in laboratory andcontrolled field trials. Show ability to discrimi-nate with 90% probability of correct classificationat maximum range. Demonstrate ability todetect standard nuclear weapons targets (providedby DoE) at range. Design incorporates resistanceto simple countermeasure.

FY2007: Demonstrate prototype devices inresponder exercises. Install prototypes at chokepoints in experimental CBRNE testbed.Demonstrate vehicle performance. Show detec-tion and discrimination at range against movingvehicle carrying unshielded standard target.Vehicle speed <70 mph.

FY2008: Transition to limited industrial produc-tion and deployment with unit cost of $25,000or less in quantities of 1000. Verify transition

plan for full rate production price of less than$15,000 in quantities of 10,000.

DIDArto.3 – Integrated Remote Detection ofCB Agents

Objectives:

Develop and demonstrate compact, low-cost, reli-able sensor technologies and/or systems for widearea, remote detection of airborne clouds andplumes of biological and chemical agents. Suchsystems should be able to reliably detect andaccurately characterize threat aerosol clouds atranges of up to 1 kilometer. Their field of viewshould afford area coverage either through widebeam scanning or through point-to-point gridsthat characterize the transmission path. Use ofcloud penetrating sensors or substances isincluded in this program as an option to providedetailed information about the cloud. These sys-tems should provide real-time data about plumeand aerosol paths for use by responders and tofeed computer models so that the event progresscan be mapped and predicted.

Currently fielded systems are complex, heavy, andlarge. They are not suitable for deployment out-doors, exposure to the elements, and continuousoperation. These limitations need to beaddressed.

A key activity for this program will be to transi-tion and reconfigure military technology andconcepts to civilian development. Many of themilitary requirements may not apply to home-land defense, and reducing requirements maylower risk and costs and accelerate maturation.For example, the military avoids the use of bista-tic spectral transmission measurements because itcannot predict or control the sensor deploymentgeometry ahead of time. This constraint doesnot normally apply to homeland defense.Furthermore, DoD is considering the use of pen-etrating microrobots and unmanned micro airvehicles to enter a suspicious cloud and collectsamples or conduct analysis. It is recommended

Stand-Off Radiation ID $29 $11$18 $32 $90


2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Totals

$0

5 4


Chapter III

that this concept be included in the trade studiesfor the RTO.

Payoffs:

Allows the emergency responder the ability todetect an attack from a distance, monitor itsprogress, issue alerts that may prevent contamina-tion of personnel, secure a contaminated area,administer to victims, apply appropriate triageand gather information about the event for evi-dence collection and analysis. This system isenvisioned as part of a layered defense systemthat either runs continuously or is activated whenother systems or intelligence have given an alertto a possible release. The result is the ability toidentify a species but not a strain and to enable acourse of treatment.

Challenges:

Currently there are no programs that providecombined CB remote detection. The sensorsneed to be reliable, work in real-time, require nowet chemistry or other exotic consumables andbe low-cost. They must be able to detect parti-cles the range of 2-10 microns, and detectaerosolized multiple chemical agents reliably.Chemical detection must deal with both toxicindustrial chemicals and chemical warfare agentssuch as sarin. There is a need for static andmobile sensors that be rapidly deployed to a fieldlocation. Low cost upkeep and operational costare essential for those systems that operate con-tinuously. Some risk reduction may be possibleby using fixed bistatic detection grids (transmitterat one location and receiver up to 500 metersaway; monitors transmissionspectra along path). Computerprocessing throughput will bean issue for imaging sensors.

Milestones/Metrics:

FY2004: Demonstrate stand-off bioaerosoldetection and discrimination range (threshold) ofone kilometer, sensitivity (threshold) of 3,000agent-containing particles per liter of air(ACPLA), and real-time detection. Analyze opti-mal deployment strategies using modeling and

simulation. Study bistatic detection paths fordeployment in urban canyons.

FY2005: Transition work from DoD and DoEto begin design and development of remote inte-grated CB sensors for deployment in urban set-tings. Adapt technologies to specifically solvehomeland defense problem.

FY2006: Continue development working tometrics: range of greater than 500 meters, dis-crimination of aerosolized biological warfareagents from naturally occurring biological debris,combined false alarm rate of less than one permonth.

FY2007: Verify performance in laboratory and controlled field trials. Show ability to with-stand full environmental range. Demonstrate 60 degree wide area coverage from single sensor.Show plume detection sensitivity for cloud den-sity of 100 micrograms per cubic meter with85% probability of detection.

FY2008: Demonstrate integrated devices inresponder exercises. Vary sensor deploymentbased on predictions obtained through modelingand simulation. Experiment with concept ofoperations. Measure false alarm rates of less thanone per month for each mode in varied urbanterrain and conditions.

FY2009: Transition to limited industrial produc-tion and deployment with unit cost of $25,000or less in quantities of 1000. Verify transitionplan for full rate production price of less than$15,000 in quantities of 10,000.

DIDArto.4 – Portable Stand-off ContainerInspection

Objectives:

Develop and demonstrate compact, non-contact,non-intrusive sensor technologies and/or systemsfor detection of biological and chemical agents insealed containers. Such systems should be able to

Integrated Sensor Suite $29 $10$25 $0$0 $104


2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Totals

$40

5 5



reliably detect and potentially characterize threatagents in containers at distances of 1-2 meters.Although emphasis is on the analysis of the vesselcontents, a helpful sensing strategy may includedetection of unique or suspicious chemical orbiological manufacturing residues that may existon the outside of the container. Current develop-mental sensors require physical contact with thevessel to function. It is desirable that the sensingmechanisms rely on techniques that are notharmful to humans in and around the vessel.Further, the sensors should be tolerant of viewinggeometry if possible. For example, short-rangeacousto-optical techniques may prove effective.Sensors that require the use of ionizing radiationor high directed energy beams (laser or micro-wave) may provide utility for scenarios wherehumans are not near the vessel being scanned.

Payoffs:

This capability gives the emergency responder theability to detect and possibly characterize thecontents of a chemical or biological agent con-tainer without contacting the vessel. Stand-offcontainer inspection would permit convenientranges of 1-2 meters stand-off detection in chokepoints such as transportation terminals and allowrapid scanning of a collection of objects that maybe found in and around the scene of a potentialterrorist attack. This also gives responders theinformation needed to direct attention and focusto specific containers; this could be particularlyuseful in hunting for terrorist weapons in ware-houses and storage areas.

Challenges:

The most significant barrier is the paucity of signatures. Chemical and biological agents arerelatively easy to conceal since they emit no radiation, and potent quantities can be carried in small vessels. They do not emit any character-istic observable radiation of any sort. Properlyprepared and sealed vessels should not have anyunique chemical or biological residues on the surface, although it may be possible to look forunusual amounts of common residues as analarm to warrant more extensive examination.Containers may vary in size, shape, and

composition. It is possible that the agent may becarried in what appears to be a commercial prod-uct container or other ordinary object such as afire extinguisher. The actual agent container maybe carried or concealed within another vessel inan attempt to defeat screening. Many detectionschemes rely on analysis of fluid characteristicsbut biological agents are likely to be carried inpowder form.

Milestones/Metrics:

FY2004: DoD/DoE to continue development ofnon-stand-off detection technology for chemicalagents. Prove ability to reliably detect selectedchemical warfare agents from ordinary harmlesschemicals. Determine limits of discriminationcapability. Validate useful performance metrics:ability to detect four or more specific chemicalagents reliably and distinguish them from ten dif-ferent harmless fluids with a false declaration rateof less than 10%. Show results against a varietyof common fluid vessels such as soft drink bot-tles, fire extinguishers, and household chemicalcontainers. Extend experiments to consider easilyimplemented countermeasures that terroristswould consider using to avoid detection.

FY2005: Extend chemical vessel inspection tech-nology to non-contact methods. Show ranges of10 to 50 centimeter with detection of one ormore selected threat chemicals. Assess practicaland theoretical limits and define metrics.Develop geometry insensitive inspection tech-niques for chemical vessels. Define potentialtechniques for bio-agent vessel inspection: con-sider bistatic (two point sensing) measurementprocedures and associated geometrical constraintsfor noncontact inspection at busy choke points;examine potential for monostatic (single pointsensing) active techniques that can probe the ves-sel to detect the agent; develop stand-off surfaceinspection techniques that identify tell-taleresidues of substances associated with productionor handling of bio-agents.

FY2006: Demonstrate non-contact chemicalinspection performance equal to contact methods. Develop compact, portable device,preferably handheld, for stand-off inspection of

5 6


Chapter III

chemical vessels. Extend range to two meters ormore. Conduct lab experiments of biological vessel inspection technology for promising tech-niques. Begin development ofscreener that relies on residuedetection on the surface of CBvessels.

FY2007: Demonstrate biodetection: one kilo-gram of 2-4 selected agents stored in dry form insealed containers at a range of 10-50 cm.Conduct demonstration against 5-10 commonlyoccurring commercial or industrial dry containerssafe enough to contain biological agents withoutleakage; e.g., powdered herbicide or insecticidecontainers (other methods are more reliable fordetecting unsafe transport). Conduct operationaltests of chemical stand-off inspection devices inrigorous, controlled trials and relatively uncon-strained urban responder exercises. DemonstrateCB residue screener detection range of twometers against 3-5 likely residues; identify likelyscreener confusers and legitimate vessels thatwould have identical residues.

FY2008: Transition chemical stand-off detectorto limited industrial production and deploymentwith unit cost of $4,000 or less in quantities of1000. Verify transition plan for full rate produc-tion price of less than $2,000 in quantities of10,000. Deploy CB residue screener in industrialproduction with same costs.

FY2009: Demonstrate non-contact bio-agentinspection performance equal to contact meth-ods. Develop compact, portable device, prefer-ably handheld, for stand-off inspection of suspicious containers. Extend range to twometers or more. Begin design of combined CB stand-off inspection device.

FY2010: Develop and test CB non-contactinspection device. Show performance of eachmode equal to the performance of individualdetectors.

FY2011: Transition CB stand-off detector tolimited industrial production and deploymentwith unit cost of $8,000 or less in quantities

of 1000. Verify transition plan for full rate production price of less than $4,000 in quantitiesof 10,000.

DIDArto.5 – Integrated Networked Sensors forCBRNE Detection

Objectives:

The ability to defend cities against large scaleattacks will ultimately depend on integrated net-works of sensors.

• Develop two or more large-scale urban net-worked sensor testbeds to support the fullspectrum of DIDA functions; testbeds shouldbe chosen to cover different urban settings,e.g., a complex seaport environment and alarge inland urban complex. Employ arrays ofstatic, mobile, and remote sensors for inter-cepting nuclear and radiological weapons,detecting and characterizing aerosolized CBagents, and mapping the attack and ensuingeffects. Integrate sensor networks with infor-mation networks for flow of raw data, indica-tions, and warning. Employ a variety of networked software agents to provide image and data processing, embedded model baseddetection, false alarm reduction, and eventmapping and prediction.

• Support the activities associated with a spec-trum of emergency responders, e.g., fire,police, rescue, emergency medical teams andmunicipal departments. The capabilitiesinclude the necessary infrastructure to supportcommunication, sensing, surveillance, instru-mentation and data collection for a wide-rangeof experiments, demonstrations and exercises.The underlying architecture should be scalableand support standard interfaces and connec-tions to facilitate plug and play experimentswith systems and sub-systems and insertion ofadvanced components and technologies.

Combined Stand-Off CB $30 $30$20$20 $30 $130


2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Totals

$0

5 7



Payoffs:

The program will establish a national capabilityfor municipalities and metropolitan areas to par-ticipate in experiments, demonstrations, and eval-uation activities. It will provide an in situ, real-time environment for advanced systems and newtechnology evaluation. The instrumentation andinformation displays will enable observation ofoperations spanning multi-threat attacks. It willallow regional coordinators, incident command-ers, and emergency responders to train, andexperiment with new concepts of operation.

The testbed and associated infrastructure willempower the civilian community to conductexercises analogous to those conducted on theWestern Test Range by the military community.These exercises have proven to be invaluable tomilitary units which subsequently are deployed toa wide-range of countries.

Challenges:

A major challenge is to design the sensor networkto overcome the failings of the available CBNREoff-the-shelf sensors. A technical challenge is thetestbed architecture which must be scalable andcapable of accommodating a wide-range of equip-ment and systems. A managerial challenge is thata broad set of capabilities is needed, and must berealized through the creation of large industrial/academic teams allied with DoE and DoD labo-ratories. The sensor network will need to inte-grate multiple legacy systems as well as state-of-the-art equipment and information systems anddata analysis.

Milestones/Metrics:

FY2004: Initiate competitive program with mul-tiple awards for urban sensor networks.Contractors conduct a detailed assessment ofalternatives using modeling and simulation, andother analytical tools. Determine cost drivers andCONOPS for sensor networks. Qualified teamswill consist of sensor and network firms withexpertise and products that cover the fullCBRNE threat spectrum. Determine area cover-age, population coverage, response time, tolerablefalse alarm rates, and other key parameters vs.

number and type of each sensor. Estimate acqui-sition and operational costs for two alternativesensor network designs.

FY2005: Complete detailed design of networks.Support Red Team activities for initiating inci-dents and evaluating real-time response of sys-tems and responder organizations. Begin installa-tion in selected urban centers. Conduct tradestudy of climate sensor density versus modelingaccuracy; adjust climate sensor mix accordingly.Demonstrate initial functional capability toregional coordinators, commanders and emer-gency responders. Integrate CBRNE sensors anddetectors with other commonly used intrusionand security systems to include seismic, acoustic,motion detection, video surveillance, and smarttags. Consider active and passive geolocation andtracking of vehicles, especially in higher risk areassuch as shipping centers and ports. Considerimplications of tracking victims in response andrecovery phases. Employ wireless and wired datatransfer as needed. Consider dedicated responsenetworks that do not become overloaded in a crisis.

FY2006: Begin series of spiral developmentexperiments in a networked testbed environment.Develop test plan that provides realistic resultswithout the need for agent release. Supportexperiments, equipment T&E and training ofother metropolitan communities who deploy tothe testbed. Demonstrate network false alarmrate of less than one per month with probabilityof detection of 99% or higher for radiologicaland nuclear threats. Response time for nuclearweapons attack must be less than five minutes.

FY2007: Demonstrate network false alarm rateof less than one per month with probability ofdetection of 85% or higher for CB attacks. Shownetwork capability to reduce false alarms by a fac-tor of five over single sensor approach. Continuethe development and implementation of the test-bed and demonstrate metropolitan scale experi-ment capability. Support training of coordinators, commanders and emergencyresponders. Support planning of large-scale exer-cises and technology evaluation and transfer.

5 8


Chapter III

FY2008: Continue support of planning, trainingand exercises for other metropolitan areas andmunicipalities throughout the country. Developtransfer package to regional defense. Disseminateand provide indoctrination seminars to states andregions.

DIDArto.6 – Combined Effects Modeling forUrban Canyons

Objectives:

Integrate CBRNE effects models and simulationsfor complex urban canyons. The models mustinclude unified, seamless software integration ofthe most mature and well validated models forCB aerosol dispersion in urban environments,munitions effects, structural damage, thermaldamage, blast and overpressure, coupled withmicroclimate prediction and fine grain climatesensor grid. In addition, they should provideinputs and outputs to help in medical and popu-lation monitoring data, as well as provide inputsto models associated with injury and casualtyassessment (DIDA.8 (Pre-Triage/DifferentiationAmong Levels of Exposure)).

Payoffs:

Additional capabilities provided to respondersinclude: tracking and prediction of plumes asso-ciated with CBR aerosol dispersion in urban set-tings; integrated modeling of explosive andincendiary effects combined with NRE threats;coupling of transport with damage and expectedcasualties; and recommendations for courses ofaction and prediction of population exposure.

Challenges:

There are reasonably validated, existing and/oremerging models for large-scale climate effects formost threats except biological. Current effectsmodeling efforts are just beginning to deal withcombinations of effects, and the microclimateeffects encountered in cities still remains an areaof significant difficulty. Microclimate models

may not become feasible until dense meteorologi-cal sensor arrays are deployed. Validation testingand evaluation and testing is a major challengeand technological solutions are being sought tomitigate legal, medical, and environmental con-strictions while still providing confidence that

models are providing useful informa-tion. Most models do not speak toeach other; uniformity and standardi-zation of inputs and outputs, common

validation metrics, and automatic results transferand data sharing are needed.

Milestones/Metrics:

FY2004: Assume development lead for modelingof combined CBRNE effects. Adapt existing anddevelopmental single phenomena models. Startmicroclimate study to determine sensor spacingand kinds needed to provide microclimate modelinputs for accurate predictions to 50m or less.Consider use of existing urban sensors both formicroclimate and exploitation in physical effectsmodels. Adapt DoD munitions effects models tolarge urban structures.

FY2005: Establish software environment forintegrated effects modeling and simulation datahandling and results passing. Combine distrib-uted computing concepts with high performancemainframe capabilities. Pass results over high-speed networks so that predictive capability is notvulnerable to single point failure. Conduct testsof microclimate modeling accuracy and a tradestudy of sensor density and cost versus modeluncertainty; adjust accordingly. Combine CBplume models with blast, shock, and radiationmodels.

FY2006: Verify microclimate performance anddetermine accuracy limitations based as a func-tion of types of conditions. Integrate microcli-mate into CBRNE effects models. Employ mul-tiple models for each agent in order to capitalizeon strengths of each and for comparisons.Develop urban in situ validation strategy toinclude dispersion of simulants, real and simu-lated climate sensor inputs, and inputs fromexisting building sensors (e.g., stress sensors orurban earthquake monitors). Deploy in the two

Civilian Regional Networks $150$100 $50$150 $200 $650


2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Totals

5 9



urban validation testbeds being used for net-worked sensors. Incorporate sensor characteris-tics. Create high fidelity digital models of centralcore and critical locales of two major urban cen-ters: include 3-D models of all major structuresdown to 30 cm or less. Define plume dispersaltest range in urban center.

FY2007: Demonstrate modeling capability in aseries of single and multiple event simulations.Show plume tracking to 10 meter accuracy in 5 knot wind with low turbulence; 100 meteraccuracy in 15 knot wind and moderate turbu-lence. Demonstrate end-to-end seamless model-ing and simulation online.

DIDArto.7 – On-Scene Assessment of Low-DoseExposure to Chemical Agents – Research

Objectives:

Research the feasibility of sensor systems that canreliably determine at the scene of an attackwhether an individual has symptoms caused bylow-dose exposure to a chemical warfare agent.In the event of a chemical attack, not all victimswill receive a dose necessary to kill or disable.Some may be injured and others may experiencesymptoms associated with low-dose exposure.

Payoffs:

Currently there is no unambiguous means forassociating physiological observables with low-dose chemical exposure. This research wouldcomplement the ongoing limited research effortsin DoD and extend the analysis to toxic indus-trial chemicals. It would also determine the feasi-bility of on-scene detection of low-dose exposureand appropriate procedures for handling andtreating these victims, if any.

Challenges:

Associating field observablephysiological symptoms withlow-dose exposure may not be

feasible. The large variety of TIC and CW agentsthat might be employed, possibly in a combinedattack, would greatly complicate this problem.Furthermore, not all people will respond thesame way and exhibit the same symptoms; somemay not exhibit any observable symptoms at all,but nevertheless need treatment.

Milestones/Metrics:

FY2004: Continue research on methods forinferring human injury from exposure to low-dose chemical agents using animal testing, bio-chemical analysis, and tissue-based experiments.Continue work in analysis of reliable data fromindustrial accidents.

FY2005: Extend current work inmodel-based injury related to moderate-dose exposure. Leverage and expand

work in long-term exposure to industrial toxins.Infer from chemical similarity, potential damageassociated with new toxins, or toxins for whichlittle useful data exists. Examine physiologicalsymptoms that may occur during low-dose exposure.

FY2006: Develop models of average humanresponse to low-dose exposure. Consider use of avariety of sensors to observe the physiologicalcharacteristics of such exposure. Expand work intemporary and permanent respiratory damageassociated with exposure to low-dose TIC.Extend DoD efforts with CW agents that dam-age the skin.

FY2007: Catalog the combined external symp-toms that may conclusively indicate the exposureto certain classes of chemical agents.

FY2008: Design sensor concepts that canobserve such symptoms in real-time.

FY2009: Incorporate sensor concept designs intohuman response models.

Combined Effects M&S $7$10 $25 $20 $62


2004 2005 2006 2007 Totals

Field Observable Indications and Sensors

$10 $20$10$10 $10 $60

ThrustDIDArto7 – Budget in Millions

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Totals

$0

6 0


Chapter III

DIDArto.8 – Real-Time Structural StressMeasurement

Objectives:

Develop a portable, real-time stress measurementsensor for continuous onsite assessment of struc-tural safety. After a blast associated with a terror-ist event, responders may need to enter structuresor rubble without knowing whether collapse isimminent. During rescue and response, thesafety of the structure or rubble may change.

Payoffs:

This capability will save rescuers lives in caseswhere the structure will not support a rescueattempt. Conversely, lives may be saved becausea rescue is safely conducted by avoiding unsaferoutes, or because an operation is found to beviable in spite of outward appearances.Responders can continuously assess the structuralstress of buildings and rubble. If stress exceedslimits associated with materials and design, orchanges in stress exceed safe margins, respon-ders are alerted and can exit to avoid injury.

Challenges:

Structural integrity models work best withdetailed information. Such information may notbe available for the damaged building; further,detailed information of rubble cannot beobtained rapidly or accurately. The correlation ofreal-time, continuous measurement of stress,movement, tremors, vibrations, and other observ-ables must be relied upon to provide estimates ofthe stability. Use of embedded models with real-time data feeds is a major challenge. Key issuesare: determination of characteristic or tell-talesignatures; packaging of multi-mode sensor intoportable system; size; weight; determination ofsensor location for best results; ease of deploy-ment and use; simplicity of results and recom-mended responder actions.

Milestones/Metrics:

FY2004: Use DoD and DoE structural modelsand simulations to urban structures such bridges,subways, tunnels, skyscrapers, and arenas.Incorporate blast and shock models and integrate

them with these urban structural models.Capitalize on rapid 3-D modeling work to pro-vide means to create structural models of build-ings, facilities, and large segments of cities.Examine sensor suite designs that can providecritical data on the scene to feed models.

FY2005: Integrate models with sensor inputs inportable device that can monitor structures whilerescue and cleanup operations are ongoing.Verify performance in laboratory and scale modelexperiments. Migrate testing to full scale facili-ties at DoE or DoD. Create scale models ifneeded. Build and test a portable sensor suite.

FY2006: Demonstrate confidence levels of 70 percent on predictive capability of model plussensor. Enter limited production and fielding:weight of 30 pounds; stand-off 10 meters ormore; automatic operations; alarm relay toresponders. Conduct operability evaluation inresponder exercises. Deploy and test sensor suitin the field if opportunities occur, here or abroad.

DIDArto.9 – Stand-off Automatic Choke PointScreener

Objectives:

Develop sensor systems that can find and inter-cept terrorists at choke points (buildingentrances, airports, etc.) prior to their intendedattack, or after an attack as they attempt toescape. This capability could allow reliablescreening of suspicious or dangerous people viaobservation of physiological characteristics.

Payoffs:

This capability could prevent attacks and facili-tate the capture of perpetrators, saving lives andmoney. Terrorists and collaborating individualscan be intercepted before they gain access to theirtargets. For example, a would-be highjackerwould be stopped at the ticket counter eventhough papers and baggage have checked out.

On-Scene Indications and Sensors

$20 $40 $20 $80


2004 2005 2006 Totals

6 1



Challenges:

The primary challenge is to identify a set of sig-natures and observables that provide unambigu-ous indication that a person intends to or isalready executing a terrorist attack. Humans varywidely in their response to threats, danger, andfear. Physiological observables taken individuallymay not suffice to drive down the false alarms.

Milestones/Metrics:

FY2007: Extend ongoing federal research to con-ceptual system designs and operational conceptsthat minimize false alarms and disruption tochoke point operations. Sensor should provideunambiguous measurement of key physiologicalindications associated with terrorist mental state.Non-contact approaches are preferable.Processing of individuals should take no morethan one minute. Although identification ofpeople is not a goal, the processing could benefitfrom identification or prior knowledge of theindividual via national database or local recordsfrom prior accesses.

FY2008: Consider the following observableseither singly or in combinations as candidates forrecognition of intent: voice, gait and head move-ment analysis, eye movement; odor; temperature;posture changes. Develop concepts that rely oncreating a baseline for each individual.

FY2009: Develop operational test scenarios thatcan be legally implemented in key choke pointsto collect sensor data. Candidate sensors mayinclude passive and active imaging to includelong-wave infrared and eye-safe laser radar, stand-off chemical sensing, and motion sensing, in sev-eral spectral regions.

FY2010: Establish test program for competingdesigns. Use live testing in urban choke points:e.g., airport passenger check-in, ticket booths,building entry, and arena entry. Select mostpromising approaches based on: accuracy; falsealarm rate; throughput or speed of measurement;and cost. Proceed to refined designs in lateryears.

Stand-Off Automated Choke Point Screener

$5 $5 $18


2007 2008 2010

$8

2009 Totals

$0

• PDA/Cell Phone Sized• Integrated CBR Suite• Multi Agent ID

• Stand-off 1 km• Man-portable, Compact• Affordable

• Stand-off 10-20 meters• Network Operations• Gamma/Neutron

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

DIDArto.1 – Wearable Integrated CBR Sensors

DIDArto.3 – Integrated RemoteDetection of CB Agents

• Microclimate to <50m• In Situ Validation• Event Mapping to 10m

• Full Urban CBRNE• FAR <1/month• Low Opns Cost/sq km

• Stand-off 1-2 meters• Monostatic• Briefcase Size

DIDArto.4 – Portable Stand-off Container Inspection

DIDArto.5 – Integrated Networked Sensorsfor CBRN Detection

• TIC and CW Agents• 20% False Alarm Rate• Event Mapping to 10m

DIDArto.7 – On-Scene Assessment of Low-Dose Exposure toChemical Agents – Research

DIDArto.6 – Combined EffectsModeling for Urban Canyons

• Man-portable• Deploy in 5 Minutes• Automatic Alarm

• Fast, Natural• False Alarm Rate <10%• Range of 10-100 ft

DIDArto.9 – Stand-off AutomaticChokepoint Screener

DIDArto.8 – Real-TimeStructural Stress Measurement

DIDArto.2 – Stand-off Radiation ID

Detection, Identification, and Assessment Technology Roadmap

6 2


Chapter III

6 3


Definition

Unified Incident Command (UIC) is the capabilityto seamlessly acquire, store, distribute and protectinformation needed by the incident commanderto successfully manage the response to a terrorismevent. “Response,” in this case, involves a varietyof actions and decisions across police, fire, emer-gency medical and other departments to includelocal, state and federal support personnel.


This capability differs from others in that thefunctional capabilities do not differ depending onwhether the incident is chemical, biological,explosive, or nuclear. Rather, functional elementsare evaluated against their performance and con-tribution to the capability across the spectrum ofinformation management environments whichinclude: Information Acquisition, InformationAssessment and Course of Action Development,Decision-Making, and Direction. This meansthat increases in capability can result from sys-tems integration, engineering, application ofcommercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technologiesand other solutions not directly reliant on newtechnology development. For example, organiza-tional changes, equipment/interface standards,and practice/training may be more relevant thantechnology in solving some of the problems. Inaddition, some capability gaps can be eliminatedby simply procuring devices in large quantities tobe distributed in smaller amounts to variousjurisdictions. There are some key priority needs,

however, that cannot be solved with existing tech-nology or non-technology solutions and willrequire research and development.


The needed functional capabilities prioritized inthe Emergency Responders’ workshops includethe following items, prioritized in order of impor-tance to the responders.

• Point Location and Identification.

• Seamless Connectivity and Integration.

• Information Assurance.

• Incident Command Information Managementand Dissemination.

• Multimedia Supported Telepresence.

The responders gave Point Location andIdentification (UIC.1), and Seamless Connectivityand Integration (UIC.2) nearly the same prioritybut with a slight edge to Point Location. Theresponders believe that the most important pieceof information to an incident commander iswhere his/her personnel and equipment in theincident area are. This is a long-sought after butonly partially satisfied need. Seamless connectivityaddresses the com-munications interoperabilityissue that vexes most responders when severaldepartments (i.e., police, emergency medical, andfire in multiple municipalities) have to worktogether in a large event. Information Assurance

Chapter IV

Unified Incident Command DecisionSupport and InteroperableCommunications (UIC)Chapter Chair: Dr. Guy BeakleyChapter Coordinator: Dr. Maria Powell

6 4


Chapter IV

(UIC.3) and Incident Command InformationManagement andDissemination (UIC.4) wererated as moderately high butnot as high a priority as thefirst two. Although still con-sidered a needed capability,Multimedia SupportedTelepresence (UIC.5) was ratedthe lowest priority amongthese functional capabilities.The sense of the responders isthat there would be real valuein having video teleconferenc-ing capability in the field andbetween responder elements;it’s just not as urgent as theother needs.

The discussion of the individual functional capa-bilities addresses the functional needs across theoperational elements, as well as technological andnon-technological solutions. It should be kept inmind that an extensible framework needs to beput together so that these individual elements cancome together and work as a unified incidentcommand. This means, for example, that a solu-tion for point location and identification mustwork with a solution for interoperable communi-cations in the unified incident command for largeand small jurisdictions.

Overall State of Technology forUnified Incident Command DecisionSupport and InteroperableCommunications

The matrix to the right shows a mix of moderateto high technological challenges in raising thelevel of capabilities for emergency response.However, as the matrix indicates, point locationand identification is the only functional capabil-ity that calls for technology development with amoderate degree of risk. All other technologyareas can achieve results with low technologydevelopment risk.

UIC.1 – Point Location and Identification.This is the ability to know and visualize the location and identity of individual responders

regardless of user position or movement, all thetime. Safety is a primary concern of the incidentcommanders. The commander needs to knowthe location and well-being of each responder forrescue and situational awareness reasons. Pointgeo-location and identification are necessaryregardless of user position or movement.Location information is also useful for giving apicture of where the resources are and monitoringstatus in cases where the response has a positionalobjective. For safety it is also useful to measurephysiological status of the individual, but cost is apractical concern. A low-cost version of a physio-logical monitoring system similar to that used byNASA might be appropriate.

Goals:

A key goal is to identify and locate an individualwithin 3 meters in any direction and under anyconditions including weather and interior, withinbuildings and in tunnels over 400 feet belowground. The responders also indicated that loca-tion of high heat and combustion and other haz-ards (including the chem/bio/radiation hazards asaddressed in the DIDA NTRO) would beextremely valuable and should be transmitted byaudible alert to the responder in danger and alsoto a field command location. The positionalinformation, physiological status, (and environ-mental warning, if provided) must be transmitted

12

3





Unified Incident Command Decision Support and InteroperableCommunications

1. Point Location and Identification

2. Seamless Connectivity and Integration

3. Information Assurance

4. Incident Command Information Management and Dissemination

5. Multi-Media Supported Telepresence


Functional Capabilities DirectionDecision-Making

InformationAssessment

and COADevelopment

InformationAcquisition

6 5


Unified Incident Command Decision Support and Interoperable Communications (UIC)

wirelessly inside/outside structures and throughrubble to an off-site command post, and to otherappropriate parties including within teams ofresponders. To aid in the visualization of posi-tion in the environment, the command displayshould provide building and other environmentaloverlays. The command should also be able toprovide this information wirelessly back to theresponder teams. All this should be accom-plished with minimum delay and flawless opera-tion of such a system needs to be assured. Theidentification and location equipment shouldcome up on the first try and stay up during theentire mission without a “crash” or other serviceinterruption.

Size, weight and power requirements for theremote devices should be kept to a minimum.Power should be provided by small replaceablebatteries and should be assisted by an intelligentpower/operational management system to ensurethat the device would continue to provide essen-tial rescue location service for the duration of amission, perhaps up to one month. The entireresponder package should be smaller than a ciga-rette pack and should weigh very little more thanthe battery. It should preferably be integratedinto individual protection gear.

Such technology, once available, would revolu-tionize personnel accountability procedureswithin responder organizations. All personnel ata response scene, including volunteers, should beequipped with these devices. Thus it would beimportant that such capabilities either be stan-dardized across jurisdictions and disciplines, orthat the equipment has a standard interface touniforms and personal protective equipment, sothat the devices could be issued to all respondersentering the perimeter.


Currently there is no affordable system for pointlocation of responders satisfying the aboverequirements. The requirement, “under any con-dition” needs to be specified so not to obviatemore affordable solutions. An interim goal might be to operate from five stories down in abuilding or a somewhat more difficult require-

ment to operate 50 feet down in a subway thathas not been previously wired. Responders statedthat there is some capability available to locatepersonnel in the operational area in two dimen-sions only. Current systems indicate in whatdirection an individual may be and roughly howfar away that individual is, but not, for instance,what floor he/she is on. Current systems arebeing used mostly by some of the larger firedepartments, have limited range and are not inte-grated into command situational awareness sys-tems. A range of at least 1,000 feet is required.

State of the Art:

Commercial-off-the-shelf equipment exists for anumber of applications other than those forresponders. These include child location in parks(wristband device placed on the child, receivers atvarious locations in the park and location sta-tions, where queries can be made), vehicle loca-tion systems, Radio Frequency Identification (RF ID) tags for inventory control and variousexperimental systems. R&D is being conductedon RF ID tags by Naval Air Systems Commandand the Army’s Land Warrior program, digital RFtags by DARPA/Army CECOM and others,Ultra Wide-band (UWB) by Lawrence Livermoreand U.S. Army, and Blue Force Tracking (mostlyclassified). Army NVESD is presently developinga prototype UWB position location and trackingsystem specifically designed for interior fire andrescue operations.

The capability to determine the location of awireless 9-1-1 caller is becoming available insome parts of the country. The FCC’s wirelessE9-1-1 rules seek to improve the reliability ofwireless 9-1-1 services and to provide emergencyservices personnel with location information thatwill enable them to locate and provide assistanceto wireless 9-1-1 callers much more quickly.Even though this capability does not meet all ofthe responder needs it will be very cost effectiveand may be the most satisfactory solution forusers with limited resources. The FCC has man-dated that wireless carriers provide the geographiclocation of cellular 9-1-1 callers as part of its E9-1-1 Phase II rules. Phase I of the FCC

6 6


Chapter IV

mandate, required that, effective 4/1/1998, wire-less carriers provide the callback number and thelocation of the cell site or base station receiving a9-1-1 call. Phase II of the FCC mandate addi-tionally required that wireless carriers provide thegeographic location (i.e., latitude and longitude)of the caller as part of Phase II E9-1-1 implemen-tation, beginning October 1, 2001. The fulldeployment (i.e., 95% penetration) of this capa-bility is required to be completed by December31, 2005. The requirements do not satisfy thoseof the responders in that the location is estimatedto within a 50 meter – 150 meter radius forhandset-based location technologies, and a 150 –300 meter radius for network-based locationtechnologies. Also, depending upon the type oflocation technology chosen by a wireless carrier, acaller’s location may not be able to be determinedif the call originates from deep within a buildingor subway.

Steve Wozniak, the co-founder of AppleComputer, recently announced the developmentof a simple and inexpensive low-data rate wirelessnetwork that uses radio signals and global posi-tioning satellite data to keep track of a cluster ofinexpensive ($25 production cost) tags within aone- or two-mile radius of each base station.WozNet will include a home-base station that hasthe ability to track the location of dozens or evenhundreds of small wireless devices that can beattached to people, pets or property. While thespecific technical solution (reliance on GPS) cho-sen for WozNet is unlikely to translate directlyinto the solution for responders (unless high-power GPS pseudolites can be developed to pene-trate buildings and rubble), the low-cost of thetags and system suggests that other system con-cepts could be developed inexpensively as well.

Ultra Wideband is a promising new technologythat sends out short pulses that occupy a wide-range of frequency. Because receivers using thistechnique can discriminate signals in a great dealof noise, transmitters require very little powerand the system can operate under the noise floorused by higher-powered devices such as GPS andcell phones. A number of companies such asTime Domain Corp. and MultiSpectralSolutions, Inc. have considerable capability in the

new technology, but further R&D needs to bedone to meet the responders’ needs.

The U.S. Army CECOM has a number of sci-ence and technology programs on position, navi-gation and tracking that directly relate to theseneeds. One is on advanced position and trackingfor the Objective Force and is in its initial year ofa four year investigation. Another program usestriangulation technology to pinpoint locationwithin 25 ft. Other programs examine net-worked assisted GPS, Ultra Wideband (UWB)for ranging, and dead-reckoning models. TheNavy uses Infolinks units, which may be toocostly for many municipalities. None of theseprograms meet all of the responders’ requirementsincluding low-cost.


Point location through 400 feet of ground orconcrete is not practical from a size weight,power and cost perspective. Practical groundpenetration limits are about 20 feet through reinforced concrete. Going down 400 feet in atunnel would best be done with a tunnel com-munications system. It may be best to set anintermediate requirement of penetrating five sto-ries down in a building or a somewhat more dif-ficult requirement of penetrating 50 feet down ina subway that has not been previously wired.Concepts of operations that involve deployingwired links to RF repeaters may help bridge these gaps.

For the near-term the technology risks are moder-ate to high in propagation through buildings,earth, or rubble, but will likely improve as tech-nologies such as UWB and component miniatur-ization continue to attain success in performance,size, weight, power, and cost. Barriers to reach-ing the goals include detection of RF propagationthrough buildings, walls and rubble.

Gap Fillers:

The chosen approach is to begin with demonstra-tions of existing technologies combined withresearch on alternative approaches to surmount-ing the identified technical barriers and limita-tions. This initial phase would be followed by

6 7



integrated systems development and demonstra-tion and transition to industrial production ofthe resulting devices.

UIC.2 – Seamless Connectivity andIntegration. This is the ability to provide com-munications systems that are able to seamlesslyand dynamically interconnect multiple intera-gency users (with multiple functions), as well asother information and communications technol-ogy systems.

Goals:

Within several minutes after the Pentagon attackof September 11th, emergency workers from tenjurisdictions were on the scene, trying to commu-nicate with different technologies, on differentradio frequencies, using different spectrum bands.Incident command communications systemsmust be able to seamlessly and dynamically inter-connect multiple interagency users, who havemultiple functions, and multiple information andcommunications technology systems. The com-munications system should integrate wired andwireless systems and enable communicationswithin and between tactical, operational, andstrategic levels. This includes the ability to sup-port separate communications channels amongresponders, strike teams and task forces.

A principal problem is that the existing equip-ment that responders have is not necessarilyinteroperable among fire fighters, police, andemergency medical personnel, even within thesame jurisdiction. This problem has been largelyaddressed by most jurisdictions, but equipmentfrom different jurisdictions is most likely notinteroperable, e.g., the county equipment maynot communicate with the city equipment, oradjacent county equipment or the state equip-ment or various Federal departmental equipment.Interoperability between in-place equipment is abig problem.

Communications capability should include videoand data communications in addition to voice.The equipment should be scalable and integrateup to 500 agencies/systems. A call plan withestablishment of networks takes care of a lot of

problems. 500 people do not need to talk witheach other at one time. The system may have tohandle that many entities at one time, but even ifit were technically possible to allow all pairs tocommunicate simultaneously, this would not fitwith the needs for incident command to main-tain a common operational picture flowing upand a coherent set of orders flowing down. Thereis also the need for responders to spend most oftheir time doing rather than communicating.

The normal procedure is to establish a hierarchi-cal communications plan that simplifies the con-nections that need to be made. The systemshould handle 50 agencies with links to state andnational systems. The agencies should have theirown network plan with ten or fewer simultaneouscallers. The system should not require techni-cians to be on-site and use common terminologyand nomenclature. It should also have the abilityto operate within and between challenging envi-ronments and terrain, e.g., high rise buildings,underground, in canyons, and on-the-move. Anumber of levels of security will be required torestrict information that would be harmful in thewrong hands. However, it is envisioned that thesecurity system will be much simpler than that ofthe military. See UIC.3 (Information Assurance).Peer to peer communications in IP networksoffers additional capability and should beincluded.


Communications systems vary across differentjurisdictions and departments. Digital communi-cations systems are only just now being deployedacross the nation, and for the most part, withoutconcern for interoperability. The standard systemin most localities is an 800 MHz trunk system.However, this has limited range, especially inurban environments, and not all localities havechanged to this system or have the requiredrepeater system to facilitate its use. The systemalso takes substantial time to initially upgradeand make available for use.

This is an area where the responders believe thatthe needed capability, as they have describedabove, is not available because of a combination

6 8


Chapter IV

of affordability and lack of standards. There isalso a significant deficit in the ability to commu-nicate within large buildings, deep in subwaytunnels and in underground structures andcanyons. Current systems mostly offer only voicecommunications, with little or no capability fortext, graphics, images, or video.

State of the Art:

Many state and local projects have been insti-tuted for increasing communications interoper-ability – including, for example, those by theMassachusetts State Police, Kentucky respondersand a number of Florida projects, which havebeen undertaken to relieve the problems in theirjurisdictions.

Interconnect appliances exist to interconnect vari-ous existing radios. They vary in capability frominterconnecting six different radios to intercon-necting twelve radios over eight networks.

Standardization efforts have also taken place.Notable among them is Project 25, by theAssociation of Public Safety CommunicationsOfficials, standardized as ANSI 102. Project 25is an open-standard, digital land mobile radio sys-tem that is backward compatible to traditionalanalog radios. In the digital mode it achievesdouble the spectrum efficiency and includespacket data services.8 The problem is the juris-dictions have existing radios and support towerinfrastructure and do not have the money toupgrade them.

Wireless network standards include IEEE 802.11for high bandwidth, packet switched communica-tions but limited mobility due to short-range;IEEE 802.16 for high bandwidth, packetswitched, metropolitan area coverage; 3G cellularfor medium bandwidth, circuit switched, andcontinuous coverage via cellular design; and thenew IEEE 802.20, which is under developmentfor a continuous coverage cellular system similarto 3G in many respects, but utilizing packetswitched access. 2.5G and 3G cellular systemshave the advantage that they use the same towers,base stations and radios of the current (2G)

digital systems. 2.5G and 3G systems will havedata rates of approximately 115 kb/s and 384kb/s, respectively. Cellular systems are problem-atic in times of emergency because of the generaloverloading of the spectrum and potential loss ofsupport structure. However, once effective prior-ity use provisions are put in place, low-cost, and 9-1-1 capability makes cellular attractive forresource-limited organizations.

Emergency responder command and controlvehicles are available that offer satellite, softwareprogrammable radios, cellular telephone andwireless LAN capability. One problem is the cost(approximately $250,000, although this costwould come down if they were mass-produced).

The Defense Department’s Joint Tactical RadioSystem (JTRS) is a mobile radio system wherehardware and software products conform to a sin-gle Software Communications Architecture(SCA). The government is procuring a family of affordable tactical radios to meet military communications requirements in a competitiveenvironment by capitalizing on commercial tech-nologies and processes. The radios are expectedto cost $2,000 – $5,000 in quantities for onechannel and one mode. The SCA makes it possi-ble to procure radio applications such as wave-forms and hardware independently. JTRS will beused in the military environment to provide com-mand, control, and communications with forcesvia voice, video, and data media forms during allphases of military operations to include base sup-port in non-military roles. Commercial availabil-ity is expected in 2006.

Power line networks may be considered as a solu-tion to the failure of wireless communications towork in many high rise buildings and underground. The power line capability should beincluded in some radios and the radios shouldwork even if the power is disrupted.


There are barriers and limitations to solving this problem. One is interoperability of all thedifferent radios that departments have purchased

8 See Desourdis et al, “Emerging Public Safety Wireless Communication Systems,” Artech House, 2001 for further information.

6 9



over the years. Scale and affordability will beissues here. The requirement for a network man-ager or technician is also a problem. Two-waybroadband communications among vehicles andresponders on the move in urban environments is a difficult problem. Interconnection of existing equipment is a solvable problem butupgrades may have to be made in order to meet the requirements. Although the near-termavailability of these technologies is marginal, thetechnological risk of developing them is low.

Gap Fillers:

Because the primary barriers to responders havingthese capabilities have to do with standards,interoperability (including legacy systems), andavailability of resources, the chosen technologyapproach is to demonstrate a “Responder C3

System” that is developed over time using a spiraldevelopment process. The development shouldstart with the evaluation and adaptation of cur-rent off-the-shelf technology and be able to lever-age emerging technology as it is developed. Thisis essentially an engineering effort that establishesstandards and an architecture then iterativelyincorporates advances in the state of commercialand military technology. The state of the art ismoving much too fast on its own to justifyadding additional funding into development ofthe technology itself except in the context of spe-cific extensions of technology for our purposes.

Some of this is already being proposed in theDHS’ SAFECOMM program. SAFECOMM isa DHS effort to address the wireless communica-tion interoperability problem for emergencyresponders at the local, state, and federal levels.It will build on the efforts done to date by thePublic Safety Wireless Network Program. TheDHS intends to revitalize and enhance the SAFECOMM program however; little informa-tion is available about the new program. TheSAFECOMM program should result in anational standard architecture for emergencyresponse communications and move towarddemonstrating the goals and capability set forthabove. Our recommended program leverages the

hoped-for results of the SAFECOMM programand establishes a process to continually improvethe communications capability of emergencyresponders.

UIC.3 – Information Assurance. This is theability to guarantee the availability, confidential-ity, security, and integrity of information andinformation systems, including redundant systems.

Goals:

The unified incident command must have thecapability to operate first-time every-time andremain in operation for the duration of the mis-sion. Redundant systems may be required tomaintain fail-proof availability. The incidentcommand must provide for security, confidential-ity, and integrity of information. The responderssee system availability and system integrity as oneissue and hence they have been combined underthis requirement. The system must have the abil-ity to authenticate users including the device,operator, and data. It must include multi-levelsecurity and provide seamless security within andamong enclaves and users. The security should,of course, not degrade the data. There should bea visual indication of security status at all levels.The incident command should have monitoringand alert of attempted and actual securitybreaches. The latency should be on the order ofa tenth or a second or less.


Most of the technology needed for informationassurance probably already exists, and does notrequire extensive research and developmentefforts in addition to efforts already underway.The information assurance issues pertaining to aunified incident command for emergency respon-ders have less to do with technology push thanwith prioritization of costs, integration of tech-nologies in an incident command system, proce-dures and non-materiel solutions. Existing tech-niques from different fields can be applied toincident command.

7 0


Chapter IV

State of the Art:

There are numerous commercial-off-the-shelftechnology options already available or maturingthat aid in the authentication of users. Physicalsecurity is already fairly advanced through bio-metrics, digital fingerprinting, facial recognitiontechnologies, and iris recognition. While thetechnology exists, most of these applications havenot made it to the first responder community.For example, there is no authentication on radiosin most communities, a potential applicationwould be to use fingerprint authentication oncruiser radios. Currently, user authenticationusually comes via an identifier in standard radios,but these are subject to compromise if the radiosare lost or stolen. Biometrics is the most favoredphysical security means, and it is envisioned thatbiometrics will be in fairly widespread use in thesecurity field for authentication and will be rela-tively inexpensive (estimate of $25 per unit). Asignificant challenge will be to define policies thatsay how the information is shared (by whom,how and when) among the many agencies andentities that may be called upon to collaborate insituations of great urgency.

Authentication of networks can be achievedthrough Terminal Access Control andAuthorization systems (TACAS), Secure ID,Common Access Cards (CAC) and Public KeyInfrastructure (PKI). These are all commerciallyavailable systems. PKI has become so large thatthere can be scaling issues with the large numberof repository or servers holding certificates, whichcan increase latency (10 seconds or so).

Currently, there are a number of intrusion detec-tion systems (IDS) that are commercially avail-able that serve as visual identification of securitystatus, i.e., Internet Security Systems (ISS) andEnteyosys “Dragon.” Ever since the Linux oper-ating system came out, the Open SourceCommunity Research “SNORT” is the fastestgrowing IDS system because it is free to compa-nies. However, SNORT can be labor intensive.Organizations should also consider commercialintrusion systems such as those provided bymajor communications equipment companiessuch as Cisco Systems Incß.

Real-time video surveillance systems focus onphysical security (i.e., force protection againstbombs, terrorists, chemical, biological, etc.).These systems have built-in algorithms to identifythreats before a security breach has occurred (i.e.,snipers, trucks getting too close, employees standing in front of a locked door for more than 10 minutes). As soon as a threat has beenidentified an alert is sent to central console forprocessing.

Data Correlation Engines currently focus onAutomated Information Systems (AIS) and theareas where people and computers interact. Avariety of sensors have been built that providesecurity to particular areas, e.g., firewalls, intru-sion detection systems, and access control servers.Of course, all these sensors generate numerousalerts that could easily tie-up an entire NetworkOperating Center (NOC) just reviewing them.Data Correlation Engines attempt to reduce allthese alerts from many different sensors andmake smart decisions to select only those criticalalerts that require human intervention.Currently, there are several studies being con-ducted with regards to the “Insider Threat” toDoD Systems. Some of these studies are propos-ing the creation of data correlation systems thatactually combined physical security systems(video surveillance) with AIS data correlation.


Multi-level security system technology tends tobe very hard to do and not very conducive tointeroperability. Currently, there are “guards”that fit between two different security classifica-tion levels on a network. The Operating SystemsMulti-Level Security (OSMLS) is one computerthat can process both classified and unclassifiedinformation. It has been recently developed byDARPA but is not commercially available and iscostly. Classified information moving betweenagencies and especially between Federal and localentities has always been a concern and difficult toimplement for both technical and security rea-sons (many local responders do not possess clear-ances). It is more appropriate from the emer-gency responder perspective to have multi-agencysecurity or privacy protection where information

7 1



is segregated between agencies that have a need toknow about particular information. For example,there may be some criminal information that thepolice do not want EMS or the Fire Departmentto know. Also, there is a requirement that 9-1-1information be kept private. However, the uni-fied incident command needs this information.

Another important aspect when combining dif-ferent classifications of information is to makesure that it goes to the right database that canstore information securely with different levels ofprivacy. Law Enforcement Online (LEO) mightbe a good Web-based source/model to maintainsecure and local access to pertinent information.

A very high-level of redundancy for all compo-nents/pathways/data elements is very expensiveand difficult to implement but it can be achieved.NASA and the military services have imple-mented systems with very high redundancy, butthey are very few players in this field. Someamount of redundancy is realistic, but mostresponder units do not currently have this cap-ability. Most communications channels have twobackup routes. Some redundancy is built intocell phones. Nextel phones can become walkietalkies. Most mobile responder units currentlyhave at least two units – a cell phone and a radio.

Less than 1/10 second latency is currently verydifficult to achieve especially with encryption.The current state of the art is about 400 millisec-onds, but the military have systems with latenciesone half that. While responders feel that it isimportant to have the fastest communicationsavailable and intelligible conversations, there is anunderstanding of what is a reasonable expecta-tion. The marginal improvement in this capabil-ity is not enough to justify money to acceleratethe current progress of research of improving thistechnology to less than 1/10 latency.

Information assurance is an area that the emer-gency response community can piggyback onprogress by, and leverage innovation of others.Despite this fact, however, horrendous integra-tion problems and a number of unknownunknowns regarding technologies makes this par-ticular technology marginally available in the

near-term. The responders believe little to nocapability exists for this element and the technol-ogists believe that the technology developmentrisk is low to moderate.

Gap Fillers:

Again, because the primary barriers to respondershaving these capabilities have to do with stan-dards, interoperability, and availability ofresources, the chosen technology approach is tomerge the requirements for information assuranceinto the overall Responder C3 System recom-mended in the previous section. Informationassurance technologies are similar to the commu-nication and information technologies discussedin the previous section in that the state- of-the-art is moving forward quite adequately on itsown. For our purposes we need to be in a posi-tion to rapidly adopt currently available technol-ogy and promising new technology as it becomesavailable. Our recommendation is that the needfor information assurance be addressed togetherwith seamless communications. Therefore, weoffer a single Response Technology Objective forboth areas.

UIC.4 – Incident Command InformationManagement and Dissemination. This is theability to provide decision support, situation andresource status management, communication sys-tem management, and mission/task tracking inorder to allow responders to see, understand andact.

Goals:

The incident command must have tools and serv-ices to provide decision support, situation andresource status management, communicationssystem management and mission/task tracking.Streaming video, information visualization, andfusion tools are needed as well as modeling andsimulation capability, and graphic representationof geo-location of responders with building/equipment overlay. These tools and services sup-port all hazardous incidents and should be pow-ered from any number of sources includingAC/DC, solar and batteries. Commanders needaccess to all sorts of databases including weather

7 2


Chapter IV

reports. The decision support suite should havean automated mode where it gives problem alertswithout being prompted. The system shouldoperate wirelessly and transmit off-site. Andfinally the software should have a cost goal of$3,000 to $10,000, which could potentially limitthe capability. This cost limit is related to thesize of the community – a larger community canafford a more sophisticated system.

The capability should include the acquisition,processing, verification, and targeted distributionof intelligence in operational support of incidentcommand. Real-time access to open sourceinformation, e.g., mass media; public safetyanswering point, e.g., 9-1-1 call data; commandboard data; and security information is required.Intelligence sources providing imminentthreat/danger should provide immediate notifica-tion up and down and by push and pull. Toolsshould be provided for intelligence analysisincluding data mining, threat/vulnerability analy-sis, interagency assessment, aggregation, and pre-dictive analysis. The intelligence support shouldprovide the ability to fuse all intelligence disci-plines including human intelligence, signals intel-ligence, electronic intelligence, etc. into one loca-tion. Intelligence sources should have prioritycommunications links to the command staff.Provision should be made for automated reportgeneration and information sharing.


This is in an area where the responders believethat technology probably exists, but no one hastaken the time or provided the money to inte-grate technology into a system of systemsdesigned for emergency management unifiedincident command. They believe there is mar-ginal capability to gather the information neces-sary, but little capability to manage the informa-tion. The responders believe that very little inthe way of automated decision support tools isavailable to this community, and what may beavailable is too expensive. There is also little datamining capability available to the responders.One of the responders from New York gave thisexample: a review of emergency telephone data-bases indicate that at the World Trade Center,

9-1-1 calls came in indicating that the structurewas showing signs of collapse in time to warnmany of the personnel in the buildings. Therewas no capability to recognize this or “hotwire”the information to the incident commander andresponders.

State of the Art:

Many information management tools are avail-able and emerging to perform incident commandand control. In fact the tools exist in manyforms and provide varying degrees of decisionsupport, situation and resource management,communications systems management and mis-sion/task tracking. It is true no single integratedsystem or network exists for performing thisfunction, but programs to set standards and toestablish what systems are interoperable would gofar toward satisfying responders’ needs. In themilitary, a suite of standards is used to define theparameters to which component modules mustconform and this is generally satisfactory towardmeeting the goals of information management.For example, the Defense Collaborative ToolSuite sets standards that are used for keepingtrack of collaboration, chat function, audio, videoteleconferencing (VTC), mapping, “white board-ing,” document sharing, application sharing, etc.

The capability to mine data during an incident isby no means insignificant. Sizable investmentshave been made by the military on decision sup-port systems with data mining capabilities andthese should be leveraged for emergency responseoperations. U.S. Army CECOM has programssuch as DaVinci for distributed analysis and visu-alization and Area Secure Operations Commandand Control (ASOCC) that should be investi-gated for appropriateness for responders’ require-ments. DaVinci is a windows-based applicationthat has a map view, a resources view and a timeline view of the emergency event with modeling and simulation and monitoring capa-bility. ASOCC is a package of commercial and government off-the-shelf software that provides information exchange, visualization, collaboration, decision support, and orders andreporting functionality. These systems should be considered for appropriateness in providing

7 3



effective information management and dissemination.

TSWG’s CoBRA, the chem-bio response aid, is acost effective application and is available on aruggedized laptop. However, it lacks resourcemonitoring and tracking capability. There are anumber of other sophisticated systems for laptopssuch as PEAC (Palmtop Emergency Access forChemicals) and CAMEO, which have capabilityto model plumes. At least 50 different softwarepackages exist that provide expert agents, emer-gency service information management, engineer-ing analysis and decision support. A concertedeffort is needed to fully integrate some of thesetechnologies into fully functional systems in thecontext of responder operations. Efforts shouldbe expended to objectively evaluate systems thatshow promise and to determine the best of breedfor the responders’ requirements. The importantpoint is to integrate the best of breed into systemof systems and decide the standards, to preventproliferation of incompatible systems.

Many of these capabilities and some others arebeing encompassed by the Defense Department’sHomeland Security/Homeland DefenseCommand and Control ACTD (HLS/HD C2

ACTD). Its purpose is to provide a homelandsecurity decision support center for knowledgecapture and knowledge management using high-powered computing and visualization capabilitiesfor emergency response.


Although responders believe little to no capabilityexists for this element, technologists believe thatthe technology development risk is low, withtechnology readily available in the near-term.

Gap Fillers:The program we are recommending leverages theHLS/HD C2 ACTD to provide ever increasingcapability in a spiral development process. It usesthe technologies integrated into the ACTD as thebasis and then evaluates emerging technologiesfor inclusion in an Incident CommandInformational Management Tool Set. The key

to the process will be a constant eye towardreducing cost. The cost of the system needs to besuch that local emergency management organiza-tions can afford it.

UIC.5 – Multimedia Supported Telepresence.This is the ability to provide a multimedia telep-resence between incident commanders responsepersonnel, technical specialists, and off-site facilities.

Goals:

The unified incident command should providemultimedia telepresence capabilities among andbetween incident commanders, response person-nel, technical specialists, and off-site facilitiesincluding the capability to stream video. Thisincludes the ability to provide an overhead view,to see beyond the current location utilizing suchcapabilities as manned aircraft, UAVs (unmannedaerial vehicles), UGVs (ground) and nationalassets such as satellites. Real-time virtual reach-back (private national network) is to be provided.The incident command should provide distrib-uted collaborative decision support capability. Itshould provide for 5-7 critical feeds and handleup to 100 sites for up to three separate telecon-ferences. It should have the ability to link withoutside entities that are not necessarily on theestablished network such as CNN by whatevermedia including phone, video, and web. Themultimedia should be scalable and support hand-held capabilities in the field. It should be easilyusable and provide good image quality, even ifthe responder is moving. The system should havethe ability to incorporate the appropriate securityschema.

This is an area where inexpensive COTS equip-ment should be employed and adapted wherenecessary. Being able to collaborate and see fromafar is a very powerful tool, but the cost of animplementation can be considerable. Capabilitiesof the military and intelligence communityshould be examined to see what fits its require-ments. In addition, the command should look tothe Internet for practical solutions that can beimplemented at low-cost.

7 4


Chapter IV


Video teleconferencing technology is availableand deployed in some areas. For a large numberof areas it is simply too expensive for many users.No responder department represented in theworkshops had anything close to the above capa-bility desired by the responders. Such extensivecapability, to include collaborative decision sup-port and connectivity with handheld devices inthe field is not even on the horizon as far as theresponders can now see.

State of the Art:

Information portals or gateways are commonlyconstructed providing access to the Internet forspecialized services. A dynamic system can bedesigned, leveraging Internet methodologies, forad hoc networks that support multimedia serv-ices. The architecture can be configured suchthat systems are separable, but interconnected tomaintain privacy. By implementing inexpensivecomputers and hand held devices each unit(node) can be low-cost and offer considerablepower to access information needed by theresponders.

The National Guard now has the technology tolink up to 100 locations. It is in the process ofupgrading its teleconferencing system to onebased on the Internet protocol. The DefenseCollaborative Tool Suite (DCTS) sets standardsthat are used for collaboration, chat function,audio, video teleconferencing (VTC), mapping,“white boarding,” sharing documents, sharingapplications, and optionally streaming media.The Joint Interoperability Test Command testsDCTS equipment for certification. DCTSexceeds the requirement for 5-7 critical feedsnow, but the cost of $150,000 per suite may betoo expensive for most users. It would be pru-dent to see if a cost reduced system could meetmost responders’ needs.

A large amount of research and developmentwork is being conducted in the multimedia area.A new compression technology has been stan-dardized jointly by the InternationalTelecommunication Union and InternationalStandards Organization that permits quality

video to fit in half the bandwidth previouslyrequired. TSWG is having work done on aTeleconferencing Bridge to develop a secure com-munication system that allows military and othergovernment organizations to communicate withmultiple parties simultaneously in a secure, butnot classified environment. The secure bridgesends encrypted communications to up to 30connected devices. The design will support com-munications between both fixed and mobileunits.

Video technology changes rapidly since it isdeveloped for many commercial applications.Micro cameras exist today that previously did notexist. Games, the Internet, and computers havepushed the technology to low-cost solutions forthe home. There are commercial services thatoffer city maps, 3-D images, building plans, andthe like. One example is I3 Systems (3-Dimagery, outside the building, modeling, web-site). The idea is to link to these various servicesfor data mining. Efforts are being made toobtain interior plans for buildings (not through3-D imagery but by other requested standards).Police have gone into many public buildings andcompletely mapped the area. Obtaining blue-prints of older buildings is generally not a prob-lem, although the accuracy and timeliness of thedrawings are many times a concern.

It is desirable to have a common operational pic-ture and be able to click on the area of interest.The Army has a program to obtain and distributea Single Integrated Ground Picture (SIGP).


The only technical barrier noted was the abilityto provide such a robust system at a cost thatlocal agencies can afford.

Gap Fillers:

The chosen approach has two phases. The first isto adapt current Web-based technologies to theResponder environment. The second is to inte-grate this system into the emerging Responder C3

System and refine these systems through a seriesof exercises into a standardized package forresponder use.

7 5



Unified Incident Command DecisionSupport and InteroperableCommunications Response TechnologyObjectives (UICrto)

UICrto.1 – Point Location and Identification

Objectives: Conduct demonstrations of existing point loca-tion and identification technologies combinedwith research on alternative approaches to sur-mount the identified technical barriers and limi-tations. The demonstrations should be followedby integrated systems development of point location hardware and transition to industrialproduction.

The system should locate within three meters inany direction, identify, and determine the well-being of each responder under any conditionsincluding weather and interior to buildings andunderground.

The point location and identification transmittersshould be miniaturized and seamlessly integratedfor use on the responders’ person or clothing.They should provide rapid (timely) alert to thewearer of danger to well-being and type of attackand wireless readout of exposure information,date, time, and location history for use in epi-demiological analysis, command response, andtreatment. The device should be smaller than acigarette pack and carried in a convenient placethat does not hinder free movement, or the sen-sors may be embedded in headgear and/or cloth-ing and uniforms. The device must haveonboard storage and some processing for record-ing, analyzing, and retaining history of the indi-vidual’s exposure.

Payoffs:

Wearable sensors will save lives and help respon-ders and leadership understand the extent andseverity of population exposure. This will greatlyreduce casualties and enable accurate responsewith minimum panic and confusion.

Challenges:

The commanders want a fool-proof system for locating a person in any event, under any

conditions, and in tunnels over 400 feet belowground. Point location through 400 feet ofground or concrete is not practical from a sizeweight, power and cost perspective. Practicalground penetration limits are about 20 feetthrough reinforced concrete. Going down 400feet in a tunnel would best be done with a tunnelcommunications system. We need to furtherrefine the requirement to see if there is an inter-mediate requirement of penetrating five storiesdown in a building or a somewhat more difficultrequirement of penetrating 50 feet down in asubway that has not been previously wired.Reliable alerting, discrimination, and identifica-tion are challenges in a small package that accom-panies the responders. The combination of apoint location and identification device and well-being monitor makes the wearable device neces-sarily larger. Key enabling technologies include3-D visualization, UWB technology, state-of-art battery supplies, miniaturization of electricalcomponents including antennas, and productruggedization.

Milestones/Metrics:

FY2004: The Department of Homeland Security(DHS)/The Technical Support Working Group(TSWG) initiated a new Broad Area Announce-ment on Integrated Spatial Recognition that canyield results for this requirement. However, pro-grams are needed that specifically address theresponders’ requirements. The programs can besegmented into what is available now (principallyabove ground), R&D on point location in build-ings, and research below ground. HomelandSecurity should sponsor a new program demon-strating current point location, identification, andtracking technology above ground, in a basementunderground and under rubble. The Army NightVision UWB prototype is scheduled for 4QFY04and could form a baseline for the current state ofthe art of UWB in interior search and rescueoperations. The cost would be about $2 millionand require one year.

FY2005: Over the next two years, a second program should be established for R&D forpoint location within buildings. UWB is apromising technology for this application. The

7 6


Chapter IV

R&D program would cost about $10 millionover two years with a prototype at the end of theprogram. Metrics include: total weight of inte-grated sensor, less than one pound and batterylife of one week, minimum.

FY2006: The third program is research in whatcan be done in propagation through the ground,through concrete, and under rubble. This couldbe a million-dollar-a-year program and could lastas long as there are promising new results. Theperformance should be verified in laboratory andcontrolled field trials.

FY2007: Battery life of resulting systems shouldbe extended to one month. Demonstrate inte-grated devices in responder exercises.

FY2008: Implement the point location andidentification system and demonstrate it.

FY2009: Transition to limited industrial produc-tion and deployment with unit cost of $50 or lessin quantities of 1000. Verify the transition planfor a full rate production price of less than $30 inquantities of 10,000.

UICrto.2 – Seamless Connectivity andInformation Assurance

Objectives: Demonstrate a “Responder C3 System” that isdeveloped over time using a spiral developmentprocess. The development should start with theevaluation and adaptation, if necessary, of currentoff-the-shelf technology and be able to leverageemerging technology as it is developed. This isessentially an engineering effort that establishesstandards in an overall open architecture andthen iteratively incorporates advances in the stateof commercial and military technology.

The Responder C3 System must be able to seam-lessly and dynamically interconnect multipleinteragency users, who have multiple functions,and multiple information and communicationstechnology systems. The communications system

should integrate wired and wireless systems andenable communications within and between tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Thisincludes the ability to support separate communi-cations channels among responders, strike teamsand task forces.

The program will also address information assur-ance needs of first responders. Those needsinclude the capability to operate first time everytime and remain in operation for the duration ofthe mission. The system must have the ability toauthenticate users including the device, operator,and data. It must include multi-level securityand provide seamless security within and amongenclaves and users. The security should, ofcourse, not degrade the data. There should be avisual indication of security status at all levels.The incident command should have monitoringand alert of attempted and actual securitybreaches.

The program will leverage the efforts and resultsof the SAFECOMM program with regard towireless communications interoperability and will

be the integrating activity for allemergency response communica-tions standards and systems. Itwill also leverage DoD effortssuch as the Army Land Warrior,

Future Force Warrior, and Future CombatSystems programs, which call for integrated net-worked operations that involve the dismountedsoldier.

Payoffs:

Interoperable communications will save lives andhelp responders and leadership understand theextent and severity of population exposure. Thiswill greatly reduce casualties and enable accurateresponse with minimum panic and confusion.

Challenges: The primary barriers to responders having seam-less connectivity and integration have to do with standards, interoperability, and availabilityof resources. Responders have existing equip-ment and the equipment is not necessarily interoperable among fire fighters, police, and

Point Location and Identification System

$2 $5 $6 $3 $3 $2 $21

ThrustUICrto.1 – Budget in Millions

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Totals

7 7



emergency medical personnel, even within thesame jurisdiction. Interoperability between in-place equipment is a big problem. Developing anational architecture and standards will requirecooperation at all government levels and acrossdozens of non-government organization. This isa huge cultural issue.

Milestones/Metrics:

FY2004: Evaluate the progress of theSAFECOMM program and develop a pro-gram schedule to accommodate expected accom-plishments. Evaluate military C3 capabilities formeeting responders’ needs.

FY2005: Establish an overall Responder C3

Systems architecture and standards set capable ofintegrating the networked sensors of DIDArto.5(Integrated Networked Sensors for CBRNEDetection) using COTS technologies whereverpossible. Begin evaluating “off-the-shelf ” (bothcommercial and military) technologies thataddress the goals described above. IntegrateCOTS technologies as appropriate into a demon-stration system.

FY2006: Begin integration of SAFECOMMresults and ICIM tools (UICrto.3) as appropriate.Demonstrate initial capability with availableCOTS and SAFECOMM developments.Evaluate the demonstration and begin integratingthe next block of improvements as indicated.

FY2007: Continue to integrate SAFECOMM,COTS and ICIM tools into the system. Developand conduct large scale demonstration for seam-less connectivity and information assurance capa-bility across at least ten jurisdictions and 20 ormore agencies. If possible, piggyback on sched-uled emergency responder exercises. Continue toevolve the architecture and standards. Begin theResponder C3 Systems commercialization effortto increase the likelihood of transitioning thecapability to responders.

FY2008: Integrate Point Location andIdentification technology developed underUICrto.1 (Point Location and Identification) andother improvements indicated by the previous

years’ demonstration. Continue Responder C3

Systems commercialization efforts.

FY2009: Complete integration of ICIM andpoint location tools and transition the demon-stration system to architecture and standardsmaintenance efforts.

UICrto.3 – Incident Command InformationManagement and Dissemination

Objectives:

Provide incident command decision support, situation and resource status management, communications system management and mission/task tracking. This capability shouldinclude information visualization and fusion tools as well as modeling and simulation capabil-ity. It should include graphic representation ofgeo-location of responders with building/equip-ment overlay. It should have access to all sorts of databases including weather reports. The decision support should have an automated mode where it gives problem alerts without being prompted.

In addition, the capability should include theacquisition, processing, verification, and targeteddistribution of intelligence in operational supportof incident command; real-time access to opensource information, e.g., mass media; publicsafety answering point (9-1-1) call data; andcommand board data. Finally the softwareshould have a cost goal of $3,000 to $10,000.The effort will be a true spiral development,demonstrating and transitioning increasingprogress toward the target capability (as definedby the goals), in increments.

A national DHS SONET (synchronous optical network technologies) digital backbonesystem is needed to provide the imagery, voice,data, and video information needed. It should be a part of a DHS telecommunications system. Leveraging the DoD’s Global Grid as well as a number of existing commercial

Responder C3 $6 $10 $15 $20 $20 $10 $81


20092004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Totals

7 8


Chapter IV

communications “rings” should provide adequate technology.

Payoffs:

Incident command information manage-ment and dissemination will save livesand help responders and leadershipunderstand the extent and severity ofpopulation exposure. This will greatly reducecasualties and enable accurate response with min-imum panic and confusion.

Challenges:

The capability to mine data during an incident isby no means insignificant. Sizable investmentshave been made by the military on decision sup-port systems with data mining capabilities andthese should be leveraged for emergency responseoperations. Making the system of systems exten-sible going from very low-cost for simple systemsto rather high cost in larger metropolitan areas isalso a challenge.

Milestones/Metrics:

FY2004: Evaluate the results of DoD’s HLS/HDC2 ACTD. Perform a gap analysis between theDoD system and the goals set forth above. Beginconstruction of a DHS SONET digital backboneto support the ICIM testbed.

FY2005: Transfer the ACTD technology into anICIM testbed. Finish construction of a DHSSONET digital backbone system. EvaluateCOTS technology to address gaps identified inthe previous year and reduce the cost of the over-all toolset. Begin developing the initial ICIMtool set with DoD and COTS technology.

FY2006: Complete development of initial ICIMtool set. Demonstrate the capability in an emer-gency response exercise. Transition the capabilityto the Responder C3 System (see UICrto.2(Seamless Connectivity and InformationAssurance)). Continue to evaluate COTS andnew technology to improve capability and reducecost.

FY2007: Demonstrate and transition increasedICIM capability to the Responder C3 System.

FY2008-2010: Continue progress toward targetcapability and beyond by iterating and transition-ing new versions of the ICIM toolset.

UICrto.4 – Multimedia Supported Telepresence

There are many camera systems in place that maybe able to provide information about an incident.The problem is how to collect the video, processit and distribute it. It would be helpful to theincident commander if he/she could plug into avideo system already installed in a building. Thisis a systems access/integration problem as well asa dissemination problem. High resolution in theimagery is a desirable feature. The respondersneed current images, not those of a week ago.There is also a great need for information that isnot readily available at an incident. This includesdetailed maps, land-use data, and infrastructuresuch as airports, railroads, highways, bridges, andutilities. A program needs to be instituted usingInternet technologies for obtaining this informa-tion on a timely basis. This is analogous to theradio communications gateway discussed inUICrto.2 (Seamless Connectivity and InformationAssurance), but this is an information portal orgateway.

It is greatly desirable to have an overhead view ofthe incident. This can be done by tethering cam-eras or even repurposing a camera system from aUAV such as Predator into a manned system forflying over incident areas. An additional problemexists in transmitting a video from a scene to aresponder in route, especially in an urbancanyon. On-the-move receivers are needed thatwork in urban canyons. Metadata (data aboutthe image – where is it, what it is, etc.) is alsoneeded and should be inserted into the video atthe source. These advanced multimedia featurescould be included in an advanced concepts tech-nology demonstration to collect the relevantinformation about an incident, integrate it, andmake it available to the responders. The cost of such a program should be about $2 millionwith duration of one year. The main risk is

UIC Information Management and Dissemination

$15 $15 $20 $7 $5 $5 $67


20092004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Totals

7 9



feasibility (user friendly, functional, form factor,and cost). A broader $5 million program shouldbe undertaken subsequent to the demonstrationfor setting standards over the next three years.

Objectives:

The first objective is to adapt current Web-basedtechnologies to the responder environment inorder to obtain multimedia information on atimely basis. The second is to refine these sys-tems through a series of exercises into a standard-ized package for responder use. The programusing Internet technologies will gather low hang-ing fruit and should cost about $2 million for a first year program to integrate current Webtechnologies.

Establish an advanced concepts technologydemonstration to collect the relevant informationabout an incident, integrate it and make it avail-able to the responders. The cost of such a pro-gram should be about $2 million with durationof one year. A broader $1 million per year pro-gram should be undertaken subsequent to thedemonstration for setting standards over the nextfew years.

Payoffs:

Multimedia systems will save lives and helpresponders and leadership understand the extentand severity of population exposure throughactual visualization of the incident. Thiswill greatly reduce casualties and enableaccurate response with minimum panicand confusion.

Challenges:

The main risk is feature/function feasibility (userfriendly, functional, form factor, and cost).

Making the system of systems extensible forgoing from very low-cost simple systems to ratherhigher cost, larger metropolitan systems is also achallenge.

Milestones/Metrics:

FY2004: Develop and demonstrate Internettechnologies for obtaining multimedia informa-tion on a timely basis. The system should do aquick search in less than one second. It shouldhave drill-down capabilities. A second projectshould be initiated to establish an ACTD to col-lect relevant information about an incident.

FY2005: Productize the Internet software.Establish standards based on the multimediaACTD.

FY2006: Verify performance of the Internet soft-ware in laboratory and controlled field trials.Establish standards based on the multimediaACTD.

FY2007: Demonstrate the Internet software inresponder exercises. Establish standards based onthe multimedia ACTD.

FY2008: Transition to the Responder C3 System(see UICrto.2). Further establish standards basedon the multimedia ACTD.

FY2009: Conclude the standards effort based onthe multimedia ACTD.

Multimedia Supported Telepresence

$4 $5 $3 $3 $3 $1 $19


20092004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Totals

8 0


Chapter IV

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

• Location of Any Responder within 3m in Any Direction

• Identification• Determination of

Well-Being

• Decision Support• Situation and Resource

Status Management• Mission/Task Tracking

• Engineering Effort to Leverage COTS Technologies

• Standards

UICrto.1 – Point Location and Identification

UICrto.3 – Incident Command InformationManagement and Dissemination

• Embedded Building Video Systems

• Overhead Views via UAVs

UICrto.2 – Seamlesss Connectivity and Info Assurance

UICrto.4 – Multi-media Supported Telepresence

Unified Incident Command Decision Support and Interoperable CommunicationsTechnology Roadmap

8 1


Definition

Response & Recovery (R&R) is the capability forthe rapid location and rescue of individualstrapped or isolated by the effects of a terroristattack, and the rapid, effective and thoroughdecontamination of large numbers of victims,buildings and equipment, to support emergencyresponse operations to include urban search andrescue, decontamination and restoration of criti-cal services.

Operational EnvironmentsResponse and Recovery is focused on the fiveoperational environments represented by thethreat: chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear,or high-explosive and incendiary effects of anevent. These threats are explained in detail in theChapter III (DIDA). The effects represented bythese operational environments were kept deliber-ately broad to reflect the variations in capabilitiesand understanding among jurisdictions of differ-ent sizes and resource levels (e.g., volunteer emer-gency responders in small towns to career emer-gency responders in large metropolitan areas).

Needed Functional Capabilities andPrioritiesEmergency responders identified and prioritizedtwelve functional capabilities needed to respondin the operational context and mission statementdescribed above. These capability elements arepresented below, in order of descending priority.

• Mass Victim Decontamination.

• Rapid Decontamination of High Value andCritical Response Equipment.

• Establishment of Perimeters.

• Functioning in the Absence of CriticalInfrastructure and Restoration of EssentialPublic Services.

• Health and Crisis Response Education.

• Specialized Search and Rescue Capabilities.

• Evacuation/In-Place Shelter Management.

• Residual Hazards Assessment and Mitigation.

• Mass Fatality Management.

• Traffic Management.

• Incident Action Planning.

• Public Relations and Media Management.

Overall State of Technology forResponse and Recovery

The matrix on the next page shows that respon-ders have at least a marginal capability in most of the functional capabilities represented.Furthermore, in those areas where some technol-ogy development is still required, technologiescan be delivered, or at least demonstrated, in thenear-term, without significant technology devel-opment risk. This means that capability increasesare possible in the near-term in this particularNTRO. It also means that barriers to capabilityincreases are more likely to be related to cost,training, policy, or planning concerns than totechnology per se.

Chapter V

Response and Recovery (R&R)Chapter Chair: Dr. Barbara ReagorChapter Coordinator: James Hammill

8 2


Chapter V

R&R.1 – Mass Victim Decontamination. Theability to identify contaminated people, isolate them,move victims out of the “warm zone,” and removecontaminants at a gross (not definitive) level. Thisalso includes an ability to determine the necessarylevel of decontamination required before furthertransportation or treatment.

Goals:

• The minimum level of decontamination this capability should insure is dependent on the contaminating agent itself, but gener-ally should be a level sufficient that the victims no longer present a secondary con-tamination risk to themselves, their emergencyresponder/caretakers, or to the immediateenvironment. This means victims, once

decontaminated, couldbe handled by responders using onlygloves and minimalprotective clothing.

• This functional capa-bility ought to bedirectly supported by,and interactive, withother capabilities thatprovide real-timeinformation on pres-ence and type of con-taminant. This will be dependent on capabilities reflected in Chapter III(DIDA).

• Decontamination“through-put” needs to be scalable toaccommodate victimsas quickly as they canbe brought to thedecontamination zone.


• Responders believedthere is now a mar-

ginal capability to perform this function, limited mainly by cost and availability ofequipment.

• This functional capability is stronger now for the nuclear and radiological operationalenvironments than it is for chemical and bio-logical environments, especially for those juris-dictions with nuclear power plants or othersignificant presence of radioactive materials.This is due in part because of the focus andattendant resources the federal governmentplaces on areas with nuclear power plants,weapons labs, etc.; a different focus than thefederal government places on chemical storagefacilities or plants that process toxic industrialchemicals and materials.

12

3





Response and Recovery

1. Mass Victim Decontamination

2. Rapid Decontamination of High Value and Critical Response Equipment

3. Establishment of Perimeters

4. Functioning in the Absence of Critical Infrastructure and Restoration of Public Services

5. Health and Crisis ResponseEducation

6. Specialized Search and RescueCapabilities

7. Evacuation/In-Place Shelter Management

8. Residual Hazards Assessmentand Mitigation

9. Mass Fatality Management

10. Traffic Management

11. Incident Action Planning

12. Public Relations and MediaManagement




• Responders believed that the high explosive/incendiary operational environment was notrelevant to this functional capability. Althoughhigh-explosive or incendiary terrorist attackscan have toxic effects, these effects would behandled as in a chemical operational environ-ment. A large amount of dust and dirt per seis not considered contamination.

State of the Art:

The U.S. Government has years of experience inmass decontamination for radiological crises.However, even with this experience, large amountsof equipment are still required to collect effluentduring radiological decontamination efforts.

For chemical decontamination, the standardapproach is to use mass quantities of water forgeneral classes of chemicals. However not allchemicals can be effectively removed using water.The effectiveness of specific technologies andmethods for chemical decontamination will beinherently dependent on detection and identifica-tion of the agent. These capabilities can befound in Chapter III (DIDA).

There are a number of programs underway thathave application for this functional capability;however, these programs are not necessarily beingdeveloped with emergency response applicationsin mind. Technologists believe there is an oppor-tunity to provide access to some technologies thathave been or are under development in the fed-eral government and military arenas. At a mini-mum, there is an opportunity for technologytransfer to assist emergency responders in theshort-term by engineering and demonstratingthese technologies for emergency responder applications.


The primary limitation for fielding these tech-nologies is one of cost, rather than technology.Costs will be especially prohibitive for decontam-ination equipment that is agent-specific (cost fordecontamination equipment for standard toxicindustrial chemicals and materials is withinreach). Cost considerations also limit trainingand sustainment of new capabilities for mass

8 3



victim decontamination: the drain on personneland resources for training on new technologiesand products transferred, for example, from theDefense Department to the local response com-munity will require ongoing funding to assureproficiency and maintenance is sustained.

Technology is marginally available in the near-term for chemical decontamination. Respondersand technologists agreed that many chemicals canbe cleaned with existing or near-term technolo-gies for certain chemical agents (mainly militarychemicals). However, generally applicable tech-nologies are only marginally available in the near-term, that would adequately perform in an environment where military-grade and/ortoxic industrial chemicals/toxic industrial materi-als (TICs/TIMs) were present in mixes. It wasagreed that one can rapidly determine presence ofgeneral classes of agents, but the specializedequipment tends to be built around chemicalwarfare agents, and is expensive.

A technological limitation of decontaminationtechnology is one that is also inherent in detec-tion and identification technology: minimizingfalse positives in detectors, swipes, etc. Currentdetection equipment requires specialized labor-intensive maintenance in order to keep error ratesdown.

Finally, decontamination effectiveness will be lim-ited by the ability to contain or neutralize con-taminated effluent. EPA guidelines have not ade-quately addressed the release or disposal ofcontaminated run-off. Emergency responderswill not have the luxury of waiting for a decision.A “mass decontamination effort” will requireimmediate action and the decision will rest withthe incident commander. An interim solution at the scene may be to collect effluent in lots ofbarrels or pumped into large tank trucks or blad-ders (if available) and hold for disposition. Thiswould require tracking of the containers.

Gap Fillers:

Technology advances in this area are consideredto be of low technological risk and achievable inthe near term. Technology programs must firstdifferentiate civilian needs from military, and

8 4


Chapter V

then consider existing military equipment andtechnology to transition to responder use (includ-ing mobile detection mounted on vehicles). TheDoD’s Office of Technology Transition(Commercialization and Dual Use Science andTechnology divisions) should be engaged to seewhere technology exists and whether it can bemoved to the private sector for commercializationand/or transferred to the emergency respondercommunity through technology transfer.

In tandem with investigating current programs,the U.S. Government (ideally, the Department of Homeland Security) needs to develop testmethods and standards (e.g., how clean is clean,environmental tolerances for effluent, etc.), tocompare against current decontamination tech-nologies in responders’ scenarios. Testing andstandards are critical to increasing responders’capabilities in this area in the near-term, evenwith significant investments. Some of the testingand evaluation can be accelerated, to shrink thetimeline two to three years.

Gap-fillers to address responders’ requirementsinclude:

• A modeling and simulation exercise/feasibilityanalysis focusing on specific scenarios andagents, to evaluate existing decontaminationtechnologies.

• Development of a highly intuitive GraphicalUser Interface (GUI) for equipment PersonalDigital Assistant (PDA) or laptops in vehiclesto augment the training for the emergencyresponder community.

• Establishment of a digital capability that willprovide a picture (graphs) regarding action tobe taken upon arriving at a chemical/biologi-cal incident (i.e., 1-800-CHEMBIO). Thissystem would answer questions right away andprevent unnecessary efforts, delays or lost time(this gap filler is similar to those called out inDIDA.3 (Classification and Mitigation)).

• Research for “Effluent Decontamination andDisposal.” A program for how to track thisby-product is needed. Binding agents couldbe added to help contain the effluent and

prevent secondary contamination on city sur-faces or sewers; additionally, other chemicaladditives could be used to neutralize (anti-bacterial, base for acids, etc.) harmful effectsto the environment.

• Distance learning technologies, to conveydecontamination procedures and standards,for delivery to “networked learning centers”(i.e., fire houses or National Guard facilities).

• Cross-cutting capabilities from other NTROs(especially Unified Incident Command andEmergency Management PreparednessPlanning), such as incident command/missionplanning software (e.g., overlays) will help inestablishing decontamination site boundaries(zones), associated weather conditions, etc.

R&R.2 – Rapid Decontamination of HighValue and Critical Response Equipment. Theability to identify contaminated equipment, isolateit or move it out of the warm zone, and removecontaminants to a verifiable level of “clean,” inorder to rapidly return equipment to service in themidst of an emergency.

Goals:

• Rapid return of equipment to service (<1 hour).

• Two levels of decontamination: for emergencyuse and reuse, and definitive decontamination.


• Responders felt the current capabilities for this functional capability were identical to thatof mass victim decontamination: a marginalcapability exists today (irrelevant for high explosive/incendiary).

• Currently, much equipment has to bedestroyed because it cannot be decontam-inated. This is a significant cost to jurisdictions.

State of the Art:

There are a number of technologies under devel-opment. Resource management and trackingtechnology is available and can be engineered to

8 5



accommodate this application. Materials scienceproducts under development by Nuclear/Biological/Chemical (NBC) survivability pro-grams are an example of this possibility. Theseproducts include contamination-resistant materi-als and paint: a Soldier and Biological ChemicalCommand (SBCCOM) (now EdgewoodChemical and Biological Center (ECBC)) report,Comparison of Decontamination Technologies forBiological Agents on Selected Commercial SurfaceMaterial (April 2001), evaluates available tech-nologies (mostly research-scale) based upon theirability to reduce the spore contamination on pan-els of different materials representing office envi-ronments. The study also examines chemicalagent resistant coatings (paint) which could beused on high-value equipment. These effortscould be applied to emergency response equip-ment, but the technology is currently too expensive.

Water is still a primary decontamination material, but is usually detrimental to electronics.Technology does exist to protect electronics, andcould become part of a “standard” for new equip-ment going forward. However, the cost to retro-fit the embedded base of equipment would beprohibitive.

Other technologies and products are under devel-opment by the Defense Department. In applyingthese technologies, there will be issues related totechnology transfer and commercialization.Some efforts are underway to identify strategiesfor technology transfer out of the military arenaand into civilian hands, especially emergencyresponder, use. It is plausible that the responsecommunity will provide new markets for thoseproducts and technologies, which might helpdrive costs downward into the affordability rangefor local jurisdictions.


The technologies needed to raise the level ofcapability in this area are of moderate technologi-cal risk, and will require more research ratherthan technology transfer.

Technologies in these areas will inherentlydepend on sensors to automatically track equipment being committed to the contaminatedzones. Some organizations manually bar codeequipment going into a hazardous area, but thatwill not work effectively in a WMD event as itwill become time-prohibitive, and manual effortsare error-prone.

Contamination-resistant materials and materialsscience will be expensive, but the option to sacri-fice large quantities of high valued equipment isnot efficient: equipment should be decontami-nated and returned to service for use on the nextcall.

Cost is a significant challenge for the availabilityof materials, polymers, etc. Technology transferand commercialization strategies (e.g., market-place incentives) are not mature.

Gap Fillers:

This functional capability is reliant on resourcemanagement and decontamination technologies.The government needs to develop and evaluateresource management concepts for identifying,finding, indexing, and limiting use of contami-nated equipment during crisis, as well as manag-ing the usability and safety of equipment that willbe used and kept in the “hot/warm” zones. Astechnology for resource management becomesavailable, associated procedures will need to bedeveloped to quickly identify critical equipmentneeded for specific events. Electronic communi-cations will be paramount under these conditions(see Chapter IV (UIC)).

Methods need to be developed and tested todetect equipment degradation after decontam-ination technologies have been applied.Decontamination will have some negative effecton the life expectancy of the equipment.Prototypes can be built and studied in materialsscience labs, but large-scale production of protec-tive polymers for use today will be a manufactur-ing challenge.

8 6


Chapter V

Decontamination technologies can mitigatereliance on resource management and fill gaps inthis overall capability. Such gap-fillers include:

• Development of materials science programsfor CBRNE survivability/contamination-resistant emergency equipment;

• Research to create a “plastic casing” to encaseand seal equipment without degrading functionality;

• Water resistance appliqués/membranes forelectronics to enable the use of water as adecontamination agent;

• Research concepts of providing a “multi-layer”system that could be removed and discardedfor rapid equipment reuse;

• Research and development in manufacturingscience/engineering and equipment design toallow rapid maintenance/replacement ofdegraded parts;

• Research to provide dosimeter type compo-nents/instrumentation to signal when equip-ment is becoming unsafe.

R&R.3 – Establishment of Perimeters. Theability to identify, establish, manage, and control(including inter-zone movement and control of flowbetween) hot, warm and cold zones and securityperimeters.

Goals:

• First units on scene, regardless of discipline(e.g., law enforcement) can recognize hazardand quickly (within minutes) determine andverify hot zone.

• Ability to establish (cordon) and communicatehot zone to arriving units.

• Security perimeter established and securedwithin minutes by first arriving law enforcement.

• All perimeters modified (expanded or con-tracted with varying levels of security) as nec-essary in real-time.


• This capability exists today in the high explo-sive/incendiary operational environment.

• This capability is marginal for the chemical,radiological, and nuclear environment, andnon-existent for the biological operationalenvironment.

• In general, this functional capability dependsheavily on detection, identification, and assess-ment capabilities. (See Chapter III (DIDA).)

State of the Art:

Currently, situational awareness technologies suchas cameras in a police cruiser or at intersectionscan be employed to establish perimeters. Byassessing and leveraging the technologies in placefrom both public and private enterprises (sub-ways, parking lots, automated teller machines,etc.) self-generating perimeter concepts canbecome a reality.

Modeling technologies also exist which can beused to provide suggested responses such asperimeter sizes. These technologies have existingscenarios built-in, and will automatically monitorthe aspects of an event, whether it be a “what-if ”simulated event for training purposes, or a realevent. The tools use detailed computer algo-rithms and data processing architecture usingspecifically tailored expert assistance logic andhigh-speed data manipulation techniques.


This capability element is reliant mainly on tech-nologies from Chapter III (DIDA) for sensorsand Chapter IV (UIC) for communications.There are significant challenges in having detec-tion technology (to know if the situation ischanging), and communications technology (toknow where your people are, and to communi-cate reliably with them). Real-time detection isneeded to decide if the perimeter needs to changedue to weather changes, perimeter breaches orunknown parameters that may be uncovered dur-ing the event. Plume modeling technology isavailable but training and sensor placement isrequired for it to be effective.

8 7



Gap Fillers:

• Development of vehicle instrumentation with DIDA technologies that can be inte-grated with vehicle-mounted geographic infor-mation system (GIS) capabilities to “model” aperimeter.

• Development of systems that integrate sensorsinto perimeter modeling tool-kits, with sen-sors and communications that are weight-neutral and integrated into standard equip-ment (e.g., police badges) and linked into GIS,C2, modeling systems, etc.

• Development of technology suites, advancedsystems and concepts so that potential targetsites can self-generate perimeters, by inputtingdata into arriving personnel GIS and model-ing systems.

• Use of wireless and internet technology tomove pictures/information to responders andback to command posts while still in theassessment stage of the incident.

• Leverage current infrastructure capabilities likethe Department of Transportation’s (DoT’s)camera and monitoring equipment used inmetropolitan areas.

• Systems integration of all the above needs tobe developed. All of the “piece-parts” areavailable.

R&R.4 – Functioning in the Absence of CriticalInfrastructure and Restoration of EssentialPublic Services. The ability to carry out the criti-cal missions of the organization in the absence offacilities and utilities that are normally available,and then decontaminate, reconstruct, and reactivategovernment and private services, mechanisms, andprocesses that serve as or support essential publicservices, including emergency services, food andwater, electricity, sanitation, and other functionsthat directly support immediate human needs.

Goals:

• Operation for twelve hours in the absence ofcritical infrastructure.

• Restoration of essential public services (i.e.,those needed for assuring the lives and well-being of the public in the vicinity) withinthree days.


• Capability is available across the spectrum forresponders to function in the absence of criti-cal infrastructure for twelve hours.

• Capability is marginal for responders to restoreessential public services within three days forall but nuclear operational environments.Capability does not exist to restore publicservices within three days of a nuclear attack.

State of the Art:

A variety of programs exist within the FederalEmergency Management Agency (FEMA), DoD,and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)to provide solutions for functioning in theabsence of infrastructure and quickly and tem-porarily restoring critically needed public services.These programs include long-lived power sources,smart cables for power conversion, quicklyerectable communications towers, multi-fuelcompatible generators, and alternate powersources. Many regulatory agencies provide formethods and procedures to assist with naturaldisasters such as forest fires, earthquakes, andfloods. These methods and procedures aredirectly applicable to man-made terrorist events.


Cost is a main barrier. Technologies will need tobe purchased in “quantity” to be affordable to all.Emerging power sources are still very expensive.Capability is reliant on power sources, such assolar, wind, gasoline, battery, etc. The smallmanufacturing base in this area does not push theenvelope on battery development as demand islow or limited to highly specialized equipment inthe DoD. As a consequence, R&D programs forthe desired technology is sparse or directed tovery specific products or agencies/departments.

8 8


Chapter V

Gap Fillers:

• Development of lightweight long-lived powersources (e.g., batteries) and recharge technolo-gies (e.g., photovoltaics).

• Development of alternative micro-powersources.

• Development of power management in elec-tronics design (energy efficiency design).

• Development of multi-fuel engines.

• Systems engineering to integrate nationalmonitoring of critical infrastructure interde-pendencies into jurisdictions’ response capabilities.

R&R.5 – Health and Crisis ResponseEducation. The ability to develop and disseminatea public education program to help prepare the pub-lic psychologically and physically to deal with theeffects of the attack, to make them aware of emer-gency procedures and services in the event of theattack, and to make them understand the necessaryrequirements they must fulfill or be aware of (e.g.,first aid, personal decontamination, hazard avoid-ance, etc.) in the aftermath of an attack.

Goals:

• A checklist in each citizen’s house, as well asschools and businesses.


This capability exists today for the nuclear envi-ronment, but is marginal for the other opera-tional environments.

State of the Art:

There are several programs and public informa-tion campaigns that successfully address cross-cultural/language barriers and could be used asmodels. Examples include: the NationalLibraries of Medicine Breast Cancer campaign;the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA’s)food safety program, and E9-1-1. Other publicinformation programs provide a model for incor-porating education with technology: NationalWeather Service, Amber Alert System, reverse 9-1-1, Emergency Notification Systems and

Emergency Broadcast System. The Departmentof Transportation (DoT) has a broad range ofdiverse technologies, known collectively as intelli-gent transportation systems (ITS), which mightfulfill many of these needs. ITS is comprised of anumber of technologies, including informationprocessing, communications, control, and elec-tronics. There are a number of other federalmodels to draw upon: for example, following the accident at Three Mile Island in 1979, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) reex-amined the role of emergency planning for pro-tection of the public in the vicinity of nuclear power plants. The Commission issued regula-tions requiring that before a plant could belicensed to operate, the NRC must have “reason-able assurance that adequate protective measurescan and will be taken in the event of a radiologi-cal emergency.” The regulations set sixteen emergency planning standards and define theresponsibilities of licensee, and State and localorganizations involved in emergency response.

Finally, there are a number of capabilities withinthe private sector for training and awareness intowhich terrorism planning is being or can beincorporated. One such example is CorpNet, forbusiness continuity planning education. Anotherexample is the Partnership for Public Warning(PPW), a partnership between the private sector,academia, and government at the municipal, stateand federal level. The PPW’s mission is todevelop a consensus on process, standards andsystems that will provide the right informationabout dangers to life and property to the rightpeople, in the right place, and at the right times,so those in harms way can take timely and appro-priate action to save lives, reduce losses and speedrecovery – whether from natural disasters, acci-dents or acts of terrorism.

Technology Limitations and Barriers:• There are no “technology limitations” in deliv-

ering information. However, there are “barri-ers” to delivery: multi-lingual, multi-cultural,education levels (documentation should notexceed a fifth grade level), and distributionmethods to assure information reaches everyhousehold.

8 9



• Technology is available for notification to thepublic-at-large (homes, offices), however thereis no demand or push by emergency manage-ment at the national or state levels. A pro-gram of this type would incur large upfrontcosts. However, this will not happen withouta good business case or mandate or both.

Gap Fillers:

• Enhancement of current technologies withnotifications systems such as: CommunityNotifications System (CNS), Carrier GradeNotification System (CGNS), EmergencyNotification System (ENS), RemoteSurveillance Support System (R3S).

• Create a program based on three factors:awareness, education (dealing with genericproblems/situations and generic answers) andtraining.

• Work within existing projects and organiza-tions (above) in the government, private sectorand academia to establish a national awarenessprogram.

R&R.6 – Specialized Search and RescueCapabilities. The ability to rapidly locate, assess,and rescue, injured and/or contaminated victims ina CBRNE environment with or without structuralcollapse.

Goals:

• Safely locate, disentangle and remove victimsquickly and efficiently.


• FEMA’s Federal Urban Search and Rescue(USAR) Task Forces represent the highest levelof capability today, with listening devices,search cameras, and robots for detection andextraction. Most jurisdictions do not have aFederal Task Force.

• In addition to this uneven national capability,even Federal Task Forces today have a mar-ginal capability to do specialized search andrescue in a contaminated environment, especially in a biological operational environment.

• In a terrorist event, the time it takes for aUSAR team to respond (two to four hours) isinsufficient to allow for rescue operations. Bythe fourth hour, it is a recovery operation.

• USAR teams have capability to temporarilystabilize collapsed structures and rubble piles.

• There is limited access to specialized searchand rescue training for non-USAR personnel.

State of the Art:

The FEMA USAR task forces currently carrysearch cameras, acoustical devices, and smart lev-els (for structural engineering) as standard rescueequipment. However, FEMA Task Forces are notavailable for response, per policy, unless disasterincludes collapse of a reinforced concrete build-ing. All 28 FEMA teams will be upgraded toWMD capable, which will allow them to enter ahot zone for short periods of time. Extendedtime will be dependent on new PPE and theavailability of relief workers and the extent oftime required on scene. Various technology com-ponents are available for an emergency respondertechnology platform. However, the effectivenesscannot be determined until requirements are pro-vided. Engineering/integration, standards andoperational test and evaluation (OT&E) are critical to overall effectiveness of the needed technology.


• Ground penetrating radar (GPR) capabilityexists for up to ten feet of earth. The abilityto look through 30-50 feet of rubble is cur-rently a technological challenge (GPR hasbeen researched extensively with limited suc-cess for land mine detection).

• Sensor suite for robotics is a question ofrequirements, packaging and cost, not engi-neering. Radar can be made to work withrobotic arms, etc. Requirements need to begenerated to match the responder mission(weight constraints, power, endurance, stan-dards, etc.).

• Standardized caches of equipment will need tobe flexible, one-suit-fits-all.

9 0


Chapter V

• Communications challenges are inherent intransmitting out from under rubble, in/out ofa building, etc. (This barrier is probably bestovercome by ultra wideband communicationstechnology, a recommended Strategic ResearchArea described in Chapter I.)

• Personal protection technology (see Chapter II(PPE)) advances are needed to improveendurance in a WMD environment. Powersource materials are also a challenge for theseoperations.

• Cost limitations for local jurisdictions applyhere, as well.

• The challenges of packaging components atthe device level (weight, range, etc.) dependon requirements. This is an area of low tech-nology risk. The various components exist.Technology for packaging and manufacturingrequire research. With funding this can beachieved within three years. Basic work isalready being reviewed by the Communi-cations Electronics Command (CECOM) insupport of DHS.

Gap Fillers:

• Upgrade of all USAR Teams to be WMD-capable as soon as possible.

• Standards and test and evaluation (T&E) forground penetrating radar for application inthis functional capability.

• Development of ultra wideband communica-tions capability in an operational package thatsends telemetry further up the commandchain, beyond the on-scene rescue unit (seeChapter IV (UIC)).

• Standards and T&E for ultra wideband com-munication technology (see Chapter IV(UIC)).

• Development of requirements for applying thevarious sensor suites, platforms, robotics, bat-teries, etc. which already exist.

• Engineering for packaging all the various com-ponents into a suite to make a ruggedizedcapability, followed by operational testing andevaluation.

• Research and development in acoustic detec-tion, improved ground penetrating radar,robotics for gas detection (carbon dioxide(CO2) detection for victim location), etc.

R&R.7 – Evacuation/In-Place ShelterManagement. The ability to manage public accessto relocation destinations, and planning and deploy-ment/location and direction to in-place shelters forthose citizens for whom evacuation is not possible ornecessary.

Goals:

• In-place shelters to handle 1000 persons.

• Climate control.


• The capability exists today for the high explosive/incendiary environment. The capa-bility is marginal for all other operationalenvironments.

• Evacuation plans have not been established formost major cities in the U.S., besides those atrisk from hurricanes.

State of the Art:

Technology is available to build emergency infra-structure, provide ballistic protection, and placehigh energy particulate air (HEPA) filters to tem-porarily cover heating, ventilation and air condi-tioning (HVAC) systems. Evacuation and shel-tering is more of a policy, planning andmanagement issue with complex managerial andpsychological impacts. The Red Cross has estab-lished shelter in place guidelines. From the DoDside, the Defense Advanced Research ProjectsAgency (DARPA) has “Force Provider,” whichprovides temporary shelter for mobile populationin crisis, and the “Immune Buildings Program,”which can provide technologies and solutions forin-place sheltering.

9 1




• Management of the process is more of a chal-lenge than technology development (i.e., quar-antine situations, public access and control,media relations, communication and educa-tion, integrating plans with technology suitesfor evacuation routes, integrating plume mod-eling, and ability to communicate once theevacuation starts.

There is little technological risk in developingprograms to meet these capabilities.

Gap Fillers:• “Force Provider”-type pre-positioned struc-

tures should be stored at regional depots in the U.S. ready for deployment to house evacu-ated or to isolate and control contaminatedpopulation.

• Use of business contingency planning organi-zations/media to include evacuation/shelter-in-place planning as part of their industries corerequirements when developing company/family contingency plans.

• Initiation of a new National EvacuationProgram similar to the FEMA Fallout ShelterProgram.

R&R.8 – Residual Hazard Assessment andMitigation. The ability to identify, assess the pres-ence and danger of, and mitigate lingering presenceand effects of threat agents, secure still-dangerousareas, and manage waste and effluent from contam-inated areas.

Goals: • No secondary contamination.

Current Capabilities: This capability exists today across the spectrumof operational environments. However, the capa-bility is dependent upon emergency managementpreparation and planning functions. (SeeChapter VI (EMPP).)

State of the Art:Most major jurisdictions have in-place programsand plans to comply with regulations prescribingthis functional capability, promulgated by, e.g.,FEMA, EPA, DoT, etc.

Technology Limitations and Barriers:The ability to address and mitigate any “residualhazard” is highly dependent on the community’scapabilities and availability of resources. It isprobable that metropolitan areas will have localcontrol and response capabilities which willquickly move to apply EPA guidelines, addressany particulate contamination and take steps toalleviate the effects.

Gap Fillers:

Apply decontamination technologies that areavailable or will be developed, e.g., in R&R.1(Mass Victim Decontamination), R&R.2 (RapidDecontamination of High-Value and CriticalResponse Equipment), etc.

R&R.9 – Mass Fatality Management. Theability to contain, decontaminate, remove, andtrack fatalities.

Goals:

• Collection, preservation of the body (suitablefor open casket).

• Positive identification of the body.

• Maintenance of evidence.

• Preservation of personal effects.

• Notification of the next of kin.


• The capability exists today for hazardousmaterials (HAZMAT) units to perform thisfunction, with the exception of a biologicaloperational environment, for which no capa-bility exists today. However, HAZMAT unitswill not turn to this mission until they are fin-ished dealing with live victims.

9 2


Chapter V

• Coroners do not have this capability for any operational environment except highexplosive/incendiary.

State of the Art:

There are procedures in place to address fatalitiescaused by a terrorist attack using chemical,nuclear and high explosive devices. The NationalMedical Response Plan created a DisasterMortuary Operational Response Team(DMORT) consisting of fifty personnel in train-ing to respond to a “mass fatality incident.”However, under the best circumstances theDMORT team can decontaminate up to fiftybodies in a twenty-four hour period. Biologicaland radiological (dirty bomb) decontaminationdoes not have sufficient documentation to deter-mine how decontamination will be handled forexternal and internal cleansing of the remains.These contaminants raise serious concerns andquestions as to what the disposition of theremains will be once a decontamination process iscomplete. While the goal of the DMORT teamis to preserve the body, preferably for open casketviewing, there may be an unwillingness on behalfof the local mortuaries to receive decontaminatedremains without an agreed measurement thatdefines what “clean” is.

Current technology for “food irradiation” hasbeen partially successful. This technology (e.g.,Sure-Beam) was applied in decontaminationefforts of post office facilities after the October2001 anthrax attacks. The technology could beapplied to biological decontamination.

Chemical/biological body bags heat-sealed, withgaseous decontamination, is a concept underdevelopment. However, there are issues withtransporting contaminated remains to a deconta-mination site.


• Political, religious and cultural considerationsdrive the technology requirements.

• Biological decontamination of bodies must beinternal as well as external.

• If decontamination is not an option, bodiesmight have to be cremated. However, suffi-cient cremation capabilities do not exist in theU.S. for an incident involving mass fatality.

• Food irradiation and gaseous decontaminationtechnologies are promising, but are also verylarge and not easily mobile.

• Irradiation technologies pose specific problemsin radiation management, transportation ofbodies, metrics for cleansing bodies internally,facilities vs. numbers of dead to be decontami-nated, etc.

Gap Fillers:

• Adaption of gaseous decontamination andfood irradiation technologies to this capability.

• Mobilization and miniaturization of irradia-tion and gaseous decontamination technology.

R&R.10 – Traffic Management. The ability tomanage traffic in evacuation and around incidentsite, to include knowledge of traffic flows, alterna-tive routes, relocation routes and destinations, andaccidents/traffic blockages.

Goals:

• Real-time traffic re-routing.

• Knowledge of “flow” (i.e., number of cars,their destinations, etc.).

• Ability to handle evacuation of >100,000 vehicles.


A marginal capability exists today, across all oper-ational environments.

State of the Art:

Traffic management capabilities exist today andare employed in most major cities. Nevertheless,more sophisticated products could be developedthat would allow for dynamic rerouting whilemaintaining the integrity of the “final destina-tions” selected to house evacuees. The U.S.Army has technologies and algorithms for

9 3



situational awareness, traffic routing and re-rout-ing, alternate routing and timing, knowledge ofblockage. Simulation programs can be createdfrom these technologies to provide “sensible evac-uation routes and policy/procedures” dependingon strategic decisions at the time of the particularincident. Each urban area will differ on a day-by-day basis depending on road maintenance(closures or bottlenecks), construction etc. It willbe important to have a collaborative tool to prac-tice traffic management in a crisis mode andidentify known shortcoming and areas forimprovement.


• A major metropolitan area will never haveenough personnel and assets to deal real-timewith a mass evacuation traffic crisis.

• This functional capability is reliant on perime-ter establishment and security technologies,and interoperable communications.

Gap Fillers:

• Systems integration: GIS visualization tech-nology, fed by rapidly reconfigurable sensorsuites, integrated with other existing productsfor traffic control, perimeter establishmentand control, etc.

• Pre-planning with communities that will bereceiving the evacuees (see R&R.7 (EvacuationIn-Place Shelter Management).)

• Use of message boards that can be towed intoplace or messages displayed on electronic sig-nage if applicable.

• A designated radio broadcast channel foremergency information in each urban area.

R&R.11 – Incident Action Planning. The ability to implement a process that starts with pre-event planning, and then assessment, identificationof goals and objectives, strategy for dealing with sit-uation, assignment of tasks, and follow-up.

Goals:

• Part of a unified incident command process.

• Written, formal documentation (continuallyupdated) by the start of the “second opera-tional period” (in responders’ terms).

• Plan that covers all agencies/activities relevantto the incident, to include functional annexesfor each agency that participates in unifiedincident command.

• Includes a safety plan and a medical plan andmay include other event specific plans.

• Disseminated in all operational periods.

• Integrates GIS, expert systems, sensors andprocessing systems (tied into detection, etc.)and shared databases/information systems onreadiness and availability of response assets,integrated as a comprehensive web based sys-tem to determine which plans and capabilitiesare appropriate for the incident scenario.

• Includes post-incident analysis and correctiveaction program.


There exists today a marginal capability for thisfunction. Larger jurisdictions with a dedicatedOffice of Emergency Management have astronger capability in this functional area.

State of the Art:

Today, incident planning technologies exist butwill require integration and standardization intosuch structures as the National IncidentManagement System (NIMS), etc. It is critical tobe able to provide on-the-fly managing of assetsand people along with knowledge of terrain andoperational area and have the flexibility of re-tailoring and distributing scenarios and plans.The DoD has a great deal of experience in thisarea, with programs such as DARPA’s CommandPost of the Future, and the U.S. Navy Space andNaval Warfare Systems Command’s (SPAWAR)

9 4


Chapter V

programs to integrate situational awareness sys-tems into command post systems. Many plan-ning tools have come out of these efforts, which could be leveraged to the emergency respondercommunity.


• This problem is process-intensive, and notlimited by technology barriers.

• Planning is reliant on all-source situationalunderstanding and unified incident command.(See Chapters IV (UIC) and XI (ASU).)

• Common standards are required for interoperability.

• Training issues are inherent, including strainon personnel, readiness, cost and time neededfor training, etc. Technology must be highlyintuitive and flexible (multimedia and flexiblein time).

Gap Fillers:

• Affordable and highly intuitive common suiteof tools (GIS, satellite phones, video telecon-ference (VTC) capability, interoperable com-munications link, software, etc.) integratedinto the NIMS, etc.

• Training technology to facilitate deploymentof this capability.

R&R.12 – Public Relations and MediaManagement. The ability to accommodate thelogistics requirements of the on-scene media encamp-ment, to provide the media necessary informationcritical to informing the public of the threat andassociated emergency directions (e.g., evacuation,danger areas), and to manage the safety of themedia (their physical safety).

Goals:

• Established process for using media resourcesfor enhancing public safety (site cameras, heli-copters, satellite connectivity).

• Use of media assets to help emergency operations.

• Control of airspace.

• Dissemination of accurate information.

• One unified voice, in a qualified public infor-mation officer that the represents the unified command structure.


This capability exists today.

State of the Art:

Media firms and government agencies have longestablished crisis communications plans thatinclude designations for media encampments,logistics for power, water, etc. However, mediacoverage of disasters has increased public expecta-tions for government response.


There are no significant technology limitationsfor providing this functional capability.Difficulties arise only in policy or planning issues,such as education of responders and governmentofficials in the methods and procedures necessaryfor dealing with a terrorist event, and the controlof sensitive information during ongoing crises orlaw enforcement investigations.

Gap Fillers:

Media plan for terrorist events, refined to takeinto account lessons learned from recent history(e.g., 9/11, Iraqi campaign, etc.).

Response and Recovery ResponseTechnology Objectives (R&Rrto)

R&Rrto.1 – Contaminated Victim KnowledgeBase

Objectives:

Develop a tool for emergency responders to usein determining how to respond to a mass chemi-cal, biological or radiation contamination event.Using data provided by available sensors andinformation stored before the event, the tool willprovide responders with the best course of actionto begin the decontamination of large numbers ofvictims. The tool will facilitate rapid identifica-tion of the presence and type of contaminant,communicate results to a knowledge base, and

9 5



provide responder with recommended course ofaction. The tool should include a highly intuitiveGraphical User Interface (GUI) and be useableon a Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) or a laptopin a vehicle. It should have the capability to pro-vide graphics regarding action to be taken uponarriving at a chemical/biological incident. Seealso DIDA.3 (Classification and Mitigation) andDIDA.8 (Pre-Triage/Differentiation Among Levelsof Exposure) for application to other needs.

Payoffs:

This will help emergency responders effectivelyidentify, isolate and prepare to decontaminatevictims. It will help to save lives and preventspread of contamination.

Challenges:

The development of such a tool is considered lowrisk, however its utility will depend on the real-time data about the incident and the nature ofthe decontamination it uses. Availability of real-time data is dependent upon the development ofnew and improved sensors, which are addressedin Chapter III (DIDA).

Milestones/Metrics:

FY2004: Benchmark similar systems for develop-ing course of action recommendations. Developarchitectural design for the tool, collect and inte-grate existing information.

FY2005: Develop a prototype of the tool andbegin emergency responder testing. Begin com-mercialization effort to aid in transition toresponders.

FY2006-2008: Integrate and deploy systems for emergency responders while continuing to integrate new products and methodologiesinto the system. Complete commercializationeffort.

R&Rrto.2 – Protective Coatings for CriticalEquipment

Objectives:

Develop materials and appliqués that will resistcontamination or facilitate rapid decontamina-tion without degrading sensitive equipment suchas electronics, such that critical equipment can berapidly returned to service within the contami-nated zones in less than one hour.

Payoffs:

Enables rapid return to service of critical equip-ment that is too expensive or important to be discarded, without causing secondary or continu-ing contamination to personnel or environment.

Challenges: Much of the equipment needed by emergencyresponders is electronic in nature and may not beable to be cleaned using convention cleaning pro-cedures (e.g., water) or returned to service withinone hour. Protective casings impair functionalityor usability of equipment. Materials science facestechnological challenges. (See Chapter I for adiscussion of materials science as a StrategicResearch Area.)

Milestones/Metrics: FY2004: Identify and evaluate potential enablingtechnologies.

FY2005: Begin research or applied technologyeffort on new materials and coatings as indicatedby evaluation process in the previous year.Develop metrics for evaluating “clean.”

FY2006-2007: Develop and test alternative pro-tective coating concepts for several common,high-value pieces of responder equipment.

FY2008: Develop prototype protection packages.Test packages in operational environment. Begincommercialization efforts to transition technologyto use.

Develop Integrated Technology Suite (Toolkit) Pilot

$5 $5 $5 $5 $5 $25

ThrustR&Rrto.1 – Budget in Millions

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Totals

Protective Coatings $15 $22 $25 $18 $10 $90


2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Totals

9 6


Chapter V

R&Rrto.3 – Ground Penetrating Radar forSpecialized Search and Rescue

Objectives:

Develop and demonstrate an affordable groundpenetrating radar system to assist search and res-cue operations, in order to rapidly locate, assess,and rescue, injured and/or contaminated victimsin a CBRNE environment with or without struc-tural collapse, including location of live victims buried in tunnels or beneath reinforcedconcrete up to fifty feet.

Payoffs:

Rapid response and greater chances of recovery ofinjured victims.

Challenges:

Penetrating reinforced concrete or dense rubble.Penetrating radar capability exists for up to ten feet. The ability to look through 30-50 feetof rubble is currently a technological challenge.

Milestones/Metrics:

FY2004: Define requirements for applyingground penetrating radar for urban search andrescue operations in a CBRNE environment.Identify existing programs in DoD and industryand create a development consortium to acceler-ate the product development.

FY2005/2006: Develop and engineer a searchand rescue Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR)prototype. Develop a commercialization planusing consortium members.

FY2007: Begin field testing GPR prototype.Demonstrate capability in a large-scale urbansearch and rescue exercise.

FY2008: Complete commercialization of GPRand transition to use by emergency responders.

R&Rrto.4 – Irradiation and GaseousDecontamination for Mass Fatalities

Objective:

Adapt irradiation and gaseous decontaminationtechnologies and methods (e.g., food irradiationand concepts used on postal facilities afterOctober 2001 anthrax attacks, etc.), for mobileuse in a mass fatality incident.

Payoffs:

Safe handling, tracking, and delivery to family, ofdecontaminated remains, without degrading thedecedent’s suitability for open casket funeral.

Challenges:

Radiological containment safeguards; mobility oflarge equipment for irradiation/gaseous deconta-mination and fatality processing; verification ofbiological decontamination, especially insidecorpses.

Milestones/Metrics:

FY2004: Develop requirement for applying irra-diation and gaseous decontamination technolo-gies to this functional capability, to includesafety/surety (e.g., radiological surety) systems andconcepts.

FY2005: Identify and evaluate potential enablingtechnologies and procedures.

FY2006: Engineer solution based on technolo-gies found. This will likely require making thetechnology small enough to serve the function’slogistical needs.

FY2007: Continue engineering development andbegin testing equipment and concepts of opera-tions. Develop methods and procedures; trainingprograms.

FY2008: Demonstrate capability in a mass fatal-ity exercise. Transition to use.

Ground Penetrating Radar

$5 $10 $15 $20 $5 $55

Thrust

R&Rrto.3 – Budget in Millions2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Totals

Mass Fatality Decontamination

$3 $4 $16.5 $15.7 $15.7 $54.9


2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Totals

9 7



2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

• Ability to Identify, Isolate and Prepare to Decontaminate Large Numbers of Victims

• Graphical User Interface

• Rapidly Locate, Assess, and Rescue Injured and/or Contaminated Victims

• Location of Victims in Tunnels Up to 50 Feet

• Materials and Appliques that Resist Contamination or Facilitate Decontaminiation

• Return to Service within One hour

R&Rrto.1 – Contaminated Victim Knowledge Base

R&Rrto.3 – Ground Penetrating Radar forSpecialized Search and Rescue

• Enables Safe Handling, Tracking and Delivery of Decontaminated Remains

R&Rrto.2 – Protective Coatingsfor Critical Equipment

R&Rrto.4 – Irradiation and GaseousDecontamination for Mass Fatalities

Response and Recovery Technology Roadmap

9 8


Chapter V

Definition

Emergency Management Preparation andPlanning (EMPP) is the capability to performvulnerability analysis of high-risk facilities andlocations, plan responses to various terrorist sce-narios, perform low-cost high impact training forterrorist incident response, and coordinate amonglocal authorities before a terrorist attack. Thiscapability objective focuses on preparation andplanning across all phases of comprehensiveemergency/disaster management.


The operational environments for this NTROare: chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear,and high explosive/incendiary. The type of eventresponders must address dictates the needs ofincident commanders, and thus the demands onthe EMPP support structure to manage the pre-paredness, support coordination, and resourcesneeded by incident commanders.

However, from the perspective of the emergencymanager, the type of event or threat scenario isnot the critical factor in developing an effectiveand coordinated response and recovery system.In most jurisdictions, the emergency manage-ment and EOC function are required to take amulti-hazard/risk perspective. Plans call for theEOC to deal with the complexity of cascadingevents and constant variations in response priorities.

Some objectives will describe needs for a work-space that supports the functional staff during

their various emergency support tasks. Thatworkspace has some variations in its nomencla-ture but is generically referred to as anEmergency Operations Center (EOC). TheEOC has a role in all phases of emergency management:

• In the preparation phase, the EOC is func-tional and prepared for any contingency. It isused for orientations, training, and exercising.

• In the emergency response phase, the EOCalong with supporting department operationscenters, serves as the central point for agencyor jurisdiction coordination and overall man-agement of the emergency.

• In the post emergency or recovery phase, theEOC can be used to house supporting organi-zations and direct the recovery operation.

It is important to note that EOCs do not directlymanage or “command” incidents. “Command”implies setting incident objectives, determiningstrategy and tactics, and assigning and supervis-ing tactical resources. This is the role of the on-scene incident commanders using the componentelements of the Incident Command System(ICS). The EOC is part of the support structurefor the ICS and its commander, but the EOCdoes not command, it coordinates and supports.In a complex incident involving multiple agenciesand organizations there may be a more elaboratecoordinating structure within the EOC that isusually referred to as Unified Incident Commandor the Incident Management System.

9 9


Chapter VI

Emergency Management Preparation andPlanning (EMPP)Chapter Chair: Brett KrigerChapter Coordinator: Dr. Maria Powell

Responders emphasized that emergency responseis initially dependent on local resources and capa-bilities. The system at the local level must beadequate to support the initial response and thensmoothly expand to encompass regional, state,and/or national multi-agency coordination. Thisability to expand rapidly and integrate resourcesto supplement the original local responseinvolves:

• Establishing priorities for response.

• Allocating critical resources.

• Developing strategies for coordinating multi-agency and inter-agency response problems.

• Sharing information.

• Facilitating communications.


Responders emphasize that the coordination andsupport for all stages and levels of the threat spec-trum must be addressed. However, emergencymanagement is generally focused on preparednessstrategies that provide for impact assessment,resource prioritization, and consequence manage-ment. These strategies originate with decision-makers who function collaboratively in EOCs.The traditional capabilities of EOCs are based onthe readiness and effectiveness of emergencyresponse services to respond jointly to a signifi-cant event that is beyond the capability of anyone agency or organization.

Response to a major terrorist event places greaterdemands on the management system than otherlarge-scale incidents. The initial response wouldbe quickly supported by multiple agencies fromall levels requiring a rapid assemblage of diversecapabilities, some from distant areas that have lit-tle operational familiarity with the others. Thiswould occur in the midst of confounding uncer-tainties, limited resources, conflicting prioritiesand potentially tragic misdirection. Manyresponders, lacking clear guidance, would simplyreact to apparent immediate needs.

The complexity of coordinating and prioritizingthe resources of multiple agencies requires themultilateral sharing of authority to ensure themost rapid and effective response possible. A sin-gle manager cannot be directly responsible for allof the efforts needed to minimize this elapsedtime. A manager has to have plans, data, andcommunications to competently work with oth-ers as necessary, and to support emergencyresponders and incident commanders in efficientresponse.

In a major area-wide incident, there may be mul-tiple incidents of various types within a singlejurisdiction. Some incidents may be single-discipline (e.g., fire service) incidents; others maybe multi-disciplinary incidents operating under aunified command. The jurisdiction’s EOC maybe activated to coordinate the overall response,while the Incident Command System is used byfield responders. Incident commanders maycoordinate their actions through departmentoperations centers which are represented in theEOC. There may also be direct coordination andcommunications occurring between incidentcommanders and the EOC. The complexitiesand difficulties of sharing data and informationthat is critical to an effective, safe, and timelycoordinated response is at the core of thisNTRO.

The enabling technologies for these capabilitiesare already available, in many cases, or in stagesof advanced development. Still the capabilitiesare not generally in place at the local level. Insome cases the obstacle is not availability but thecomplexity of the software, maintaining compe-tence to operate it, availability of data sets, andcosts in time and dollars for procurement train-ing, and sustainment. The needed functionalcapabilities are presented below in order of prior-ity, the first being the highest based on respon-ders’ input in workshops and field interviewsconducted during the earlier phases of this effort.

• Risk Awareness and Assessment

• Mission Rehearsal, Simulation, EmbeddedTraining and Distance Education

1 0 0


Chapter VI

• High-Value Target Identification andMonitoring

• Alternate/Mobile Hospital Contingencies

• Course of Action Development

• Establish Emergency Operations Center

• Facilities/Infrastructure Hardening

The responders rated Risk Awareness andAssessment (EMPP.1) as the highest prioritywithin EMPP. Risk awareness is the most impor-tant requirement of planning response to a terror-ist attack. The next four were rated near eachother in priority: Mission Rehearsal, Simulation,Embedded Training and Distance Education(EMPP.2); High-Value TargetIdentification and Monitoring(EMPP.3); Alternate/MobileHospital Contingencies(EMPP.4); and Course ofAction Development (EMPP.5).

The next highest priority wasEstablish Emergency OperationsCenter (EMPP.6). Theresponders thought that, eventhough this area can useimprovement, they are alreadydoing this function in mostgeographical areas. Finally,Facilities and InfrastructureHardening (EMPP.7) was ratedlowest priority because it isnot a central function ofemergency management.

Overall State ofTechnology forEmergency ManagementPreparation and Planning

The matrix below shows a pattern of few technological challenges in meeting the needs of Emergency Management Preparation andPlanning. The key challenges will be in the highest priority Risk Awareness and Assessment(EMPP.1), but these challenges should not be technologically significant. Technology is

available, at least marginally, in the near-term forapplication in all but a handful of specific areas,even for those areas where capability is marginal(e.g., the highest priority Risk Awareness andAssessment) or non-existent (e.g., the third-highestpriority High-Value Target Identification andMonitoring (EMPP.3)). These technologies canbe developed and integrated with little technolog-ical risk. This emphasizes the point that capabili-ties in this response objective can be increasedtoday, through systems integration or even com-mercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies, aswell as from non-technology solutions such aschanges in organization, doctrine, and training,and through the development and adoption ofstandards.

EMPP.1 – Risk Awareness and Assessment. Theability to provide analysis and assessments of threat,vulnerability and criticality of events, venues, andsystems (including key assets and infrastructure).

The first step in emergency management prepara-tion and planning is the understanding of therisks and an assessment of how to address them.The ability to support this process technically

1 0 1


Emergency Management Preparation and Planning

12

3






1. Risk Awareness and Assessment

2. Mission Rehearsal, Simulation, Imbedded Training and Distance Education

3. High Value Target Identification and Monitoring

4. Alternate/Mobile Hospital Contingencies

5. Course of Action Development

6. Establish Emergency Operations Center

7. Facilities/Infrastructure Hardening




with automated decision aides and other infor-mation technology will increase the effectivenessof the analysis and therefore the plans that arederived.

Goals:

• Ability to collect and integrate data on multi-ple sites.

• Ability to sort and prioritize.

• Identification of potential cascading effects.

• Data sets that employ nationally mandatedstandards.

• Management of data in secure format.

• Data sharing across jurisdictions, departments(digital format).

• Integration of national information and pastexperience.


Most technologies needed by this functionalcapability are available today, irrespective of cost.The consensus is that initial cost is not necessar-ily the salient issue – lack of integration andusability are the main roadblocks. If integrationand usability are taken as the main factor indefining availability, then the capabilities are gen-erally seen as unavailable.

Responders have to quickly assess the situationsurrounding an incident that put lives and prop-erty at risk. Their knowledge, training, and expe-rience provide the primary basis for the initialactions they take. In addition, responders under-stand that there are software tools that may helpwith the risk assessment of key facilities andinfrastructure and models that predict impacts;however, there is currently little evidence of wide-spread use. Much of the software is complex andtime-consuming to operate competently andcomprehensive data sets needed to make modelresults useful are not always available.

Even where the technologies (and supportingdata sets) are employed, the decision support

outputs are incomplete and require additionalanalysis. There is common agreement that thetechnologies are potentially available but there isconfusion on whose job it is to operate the soft-ware, run the models, and conduct the analysis.Most of the software tools typically available tomost responders offer only incomplete pieces ofthe required analysis, and the various systems arenot integrated into a comprehensive useable tool.

State of the Art:

There are a number of COTS products that com-bine agent dispersal and plume modeling (partic-ularly chemical, nuclear, radiological, high explo-sive, or natural disasters), GIS systems, anddatabase-linked decision support software: manyof these products are based on experience withnatural disasters. Most of the advanced programsin this area are under active development by theDepartments of Defense (e.g., the NationalGeospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) and theDefense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)) orthe Department of Homeland Security (especiallyFEMA). Many of these modeling or decisionsupport products are mature enough to have beenimplemented in various local, state, and federalemergency management organizations.


There are no specific technological limitations toachieving these goals. There are some limitationsin the area of storage and display capabilities inindividual response vehicles, and even greaterlimitations in the speed of delivery via wirelessmeans in a networked or Web-enabled mode.However, the technologies needed to overcomethose restrictions are beyond the scope of thisfunctional element.

Although there are no specific technological limi-tations or restrictions on data sharing, the issue ofinteroperable equipment and software has been aconcern for many public safety officials becausethere is not a focused, clearly delineated set ofInternet standards for incident management.Improved interoperability and speed of dataexchange could be gained with standardization inthe Expanded eXtensible Markup

1 0 2


Chapter VI

Language/eXtensible Markup Language(EXML/XML) Web programming language.

Gap Fillers:

The next step should be to ensure that the soft-ware already utilized is configured such that theneeded features have output that is transportableto other EOC software programs.

EMPP.2 – Mission Rehearsal, Simulation,Embedded Training and Distance Education.The ability to conduct realistic, high-quality train-ing programs and exercises that comply withnational training standards (i.e., to meet continuingeducation requirements).

Mission rehearsal and simulation is generally con-sidered to be a specialized method of deliveringtraining involving realistic practice to accomplisha specific operation or task. There are manycommercial systems for accomplishing that activ-ity and the military departments have developedvery elaborate methods and systems. Some of themost sophisticated are those employed for train-ing in aircraft and space vehicles.

Embedded training is event- or threat-specifictraining that could be concurrent with, and thusaccompany, other all-hazards training. Examplesinclude chemical terrorism response training thatcould be combined with “ordinary” HAZMATtraining. This would incorporate (i.e., embed)new requirements for specialized skills andknowledge into existing required initial andrecurring training. Responders’ time is already ata premium for training: most jurisdictions canbarely afford the drain on readiness from timeaway and overtime costs for personnel to keepcurrent with normal-duty training requirements,notwithstanding additional training requirementsfor terrorism response. Embedded training pro-grams and technologies can create efficiencies inmeeting training requirements that save jurisdic-tions time and money while increasing prepared-ness for terrorism alongside all-hazards training.

The subject of distance education covers a verybroad range of training methods that range fromposted printed materials (e.g., correspondenceschools) to completely Web-based programs. In

many cases, the delivery method varies but thesame training and course materials may beaccomplished either way. The concern about dis-tance learning systems is to ensure the supportingequipment requirements are compatible withwhat is available to responders in their operatingenvironment (i.e., firehouse, squad room, etc.).

E-learning, Web-based learning, online learning,and distance learning are widely used as inter-changeable terms. However, these terms havesubtle, but distinguishable differences. Usefuldefinitions for these distance learning systems are:

• E-learning – generally covers activities involv-ing computers and interactive networks simul-taneously. The computer is not necessarily thecentral element of the activity nor does it pro-vide learning content. However, the computerand the network are key factors in the learningactivity.

• Web-based learning – generally covers learningmaterials delivered in a Web browser, includ-ing when the materials are packaged on CD-ROM or other media.

• Online learning – associated with contentreadily accessible on a computer with contentaccessed on the Web or the Internet, orinstalled via media (i.e., CD-ROM) on thecomputer’s hard disk.

• Distance learning – includes any interaction ata distance between instructor and students,but provides for interaction between instructorand student. Simply posting or broadcastinglearning materials is not distance learning.Instructors must be involved in receiving feed-back and evaluating level of skill/knowledgemastery.

Distance learning has traditionally referred to tel-evised broadcasts and correspondence courses,and still includes those delivery systems.However, responders were more concerned withreducing the overall training load by ensuringthat the requirements for accomplishing levels ofknowledge and certifications were carefullycrafted and met national standards (few are cur-rently established). The delivery method was not

1 0 3



considered to be particularly important – onlythat it be effective and efficient.

Beyond HAZMAT response, there are currentlyno national minimum requirements that coverterrorism training. The Occupational Safety andHealth Administration (OSHA) and the NationalFire Protection Agency (NFPA) provide for somestandards. True national training and credential-ing standards would provide for smoother inter-operability for multi-agency, multi-level responseoperations.

Goals:

Training programs and distance education shouldbe:

• Embedded in current systems when possible.

• Embedded in current duties when possible(concurrent training).

• Tailored to different scenarios and localities.

• Supportive of mission essential tasks.

• Re-configurable.

• Interactive at various levels from responder tocommand to higher authorities.

Training Programs should:

• Be mandatory (100% of personnel within agiven timeframe; retraining at given intervals).

• Include testing and assessment.

• Include capture/sharing/implementation oflessons learned.

• Assess particular skills or subsets within train-ing modules, so that trainees do not have torepeat entire modules to learn a narrow subsetof skills.

Responders also indicated that training managersand distance learning developers should pursueadditional goals as existing emergency responseeducation and training gradually transitions fromtraditional linear classroom instruction to more

interactive, asynchronous, delivery strategies.These goals include:

• Selection of delivery methods and technologiesshould follow a careful needs analysis that hasbeen validated by responders.

• Availability to as many of the potentialextended response teams as possible to includestate and local emergency responders, govern-ment officials, National Guard units, FEMA,FBI and the Department of Defense.(Participants sharing training are more likelyto appreciate each other’s roles and developrelationships that will help coordinate efforts.)

• Employment of scenario-based simulationexercises that place response teams in real-lifesituations through realistic virtual interaction.

• Ability to replay and evaluate the actions takenand decisions made by trainees, so that theycan critique their overall performance and setgoals for improvement.

• Provisions for sustaining and refresher trainingare essential regardless of the technologyemployed.

• Simulations that test critical decision-makingskills during all types of CBRNE crisis scenar-ios, including the more probable scenarios ofaccidents and natural disasters.


The responders believe that the capabilities to do all the things above are available, especially inthe military. However, standards development,minimum skills/knowledge determination, andcoordinated funding are required to tailor thetechnology to emergency responder operationalrequirements.

Achieving the goals primarily involves changinghow responders train, not providing deliverytechnologies. There is no national standard fortraining processes, nor is there a central reposi-tory for training and exercise coordination. Thishas created confusion among training methods,

1 0 4


Chapter VI

variance in results, and duplicative trainingefforts.

State of the Art:

Technology to accomplish delivery of automateddistance learning is advancing more rapidly thanthe ability to employ it effectively. The Web hasrapidly evolved from a text-only medium to amultimedia communication system with new andvaried opportunities for learning at anytime andin any place. The technological revolutionenables the teaching-learning process to meet theneeds of any responder. More and more trainingis being made available online but the acceptanceof that delivery mode has not been universal.Given the ever-expanding range of possibilitiespresented by new technologies, training develop-ers must identify processes that work.Educational needs should drive the technologyrather than vice versa. Models developed toguide this process often fail to address the specificneeds of the adult learner. Standards and guide-lines need to align with specific learner needs andprogram goals.

There are many commercial and military systemsand tools available that permit response simula-tion and rehearsal. These are computer-controlled training systems that simulate specificreal-time emergency environments. They effec-tively allow trainers and incident commanders toevaluate and re-evaluate their management strate-gies based on dynamic scenarios, including thelikely behavior of responders, victims, other peo-ple on the scene, vehicles, fires, explosions, chem-icals, weather and other environmental factors.The simulator response training and evaluationfor virtually any type of emergency should allowfor review and repeat for different strategies, pro-cedures, and events. The system also allows usersto test and measure the aptitude of emergencyresponders, allowing them to identify problemsand correct them before making a fatal mistake inthe field. System costs vary by simulation com-plexity and range from tens of thousands of dol-lars to many millions.


The adequacy of available bandwidth andinstalled user equipment was discussed as a technical constraint to widespread implementa-tion. In most of the country (outside the largermetropolitan areas), equipment is rarely state-of-the-art and Internet connectivity (if available) islikely to be via dial-up modem. Many volunteerfire departments don’t have computers – legacy-capable or otherwise.

Gap Fillers:

• Improve output of compression using softwareonly (i.e., without the need for high-tech sys-tems or hardware).

• Smart card/chip that contains an “electronictranscript” securely verifying ID, levels andcurrency of training/certification for outsideagency responders that are integrated withlocal ICS.

• Grant-funded equipment upgrades to ensureadequate multimedia equipment and tools areavailable for local academies/jurisdictions.

• Use of open source user-friendly tool sets tofacilitate customization of training packages bylocal or regional training managers/academies.

EMPP.3 – High-Value Target Identificationand Monitoring. The ability to monitor high-value targets by retaining their identification, uti-lizing appropriate monitoring techniques that com-municate status whenever needed, and addressingthreats as they become manifest and evolve withrespect to high-value targets.

There is no single approach to critical infrastruc-ture protection for every community. Each mustaddress its security concerns to reflect uniqueaspects of consequences, threats, and vulnerabili-ties in terms of credible threat, tolerance for riskand ability to mitigate consequences. Leadersand planners must identify the vulnerabilities ofnumerous assets, and then categorize and rankthe risk profiles of the facilities and assets they

1 0 5



identify as critical. The results of that localizedanalysis are the only basis upon which an effec-tive and credible monitoring and response systemcould be implemented.

Goals:

Responders described system requirements andneeds that are very similar to those of physicalprotective systems for very high-value targets suchas chemical and nuclear weapons storage areas,sensitive military sites, missile sites, and strategiccommand and control centers:

• 24 × 7 × 365 real-time capability.

• Ability to fuse information from multiple sen-sors (community infrastructure protectionwould require integration of tens of thousandsof sensors).

• Integration at various echelons (multi-agency,multi-level, and transnational).

• Scalable and on-demand.

• Inclusion of decision aids (such as expert sys-tems for pattern recognition, etc.).

• Secure management of data.

• Validation capability.


Technologies that support these requirements canintegrate, sort, and respond to sensors and pro-grammed patterns, but patterns and alarm-levelparameters are subject to user interpretation andresponse determination. These technologies canmeet the needed goals, but are contingent on theprogramming of software for monitoring systemsto interpret patterns that users establish. Thetechnologies to install sensors and monitoringsystems are available and very capable.

The implementation of these technologies as aconsistent capability is very limited within theresponder community. Responders and technolo-gists discussed existing technologies that are avail-able but determined that it would be complexand expensive for most jurisdictions to deploy

them. Even if the expense for support hardwareand infrastructure is provided, the issues of train-ing, pattern awareness programming, and userinterface for response will impede effective implementation.

Most localities maintain a list of key assets orlikely targets that is updated yearly but these tar-gets have been identified based on traditionalrisks and threats, such as susceptibility to fire haz-ards. The sites and facilities that are likely to beattractive terrorist targets may require differentexamination. The current target lists are initiatedand maintained by a building walk-through, andthe results are rarely captured in a database ordigital format. Current systems are not config-ured to allow monitoring of targets in real-timefrom a centralized command center.

State of the Art:

There are no existing programs that are techno-logically enabled or specialized to auto-generatethis information or produce databases that willsupport visualization. Existing GIS and conse-quence assessment programs will recognize data-bases that have been populated with this data butthere are no existing technologies that will permitauto- or self-population.

There are extensive existing security systems andsensors which can be employed in conjunctionwith alarm/switcher/multiplexer interfaces tocomputer displays to provide a degree of capabil-ity to support the stated goals. Sensor technolo-gies include:

• Perimeter monitoring of systems (i.e., trafficcameras/closed circuit television (CCTV)).

• Physical protection systems (security andalarm technologies).

• Satellite imagery.

• GIS/database technology.

• Multi-function unattended ground sensors.

• Seismic sensors for pattern recognition.

1 0 6


Chapter VI


There are generally no technology limitations orbarriers to achieving the stated goals. Monitoringand sensor technology (except for biological sen-sors that are discussed elsewhere in this report)are very mature and are in widespread use toaccomplish the described goals (i.e., nuclearpower plants, nuclear weapons storage areas,highly classified military security areas).However, the sensors only report status. Theinterpretation and decision making must be pro-grammed into automated Supervisory Controland Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems,Programmed Logic Controllers (PLC), alarmswitcher/multiplexer systems, or left to the inter-pretation of human operators.

Gap Fillers:

The goals described above are procedural andoperational but could be enhanced by use ofavailable technologies. There are no gap fillersneeded for this functional capability beyondthose initiatives described in other NTROs (seeespecially Chapter III (DIDA) for sensor anddetection technologies).

EMPP.4 – Alternate/Mobile HospitalContingencies. The ability to identify and providealternate and surge medical locations during pre-event planning.

This capability is needed during any large-scale orcatastrophic event whether it is caused by a tech-nological accident, natural disaster, or CBRNEattack. To achieve efficiency, the medical caresystem is carefully balanced between anticipatedneed, and in-place capacity. A sudden surge invictims would quickly overwhelm the medicalcapabilities of nearly any locality. The incidentmanagement system would need to designateappropriate alternate and surge medical locations.Hospitals do not generally plan (nor do they havethe sole responsibility to plan) for these surgerequirements and they do not traditionally have asystem for reporting bed-space or staff capacitiesin real-time.

Goals:

This capability should provide data necessary to acommon operational picture for medical needs

management, before the overwhelming needscause a system overload. For example, the urgent care centers should set up an informationclearinghouse to continuously match casualtydemand with bed supply. Each network wouldprovide information links to its correspondingnetworks. The hospitals would provide capacityinformation to the transport network; the on-scene casualty stabilization and triage networkwould provide casualty information (numbers,types and locations) to the transport network;and the transport network could generate its own transport missions based on need and resourceavailability.

Major incident or mass casualty response requiresrapid communication of the status of emergencymedical resources between field units, hospitals,dispatch centers and many other organizationsinvolved in the response. Such information tra-ditionally includes information on the incident orthreat, emergency department capacities, bedavailability, specific treatment protocols, the sta-tus of pharmaceutical stocks, availability ofresponse personnel, equipment and teams, andstatus of other medical resources (e.g., NationalDisaster Medical System). In addition to provid-ing this information, this capability needs to pro-vide for:

• Quick establishment of screening/triage at des-ignated primary and alternate medical facilitiesor emergency centers.

• Hospital “lockdown” (control entry/exit to enforce quarantine or limit spread of contaminants).

• Public education to help citizens function asfirst-aid or stopgap healthcare providers.

• Personnel and staffing planning across aregion.

• Pre-event stocking of needed supplies andpharmaceuticals.

• Identification of needs and inspection of alter-nate facilities.

• Integration of planning with other organiza-tions and participants.

1 0 7




Currently, distribution of information and gath-ering of required data is accomplished throughfaxes, telephone calls, and radio transmissions,which can take 45-90 minutes to complete, evenif the effort is pre-planned. This time consumingprocess hinders the ability of resource managersto meet the first two goals identified above.However, other than for communications and information distribution, technology is probably not the major obstacle to achievingthese capabilities.

Emergency response organizations and support-ing EOCs have guidance available to themregarding the spectrum of possible events to planfor; however, there is no guidance on how to planfor the specific needs for emergency medical serv-ices. This area requires very specialized knowl-edge that is not traditionally found among emer-gency planners in an EOC or in responderorganizations. There are some plans for massimmunizations that could be somewhat useful astemplates, but there is a need to train people onhow to plan for these contingencies.

Few localities have identified alternative hospitallocations for additional bed space or treatmentspecialties. Most hospitals have cooperativeagreements to transfer certain types of patients toalternate hospitals, but these transfers will over-whelm hospitals very rapidly in the case of amajor CBRNE event. There is very limited surgecapacity at most hospitals and few have the capa-bility to lockdown to prevent walk-ins.

State of the Art:

Attaining the objectives and goals for this areamay be facilitated through assistance from theCenters for Disease Control (CDC) and theHealth Resources and Services Administration(HRSA).

CDC-HRSA bioterrorism funding grant pro-grams are available to help state and local govern-ments upgrade public health infrastructure andhealth care systems to better prepare for andrespond to bioterrorism and other public healthemergencies. CDC administers public healthpreparedness awards, which total $870 million.

HRSA funds the hospital preparedness coopera-tive agreements, totaling $498 million. TheCDC’s guidance this year focuses on seven areas: preparedness planning and readinessassessment; surveillance and epidemiology; laboratory capacity for handling biologic agents;laboratory capacity for handling chemical agents;health alert network and information technology;communicating health risks and health informa-tion dissemination; and education and training.

The HRSA guidelines for cooperative agreementsoutline six priority areas: governance; regionalsurge capacity to handle terrorism victims; emer-gency medical services; hospital linkages to publichealth departments; education and preparednesstraining; and terrorism preparedness exercises.

Several software systems have been developed andused by medical facilities to improve the ability totrack and report capabilities through emergencymanagement centers. These systems have sub-stantial overlap with those that will help provideearly warning of a biological attack through mon-itoring of the demand for medical care. (SeePHRBAE.1 (Surveillance and InformationIntegration Systems) as well as MR.2 (MassCasualty Medical Care Management).)


This capability does not require additional tech-nology development to meet the stated goals.The technologies and software tools exist, but therequirement for hospitals and medical facilities toaccumulate and report the data through standard-ized protocols does not. The barriers are prima-rily procedural and operational.

Gap Fillers:

A key gap filler is the development of systemswith existing technologies for integrating and dis-tributing needed information on hospital andalternate facility capacity and resource availability.The ability to track the information exists, butsome hospitals see this information as commer-cially sensitive, and others see this process as anexcessive administrative burden. Thus, the will-ingness and procedures to share this informationshould be addressed through national standards

1 0 8


Chapter VI

and benchmarks. Planners should pursue the following paths to partially implement this capability:

• Conduct case studies and identify best prac-tices from actual events or benchmarks fromeffective advances in managing hospital contingencies.

• Build on existing networks. For example,Maryland has a secure statewide health sectoremergency data communications system andFacilities Resource Emergency Database(FRED) that is used both for facility resourcemanagement and for alerting.

• Evaluate the CDC/Public Health Servicereport on emergency management trackingsystems in Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas, andOklahoma for feasible pilot programs.

• Integrate with syndromic surveillance efforts.Reporting of hospitals/pharmacies reportinguse trends could be expanded to includebeds/assets. Many of the same communica-tions links are needed for both purposes.(PHRBAE.1 (Surveillance and InformationIntegration Systems) discusses other efforts aswell.)

EMPP.5 – Course of Action Development. Theability to develop Office of Emergency Management(OEM) procedures, tactics and plans after identifi-cation of potential terrorist threats within a locality.

Providing accurate and accessible information tosupport contingency planning and response pres-ents a formidable challenge to the emergencyplanning community. The emergency manager’schallenge has always been to acquire enoughaccurate information to make correct decisions,prioritize the application of resources, and thenkeep track of the results. Additional complexityderives from the requirement to coordinateresponse operations in an overwhelming CBRNEevent with response undertaken by a variety ofagencies with blurred responsibilities. A complexweb of government agencies, military organiza-tions, and state and local responding agenciesoperate within an uncertain organizational

structure that needs close coordination. A highdegree of organization and preparation is requiredto support responders’ information needs effec-tively, and success relies on the ability to acquirereal time data which change dynamically, inte-grate it with geographical data, and provide themanagers and responders with a continuous viewof the status of the situation.

Tactical/operational decision makers (responders)need to have this vast array of data immediatelyavailable, generally in a graphical display form.Additionally, there is the need for an organizedmanagement information system to supportstrategic activities (i.e., pre-disaster planning,training and event reconstruction that occur atthe EOC).

Goals:

The various interrelationships of data requiredneed to be integrated into several complete deci-sion support systems and management informa-tion systems to support tactical planning,response management and damage assessment.The various systems fall into two fundamentalcomponents: database systems, and expert sys-tems. The database system serves as a warehousefor the data, and the expert system implementsdecision support. Linked modules include visual-ization systems to translate raw data and modeloutputs, and GIS tools to represent geographi-cally referenced information. Visualization toolsare essential for emergency managers to integrateand analyze the complex, massive datasets thatwill flow from WMD events that most respon-ders and managers expect.

It should be recognized that this functional capa-bility is very closely aligned with the descriptionand goals of EMPP.1 (Risk Awareness andAssessment), as well as UIC.4 (Incident CommandInformation Management and Dissemination) andLS.1 (Logistics Information System). An effectivedecision support system should provide:

• Capabilities benchmarked by experienced andfully resourced municipal emergency manage-ment agencies.

1 0 9



• Interagency and metropolitan area integration.

• Simulation/exercise evaluation of plans.

• Modeling, simulation, and red-teaming capability.

• Ability to identify and track training and per-formance needs.

• Indicators for early warning assessmentprocesses and tools (e.g., play-books and targetfolders).


Technologies exist in this area, but they have yetto be effectively applied to this problem. Little inthe way of templates and decision support soft-ware has been utilized by responders.

A working system (even if all of the data sets areavailable necessary to support visualization) mustbe fully integrated, in order to couple attribute-based dataset queries with high performance visu-alizations. There are advanced file-based systemsthat provide a solution to this problem, but thereis little implementation at the state or local levels.(These should not be considered technology limi-tations as much as availability, training, andusability impediments.)

State of the Art:

The state of the art for EMPP.1 (Risk Awarenessand Assessment) described available software appli-cations that are useful for this functional capabil-ity as well. There are several software systemsthat have been applied to achieving some of thegoals listed for this functional element.


Despite the apparent merits, most visualizationsystems generally lack data management supportof the scope described by the goals listed above.They offer some built-in support for finding per-tinent datasets based upon the attributes of thedatasets but generally provide a fairly low-levelfile browsing or tabular reporting mechanism.Additional complexity is added by diffuse emer-gency management and response organization

personnel who need to collaborate in a multitask-ing, multistage effort.

Gap Fillers:

Products that could be deployed soon and thatwould close some gaps in this needed capabilityinclude:

• A common standardized distributed databaseand web server that can be used by federal,state and local emergency planning andresponse agencies, to provide comprehensiveupdated data and models relative to antici-pated CBRNE threat scenarios.

• A decision support system that provides algo-rithmic simulation and support for evaluatingintervention and response actions, and high-lights specific planning and operational issuesas a consequence.

EMPP.6 – Establish Emergency OperationCenter (EOC). The ability to establish an effectivemulti-agency, multi-discipline coordination andinformation resource center, to support coordinationand direction of strategic resource management,communication, logistics, etc. following a WMDevent.

In a catastrophe, decision-makers would face avast amount of disorder and the most pressingneed would be for a unified concept of opera-tions that would reduce the disarray among pri-mary responders. With central managementoverwhelmed in the first few hours, the EOCwould be the focus for supporting networks oper-ating somewhat independently without any sig-nificant degree of direct coordinated guidance.

Goals:

Responders emphasized the need to “build fromthe bottom up.” This approach provides solidprototypes and operational concepts that havecredible support among the responder commu-nity that can develop into a synchronizednational emergency management system overtime. Effective unified command at the locallevel is the first step in developing a nationalcapability to respond effectively to a major terror-ist event.

1 1 0


Chapter VI

The objective of a unified concept of operationsfrom a central EOC is to mobilize, deploy andutilize all essential resources and capabilities intoan action plan that effectively prioritizes tasksneeded in response to a terrorist attack.Coordination, cooperation, and collaborationamong the decision-makers requires establishingan EOC capability that can meet the followinggoals:

• Interoperable communications (up/down/horizontal).

• Current situation and resource status and location.

• Ability to project future operations.

• Database and communications integration.

• Common command system and terminology.

• Seamless integration between EOC and fieldcommand units.

• Open architecture and ability to exchange/syn-chronize datasets among different nodes in thedecision-making or management network.

• Rapid communication links to regional andnational EOCs, agencies and “trigger points”(surveillance control stations, command posts,etc.).

• Geographical and functional redundancy inother non-proximate location.

• Surge capacity workspace and logistics support.


Each state has some facility designated as anEOC but capabilities, space, and equipment varywidely. Major metropolitan areas have a range ofEOC facilities that mirror the range of capabili-ties at the state level. However, fiscal constraintswould make it virtually impossible for jurisdic-tions to have all capabilities needed to respond toa major event, forcing them to draw on capabili-ties from many different locations. The scope ofmobilization, deployment and utilization needed

at theses facilities could be compared to the chal-lenges of planning for continued operation ofcities following a limited nuclear attack duringthe Cold War. At present, in the event of a cata-strophic attack, EOC network and response man-agers would find themselves operating in an envi-ronment with the following characteristics:

• Many jurisdictions would lack adequate plan-ning, training, information systems, commu-nications, or response agency associations suf-ficient for all possible scenarios.

• Most initial responses would be ad hoc anddepend on system capacities and respondertraining in place at the moment of the attack.

• Confusion and misinformation would prolif-erate regarding unknown agents and theireffects, public reactions, other response activi-ties, and availability of needed resources.

• Competing priorities, competition forresources and lack of coordination would beendemic among responders, incident com-manders, and EOC directors.

• Strict command and control would be impos-sible as emergency responders followed theirinstincts in the initial moments following theattack. In the first three to six hours, incidentcommanders and supporting systems would behard-pressed to assimilate the scope of impactsand resource needs to issue all of the necessaryorders, even if communications were perfect.

State of the Art:

There is a daunting array of operating centers ofvarious sorts at the national level. Only FEMAhas developed an effective system of RegionalOperations Centers (ROCs) designed to coordi-nate federal response in support of state and localjurisdictions for emergencies and disasters.

Most very large municipalities, states, and DHS(FEMA) have operations centers that are capableof functioning to achieve the stated goals. TheFEMA Regional Operations Centers weredesigned and equipped specifically to implementthe Federal Response Plan and manage the

1 1 1



resource support needs of states following a disaster.

The Emergency Management XML Consortiumis developing standards based on ExtensibleMarkup Language to help emergency managersand responders improve data and graphic com-pression to facilitate and better integrate diversesoftware and hardware. The consortium is organ-ized under the Standardization Committee of theOrganization for the Advancement of StructuredInformation Standards (OASIS) standards body.

The consortium working on the StandardizationCommittee has more than 50 members that aresupporting the development of the XML schema-based standards. The range of improvementsincludes unified incident management, geo-graphic information system data accessibility andusage, notification methods and messaging, situa-tional reporting, source tasking, and asset andresource management. Technologists expect tohave a clearer and streamlined path to Internetinteroperability using this EXML standard byend of 2003.


There are no specific limitations to the imple-mentation of existing technologies in the EOCenvironment. Data transfer and communicationsare where most technological limitations reside,to include access to telecommunications, cellphone networks, and the Internet during a crisis.Limitations in sharing data and communicating(i.e., equipment interoperability) also have been aconcern for many public safety officials for years.9

Communications interoperability issues, such asthose identified after the September 11th, 2001,terrorist attacks between New York City firefight-ers and law enforcement officers, also extend tothe sharing of other digital exchange and integra-tion capabilities where there is not a focused,clearly delineated set of standards for incidentmanagement.

There are presently some limitations in storageand display capabilities in individual responder

vehicles and even greater limitations in the speedof delivery via wireless means in a networked orWeb-enabled mode (especially in the networkoverload conditions to be expected in an inci-dent). Responders are also concerned with thedifficulty in data integration and graphics/datacompression, exacerbated by a lack of softwarestandards. Technologists have noted, however,that improved interoperability and speed of dataexchange could be gained with standardized cod-ing for the commonly used EXML/XML Webprogramming language, discussed above.

Gap Fillers:

Templates and training courses to establish EOCscould be very helpful. The federal governmentmight consider establishing local/state/regionalEOCs, of which there are currently a few examples.

Because of its complexity, a unified concept of operations requires common response coordination with the strong support by majorstakeholders. One option to expand the coordi-nation of multiple agencies from multiple levels isto develop regional operations centers in majorcities that are well-staffed and more experiencedin the problems associated with a major event.They have planned, trained, and exercised withsurrounding counties, states. They are familiarwith the integration of federal and military assets.

Emergency managers and unified command sys-tems have made great strides in developing EOCsand operating concepts to address these problemsthat are likely to occur in coordinating responseto a major terrorist incident. Most build on theincident command system. However, the lack ofa unifying concept of operations that functionsfrom a capable EOC facility would lead to wastedresources, lives lost and a delayed response.While there is acceptance that a tightly managedresponse might initially be impossible, a manage-ment concept that provides for a well-connectedEOC could allow considerable independentaction within centrally coordinated guidelines.This could be accomplished through a coherent

1 1 2


Chapter VI

9 Methods for assuring communications connectivity and achieving interoperability are addressed in the NTRO on Unified Incident CommandDecision Support and Interoperable Communications

“network of networks” that linked the EOCs ofresponse organizations from many agencies andlevels.

EMPP.7 – Facilities/nfrastructure Hardening.The ability to provide information on mitigation,hardening techniques and response planning to facility managers regarding identifiedhigh-value assets and facilities, apply hardeningcodes (to include retrofit laws and standards) andtest and evaluate the hardening effort.

Goals:

The traditional threat modes that governmentand military facilities consider for building andequipment protection include hardening meas-ures in the following groupings:

• Penetration shielding from man-portableexplosive (thrown explosive, missile, rocketpropelled grenade) attack.

• Protection from terrorist/saboteur vehiclebombs.

• Radiation shielding.

• Protection from air bio/chemical contamination.

• Protection from intruders proceeding on foot.

• Shielding from electromagnetic pulses (EMP).

The range of hardening would generally includesecurity, robustness, resilience, and redundancy.The goals for this functional element are:

• Procedures to identify and prioritize high risktarget hazards (coordinated with EMPP.3(High-Value Target Identification andMonitoring) above) for hardening.

• Centralized repository of standardized codesand strategies.

• Ability to retain functionality of the structurebeing hardened, balancing functionality vs.security (cost-benefit analysis).

• Certification of tested and evaluated products.


The capability to conduct risk assessments andengineer hardening in all listed categories is avail-able. DoD and FEMA have studied hardeningmethods and established protective standards fordecades. However, the guidance on what levelsof hardening are required is limited and specificto locations that have unique requirements forprotection of equipment or personnel, and usu-ally specified in regulations (i.e., prisons, weaponsstorage, communications centers, banks, etc.).More extensive tools are required, for determin-ing needs and standards for general application atthe state and local levels.

State of the Art:

The Department of Defense has many programsthat address the needs of the military to protectand defend soldiers, equipment and personnelfrom attacks of all kinds, including those thatmight be perpetrated by terrorists.


The technologies are mature for assessment,design, engineering and applying physical hard-ening to facilities to achieve desired levels of pro-tection. The only impediments are methods forcredible risk assessment to determine needs forphysical enhancement and justification of thesubsequent cost for completing the upgrades.Standards for assessment, design, and engineeringagainst chemical, biological and radiologicalthreats are less mature because of the wide varietyof the threats and because of limits on ourknowledge of lethal doses in real world condi-tions. Improvements are easy to design but fullprotection is very difficult to assure; arriving atan appropriate intermediate point would be diffi-cult. Hardening against nuclear blast, fire, andEMP effects is also fairly well understood butimpossible at close range.

Gap Fillers:

FEMA provided extensive guidance to states andlocal governments for analyzing facility protec-tion and attack resistance during the Cold Warera from the late 1950’s through the mid 1990’s.FEMA provides standards for EOC survivability

1 1 3



and hardening enhancement for existing struc-tures to serve as shelters, command centers, andalternate government sites. Each state had aFacilities Engineer staff position that was 100%federally funded. This information and guid-ance is still available from FEMA archives andmany states retain the regulatory and guidanceinformation. The Department of Defense andcommunicable disease laboratories have methods,techniques, standards and protocols for construc-tion of facilities that are effectively resistant orhardened to prevent penetration or release of bio-logical threats. The cost and operational viabilityof such facilities in the CBRNE terrorism contextis highly questionable, however. While the abilityand technology exists to construct or harden afacility to the standard of a Level 4 Bio-Lab, thefunctionality of such facilities would be severelylimiting and it is doubtful that a cost/benefitanalysis would support application except in rareinstances. Jurisdictions that desire hardening to the blast overpressures of the nuclear attacksurvivability standards that FEMA defined orthat the CDC promulgates for design of a Level4 laboratory can acquire and use this informationto develop hardening standards and procedures tothe extent of the resources available to supportthe associated costs.

Emergency Management Preparation andPlanning Response TechnologyObjectives (EMPPrto)

The Emergency Management Preparation andPlanning capabilities described above are not gen-erally dependent on new or emerging technolo-gies. Rather, capability increase will come prima-rily from the identification and integration ofbest-of-breed software and procedures, guided bystandards developed specifically for emergencymanagement preparation and planning at thelocal level. Continued improvements andenhancements in technologies are still important,however. In most cases, meeting needs and goalsis dependent on development of standards, appli-cation of operational/procedural methods, acquir-ing existing data sets, man-hours to enter data forspecific sites, and/or making fiscal and training

commitments to implement existing technolo-gies. The discussion of EMPP ResponseTechnology Objectives expands on these combi-nations, and highlights existing technologies thatcan be improved or made more feasible for implementation.

The diversity of responder organizations and localand state authorities employing disparate systemsof command, control and coordination presents asignificant obstacle to effective implementation ofexisting technologies and best practices. Datawarehousing and knowledge management systemsthat have been effectively implemented withinsome military organizations, federal agencies, orlarge cities are not compatible with systems thatare generally in widespread use, thus hinderingthe ability for multi-agency, multi-level responsein a complex environment. Commonality andsimilarities among crisis management systemslocally, regionally, and nationally are needed tofoster effective joint efforts. Preparedness foreffective response management is most effectivewhen it is simple, flexible, and standardized.

In the hours immediately following a major eventinformation management and decision supportsystems must provide for decentralized manage-ment that permits a fair degree of autonomy tothe functional networks collaborating in theresponse. The rapid linkage of these compatiblesystems is needed to ensure the devolution ofinformation and management, and to establish acommon operational picture. Because of thecomplexity of implementing such systems,acceptance of hardware and software standardsneeds the enthusiastic support of major stake-holders from local, state, and key military/federalagencies. Most entities recognize the problemsand have been working on finding solutions.The most immediate need is to create a continu-ing process that builds on the insight of keystakeholders. This is consistent with the need to“build from the bottom up” in a process that pro-vides concrete pilots projects led by credible fed-eral-level agencies that could harmonize this uni-fied, national concept for support.

1 1 4


Chapter VI

EMPPrto.1 – Risk Awareness and AssessmentDecision Support Technology Demonstration

Objectives:

Determine selection criteria for software systemsthat are effective, and metrics for assurance thatcritical data sets will be available to respondersand sustainable. Determine “best-of-breed” inuseable collaborative decision-support systemsthat promote effective emergency response plan-ning. Create benchmarks for integrated systemsthat will consolidate the stove-piped risk andimpact assessment models currently available.Demonstrate an integrated, effective set of sharedtools that monitor the urban environment andprovide enhanced near real-time situational andintegrated data from disparate sources into a sin-gle coherent view to support disciplined decision-making.

Payoffs:

The development of systems that can accomplishthe stated objectives will allow the nation’sresponders and emergency managers to initiate aresponse with confidence that their incident situ-ational awareness is valid. Follow-on respondersand off-scene managers will have a common viewof the tactical arena and collective basis for crisisaction and strategy development for consequencemanagement. This demonstration should resultin a capability that helps free the crisis manage-ment team from time-consuming and tediousdata assessment and filtering, permitting higher-level situational assessment and rapid response tochanging events.

Challenges:

Although the technologies are generally available,the challenge is to design the linkable networksto overcome the traditional lack of compatibilityof many off-the-shelf proprietary software pack-ages, data sets, and digital maps. There is a tech-nical challenge in implementing the digital archi-tecture and supporting software which mustaccommodate a wide range of existing equipmentand systems. Those capabilities have beendemonstrated in exercises and tests, but the chal-lenge remains to commit the time and effort for

initial and sustainment training to ensure usabil-ity of relatively complex software.

Milestones/Metrics:

The RTO should be oriented around a demon-stration project following selection of software,training of responders/EOC personnel, andestablishing multi-agency/multi-level interoper-ability, including the following milestones:

FY2004: Pilot program to define requirementsfor software integration originating at the locallevel (bottom-up approach).

FY2005: Select demonstration sites that aresmall to medium sized cities that have a real-world pre-planned event.

FY2006: Demonstrate integrated technologies inactual use with live data and information flow toevaluate capabilities implementation andimprovement.

Technologies should demonstrate, in a carefullyconstructed series of exercises, ability to meetresponders’ confidence in the usability, interoper-ability, and capability of accomplishing the statedgoals.

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency, NationalInstitute of Justice, and the Office for DomesticPreparedness already have extensive experiencewith such assessment software.

EMPPrto.2 – Electronic Transcript SmartCard. The advent of the Internet and its steadydevelopment from a text-only medium to anexpanding multimedia communication systemhas offered new and diverse opportunities fortraining at convenient times and places. Theexpanding range of possibilities requires trainingmanagers to be proactive in the development anduse of technology in the teaching-learningprocess. They must become involved in thedevelopment process to ensure that it is the edu-cational needs that are driving the development

1 1 5



Decision Support Technology Demonstration

$2.5 $4 $3.5 $10

ThrustEMPPrto.1 – Budget in Millions

2004 2005 2006 Totals

of technology, rather than vice versa. Theseresponsibilities can be supported by technologiesthat allow training and response managers to ver-ify responders’ proficiency and currency in spe-cific skill sets and training requirements.

Objectives:

Demonstrate, for standardization and acceptance,a digital smart card/chip “electronic transcript”system that securely verifies identification, levelsof training/certification, and currency, for themultitude of responders that converge on thescene of a high-visibility CBRNE event.

Payoffs:

Immediate verification of credentials is essentialto make effective use of volunteers and mutualaid that may arrive in a chaotic fashion. Thetracking of the individuals for safety and theirqualifications is an overwhelming task for inci-dent commanders. Use of such smart cards, withchips programmed to turn on when the wearercrosses a designated perimeter, would give the on-scene commander a rapid, accurate, and verifiablepicture of resource and skill availability, andensure the qualifications of each responder at thescene. This objective could ultimately be com-bined in a synergistic way with the responder per-sonal locator technology that is the subject ofUICrto.1, to enable safety monitoring andaccounting throughout the event.

Challenges:

The GPS-enabled smart card technology toachieve the objective is available but it isnot in widespread use. The GPS featuremay not in fact be necessary in an early ver-sion that would rely on the inherent shortdistance of the card/reader combination forrough location. This is a low-risk demonstrationproject to benchmark systems that can ensureinterface and display capabilities in the emer-gency responder communities. The challenge isto gain acceptance of the use of technology thattracks movement and location of individuals. Insome implementation scenarios, responders sawpersonnel tracking as an invasion of privacy orviolation of union rules. Procedures and policies

that address these concerns have been demon-strated in Boston, Massachusetts and PrinceWilliam County, Virginia.

Milestones/Metrics:

Milestones should focus on demonstration proj-ects in three sites (large, medium, and small juris-diction) following selection of software, evalua-tion of hardware, training of ICS staff, andresponders to employ the “smart card” technol-ogy in a multi-jurisdiction response exercise.

Technologies should demonstrate, in a carefullyconstructed series of exercises, ability to meetresponders’ confidence in the usability, interoper-ability, and capability of accomplishing the statedgoals.

FY2004: Research existing technology; definerequirements for information to be tracked; spec-ify/the minimum equipment specifications; selectsoftware to implement the smart card technology.

FY2005: Select three jurisdictions for demon-stration sites that test the technology in the fullrange of response; demonstrate tracking technolo-gies in actual use with live data and informationflow to evaluate capabilities implementation andidentify shortfalls.

FY2006: Evaluate systems for effectiveness.

FY2007: Produce strategies, best practices, andtechnology benchmarks/minimum standards fortechnology implementation.

EMPPrto.3 – Alternate/Mobile HospitalContingency Management

Objectives:

Develop standards based on case studies, bench-marking, and best practices in use for managinghospital/medical contingencies. A formal studyof software systems (perhaps by CDC or PublicHealth Service) is needed, to determine the exist-ing capabilities, feasibility of expansion, and the

1 1 6


Chapter VI

Electronic Transcript Smart Card

$2.25 $3 $7


2004 2005 2007

$1

2006 Totals

$0.75

inclination of hospitals to support the reportingrequirements.

Payoffs:

Quick implementation of critical resourcereporting of hospital and medical resources incommon database formats for decision supportby incident commanders, emergency respon-ders, and emergency managers.

Challenges:

This is a very low risk enterprise that uses readilyavailable existing technologies and COTS soft-ware to accomplish the desired goals. Bench-marking and best practices will be demonstratedin a relatively straightforward endeavor that stud-ies the implementation in three to five munici-palities using existing systems.

Milestones/Metrics:

Review and evaluate software to use in a demonstration project to test capabilities forcoordinating medical resource availability andprioritization. This demonstration project shouldfollow selection of software, training of respon-ders/EOC personnel, and participating hospitalsin two jurisdictions. Project completion includesthe following milestones:

FY2004: Pilot program to define requirementsfor software integration, and demonstrate imple-mentation, originating at the local level withjurisdictions that have volunteer hospital partici-pation (bottom-up approach).

FY2005: Demonstrate technology and evaluatesystem usage, in two jurisdictions that have hos-pital/medical facilities with existing computer-based resource tracking capability, with integratedtechnologies in actual use using live data andinformation flow to evaluate capabilities imple-mentation and identify shortfalls.

FY2006: Analyze and define strategies/best prac-tices for technology selection (benchmarking) andimplementation.

Technologies should demonstrate, in two care-fully constructed exercises, ability to meet respon-ders’ confidence in the usability, interoperability,and capability of accomplishing the stated goals.

EMPPrto.4 – Course-of-Action DevelopmentSystem. Computer-based decision support andinformation management technologies can assistthe emergency planning/response community inachieving a higher level of sophistication in infor-mation assessment, integration and manipulation.An effective decision-support (or course of actiondevelopment system) should synthesize informationin a manner that facilitates and speeds up thedecision-making process and allows for the devel-opment of databases that reflect the full spectrumof the various organizational modes, resourcesand capabilities. Policy and procedure integra-tion with constant sustainment training is neededfor this capability to find broad acceptance andimplementation.

Objectives:

Software integration to link existing GIS, model-ing, planning, flood and incident managementsystems, National Crime Information Centerinformation, Radiological EmergencyPreparedness systems, and specialty databases(e.g., California’s earthquake-related systems),with existing decision support programs. Thesponsorship of this effort should fall to the organ-izations already heavily committed to developingsystems that span the local, state, federal, andmilitary multi-level response structures. Thosetwo national organizations are the Defense ThreatReduction Agency (DTRA) and Department ofHomeland Security (FEMA). The CATS systemthat is sponsored by DTRA is particularly well-suited to build on for benchmarking and stan-dards for integration and interoperability, and theFEMA HAZUS-MH system is the most capableGIS-based natural hazards system.

1 1 7



Alternate/Mobile Hospital Contingency Management

$1.75 $0.75 $0.75 $3.25


2004 2005 2006 Totals

Payoffs:

A course-of-action development system will helpincident commanders and EOC officials makebetter decisions more efficiently and in bettercoordination. Developing interoperability stan-dards will facilitate the DHS policy for EOCregionalization and encourage others to make thecommitments to cost, training, and strategicplanning necessary to commit resources andimplement compatible EOCs.

Challenges:

There are no significant technological challengesto pursuing these goals. Risk is minimal.

Milestones/Metrics:

The salient effort is focused on a proof-of-concept demonstration project that provides formulti-agency, multi-level linking of compatiblesystems that are already in use. A unifiedapproach by organizations “owning” the softwaremust define protocols for exchange of compatibledata sets and visualization outputs. The ultimategoals are to select the most capable and compati-ble software, select viable demonstration sites fora tiered exercise, train responders/EOC personneland other participants, and demonstrate multi-

agency/multi-level interoperability. The projectincludes the following milestones:

FY2004: Evaluate candidate software that isavailable and in effective use; define integrationand data-exchange protocols that will be compat-ible with system capabilities at local levels.

FY2005: Define minimum equipment criteria;select equipment for use in testing; deploy soft-ware and equipment for exercise and train participants.

FY2006: Select four demonstration sites that arerepresentative of the full range of local responsecapabilities (one large, two medium, one smalljurisdiction); demonstrate integrated technologiesin actual use with live data and information flowto evaluate capabilities implementation and areasfor improvement. Evaluate effectiveness of systems.

The technology demonstration will facilitateresponder and command-level confidence in theusability, interoperability, and capability ofaccomplishing the stated goals.

1 1 8


Chapter VI

Course-of-Action Development System

$3.5 $8 $6.75 $18.25


2004 2005 2006 Totals

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

• Local Bottom-Up Requirements for Software Integration

• Pre-Planned Events• Demo Integrated with

Real Data and Bandwidth

• COTS Software• Integrated and

Demonstrated in 5 Jurisdictions

• Verifies Responder ID, Training, Certifications

• GPS Enabled• Interoperable

• Multi-Agency, Multi-Level Linking of Compatible Decision Support Systems

EMPPrto.1 – Risk Awareness/Assessment

Decision Support Technology Demonstration

EMPPrto.2 – Electronic Transcript Smart Card

EMPPrto.4 – Course-of-Action Development System

EMPPrto.3 – Alternate/Mobile Hospital Contingency Management

Emergency Management Preparation and Planning Technology Roadmap

Definition

Medical Response is the capability to providerapid, effective, safe treatment of persons exposedto CBRNE threats. This is achieved by mobiliz-ing, deploying, and sustaining a safe field medicalresponse in full coordination with hospitals andpublic health infrastructures.

This section is complemented by the PublicHealth Readiness for Biological Agent Events(PHRBAE) National Terrorism ResponseObjective (see Chapter VIII), which focuses oncapabilities needed specifically for response tobiological threats.


The type of event or threat scenario proved to bethe most relevant way of defining the variety ofoperational environments for medical response.Therefore, this NTRO’s OperationalEnvironments are: chemical, biological, radiolog-ical, nuclear, and high explosive/incendiary.However, in most instances the effects of anuclear explosion on survivors amount to combi-nations of exposure to radiation, heat, fire, andblast (though probably on a larger scale). Thus,the nuclear operational environment calls forcombinations of capabilities needed for the radio-logical and explosive/incendiary operational envi-ronments. For this reason, within some func-tional capability areas, the ‘nuclear’ operationalenvironment is considered not applicable becauseall the needed capabilities are included within theradiological and explosive/incendiary operationalenvironments.

The capabilities required for medical response toa biological or radiological incident differ from

those appropriate in a chemical, nuclear or highexplosive incident. In biological and radiologicalevents, there is a longer time delay betweenrelease of the agent and manifestation of its con-sequences among an affected population. Thecontinued threat of exposed persons to otherspersists because of the infectious quality of bio-logical agent or prolonged half-life of the radio-logical agent. The effects of nuclear, chemicaland explosive materials on a target are apparentwithin seconds to minutes of the event.Radiological materials will manifest their adverseeffects on a target within hours if the dosage ishigh; it may take weeks to years to observe thefull consequences of the threat materials at lowerdoses. Humans, animals, or plants will manifestclinical signs typically seventy-two hours to eightdays after exposure to a biological threat agent.Because of the delay between exposure andappearance of clinical signs, the type of emer-gency responder will differ and the managementof the high threat situation will require strategiesthat differ from other CBRNE events.

There are two distinct timelines for recognitionof an event: immediate and delayed. If sensorsystems that detect threat agents are present atthe time of release, immediate action may betaken by authorities in proximity to the event.Such action includes securing the perimeter fol-lowed by treatment of exposed persons withappropriate antibiotics, antivirals, and anti-toxins.However, the more likely response to a biologicalevent (and to low-level radiological and chemicalevents) will be along a delayed timeline, wherethe dispersal of the threat agent will not bedetected at the time of release. Responders may not recognize the occurrence of an eventuntil after the first appearance of clinical signs

1 1 9


Chapter VII

Medical Response (MR)Chapter Chair: Dr. Stephen KornguthChapter Coordinator: Michelle Royal

inconsistent with normal patterns of illness in thecommunity. This will occur typically three toeight days after release of the biological agent, orpossibly longer in the case of a low-level radiolog-ical incident. The emergency responder in thissituation will be the health care provider in anemergency medical service environment, anemergency room, a private physician, the pathol-ogist, a pharmacist or a family member.

Diagnosing and distinguishing an illness as aresult of either an emergent disease or bioterroristactivity will be frustrated by two issues: 1) manyillnesses appear similar to common flu at earlystages (enteric or respiratory signs), and 2) theprocess of differential diagnosis requires the diag-nostician first to rule out the most probablecauses of illness before considering unlikelycauses.

There are three important timeframes related to abiological threat: pre-event, minutes to hourssurrounding the release event, and four or morehours post-event. Protective measures in the pre-event period and during the release phase includevaccination, storage and maintenance of vaccines,antivirals and antibiotics, body-cover similar tothat used in surgical suites, face masks that coverthe mouth, nose, ears and glasses. In the absenceof skin abrasions or puncture wounds, biologicalthreat agents (i.e., viruses, bacteria, fungi and tox-ins) will generally not penetrate intact skin (withthe exception of cutaneous anthrax). They maybe ingested, inhaled or injected. After the firstfour hours antibiotics, antivirals and vaccines willbe required. Those persons exposed to agentsshould be placed in isolation. Care providers andemergency responders will require face masks andgloves. Washing hands with detergent or dilutedbleach is required and contaminated clothesshould be removed and contained at a safe desig-nated site near the incident.


The functional capabilities needed for thisNTRO, in priority order, are:

• Mass Medical Prophylaxis

• Mass Casualty Medical Care Management

• Individual and Collective Protection of HealthCare Personnel and Facilities

• Rapid Clinical, Environmental and VeterinaryField Assessment.

• Medical Response to Public Affairs

• Modeling of Exposure/Casualties for Locationand Numbers

• Definitive Decontamination

• Medical Staff Surge, Re-Supply and ProperAccreditation

• Telemedicine in Support of Surge

The functional capabilities are presented in prior-ity order based on responders’ input in work-shops and field interviews conducted during theearlier phases of this effort. The functional capa-bilities were subsequently modified and validatedin workshops involving both responders andtechnologists. The first three (Mass MedicalProphylaxis (MR.1); Mass Casualty Medical CareManagement (MR.2); and Individual andCollective Protection of Health Care Facilities andPersonnel (MR.3)) were regarded by a strong con-sensus as the highest priorities in this NTRO.

It should be noted that this NTRO originallyconsidered the functional capability Therapeuticsand Treatments in Dangerous Environments. Thisfunctional capability was originally consideredlowest priority of the NTRO. After further con-sideration, responders agreed there was no realneed to pursue this capability because they couldnot foresee any scenario where treatment will begiven in the “hot zone.” Current strategyinvolves the removal of exposed persons from thehot zone to an adjacent clean area and subse-quent removal of clothing and washing ofexposed persons. Therefore, this functional capa-bility was eliminated from the list of neededcapabilities for this NTRO.

The responders believe that marked improvementis needed in the rapid detection of agents in hot

1 2 0


Chapter VII

zones and of personsexposed to threatagents. They alsobelieve that newapproaches are neces-sary for administrationof prophylaxis to largenumbers of persons. Ahigh priority wasplaced on developingtools for looking down-range at an incident toidentify health status ofvictims and detectingthreats in the environ-ment. This isaddressed in part inChapter III (DIDA)and Chapter IV (UIC).A related high priorityis availability of avoice-activated docu-mentation assessmenttool to link emergencyresponders to hospitalsand clinics via theInternet.

The discussion of the individual capabilities isrelated to the needs identified. Several of theessential needs do not require novel technologydevelopment (e.g., capability to distribute vac-cines, antivirals and antibiotics) but rather requirean adaptive change in administrative policy andculture. Other needs do require technologicalinnovation (e.g., modeling dissemination ofaerosols based on meteorological data at low alti-tude). While technological advances are requiredin this area, modification of public attitudes andadministrative structures will also be required ifsuccess is to be realized.

Overall State of Technology forMedical Response

The matrix below shows a pattern of moderate tohigh technological challenges in meeting theneeds of medical responders.

MR.1 – Mass Medical Prophylaxis. The abilityto provide mass medical prophylaxis (includingantibiotics, antivirals and vaccinations) to personsexposed to biological agents, and to provide appro-priate pharmaceuticals or protective materials topersons exposed to chemical, radiological or highexplosive incidents.

This functional capability assumes that knowledgeof an incident is timely enough that prophylaxis isadministered at or near the scene and thereforecan mitigate danger to potential victims andresponders. In the case of biological or radiologi-cal agents, the window for recognition of an eventis about 24 to 96 hours post exposure; for chemi-cal agents, the window is seconds to minutes.

Goals:

This functional capability includes the followinggoals:

• Identification of at-risk population.

1 2 1


Medical Response

12

3





Medical Response

1. Mass Medical Prophylaxis

2. Mass Casualty Medical Care Management

3. Individual and Collective Protection of Health Care Facilities and Personnel

4. Rapid, Clinical Environmental and Veterinary Field Assessment

5. Medical Response Public Affairs

6. Modeling of Exposure/ Casualties for Location and Numbers

7. Definitive Decontamination

8. Medical Staff Surge, Re-Supply and Proper Accreditation

9. Telemedicine in Support of Surge Requirements




• Protection of population from developing ill-ness after a CBRNE event.

• Identification of appropriate prophylaxis andcontraindications.

• Improved delivery methods.

• Strategy development for distribution of mate-rial (including staffing, logistics, facilities,etc.).

• Expedient/efficient acquisition, distributionand administration (to include tracking) ofprophylaxis.

• Strategies for managing pharmaceutical stockpiles.

• Security, force protection and social control.

• Methods to model and test systems in order toimprove preparedness for mass prophylaxiseventuality.

The key to this capability is to detect the pres-ence of threat agents at the earliest point afterdissemination, to identify the population at high-est risk, and to devise a plan to administer pro-tective medication. The detection and identifica-tion of threat agents requires sensor technology asdescribed in Chapter III (DIDA). (See alsoPHRBAE.1 (Surveillance and InformationIntegration Systems), PHRBAE.2 (Rapid High-Throughput Clinical Assessment and Testing) andMR.4 (Rapid Clinical Environmental andVeterinary Field Assessment).) The identificationof the “at-risk” population includes identifyingthose in the immediate vicinity of the release ofagent and others with particular susceptibility tothe threat agents (such as the immuno-deficient,aged, or those with chronic disease). This func-tional capability probably requires specializeddemographic databases.

The goals point to a system that merges knowl-edge about the ongoing incident, previous knowl-edge about prophylaxis procedures and protocolsand modeling and simulation to provide a knowl-edge base that responders can use to manage amass prophylaxis operation. In addition, this

functional capability establishes a need for newrapid delivery techniques. Improved deliverytechniques require development of strategies fordistribution (including staffing, logistics, facili-ties, etc.), expedient and efficient acquisition, andadministration (to include tracking) of pharma-ceutical stockpiles.

Improved methods have been established forsecurity, responder protection and social controlin the event of a CBRNE incident. However,desk-top drills conducted across the nation con-tinue to reveal shortcomings in the system. Toimprove the capability of the nation to minimizeadverse consequences from a CBRNE attack, anadditional goal of this capability is developmentof new methods to test the readiness of systemsfor mass prophylaxis.

The development (as opposed to managementand delivery) of novel prophylaxis to improveprotection against some agents is implied in thisfunction. However, this has been outside thescope of Project Responder. Therefore, this func-tional area is limited to the management anddelivery of prophylaxis.


There is no technology in use for rapid identifica-tion of at-risk populations. Systems that use real-time information about an attack do not yet existbecause that information has not been previouslybeen available. The federal government andsome cities are now deploying the kind of sensorsystems that could provide that information, onan experimental basis, but more development isrequired.

With regard to identifying appropriate prophy-laxis and contraindications, current studies on thehuman genome are anticipated to provide infor-mation regarding which individuals are most sus-ceptible to adverse responses to antibiotics andother chemicals. It is not possible now to deter-mine which individuals are most susceptible toadverse clinical response to vaccination.

Delivery methods have not changed their basictechnology in years, but policies have becomemore conservative and less supportive of mass

1 2 2


Chapter VII

prophylaxis. Auto-injectors and reusable syringesare still the fastest means for delivery. But undercurrent administrative policies and procedures, ithas been estimated that approximately 50,000 to100,000 persons could be vaccinated for small-pox per day in the U.S. according to the Centerfor Disease Control. Compare this with the vac-cination of five to six million in two weeks inNew York City in 1947. The change is a conse-quence of the large number of immuno-deficientindividuals today (e.g., organ transplants, AIDS)and the litigious nature of society compared withthat in 1947. Difficulties in mass vaccination arefurther evidenced by the large number of healthcare workers (90%) who have refused vaccinationwith the smallpox vaccine. This indicates thateven knowledgeable workers do not perceive therisk/benefit ratio of vaccination to be beneficial atthis time. Immunization of the population in anurban area the size of New York or other metrop-olis could require as much as seventy days. Bycontrast, other countries estimate that a popula-tion of five million persons can be immunized inten days. The problem is therefore more socialand political than technological.

Chemical, radiological, nuclear and HE threatsare not readily managed by prophylaxis. Readyavailability of anti-nerve gas antidotes (acetyl-cholinesterase inhibitors) can mitigate the effectsof exposure; inappropriate use of the antidotehowever is associated with adverse clinical effectsand therefore contributes to the social and legalissues mentioned above.

State of the Art:

Technology currently exists for more rapid deliv-ery of prophylaxis, and for tracking the adminis-tration of pre-event and post-event treatment.Marked improvement is needed in rapid adminis-tration of prophylaxis for chemical and biologicalthreats as such threats emerge. New tools tomonitor and track administration of treatmentsare also needed.

Elements of the technologies that will enable thegoals are emerging today. Smart sensor networksare being developed by the Department ofDefense. The Department of Homeland Security

is investigating the use of urban mass transitmonitoring systems and other fixed arrays as abasis for understanding the urban environment.Demographic databases with GIS registration arebeing deployed, and data mining of 9-1-1 sys-tems is spreading. Systems that provide event-driven treatment management and bar-codingtied to medical records are also being developed.


There are few major technical barriers to increas-ing our ability to administer antidotes to biologi-cal, chemical and radiological agents. The largesttechnical barrier is the ability to integrate dis-parate databases. However, the primary limita-tion is the lack of an administrative infrastructureable to deal with licensing of personnel who arenot physicians or are from another jurisdiction.The fact that almost all countermeasures to bio-logical, chemical or radiological threat involvesome level of morbidity raises the likelihood oflitigation. Rapid determination of at-risk popula-tions is reliant on sensor systems. Therefore, theprimary technology barriers to providing thiscapability are similar to those described inChapter III (DIDA).

Gap Fillers:

The primary gap filler would be the developmentof a knowledge base with decision aides, tem-plates, and management support for respondersto use to manage a mass prophylaxis operation.The system would integrate existing and futuredatabases to provide access to situational aware-ness. In addition, a program needs to be createdthat will address a more rapid delivery systemwith significantly higher throughput rates

MR.2 – Mass Casualty Medical CareManagement. The ability to provide automatedsupport for handling large numbers of casualtiesbeing cared for in many geographical locations andwith a wide variety of injuries within likely terroristscenarios. It includes triage and hospital care.

The emergency responders placed a high priorityon developing an ability to look “downrange” atan incident to allow remote triage and to provide

1 2 3


Medical Response

appropriate support tools for the on-sceneresponder, similar to those discussed in the previ-ous section. This capability would allow remotesensing of vital signs (e.g., blood pressure, pulse,blood oxygenation, dilated pupils and panic lev-els). When coupled with a voice activated docu-mentation headset to remotely link vocally docu-mented assessment with text/cathode ray tube(CRT) screen, staff at remote hospitals will bebetter able to evaluate crisis situations. All thiswould be part of an automated system to managethe treatment and keep track of the casualties.This capability should be interoperable across allagencies likely to be involved, at least on aregional basis (if not national) and used on adaily basis.

Goals:

The goals for this functional area include:

• Ability to monitor a patient’s progress throughthe system in order to keep track of wherepeople are and treatment updates; linked intoa common operational picture for deploymentby emergency responders.

• Ability to attach to patients.

• Capable of identifying triage priority, clinicalstatus and personal information; and remotelytransmitting it in real time to a common oper-ational picture available to command, EOC,hospitals and other key personnel.

• Medical operational picture containing real-time information about the resource statusand patient care capabilities of the local systemto command post/EOC (see also EMPP.4(Alternate/Mobile Hospital Contingencies)).

• Development of strategies and systems for dis-tributing personnel resources in massive casu-alty systems.

• Management of some critical patients simulta-neous with triage.

• Biosensing.

• Expert systems to provide appropriate treat-ment strategy to emergency medical services(EMS) and other responders.

A key goal is the development of technology tomonitor a patient’s progress through the systemin order to keep track of patients’ locations andtreatment updates. As discussed in the previoussection, the management of large number ofcasualties is one of the biggest problems facingresponders. The management system envisionedby this set of goals would certainly overlap withthe requirements described in MR.1 (MassMedical Prophylaxis), with greater scope. Thegoal which differs here is the ability to sense vitalphysiological information without direct contact(i.e., non-invasive). Responders referred to this asthe “triage tricorder.” Once acquired, physiologi-cal information could be remotely transmitted, inreal time, to provide a common medical opera-tional picture made available to command, EOC,hospitals and other key personnel. The biosens-ing tool is similar to that described in Chapter III(DIDA). Decision support technology todevelop triage strategy can emerge from thisapproach.


At the present time, there are multiple existingsystems being used to identify and track victimsat an incident site. These systems are primarilymanual (e.g., names are taken and entered byhand) and the resulting data sets are not stan-dardized nor linked to other users. Commonoperational picture systems exist in the militaryand those systems do integrate medical situa-tional information. The military systems wouldneed to be adapted for civilian use. No capabilitycurrently exists in the field to remotely sensephysiological characteristics. Some voice acti-vated/recognition medical documentation sys-tems are being deployed in the clinical environ-ment but not in the field. Current voicerecognition technology does not work well innoisy environments. Terrorist events will mostlikely be noisy and chaotic.

1 2 4


Chapter VII

State of the Art:

The use of bar codes to track moving items orstockpiles of food is well established at FederalExpress and major food stores. Many prototypesystems are under development to provide infor-mation continuity between emergency medicalservices and hospitals. The State of Maryland hasa prototype program for formatting triage sheetsto electronic forms and reporting this informa-tion to incident command system for assigningbeds. A commercially available software packagefrom Cerner allows the rapid capture of clinicaldata at the time of patient entry into the system.The DREAMS (Disaster Relief and EmergencyMedical Service) project in Texas also utilizeselectronic data sets obtained at an incident site toprovide a common operational picture to distantmedical care providers. The Virginia health caresystem provides emergency room facilities withmedical data from an ambulance, via radio fre-quency transmission.


For this capability to come to full fruition, everyhealth care organization that can potentiallybecome involved in an incident needs to have thesystem or be interoperable. This presents notonly a technical challenge to successfully integrateboth new and legacy systems, but a policy andadministrative challenge to establish and imple-ment national standards; not to mention costissues.

Current systems have yet to be tested in a trulymass casualty situation where tens of thousandsof victims need to be managed. It remains to beseen what technical difficulties emerge from thatscenario. The ability to develop voice recognitionsystems that can operate effectively in very noisyenvironments has yet to be realized.

Gap Fillers:

Some elements of programs that should be con-sidered to fill gaps include:

• Voice activated documentation software pack-ages which will permit electronic (remote)information transfer between an incident site

and medical management authority, EOC orincident command; the information could beconverted to text on a CRT screen.

• Automated casualty management system usingbar code technology or radio frequency tags.The system would track patients and theirmedical information and relay the informationback to incident command. This could also be used for syndrome information andanalysis.

• Expansion of the physiological monitoringprogram recommended in DIDA to includethis area’s bio-sensing needs.

• Systems built for everyday use, not just cata-strophic incidents.

• Standards developed and accepted by usercommunities on a regional and national basis.(The standards must then be integrated into everyday operations so the user commu-nity is familiar with the procedure. AnInternet-based system is one way of achieving some standards and to have a robust communications.)

• Ability to train on the system. The inclusionof simulation and virtual reality elements totrain while operating the system will beimportant (e.g., embedded training). (SeeEMPP.2 (Mission Rehearsal, Simulation,Embedded Training and Distance Education).)

MR.3 – Individual and Collective Protection-Health Care Facilities and Personnel. Theability to protect medical care personnel and facili-ties (to include field hospitals and triage areas) fromCBRNE hazards.

In the event of a CBR incident, there will be aneed for automatic lockdown mechanisms inhealth care facilities. This is required to diminishthe risk of disease to patients at the hospital thatare in a pre-existing state of compromised health.The automatic lockdown may be expected toreduce security needs and release responders toundertake other critical missions. Field hospitalswould be established to further reduce the risk of

1 2 5


Medical Response

disease dissemination to compromised patients.(See MR.2 (Mass Casualty Medical CareManagement) and EMPP.4 (Alternate/MobileHospital Contingencies).) Although technology is an issue, isolation of patients and establish-ment of field hospitals also involves many policydecisions (e.g., financial allocations, sources offield hospital, routing of critical care patients).

Goals:

The following goals are an indication of whatcapability is needed in this area:

• Sensor-based, automatic, real-time, securelockdown systems (i.e., double-door systems).

• Over pressure, filtered air.

• Capacity for isolation.

• Adequate security for site and personnel in thecase of a lockdown, supported by rules ofengagement (not generally technology enabledexcept for where manpower can be replaced bybarriers with trusted access systems).

• Proper respiratory protection that allows fieldand hospital medical personnel to see andcommunicate with the victims (covered inChapter II (PPE)).

• One-size-fits-all respirators which are easy touse and not bulky. Ease of operation, storableover long term, can be worn for a long timewithout taxing the responder (covered inChapter II (PPE)).

• Airlock and bubble to provide containmentand safe operations (addressed in Chapter VIII(PHRBAE)).

• Technical evaluation of hospital design whichprovides ways for people to be assessed with-out contaminating large numbers of people(not primarily technology-enabled).

As indicated by the parenthetical comments, anumber of these goals are being addressed inother NTROs. Still more are not strictly techno-logically enabled, although some may benefit

from the application of mostly off-the-shelf tech-nology (such as in the case of the security goal).It would be most effective to have technical eval-uations of hospital designs prior to constructionof new facilities so as to enable care of affectedpersons without contaminating large numbers ofpeople. The development of national standardssimilar to building codes would be necessary.


At the present time very few, if any, hospitalshave a security force capable of locking down thefacility. Bio contagion in hospitals is a real prob-lem; nosocomial infections are commonplace inmost urban medical facilities. Very few hospitalshave any capability to house patients with highlyinfectious disease. Even those that do have suchcapability can manage only between ten and fortypatients. Many of those hospitals are located inremote areas and present a challenge in transport-ing patients from an incident site to the facility.Therefore, although the technical ability to treatpatients with highly infectious disease or chemi-cal exposure exits, the ability to manage a majorattack with associated large numbers of victimsremains unaddressed. The low probability ofsuch an attack diminishes the likely allocation oflocal resources. The high consequence of theevent, however, requires novel approaches andsolutions. Facilities around the country exist formanagement of patients with highly infectiousdisease or with chemical agent exposure.Examples include Ft. Detrick, the University ofTexas at Tyler, and the Johns Hopkins University.All the technologies needed to create this capabil-ity exist in a commercial off the shelf mode.However, the expense of integrating the capabil-ity in existing hospitals will be prohibitive. Thereare also a limited number of field hospitals in theArmy (e.g., Natick) and Air Force for treatmentof individuals in conditions of isolation.

State of the Art:

Most of the relevant state-of-the-art technologiesreside in the military. For individual protectionof health care providers, military medical person-nel use the same gear as soldiers. Some of themilitary hospitals and labs have been fitted with

1 2 6


Chapter VII

isolation units that are meant to deal with thetreatment of any infectious diseases, includingthose that are bio-warfare threats. Natick ArmyResearch & Development Center has developedfield-deployable hospitals (and other enclosures)built to protect health providers and patientsfrom chemical and biological threats. Some hos-pitals have built-in protection fields in their triageand emergency room areas. However, thereseems to some difference of opinion as to theeffectiveness of the methods used. Lack of stan-dards for emergency responders is a problem.


The major limitation and barrier in establishingprotected facilities is not technical, but financial.The low probability of an attack, even with highconsequences, limits enthusiasm for major out-lays of funds, especially by local governments. Inaddition, a large portion of the country’s health-care facilities are private sector entities that mustbe concerned about the financial “bottom line.”Thus, there are very limited resources to financethe required changes. In cases where tens ofthousands of victims will need treatment, alter-nate facilities in schools and other governmentowned buildings will probably be converted intotemporary hospitals. The decontamination ofthese buildings after use and the public accept-ance of assurances that re-occupancy of the build-ings will be a very low risk will raise new issues.As an example, reutilization of schools may beproblematic if public perception exists that theschools may be unsafe. The inability to usepostal facilities that were contaminated byanthrax after clean-up, and the utilization ofschools that had reported high levels of asbestos,are two examples of the difficulties regardingcommunity acceptance of decontaminated struc-tures. As stated above however, these are essen-tially policy and social issues, not technical. Itwould help to have a better understanding of therisks at low levels of contamination, and assaysthat detect those low levels. Chapter III (DIDA)recommends work on sensors that would help inthis area.

Gap Fillers:

From technology standpoint, technologists andresponders agree that the technology is availableto meet this needed capability. The deploymentof that technology is a funding and policy issue,and therefore no gap filling programs are offered.However, the need remains, and the federal government should study the situation with aview toward determining whether federal fundingand policy initiatives are needed to create thiscapability.

MR.4 – Rapid Clinical, Environmental andVeterinary Field Assessment. The ability to assessenvironmental, human and animal data relating tothe existence of biological, chemical or radiologicalthreat. This assessment will assist responders inmedical triage and diagnostics.

There is an unmet need to have minimally inva-sive, rapid diagnostic tools that can be linked todynamic models of chemical, biological or radio-logical agent dispersal, and the clinical appear-ance of disease/morbidity/mortality. These toolswould support the treatment and management ofthousands of victims.

Goals:

• Rapid diagnostic tools to safely and accuratelydetect and identify injuries or illnesses.

• Link remote responder to reach back to a specialist for diagnostic support (telemedi-cine–video and data link/distance triage).

• Linked in real-time to dynamic models, sur-veillance systems to acute care.

• Broadened multimedia training to expandknowledge among all responders.

These goals again speak to the need for a mini-mally invasive field diagnostic tool that provides,among other things, the capability to reach backto a specialist for diagnostic support. The linkagemust be available in real time and allow theemergency responder to access dynamic models

1 2 7


Medical Response

of disease dissemination and surveillance system.The end result of this activity is to facilitate themore rapid and effective triage of patients basedon information obtained across distances ofmiles.


A variety of tools have been developed and testedfor measurement of blood oxygen, glucose andbody temperature. Sandia and Los AlamosNational Laboratories have developed infraredsystems for such applications (these are discussedin Chapter III (DIDA)). Thermal scans havebeen utilized by Canada, Taiwan, China andother Asian nations to detect individuals with ele-vated body temperature during the SARS out-break in March 2003, although it remains to beseen how effective they really are in screening fordisease. All the methods identified must beapplicable for screening large numbers of subjectsrapidly. This capability is limited compared togoals needed in this functional capability.

State of the Art:

The national laboratories have developed pro-grams for utilizing infrared spectral analysis todetermine changes in wellness of individuals.Sandia Laboratory and the private sector havedeveloped infrared devices to enable the measure-ment of blood glucose and cholesterol. Infraredscanning of individuals allows for rapid determi-nation of body temperature and was used on alarge scale in monitoring which airline passengersfrom Asia were possibly SARS carriers during thespring of 2003. Blood oximetry allows for thedetermination of oxygenation of the blood; this isan important parameter in triage of patients.Miniaturization of nuclear magnetic resonance(from the Applied Physics Laboratory of JohnsHopkins University) and gas chromatographydevices can now permit rapid screening of closedenvironments for signatures of chemical agentsand precursors in exhaled air volumes. Theminiature mass spectrometer device was devel-oped from funding provided by the DefenseAdvanced Research Projects Agency. The MatrixAssisted Laser Desorption Ionization (MALDI), a

type of mass spectrometer, has significant capabil-ities for identifying chemical or biological threats,but it is not available in a lightweight mobileform. Retinal scanning for diabetes is anothertechnology allowing for rapid screening of sub-jects for signs of illness.


Among the difficulties with these rapid screeningprocedures is the wide range of “normal” valuesin the total population. It would be most usefulto have a data set with internal calibrations for allpersons. Alternatively, distribution curves of“normals” in each population are required if rapidscreening is to prove useful. More ways need tobe discovered to sense that the body (humans andanimals) is giving indications of sickness. Finally,the speed with which we need to analyze the sen-sor feedback, in order to diagnose the individual,is technically challenging.

Gap Fillers:

Fundamental research is required on ways to dis-cover and detect physiological clues to illnesswithout invading the body (such as those men-tioned above). (See also the Strategic ResearchAreas in Chapter I.) The many new non-invasiveapproaches to sensing physiological phenomenashould be benchmarked and a study of possiblesynergistic combinations be performed. A libraryof blood component signatures (such as infraredspectrum) should be developed in support ofthose methods that use blood as a diagnosismedium.

MR.5 – Medical Response to Public Affairs.The ability to manage large numbers of otherwisehealthy people concerned for their well being as theresult of a CBRNE event, without taxing the med-ical resources of the community. This managementis realized through the use of public communica-tion systems including the Internet, radio, televi-sion, the press and telephone; and by coordina-tion with state Departments of Health, the officeof the governor in each affected state and theCenters for Disease Control.

1 2 8


Chapter VII

Goals:

An overall goal is providing public awareness at asufficiently high level so that the well-informedcan initiate self-help processes, thereby increasingthe efficiency of medical response personnel. Thespecific goals identified by responders are:

• Strategy for reassurance of unaffected or mini-mally affected populations.

• Remote or offsite screening system which can field calls or visits (e.g., reception centers,telephone hotlines, website) from potentialpatients who report their symptoms.

• Reduction of impact on medical resources ofthe affected area.

• Rapid screening for exposure to WMD agent(dealt with in MR.4).

• Capability effectiveness before people arrive atthe hospital.


At present, the strategy for reassuring the popula-tion is through non-governmental media outlets.These sources are often inconsistent. Tremendousstress is placed on medical personnel and hospitalfacilities as a result. Many clinical care practices(including Health Maintenance Organizations(HMOs) and Preferred Provider Organizations(PPOs) have established a filtering systembetween the patient and physician, sometimescalled an “Advice Nurse” where providers effec-tively triage their clients and give medical advicevia the telephone. For the larger HMOs this is avery sophisticated high-transaction-rate process.Some of the large telecommunication companiesare developing call center capabilities that canhandle thousands of calls an hour. This combi-nation of technology and process would be help-ful in creating this capability. A coordinatedhealth care support center, able to handle largevolumes of telephone inquiries and walk-in cases,would be necessary in the event of a biological,chemical or radiological incident.

State of the Art:

In addition to Advice Nurses and the initiativesof some of the telecommunications carriers, com-munities are deploying reverse 9-1-1 systems,where local emergency managers can get urgentinformation to their constituents via telephone.


This is another area where technology to enablethis capability already exists. Technology to sup-port this capability is already being pursued bycommercial telecommunications companies andHMOs. The barriers are primarily policy andfunding. Among the policy issues to beaddressed are mechanisms to increase the num-bers of lay persons who can provide assistance ina medical emergency. Under what circumstancemay lay persons be utilized to provide serviceswhile liability concerns are managed? HMOshave extensive experience in managing the accessto medical care providers, patients, relatives andthe worried well. An examination of which pro-cedures are most effective in increasing patientcare and reducing inefficiency may improve caredelivery in a crisis situation.

In the U.S. the mass communications commu-nity could provide real assistance to the publicand care providers. In many cases, including theWorld Trade Centers in September 2001, themedia served an important role. In other casesmedia coverage has been less than helpful, or haseven hindered crisis response. Absent any seriousplanning media support would be uneven andhaphazard at best. The federal government maywant to examine the use of media to help managea worried populace.

Gap Fillers:

There are no gap filling technology objectivesrecommended in this area.

MR.6 – Modeling of Exposure/Casualties forLocation and Numbers. The ability to provideautomated support for understanding the likelyrange of exposure and casualties in particular situa-tions, primarily the dispersal of threat agents.

1 2 9


Medical Response

Chapter VIII (PHRBAE) discusses modeling ofexposure specifically to biological agents.

The need for modeling and simulation to sup-port responding to a terrorist incident is fre-quently mentioned throughout this document.Responders want to know what they are dealingwith, and where. This section is concerned withmodeling of radiation and chemical exposure.The desire is for a system that can not onlymodel the dispersal of threat agents, but what thelikely exposure to individuals in a given locationis as the plume moves and disperses.

Goals:

The goals for this area are as follows:

• Pre-event modeling for policy and proceduredevelopment.

• Prospective, near real time dynamic modelingsystem for the entire U.S. in order to projectfuture outcomes from current emerging situa-tions (mid-event).

• Models should be able to dynamically interactwith other models, databases and sensorinputs.

• Any system output must be user friendly atleast at the responder command level.


Although models exist for the effects of agents onhuman, animal and plant populations, none ofthese are real-time models; none interact withother challenge conditions (such as weather orurban canyons) and decision making tools. Forexample, the National Oceanic and AtmosphericAdministration (NOAA) models wind move-ments at several hundred feet above ground level.Wind modeling below this level and inurban/rural canyons has not been demonstrated.The Department of Defense does possess realtime models for agent dispersal but these are pri-marily for elevated altitudes. Oklahoma City hasused weather radar data (Doppler) for plumemodeling.

Although various federal agencies have modeledaerosol dispersal under varying conditions ofwind, temperature, and surface morphologies,decision making tools based on such modernanalyses are not available to emergency respon-ders. For the most part, responders do not haveany access to such modeling tools for estimatingcasualty level and threat dispersion during anactual incident.

Providing emergency responders with real timeaccess to models and the capability to use suchmodels poses a potential security risk. Suchinformation could be exploited by terrorist if the information got to them – the majority ofemergency responders are not cleared for receiv-ing classified information. This may be a techni-cal limitation as well as a policy issue.

State of the Art:

The Department of Defense and NOAA havedeveloped very sophisticated modeling and simu-lation technology to support prediction of chemi-cal and biological agent “plumes.” Most, how-ever, do not work in real time and little has beendone to integrate the models with real-time sen-sor and weather information. Most of the tech-nologists involved in this process felt that all theelements of technology needed to accomplish thisfunctional capability are in hand and the techni-cal risk of developing the needed capability islow.


There are significant technology gaps facing theemergency responder with respect to models ofagent dispersal. These include determination ofthe dose of agent that an individual is likely toencounter if he/she is in a building (as comparedto on the street). For example, what is the effectof HVAC on agent dispersal and what are theurban canyon effects? The lack of knowledge ofmicro-weather effects on modeling of agent dis-persal is a major limitation.

The anthrax release in October 2001 revealed the differing dosage thresholds for different

1 3 0


Chapter VII

populations; in one case an elderly woman inConnecticut, who received a relatively low doseof agent (presumably much less than 8,000 pfu)died from the disease. The minimal effectivedose in the well population may be several mag-nitudes higher than that required for serious ill-ness in the immune compromised, the aged ornewborns.

The current modeling technology requires inter-pretation by specialists – in a crisis situation suchassistance will not be readily accessible. There isno clear understanding of the level of trainingrequired for an educated responder to make effec-tive use of real-time dynamic models. The use ofmodeling systems for agent dispersal and estima-tion of disease based on the demographic andmeteorological data by the responder communitymay challenge the degree of fault tolerance andsensitivity of the system. A user community lessaware of the limits of a model may initiateactions inconsistent with the goals of the design-ers of such a model.

As stated earlier, the release of dispersal modelsand associated information to emergency respon-ders does have security implications as well. Thecost associated with providing security checks onall emergency responders may prove to be animpediment to achieving this aim.

Gap Fillers:

The most effective approach may be teaming ofemergency responders with NOAA and the pri-vate sector to develop meteorological maps thatcan model aerosol dispersal. A limited number ofemergency responders may be trained andemployed as critical regional experts in interpreta-tion of model systems. These individuals may bevetted for security clearance and sustain a highlevel of readiness with appropriate compensationfor this responsibility.

MR.7 – Definitive Decontamination. The abil-ity to remove (or neutralize) all contaminants onvictims. Although definitive decontamination isdefined as the removal of all contaminants, this

should be understood as the removal of contami-nants to a level that is not anticipated to causeclinical signs of chemical, biological, radiologicaltoxicity. The major aim of this effort is the drydecontamination of large numbers of persons(hundreds of persons) exposed to threat agentswhile they are still in or adjacent to the hot zone.

Goals:

The goals identified by the responders for thisarea are:

• Capability to definitively decontaminate athousand people at a time. (Facility, personneland supplies need to be expanded to meet theneeds.)

• Tools to measure contamination in order toensure decontamination of victim.

• Capability to do definitive decontamination ofcomplex wounds in the field.

• Dry decontamination/neutralization system.

• A database of available and appropriate decon-tamination resources/processes.

The decontamination must be achieved within atime frame that assures the population does notmanifest toxicity from the dispersed agents.Deployable (handheld) sensors need to be devel-oped to measure contamination in order toensure decontamination of victim. The technol-ogy for this is being addressed in Chapter III(DIDA). The ability to quickly expand facilities,trained personnel and supplies needs to be cre-ated. The capability must permit the definitivedecontamination of complex wounds in the field.Dry decontamination/neutralization approachesshould be explored (e.g., UV light for someagents).10 The purpose of the dry decontamina-tion is to allow decontamination in very coldweather. The associated problem is that theclothes must be decontaminated, the body hairdecontaminated and that this be accomplishedprior to transport of affected individuals to a safesite. Responders need a database of available and

1 3 1


Medical Response

10 Deployable trailers with heated showers, hot air dryers, and clean clothes may serve as a non-technological alternative to dry decontamination.

appropriate decontamination resources, processesand tools to assess successful decontamination.This goal is being addressed in the Chapter V(Response and Recovery).


Several methods have demonstrated utilityincluding the application of material with highstatic electrical charge; tissue paper; and the useof diatomaceous aluminum silicates. Electrostaticprecipitation of biological agents suspended in airis one method to remove agent from an environ-ment. Such techniques do not remove agentfrom surfaces with limited air flow (e.g., nooksand crannies). Currently, removal of clothingprecedes decontamination procedures for affectedpersons. The emergency responders believe thatreluctance to disrobe in public will be a majorimpediment. The need to cleanse areas of abun-dant hair (head, armpit and groin) compoundsthe problem. Tools need to be developed to edu-cate citizens and place their concerns of modestyin the larger context of physical danger. Theresulting appreciation of the risk/benefit conse-quence of refusal of treatment may mitigate socialconcerns. Washing contaminated body areaswith water, detergent and bleach is a preferredmethod but has restricted applications in cold cli-mates. Sensors for assuring decontamination areneeded.

State of the Art:

The Oak Ridge National Laboratory has a pro-gram for decontamination called REACT/S(Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/TrainingSite). The interagency Technical SupportWorking Group (TSWG) has a current broadagency announcement requesting novel conceptsfor rapid decontamination. Several programsexist in the United States for developing deconta-mination protocols for chemical or radiologicalagent exposure: these programs include develop-ments by the Army’s ECBC (formerly SBC-COM), and Montgomery County, MD.Technology transfer from former Soviet Unioncountries and Israel is being explored to achievethese goals.


The primary difficulty is that the nooks andcrannies of the human body are very difficult toreach (e.g., arm pits, body creases, groin etc.),perhaps more so with a dry material.

Contamination of respiratory airways by biologi-cal and radiological agents fosters recurring agentdispersal during respiration. Perhaps the mostdifficult challenge is developing rapid throughputof potentially exposed persons with sufficientdecontamination to permit further movement ofthe population.

Gap Fillers:

The development of a dry decontaminationmaterial would be very helpful. This could begas not harmful to humans, or a device like a lintbrush with “sticky” surfaces for adhesion of agentparticles. Before this can be done there is a needto develop a scientific basis for evaluating effec-tiveness of decontamination materials. Thedevelopment of training programs for the publicto appreciate the need for full body washes maybe more useful in the near-term.

MR.8 – Medical Staff Surge, Re-Supply andProper Accreditation. The ability to identify andalert appropriate medical personnel from geographi-cally distant areas about a CBRNE incident, andpermit a rapid procedure for accreditation of profes-sional persons that can provide assistance from dis-tant jurisdictions.

The technologies exist for accreditation of caregivers and for establishing national databases.The distribution of individual smart cards (withdate of birth, credentials, other pertinent records,biometrics, etc.) is one technological solution(See also EMPP.2 (Mission Rehearsal, Simulation,Embedded Training and Distance Education).)The data entered on the card will be most effec-tive if standardized on a national level. Thesepoints and control of access to the data are therefore policy issues. The accountability of the agency for distribution of data is a majorproblem to be managed given recent public concern regarding large scale data assembly and acquisition.

1 3 2


Chapter VII

Goals:

• Creation of a national database of credentialedindividuals which could be accessed byauthorized personnel, sorted, and “mobilized”when needed (e.g., FEMA Disaster AssistanceEmployees (DAEs), medical reserve corps,etc.).

• Biometric identification.

• Database and web technology.

• Process: initial and ongoing maintenance.


At present, individuals who wish to provide assis-tance during a threat situation arrive at an eventwithout credentials. These persons could includeimposters or even terrorists. Certifications arenot recognized across state borders. In theMurrah Building bombing and at the WorldTrade Center, an appropriate deployment of thevolunteers could not be realized because of thelack of certification and loss of communications.Plans for the use of skilled volunteers remain tobe developed in most jurisdictions. Variousregions throughout the U.S. have DisasterMedical Assistance Teams (DMAT) that are cre-dentialed, trained, and equipped, but, there arenot enough DMAT personnel to manage a cata-strophic event that may occur during a WMDattack.

The Department of Homeland SecurityEmergency Preparedness and ResponseDirectorate is exploring credentialing. The DoDSmart Card program is also being evaluated todetermine whether it may be useful in a WMDsetting.

State of the Art:

This is another area where the technology to cre-ate the capability is available. Smart card tech-nology, along with biometrics and current Web-based information management technologies canbe brought together rather easily to create thisfunction once the policy and administrative issuesare solved. These issues are also addressed inChapter IV (UIC) and Chapter VI (EMPP).


This issue is not a technology issue but is rather apolicy issue related to standardization of data inbiometric identification, database and Webaccess. As such it requires evaluation of existingprotocols and procedures to determine the mostappropriate system for the task. The goal couldbe realized with little or no new technologicaladvances. This is primarily a policy problem.

Gap Fillers:

Since the technology for accomplishing the capability exists, no new technology efforts arerecommended.

MR.9 – Telemedicine in Support of SurgeRequirements. The ability to access geograph-ically distant medical skills in real-time via telecommunications.

It is anticipated that in responding to a CBRNEattack, there will be a need to access medicalexpertise that may be geographically distant fromthe event, either because the number of victimshave overwhelmed the local medical capacity, orbecause the unusual nature of the injuries mayrequire specialized expertise. The latter was thecase during the release of anthrax through thepostal system in October 2001.

Various scenarios have assumed that a terroriststrike with a highly contagious disease such assmallpox would lead to approximately 10,000clinical cases within seven days of exposure. Thiswould be the first wave. Subsequent waveswould then ensue. The dissemination of anagent, if perpetrated at a major port of entry (e.g.,airport) would be rapid, with multiple sitesimmediately affected. There is no currenttelemedicine capability in the U.S. or elsewherethat can support medical care delivery to 10,000patients with a highly infectious disease such assmallpox. In the event of a strike with an infec-tious and lethal – but not contagious – biologicalagent (e.g., anthrax), the care of 10,000 patientswould overwhelm the public health capability ofthe local community, but propagation of diseasewould not be a major concern.

1 3 3


Medical Response

A nationally distributed telemedicine capability,involving several thousand available physicianswith all medical specialties, could provide accessto distant care-givers. Emergency care physicianssee more than eighty patients per day in emer-gency room environments. Under conditions ofstress the processing of patients will permit fiftypatients per day per physician. Under these con-ditions 200 physicians can manage 10,000patients on a 24××7 basis. The use of simple dedi-cated telecommunications facilities, both terres-trial and satellite based, can provide a robustresponse to a mass casualty event. There will beminimal disruption of normal patient care in thesecondary support area. This also alleviates atremendous logistics burden and financial cost ofhaving to transport physicians into the area of anattack.

If this sort of telemedicine capability were estab-lished, physicians and health care providers willrequire training familiarity with visual and audi-tory telemedicine devices, or several hours train-ing, prior to a threat event.

Goals:

The goals for a telemedicine capability are:

• Haptic, auditory, and video capabilities, scala-ble for large numbers of casualties; multiplesites; flexible.

• Robust, encrypted (secure/protected) communications.

• Automated collection or compilation, mainte-nance of and access to electronic medicalrecords.

• Ability to reach patients in their homes.

• Standardized technology protocols.

• Rapid deployability.

Current Capability:

Telemedicine is in use today for medical consul-tation, but has not been widely tried in the emer-gency/crisis context. The military has experi-mented with actual tele-operated remote medical

procedures including surgery. In the civilian sec-tor, telemedicine is primarily used to providehealth care to persons in correctional institutions(costs of care and risk of escape are reduced).

Telemedicine capabilities are present in manyregions of the U.S. including: the University ofTexas Medical Branch in Galveston, the EastCarolina University, and the Maryland Instituteof Trauma Studies. These telemedicine programsare primarily terrestrial-based systems with a lim-ited number of physicians at the university site.The Department of Defense Joint MedicalOperations-Telemedicine program is a focus oftelemedicine developments for the military.

Telemedicine practitioners at the current time donot have the experience or capability to managesimultaneously a thousand injured people. Moretraining and exposure to telemedicine will berequired. In addition, it is unclear that the med-ical system in the U.S. has sufficient emergencymedical physicians to care for several thousandaffected patients. Research is required regardingmechanisms to manage a crisis with mass casual-ties on the order of tens of thousands. Researchis also required to understand the pool of skillsavailable among the national public health com-munity for such a capability.

State of the Art:

Beyond the activities described in the previoussection, the DoD has completed a TelemedicineAdvanced Concepts Technology Demonstration(ACTD) which advanced the state of the art inusing telemedicine across great distances and inusing such a system to collect data to add fidelityto the theater commanders situational awareness.The program developed and demonstrated adeployable telemedicine system that can be trans-ported to a field of operation providing medicalreach back to austere environments.


Current telemedicine systems were not designedto provide care for hundreds or thousands of per-sons. The potential throughput thereforeremains to be determined. DARPA has per-formed some impressive work in transmitting

1 3 4


Chapter VII

haptic sensation for use in telemedicine.However, the bandwidth requirements are solarge it would be impractical for application tothis capability in the near future. Providingrobust, high-data-rate communications, that willbe available even during an attack could provechallenging (see Chapter IV (UIC)).

Gap Fillers:

Research is needed into how quickly doctors anddistant caregivers can screen patients via telemed-icine; this research is needed so that any technicalrequirements can be identified that supportincreased throughput. In parallel a telemedicinetest bed should be created that can continue toexplore improvements in telemedicine to supportdisasters and mass casualty incidents. Thetelemedicine program could develop into a pro-gram for an Artificial Intelligence VirtualClinician in the far term. The system would pro-vide information to a caregiver on the ground ina remote site so that the patient’s survival andwell being is sustained. It will likely enable non-physician practitioner to screen patients.Although the subject of communications avail-ability is critical, the government and telecom-munications companies are working hard onthose issues already.

Medical Response – ResponseTechnology Objectives (MRrto)

MRrto.1 – Mass Prophylaxis Knowledge Baseand Decision Aid

Objectives:

Develop a tool for emergency responder respon-ders to use in determining the “at-risk” popula-tion in a mass chemical, biological or radiationcontamination event and developing a mass pro-phylaxis course of action. Using data providedby available sensors, micro-weather information,demographic and medical protocol information,and other information stored before the event,the tool will provide responders with the bestcourse of action to begin the vaccination of large

numbers of victims. Taking advantage of model-ing and simulation and using the informationabove, the tool will identify the geographic loca-tion of likely or possible victims and provideresponders with a recommended course of action.The tool should include a highly intuitiveGraphical User Interface (GUI) and be useableon a Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) or a laptopin a vehicle to augment the training of emergencyresponders. This effort should leverage and beintegrated with R&Rrto.1 (Contaminated VictimKnowledge Base). It may be efficient to merge thetwo efforts.

Payoffs:

This will help emergency responders effectivelyidentify and prepare to provide mass prophylaxisto victims and potential victims. It will help tosave lives and reduce the effects of a chemical orbiological attack.11

Challenges:

The development of such a tool is consideredmoderate risk. Its utility will depend on the real-time data about the event and the quality of thedemographic data that can be developed aboutthe area in question. It will also depend on theaccuracy of our projections of the lethality of bio-logical warfare (BW) agents. Recent informationon the lethality of anthrax spores indicates thatprevious projections of the lethal dose being10,000 spores may be off by several orders ofmagnitude. This may be true of other agents.Integrating meteorological information, especiallyin urban areas will be a challenge. Data on thesusceptibility to specific threat agents may also bedifficult to develop. Availability of real-time datais dependent upon the development of new andimproved sensors, which are addressed in ChapterIII (DIDA).

Milestones/Metrics:

FY2004: Begin research on the types of data thatwill be needed to be able to predict who the at-risk population is and where they are located.

1 3 5


Medical Response

11 However, high precision will not be achieved without much greater understanding of the lethality of various agents. The ultimate level of understanding is limited not only by ethical limits on testing but by the possibility that terrorists will use a novel or modified agent for which information cannot be developed in advance.

This will likely include weather, demographics,susceptibility and threat information. Surveydemographic information available in large citiesand determine if that data can be used for thissystem. Develop strategies for acquiring theneeded data. Evaluate the BW lethality informa-tion and research and assess its effect on currentmodeling.

FY2005: Continue research into the types ofdata that will be needed to accurately predict theimpact of the BW event. Develop strategies foracquiring the needed data (demographic, weather,etc.). Continue evaluating research on lethalitymodeling. If appropriate, add funding to acceler-ate that research.

FY2006: Benchmark existing or emerging sys-tems for developing course of action recommen-dations. Develop architectural design for thetool, collect and integrate existing information.Begin work in improving the modeling and sim-ulation (M&S) capability using real-time data tomake predictions. If possible, coordinate withR&Rrto.1 (Contaminated Victim Knowledge Base).

FY2007: Begin development of a prototype ofthe tool. Begin commercialization effort to aid intransition to responders. Continue to improvethe modeling capability to support the predictivegoals of the system.

FY2008: Complete development of the proto-type system and begin emergency responder testing.

FY2009-2010: Continue responder testing.Deploy systems for emergency responders whilecontinuing to integrate new products andmethodologies into the system. Complete com-mercialization effort.

MRrto.2 – Mass Prophylaxis Delivery System

Objectives:

Develop a tool that allows responders to signifi-cantly increase the throughput of individuals whoare receiving prophylactic treatment. In caseswhere there are thousands of people who need tobe vaccinated, one of the rate-limiting processesis the actual delivery of antibiotics, antivirals, antinerve agents and vaccinations. Current technol-ogy such as the jet injectors used by the militarycan not be used for some vaccines such as oneswith particulates or those that absorb alum. Theobjective of this RTO is to develop a system with the speed of jet injectors but with the flexi-bility to inject any necessary substance. Thetraining on the system must be easy and takeonly a few hours. The system must be very lowmaintenance.

Payoffs:

This will help emergency responders protectgreater numbers of people in a shorter amount oftime. It will help to save lives and reduce theeffects of a chemical or biological attack.

Challenges:

The development of such a tool is considered tohave moderate risk. Prophylaxis media varygreatly in physical characteristics and deliverymethod. Injector mechanisms that can provideany kind of prophylaxis will be a challenge. Thesystem will have to deliver a number of differentdrugs with very similar procedures to make train-ing requirements as simple as possible. The clini-cal trials for such a system will be extensive andcostly.

Milestones/Metrics:

FY2004: Begin investigating candidateprophylaxis delivery technologies andstrategies.

1 3 6


Chapter VII

Mass Prophylaxis Knowledge Base and Decision Aid

$9 $12 $18 $20 $20 $25 $104

ThrustMRrto.1 – Budget in Millions

20092004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Totals

FY2005: Award contract or grants for up to fourcompeting approaches to developing the technol-ogy. Investigate potential applicability to every-day needs.

FY2006: Continue to fund competingapproaches.

FY2007: Complete prototype development.Begin animal testing of prototype systems.Down select the best approach for clinical trials.Begin commercialization effort.

FY2008: Complete animal testing and beginFood and Drug Administration (FDA) approvalprocess. Continue commercialization effort.

FY2009-2010: Conduct human trials. Continuetesting and FDA approval process until approved.

MRrto.3 – Casualty Management System

Objectives:

Develop a tool for emergency responders to useto manage potentially tens of thousands of vic-tims from a mass casualty event. The systemsshould be able to positively track each patienteither through tagging (i.e., bar code) or throughbiometrics. The system should provide the med-ical/syndromic and treatment records as well asthe physical location of the patient. Data shouldbe able to be entered into the systems in severalways including voice recognition and wirelessPDA keyboards. The system should be inte-grated with the Incident Command System toprovide commanders with real-time picture of themedical operational situation. The system shouldbe able to be used in everyday operations andscalable to be used in mass casualty situations. Itmust integrate with legacy systems at hospital.Finally, patient privacy needs to be ensured in thedesign of the system. The work should be man-aged in tandem with that of EMPPrto.3.

Payoffs:

This will help emergency responders effectivelymanage very large numbers of victims. It willreduce mistakes in treatment, provide importantinformation for incident command and even pre-vent losing patients amidst the chaos of a cata-strophic event. It will help to save lives and allowthe medical community to treat the casualtiesmore effectively.

Challenges:

Voice recognition in noisy environments is verydifficult. This capability must be highly reliablebecause it will be the method for entering patientdata into the system, and that increases the chal-lenge. Integration with legacy systems is always atechnical challenge. Interoperability with com-

mand systems may prove difficult. Theability to support hundreds of practition-ers in the field, all at once and wirelessly,may present bandwidth problems.

Milestones/Metrics:

FY2004: Benchmark systems that track objectsthrough processes such as that used by parceldelivery services. Evaluate current patient man-agement systems especially those intended tomanage thousands of patients like the Defense ofDepartment. Evaluate the state of biometricidentification and other ways to positively iden-tify and track patients. Determine the availableenabling technologies and begin development ofa Casualty Management System Architecture.

FY2005: Continue to develop the system archi-tecture. Begin first prototype system develop-ment with available technology even if it fallsshort of goals but improves capabilities. Begincommercialization effort.

FY2006: Complete system prototype and beginfield testing the system in realistic situation wherethousands of victims must be processed. Adjustsystem design based on result of testing andreview opportunities for technology insertion toincrease capability.

1 3 7


Medical Response

Mass Prophylaxis Delivery System

$10 $30 $30 $35 $35 $50 $190


20092004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Totals

FY2007: Continue field testing. Begin develop-ment of second prototype. The second prototypeshould be able to handle ten thousand patients in24 hours. Complete commercialization efforts.Transition initial capability for use by responders.

FY2008: Complete development of second pro-totype. Field test second prototype. Transitionimproved capability to responders through com-mercialization efforts.

MRrto.4 – Telemedicine Testbed

Objectives:

There are three objectives in this RTO. First,establish a telemedicine testbed where research onnew concepts of operation and new enablingtechnology can be explored to support disastersand mass casualty incidents. Second, conductresearch on how quickly doctors can screenpatients via telemedicine. Third, develop an arti-ficial intelligence virtual clinician, with the abilityto provide medical advice to a distant practitionerwithout a physician being directly involved.

Payoffs:

This will help responders screen and treat morevictims in a shorter period of time. It will allowreach back to specialists who may not be in thearea of the incident. It could provide accessto doctors or credible medical advice to anincident anywhere in the country. This couldalso provide an important capability to healthcare in remote areas on a daily basis.

Challenges:

The biggest challenges will be creating thetelecommunications and information technologycapacity necessary to bring access to hundreds ofdoctors to an incident, training enough cliniciansto test the system, and of course the long-termresearch into building a virtual clinician.

Milestones/Metrics:

FY2004: Begin development of a telemedicinearchitecture for the testbed. Issue a broad areaannouncement for a health care and researchorganization to host the testbed and beginresearch on how quickly physicians can screenpatients using telemedicine.

FY2005: Continue research on how quicklypatients can be screened and begin work onbringing large numbers of physicians on lineto respond to a mass casualty incident. Beginwork on a virtual clinician capability.

FY2006: Continue optimizing the telemedi-cine capability. Test the system in mock disasterexercises. The goal is to screen at this point is toscreen at least 5,000 patients in 24 hours.Continue work on virtual clinician.

FY2007: Begin investigating strategies fordeploying a robust telemedicine capability around the country. Investigate how to host the disaster telemedicine system on existing oreasily modified infrastructure. Continue testingand exercising the telemedicine system.Continue add capability and use the systemincluding virtual clinician capability, if available.

FY2008: Continue to test new capability andrespond to disasters. The goal at this point is to screen at least 10,000 patients in 24 hours.Integrate new virtual clinician capability. Deploysystems in other cities as funding allows.

MRrto.5 – Novel Decontamination – Research

Objectives:

This will help responders effectively decontami-nate large number of victims in the event of achemical or biological attack, especially in coldweather. It should significantly increase thethroughput of people being decontaminated and

1 3 8


Chapter VII

Telemedicine Test Bed

$5 $10 $12 $15 $10 $52


2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Totals

Casualty Management System

$2 $3 $4 $7 $6 $22


2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Totals

will probably save lives. This is fundamentalresearch, which should focus on use of gaseousmaterial (benign to humans but not to threatagents), ultraviolet light and other energy sources,and powders and kinetic methods.

Payoffs:

Responders would prefer a capability to decon-taminate people without liquid or soaking decon-tamination materials. The decontaminationmethod should be able to quickly reduce thethreat to levels that do not cause toxicity, in allweather conditions, without the victim having toremove all their clothes. There are currently noknown dry materials that can decontaminate arange of agents but are also benign to humans.

Challenges:

There are currently no known dry or gaseousmaterials that can decontaminate a range ofagents that are also benign to humans.

Milestones/Metrics:

FY2004: Begin research into various materialsand strategies for dry decontamination of people.Issue a BAA seeking new ideas to accomplish thegoals set forth above; award several significantgrants to research activities to fund severalapproaches. This is fundamental work and willneed to be continued until breakthroughs occuror the science community runs out of credibleideas to pursue.

FY2005-2008: Continue fundamental researchinto various approaches for dry decontamination.By 2006 or 2007 it may be possible to beginsome applied research.

1 3 9


Medical Response

Novel Decontamination

$2 $4 $6 $6 $6 $24


2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Totals

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

• Determine “At Risk” Population

• Recommend Course of Action

• Real-Time

• Manage >10K Patients• Wireless Connect to IC• Uses Biometrics

• High-Speed• Low Maintenance• Multi-Drug Capable

• Up to 10K Patients in 24 Hours

• Access to >100 Physicians

• Expert System Support to Field Practitioners

• Dry Decontamination Materials

• New Delivery Methods

Virtual Clinician

MRrto.1 – Mass Prophylaxis KB and Decision Aid

MRrto.2 – Mass Prophylaxis Delivery System

MRrto.3 – Casualty Management System

MRrto.5 – Novel Decontamination

MRrto.4 – Telemedicine Test Bed

Patient Screening Research

Medical Response Technology Roadmap

1 4 0


Chapter VII

Definition

Public Health Readiness for Biological AgentEvents (PHRBAE) is the capability for publichealth infrastructure and health care delivery sys-tems to be prepared for and respond to an eventinvolving biological agents.

Biological agents include bacteria, viruses, fungiand biological toxins. While biological toxins areessentially poisons of biological origin, the firstthree are infectious, meaning that because theycan multiply in the human body, a very smallamount of agent can cause illness. The most seri-ous biological attacks may involve a subset of theinfectious agents that are especially contagious –disease is easily communicated from person toperson, raising the possibility of epidemic or evenpandemic spread. As the recent SARS epidemicdemonstrated, the medical system channels sickpeople into the care of health professionals,meaning that an especially virulent disease organ-ism will be automatically vectored against thoseassets that are needed to contain and treat theoutbreak.

This NTRO is not a complete recipe for readi-ness to deal with a biological attack. First, theoverall scope of Project Responder has excludedinnovations in medical treatment such asimproved vaccines, antibacterials, and antivirals.Second, many key elements of preparedness, suchas networked sensor systems for detection of anurban airborne biological agent release, areincluded in other NTROs where they have com-monalities with preparedness for chemical, radio-logical, nuclear, or explosive and incendiaryattacks.


This NTRO is only concerned with biologicalagents, so the other (CRNE) attack modes arenot relevant. Within biological agent incidents,it is possible to distinguish among different sortsof attack. There are three major categories ofbiological threat agents: highly infectious/conta-gious organisms that will replicate in a human oranimal host and generate new infectious bacteriaor viruses (e.g., smallpox, ebola); live organismsthat will cause disease in a host following expo-sure of the host but that are not readily transmit-ted from one person to another (e.g., anthrax);and biological materials that can cause severeclinical distress or death in a human or animalbut do not have the ability to replicate (toxins).Although materials from all three categories cancause illness, the virulence of the first one and thepossibility of pandemic makes it of special con-cern. The distinct modes of exposure and courseof illness characteristic of different agents meansthat the type of agent is indeed an important fac-tor in determining the appropriate response.However, using the type of agent to distinguishamong operational environments makes only lim-ited sense because often the type of agentinvolved is something that only becomes clearover the course of an incident.

Instead, progression of exposure and disease pro-vides the defining characteristic for the opera-tional environments. A successful biologicalattack is likely to be mounted covertly, with thedispersal of agent going unnoticed. Withoutwidespread deployment of advanced technologysensors (see Chapter III (DIDA)), sick patients

1 4 1


Chapter VIII

Public Health Readiness for BiologicalAgent Events (PHRBAE)Chapter Chair: Dr. Stephen KornguthChapter Coordinator: Michelle Royal

appearing in doctors’ offices and emergencyrooms will likely be the first indication that any-thing is awry. Thus the first and primary respon-ders in this event may be health professionalsrather than the public safety officers who are typ-ically the responders in the other NTROs. Thereare major differences between technologies thatare important before symptoms are widespread,and technologies that are useful after mass illnesshas occurred. In the case of contagious disease,exposed victims may present a continued threatto others, extending the attack in time and geog-raphy. Therefore, the operational environmentsassociated with the PHRBAE NTRO are: Pre-Event, Immediate Post-Dispersal, Initial Post-Symptomatic, Mass Illness, and Recovery.

The use of biological agents by hostile nations orterrorist groups differs from other WMD threats.This is because the clinical signs resulting fromexposure to biological agents may take 48 ormore hours to emerge and because the replicatingnature of all the biological agents (except toxins)causes a persistent clinical threat well after thefirst episode has completed its course. While nota focus of the NTRO, it is also worth noting thatthe improved capabilities it would afford wouldalso be relevant to naturally occurring emergentdiseases. With the exception of the anthraxrelease through the mail in October andNovember 2001 and the Salmonella poisoningevent of a decade ago in Oregon, all disease out-breaks in the continental United States were nat-urally emergent diseases. This is generally trueon a global scale. Therefore steps taken to ame-liorate the clinical impact of biological agentattack will generally improve the health of allU.S. citizens and residents and have beneficialconsequences for medical care world-wide.


In order of declining priority, the needed capabil-ities for PHRBAE are:

• Surveillance & Information IntegrationSystems

• Rapid, High-Throughput Clinical Assessmentand Testing

• Modeling of Exposure and Containment

• Isolation and Quarantine

• Affordable Specimen Transport for CW/BWAgents

• Transport of Contagious Patients

• Safe Handling of Medical Waste

The functional capabilities are presented in prior-ity order based on responders’ input in work-shops and field interviews conducted during theearlier phases of this effort and subsequentlymodified or validated in both responder andtechnical workshops in this phase.

Surveillance and Information Integration Systems(PHRBAE.1) was universally assessed to be ahigh priority and this was also ranked as the mostimportant functional capability to fulfill. Rapid,High-Throughput Clinical Assessment and Testing,(PHRBAE.2) and Modeling Exposure/Containment(PHRBAE.3) also received a large number ofhigh-priority votes from the responders. Isolationand Quarantine (PHRBAE.4) received a widerange of rankings, from high- to low-priority.The functional capabilities of Affordable SpecimenTransport (PHRBAE.5), Transport of ContagiousPatients (PHRBAE.6), and Safe Handling ofMedical Waste (PHRBAE.7) received only mid-and low-level priority rankings.

Overall State of Technology for PublicHealth Readiness for Biological AgentEvents

The matrix on the next page shows a wide varietyin the readiness of technology to meet the needsof responding to biological agent event.

Several of these capabilities require new techno-logical developments (e.g., the identification ofbiomarkers for human exposure to biologicalthreat agents) while others require acquisition ofcostly equipment (e.g., transport of infectedpatients) or a thoughtful restructuring of current

1 4 2


Chapter VIII

administrative policy (e.g., development of com-mand and control infrastructure and proceduresfor quarantine). In other important areas, suchas surveillance, the needed technology is well inhand and merely needs to be applied in a stan-dardized framework.

PHRBAE.1 – Surveillance and InformationIntegration Systems. The capability to do routinenear-real-time processing of epidemiological andveterinary data to provide early detection, identifi-cation, assessment, and tracking of exposure to bio-logical agents.

Since early appropriate prophylaxis and treatmentcan often dramatically improve health outcomes,early alerting of an attack is crucial. In theabsence of physical discovery of the attack itself,the first indication of an attack will be sickenedpeople and animals. Data sources for alertinginformation may include hospitals, emergencyrooms, ambulance and other EMS services, clin-ics, doctors offices, schools, pharmacies, veteri-narians, coroners, laboratories, nursing homes,major employers (including military installa-tions), prisons, and points of entry into the conti-nental U.S. (CONUS) for humans and livestock.

The surveillance systemshould include bothautomated reporting ofdata for routine analysisand collation of reportsby health professionals of unusual cases andpatterns.

Early detection hasthree components: datainput, data analysis, anddisplay of information.The data input includesarchival data sets, cur-rent and emergent dis-ease-related data sets,and reports from pri-mary emergency med-ical care. Effectiveresponse decision-mak-ing requires (1) access inreal-time to the full

spectrum of health related data (archival data setswith seasonal patterns of disease incidence andprescription and over-the-counter pharmaceuticaldemand, current status-of-patient reports)throughout a network; (2) the ability to evaluateand disseminate specific actions and resourceallocation requirements (including focused epi-demiological and clinical investigation) followingintegration of the information; and (3) capabilityto transfer data electronically to alternative deci-sion makers when situations such as task overloadoccurs.

Archival data sets for occurrence of disease in theU.S., during the past three years are availablethrough most of the state departments of health.Diseases and symptoms requiring public healthreporting can be tracked through the Center forDisease Control (CDC). The incidence of ill-nesses not subject to reporting requirements ismore difficult to characterize. Today, statistics onemergency room visits across many hospitalscould provide an understanding of disease emer-gence but only with a significant delay after thedisease presents clinically. Physicians use codesfrom the International Classification of Diseases,

1 4 3


Public Health Readiness for Biological Agent Events (PHRBAE)

12

3





Public Health Readiness for Biological Agent Events

1. Surveillance and Information Integration Systems

2. Rapid, High-Throughput Clinical Assessment and Testing

3. Modeling Exposure/ Containment

4. Isolation/Quarantine

5. Affordable Specimen Transport of Cw/BW Agents

6. Transport of Contagious Patients

7. Safe Handling of Medical Waste


Functional CapabilitiesMassIllness

Initial Post-Symptomatic

ImmediatePost-EventPre-Event Recovery

ninth edition (ICD-9) to define the illnesses (andcause of death) of patients; assignment andreporting of the ICD-9 codes now lags presenta-tion of clinical signs by 24-48 hours or more—somewhat late for dealing with the initial cases offast-onset infections. Moreover, novel or rare dis-eases are likely to be mischaracterized at the start,further delaying clear reporting.

The initial recognition and description of anemergent illness greatly eases the identification of subsequent cases of illness (e.g., anthrax inOctober 2001, SARS and monkeypox). Once an illness is identified and either its signs andsymptoms codified or a clinical test developed, it can be readily tracked. However the concur-rent emergence of two or more biological diseasesor a similar disease with two or more sources ofagent greatly increases difficulty in diagnosis andtracking, and this possibility must be taken into account in preparedness and technologydevelopment.

Prior to diagnosis and the assignment of an ICD-9 code, illness may be classified by present-ing signs (syndromic characterization) and mostemergency room admissions nurses – and,increasingly ambulance and other emergencymedical service (EMS) personnel—do categorizethe patient in this way.

A large number of patients in a reporting uni-verse may be needed to detect initial disease out-break merely on the basis of statistics; a small butgeographically dispersed initial outbreak (such asmight result from exposure in a hub airport oreven a metropolitan train station) would be espe-cially difficult to identify unless travel informa-tion were routinely included in reporting.

Goals:

A primary goal is the near-real-time capture (ide-ally within six hours of early clinical signs) ofindicators that a disease with high threat poten-tial is emerging in a community. To enable cap-ture of such data, an automated data collectionand retrieval system is necessary and the report-ing of this data should be mandated on anational level with associated funding to support

this activity. The acquired data must be compli-ant with health privacy regulations (HIPAA) andtransmitted to the appropriate users with securecommunication systems.

This will by necessity be an evolutionary systembecause few of our medical facilities utilize realtime electronic admission protocols or systems;therefore the adopted process should integrate (tothe greatest extent possible) the output of legacysystems while encouraging hospitals, clinics, andother reporting entities to move toward systemsthat immediately capture interactions in digitalform.

The acquired information at the local level mustbe integrated with regional and national databecause of the highly mobile culture in which welive.

The presentation of the data should include bothgeographic and time dimensions. It should beiconographic and scalable to permit comprehen-sion by the user community that an event is inprogress. The software must also provide multi-ple views to allow analysis of the data; for exam-ple the geographic and temporal data should beable to be overlaid with actual weather and winddata, local and regional transportation systems,and commuting and other movement patterns.The system should automatically provide all theinformation and contacts needed for moredetailed epidemiological investigation (identifica-tion of index cases, etc.). The system must beuser-friendly to public health experts and epi-demiologists. The tactical decision making understress (TADMUS) program developed by thethree military departments can serve as a modelfor this activity.

In addition to these advanced data displays, thesystems should include validated, highly credible,probabilistic models for analysis of the data. Thiswould permit detection and assessment of devia-tion from baseline rates based on archival data asadjusted for seasonal, weekly, and other variationand demographic change.

Advances in rapid clinical assessment and testing,including the sensing of specific biomarkers of

1 4 4


Chapter VIII

infection as described in PHRBAE.2 (Rapid,High-Throughput Clinical Assessment and Testing),would be highly complementary with the surveil-lance system. The surveillance system indicatingunusual numbers of cases could prompt the useof tests that might not otherwise be ordered, andaffordable and rapid clinical screening wouldincrease the specificity and accuracy of initialdiagnosis and thus increase the power of the sur-veillance system. Even rapid tests that are notcapable of identifying biological warfare agentsbut that commonly result in earlier diagnoses thatexclude biological warfare agents as the causewould improve the power and speed of the sur-veillance system by reducing the backgroundnoise against which a biological agent eventwould need to be detected.

Similarly, the widespread deployment of net-worked environmental sensors capable of detect-ing airborne biological agent (DIDA.5 (DetectorArrays and Networks)) and improved surveillanceof the food chain for foodborne pathogens(MRPA.1 (Rapid Diagnostics and Detection toConfirm the Introduction of CBR Agents toAnimals, Plants, and Food/Feed)) would also behighly complementary with the epidemiologicalsurveillance capability. The surveillance informa-tion display should also easily interoperate withprograms for collecting weather information(DIDA.7 (Collection and Dissemination ofWeather and Environmental Conditions)) model-ing agent dispersal (DIDA.6 (CBRNE EffectsModeling and Simulation)), exposure (MR.6(Modeling of Exposure/Casualties for Locations andNumbers)), and onward contagion (PHRBAE.3(Modeling of Exposure and Containment)).Finally, the EMS and healthcare aspects shouldbe integrated with the health resource optimiza-tion and casualty management data systems inother NTROs (MR.2 (Mass Casualty MedicalCare Management)) and EMPP.4 (Alternate/Mobile Hospital Contingencies)).

Because the likelihood of a WMD event is low,even as the consequences can be catastrophic,training of response officials in the use of the sys-tem should require less than four hours. Thedeveloped system should include automated deci-sion support tools; analysis tools and the output

must be a simple product-with no requirementfor local technical support.


Many metropolitan public safety agencies haveestablished multi-source reporting systems butwithout the scope, reporting rapidity and fre-quency, regional and national integration, detailor analytic power envisioned under this func-tional capability. Summary information on 9-1-1and EMS calls are already generally available topublic health departments but not always withthe timeliness, analysis, and level of detail thatwould make them fully useful. They are not typ-ically summarized in a standard manner, and areoften not collated across jurisdictional lines.

New York City has a syndromic surveillance sys-tem in place that is widely regarded as one of thebest. Many modern hospitals have adopted elec-tronic data entry of syndromic signs because thisfacilitates billing procedures and cost recovery;several systems have been prepared by the privatesector (e.g., Cerner and Eclipsys) for this purpose.Such data can be made available for surveillancein real time. Privacy rights of the patient are aprimary concern, but all personal identifiers inthe data may be removed prior to screening bypublic health and emergency response officials.Reportable data (i.e., data on illness required tobe reported to public health authorities) is exam-ined for significant increases (compared to nor-mal expectations based on seasonal and weeklypatterns, and local weather and other sources ofvariation) in illness having particular clinicalmanifestations (e.g., rash, bleeding from orifices)as well as less specific indications (respiratory dis-tress, fever).

Several nationally funded programs have exploredmethods to identify emergent disease from hospi-tal admissions and have met with limited opera-tional success. One major difficulty is that health care providers have limited time for pro-cessing the additional paperwork that most ofthese systems require today. Clinics, free stand-ing urgent care facilities, and doctors’ offices maybe even richer sources of early indications of anoutbreak, but these are even more decentralizedthan hospitals, and so a major effort would be

1 4 5



needed to attain adequate participation. Thedata to be captured must benefit the hospitaladministration, physician or allied health personin a cost-effective manner. While the primarydriver of the electronic data entry system may beearly recovery of payment from third party agen-cies such as Blue Cross/Blue Shield, advocates offully digital case management (including links tothe pharmacy and automated filling of prescrip-tions and tracking of clinical tests and theirresults) suggest that it can reduce medical andpharmacy errors and cut costs as well.

An additional parameter that has been consideredfor early indication of emergent disease is pur-chase of over-the-counter pharmaceuticals orhealth care items (e.g., analgesics, antipyretics, tis-sues for the nose). Many of these items are effec-tively stockpiled in the home and purchased aspart of periodic shopping trips (e.g., on week-ends, coincident with grocery sales); thereforethese data may not provide sensitive early indica-tion of emergent disease. Proprietary issuesinclude the reluctance of stores to reveal informa-tion that would compromise a competitive edge.Private hospitals are also reluctant to providedaily occupancy information to competitorsbecause of the proprietary nature of the informa-tion. Trust building is thus a major concern.

Once archival data sets have been established andreal time syndromic data are obtained andprocessed, a variety of statistical techniques canbe used to assess the significance of apparentdeviations from the baseline. Appropriate soft-ware, together with expert judgment, could sug-gest a full-blown alert or a call for more detailedclinical and epidemiological investigation.

In the current environment, near-real time, fine-grained electronic surveillance in medical facilitiesis not available, although some communities havedeveloped data reporting and alerting proceduresbased on grosser indications. Few localities haveautomated download capabilities to public healthservers. At present, approximately 15% of emer-gency room facilities capture data digitally and socould be used to track emergent disease.

Archival data sets currently exist for disease inci-dence in most states in the U.S. and for much ofthe developed world. Data relevant to emergentdiseases may also be obtained from the Worldand Pan-American Health Organizations andother relevant international agencies. However,what one really wants for a baseline is data col-lected in the same way and format as the databeing collected on a current basis. Thus a syn-dromic surveillance system will only be maxi-mally effective once it is in place long enough fora baseline of syndromic data (and not just fin-ished diagnoses at a later stage of disease) to beable for comparison. The increased geographicaldistribution of West Nile Virus during the pastthree years has increased vigilance and monitor-ing of diseases in birds. The West Nile Virusoutbreak was first recognized because of the largenumber of deaths of birds in the New York area(and particularly at the Bronx Zoo). As a resultof the lessons-learned analyses from that event,state health laboratories, regional zoological soci-eties and federal laboratories have developedcommunications linkages and network programsand have resurrected decades-old efforts to main-tain and watch chickens as disease sentinels forbird-borne illness.

State of the Art:

The information processing technologies requiredare not different in kind from those in use bylarge commercial enterprises (for example, Wal-Mart) to track, analyze, predict, and respond tovarious components of consumer demand on anear-real-time basis. Nearly every capabilityimagined has been demonstrated in one researchproject or another. However the heterogeneity ofdata sources, the multiplicity of regional users,the concern for privacy, and the need for earlyresponse to and focus on small signals in the dataimposes additional challenges. Thus the requiredtechnology integration will not be entirelystraightforward.

Project Responder has identified at least ninelocal, regional, and national efforts to standardizedata formats and provide timely information.Many of these are Web-based and provide hospi-tal, EMS, and/or pharmacy status to users and

1 4 6


Chapter VIII

can issue a web alert and/or alert emergencyroom doctors and public health specialists viapagers. Some provide both spatial and temporaldisplays of the surveillance data and statisticalanalysis of the data compared to expectations.

The National Electronic Disease SurveillanceSystem (NEDSS) is an initiative of the Centersfor Disease Control that promotes the use of dataand information system standards to advance thedevelopment of efficient, integrated, and interop-erable surveillance systems at federal, state andlocal levels. CDC’s Health Alert Network(HAN) is developing Internet connectivity atstate and local health departments; this mecha-nism could be used for exchanging informationand for distributing alerts based on surveillance.

ESSENCE II (Electronic Surveillance System forthe Early Notification of Community BasedEpidemics) is an operational prototype testbedfor the National Capital Region being used totest concepts and technologies that are notmature enough to be fielded by local healthdepartments. Sponsored by DoD, ESSENCE IIis integrating military and civilian health indica-tor data, evaluating non-traditional data sources,and developing new analytical techniques toidentify abnormal health conditions.

Commercial systems enable capture of syndromicdata or confirmed diagnoses in health care facili-ties. Although there is currently no standardiza-tion of approaches across these multiple systems,the CDC is developing standards for syndromicsurveillance. Large national programs are devel-oping technology to identify biological agents inlivestock, to encourage the use of sentinel chick-ens and establishment of joint efforts betweenzoos and state departments of health (seeMRPA.2 (Coordination of Animal and PlantEntities with Public Health, Law Enforcement, andState, Local, and Federal Government andIndustry)). DARPA has funded the Bio-eventAdvanced Leading Indicator Recognition(BioALIRT) project for advanced surveillancetechniques and the ENCOMPASS Project todemonstrate techniques for effective allocation ofresources when a crisis situation has emerged.

In 2003 the real time acquisition and transmittalof electronic data from large hospitals and otherhealth system participants is technically feasible.There is a need to identify baseline standards formachine data analysis and presentation in aniconographic format that is comprehensible. Theintegration of different agencies, communitiesand disciplines (to include veterinary) into thesurveillance effort is technically feasible. Theoverlay with transportation lines, water systems,commuting patterns, weather data, and the like isnot technically difficult but it may be costly. Theautomated alerting function, even once madereliable, should still be backstopped by the flexi-ble display of all the data and the ability forexperts to manipulate the data for appropriatedisplay. (This is needed for detailed investigationin any event.)


As implied in the previous discussion, the majorbarriers are institutional rather than technologi-cal, although integration of disparate softwaresystems can pose thorny problems. Privacy issuesare of some concern as well, although there isclear precedent for reporting based on publichealth needs.

Business incentives lead to reluctance on the partof pharmacies and health providers to participateprior to the confirmed outbreak of a disease.There is a need for trusted agents who will inter-face between public health and emergencyresponse agencies, pharmacies and medical cen-ters as an integrated system is being created.Some technology is required to allow for auto-mated data input, regional monitoring of dataand the reduction of background noise until alarge enough data set is established.

Because there are thousands of emergency roomsand many more doctors’ offices, data acquisitionwill be costly and cumbersome unless it is builtinto the medical reimbursement system.Detailed information of causes of death is notreported on a timely basis in many medical exam-iners’ offices because of cost and low numbers ofautopsies. There is a requirement for research todetermine what types of information should be

1 4 7



collected (and to what level of detail) and thecost effectiveness of such information.

Gap Fillers:

Perhaps the most immediately available and mostsensitive early indicator of severe acute illness is9-1-1 call and EMS treatment records. These arelargely accessible to public safety departmentsnow, and efforts at standardization of data areunderway. This is probably the “lowest hangingfruit” for immediate improvement in capability.Multiple projects are already under way to collectsuch data. What is needed is a forum for demon-stration of what is being done and harmonizationof the different approaches and a path toward fullinteroperability in the future.

For many threat agents, the onset of severe illnessis too late. Picking up indications of less severeinitial symptoms is a harder problem – clusters ofwork absences may be the earliest indicator anddetailed reporting from doctors’ offices and clin-ics may be the best indicator. Despite the diffi-culties, several of the regional demonstrationshave shown promise in improving the earlyrecognition of disease outbreaks. Furtherresearch and analysis is needed to understand therelative cost and value of including varioussources of information in the surveillance system.Such understanding is needed to guide the evolu-tion of the overall surveillance system. A key factor in such value-of-information approaches is the cascade of actions that follows from a warning being delivered. Such actions includefurther investigation of the possibly identifiedoutbreak as well as moves toward containmentand treatment.

For the overall surveillance system to be maxi-mally effective, interoperability of data sets anddata standardization is needed to facilitate robustdata mining. Data mining and statistical com-parison of actual data with expected rates (basedon history, seasonal and weekly patterns, etc.) isthe key to early detection of disease outbreak.Thus an important initiative will be harmoniza-tion of data standards.

In all of these examples many existing programsare pointed in the right direction. Systems

integration is the biggest technical challenge, withthe technical challenge itself being dwarfed by thedifficulties in getting private sector organizationsto cooperate and the need to assure that privacyrequirements are adhered to.

PHRBAE.2 – Rapid High-Throughput ClinicalAssessment and Testing. The capability to dorapid testing of clinical specimens to determine thenature of an infectious agent so that specific treat-ment can begin before the appearance of symptoms.

Rapid clinical assessment and testing is importantbecause of the dramatically improved health out-comes that can result from early treatment andisolation of affected individuals. The capability isapplicable to biological agent events in threemain contexts: screening of large numbers of pos-sibly exposed individuals who have been in thevicinity of a suspected biological agent release tosee if they are likely to become ill; containing thespread of an epidemic by determining if individu-als are infected and contagious, ideally recogniz-ing initial human spreaders of disease and cer-tainly rendering isolation and quarantine moreefficient; and identifying the pathogen in apatient so that specific treatment can begin assoon as possible and ideally before appearance ofsevere symptoms.

The three contexts impose somewhat differentrequirements but some common technologies areuseful across more than one. Some tests maylook directly for the offending organisms; otherslook for an early systemic response (for example,stress factor or antibody production). Differenttypes of agents and agent-induced illness will bemore or less susceptible to detection and identifi-cation by these different methods, and this sus-ceptibility will typically be different at differentpoints over the course of an illness induced bybiological agent. Shortly after initial exposure, anagent may be detectable in the mucosa or on theskin, but very sensitive detection would berequired for this type of detection to succeedagainst organisms that can cause infection even invery small numbers. Some time after that, butstill before the onset of clinical symptoms, it maybe possible to detect systemic responses. Duringthis phase it may be still be hard to detect the

1 4 8


Chapter VIII

infectious organism itself in the body. The sys-temic response may be detectable long after theillness has past and the patient is no longer con-tagious, producing a false positive if the test isintended to be used for an index of potentialmorbidity and contagion.

For these reasons, as well as the wide variation inhealthy physiology, there is unlikely to be one testor set of tests that can be used in all contexts forall suspected pathogens. In many cases the bestsolution is a fairly imprecise screening test fol-lowed by a more exact (and probably less rapid)test where the screening test raises concern.

As noted previously, routine use of such testing inemergency rooms, urgent care clinics, and doc-tors’ offices would significantly improve thepower of the surveillance system discussed inPHRBAE.1 (Surveillance and InformationIntegration Systems). If, as is likely, the capabilityalso identifies normal disease agents more rapidlythan current medical practice, then its adoptionin routine medical care would also produce ageneral improvement in health. (Health wouldbe further protected through a dramatic reduc-tion in the inappropriate use of antibiotics, lead-ing to reduced proliferation of resistant bacteria.)

Goals:

A primary goal is the rapid detection and identi-fication of multiple threat agents in biologicalsamples from human and animal sources.Responders would like a system that rapidly andaccurately assesses a patient for all possible ill-nesses without invasive sample taking, at lowcost, and ideally without any previous informa-tion on the nature of exposure. Traditionally,most medical tests are deployed to screen for par-ticular conditions or to rule out particular diag-noses rather than to determine health and expo-sure status to all harmful organisms, so this goalamounts to a revolution in screening and diag-nostic practice. Such testing would be maximallyeffective in initial detection of an attack on thegeneral population if it were incorporated ineveryday medical practice in doctors’ offices and clinics, as well as emergency rooms and hos-pitals. This would be likely to occur because a

technology capable of performing the desireddetection and characterization of infection withthreat agents would likely also be able to diagnosenaturally-occurring infections.

In each of these settings identified above, a keygoal would be for the test to be rapid enough toallow a single encounter with the individualbeing tested so the sample or signature can beacquired, the test run, and the results made avail-able before the individual leaves the controlledsetting of the test venue. Otherwise the individu-als must be called back with results and there isan inevitable leakage of patients from the systemand a lag before treatment or other appropriateintervention can be started. If a single encounteris not practical, then an important element of theoverall system would be record keeping and pos-sibly biometric identification to ensure that indi-viduals can be contacted and that identity infor-mation is maintained through the process.

Responders indicated that ideally the samplingsystem should be field deployable, non-invasiveand be completed in less than a minute. Themost probable system concepts would involvemulti-level screening. The first level would indi-cate presence or absence of threat agent while the second would verify the initial positive read-ing and identify the agent. Clearly a very lowrate of false negatives is essential in the first levelof screening. Training for responder use of thescreening system should require less than 1 hour and therefore the methodology must be transparent.

In our workshops, responders imagined a releaseof biological agent in a stadium; they would liketo be able to screen all attendees on the wayout—requiring total processing times per personof a minute or so at most. The most preferredsituation would have infected individuals readilyidentified by some spectral image within sixtyseconds from a distance of greater than ten feet,or by breathing into an advanced breathalyzer.This is not achievable currently. An intermediatesolution would utilize sweat and nasal swabs, orsmall samples of blood (<10 microliters) takenfor example by a capillary prick. The time

1 4 9



required for obtaining these samples wouldapproximate thirty seconds leaving a minute atmost for processing to meet the responders’ idealthroughput requirement. In this case a screeningtest for exposure could be supplemented by amore detailed test to identify the agent.Obviously in this scenario the supplementary testto characterize the agent need only be given to asmall subset of exposed individuals—to identifythe agent and to ensure that only one agent hadbeen dispersed.

However, for ill patients in an emergency roomor hospital, even tests that took an hour or morewould be substantial improvements over standarddifferential diagnosis techniques and would meetthe single encounter standard.


Current capabilities are limited to traditionalmedical diagnosis tools in the hands of trainedmedical personnel.

State of the Art:

Current technologies permit thermal imaging ofindividuals to determine if they are febrile; thistechnique has been employed during the SARSepidemic to screen persons traveling from the hotzone (China, Hong Kong, Taiwan) to the U.S.However there is no experimental data assuringthe value of this approach.

In hospital environments, it is now possible toidentify many threat agents using genomic(DNA/RNA) or proteomic (antibody) basedtests. Some genomic systems are deployable andweigh less than forty pounds (e.g., Cepheid).These systems allow detection of a limited num-ber of threat agents or sequences, but systemsthat allow greater parallelism are emerging from the laboratory (Nanogen, Sequenom,Applied Biosystems). The proteomic systems can be adapted to paper strips similar to that forblood glucose monitoring by diabetic, or adaptedfor smaller sample sizes through automated fluo-rescent readout (Rules-Based Medicine). The

proteomic systems are subject to cross-reactionsand therefore have a significant false positive rate.

Transdermal IR spectroscopy can reveal the pres-ence of low molecular weight metabolites inblood and this may provide indication of chemi-cal (e.g., nerve agents) or biological agents (tox-ins) that markedly reduce blood glucose, oxygenor other vital materials. This technology comple-ments iontophoresis (electrically-driven transportof small molecules through the skin) that is usedcommercially in the GlucoWatch, a wrist devicediabetics can wear, to monitor their blood glu-cose profiles.12

The recently completed human genome projecthas permitted researchers to identify early bio-markers of human response to threat agents.This technology, funded in large part by theDepartment of Health and Human Services(HHS) will allow rapid growth in this generalarena.

Novel research tools, based on human genomeexpression, are correlating the appearance ofinducible protein with various disease states.Research to this point suggests that such hostresponse biomarkers may permit clinical investi-gators to determine whether an individual hasbeen exposed to a pathogenic agent. Suchchanges may appear within 4-10 hours followingexposure. Various corporate entities have devel-oped platforms for rapid screening of inducibleproteins that may have utility as biomarkers ofexposure and disease (e.g., Affymetrix, Roche,Chiron, Rules-Based Medicine, Biosite). Even ifthe biomarkers can only differentiate bacterialfrom viral agent exposure, treatment and prophy-laxis may be initiated while the individuals arepre-symptomatic. It would be useful to developsoftware that correlates syndromic surveillanceand biomarker expression patterns.


There is no current technology available for thenon-invasive rapid characterization of biological

1 5 0


Chapter VIII

12 However the GlucoWatch is marketed only as a supplement and not a replacement for regular blood glucose metering. It must be calibrated eachtime it is worn and it is far from instantaneous—it takes 2 hours to “warm up” and then produces readings that are time-averaged over twentyminutes. So a capillary prick is much faster and more accurate.

agents in the body including viruses, bacteria,fungi and toxins. Characterizing biologicalagents in clinical samples is also problematic.Point detectors are currently available but requiresignificant time and their ability to detect smallamounts of agent in biological samples such asmucous is not clear. Genomic analyses require asample preparation of approximately ten minutesto release the DNA or RNA. Subsequent pro-cessing is also on the order of ten or more min-utes. Genomic analyses, if done with sufficientwell-identified and appropriate probes will bevery accurate with very few false positives or neg-atives. Proteomic analyses based on immunologi-cal reactions will require much less time (approxi-mately five to ten minutes) but cross reactionsbetween the immunoglobulin and related butnon-pathogenic organisms will result in signifi-cant false positives and negatives. While geneticengineering of threat agents can circumvent theimmunoassay-based systems, appropriategenomic probes should be able to detect theorganism anyway.

The genomic systems can utilize samples in thetens of microliters (drops) because of nucleic acid amplification. Proteomic analyses mayrequire somewhat larger sample volumes. Severalidentified proteins that are induced followinginfection are also induced by stress not related toinfection (e.g., pregnancy) and so are not reliableindicators.

DARPA is developing a single, hand held devicethat is anticipated to use proteomic and genomictechnology to detect infectious agents.Microelectronic chips that can detect biologicalthreat agents are under development in the com-mercial sector as well. A Nanogen on-chipsstrand displacement amplification technique andthird wave technology invader systems are non-polymerase chain reaction systems. The feasibil-ity of detecting biological agents in the field bythese methods remains to be demonstrated.These will have a rapid-turnaround if successful.

At the present time there are no truly non-inva-sive rapid analytical systems for detecting threatagents or host response markers for infection.

Transdermal detection of blood metabolites ismost effective for low molecular weight materials(not proteins). However, IR spectroscopy is sofar unproven and iontophoresis is slow.

Electronic nose technology developed at severaluniversities, including The University of Texas atAustin, Department of Energy NationalLaboratories and private industry may providetools with utility but this is an emergent technol-ogy. The idea is to sample the breath or perhapssweat and/or saliva.

Gap Fillers:

The disease process for threat agents – includingthe body’s response—is imperfectly understood.An effort to learn more about the biomarkersthat correlate with different stages of the diseaseprocess for different biological threat agents hasbeen proposed as a Strategic Research Area (seeChapter I (Introduction)).

The panoply of technical approaches to rapidclinical assessment and testing must be winnowedover time to the level of a few alternatives forserious investment throughout the medical community.

However, responder interest in an extremely rapidtest that can be administered if necessary withouttrained medical personnel suggests an earlyemphasis on evaluating the power of transdermalIR chromoscopy to detect low-molecular weightbiomarkers. If this approach pans out, then thedevelopment of a library of infrared spectralproperties of blood components, which can beused to determine the presence of biologicalagents, will benefit both responders dealing withchemical and biological threats as well as the gen-eral medical community.

To the extent that the testing process separates asample from the person even within the confinesof the single encounter standard (and even moreso if the single encounter norm must be vio-lated), then a process for certain identification ofthe individual and association of the sample withthe individual is needed. Bar code technologyand existing personal identifiers (e.g., drivers’

1 5 1



license magnetic strips) can be of assistance inthis task. The use of biometrics should also beexplored.

With the exception of the person/sample identifi-cation technology, all of these technologies arejudged to be high risk because no technology isreadily available to meet the stated goals of emer-gency responders.

PHRBAE.3 – Modeling of Exposure andContainment. The ability to predict the likelynumbers and geographical distribution of individu-als exposed to biological agents through modelingexposure to or containment of an agent. The tech-nology will help public health and safety officialsmanage emerging threat conditions by anticipat-ing which regional areas and personal lifestylesare conducive to exposure to moderate to highlevels of agent and thereby plan for prophylaxis,and quarantine, and for back-tracing contagionto its source(s).

The DIDA.6 (CBRNE Effects Modeling andSimulation) and MR.6 (Modeling ofExposure/Casualties for Location and Numbers)functional capabilities focus respectively on mod-eling atmospheric dispersion of CRBNE agentsand effects and the illness resulting from exposureto chemical and radiological materials. The mod-eling of dissemination of biological agents afterinitial airborne dispersal, and their distributionthrough other channels, is addressed in this sec-tion. The major differences between biologicalagent dissemination and that of either chemicalor radiological agents include the self-replicatingnature of the biological agents and their very longsurvival in particular circumstances. As a result,persistent infection is a problem in certainexposed individuals. For highly contagious bio-logical agents, infected individuals can serve asseeds for iterative dissemination of the agent andtherefore cause multiple waves of illness. (TheSARS epidemic has prompted research into thephenomenon of the “super spreader.”) In highlymobile modern society, exposure of a small popu-lation in an airplane can lead to rapid distribu-tion of pathogen globally. For zoonotic disease(transferred from animals to humans or spread by

an insect vector) dissemination patterns are afunction of the migration of the host and pres-ence of the vector (such as West Nile Virus).

Goals:

Responders and public health officials recognizethat they will be lucky to discover a biologicalagent release in progress. So the modeling soft-ware must have the capability to backtrack fromemergent illness and epidemiological informationto discern the initial dispersal mechanism andarea. The system must also be able to model thelikely pattern of infection from residual agent inthe environment. It should predict likely demo-graphic and geographic progression of an epi-demic starting from information on the diseaseagent, its virulence, the current health status of the population, and other factors such asweather. In addition, it should also be capable of projecting the effects of such policy measuresas quarantine.

The modeling capability to interpret informationoutput during threat conditions must be availableto responders and public health officials at theincident scene as well as command centers, andbe accessed from mobile computers. The model-ing information should have the capability to beintegrated with other data sources and data users(including early detection/syndromic data, deci-sion support for isolation/quarantine/contain-ment, hazmat integration) and preferably be web-enabled. The operation of the modeling programshould be graphical and easy to understand. Thesoftware should not require significant technicalsupport on-site. The training of responders touse the modeling program should require fourhours or less and the results of a modeling runshould be available within one hour. The model-ing system should utilize real-time meteorologicaldata and be capable of managing multi-levelsecurity.


The Army Medical Command has published abook that catalogues biological threat agents,prognosis of clinical disease from these agents andtreatment protocols. The book is available in a

1 5 2


Chapter VIII

wireless form that can be accessed from a PDA.This material is prepared for physicians ratherthan public safety responders.

The airborne dispersal models discussed inDIDA.6 (CBRNE Effects Modeling andSimulation) generally do not consider the possi-bility of re-aerosolization of agent that has beendeposited after an initial airborne dispersal, orthat has been introduced into the environmentthrough non-airborne means.

Crude epidemiological transmission models havebeen used to support exercises but are not typi-cally deployed in incident command centers or instate public health headquarters.

State of the Art:

Communities around the U.S. monitor environ-mental air quality and study the dispersal of par-ticulates in urban and rural communities.Included in this are the Houston AdvancedResearch Council (HARC) environmental airquality program and programs in the Los Angelesarea. Similar data are collected in majorEuropean cities concerned about environmentalquality. While the particulates monitored (e.g.,diesel emissions) have a significantly smaller size(0.1 micron diameter) than biological agents, thepatterns of agent dispersal and distribution canbe estimated by responders using appropriatetechnology. The Los Alamos NationalLaboratory (LANL) epidemiological program fortoxic metals and threat-agent dispersal has mod-eled the diffusion of such materials in groundand surface water.

The CDC has modeled the spread of infectiousdisease in communities. Some of this is availablethrough the Morbidity and Mortality WeeklyReports of CDC. Epidemiological models have been used in policy analyses of vaccinationstrategy.

Some of the cited data may not be readily avail-able to the general responder community for rea-sons of security. The establishment of trustedindividuals at major centers, who could accesssuch data, may facilitate rapid transfer to person-nel in the field as necessary. While extensive

research has been performed by the defense com-munity in agent dispersal there is a need to fusemilitary information with public health modelingand data sets.


The likelihood that a given dose of agent encoun-tered by various routes will cause infection inhumans is not well characterized. The relativesusceptibility of young persons, the aged, patientswith compromised immune systems (e.g., AIDS,organ transplant recipients) remains to be deter-mined. The number of anthrax particles believednecessary to cause disease in August 2001 had tobe revised downward in 2002 because of an eld-erly woman in Connecticut who developed thedisease. Almost all susceptibility data wasacquired from models using healthy animals.The effects of urban crowding, nutrition, co-infection with other agents, and occupational sta-tus are confounding elements. Moreover, it isentirely possible that an incident will involve spe-cially bred or engineered organisms that have vir-ulence or toxicity different from the strains previ-ously encountered.

The determination of which modeling system isto be used will affect training programs and theneed to have consensus on national use of a spe-cific model will delay implementation of thistask. This is less a technology issue than a policyissue.

Gap Fillers:

The linking of early disease detection systems(e.g., syndromic) with Global InformationSystems and data/mapping is readily achievable.The electronic storage of archival disease emer-gence data, from state departments of health, canprovide a basis for an analysis and review of les-sons learned. The information of interestincludes: the co-dependency of agents on otherkinds of infection, the effects of demographicshifts on emergent disease and virulence changesin biological organisms.

Research is required to investigate the role of var-ious societal and biological situations on agentdissemination and emergent epidemics. These

1 5 3



situations include how the living conditions(urban/rural), employment conditions (density,ventilation, humidity), transportation patternsand genomic markers affect the spread and viru-lence of the disease. The SARS epidemic inChina revealed significant differences in suscepti-bility of various communities in affected areas tosevere disease.

Many continuing research initiatives are relevantto this area and there are no particularly difficulttechnological questions in system development;the difficulties relate primarily to a lack of fullknowledge on the modes of transmission anddegree of virulence of the wide variety of threatagents that can be envisioned (some of themgenetically engineered). Thus there is an inherentlimit to the accuracy of the modeling that can bedeveloped.

PHRBAE.4 – Isolation and Quarantine. Theability of public health and safety officials to mini-mize the onward spread of infectious disease throughthe control of contact between unexposed and conta-gious individuals. Isolation refers primarily totechniques for protecting healthy people fromexposure to contagion even when they must benear and even interact with contagious individu-als; quarantine refers to the enforced residentialsegregation of possibly contagious people.

The technology should support the identificationof exposed populations and measures to ensureeffective isolation of exposed and unexposed pop-ulations. This applies to potentially contagiouspopulations both in and out of treatment facili-ties. This capability will permit establishment ofcare delivery facilities that will house thousandsof patients in a secure, appropriate manner.MR.3 (Individual and Collective Protection –health Care Facilities and Personnel) discussestechnologies and mechanisms to prevent thespread of contamination from threat agentswithin established medical care facilities (e.g.,clinics, hospitals). A significant portion of thepopulation within these facilities is immuno-compromised or otherwise more susceptible todisease (nosocomial infections).

Goals:

The emergence of SARS in China and Canadahas heightened awareness of the need to developa capability to isolate and quarantine individualswith serious contagious disease. There is an asso-ciated need to monitor the success of isolation.GPS monitoring of quarantined individualswould be an enabling technology for this goal,although it is also necessary to ensure that previ-ously uninfected individuals do not stray intocontact with quarantined people and places.Education of the public to achieve operationalacceptance is also needed.

An important requirement is creation of an entitythat can authorize orders for isolation and quar-antine and can enforce such an order. At thepresent time the authority to quarantine residesin the state departments of health while enforce-ment resides with public safety organizations orthe National Guard.

Current Capability:

In the period after recognition of a release of abiological threat agent in an urban area it will benecessary to process thousands of people. If hos-pitals and public spaces are to be used for isola-tion of patients with highly communicable dis-ease, such facilities will need to be retrofittedwith effective isolation capability (e.g., positiveand negative pressure and airflow). Very oftenthe unintentional admission of a person with ahighly contagious disease results in contamina-tion of the hospital. For example, the air han-dling capability of many emergency rooms isdirectly connected to air handling in the wholefacility. Containment then becomes a matter ofsecurity and exercise of authority—extremelycontagious people must be kept out of the emer-gency room. A sensor which could scan peopleas they walk in and determine which personswere exposed would be very advantageous.13

Screening stations may need to be establishedoutside of the treatment facility itself. Patientswith highly communicable diseases should beprovided rooms with negative pressure to reducedissemination of contaminated air throughout a

1 5 4


Chapter VIII

13 Unfortunately, since very small numbers of certain kinds of bacteria or virus particles lodged within the body can bloom into a virulent and conta-gious infection, it is entirely possible that someone entering the hospital appearing to be “clean” could after a period of days in the hospital becomea source of contagion without encountering any further agent within the hospital.

structure; other patients may be provided roomswith filtered airflow and positive pressure if thereis high confidence that they are not contagious.Ideally each patient would be provided with fil-tered air and provision would be made for theremoval of the bulk of the air from a room sothat inadvertent spread does not occur. Relatedto this point is that most mobile or portable hos-pital units do not have the capability to regulateairflow in the manner needed to sustain negativepressure. Today, most hospitals do not have asignificant number of isolation units.

New guidance on effective quarantine emergedfrom the SARS experience. The experience withSARS has been described in the CDC’sMorbidity and Mortality Weekly Report(MMMWR) and provides good data on theToronto experience showing how they did isola-tion and quarantine in schools and home- basedand hospital isolation. Home care was providedfor 350 individuals suspected of SARS. In addi-tion, Canada prepared forms alerting deplaningpassengers to the signs of SARS. The SARSresponse projects of Canada, Taiwan and SouthAsia are models for developing new approaches tobiological threats in the developed world. Yet therules of engagement for declaration of quarantineare ambiguous as was seen during the SARSevent in Canada. Economic loss to the commu-nity and political requests to remove quarantineemerged. Standardized methods of quarantineenforcement remain to be developed.

State of the Art:

In the event of a severe outbreak of highly infec-tious disease the military uses field hospitals formass quarantine rather than fixed facilities.

Architectural and engineering plans have beenprepared to retrofit the emergency room facilitiesat the University of Pittsburgh for managementof patients with highly infectious disease. Theretrofitting includes placement of fans and HEPAfilters. Other hospitals have been retrofitted orhave plans to be retrofitted for such an incident.The CDC has prepared a report on lessonslearned from the Toronto SARS event (schools,

home-based, hospitals). The National GuardBureau in 1999 prepared a report on the role ofthe NGB during quarantine and came to theconclusion that declaration of quarantine is problematic.

The most serious issues related to isolation andquarantine primarily have to do with policy andresources, not technology.


Policies and procedures for declaration of quaran-tine vary from state to state and are markedlyaffected by legal issues. There is a clear diver-gence between authority to declare a quarantineand enforcement of the declaration. Because ofthe expectation that a biological event will affectthousands of people, it appears clear that neitherthe U.S., nor any other nation in the developedworld, has the capability to manage thousands ofpeople ill with a highly contagious and lethal dis-ease. The likelihood that the disease will emergein a short time period (less than fifteen days)compounds the logistics of medical management.In addition to medical care there will be difficul-ties with enforcement of policy and maintainingsecurity.

Gap Fillers:

Various federal entities have examined the rolethey may play in quarantine. The Department ofHomeland Security is expected to participate inthis effort and the National Guard has examinedits potential role in the quarantine process. Thesuccess of the SARS efforts is likely to influencefuture quarantine processes.

Responders believe that current procedures forprotecting health providers and responders arenot adequate. However, a search for enablingtechnologies led to little more than air handlingsystems, locator devices, personal protectiveequipment for medical workers, and decisionsupport tools—all of which are well within thestate of the art. Needed sensor systems will bedeveloped as part of other functional capabilitiesand NTROs.

1 5 5



PHRBAE.5 – Affordable Specimen Transportfor CW and BW Agents. Procedures and deviceswhich provide the ability for transportation ofpotentially lethal chemical and biological agentsand the availability and security of containers usedto transport biological agent samples.

Goals:

Emergency responders have a need to containbiological samples for shipment to a laboratorywhere they can be analyzed. The shipping con-tainers (vials) must be affordable, cost less than$100, be available in multiple sizes and be able tosustain viability of living cells that are being sam-pled. The vials and shipping containers must beruggedized (they should withstand a plane crashwithout dispersing agent). Training of respondersis required for collection of the sample withoutdisturbing a chain of evidence, packaging of thesample and addition of nutrients or other amend-ments to assure intact arrival at the analytical site.There is a particular need to address evidence anddocumenting the chain of custody.


At the current time chemical agent samples aretransported in salvage cylinders that cost about$6,000 each. Lawrence Livermore usesmicrofibers in a waterproof plastic case that isopened in a hot zone and then closed, decontam-inated on the surface and transferred to an ana-lytical laboratory.

The shipment of suspected or actual biologicalagents does not require such expensive packagingbecause no volatiles are involved. The biologicalsamples are placed in sample vials, secured withan O Ring, placed in a zip lock bag and thenpacked using triple containers (each inserted intoa larger container) and labeled as biohazard. Thecontainer can be manipulated despite limiteddexterity of responders in HAZMAT suits. Someclinical specimens need oxygen, some refrigera-tion, and some positive pressure. The size of the sample is frequently small but may vary and include large sample volumes. The cost of

shipping and containers is less than $100.Federal Express now knowingly transports thesehazardous samples.

The responders indicated that the average firedepartment does not have the money to purchasethe available biohazard containers. If federalfunds are not provided, the realities of today’s fis-cal climate mean that local governments will notpurchase the vials even at low cost. Responderdepartments that have special operations capabili-ties typically have one or two containers. Therewas a perceived need for readily available proce-dures, protocols, and shipping vials for samplerecovery

State of the Art:

Several federal agencies and commercial organiza-tions have standardized protocols for the ship-ment of biological samples (i.e., USAMRIID,CDC, American Type Culture Collection[ATCC]). The U.S. Department ofTransportation (DOT) describes protocols forsample shipment and carriers that can safelytransport such materials.


The shipment of biological agents does notrequire new technology development. Themajority of samples to be analyzed for the pres-ence of biological agents are small in volume(under 50 milliliters).

Although responders do not have appropriatecontainers, such containers are available and rou-tinely used. While no RTO is associated withthis functional capability, the Department ofHomeland Security should review the marketavailability of affordable appropriate containersand establish standards and guidelines for respon-der stocking of these containers.

PHRBAE.6 – Transport of Contagious Patients.The ability to transport multiple contagious patientswithout endangering medical care providers or thepublic.

1 5 6


Chapter VIII

Goals:

Responders want access to single-patient mobileisolation environments that are cost effective(priced below $1500), have disposable liners, areeasily deployed and non-stressful to the patient.The unit must allow clinical assessment and criti-cal interventions by multiple providers, be userfriendly and require less than one hour of train-ing of emergency responders for appropriate use.It should be light-weight and easily processed fordecontamination, and be accommodated on astandard ambulance stretcher.

It should accept a full range of patient sizes (pedi-atric through obese) and those with special needs.It should be self-sufficient with respect to powerfor at least two hours and allow for administra-tion of life support oxygen. In the best of cir-cumstances the unit should be able to accept anew patient after fifteen minutes of decontamina-tion. Such a device should be introduced intothe National Pharmaceutical Stockpile.

Current Capability:

Patient isolation systems for use in transport arenot currently in use by emergency responders,and are not deployed in quantity by theDepartment of Defense or other federal agencies.

There are no standards or accepted protocols fortransporting hundreds of patients infected with ahighly contagious lethal disease. Affordability is abig barrier for acquisition of the pod systems.Because current policy strongly recommendsagainst the movement of patients who areinfected with a highly contagious biologicalagent, reconsideration of this guideline in con-junction with analysis of technological optionswould be needed before transportation isolationsystems would become a critical item for biologi-cal defense in the United States.

State of the Art:

The Department of Defense has invested in thedevelopment of systems that facilitate transportof very ill (especially trauma) patients and othersystems that permit transport of persons infectedwith highly contagious agents. These systems are

designed for long-range air transport, whichimposes requirements that may not be needed formetropolitan emergency response.

USAMRIID has a small number of AeromedicalIsolation Teams to safely transport patients withlethal communicable diseases from the field intoUSAMRIID containment facilities. The teamsare equipped with flexible clear plastic enclosureson wire frames with battery-operated negative-pressure air filtration systems and glove boxes.These come in two sizes—a stretcher size unitthat can be carried by two people and a larger airtransportation unit that facilitates in-flight med-ical care.

The Life Support for Trauma and Transport(LSTAT) is an individualized portable intensivecare system and surgical platform providing resus-citation and stabilization capability through anintegrated suite of state-of-the-art medicaldevices. It is designed to decrease mortality, mor-bidity and disability by moving trauma care far-ther forward toward the site of an injury forimproved diagnostics and therapeutics through-out the evacuation and treatment process. Thecurrent, third generation, LSTAT, features a ven-tilator, suction, oxygen system, infusion pump,physiological monitor, clinical blood analyzer,and defibrillator. These medical devices are com-plemented with a fully network-capable on-boardcomputer monitoring system and stand alonepower system all packaged together in the NATOlitter form factor. However, owing to the smallnumbers of systems (around 25) currently field-deployed, the systems tend to be used more asmobile forward patient support systems in austereenvironments rather than end-to-end trans-porters. The price of the system ($165,000) isalso an obstacle to widespread use. The high-endmedical support features would often not berequired for transport of patients who are conta-gious but stable. Although the current LSTATdoes not have isolation capability; the next-gener-ation LSTAT, currently in development, will beavailable with a canopy and negative and positivepressure and filtering for isolation of contagiousand “clean” patients (respectively).

1 5 7



The Alion Corp has a product that involves plac-ing the patient in a contained elastomeric unitwith capability to administer critical gassesincluding oxygen.


Design of such pod systems is fairly straightfor-ward. Tradeoffs between cost and levels of capa-bility must be addressed in the context of pre-ferred concepts of operations for where and howpatients would be treated. It would be worth-while for the Department of Homeland Securityto host a demonstration and standards develop-ment process that would help coordinate a mar-ket for vendors of such systems.

PHRBAE.7 – Safe Handling of Medical Waste.The safe handling and disposal of large quantities ofunusually infectious medical waste, for use in homesand alternative treatment facilities as well as doc-tors’ offices and other established medical care facili-ties. In a situation following massive outbreak ofdisease with a highly contagious and lethal bio-logical agent, the large volume of contaminatedmaterials would pose a major logistical problem.The rate of accumulation of contaminated mate-rials and large volume differentiates scenariosinvolving biological agents from what we dotoday. Medical waste includes used needles,blood and pus, absorbent materials from diapersand sponges, bandages and dressings, and humanexcretory products. Among the components thatcould mitigate the management problem are spe-cial vehicles or containers configured to fit exist-ing vehicles. High tensile strength disposablematerials must be used because infected individu-als may be self-administering drugs with needlesand current practices may result in improperlycovered sharp pointed objects which can pokeholes in trash bags. The disposal bags and pro-cessing must be affordable, but may be thirdparty reimbursable.

Responders recommend including waste-handlingsupplies in the stockpiled push packs.

Goals:

The potential magnitude of the waste suggeststhe development of interoperable containers for

hazardous trash that can be used by existinginfrastructure in major medical centers and hos-pitals. The containers require minimal handling,must be rugged and able to contain most danger-ous organisms. Safe storage would be requireduntil disposal capacity can be arranged.

Training of home health care providers for use ofthese containers should require less than ten min-utes. The containers must be part of a nationalstockpile and part of all home care kits. This is alogistics issue, with education and proceduralcomponents.

State of the Art:

Existing products for home health care currentlyexist.


There are no technology or cultural limitations orbarriers. No RTO is defined for this functionalcapability.

Public Health Readiness for BiologicalAgent Events Response TechnologyObjectives (PHRBAErto)

PHRBAErto.1 – Health Surveillance for EarlyDetection of Biological Agent Events

Objectives:

Develop a comprehensive surveillance system thatensures initial recognition of an emergent illnessat the earliest point in the progress of a biologicalagent event. This system would be based in met-ropolitan and regional areas but would allow fullytransparent data aggregation up to the nationallevel. Near-real-time data sources would includework and school absences, over-the-counter andprescription pharmaceutical purchases, syndromicinformation on clinic, doctor, emergency roomand hospital visits, 9-1-1 and EMS calls, andinformation from veterinary sources and medicalexaminers. It would encompass historical datasets and regional demographics, commuting andtravel patterns to support full data mining capa-bilities, and forward links into epidemic model-ing capability. It would have a full set of icono-graphic, geographic, and temporal display modes

1 5 8


Chapter VIII

and semi-automated and automated modes forcorrelation of data bearing on emerging clustersof illness and their statistical significance com-pared to base rates. The system would also pro-vide alerting functions for further epidemiologi-cal investigation and for policy interventions.

Payoffs:

There is a 48 to 72 hour lag between initial expo-sure to an agent and appearance of clinical signs.Medical interventions with antibiotics/antivirals,vaccines or containment of the exposed personsduring this window can greatly diminish thenumber and severity of subsequent cases of ill-ness. Early recognition will lead to early identifi-cation of the pathogen; once an infectious illnessis identified, further occurrences can be morereadily identified and treated.

The result will be a decrease in the number ofpatients that will acquire the disease from second-ary or tertiary exposure and a decrease in theseverity of illness in those persons exposed to theagent initially. Of course, a powerful health sur-veillance of this sort would help in dealing withnatural as well as deliberate public health threats.

Challenges:

A key challenge is identifying emergent disease ina cohort sufficient in size to reduce false posi-tive/negative data sets. A large number ofpatients are needed and this can be achieved bynetworking multiple hospitals/clinics in aregional system. However, the ability to detectsmall initial clusters (ideally) of pre-clinical illnessagainst this background requires sophisticateddata mining tools. In addition to alerting, thesystem must allow rapid revealing of patient iden-tifying information for further investigation,while maintaining patient privacy under normalcircumstances.

The surveillance data must be acquired in near-real-time without additional effort by the healthcare providers. This is a medical economics issue.A surveillance system based on capture of elec-tronic medical data, from which all individualidentifiers have been removed, can be devised to protect patient privacy. However, sufficient

identifying information must be held in reservefor rapid exploitation in fast follow-up epidemio-logical investigation once disease clusters havebeen recognized.

Cost/benefit research will be needed to determinethe types of data sources to be included in thedeployed system and the level of detail thatshould be reported. Careful attention to archi-tecture will be required so that useable systemscan be brought up quickly with provision forthem to evolve gracefully into a fully poweredintegrated system over time. Different regionswill have different starting points and needs andso the system will definitely have to toleratediversity.

Milestones/Metrics:

FY2004: Benchmark epidemiological early warn-ing research to date. Survey public health data-bases and select data sets appropriate for thesepurposes. Harmonize diagnoses and other infor-mation codes used in these systems. Using thebest practices of existing research efforts, begindesign of an Syndromic Surveillance andResponse Prototype. Initiate research on newmethods of automated population of health caredatabases (e.g., automated diagnostic labs withreal-time links to syndromic databases – seePHRBAErto.2 (Rapid, High Throughput ClinicalAssessment and Testing) and the Strategic ResearchArea on Biomarkers of Agent Induced Disease andSystemic Injury), for possible eventual inclusion inlater versions of the system.

FY2005: Deploy Syndromic Surveillance andResponse Prototype initial capability (perhaps atthree sites with different demographic characteris-tics); establish minimum standards for interoper-ability, data formats, and provisions for displayand analysis. Begin test and evaluation of proto-type in three cities. Continue research into valueof disparate data sources and integrate into proto-type as appropriate. Continue research into auto-mated syndromic data generation.

FY2006: Conclude research on value of disparatedata sources. Continue testing and evaluatingprototype system. Develop improvements to the

1 5 9



prototype based on test results and data accessand generation research.

FY2007: Finalize interoperability standards forSyndromic Surveillance and Response systems.Increase deployment and testing of prototype toseveral more metropolitan areas. Continueresearch into automated data gathering and inte-grating results of that research.

FY2008: Finalize Syndromic Surveillance andResponse System architecture, design and tools.Demonstrate target capability nationwide. Assess results of research on automated diagnosisand reporting for inclusion in future version asappropriate.

PHRBAErto.2 – Rapid High-ThroughputClinical Assessment and Testing

Objectives:

Improve the speed, throughput, comprehensive-ness, and convenience of clinical assessment andtesting for characterization of biological agentexposure and disease status, in the three contextsidentified in PHRBAE.2. Draw on the StrategicResearch Area, Biomarkers of Bio-Agent InducedDisease (see Chapter I), to develop additional,non-invasive, approaches to screening and diagnosis.

Payoffs:

Such an improved capability would significantlyimprove the likelihood of early recognition andaccurate characterization of a biological-agentinduced epidemic, with substantial benefits inreduction of morbidity and mortality.Depending on the context, it may also: improvethe accuracy of treatment, improving results andreducing the threat of side effects; improve theefficiency of efforts at isolation and quarantine,further reducing the scope of an epidemic; andreduce exposure of health care workers andresponders to threat agent and permit respondersto operate with reduced protective gear. By

improving the speed and accuracy of ordinarymedical diagnosis, faster clinical testing will alsoimprove the power of the health surveillance sys-tem, even apart from its direct role in diagnosingbiological agent induced illness among patients indoctors’ offices, emergency rooms, and clinics.Finally, the technology for rapid diagnosis wouldimprove health outcomes and reduce medicalcosts in the absence of a biological agent event.

Challenges:

No combination of current technology exists toprovide the combination of speed and stand-offdesired by responders. Fortunately, achievingmuch of the payoff identified does not require

reaching this level of capability.

However, no other context is likely to placethe emphasis on minimal contact and onspeed as the role of screening for exposure to

biological agents; so this should have a specialpriority. At the same time, there would be such ahigh payoff for accurate clinical blood tests thatwould take even an hour or more that thisavenue is also important to explore.

As compared to naturally-occurring disease, bio-logical agents may be engineered to circumventdetection; this possibility needs to be taken intoaccount and may bias the preferred approach infavor of genomic tests instead of immunoassays,even though these tests tend to take more time.

Finally, there is likely to be an interval after expo-sure where no minimally invasive test will iden-tify 100% of those who may become ill. Also,attempting to identify agents before they rise tothe level of major infection means that the testwill face a very high background noise level ofother microorganisms. Many biological agentswill be hard to distinguish from similar non-pathogenic organisms. For all these reasons,achieving the ultimate level of capability cannotbe the sole focus of this RTO.

Because of the strong overlap with normal med-ical practice, agencies of HHS, including theNational Institute of Allergy and InfectiousDisease, and the CDC, should be directly

1 6 0


Chapter VIII

Early Detection $20 $30 $45 $60 $50 $205

ThrustPHRBAErto.1 – Budget in Millions

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Totals

involved in the development of programs underthis RTO, together with agencies with expertisein threat agents.

Milestones/Metrics:

FY2006: Review progress of Strategic Research(see Chapter I) into the outward physiologicalsigns of exposure, disease and injury. Review cur-rent research and technology developments inminimally invasive rapid testing techniques.Begin developing an architecture and strategy fordesigning a Rapid High-Throughput ClinicalAssessment and Testing System (RHTCAT), atfirst with minimally invasive techniques and laterwith non-invasive techniques.

FY2007: Issue a Broad Area Announcementseeking several approaches to designing andbuilding RHTCAT.

FY2008-2010: Award several contracts todevelop promising approaches. Test and evaluateseveral competing prototypes. Begin commercial-ization and clinical testing efforts on the mostpromising approaches, most likely through partnerships with established medical diagnosticsuppliers.

PHRBAErto.3 – Models for Re-disseminationand Contagion of Biological Agents

Objectives:

Develop improved models for the re-dissemina-tion and contagion of biological agents. Themajor differences between biological agent dis-semination and that of either chemical or radio-logical agents include the self-replicating natureof the biological agents and their very long sur-vival in particular circumstances. The modelsmust be integrated with surveillance information(PHRBAErto.1 (Health Surveillance for EarlyDetection of Biological Agent Events)) to help get astarting point. They must also encompass policyoptions such as quarantine and treatment to seethe effect on projections.

Payoffs:

All biological agents, with the exception of tox-ins, will replicate in a host. As a result, persistentinfection is a problem in certain exposed individ-uals. For highly contagious biological agents,infected individuals can serve as seeds for iterativedissemination of an agent and therefore causemultiple waves of illness. The payoff for successin this task may be the reduction in severity ofillness in potentially infected persons and theelimination of subsequent waves of illness in indi-viduals coming in contact with the initial targetpopulation.

Challenges:

Modeling of this sort faces three primary chal-lenges. First, accurate predictions would requirevery detailed data about initial exposure andfuture patterns of interaction, which would bedifficult to get. Second, because the modelsattempt to capture events of a sort that havenever happened, the estimated parameters of con-tagion and survival are likely to be wildly inaccu-rate. Finally, for many of the biological agents,we do not have human infectivity or lethalitydoses. Extrapolation from old data or inappro-priate animal models is insufficient. (Moreover, abiological agent event may involve a wholly newvariant of an existing organism.) In the interim,the modeling and simulation community mustcontinue to refine the physical, chemical, meteor-ological effects and other parameters that do notrely on human effects.

Therefore, the main challenge will be to keep themodeling at a level where it is relevant to policyand not to expect it to be an exact, “validated”reflection of reality.

Milestones/Metrics:

FY2004: Survey existing models and defineappropriate performance levels. Identify gaps incapability needed to accomplish goals. Developstrategy to fill the gaps.

FY2005: Issue a Broad Area Announcementseeking an advanced technology demonstration

1 6 1



RHTCAT $15 $30 $40 $85


2006 2007 2008 Totals

using the strategy developed. Evaluate BAAresponses and choose one or more performers.

FY2006-2007: Develop Bio ContagionModeling Tool. Conduct field demonstra-tions and finalize specification for deployablesystem(s).

FY2008: Begin to transition final capability to users.

1 6 2


Chapter VIII

Bio Contagion Modeling Tool

$10 $25 $40 $40 $40 $155


2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Totals

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

• Initial Recognition of an Emergent Illness at the Earliest point

• Near Real-Time Data Sources

• Integration of Models with Surveillance Information

• Improved Speed, Throughput, Comprehensiveness, and Convenience

PHRBAErto.1 – Health Surveillance for Early Detection of Biological Agent Events

PHRBAErto.2 – Rapid, High-Throughput Clinical Assessment

and Testing

PHRBAErto.3 – Models for Re-dissemination andContagion of Bio-Agents

Public Health Readiness for Biological Agent Events (PHRBAE) Technology Roadmap

1 6 3


Definition

Logistics Support is the capability to deliverequipment, consumables, food, water, other sup-plies, shelter and transportation when and whereneeded in support of emergency response to aterrorist incident.

Several aspects of this definition should be keptin mind. First, many functions that would beviewed as logistics in a military operation overseasdo not appear here because they are primarilycivil support rather than support to the responseper se. Functions of ordinary civil society such astraffic management and water and electricity arecovered in other NTROs (EmergencyManagement, Response and Recovery, andMedical Response) and not in logistics. Second,this NTRO primarily addresses the ability todeliver support to responders rather than the sup-port itself. It is the marshalling of the suppliesrather than the supplies themselves. Finally, theNTRO focuses on aspects of logistics that can beenabled by technology; much prosaic supply andmaintenance activity does not get specific men-tion as a result. For example, the NTRO doesnot address the pre-positioning of supplies or thepre-loading of purpose-specific pallets of supplies.

The specter of catastrophic terrorism requiresthat disparate responder organizations – ones that normally do not work closely together –must learn to operate together. Efficient inter-operation requires consistent procedures andequipment standards. However, inconsistentpolicies, specialized responder needs, limitedbudgets, imperfect communications, andrestricted training all limit the success of currentlogistics operating procedures. While technologyis important to achieving the ultimate level of

desired performance, standardization of proce-dures and items would improve performanceeven without an infusion of new technology. Theprocess of deploying an affordable technology-based tool can work to harmonize procedures aswell as providing more rapid, more precise, andmore comprehensive logistics management, andthus better support to emergency responders.


Logistics is the process of supplying, transporting,maintaining, and servicing all elements of theresponder’s capabilities. In evaluating logisticsfunctions, responders thought it more useful todistinguish between phases of the response ratherthan the type of attack. They thought that therewas likely to be as much variation in logisticsrequirements within a particular attack categoryas between categories. Responders focused onneeds to ensure a high state of readiness prior tooperations through the use of deliberate plan-ning, to provide support during the initialresponse to an incident, to provide tailored sup-port as the specific requirements of an incidentemerge, and to rapidly reconstitute logistics capa-bilities at the conclusion of the incident. Thesephases are conveniently labeled: pre-crisis deliber-ate planning, post-event initial logistics response,adaptive execution, and logistics recovery.

Throughout these phases of an incident, there isthe need to effectively anticipate requirements,communicate among jurisdictions and organiza-tions, manage transportation and other logisticsprocesses, and optimize assets. Due to the varietyof responder disciplines and organizations, poli-cies, procedures, and equipment in a given loca-tion are not standardized and often not interoper-able. The lack of standardization of equipment

Chapter ix

Logistics Support (LS)Chapter Chair: Dr. Lou MasonChapter Coordinator: Dr. Maria Powell

1 6 4


Chapter IX

complicates the provision of consumables such asbatteries and service items, which may varyaccording to the type of equipment. This diffi-cult situation is likely to be further complicatedby a lack of trained logistics personnel and effec-tive logistics command and control procedures.A language barrier often causes additional diffi-culties and delays: naming conventions often cre-ate confusion, especially when communicating acritical need where specificity is paramount.Responders cited the need to not only coordinatelogistics operations internally, but also with exter-nal organizations (other responders, federal, state,and commercial) throughout the planning, execu-tion, and reconstitution processes.


Listed below, in declining priority order, are thelogistics functional capabilities required:

• Logistics Information System

• Automatic Generation and Assessment ofSupply Requirements

• Inventory Management

• Mortuary AffairsManagement

• Lightweight, Long-lived Power Sources

• TransportationOptimization

• Assessment of SafeAir, Sea and GroundBases of Operations(Supply Depots)

Responders rated theLogistics InformationSystem (LS.1) capabilitywell above the rest inpriority; the AutomaticGeneration andAssessment of SupplyRequirements (LS.2) was

solidly in the second position. Only the lastcapability received a majority vote as a low prior-ity; the other four capabilities received mixed values.

In examining how these capabilities can best beimproved, technologists and responders partici-pating in the technology workshop determinedthat, to the extent that capabilities identified inthe FCEs are susceptible to improvement bytechnology, the gains will be realized most expe-ditiously if these capabilities are addressed essen-tially as modules of an Integrated LogisticsInformation System.

Overall State of Technology forLogistics Support

The matrix below summarizes the readiness oftechnology to underpin capabilities for LogisticsSupport.

The predominance of green in the inner boxesmeans technologies needed to support functionalcapabilities in most of the operational environ-ments are within reach; the preponderance of yel-lows and greens in the intermediate boxes meansthat there are few gaps that are believed to exist

12

3





Logisitcs Support

1. Logistics Info Systems

2. Automatic Generation and Assessment of Supply Requirements

3. Inventory Management

4. Mortuary Affairs Management

5. Lightweight, Long-lived Power Sources

6. Transportation Optimization

7. Assessment of Safe Air, Sea, and Ground Bases of Operations (Supply Depots)


Functional CapabilitiesAdaptiveExecution

Post-EventInitial Logistics

Response

Pre-CrisisDeliberatePlanning

LogisiticsRecovery

1 6 5


Logistics Support

between the capabilities that are needed and theexpected results of commercial and governmentdevelopment programs already in train. This isbecause of the close relevance of both commercialand military logistics systems in meeting respon-der needs. Even for the Logistics InformationSystem (LS.1), the red coloration of the innermostboxes was governed only by a few “ideal” capabil-ities; dramatic capability improvements comparedto today were judged to fall well within the gam-bit of existing technologies.

LS.1 – Logistics Information System. The capa-bility to provide response commanders at variouslevels accurate and timely information on supplyavailability, resupply needs, and logistics resourcesand to allow them to manage the flow for optimumresponse effectiveness. Access to the LIS by com-manders and other elements of the logistics sys-tem must be standardized, interoperable, andaffordable, and the LIS must be capable of:

• Accurate and timely logistics data capture andinformation fusion.

• Real time mission response asset accountabil-ity and tracking for personnel and equipment.

• Current supply usage and demand trackingand communication.

• Distributed visibility into the pipeline.

• Assured real-time logistics operational management.

The need for such an integrated logistic informa-tion system is paramount, to ensure that respon-ders on the incident scene are maximally effectiveand that the effort to supply everything theymight need (in the absence of good informationon the actual needs) does not become an obstacleto other elements of the response.

Responders need an affordable solution, with theinherent flexibility to track assets (people, things,supplies) in real-time with a high degree of accu-racy for their location and status. (Many of theinputs would be provided by sensors and com-munication channels developed under otherNTROS—for example the responder location

and health status monitors discussed under UIC,the various attack characterization technologiesdiscussed in DIDA and the smart breathingapparatus and protective clothing addressed inPPE.) The LIS should provide a collaborativeplanning and management environment, allow-ing appropriate responders and officials at variouslevels to address logistics issues via voice and data,sharing a common logistics picture of the currentand projected status of assets and flows.

In other words, responders want a flexible, adap-tive, and easy means to share a blueprint of thesituation (like a scalable map of an area – the pic-ture), the ability to mark (draw and annotate),and the ability to aggregate and drill down oncontent (data and information). All respondersand technologists realize that this need cannot bemet by imposing a standardized, one-size-fits-allsystem across the variety of responder domains,cities, states, etc. By paying attention to an openarchitecture and interoperable systems, many ofthe information system needs can be met by deci-sion support tools that require minimal training,permit reliable access to information, and providesynchronous and asynchronous collaboration.

In the pre-crisis phase, the LIS would function tofacilitate deliberate planning and simulated andphysical exercises of logistics response across juris-dictional and disciplinary boundaries. In theimmediate post-event phase, the LIS would helpcommanders tailor and manage the initial logis-tics flow, mostly based on pre-planned options.The LIS would enable an early transition to theadaptive execution phase, in which the logisticsresponse is closely matched to the actual needs ofthe event rather than to pre-planned scenarios.

In the adaptive execution phase, the LIS wouldincorporate up-to-the minute inputs both aboutthe evolving nature and scale of the event and theneeds of responders on the scene to recalculatelogistics needs. Finally, the real-time trackingprovided by the LIS will support an earlier, moreaccurate, and less-costly repositioning of logisticsassets and reordering of consumables, resulting inan earlier and more efficient recovery of full logis-tics capability.

1 6 6


Chapter IX

Goals:

The LIS must meet responder needs in threeareas: performance, integration with broader inci-dent management systems, and openness to allresponse organizations. The performance goalsrelate to the ability of the system to collect, track,and present information relevant to projectingdetailed logistics demand, tracking and displayinglogistics flows and assets, and planning and man-aging the deployment of logistics assets to meetthe demand over the full course of the response.The LIS must function as a part of a broaderincident command system and supporting soft-ware, for the most part running on the samehardware and using the same communicationchannels and protocols. Finally, the LIS must beflexible and open (while remaining robust andsecure) so that it can accept demand, flow, andasset information from and allow planning partic-ipation by all response organizations, includingall responder specialties, all regional responderdepartments, volunteer personnel and private-sector assets, as well as FEMA and other federalgovernment participants.

Ideally, all response and regional and federal gov-ernment organizations would be included, inte-gration with the incident command systemwould be seamless, and the status of all personneland equipment (no matter what jurisdiction ororganization they belong to) would be trackedautomatically along with their projected demandfor consumables. Similarly, all supplies andtransportation and storage assets would automati-cally communicate their availability, location, andother relevant attributes to the LIS on a real-timebasis.

In practice, of course, significant improvementsover current capabilities could be achieved by sys-tems that fall well short of meeting these idealgoals. Because of the mix of systems that differ-ent jurisdictions, agencies, and vendors will havein place, the LIS must provide interfaces fortracking and marshalling assets that are notequipped with the most modern reporting capabilities.


Today, the logistics function is not generally rec-ognized as a separate discipline. Automatedtracking capabilities are non-existent in mostresponder contexts. Although some jurisdictionshave established bar-code tracking for materialsover a certain value ($500), these are not typicallyintegrated across disciplines and jurisdictions.Responder personnel are typically tracked byblackboard or at an aggregated (squad) level. ICS (incident command system) software existsbut is unaffordable for most jurisdictions and notstandardized.

Information integration and scalability are cur-rent limitations to the effectiveness of logisticsmanagement across responder domains.Capturing and managing data and knowledge isdifficult and limited. Information on the statusof equipment readiness and inventories is virtu-ally non-existent, and where information exists,the lack of accessibility, transparency and interop-erability makes the information of little value toexternal elements.

State of the Art:

The current state of logistics information systemsis evolving at a rapid rate, both within the com-mercial supply chain and also in government. Inaddition to full visibility of assets and goods intransit, the trend is toward increased integration,collaboration, and adaptability. Making informa-tion systems completely Web-accessible reducesthe significance of boundaries among organiza-tions and functional domains. Data integration,mining, and mediation technologies are permit-ting the use of data residing in legacy systems,even with differing semantics and schemas, to beaccessed and combined in near real-time withoutspecial-purpose programming. High resolutiongraphics and visualization capabilities permitusers to create customized views of informationfor collaborative analysis via the Web.

Tagging and sensing mechanisms (bar codes,radio-frequency ID tags, etc.) are becomingcheaper and more reliable, as are mechanisms

1 6 7


Logistics Support

that automatically report on the status ofmechanical systems and power sources. Finally,discretionary access control and role-based cus-tomization is evolving as a standardized feature indecision support tools to permit a level of secu-rity and prevention of information being misusedor interpreted out of context. The major chal-lenge in the responder domain is to obtain acapability that can be put at the disposal of a crit-ical mass of users to ensure stability, providingstrong incentives for cultural issues to beresolved.

Today, responder logistics command and controldoes not take advantage even of yesterday’s tech-nologies, not to speak of tomorrow’s. Emergingtechnologies will permit greater flexibility at alower cost. The key to leveraging state-of-the-artsoftware is integration and user access, permittingusers to tailor products to meet multiple logisticfunctions with the level of specificity required toforecast needs, make decisions, prioritize assets,and monitor readiness during any phase of anincident.

The military has invested years in evolving andcustomizing logistics capabilities. Current trendssee the military looking to the commercial supplychain for inventory, transportation, optimization,management systems, and business practices.Commercial supply chain practices, born in the“lean” or “just-in-time” manufacturing ethos andthe Wal-Mart lean inventory, low-margin, cus-tomer focus, facilitate reduced inventory anddelivering the right product at the right time tomeet customer demands. Tracking of shipmentsis critical and anticipation of needs is beingaccomplished with an unprecedented level ofaccuracy. Small businesses who have limitedresources have turned to third party logisticsproviders (3PL) to provide support (parts andtransportation) for low density critical resources.3PL providers have moved into a global brokerposition to make the best of the competitive mar-kets.

The military has realized the value of this conceptwith the creation of the Defense LogisticsAgency’s EMALL (electronic commerce mall)permitting consumables to be identified, located

and purchased via the Web. This medium hasreduced government inventories, reduced order-ing and financial paperwork, increased customersatisfaction, and optimized transportation time.It has also permitted greater vendor participationand competition. An EMALL for responderscould identify, locate, and purchase items to meetincident needs, in the quantities required, with-out having to hold significant and costly invento-ries locally, let alone be burdened with additionaldecisions in times of crisis.

Commercial supply chain management solutionsexist that could be readily adapted for use byresponders to meet many basic and collaborativeneeds. Short of the single EMALL concept,regional or national organizations could standard-ize the interfaces between responder organizationsand vendors and other logistics asset providers, toprovide visibility into supplier pipelines. Oneway of doing this would be to provide incentivesfor vendors to use customized plug-ins for cus-tomer relations management (CRM) softwarepackages. Optimization tools for transportationrouting and movement planning could provideresponders the ability to integrate a myriad oforganizations supporting an incident into a com-mon picture to set priorities and maximize uti-lization. Companies like i2 and Manugistics areleaders in this arena supporting large organiza-tions like FEDEX, UPS, Dell, etc., in meetingtransportation optimization needs.


Communications connectivity must be assuredfor the LIS to be effective. Managers of logisticsresponse during an incident will have to competefor limited communications resources. Whilelogisticians might prefer the autonomy of dedi-cated communications, it is easier to provideredundancy, security, and communications assur-ance as part of a unified communications system.Since responder logistics and overall incidentcommand must interact frequently and be syn-chronized, it makes sense for the communicationsto be effectively seamless.

Responders are not satisfied with the level ofexperience and training that characterize the

1 6 8


Chapter IX

people who end up fulfilling logistics tasks in acrisis. Modern systems have more complex logis-tics demands, requiring more sophisticated sys-tems and managers. Training across boundaries,both practical and cultural, is required with anyimplemented systems solution. While trainingand integrated exercises are costly, this cost ismitigated if the systems developed for terroristincidents are put in use every day. Respondersand technologists agree that any information sys-tem should be used on a day-to-day basis andmust serve equally well throughout the opera-tional environments of the planning and execu-tion continuum.

Any system must be scalable and able to retrieveand mediate data from disparate sources withoutthe need to cache at fixed points. Also, data mayrequire integration and downloading to localclients for immediate use while not connected tonetworks.

Integrating tracking technologies is difficult anddemands continued testing for interoperability,reliability, and scalability. Responders worry thattoday’s technologies for tracking are not matureenough to eliminate risk to life and mission.However, the limited logistics throughput in acrisis means that even with some risk of break-down, an improvement in visibility wouldincrease the reliability of the right supplies arriv-ing. These risks are arguments for good prac-tices, for testing and for backup operationalmethods, not for avoiding the use of moderntechniques for tracking critical assets during execution.

Gap Fillers:

In the short term, several initiatives couldenhance logistics information systems available to Responders:

• Establish a Web presence to disseminate expe-rience with logistics in exercises and incidents,and to engender discussion of best practicesand appropriate lessons. An initial nationalcapability could be provided within a year forunder $2M. This could be tied to MIPT’sBest Practices – Lessons Learned Knowledge-base effort.

• Establish standard interfaces for COTS track-ing capabilities (bar codes, RFID) ($5M overtwo years).

• Evaluate commercial and military candidatesfor inclusion in a semi-automatic suite oflogistics decision-support and command andcontrol system ($5M over two years.)

• Establish a robust server infrastructure on theInternet as the medium for collaborative logis-tics information systems. A mesh of coopera-tive servers could be established at a cost of$1M a year over 1-2 years. This should bedone in conjunction with filling other secureresponder collaboration and communicationneeds, as described in Chapter IV (UIC).

• Integrate commercial products and the abovegap fillers – approximately 2 years at a cost of$6-10M.

In addition, the following longer-term initiativescould be started:

• Evaluate the benefits of an automated logisticscommand and control suite of decision sup-port products, with software agent technolo-gies for search and optimization. Such a system could be developed and fielded within5 years at a cost of $40-120M, depending on the level of fielding and training. The big problem here is the need for automateddomain bridging by software agents. Such a project should involve agencies such asDARPA to ensure that emerging informationand communication technologies would beconsidered where appropriate.

• Evaluate the possible benefits of a next-generation, higher-resolution, longer-distancetracking capability, not hindered by interfer-ence (using ultra-wideband, mesh net, orthog-onal frequency division multiplex (OFDM),and related technologies). Fully evaluatingsuch a capability would be possible within 3 years at a cost of $5-10M; it could perhapsbe deployable in 10 years at $50M. This is a high-risk S&T endeavor with globalimplications.

1 6 9


Logistics Support

The next-generation tracking capability, and to alesser extent the automated domain-bridgingaspects of the command and control decision-support suite, are high-risk; without these ele-ments the overall level of technical risk for LS.1would be moderate and the increase in logisticsperformance from the intermediate technologies(COTS tracking and expert-guided decision sup-port systems) would still be dramatic comparedto current practice.

In addition to the high technical risk, there is thequestion of what could be called commercializa-tion risk. This is the equivalent of Sony’s techni-cally superior Betamax videocassette format – atechnical success that even its inventors do notuse because of the dominance of VHS in themarketplace. Because of economies of scale aswell as the need for interoperability, responderscould not afford to buy a logistics system basedon components that differ from those in use incommercial and military systems; thus the successof the next-generation tags would require thatthey would be adopted into military and com-mercial systems before being made available toresponders. But it seems unlikely that theresponder tail could wag the commercial and mil-itary dog in this way unless their requirementswere very similar; if the requirements are so simi-lar then it is unclear why the larger commercialand military R&D budgets would not result inoff-the-shelf products that could then be adoptedby responders without any substantial DHSR&D investment. Thus all that may be requiredin these advanced areas is a mechanism for insert-ing a responder voice into the counsels of mili-tary and commercial decision-making.

LS.2 – Automatic Generation and Assessmentof Supply Requirements. The capability to helpresponders forecast needs, identify sources, prioritizerequirements, and order supplies. Additionally,requirements for sustaining an incident must takeinto account the type of incident, weather, dura-tion, available transportation throughput, andorder/ship times. Responders need a decisionsupport tool for meeting this need that is intu-itive, helps determine requirements, maintainsaccountability, and can automatically generate

requests. Responders agree that no incident islike another, but that a capability must be avail-able to generate requirements that have a highdegree of accuracy for meeting projected needs;in other words the system must “learn” from pre-vious endeavors and make reasonable recommen-dations of supplies required in scope and time.

Goals:

• Develop an acceptable nationally recom-mended and standardized database/system togenerate requirements appropriate for specificCBRNE. The information needs to be user-friendly, consolidated and formatted to fit spe-cific incidents, command organizations, andlogistics systems and suppliers.

• Provide capability in execution phase to re-supply in real-time with just the right suppliesso as not to overburden a staging system.Coordinate private donations and on-sceneprocurement (Wal-Mart, Home Depot, etc.).

• Interface with Logistics Information Systemand its tracking element as well as the IncidentCommanders’ operational plans.


This capability, as defined, is largely unavailableto responders today:

• Very limited baseline requirements informa-tion exists for explosives, incendiary andchemical incidents. Information exists to alesser extent to meet biological and radiologi-cal incidents.

• In all cases, information retrieval is problem-atic.

• During execution, assessing requirements ismanual and reactive – tools are non-existent toprovide options, let alone determine, source,and order sustainment.

• No capability exists nationally for respondersfrom varied domains to access.

• Some capability exists within FEMA and theUSAR to pick sustainment items and find

1 7 0


Chapter IX

sources of supply; however, the programs donot generate projected sustainment based onspecifics of the subject incident.

State of the Art:

Both the Army and USMC have built require-ments-generation products for meeting wartimescenarios. The Joint Theater Logistics ACTD(DARPA) has created collaborative Web-basedaides that do requirements generation for missionneeds based on force structure. Commercial sup-ply-chain systems tend to be oriented to repeti-tive operations rather than one-of-a-kind inci-dents; thus there is no single off-the-shelf systemthat performs this task.


Creating a flexible decision support tool forrequirements generation is not limited by tech-nology. The ability to field, integrate, and ensureinteroperability of such a capability are the onlychallenges. Additionally, this capability must beorchestrated to work in concert with a logisticscommand and control and information system.

Gap Fillers:

Using COTS products, software could rapidly beadapted to this need and fielded. This capabilitywould have to link to commercial sources forplacing orders and managing shipments.Software could be accessible for download via theWeb and use Web-based interfaces for generatingrequirements, sourcing, and monitoring oforders. Additionally, the software must continu-ally update historical “knowledge” for types ofincidents, commodities used, and shortfalls. Thiscapability could be provided to responders within2 years for approximately $15M. The rightapproach is to build this capability in as a modulein the LIS.

LS.3 – Inventory Management. The ability tomanage sustainment inventories, ensuring stocks arerotated, consumed prior to shelf-life expiration, andoptimized for best use. In addition, respondersdesire to maintain minimal stocks, while not fail-ing to meet emergency needs, at the least possiblecost.

Goals:

• Develop a category-based, interoperable,inventory management system that can be made mission-specific, affordable, andaccessible.

• System must be easy to use, shared acrossjurisdictions, and data continually updatedand accessible.

• System should interface with the LIS.


Inventory management systems that span organi-zational boundaries are not used by responderstoday. Current practice has the following characteristics:

• Manual – use of whiteboards, markers, etc.

• Local commercial sources required to fillemergency orders, if stocks are available.

• Some jurisdictions have limited inventorymanagement tools (most “home spun”).

State of the Art:

Commercial supply chain tools exist to meet thisneed. Some jurisdictions have limited programs,but at a very basic level. COTS inventory pro-grams continue to increase capabilities, interoper-ability, and flexibility. Many programs share dataacross the Web and provide collaborative inven-tory decision making.


Technology is not a barrier – many similar pack-ages exist in industry. However, the integrationof a variety of different packages chosen by differ-ent responder organizations would be a signifi-cant problem.

Gap Fillers:

Commercial supply chain software could beadapted on a decentralized basis to meet thisneed, with the proviso that it interface with theLIS so that supply status be more broadly visibleto incident commanders. Additionally, via a 3PLprovider, commercial inventories could be made

1 7 1


Logistics Support

visible to responders in times of crisis for needs tobe met locally by rapid purchase. The inventorymanagement software needs to be cognizant oflocation of inventory as it moves (in space andacross jurisdictional boundaries), especially ifinterim supply depots are created. For this rea-son the most sensible arrangement would be tohave the inventory management system serve as amodular element within the LIS.

LS.4 – Mortuary Affairs Management. Theability of responders to recover remains and makeforensic identification of victims of CBRNE inci-dents. Recent history has made responders con-scious of the magnitude and sensitivity of recov-ery tasks.

Goals:

• An information system that can match DNAof many recovered fragments to multipleDNA samples of victims or relatives (some-times each in the 1,000s).

• Provide temporary morgues on site.


Existing capabilities vary across localities but aregeared for standard forensic work. The New YorkCity (World Trade Center) and Oklahoma Cityincidents demonstrate a need for procedures andinformation tools to be linked. Standard forensicDNA tools are designed for comparing one sam-ple to a few possibilities. The need to matchmultiple samples to vast populations increasescomplexity. Evidence rules normally requiremedical examiner notation of all bodies or partsrecovered. Thus delays occur in massive events.Two temporary morgues (equipment caches) cur-rently exist in the U.S. Potential military assis-tance is extremely limited. The Army has onlyone active duty mortuary affairs company (54th

Quartermaster) without laboratory capabilitiesfor scientific identification.

State of the Art:

The following technologies are available:

• PDA-based scanning technology for inventoryand segregation.

• Forensic DNA typing technologies.

• GPS for site marking and discovery.

• Use of animals and limited mechanical sensorsfor finding body parts.


The primary technology challenge is making theidentification, not tracking it. Automated tech-niques for sensing and finding body parts havenot been a real focus of investigation. The highlevel of background contamination on the site ofan explosion, fire, or building collapse poses diffi-culties for detection technology. DNA matchingtechnologies take too long because of the needfor amplification. Also, current technologiesrequire expert personnel, so the need for trainingof personnel and providing experts rapidly toincidents is a problem.

Gap Fillers:

Several initiatives are worth exploring:

• Robotic system with appropriate sensors (arti-ficial nose) for location of body parts.

• Automated support for geospatial and forensicrecord keeping of remains.

• More rapid techniques for matching DNA inthe hundreds to thousands context.

LS.5 – Lightweight, Long-Lived Power Sources.Longer-lasting, lighter weight, shorter recharge, easy-to-manage batteries. Batteries are expensive andconsumed at a rapid rate by all categories ofresponders. Types of batteries are as varied as thesystems they support. Shelf life and cost prohibitthe warehousing of all battery requirements inample quantities to support incidents. Weightand space prohibit the individual from carrying asupply of batteries to last for continual supportduring incidents. Standardization of equipmentand batteries would be desirable but seemsunlikely to happen soon given the large installedbase.

Battery sustainment is a critical issue for interoperability.

1 7 2


Chapter IX

Goals:

• Responder safety and effectiveness in emergen-cies that may require extended presence in thearea.

• Rapid resupply with reduced logistics tail(supply and maintenance).

• Alternative power sources.

• Minimum 24 hour battery.

– Reduce recharge time to under 15 minutes.

– Reduce size and weight to absolute mini-mum for various categories of batteries.

– Chip that tells the logistics system that bat-teries are running low.


• Responders find that batteries limit their abil-ity to operate equipment, even short of a full8 hour shift.

• Batteries often fail without notice.

• Responders view batteries as unreliable, heavy,and large, with long and unpredictablerecharge times.

• Gel cells and solar cells are used for communi-cations and repeater systems, but are limitedby weight.

• Generators carried by responder equipmentare not geared for servicing individual respon-der equipment.

State of the Art:

The same issues faced by responders are receivingthe attention from military leadership with spe-cific programs and funding.

• A DoD program (STO IV LG 2003.01) isfocusing on portable and mobile power for theArmy’s “Objective Force.” This program is a 3 year effort at $20M designed to addresslithium polymer technology.

• CECOM is also working with throw-awaylithium battery technology, rapid chargingtechnology (to reduce recharge times by 50percent), metal-air battery technology, andintegration of power distribution into clothingand equipment.

Exotic future power sources include novel electro-chemistries, portable fuel cells and fluid elec-trolyte cells that are recharged by exchanging theelectrolyte rather than being electrically rechargedwithin the battery.

In general, however, the main driver for improve-ment in batteries has been the commercial mar-ket (cell phones, laptop computers, etc.). Exceptfor very specialized purposes, this seems likely tocontinue to be the case.


The CECOM programs face problems in work-ing with the market to guarantee the volumerequired to have commercial partners invest inthe technologies. There is an inherent danger inattempting to standardizing power sources forfuture equipment; standardization inevitably hasthe character of a least common denominator,restricting performance and limiting innovation.

Cost is crucial. The cost for some future batterysource meeting the specified goals may run thecost up to three times the current price.

Because economies of scale dictate that respon-ders use battery technology that is commerciallyavailable, there is little possibility of economicallyproducing specific developmental items forresponder use.

Gap Fillers:

While the perfect world would at least standard-ize the equipment used by responders, legacyequipment would prevent this for some time evenif standardization for new equipment were tobegin today. Battery sustainment should be acritical concern when purchasing new equipmentor upgrading. Additionally, large organizationsshould manage battery sustainment as a critical

item and seek contracts for rapid resupply duringmajor incidents.

As communication capability begins to perfusethe responder community (for example via thepersonnel status tracker in UIC.1 (Point Locationand Identification)), consideration should begiven to automatic reporting of battery status to allow improved management of batteryreplacement.

DHS should ensure that both DoD and commer-cial battery developers are aware of responderpower source requirements and that theserequirements are factored into DoD R&D proj-ects and acquisition requirements. However, themost likely scenario is that responders will benefitfrom advances in cell phone and laptop batteries.

LS.6 – Transportation Optimization. Theability to have assured delivery of mission criticalpersonnel and goods. Transportation in support ofan incident is often in direct competition for thesame routes as emergency equipment (and evacu-ation). Sustainment is limited by scarce routes,assets, size and capacity of vehicles underdegraded road conditions, and scheduling.Transportation planning, scheduling, routing,and mode determination are issues that requireoptimization and risk avoidance. Often the mixof commercial contractors, responder support,and other agency vehicles moving equipment andresupply creates transportation chaos requiringintervention on the part other responders (police)who may not be fully aware of the logistics situa-tion or priorities.

Goals:

• Local – monitoring traffic patterns and restric-tions, location of transportation bottlenecksand assets, all in near real-time.

• Non-local – Fed Ex, UPS and military long-haul transport; have plans in place to follow-through with local representatives of compa-nies, or through digital communication.

• Personnel coordination with military transports.

• Secure, timely capabilities for command andcontrol and rerouting.


• Responders are conscious of imperfect integra-tion between federal and local transportationresources, across local jurisdictions, andbetween public and private sector transporta-tion authorities and providers.

• Emergency managers currently rely on com-mercial carriers, military transport, or con-tracts with local bus system operators.

State of the Art:

• Commercial software exists that can assist inroute and carrier scheduling and selection solong as information on degraded networks isprovided.

• Establishing emergency access routes for trans-portation bottlenecks and plans is addressedby large jurisdictions.

• Some cameras exist in large areas that providetraffic monitoring and permit changing trafficlight patterns to optimize flow on command.

• Sensors on vehicles in traffic could automati-cally report positions and speeds to a centralfacility (assuming communications are available).


Technology exists to provide real-time monitor-ing of transportation assets. However, the costsare considered prohibitive. Equipping every vehi-cle on the road and providing visual monitoringof all routes is regarded as impossible by respon-ders today. Another major problem is the con-flict of responder needs with evacuation of citi-zens from danger zones. The confusion in NewYork City on September 11th is a perfect example.Here logistics needs to be facilitated by capabili-ties in Chapter VI (EMPP) and Chapter V(R&R).

Gap Fillers:

Some COTS products exist that could be madeavailable to plan, optimize, and execute logistics

1 7 3


Logistics Support

1 7 4


Chapter IX

transportation assets. For example, i2Technologies recently fielded a lightweight appli-cation with basic map visualizations to the Army’s7th Transportation Command for port clearanceand sustainment delivery. Providing a basic capa-bility for planning and execution would be astart. This could be accomplished within a yearat a cost of approximately $2M. Technologistsquickly imagined many systems concepts thatcould relatively inexpensively provide informationon the status of the road network. UAVs oraerostats could provide inexpensive traffic flowinformation in conjunction with other emergencymissions such as communications relay. If com-munications bandwidth is available, communicat-ing tags on vehicles hold substantial promise ofproviding adequate near-real-time information.(If the cell phone system is working, one couldimagine that a small reprogramming of theOnStar and similar systems in cars could be usedto automatically report information on trafficspeeds and bottlenecks. Such an emergencymode could be required on cars and trucksequipped with similar GPS systems in thefuture.)

LS.7 – Assessment of Safe Air, Sea and GroundBases of Operations (Supply Depots). The abil-ity to assess the safety, security, accessibility andcapacity of potential bases of operations (supplydepots). During an incident, logistics respondersoften need to establish temporary locations tomarshal personnel and supplies and to operatesupport bases. Route considerations, space,buildings, and security are factors that must beconsidered, while locating the operation as closelyas possible to the incident. In some cases, morethan one site may be required. The assessmentmust be rapid and accurate to ensure that theresponse is not delayed or impeded.

Goals:

• Real-time satellite imagery (GIS), sensors ofstorage locations and adjacent routes.

• Template of requirements for basing – natureof materials, resulting base requirements.

• Database of locations which could be used forsupport bases; updated regularly.

• Consideration of security (to include marine,temporary structures).

• Rapid and accurate re-assessment during anincident to avoid delays in response.


Most localities have identified areas for use, butnot a database of areas. Technology that couldhelp determine safety of the areas (GIS/sensors) isnot available and/or very expensive. Localknowledge is applicable but interaction of avail-ability with detailed requirements is not currentlyfacilitated.

State of the Art:

Technologists noted programs exist, that if inte-grated with LS.1, could assist logistics responders:

• UAVs, satellite photography (remote imag-ing/sensing).

• National databases for ports and airfields(NGA) with integration into decision supporttools (Transportation Command(TRANSCOM) and DARPA both have cre-ated limited products).

• CECOM – Single Integrated Ground Picture(SIG-P).

• Military Traffic Management Command(MTMC) route databases.

• Intelligent Roadway and Railway InformationSystem (IRRIS).


The main limitations to full capability in thisarea are in the area of resources. To a lesserextent, there are issues with how best to integrateheterogeneous sensors (a central concern inChapter III (DIDA)). Problems of knowledgemanagement, representation, and optimizationwould need to be worked through but these are

not particularly difficult problems. Finally, infor-mation collaboration across jurisdictions wouldbe a practical issue. However, none of these isconsidered a technology limitation.

Gap Fillers:

The technologists determined that this issue canbe facilitated by adapting existing governmentproducts for civilian use. The concept would beto permit access to systems over the Web whichprovide collaborative viewing of the operationalpicture. Integrating the Web-based Joint TheaterLogistics collaborative mapping tools into the LIScan provide planning and real-time executionmanagement of depots. This effort would taketwo years and possibility up to $15M to field thecapability for use by responders nationally.

Logistics Support Response TechnologyObjectives (LSrto)

LSrto.1 – Integrated Logistics InformationSystem (ILIS). This Responder TechnologyObjective is designed to improve capabilities forLS.2 (Automatic Generation and Assessment ofSupply Requirements), LS.3 (InventoryManagement), LS.6 (TransportationOptimization), and LS.7 (Assessment of Safe Air,Sea and Ground Bases of Operations), in additionto LS.1 (Logistics Information System).

Objectives:

Develop an integrated yet evolutionary IntegratedLogistics Information System capable of connect-ing all echelons of command (including regionaland national) and all types of suppliers and otherlogistics nodes. The functions of this informa-tion system include planning and launching theappropriate initial logistics response to supportemergency response to disasters, tracking invento-ries and items in transit (across jurisdictions),projecting needs for consumables and other sup-port items including transportation, providinginformation and decision support for transporta-tion optimization, and providing information rel-evant to the rapid assessment of safe bases ofoperation. The information system should usecommunication links provided in Chapter IV

(UIC). It must be based on an open architecturethat allows software from different vendors tointeroperate, and it must provide basic interfaces(Web-based and call-centers) that allow somelevel of service to and integration with depart-ments lacking modern logistics systems.

Payoffs:

Such an integrated logistics information system isthe only feasible way to ensure that the decentral-ized and diverse character of responder organiza-tions does not remain a significant impedimentto mission support in the difficult context of thelimited resources available for a response to cata-strophic terrorism and the significant physicalobstacles that would attend such a response.

Challenges:

There are no severe technical challenges in pro-viding the individual components of a logisticsinformation system that would provide signifi-cant improvements to capability. Careful systemdesign should allow multilevel processes, someadvanced planning, and additional human effortto provide adequate capability even if the mostadvanced capabilities outlined by technologists(automatic domain-bridging and wide-area tagsthat cannot be jammed) are in fact not achieved.However, very significant challenges do exist,including: software integration on the scalerequired, providing for the needed level of open-ness to the variety of user interfaces requiredwhile also providing for continual evolutionaryimprovement. A further challenge will be entic-ing both software vendors and responder depart-ments to participate in the development andtechnology transition processes.

Milestones/Metrics:

FY2004: Develop the basic architecture for theLIS and the mechanisms by which the develop-ment will be carried forward. (In other wordsdetermine the boundaries and ownership of andsupervisory structure for centrally-provided utili-ties and interfaces and the procedures by whichmodules that will be owned and used by respon-der units will be certified and maintained.)Begin the short-term initiatives listed as gap

1 7 5


Logistics Support

1 7 6


Chapter IX

fillers under LS.1 and the evaluation of thelonger term gap fillers (next generation trackingand automated domain bridging).

FY2005: Provide an initial demonstration test-bed including appropriate initial simulations andscenarios that will allow evaluation of off-the-shelf software components. Establish a roadmapof milestones for incremental capability rollout.Complete the evaluation of longer-term initia-tives and establish a plan of action for them.

FY2006: Establish an initial operating capabilityfor central services; establish two regional opera-tional testbeds.

FY2007: Establish a third regional operationaltestbed.

FY2008: Initial National Operational Capabilityfor the LIS.

LSrto.2 Many-to-Many DNA Matching ofBody Parts

Objectives:

Develop the capability to recover, track, andidentify using DNA comparisons of bodilyremains from mass casualty events.

Payoffs:

Such a capability would ease the uncertainty andsuffering of relatives and also aid in the forensicreconstruction of mass casualty events.

Challenges:

The rapid development of novel DNA sequenc-ing technologies provides the means for achievingthis capability but it also means that the processof choosing a technological approach will beuncertain.

Milestones/Metrics:

FY2004: Review technologies for locating andrecovering remains and possible approaches to rapid DNA comparison. Issue an RFP forelaboration of technical approaches and proof of concepts.

FY2005-2006: Choose a maximum of threerecovery and three identification technologies forfurther development; issue appropriate RFPs andfund winners.

FY2007: Field prototype systems; conductdemonstrations.

FY2008: Develop operational systems for field-ing in FY2009.

ILIS $9 $21 $27 $32 $40 $129

ThrustLSrto.1 – Budget in Millions

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Totals

DNA Matching

$3 $6 $10 $10 $10 $39

ThrustLSrto.2 – Budget in Millions

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Totals

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

• Integrated System Capable of Connecting All Echelons of Command and All Types of Suppliers and Logistics Nodes

• Ability to Recover, Track, and Identify using DNA Comparisons

• Aids in Forensic Reconstruction of Event

LSrto.1 – Integrated Logistics Information System

LSrto.2 – Many-to-Many DNA Matching of Body Parts

Logistics Support Technology Roadmap

Definition

Crisis Evaluation and Management (CE) is theability to enforce the law and protect publicsafety by anticipating, preventing, reducingand/or removing a threat or act of terrorismincluding disabling terrorists and threat devices.


This NTRO is focused on the five operationalenvironments represented by threat: chemical,biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-explo-sive/incendiary effects of an event (i.e., CBRNE).


Responders and technologists considered a set ofsix functional capabilities required to function inthe operational context described above. Thesecapabilities are presentedbelow in order ofdescending priority:

• Identifying, Locating,Disarming andSeizing Perpetrator(s)

• Tactical ThreatAssessment

• Disposing of CBRNEDevices

• Initiating CrisisManagement Process

• Perimeter Security

• Media Managementand Accommodation

Overall State of Technology for CrisisEvaluation and Management

Capabilities providing intelligence, surveillance,and reconnaissance (ISR) are critical to crisis eval-uation and management capabilities. Respondersgenerally lack high-technology ISR tools inte-grated in such as way as to cross jurisdictionaland disciplinary lines. Many systems used in thespecial operations, military and intelligence com-munities are not widely used by responders. Insome cases, “low-density high-impact” items suchas millimeter wave imaging technology oradapted remote-controlled fiber optically-guidedvehicles could be decisive in providing real-timeintelligence needed for crisis evaluation and man-agement.

The matrix below shows that technology is avail-able today to increase capability in most of thelower-priority functional capabilities. The chart

1 7 7


Chapter x

Crisis Evaluation and Management (CE)Chapter Chair: Hal KempferChapter Coordinator: Michelle Royal

12

3





Crisis Evaluation and Management

1. Identifying, Locating, Disarming, and Seizing Perpetrator

2. Tactical Threat Assessment

3. Disposing of CBRNE Devices

4. Initiating Crisis Management Process

5. Perimeter Security

6. Media Management and Accommodation




1 7 8


Chapter X

indicates, however, that in the higher-priorityfunctional capabilities, there are still moderatetechnology challenges to increasing capabilities.It will be important to focus on these challenges,especially in tactical threat assessment in the bio-logical environment, where responders indicatedthat virtually no capability exists today.

CE.1 – Identifying, Locating, Disarming andSeizing Perpetrator(s). The ability to neutralizeand then apprehend the perpetrator(s).

Goals:

• Ability to neutralize and take custody of theperpetrator(s), eliminate the threat withouthindering the ability to acquire more informa-tion and evidence, understand the threat, etc.

• Safety for responders, hostages, and if possibleperpetrators.

• The technology of the responders shouldexceed the technology of the perpetrators.


Responders divided the capabilities of CE.1 intotwo main areas; 1) identifying and locating per-petrators, and 2) disarming and seizing perpetra-tors. The first area is more ISR-intensive; thesecond area more focused on tactical operations.The crucial technologies for both of these areasare: ISR systems, non-lethal weapons, and sensorsand tracking. Safety for responders and the pub-lic is a constant theme. Technological superiorityof public safety officials over perpetrators isimplied or assumed (although during workshops,perpetrator technology was occasionally broughtup for benchmark discussion and to challengeassumptions).

Initially, responders need to be able to identify asuspect or perpetrator quickly through bothinformation sharing systems and technologies tophysically identify perpetrators. There are a vari-ety of means available today to do this if the sus-pect’s identity information is already archived.For non-intrusive identification, facial recogni-tion (and voice recognition) technology and software has been used for law enforcement

applications as well as for counter-terrorism atspecial events (e.g., the 2003 Super Bowl).Details on this are further explained in CE.5(Perimeter Security).

COTS technologies for facial and body recogni-tion are available today for identification of per-petrators in the field. Some advanced applica-tions of this technology have been developed inLas Vegas casinos. Voice recognition softwarewith advanced wireless technology is seen as away to do biometric identification in the fieldthrough voice print analysis technology.Technologically, this has far greater potentialtoday due to recent advances in wireless telecom-munications and opportunities for better exploit-ing the standard technique of field interviews.

One technology requirement discussed byresponders is the need to “see through walls.”Infrared “flashlights” or portable camera systemsare commercially available that can provideimages from inside buildings and vehicles todetermine “hotspots,” such as people, lamps, etc.At border crossings, infrared imaging of contain-ers and vehicles is a common practice used byU.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement(ICE). Millimeter wave cameras are also used for“remote frisking” to detect weapons or drugs car-ried by persons.

Non-intrusive tracking measures include surveil-lance technologies such as optical sensors andsoftware that can discriminate between colors,shapes, movement and background. Lawenforcement helicopters use these technologies tofollow moving vehicles in heavy urban traffic.

For physically capturing and disarming perpetra-tors, there are a variety of capabilities available, toinclude lethal force, and “non-lethal” capabilities.non-lethal technologies include bean-bag projec-tiles and rubber bullets, flash-bangs, sticky foam,HERF (high energy radio frequency includinghigh power microwave or HPM weapons), robot-ics, tasers, net guns, microwave vehicle stopping,NIJ’s ring airfoil projectile (RAP), and advancedweapons being developed at the U.S. Army’sPicatinny Arsenal and Rome Labs.

Disabling perpetrators wired with remote or sui-cide explosives presents a challenge against whichresponders have no capability. Responders need atechnical means to block or neutralize the fre-quencies of a remote detonating transmitter with-out detonating the device itself. Disarming andseizing such a perpetrator puts responders and thepublic at substantial risk; the presence ofchem/bio or radiological agents presents a varietyof additional technical challenges.

State of the Art:

Programs such as the Regional InformationSharing System Network (RISSNET), OpenSource Information System (OSIS), LawEnforcement Online (LEO) and Joint RegionalInformation Exchange System (JRIES) show dra-matic promise for sharing critical threat intelli-gence, or criminal or perpetrator identificationand location. However, these systems are notfully integrated. Integrating these systems wouldappear “low-hanging fruit” that could result inlarge returns on investment. With OSIS nowbeing managed under the INTELINK office, thecapability exists to more quickly sanitize and thenfurther tie together classified federal intelligenceinto timely bulletins, warnings or database infor-mation for unclassified dissemination to state andlocal authorities.

Database information on the perpetrator is essen-tial, along with the ability of responders toquickly query online databases. RISSNET isdesigned to share law enforcement informationacross municipal and state boundaries, and tiestate and local law enforcement in with federallaw enforcement agencies. RISSNET currentlyprovides valuable information on potential oractual perpetrators of terrorism to support activeinvestigations, although much of the RISSNETdata is still related to drug investigations.

The FBI’s Law Enforcement Online (LEO) sys-tem was originally started as an alternative toRISSNET, but is now is integrated with it. LEOhas a multitude of applications and informationsharing tools. RISSNET has six networkedregional centers that share criminal intelligenceand information, to include perpetrator data, and

provides a systems interface to coordinate effortsagainst criminals nationwide. LEO is available tostate and local law enforcement, but is a U.S.Department of Justice sponsored system managedby the FBI.

Non-lethal technologies, whether against personsor vehicles, are not fully mature, and probablyrequire several years’ development for full utility.Tasers and the ring airfoil projectile hold promisefor wider application in the NTRO, and could becritical gap fillers until more robust technologiescome online. The air taser is a very popular non-lethal weapon that uses projectile probes con-nected by wire with a power source to deliver alarge high voltage, low amperage charge to thetarget. It is widely used in law enforcement, cor-rections, security work and for self-protection.The drawback is that there is no technical meansat the time to make the probe or round self-con-tained; it must be connected to the main gun bywires. This dramatically limits range and utility,with maximum range of 21 feet, and very limitedability to quickly engage other targets.

Lasers are currently used for aiming of ballisticrounds (and illegally used by criminals for flashblindness of enforcement personnel or oppo-nents), but may be used in the future as a carrierof disruptive effects such as tetanization to dis-rupt muscle function. The technology to thisdoes not exist yet, it is mostly theoretical and sev-eral years off by most estimates.

While not technology per se, there is a generalresponder shortfall in working with technology,particularly for analytical purposes. Identifyingand locating perpetrators and developing threatassessments are primarily intelligence functionstied to investigations, but not solely investigative.Personnel such as Criminal Intelligence Analysts(with the State of California), or analysts withDHS and the FBI are not trained with technol-ogy, software and techniques commensurate totheir other intelligence community counterparts.The ability to assess a transnational criminalenterprise, or one that simply supports terrorism,and then define its modis operandi, infrastructure,

1 7 9



key players and their roles, etc. is different fromthe training for standard crime analysis.


A significant barrier is the problem of systemsdeveloped along “stovepiped” bureaucratic lines,which prevents information sharing. Federalbureaucracies (and state and local agencies) havebeen wedded to their own in-house systems asthe backbone of their information managementprogram. The FBI uses FBINET, the DEA usesNADDIS or FIREBIRD, ICE uses TECS II, andso on throughout the government. Shared infor-mation systems such as RISSNET, JRIES andLEO are often viewed as secondary and less use-ful, except for some state and local enforcementagencies that have adopted them as their primarylaw enforcement sensitive database.

LEO, RISSNET, OSIS, JRIES and OpenNETare not fully integrated. Looking at their systemsbackbones and operating software, there does notappear to be a clear technological limitation fromfurther or complete integration of these systems.

For responders, information or intelligence shar-ing is a key part of identifying perpetrators, butsecurity of sensitive case information has been aprimary limitation to sharing perpetrator data.Workshop participants highlighted the DrugEnforcement Administration’s (DEA) NationalDrug Pointer Index (NDPIX) system that allowsdata queries on various types of informationfields such as names, numbers, addresses, dates,etc. While allowing “cross pollination” betweeninvestigators, it only allows sharing of as muchinformation as the inputting investigator, or ana-lyst wishes to reveal. When a query results in a‘hit,’ contact information for the case agent oranalyst is provided. This linkage process allowswide dissemination of key data components toother law enforcement agencies while protectingsensitive data surrounding persons, places, num-bers or things involved with ongoing or sensitiveinvestigations.

There are significant technological barriers to developing systems to stop a perpetrator

threatening to detonate a WMD (to includehigh-yield explosives). With current non-lethaltechnology, there is no assured method of achiev-ing “instant paralyzation” without killing the per-petrator. The only truly fail-safe means to stop aperpetrator was referenced by the term “headshot,” meaning a ballistic projectile being firedinto the perpetrators brain causing instant cessa-tion of cognitive and sensory capabilities, toinclude motor function. By the same token, eventhis solution was potentially flawed due to theterrorist perpetrator only having to build a simple“dead-man’s switch,” which triggers the devicewhen pressure is removed. Examples of this arefound in Israel with suicide bombers.

When disarming the perpetrator, there was con-cern about interference of RF (radio frequency)signals from portable communication devicesused by responders, with mention that as little asfive watts could trigger a standard high explosivedevice. All capabilities developed for respondersshould heed this risk, especially those developedto disable perpetrators.

Gap Fillers:

There was discussion by responders of using a“stepladder approach,” building symmetrically oncapability sets as they were developed or fielded.This approach includes establishing an urbantestbed of new concepts and technologies; figur-ing out what works and what does not in ashorter time period.

A near-term gap filler is to leverage the explosionof mobile information or telecommunicationsinfrastructure. The ability to collect and sendinformation to and from the field has grownexponentially over the last few years, and thisprovides tremendous advantages for responders inhow they can identify and locate a perpetrator.When combined with technologies such as facial,body and voice recognition, or even biometricssuch as electronic fingerprinting, there is an abil-ity to rapidly identify perpetrators, and thenfront-load critical intelligence on them to facili-tate accelerated or safer apprehension. Examplesinclude merged technologies of PDAs (personal

1 8 0


Chapter X

digital assistants) that can store images, cellphones with cameras, Blackberry systems used forpaging and email usage during a crisis.

While known sensor and biometric technologyappears far less than 100% accurate or foolproof,collectively they appear to have great deterrencevalue and redundancy that greatly minimizes ormitigates the chance of perpetrator or deviceremaining unidentified if “sensed.” Technologistsand responders discussed the establishment ofsome sort of fixed or semi-fixed system of sensorsin critical places, and much of this seemed cen-tered on high profile targets like sports venues ortheme parks.

Current practice at many large public events is tophysically check personal identification andsearch any bags, carriages, etc. upon entering thefacilities or venues. Technological means exists toconduct multiple biometric and sensor scansusing existing systems of persons and personalgear. This would provide an automated tool toflag anomalous characteristics for further inquiryor search. While there are still substantialimprovements in these systems to be done, thiscapability has the potential for screening morepeople faster, while exhibiting a strong deterrentto those trying to do something unlawful. An80%, or even 50%, accuracy rate for facial recog-nition, combined with a digital fingerprintmatch, voiceprint match, and an array of mil-limeter wave and “sniffer” sensors, would appearto be a potent gap filler.

There is nothing more reliable or realistic thanthe current low-tech approaches such as spikestrips to stop vehicles. For apprehending or stop-ping persons, it appears that short term gap fillersare confined to tasers, air tasers (with theirextremely limited range) and possibly advancedfielding of the new ring foil projectile beingdeveloped by NIJ (see CE.5 (Perimeter Security)).

CE.2 – Tactical Threat Assessment. The abilityto assess threats inside buildings (i.e., seeing throughwalls), identify individuals and objects that are atrisk, and have awareness of perpetrators’ actions,position, and status of devices and weapons.

Goals:

• Rapid (within minutes) risk, hazard, and situa-tional size-up.

• Ability to differentiate perpetrators from theother people (hostages, victims, bystandersand responders).

• All-in-one integrated suite that also tells youwhat you are dealing with (a “reach” goal).


There is very limited capability for tactical threatassessment in reference to meeting these goals,with almost no available capability for biologicalthreats. There are current technologies that canbe applied such as infrared imaging, acousticdetectors and processors, radar motion detectors,and optical motion detection.

State of the Art:

Acoustic technology that can penetrate solid sur-faces exists, and DoD has done considerable workin this area. “Ping” technology was referenced byresponders and technologists as a tool for identi-fying hidden weapons or devices in tactical threatassessment. “Multi-ping” technology uses varia-tions in the local acoustic environment exploitedby target classification algorithms. This fallsunder the category of broadband active acousticsignal processing, particularly the area of nontra-ditional homing.

Imaging millimeter wave sensors can be usedwith some measure of stand-off to see throughthe walls of buildings. It is essentially microwaveflooding that can provide a sense of where wallsand flooring are, and then provide movementpatterns by taking the differences in the baselinewith the current images. The limitation is that itcannot see completely through the building anddoes not provide a high resolution motion videopicture, but it can tell if there is movement in thefront rooms of the building and where thatmovement is located. Special operations andcounterintelligence units have been using thistechnology for some years, and the equipment is

1 8 1



specially manufactured and obtained throughintelligence channels.

In addition, a system using millimeter wave sens-ing is completely contained within van that candrive up and down parking lots or other car loca-tions and “look into” vehicles to identify com-partments. This is a significant improvementover earlier versions that had a backscatter issuerequiring a hard backing on the target. The newsystem requires no such backing and is com-pletely self-contained.

Another technological approach used for tacticalassessment of building interiors is small, remotecontrolled vehicles with a fiber optic link andspecial sound dampening rubber wheels. Withaccess to an air shaft or other avenue of approach,these vehicles can gain surreptitious entry forobservation and audio collection on the targets.Normally, the system is outfitted with infraredimaging capability.

Along with the more advanced means, there isalso standard equipment such as fiber optic cam-eras for peering under doors or around corners,along with less hi-tech mirrors. These fiber opticsystems can be remotely controlled over short dis-tances to twist or turn in a particular direction toaid movement or observation. There are also amyriad of miniature cameras and listeningdevices that can be clandestinely emplaced, butthis requires very close proximity to the target inorder to do so. There are also parabolic dishdevices for listening to conversations overextended distances, and many different ways thatlistening or camera devices can be secreted intoapparel, eyeglasses, luggage, doorknobs, “polecams,” “tree cams,” or other common items.

DARPA is working on projects that will equipsmall ISR (intelligence, surveillance and recon-naissance) systems like UAVs (unmanned aerialvehicles) to detect perpetrators, and use sensorsystems to detect chemical, radiological and bio-logical weapons. Obviously, these could be easilyadapted for emplacement on a remotely con-trolled tactical ground vehicle, with space andweight limitations being a consideration.

The Department of Homeland Security is start-ing test flights at Fort Huachuca and Gila Bendin Arizona on unmanned aerial vehicles, buildingon the lessons learned and adapted applicationsdeveloped in Afghanistan and Iraq. UAVs bringsome distinct advantages such as a loiter time of4-50 hours, far longer than manned aircraft cansustain, and fly at a high enough altitude to bevirtually undetectable by noise. A UAV or dronebeing used for this purpose outfitted with cam-eras and sensors can cost between $1.5 to $4 mil-lion, which compares very favorably to costsincurred from helicopter or other manned aerialsurveillance options with similar capabilities.

Systems that archive building plans can affordrapid access to blueprints, floorplans, and evenphotographs of building interiors to assist withtactical assessment. Currently, most large build-ings and facilities submit plans to the fire depart-ment, and tall buildings are required to haveblueprints on hand in the lobby for responders toreference as needed in cases of emergency.Software exists that allows 3-D manipulation ofthese plans. This facilitates the ability of aresponder to “see” into a building.


Portability of these technologies is a major tech-nological barrier to meeting the goals of thisfunctional capability. In addition, stand-off sen-sor systems that use millimeter wave, infrared, orother radar technologies will continue to facetechnological challenges penetrating thick wallssufficiently, and yielding enough detail, to meetthe accuracy demands of sensitive, dangerous tac-tical operations involving armed perpetrators andpossibly hostages.

Gap Fillers:

A key gap filler is to digitize building and facilitydata for rapid access and 3-D manipulation bytactical responders. This should build on bothtechnologies and policies that automate the collection, digitization, and compilation of information gained as various members of thepublic safety community visit and inspect a given building. For example, fire inspectors,

1 8 2


Chapter X

health inspectors, building code inspectors,municipal licensing authorities, police officers,etc., as they inspect a building in the course oftheir duties, could provide data to an automatedinformation system, such as how many peoplework in an office, daily operation patterns, or apotential vulnerability of a particular location.This information could to be tied in with thebuilding plans or layout to provide respondersand tactical commanders a far more completepicture of the building and what is likely insideit. Moreover, it would provide a foundation foran open architecture for augmentation byadvanced “see through wall” sensor systems asthey become available and are perfected.

Another near-term gap filler is to develop a tech-nology bridge between public and private sectorclosed circuit television (CCTV) and otherremote sensor systems. This sort of public-pri-vate cooperation has been done successfully inother spheres, to include utility and informationsharing. The administrative burdens and techno-logical challenges would be minimal.

CE.3 – Disposing of CBRNE Devices. Theability to disable, render safe, contain, handle,transport, and dispose or destroy of contaminatedthreat devices, including contaminated explosiveordnance disposal.

Goals:

• Containment or otherwise management of“excessive” amounts of explosives.

• Accomplishing this functional objective safelywhile preserving evidence or sources of intelli-gence, and not exacerbating the situation.

• Ability to render safe the location where thedevice was built/assembled/grown, if the loca-tion also poses a threat.


Most large jurisdictions, especially the federalagencies, have the capability to dispose of chemi-cal devices. A marginal capability exists to dis-pose of high explosive devices, usually limited incases of “excessively” large amounts of explosives

(the challenge is handling the mass of explosives,rather than the type of explosive). No capabilityexists at local levels to dispose of a biological,radiological, or nuclear devices sufficient to meetthe goals, although responders recognize thesecapabilities exist at the federal level.

State of the Art:

Workshop participants felt that much of the stateof the art for this capability resides with the mili-tary and federal agencies. For example, if a juris-diction faced the problem of disposing of a radio-logical device, they would not attempt to do soon their own. The Department of EnergyNuclear Emergency Response Teams (NEST)teams are designed and equipped for this missionand would be called in. Similarly for biologicals,the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute ofInfectious Diseases (USAMRIID) has disposalcapability.

For the responder community, there are sometotal containment vessels that will contain a mod-erately-sized explosive device (2-5 lbs) which areavailable to responders. In addition, a tent deviceis being developed in Canada which dispersesfoam that degrades biological agents.


Limitations and barriers for Disposing of CBRNEDevices are similar to those for decontamination.There is always a question of “how clean isclean.” The device, and all trace particles fromthat device, needs to be disposed of with a levelof surety that will placate both responders andthe public. Cost is also represented as a techno-logical barrier here because the large price tagassociated with some of these items is prohibitivefor all but the largest jurisdictions.

Gap Fillers:

A primary concern of the responders is develop-ment of technologies to aid in the disposal ofbiological devices. The technologists also felt thatthis operational environment presented thebiggest challenge for technology development tomeet the responders’ needs. This capability isrelated to the development of sensors (see

1 8 3



Chapter III (DIDA) which are needed to deter-mine the composition of the device, and there-fore the proper disposal means. Responders com-mented that they have to way of reliablycontaining an unknown threat.

CE.4 – Initiating Crisis Management Process.The ability to initiate functions, systems, and tech-nologies to support decision-making, course-of-actiondetermination, and subsequent incident actionplans.

Goals:

• Timely, automated notification of other agen-cies, disciplines, and levels of government withfunctional responsibilities.

• Automated activation of Memorandums ofUnderstanding (MOUs) and Mutual AidAgreements, etc.


Responders do not have this functional capabilitytoday in an automated system. Activation of cri-sis management processes is still a manual,chaotic process.

State of the Art:

Responders and technologists agreed that thetechnology exists today to enable this functionalcapability. It is only a matter of integration andimplementation, beginning with a policy-leveldecision to do so. There are several examples oftechnology approaches that could be integrated.

California’s Response Information ManagementSystem (RIMS) is a statewide computer systemused to coordinate and manage the state’sresponse to disasters and emergencies. It isInternet based, and was developed by theCalifornia Office of Emergency Services (OES) in1995. Today it has over 2000 internal and exter-nal clients, and is available to all cities, specialdistricts and state agencies within California thathave a computer access through the Internet, andis controlled through IDs and passwords.

In San Diego, as well as other cities, there is the“find me, follow me” system for automated pag-

ing and calling of key emergency response per-sonnel or emergency managers. The system willtell those on duty who is available and how farout they are, and it is event driven. It keeps oncalling or paging someone until it gets a responsethat they have been found and the message delivered.

For seismic events in California, the state devel-oped EDIS (Emergency Digital InformationSystem) following the Loma Prieta earthquake inthe San Francisco Bay Area in 1989. However,this has since grown considerably, and is a combi-nation Website, newsier and 24 hour broadcastservice. Authorized agencies can release text, pic-tures and sounds over EDIS using their ownexisting networks, and the news media and pub-lic have access to the latest EDIS informationover the Internet, via digital radio broadcasts, ontheir pagers, and by email.

EDIS is designed to be disaster-resistant, with asophisticated satellite distribution network con-stantly updating “mirrored” EDIS servers inselected newsrooms and networked facilitiesaround the state. Even when public networks areclogged after a disaster, EDIS information will beavailable statewide.


The technologies exist today to deliver this capa-bility. Cost and political will are the biggest bar-riers. Systems that rely on cellular or othertelecommunications networks will encounter thesame technological challenges that are presenttoday (e.g., bandwidth availability, cell disruptionor overloading, nodal failure or destruction, etc.).

Gap Fillers:

At the municipal or regional level, the main gapfiller would be the development of a standard sys-tem such as the “find me follow me” system thatSan Diego has put in place. For automated trig-gering of mutual aid and memorandums of agree-ment, the Washington metropolitan system estab-lished by MITRE would appear to be abenchmark for expansion and adaptation.

1 8 4


Chapter X

CE.5 – Perimeter Security. The ability to con-trol individuals, crowds, and vehicles, to preventpublic disorder or endangerment from the threat(i.e., keeping public out of the blast radius, keepingthe public from snipers or hostage-takers, etc.), andto keep public citizens and vehicles from interferingwith efforts to manage and reduce the threat.

Goals:

• Public safety – keep the public out of the dan-ger zone.

• Extend and control security perimeter andzone far enough out so that response person-nel and staging activity can operate unhin-dered by the public.

• Ensure that only authorized credentialed indi-viduals are within the perimeter. This alsowould include authorization of equipmententering perimeter/staging area.


Responders have a marginal capability to meetthese goals today, hindered mainly by the abilityto ensure authorized credentialed personnelwithin the perimeter. The technologies toachieve these goals exist today.

State of the Art:

Currently most emergency or consequence man-agement locations, especially involving CBRNE,are sealed off manually using personnel and tapeto keep intruders away. As the situation devel-ops, physical barriers are put in place, and overtime temporary fencing may be emplaced as well.For pre-existing facilities, such as amusementparks, major airports, shopping centers and casi-nos, there may be an existing CCTV system thatcan provide remote visual surveillance of theperimeter to augment “boots on the ground.”

In major HAZMAT incidents, emergencyresponders have often had to man checkpointsand set up a perimeter with personnel keepingout intruders, or enforcing an evacuation ofdownwind areas. The same capability will proba-bly be relied upon for a CBRNE incident.

For access control, there are a variety of technolo-gies that can be applied to ensure only authorizedpersonnel are allowed access to within the securedperimeter. This includes technology like barcodes, magnetic strips, passwords and so on.More advanced technology measures biometricdata (e.g., retina scanners, face recognition).Smart cards can also be applied to this capability,capturing personnel authorization as well as train-ing proficiency and currency (see Chapter VI(EMPP)).

Responders were also concerned about tacticalaccounting of equipment into a control zone.One common technology used to account forthis is to attach a tag with a bar code. Moreadvanced technology involves attaching a remotetransmitting device that can then be monitoredremotely. GPS technology, similar to what isused with On-Star devices on automobiles, cansend out the signal of where the equipment is atany given time.

Surveillance technology for monitoring a perime-ter was deemed very important to responders,with great interest on CCTVs, motion detectorsand unattended ground sensors. All of this tech-nology exists, and the ability to establish a net-work using wireless networking has only recentlybecome easily achievable.


The technologies are available in the near term tomeet the goals of this functional capability.

For authorization verification, there are still prob-lems with reading strip cards, especially in thefield. Sometimes the magnetic strip loses itscode, or the automated reader is otherwise unableto read the card. In a field environment with afast-paced crisis or event, corrective action maynot be immediately available. There is also thepossibility of counterfeit cards being produced,and the sophistication of counterfeiters todaymakes this a serious threat. It is possible toembed anti-counterfeiting technology into thesystem, however. If cards are used, there wouldbe a need for a lot of readers and reading stations,which would become manpower intensive, either

1 8 5



taking away from the available responders inorder to manage this activity or requiring addi-tional manpower dedicated to this activity.Furthermore, the technology of biometrics is notfool-proof, and both technologists and responderswere aware of false positives and false negativesbeing a substantial problem.

Non-lethal force technology for perimeter controlis a critical concern of responders. The currentstate of non-lethal technology deployed in thefield is inadequate to address enforcement ofperimeters without resorting to the threat or useof deadly force. The scenario of a little girl run-ning away from a quarantine area comes to mind,with the implied ethical, legal and political ques-tions of whether deadly force should be used,with the corresponding failure to stop her as risk-ing the chance of a greater epidemic.

Non-lethal enforcement of quarantine operationsis becoming more important. With major inci-dents, civil-military operations are more likely.In many cases, this will require military augmen-tation in the role of large-scale quarantine opera-tions. Whereas technology exists to identifyquarantine violators with substantial stand-offrange depending on the perimeter, the ability tostop them from escape is primarily the threateneduse of lethal force at present.

Gap Fillers:

There is technology being developed that allowsthe reader to scan the thumbprint of the personholding the card with the card, thus minimizingthe chance of counterfeiting ID. Smart chiptechnology is also a readily available solution thatcan meet needs in this and other NTROs such asMedical Response, Emergency ManagementPreparation and Planning, etc.: anywhere whereidentification, location, and proficiency of per-sonnel needs to be known by an incident com-mander.

CE.6 – Media Management andAccommodation. The ability to manage andaccommodate the media such that media personneland equipment (e.g., vehicles, lights, recording/broadcasting, and communications equipment) does

not give the perpetrator any tactical benefits frommedia exposure.

Goals:

• Keep the media within the right places insidethe appropriate perimeter, such that no sensi-tive tactical operations can be broadcast by themedia.

• Provide enough access to the press to satisfythem to the extent that they do not try tothwart the above functions. This includescooperation with the media to the extent pos-sible without compromising the operation.


Responders have this capability today.

State of the Art:

Responders felt that this capability is not technol-ogy enabled. Good relationships with the mediaresult in the best outcomes for managing mediapersonnel and equipment, as well as informationflows.

Crisis Evaluation and ManagementResponse Technology Objectives (CErto)

CErto.1 – Non-Lethal Safe Seizure ofPerpetrators

Objectives:

Develop less-than-lethal technologies to instantlyimmobilize perpetrators with weapons orhostages, such that explosive devices or otherweapons are not detonated, released, etc. Thistechnology will not emit radio frequency or othersignals that might set off an RF detonator.

Payoffs:

This will provide responders a way to take perpe-trators into custody without relying on deadlyforce, or presenting a danger of detonating theperpetrator’s weapon.

Challenges:Some of the more exotic technologies, likeHERF, are still in the R&D phase, and won’t be

1 8 6


Chapter X

available for years. When they do become avail-able, some of the less technical means currentlyavailable may quickly become obsolete.

Traditionally, identifying and seizing perpetratorshas been focused on the professional knowledgeand judgment of the agent or officer on thescene. Modern communications technology hasbeen slowly eroding this traditional approach,and the technology being discussed here woulderode that more.

Milestones/Metrics:

FY2005: Review the state of the art in non-lethaltechnology developments in the DoD and publicsafety community and assess the applicability ofthe technology to the goals in this NTRO.Develop concepts of operation and functionalspecifications for a suite of non-lethal tools.

FY2006: Select enabling technologiesfor the initial operational capability(Block 1) of the non-lethal suite of

tools. Develop the architecture and Broad AreaAnnouncement to begin development and inte-gration of Block 1.

FY2007: Continue development of Block 1 suite.Begin commercialization process and planningfor operational demonstration. Begin develop-ment testing of Block 1. Select enabling tech-nologies for Block 2 capability.

FY2008: Conduct operational demonstration of Block 1 capability. Begin development ofBlock 2 suite of tools. Continue commercializa-tion efforts.

FY2009-2010: Deploy Block 1 suite. ContinueDevelopment of Block 2. Conduct developmenttesting of Block 2. Demonstrate Block 2 in anoperational environment. Deploy Block 2.

1 8 7



Non-Lethal Suite of Tools

$5 $7.5 $8 $40.5$8 $8 $4

Thrust 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Totals

CErto.1 – Budget in Millions

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010• Instant Immobilization• Explosive Devices or

Other Weapons Not Detonated

CErto.1 – Less-Than-Lethal Safe Seizure of Perpetrators

Crisis Evaluation and Management Technology Roadmap

1 8 8


Chapter X

Definition

All-Source Situational Understanding (ASU) isthe ability to perform four interrelated tasks inorder to have the earliest possible, specific, andcontinuing knowledge of a threat, and to supportincident command decisions across all phases of alocal or regional response:

• Collect and identify threat-relevant informa-tion;

• Fuse and analyze information to supportthreat awareness;

• Identify persons who need to know specifictypes of information (and what that information is); and

• Disseminate appropriate information to (andonly to) appropriate persons.

As a threat crosses jurisdictional and even statelines, so must information. A crucial element ofthis ability is the need to make information read-ily available and useful to all relevant actors acrossdisciplinary, jurisdictional, and geographic lines,as appropriate to a particular evolving event,without compromising the security of this infor-mation. Skillful use of ASU speeds response by decreasing response time, decision time and time required for course of action (COA)development.

Operational EnvironmentsThe operational environments most relevant toall-source situational understanding are derivedfrom the operational progression of an event, rep-resenting phases of the “intelligence process” insupporting incident command before, during and

after a threat manifests itself, as well during con-sequence management and restoration. TheOperational Environments are defined as:

• Awareness

• Alert and Warning

• Crisis Response and Threat Reduction

• Consequence Management and Restoration


The needed functional capabilities prioritized inthe Emergency Responders’ workshops includethe following items, prioritized in order of impor-tance to the responders.

• Threat Assessment/Data Collection/Analysis

• Intelligence Preparation for Operations

• Threat Relevant Data Distribution

• Intelligence Support to Unified IncidentCommand Structure

Overall State of Technology for All-Source Situational Understanding

While responders believe that they have marginalcapability for each of the functional capabilities,the technologists rated the technologies to enablethese capabilities as available in the near-term, ifnot currently. Threat Assessment/DataCollection/Analysis (ASU.1) and IntelligencePreparation for Operations (ASU.2) are the onlycapabilities which should require technologydevelopment with a moderate degree of risk. All

1 8 9


Chapter xi

All-Source Situational Understanding (ASU)Chapter Chair: Hal KempferChapter Coordinator: Michelle Royal

other technology areas can achieve results withlow technology development risk.

ASU.1 – Threat Assessment/Data Collection/Analysis. The ability to collect and identify/recog-nize threat-relevant information (i.e., indicationsand warning), validate and analyze the data, andvalidate and assess the threat for purposes of evalu-ating threat levels and credibility. Note: this func-tional capability is crucial to the overall value ofthe ASU NTRO.

Goals:

The goals identified by responders for this areainclude:

• Ability to provide all relevant jurisdictions anddisciplines access to near-real-time, same-qual-ity information and an awareness of the threat.Responders defined near real-time as beingwithin 15 minutes. They saw this as the timewhen the information product has “realvalue.”

• Ability to collect, validate and fuse informa-tion from several disciplines (technical as wellas observations from patrol officers, firefight-ers, epidemiologists, and other responders),especially automated open-source information.

• Threat assessment toolkit that aids in patternrecognition and validating data.

• The ability to inte-grate informationamong several differ-ent jurisdictions andlevels of government.

• The establishment ofprocesses that allowquick data validation,using information ondata source.

• The ability to linkinformation/analysisand detection acrossdifferent sources.

• The establishment of processes and systemsthat foster redundant analysis and competitionamong analytical hypotheses.

• The ability to analyze multi-disciplinary (i.e.,not just law enforcement-originated) threatassessments.

• The ability to centralize pooling and synthesisof distributed or multiple sources of analysis,with access to all sources of threat informationand updates, including electronic clearing-houses (e.g., FBI’s Law Enforcement Onlineand RISS-ATIX).

• The ability to support unconstrained “think-ing outside the box” rather than forcing ana-lysts to consider limited or non-creativehypotheses, options, etc. (no blinders on ana-lysts). This is “red teaming” at its most useful.

• The ability to integrate tools for data miningof both structured and unstructured informa-tion, geared toward detection of changingtrends (i.e., early detection of emergingthreats), detection of alert situations includinganomalous detection via normalization, auto-mated foreign language translation includingunderstanding of context supported by cul-tural intelligence, and processing of images,video, audio and signal data with automatedextraction of text and image data elements.

1 9 0


Chapter XI

12

3





All-Source Situational Understanding

1. Threat Assessment/Data Collection/Analysis

2. Intelligence Preparation for Operations

3. Threat Relevant Data Distribution

4. Intelligence Support to Unified Incident Command Structure


Functional Capabilities

Crisis Responseand ThreatReduction

Alert andWarning

Preparationand Awareness

ConsequenceManagement

and Restoration


There are indications and warning (I&W)processes currently used by responders, but rarelyare they formal or disseminated as in the military.The military uses I&W in a combined human,analytical and information technology-assistedprocess that quickly identifies patterns and trendswhich enable the development of broad intelli-gence collections plans (i.e., sensors) to “watch”named areas of interest (NAI). For example, inan urban environment, if an underground pas-sageway is a likely avenue of approach for intrud-ers to a particular building, then movement ofpersonnel though that passageway could provide(tactical) I&W of a possible rehearsal, probing,infiltration or attack. Unattended ground sensorsor motion detectors could be used on this pas-sageway, and the passageway would probably bedesignated an NAI. Responders face similarissues; however, tactical I&W generates a verysmall window in which to make that intelligenceactionable. It is difficult for responders to ana-lyze this information while responding to anevent, disaster or incident using the current, well-accepted and well-proven concepts of operationin public safety. Integration of I&W as a capabil-ity requires modification of current operatingprocedures.

Responders noted that, currently, a fire captain orfire chief is likely to be the Incident Commander,but this fire chief is not normally inside the infor-mation “loop,” at least not to the same degree aslaw enforcement. There is a need for fire offi-cials, and other non-enforcement officials, to getfederal security clearances granting them access tocurrent threat intelligence. As intelligence infor-mation comes in, especially that dealing withpotential WMD threats, responders need tointervene by taking preventive or mitigating stepsearly on. Since fire officials normally don’t haveclearances, they won’t get the information earlywhen they can do the most with it.

Another alternative is to maintain an open source information analysis capability, which does not currently exist. The lack of familiarity indealing with intelligence information risks opera-tional compromise of that information. For

smaller jurisdictions, the needed informationtechnology is simply not available. If given thetechnology without proper preparation and plan-ning, it will be poorly utilized. If the govern-ment intends to provide these smaller jurisdic-tions with technology, it will need to assist themwith:

• Need assessments (i.e., what do we reallyneed?)

• Training on how to use it

• Integration of technology into current operations

Responders noted that the critical need is for “tai-lored” intelligence, not just data dumping. Noteveryone needs to know everything, but thosewho do need to know should be getting it. Forexample, if the fire department is responding toan address and there is threat information thatsays this could be a highly dangerous situation,then that “intelligence” needs to get to the initialresponders (prior to arriving on scene) for courseof action development.

Responders specifically noted some of the crisismanagement software packages that provide col-laborative and situational awareness tools, andinteroperability with other tools. Their browser-based software links the key players in a responsefor multi-agency, multi-jurisdiction collaboration,and for sharing a common operational pictureand information. One of the tools includes:

• Incident Reporting and Tracking

• Critical Infrastructure Reporting

• Situation Reporting

• Action Planning

• Personnel Management

• Alert Notification

• Real Time Messaging

Los Angeles area law enforcement uses the WarRoom of the Los Angeles Clearinghouse. An

1 9 1



enforcement operation is plotted on an electronicThomas Brothers map, where it is automaticallygeo-assessed with regard to any other eventsoccurring in the immediate vicinity. If there isother law enforcement activity, especially under-cover operations, an audible and visual alert willactivate. War Room personnel would then notifyboth active groups of their respective operations.There have been cases where undercover groupsunbeknownst to each other are actually conduct-ing enforcement operations on the same location,resulting in a “blue-on-blue” confrontation. Thisautomated GIS technology has prevented thisfrom happening on several occasions, probablysaving the lives of officers and special agents.

State of the Art:

The enabling technologies for this functional ele-ment include geospatial visualization and map-ping technology, automated link analysis systems,database access and mining techniques, collabora-tion technologies and non-structured informationanalysis and visualization technologies, allbrought together with integrated command, con-trol and communications systems (C3I). Thereare multiple COTS technologies in this area;unfortunately few of them operate on a singleplatform.

In terms of mapping software, there are only afew main vendors who provide the sort of inte-grated graphic software package that can allowgraphically depicting “map data” as broader intel-ligence products. Specifically, this involves usingthis sort of GIS product for uncovering hiddenconnections or inconsistancies requiring furtherinvestigation. Some of these are:

• Early into the Bosnia mission, one commercialprovider adapted its GIS ArcView package toinclude embedding critical data fields andimagery onto electronic maps that allowedcommanders and their staffs to “drill down”on specific locations, especially in urban ter-rain. The latest intelligence could be graphi-cally embedded, providing the commander anability to visualize the battlespace and pull upimportant information about that area toshape his decision-making.

• Technologists in the workshop mentionedindustry innovations which extend the per-formance of these systems by providing peer-to-peer collaboration, distribution, visualiza-tion and analysis of GIS data layers. Thesesystems utilize standard Web browsers andMicrosoft Office documents to collaboratewith geospatial information. Interaction is in 2-D, 3-D or 4-D and is extended for use with standard email, chat rooms and instantmessaging.

• There is at least one COTS product thatbreaks down data into the simplest form andthen maps it to find common links.Thousands of items are analyzed simultane-ously for cross-referencing. The deliverableproduct is a very different kind of “map” thatshows links between persons, places or things.Other COTS software offer link and networkanalysis, timeline and transaction analysis.Many of these systems automatically link toGIS to array information geospatially. Justafter September 11th, these products suddenlysaw a rise in demand from military usersworking counterterrorism research and analy-sis. Some of these companies have moved intothe competitive or business intelligence marketwith link analysis software for use in the com-mercial world, which has potential applicationto analyze criminal enterprises like terroristnetworks or drug cartels.

• With regard to access databases and data min-ing, there are many companies who sell largeopen source data bases such as the publicrecord databases most commonly used byinsurance investigators. LexisNexis™ pro-vides substantial legal, news, public recordsand business information; including tax andregulatory publications in online, print orCD-ROM formats. These can be viewed using various types of proprietary products or services by occupation, industry or task.LexisNexis has application software that canintegrate technologies and content to supportcritical decisions-making as well. In addition,there are companies that sell databases thatprovide past employment records, education

1 9 2


Chapter XI

verification, criminal history, and other back-ground information. More than 5000 compa-nies use one such service which is widely usedfor employment screening information.

• Open source databases, even proprietary oneslike those described above provide investiga-tors with the ability to find information onpersons, property, businesses, trends or otherelements of interest that may not appear incriminal databases, or be fully availablethrough other official government databases.For the most part, these information firms buypublic records, or information from privatesources such as the media, professional publi-cations, etc., and then put them together inlarge databases that are enabled with softwaresearch processes.

• The Defense Information Systems Agency’s(DISA) Area Security Operations Commandand Control (ASOCC) is an ACTD that wasdeveloped after September 11th. ASOCCcombines advanced information-handlingtools with command and control tools forhomeland security purposes, linking all of thecommunications capabilities with the NationalMilitary Intelligence Center (NMIC) and themilitary command authorities, as well as tothe regional intelligence centers and civilianauthorities, including law enforcement agen-cies. Civilian law enforcement entitiesincluded within the ASOCC ACTD includethe Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S.Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), the DrugEnforcement Agency, U.S. Immigration andCustoms Enforcement, and the Coast Guard,along with their associated intelligence enti-ties. After September 11th, DoD quickly real-ized that no such “linkage” capability existed;so ASOCC was developed.

• Another program specifically referenced byresponders and technologists is the CapitolWireless Integrated Network (CapWIN).CapWIN provides a “communication bridge”allowing mobile access to multiple criminaljustice, transportation, and hazardous materialdata sources. In essence, it is a state-of-the-art

wireless integrated mobile data communica-tions network being implemented to supportfederal, state, and local law enforcement, fireand emergency medical services (EMS), trans-portation, and other public safety agencies pri-marily in the Washington, DC Metropolitanarea. The purpose of CapWIN is to greatlyenhance communication and messaging sys-tems, effectively creating the first multi-state,inter-jurisdictional transportation and publicsafety integrated wireless network in theUnited States.

• The federally sponsored Disaster ManagementIntegration Services, or DMI-Services providesa capability for the consequence managementcommunity to share digital information.DMI-Services provides a series of basic auto-mated tools. These tools are designed to giveorganizations the “starter set” of applicationsthat will enable them to share digital informa-tion with others agencies.

• Workshop participants referenced Cybercop.The Cybercop Secure Portal was developed asa volunteer private sector initiative as a resultof Presidential Decision Directive 63. TheCybercop Secure Portal has its roots in asecure computer mediated communicationsproject created at DARPA (Extranet forSecurity Professionals or ESP). It uses 128 bitSSL encryption technology to create an onlinegated community where law enforcement andinformation security professionals can securelycommunicate and collaborate. The portal linksover 1,400 users and contains over 700 files inits libraries with a focus on homeland defense,critical infrastructure protection and cyber-security issues. Currently, Cybercop is highlyintegrated with FBI’s InfraGuard program.

Also important to this function are technologiesthat support the analysis of non-structured information and data fusion for all-source situa-tional understanding. Starlight is an advancedthree-dimensional visualization technology thatwas developed by Pacific Northwest NationalLaboratory (PNNL). It helps solve the problemof information overload. It has been used by the

1 9 3



U.S. intelligence community, but can be appliedto a variety of other fields, such as medical dataanalysis, environmental security and currentevents monitoring. Starlight uses a tool for non-structured information software called GENOA.GENOA is a customizable, front-end retargetablesource code analysis framework. Starlight is avisualization tool that will be integrated into theGENOA system as part of the development ofnew and complementary visualization tools. Acollaborative investigation of the use of Starlightin the Southern California area shows that thetool has operational utility but needs modifica-tion for local public safety use. Local andregional public safety operations will require anetworked operational capability which is notcurrently inherent in such operations. Starlight,or a similar tool, could be of great value in devel-oping such a regional operational capability.

There are no national standards or cooperativeoperational procedures in this area. Variousnational bodies such as the IAB (Inter-AgencyBoard), LEWG (Law Enforcement WorkingGroup) and OLES (Office of Law EnforcementStandards) have sub-groups trying to establishstandards.


As the foregoing discussions indicate, technolo-gies to support the goals in this functional areaexist and are commercially available. Integrationof these technologies, many of which are propri-etary, would facilitate the needed capability.Some of the most vexing technical limitationsinvolve the same challenges found across theentire command, control, communications andinformation management spectrum: integrationwith legacy systems and communications capacity(bandwidth). These challenges are being aggres-sively pursued across the industry.

The barriers to attaining these goals are intelli-gence community administrative and policyissues, cultural differences between responder andnational security communities, the lack ofnational standards, and most significantly, thelack of funding support at the local level. In ourworkshops, responders and technologists pointed

out that we are a “crisis-oriented society.” Issuesrelated to all-source situational understanding areoften long-term and low profile. Since thesqueaky wheel gets the grease, money for lawenforcement typically gets siphoned off into eas-ily explainable items such as putting more swornpolice on the streets or buying new cars or otherenforcement oriented equipment.

Gap Fillers:

A nation-wide trusted collaborative infrastructurethat can be used to share sensitive information isa requirement. A national response All SourceSituational Awareness prototype system, whichcombines the integration of the latest technologywith the development of new concepts of opera-tion that support incident command with intelli-gence analysis and information sharing, would bea useful step in filling this capability gap. Theprototype system and process could be emulatedby and coordinated across local regions. The goalof affordable implementation should be a pro-gram objective. The system must include thehigh-bandwidth communications necessary.

ASU.2 – Intelligence Preparation forOperations (IPO). The ability to: (1) identifywhich agency, office or official is responsible for col-lecting and analyzing which types of intelligence,and (2) implement tools, training and processes tosupport those responsibilities.

Goals:

• Automated systems for information sharingand notification of intelligence responsibilities

• Minimal redundancy in intelligence dissemination

• Maximum access to needed information andbackground for those who need to know andhave the responsibilities

• Information and facilities technologies to support different levels of clearance and classification, for seamless sharing of informa-tion among those with responsibilities, irre-spective of different clearances and venues.

1 9 4


Chapter XI

• Information sent via our channels and appli-ances that are not open to unauthorized usersor the public.

• Regional clearinghouse for data analysis tosupport nearby smaller jurisdiction withoutthe manpower for an all-source situationalunderstanding capabilities.


The concept of “Intelligence Preparation forOperations” (IPO) originally stems from the mil-itary doctrine called Intelligence Preparation ofthe Battlefield (IPB). It is a rigorous process oflooking at a particular area of terrain whereinfriendly forces are anticipating or planning opera-tions. IPB centers on three principal features:weather, enemy and terrain (WET). During thedeployment of the Combined Joint Task Force –Consequence Management in the Persian Gulf in2002, this acronym was modified for civil-mili-tary purposes to WETT, or weather, enemy,threats and terrain. Part of this WETT modifica-tion was directly related to the emerging civil-military concept of IPO.

By definition, IPB is a continuous processdefined as:

• Define the battlefield environment

• Describe the battlefield’s effects

• Evaluate the threat

• Determine threat COAs (Courses of Action)

Responders however, are not on a “battlefield,”but instead conducting operations in theirlocales. However, if the “battlefield” is changedto “operating area,” it also changes the contextand substantive meaning for responders. Forexample with this simple change the fourprocesses become:

• Define the operating area environment

• Describe the operating area’s effects

• Evaluate the threat

• Determine threat COAs (Courses of Action)

If “threat” is broadened to mean anything thatcan threaten lives or have an adverse impact onoperations, it changes the traditional concept ofIPB from being focused on the enemy, to beingfocused on preparing responders to plan and con-duct a broad array of emergency operations. Inassessing the urban environment, informationmust be collected on a number of “friendly” fac-tors and assessed with the same process as onemight assess the “threat.” This could includeinformation on businesses, and municipal gov-ernment and other entities that could assist orhinder operations. Demographic and socio-political factors must be understood also. Thereare ample examples in the US and overseas whereemergency operations have been hindered bypublic mistrust of response forces, gross misun-derstandings of what is being done, or enemyinformation operations meant to seed both dis-trust and confusion.

IPO as a doctrinal term was developed by the LosAngeles Terrorism Early Warning Group (LATEW). It has several components that take thetraditional intelligence cycle, and then “spoke”out in various directions to develop a comprehen-sive fusion process. The term “intelligence” isoften misunderstood. Doctrinally, intelligence isan analyzed information product. Collected rawdata is synthesized and fused into useful informa-tion. While that information could be acted onas presented (and frequently is), the informationis further analyzed to draw out more inferencesor conclusions, which becomes an “analyticalproduct.”

The Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning Groupdevelops and maintains a series of target folders(description of possible terrorist targets) and play-books in preparation for a large variety of poten-tial threat scenarios and venues. It uses an all-source, all-discipline, all governmental levelapproach in evaluation intelligence, and a net-work methodology for sharing and disseminatingsensitive information. Unlike other “intelligencefusion centers,” such as the FBI Joint TerrorismTask Force or California Anti-TerrorismInformation Center, the TEW concept includesresponders and analysts representing federal,state, local, military, national agencies and critical

1 9 5



industries. That way, the LA TEW ensures itsinput processes, collection methodologies andproducts meet the larger crisis and consequencemanagement needs of fire, health, enforcementand the greater intelligence community.Although there are other systems that have betterequipment and software, as well as better connec-tivity to national systems, those tend to be lim-ited to the law enforcement community. The LATEW is working on improving these issues.

The Pierce County, Washington TEW has takenthe next step by automating a number of keyfiles. A particularly apt example of this auto-mated IPO product’s potential occurred inSpokane, Washington, at Lewis and Clark HighSchool. The school had plans of the school avail-able on-line through a secure system called RapidResponder. This system provided respondersblueprints, photographs, evacuations plans andlists of hazardous materials. The plans alsoshowed such key features as windows and doors.locations of security systems, shutoffs for utilities,and a photographic layout offering a 360panoramic view that includes rooftops, gymnasi-ums, libraries, auditoriums and other gatheringplaces. The database includes phone numbersand all emergency plans. In late September2003, a disturbed 16 year-old came to schoolarmed, and took over a classroom telling theteacher and students to leave. SWAT memberswere able to readily access the Rapid Responderdatabase, discover a second door to the room,and conduct a timely and successful take down ofthe perpetrator, thereby proving the value of thistype of automated “intelligence preparation foroperations” product for responders.

Originally, the DMI-Services, was placing whatwere essentially target folders and playbooks,along with other kinds of venue plans, imageryand related response information online.However, online information security is a bigconcern with regard to dissemination of IPOrelated information. A recent example of howbureaucracy can sometimes run astray of intentoccurred when the Los Angeles MetropolitanWater District requested a vulnerability and haz-ard assessment of its system due to homeland

security concerns. As part of the bid process,they posted detailed plans of the water systemonline for potential vendors to review. This “vul-nerability” was eventually brought to their atten-tion and taken off the Internet, but not beforethe information was accessed (and presumablydownloaded) by overseas email addresses inPakistan and elsewhere in South Asia.

Threat assessments from some of the criminalintelligence clearinghouses are probably the clos-est products to anything resembling IPO. Onthe drug enforcement side, the “ThreatAssessment” actually comes from a related “cen-ter” (the Joint Drug Intelligence Group) run bythe FBI. That product is mostly distilled statis-tics on enforcement actions geared towards justi-fying funding of regional counterdrug activities.Threat assessments on the terrorism side havefocused on critical infrastructure and been princi-pally done by National Guardsmen trying toapply IPB doctrine. This has resulted in lengthylists of potential targets covering the state. InMinnesota, the National Guard has developed aseparate methodology for this kind of criticalinfrastructure assessment process, and a quantita-tive model used to assess the vulnerability or crit-icality that various utility, industry or other“infrastructure” represents.

One example of information sharing and collabo-ration that the workshop participants identifiedwas the Statewide Anti-Terrorism UnifiedResponse Network (SATURN) program inMassachusetts. SATURN is an information shar-ing and responder network that builds on currentsystems. It provides fire and emergency manage-ment personnel a process for exchanging infor-mation, and for providing training and coordina-tion of anti-terrorism strategies tied tocollaborative public safety capabilities. SATURNis a Web-based information sharing architecturethat brings together federal, state and local firstresponders and emergency management with des-ignated citizen groups called Citizen MobilizationTeams (CMT).

Responders also identified the ConsequencesAssessment Tool Set (CATS). CATS is a joint

1 9 6


Chapter XI

ESRI and SAIC program that provides a compre-hensive package of emergency management deci-sion aids, including hazard prediction models(natural hazards and technological hazards) andcasualty and damage assessment tools. It alsoaccepts real time data from local meteorologicalstations. The tool set is supplied with over 150data bases and map layers. These include thelocation of resources to support response to spe-cific hazards, infrastructure objects and facilities(communications, electric power, oil and gas,emergency services, government, transportation,water supply), a variety of population breakoutsand much more. It also allows the user to adddatabases for custom analysis. However, likenearly all hazard prediction or plume modelingsoftware, it is unable to do detailed modeling for complex areas in urban terrain, but ratheruses a model of open terrain, like a traditionalbattlefield.

Fire pre-plans are an “intelligence product”widely used by emergency responders. These arenormally hard copy documents that include lay-out and fire-specific criteria of buildings that canbe used in an emergency. These are rarely auto-mated, and fire services normally have neither thenecessary digital communications nor the infor-mation technology available to support suchautomation. Currently, most large buildings andfacilities submit plans to the fire department.Regulations require blueprints for tall building tobe on hand in the lobby for responders to refer-ence as needed in cases of emergency. All of thisdata could be digitally archived for immediateretrieval, and for data manipulation (i.e., 3-Dprojection) using various advanced softwareapplications. The ability for emergency respon-ders to “see” into buildings using this type of datais generally available now. Fire inspectors rou-tinely visit buildings and are able to update files,and image the inside of various buildings. Urbanwargaming techniques currently being evaluatedby some agencies may offer the ability to assessthe tactical threat of urban buildings in a fashionsimilar to a military assessment.

State of the Art:

Several companies have teamed up on a conceptcalled Active Citizen, with the goal of creating acommunity communication architecture to con-nect citizens, augment responders and providecritical cultural information for public safety andlaw enforcement. Active Citizen has three stepswithin what is termed a Community IntelligenceCoordination Center (CICC) that begins with:

• Data – All source reporting.

• Information – What is happening.

• Knowledge – Context.

The end-state of CICC is to enable decision sup-port with products such as planning tools andenvironmental, cultural and incident scene infor-mation. All of this is fed to public safety and lawenforcement agencies. It is a community-basedapproach that empowers citizens as partners withlaw enforcement in the effort to protect theirneighborhoods and communities, with the ideathat an alert and trained public is the greatestdeterrent to attack. At the center of the model isthe cyber citizen corps portal that feeds in envi-ronmental data, cultural data, specific informa-tion requirements, incident situation reportingand even damage assessments. The CICC’s prod-ucts are cultural analyses, environmental risk mit-igation, pattern recognition and GIS products. Itis anticipated that this capability could grow toinclude video teleconferencing (VTC) and a vir-tual emergency operations center (EOC). In itsfinal form, the cyber citizen portal would be thecollaborative center linking the federal informa-tion center, state information center, local lawenforcement and community.

Tied in with Active Citizen is the DomesticEmergency Response Information Service(DERIS) concept. DERIS demonstrated the feasibility of a portal approach to law enforce-ment crisis response. It implements NationalInstitute for Urban Search and Rescue standardsfor extreme information infrastructure, and can

1 9 7



act as a prototype for civil military C2 (commandand control) supporting the CommonOperational Picture (COP). DERIS was testedusing the Burning Man annual event in Nevadaand then at Shadow Bowl, an exercise that simu-lated a Super Bowl in San Diego with a relativedegree of success.

Active Citizen and DERIS provide a number ofinformation tools, such as:

• Prepared Response – an automated target folderarchive.

• CyberCop – ESP’s free secure collaborationportal.

• Netowl – a knowledge mining tool.

• Virtual Operations Center – MindTel’s modi-fied version of a virtual 3-D workspace tai-lored for emergency management and lawenforcement situational awareness.


The barriers to accomplishing IPO are not pri-marily technical. As in any information technol-ogy enabled function, there are concerns aboutavailable bandwidth and whether the communi-cation and information management infrastruc-ture can support the multilevel security needs ofprocessing intelligence. These problems are beingaddressed in other areas. We simply have littleexperience in moving information, especiallyintelligence information, around the respondercommunity during a major incident. UntilSeptember 11th, there was little motivation on thepart the federal government to establish strongintelligence sharing relationships with the respon-der community, especially outside tight lawenforcement circles. Before September 11th, veryfew people considered the response to an incidentas “battlefield” for which intelligence needs to beprepared. Funding priorities, training require-ments and cultural adaptations have yet to catchup with the need.

Gap Fillers:

Some of the concerns with IPO stem from infor-mation sharing, and the quality of intelligenceanalysis. A highlighted concern voiced by work-shop participants is the need for a regional clear-inghouse for data and analysis to support nearbysmaller jurisdictions. NYPD has a substantialclearinghouse capability, but this is mostly sup-porting operations within its own jurisdiction.

As previously mentioned, the Los AngelesCountry Regional Criminal Information Center(LACRCIC) or the “the LA Clearinghouse” per-forms this function. It is a combined center thathas a 24/7 data sharing/research and event de-confliction center, along with analyst groups thatprovide case support. It is also home to theCalifornia Anti-Terrorism Information Center(CTIC), which leverages its capabilities from thesame infrastructure.

In California currently, the “clearinghouse”focuses almost solely on criminal intelligence, andis tied in with the Los Angeles High IntensityDrug Trafficking Area. Their methodology isplacing “analysts” in support of criminal investi-gations, whether it is against drug traffickers orterrorists. There is a need to develop and deploya benchmark IPO process for responding to a ter-rorist threat. The federal government shoulddevelop such a process which can be used byregional authorities as a template for creating asimilar indigenous process.

ASU.3 – Threat-Relevant Data Dissemination.The ability to (1) identify what kinds of threat-related information must be disseminated, (2)identify who must receive what information (i.e.,need-to-know), and (3) deliver the appropriateinformation among disciplines only to the appro-priate agency, office, or official.

Goals:

• Integrated secure system of delivery

• Identification of need-to-know criteria.

1 9 8


Chapter XI

• Methodology for transmission of timely, in-real-time knowledge and confirmation of suchreceipt.

• Smart and timely 24×7 intelligence dissemina-tion (emphasis on timely receipt).

• “Smart Security” in dissemination technologyand methods, according to kind of informa-tion. Level of security (and hence dissemina-tion method, e.g., fax) depends on the kind of information: open channels sometimesappropriate.

• Dissemination, security and access issues takeninto account at the regional operational level,not hoarded at the individual department orfunctional agency level.

Any dissemination system must also maintainassured operational security (OPSEC).


The consensus among responders is that there isonly marginal capability to disseminate threat rel-evant data to the responder community. Anexample of this is the information that does ordoesn’t accompany the Department of HomelandSecurity’s National Terrorism Alerts. Among theconcerns were that there is no intelligence capa-bility to adequately disseminate sufficient infor-mation to compliment what is essentially anoperational threat condition change, and that thissystem is not tied to a nationwide IPO processfor moving intelligence information or assess-ments either to or from the local, state and fed-eral levels.

This problem is partially characterized in thedebates over PUSH vs. PULL intelligence. Withemail dissemination, there is a problem with get-ting the “spigot turned on” by being part of vari-ous Homeland Security or Terrorism Threatinformation groups, both open source and closed.Traditional “push” intelligence under the currentsystem creates information overload, with thesame effect as too little information, producingthe equivalent of spam emails on terrorism orrelated threats. This push methodology over-whelms the recipients. This effectively turns the

police chief or fire chief into a de facto intelli-gence analyst, since there are no effective filters oradditional assessment processes to tailor the infor-mation for specific needs or requirements. Pulldissemination, in contrast, requires an activesearch to find needed information. Much of theinformation pull capability today is Internet-based. A simple example would be a Googlesearch.

The debate is ongoing in the military with theproliferation of information on the battlefield.The 1st Marine Expeditionary Force moved to apull-based information environment focused onWeb-centric dissemination of critical informa-tion. Even before September 11th, 1st MEF staffand commanders were overloaded with emails onthe host of operations, plans and administrativeinformation dealing with contingencies coveringtwo-thirds of the globe. For the most senior per-sonnel, this meant they would get hundreds ofemails daily using the traditional push method ofdissemination. As one senior staff officer at 1st

MEF put it, “the Commander has become thesenior analyst,” hence the change in the methodof information access.

Emergency responders note that systems using apull method for homeland security or terrorisminformation, such as a Web-centric system,should include secure access, information post-ing, a tailored alert system using specific parame-ters and a drill up/drill down capability to sup-port analysis, as it is needed. Supportingtechnology probably exists, but is not obvious oreasily available to public safety emergencyresponse organizations.

Both the issue of information classification andthe handling of classified information are signifi-cant elements in information sharing that mustbe addressed. The Department of Defense(DoD), as noted in Crisis Evaluation andManagement, has initiated several projects toaddress the capability to exchange informationand data through an automated multilevel secu-rity system (MLS). These issues are significantfor public safety first response.

1 9 9



Among the many law enforcement telecommuni-cation systems in the country, the Oklahoma LawEnforcement Telecommunications System(OLETS) appears to be a benchmark. It is a pri-vate, leased-line, digital telecommunications net-work maintained by the Oklahoma Departmentof Public Safety. It serves over 750 police depart-ments, county sheriff ’s offices, highway patrolheadquarters, military bases, and emergencyoperations centers (EOC), and other agenciesconcerned with pubic safety and law enforce-ment. OLETS agencies communicate through acentral message switching computer housed atOLETS headquarters in Oklahoma City thatallows those agencies to query central databasesin search of criminal records, license and registra-tion information. OLETS also allows them tocommunicate with other agencies across the stateand nation, and access information tables thatreside at the OLETS switch.

InfraGuard, an FBI-industry collaborationfocused on the cyber-security and the informa-tion technology sector may be a good benchmarkfor two-way communication of threat informa-tion. The national InfraGuard program began asa pilot project in 1996, when the Cleveland FBIField Office asked local computer professionals toassist the FBI in determining how to better pro-tect critical information systems in both the pub-lic and private sectors. Today it is a joint teamingproject linking the private sector with the U.S.government, or more specifically the FBI. Theinitiative was developed to encourage theexchange of information by the government andthe private sector members, and private sectormembers and an FBI field representative formlocal area chapters. With hundreds of companymembers across the nation, there are now 79active chapters of InfraGuard. The FederalBureau of Investigation acts as the facilitator by:

• Gathering information and distributing it tomembers;

• Educating the public and members on infra-structure protection;

• Disseminating information through theInfraGuard network;

• Producing analytical products on informationreceived through the InfraGuard network;

• Expanding communication between govern-ment and private sector members.

State of the Art:

Responders and technologists pointed to theTulsa Area Syndromic Surveillance System(TASSS) program as a benchmark in biological orepidemiological intelligence (i.e., epi-intel) shar-ing and dissemination. It looks at all key datafields and ties into the labs, especially for trendidentification. TASSS’s objective is to alert med-ical professionals to the possibility of significantoutbreaks before large numbers of patients pres-ent with advanced stages of disease. It is a part-nership with area hospitals by electronic transferof emergency room chief complaints into theTASSS model with analytical focus on five princi-pal syndromes: fever, rash, respiratory, diarrhea,and vomiting. TASSS, which is maintained bythe Planning and Epidemiology Division of theTulsa City/County Health Department, can beaccessed through the Internet with proper clear-ance, and is a key component of the new TulsaTerrorism Early Warning Group program. Othersites that are being considered to expand the epi-demiological surveillance program of TASSSinclude schools, clinics and major employers.

The needs of responders to conduct IPO are notunlike those of power grid management andthere is technology in that industry that could beadapted for emergency response. TheDepartment of Energy’s Pacific NorthwestNational Laboratory (PNNL) has been workingon this power grid reliability, from the impact ofaging infrastructure, deregulation, and the vul-nerabilities to terrorism. PNNL envisions apower grid of the future through its EnergySystems Transformation Initiative. CalledGridWise™, it enables collaboration among gen-erators, the grid and customer loads to collec-tively increase the stability and cost-effectivenessof the power system. It applies solutions foradapting and influencing information, and con-trol technology approaches to deliver reliableenergy.

2 0 0


Chapter XI

2 0 1



GridWise is a regionally networked, but alsodecentralized approach, using smart chips thatwould be fitted onto household appliances andwould continually monitor fluctuations in thepower grid. In high periods of stress for the grid,a “grid-friendly” appliance would identify fluctua-tions and automatically shut down. Brief inter-ruptions of 5 or 10 minutes of time give the gridoperators time to stabilize the system, but would-n’t be noticeable to the consumer. The idea wasthat it would potentially stop a cascade effectsimilar to what happened in the Northeast whenthe whole grid essentially collapsed. Smart appli-ances could also stagger return to service after anoutage and thus ease the restoration of power.From an IPO technology standpoint, it is adecentralized information collection and assess-ment process that facilitates a flexible response toan emergency situation.

Another benchmark medical surveillance systemis the Emergency Medical Alert Network(EMAN) of San Diego County. EMAN wasdeveloped by the Epidemiology Division of theSan Diego County Health and Human ServicesAgency (HHSA) in December 1999. EMAN isintended to expedite confidential communicationbetween healthcare and public health profession-als in San Diego County. Fundamentally, it is anetwork dedicated to facilitating bi-directionalconfidential communication between San DiegoCounty’s medical community and public healthand safety agencies in order to ensure rapid iden-tification of and response to unusual diseaseevents or public health emergencies.

Another example of collaborative communicationof security information is the Overseas SecurityAdvisory Council (OSAC). Through OSAC,U.S. companies, to include public and privatecolleges and universities, are provided timelyinformation in which to make informed corpo-rate decisions on how best to protect their invest-ment, facilities, personnel and intellectual prop-erty abroad. It was established in 1985 by theU.S. Department of State to foster the exchangesof security-related information between the U.S.Government and American private sector interests operating abroad. OSAC is currently

administered by the Bureau of DiplomaticSecurity, and has developed into a productivejoint venture for effective security cooperation.

One example of an emerging enabling technologyis Situation Management and Awareness in RealTime (SMART), a tactical command and controlsystem developed by International Aerospacewhich enables the secure, two-way exchange ofinformation and intelligence over a low-band-width, public network. The software is designedto correlate, integrate and update data, informa-tion and intelligence from a wide range ofsources. It supports display of its CommonOperating Picture (COP) or Single IntegratedPicture (SIP) in near-real time and in interactive2-D and 3-D formats. SMART uses a “one-to-many” peer to peer network, and is intended foruse in tactical operations involving networkedtablet computers or PDA’s. Described as ‘glue-ware,’ because it links incompatible commandand control or information systems, eachSMART unit has the ability to connect to a GPSreceiver or a vehicle interface and could be usedto disseminate its position and all associated datawith that unit.


The most significant barrier to dissemination ofthreat-relevant data may be the restrictions onclassified data. The technical and administrativeinfrastructure required to store and disseminateclassified material is not available in the respon-der community. To implement such a systemwould require granting clearances for thousandsof additional people and the implementation ofadditional secure networks over which to trans-mit the data. Significantly increasing the dissem-ination of data to the responder community will require a large and expensive effort and itwill be primarily the responsibility of the federalgovernment.

The implementation of technology to assist inci-dent commanders requires significant investmentin time and effort to achieve, but minimal invest-ment to develop. Most of the useful or applicabletechnology is either available or will be in thenear term. A significant challenge will be to scale

2 0 2


Chapter XI

the national dissemination system to effectivelysupport the responder community while safe-guarding sensitive information.

Gap Fillers:

The technological building blocks for developinga threat dissemination system appear to be pres-ent in many of the products sited above. Sometailoring of those will be necessary. The capabil-ity gap seems to be the ability to integrate infor-mation processing systems. This issue could beresolved by developing a national standard towhich regional authorities can build.

ASU.4 – Intelligence Support to UnifiedIncident Command Structure. The ability toprovide valid intelligence assessments (includingestimates of threat capability, intentions/targets andtrends/potentials), damage assessments/reports,resource capability and availability, recommenda-tions for courses of action, and timely situationbriefings, in an operationally useful and real-timeprocess, to the incident commander/unified com-mand at all phases of response.

Goals:

• Support real-time decision making.

• Seamless integration with other relatedFunctional Capabilities.

• Enable maximum use of visual methods todisplay needed information.

• Insulate incident command intelligence brief-ings and decision-making from chaos and distractions.

• Incorporate reports from the field (down-range) real-time into the intelligence productas updates for the overall situational understanding.

• Allow the incident commander to disseminatedecisions with relevant intelligence “attached”to the command.

• Enable “rolling” documentation of lessonslearned as the crisis evolves.


Many of the functional needs in this area are thesame as those required in ASU.1 (ThreatAssessment/Data Collection/Analysis), ASU.2(Intelligence Preparation for Operations) andASU.3 (Threat Relevant Data Distribution).Therefore, only the differences will be addressedhere. As was the case in the preceding functionalareas, the responders and technologists who par-ticipated in Project Responder felt that this capa-bility was marginal today. One problem noted atthe national level is that the capability is very dif-ficult to develop and maintain if local officialschoose not to use the Incident Command System(ICS) and its structure. Use of the ICS is consid-ered the essential building block on which tobuild a doctrinal intelligence fusion capability.Currently, use of the ICS is not universal.Political acceptance and establishment of anational model for both developing and feedingintelligence to an incident commander is requiredto set up and implement processes like the onedescribed here. The use of the ICS nation-wideis considered essential.

In order to provide intelligence support to uni-fied command we may look to the military forexamples of current capability. At the UIC level,there is a need for an all-source intelligencefusion center (or IFC), similar to a military JointIntelligence Center (JIC) or Joint IntelligenceSupport Element (JISE). The size of these intelli-gence fusion elements is scalable. For example, aJIC may have hundreds of personnel. By con-trast, a JISE is normally for a smaller joint taskforce with a headquarters of 100-300, and is normally has a dozen or dozens of personnelassigned.

Typically, a military IFC (JIC/JISE/IOC) willhave a surveillance and reconnaissance center(SARC) either embedded or adjacent for immedi-ate feed from all sensors or reconnaissance assets;ground, air, maritime, human or mechanical.They will become the center of data feeds for allIMINT/imagery, HUMINT/human, SIGINT/signals, ELINT/electronic, MASINT/measure-ment and signature, and any other form of col-lections assets that provide raw intelligence. In a

2 0 3



typical enforcement operation, collecting infor-mation from witnesses or informants would fallunder HUMINT. The IFC may also have plans,operations and fusion or analysis sections thatsupport all of these functions, along with thosetechnologies needed to develop and maintain thecommon operational picture or COP, or that por-tion of it that is sometimes called the commonintelligence picture or CIP.

The intelligence directorate or section using it isinvolved with all facets of the intelligence cycleprocess that includes: Direction and Planning,Collections, Fusion and Synthesis, Analysis andProduction, Dissemination, Utilization, and theinputs back to Direction and Planning.Normally, the intelligence fusion is often focusedon what is called intelligence production, or turn-ing out finished products for operational con-sumption or utilization. Within non-traditionalmilitary mission spectrums, there is the potentialfor functions involved with collections planningand management that may fall under the intelli-gence fusion center, and since that requires a high degree of operational assets that have dualcapabilities for collection information and data(i.e., responders, investigators, aircraft, etc.), thisrole must be clearly defined early on with seniorexecutive intent stated and widely understood.Having an IFC, enabled by the latest technologyand reporting directly to the unified or incidentcommander is the key to this functional capability.

State of the Art:

The Incident Command Information Tool(ICIT) is an example of current technology thatcan address this issue. The incident commanderneeds real-time video capability on-site. Asproven during the Democratic Convention in2000, monitoring the media is critical to sup-porting decision-making by the incident com-mander, since so much of what is being done andcommunicated has far-reaching consequences andthe IC must be responsive to the elected leadership.

As mentioned previously, the federally-sponsoredDisaster Management Integration Services, or

DMI-Services provides a capability for the conse-quence management community to share digitalinformation. This stemmed from key develop-ment work with the Consequence ManagementInformation System (CMIS) working with theMarine Corps Systems Command prior toSeptember 11th. DMI-Services has expandedupon this to provide digital information solutionsin an all-hazards disaster incident commandresponse environment.

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s(DARPA) Command Post of the Future (CPOF)has a number of relevant technologies. CPOFincludes a Command Post InformationEnvironment (CPIE) that will provide new waysto collaborate and to interact with supportinginformation assets and sources. Included in this,the Navy is developing both 2-D and 3-D virtualreality (VR) tools that enable better battlespacevisualization by commanders in the CPOF.CPOF components include:

• Access to information and control devices viaPDAs.

• Speech recognition from microphonesthroughout the center.

• Interactive 3-D visualization.

• Gesture recognition.

• Tailorable information awareness.

A number of these technologies would be veryhelpful in getting intelligence and situationalawareness information directly to the incidentcommander and reflect his action upon thatinformation.

Some capabilities similar to those of CPOF areemerging in the commercial sector. MindTel hasbeen developing situational merging technologieswith displays to create optimized operationalspace visualization platforms. However, theinformation link is equally important. At arecent exercise in San Diego, a borrowed Navyairship was used to beam real-time visual “scenes”back to an analyst in what was called “streetscene.” During Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF),

2 0 4


Chapter XI

the Common Operational Picture or COP wastransmitted simultaneously to 1000 vehicles 20-30 miles inside Iraq.

The National Interagency Fire Command Center(NIFCC) in Boise, Idaho, is an example of an all-source fusion center specifically designed for sup-porting incident command decision-makingregarding the threat of forest fires. This fusioncenter coalesces complex data on logistics, per-sonnel, operations and other support across mul-tiple states and jurisdictions, acting as a fire infor-mation clearinghouse. For example, the RegionalFire Directors furnish a daily status reports dur-ing the fire season to the National InteragencyFire Coordination Center (NIFCC), and theNIFCC Coordinator fuses this to provide a dailysummary, by region, of the fire danger and fireoccurrence statistics, and distributes this to theirWashington office, regions, areas, and requestingstates. The NIFCC uses state of the art technol-ogy, to include broadband communications, tocollect and disseminate visual products to enablecommand decision-making, and has a dedicatedintelligence section that solely works issuesrelated to fires.

Computer generated intelligent agents or, moreappropriately, “intelligent software agents” arealso an enabling technology. These agents arecapable of recognizing certain conditions, reason-ing about these conditions, forming conclusions,and taking actions on the basis of those conclu-sions. One example germane to All-SourceSituational Understanding being developedthrough California Polytechnic University at SanLuis Obispo, California, is EMERRS orEmergency Regional Response Systems.

In general, EMMERS is the emergency responseversion of this same intelligent agent approach,and is described as an integrated decision-supportcapability for enhancing crisis management andimproving or expanding response. The EMERRSsystem design incorporates collaborative agentswith knowledge in specific domains. Proactivelymirroring changing circumstances, these auto-mated agents send alerts, inferences, and recom-mendations to response personnel. Agents areused to gather and reveal information so that the

user can have access to the most accurate and up-to-date information, accelerating the decision-making process and providing continuous sup-port at all points in the decision-making process.These “agents” monitor and contribute solutionstrategies within their areas of knowledge.

Currently, EMERRS is an evolving collection ofdecision-support applications designed to assisturban response units in dealing with a wide rangeof crisis management situations. It is a collabora-tive toolset that monitors an urban environmentand provides enhanced near real-time situationalawareness to emergency response commandersand their staffs. Functionally, EMERRS inte-grates data from disparate sources into a singlecoherent view that provides a disciplined deci-sion-making environment. Potentially, it enablesthe crisis management staff to minimize or elimi-nate time-consuming data filtering tasks. For theUIC, this allows greater resources and attentionto higher-level situational assessment and rapidresponse to changing events. User requests forassistance are supported. However, the systemdoes not wait for requests to offer contributions.EMERRS provides a decision-support environ-ment in which agents and human users interactto solve problems collaboratively.


Bandwidth is again a huge limitation. Real-timevideo and the types of large data files involvedwith imagery, modeling and special GIS productswill truly revolutionize how emergency respon-ders communicate.

Developing intelligence agents is another issueaddressed at the workshop, or more appropriatelysmart automated agents that can mine data andlearn artificially. The potential of these is great,but so is the time needed to significantly improvethe current technology to the point where it canprovide truly smart agents. With the overwhelm-ing amount of information available today, especially through the Internet, today’s smartagents could end up funneling tremendousamounts of information to a human analyst orresponder that would slow down their assessmentor decision-making processes instead of stream-lining and improving them.

2 0 5



Training of emergency personnel is another issue.There is tremendous software and hardware avail-able, but the threshold of training that it maytake to gain, let alone maintain, proficiency inusing them is very significant. Current methodsrelying on on-the-job training or going to acourse and then rarely using it won’t work. Thetraining must be made available and that will beexpensive. However, it does play to one of thestrengths of the Department of Defense and therest of the federal government in that there is apowerful training capability available to addressthis need for the nation’s responder community.This is especially true for areas dealing with intel-ligence support to the Unified IncidentCommand, since DoD is virtually the onlyorganization that has training schools with coursesubjects and substantive experience or knowledgedealing with this requirement.

Gap Fillers:

Responders saw the development of commondoctrine and processes across multi-jurisdictional,governmental and civil-military lines as critical.Once doctrine has been developed, there must bea corresponding systems integration effort thatmirrors operational or intelligence doctrine.

All-Source Situational AwarenessResponse Technology Objectives(ASUrto)

ASUrto.1 – All-Source Information Fusion andAnalysis System

Objectives:

Develop a prototype tool and doctrinal templatefor an information and analysis cell to supportIncident Command. The objective is to evaluate,select and integrate technologies that will enablethe capability to collect, fuse, analyze and presentinformation from all sources, including sensitiveintelligence information. The tool should provide analysts supporting Unified IncidentCommand with the ability to collect, mine, cor-relate, perform pattern recognition, and visualizelarge amounts of data in order to contribute toreal-time situational awareness, predict threats

and vulnerabilities, and foresee the impact of pro-posed courses of action.

The system should be able to provide analystswith access to information from agencies at thelocal, state and federal level, including intelli-gence agencies, when required. Therefore, it willneed to be able to transmit and manage classifiedinformation appropriately at various levels. Theintent is to develop a prototype suite of informa-tion and communications technologies and adoctrinal and procedural template for regionalauthorities to procure and implement to createthis capability. This capability follows the philos-ophy of preparing for all hazards. It would beuseful not only in terrorists’ incidents but in anycritical incident and perhaps on a daily basis insome regions.

The objectives of this RTO are very similar tothose of the Homeland Security Command andControl ACTD in the Department of Defense.Therefore, it will be useful to leverage that pro-gram and wait to begin this RTO until the HSC2 ACTD is completed. As this is a classicopportunity for spiral development, the programshould be planned in a way that seeks to deploy acapability as early as possible with plans toupgrade the capability as experience with the sys-tem grows. The prototypes can then be used bylocal governments as a guide for implementingtheir own capability.

Payoffs:

This will provide incident command authoritieswith intelligence products (analyzed all-sourceinformation) with far more fidelity than is currently available. It would enable access tosensitive information previously not available tothem because they could not handle sensitiveinformation. It would greatly strengthen theirdecision-making by providing a better picture of the incident environment but also provide better analysis of the courses of action they areconsidering. In the long run, responders will bebetter prepared, incident commanders will makebetter decisions, lives will be saved and propertydamage mitigated.

Challenges:

The technologies to support the objectives of thisRTO exist and many are commercially available.What is not commercially available is likely avail-able in the Defense technology base. Integrationof these technologies, some of which may be pro-prietary, is the technical challenge. Some of themost vexing technical limitations involve thesame challenges found across the entire com-mand, control, communications and informationmanagement spectrum: integration with legacysystems, communications capacity (bandwidth),and whether the communication and informationmanagement infrastructure can be made to sup-port the multilevel security needs of processingintelligence. Scalability and quality of servicerequirements may also be a challenge. In addi-tion, responders simply have little experience inmoving information, especially intelligence infor-mation, around their community during a majorincident. Federal authorities have concern aboutpassing sensitive information to local and largeraudiences. Overcoming cultural and policy issueswith multi-agency information sharing will be achallenge.

Milestones/Metrics:

FY2006: Evaluate the Homeland SecurityCommand and Control ACTD. Review theresults and assess the applicability of the technology suite and other developments (i.e., doctrine, techniques) to the objec-tives of this RTO. Begin development ofthe prototype architecture. Establish aconcept of operation/doctrine develop-ment team. The team will review current

information analysis and intelligence sharingtechniques and protocols. The team will begin todevelop standard doctrine and concept of opera-tion for a responder all-source information analy-sis cell.

FY2007: Continue development of CONOPSand standard doctrine and procedures for infor-mation and intelligence support to incident com-mand. Complete architecture and perform a gapanalysis between the target technology suite andthe HSC2 ACTD. Determine how to fill thegaps either with emerging technology or newdevelopment. Select available technologies thatwill support the developed process and beginintegration. Begin integration of initial capabil-ity prototype system, including the technologysuite and CONOPS and doctrinal templates.

FY2008: Complete integration of initial capabil-ity prototype system. Begin testing of prototypesystem. Analyze test results and develop improve-ments in the technology suite and process tem-plates based on test results. Demonstrate theprototype system in a major critical incident exercise.

FY2009: Begin deployment of the prototype system in several cities. Continue to integrateimprovements in capability either through tech-nology upgrades or improvements in CONOPS.Demonstrate new capability as appropriate.

2 0 6


Chapter XI

All-Source Information Fusion and Analysis System

$0 $0 $3.0 $5.0 $6.2 $4.0 $18.2

ThrustASUrto.1 – Budget in Millions

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Totals

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010• Capability to Collect,

Fuse, Analyze and Present Information from All Sources

• Pattern Recognition• Data Visaualization

ASUrto.1 – All-Source Information Fusion andAnalysis System

All-Source Situational Understanding Technology Roadmap

Definition

Criminal Investigation and Attribution (CI) isthe ability to rapidly, reliably and safely identifythe perpetrators of suspected terrorism incidents,including the ability to collect, process, andexamine the evidence, identify and interview wit-nesses, and determine the type, cause and initiallocation of an incident.

Operational Environment

This NTRO is focused on the five OperationalEnvironments represented by threat: chemical,biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-explo-sive/incendiary (i.e., CBRNE) effects of an event.


Responders identifiedfour functional capabilityelements they require forthis NTRO, presentedbelow in order ofdescending priority (as determined byresponders).

• Management of Con-taminated Suspectsand Witnesses

• ContaminatedEvidence Recoveryand Preservation

• Coordinationbetween Law Enforcement and Public Health Authorities

• Post-Incident Forensic Modeling andSimulation

Overall State of Technology forCriminal Investigation and Attribution

As the matrix below indicates, responders feelthey have at least a marginal capability in mostareas in this NTRO, with the exception ofradioactive evidence recovery and preservation.Furthermore, the technologies that support thisNTRO are available today for the top three prior-ity functional capabilities. The fourth-prioritycapability, Post-Incident Forensic Modeling andSimulation (CI.4), relies on technologies that aremarginally available in the near-term, except inthe biological operational environment: in thisenvironment, the technologies are high-risk andnot available in the near term.

CI.1 – Management of Contaminated Suspectsand Witnesses. The ability to quickly identify,

2 0 7


Chapter xii

Criminal Investigation and Attribution (CI)Chapter Chair: Hal KempferChapter Coordinator: Dr. Maria E. Powell

12

3





Criminal Investigation/Attribution

1. Management of Contaminated Suspects/Witnesses

2. Contaminated Evidence Recovery and Preservation

3. Coordination Between law Enforcement and Public Health Authorities

4. Post-Incident Forensic Modeling and Simulation




quarantine and decontaminate potential suspectsand witnesses, and interview and process them.

Goals:

• Quickly identify and segregate suspects fromwitnesses, in quarantine facilities.

• Integrate, sustain and equip (with proper PPE)law enforcement personnel within decontami-nation process, so they can have the ability toobserve and interview during decontaminationprocess.

• Every patrol officer outfitted with quicklyadaptable Level C PPE specifically designedfor their use, to apprehend suspects and inter-view if no time for decontamination (includ-ing knowledge of contaminant and/or symp-toms of victims). (See Chapter II (PPE).)

• Pre-positioned or ultra-light PPE for footpatrol officers (multi-purpose uniform).

• A checklist for immediate action to assess thesituation and provide for better and saferresponse.

• Track individuals who were decontaminated orprocessed (facial recognition, photo/video,etc.).


Responders have this capability today in high-explosive or incendiary environments, but there isa marginal capability for emergency responders inmost communities to conduct interviews or inter-rogations in a warm zone (i.e., with chemical,biological, or radiological contaminants).Handling contaminated witnesses or suspectsrelies on the same capabilities as handling con-taminated general populations. These capabilitieswere discussed in earlier chapters (especiallyChapter II (PPE)). Finally, responders have (orhave access to) capabilities for stand-off inter-viewing/interrogation such as closed-circuit tele-vision: the challenges here would be more fromcriminal procedure and legal requirements ratherthan technology.

An important issue is the need to assess the situa-tion quickly during a CBRNE incident. Thisinvolves some use of technologies such as sensors,imaging equipment and wideband connectivity.Whereas smaller jurisdictions may not have on-hand all of the PPE and decontamination capa-bility they need, they may be able to develop anddisseminate an accurate picture of the contami-nated area, and then virtually be supported indesignating a hot/warm/cold zone. Thus, thisfunctional capability is inherently dependent oncapabilities described in Chapter III (DIDA).

Responders noted that there is a shortage of facialrecognition capability useful for tagging suspectsor other persons of interest. Other technologiesmight be more useful to collect and retain bio-metric data for identification use at a later date,such as iris scans, or technologies from programssuch as DARPA’s Human Identification from aDistance (HID). Nevertheless, most of thesecapabilities are not present in most responderjurisdictions.

State of the Art:

Technologists identified virtual or automatedmeans for identifying and tagging suspects orpersons of interest. Amongst the ways of taggingsuspects is facial recognition or some other bio-metric identification means. Currently, lawenforcement is using finger and palm prints foridentification of suspects, and casinos have beenwidely adopting facial recognition technology fortagging suspects within the gambling industry.These technologies are useful for managing sus-pects in a contaminated environment. Thesetechnologies are also useful for identifying anddistinguishing witnesses among crowds.

Biometric technologies are also useful in caseswhen contaminated suspects must be interviewedfrom a distance, for example, using isolation andclosed-circuit television. Responders noted thatonly California can conduct interviews of con-taminated suspects, and federal resources areneeded to help with this issue. The FBI hasHAZMAT teams that are trained and equippedfor crime scene investigations in contaminated

2 0 8


Chapter XII

areas, to include interviewing contaminated sus-pects. There are technologies that ensure identitythrough biometrics sufficiently for legal purposes.

It has been said that the casino industry is “push-ing the envelope” of technical innovation invisual and behavioral surveillance. Moderndevelopments in closed circuit television (CCTV)and video recording technology have becomemethods for uncovering crime as it is taking placeand providing an archived record for later inves-tigative action. Breakthroughs in digital imagingtechnology, especially regarding facial recogni-tion, have created the public impression that casi-nos are much farther ahead in this area thanother industries. For example, the Trump MarinaCasino in Atlantic City, NJ, claims to have10,000 photographs of cheaters, and people whohave been arrested, evicted or ejected from theiror other casinos, for use in their facial recognitionsystem.

Responders identified the need for fusion of pre-existing databases for suspect management andrecord correlation. There is also a need forimmediate fusion and correlation of interviewand investigative data, with the added capabilityof providing logical leads and dynamic investiga-tive decision modeling in near-real time. Withimprovements in imaging technology, wirelessinternet service, and personal communicationsand information devices, the ability to input,query and receive data from pre-existing data-bases while in the field is becoming less of a tech-nology hurdle. In most cases, this technologyalready exists and it is only matter of funding andpolitical will to test and evaluate it, and deploy itin the field.


The technology to provide this capability is avail-able today, across all of the operational environ-ments. Technology limitations to providing thiscapability are mainly interoperability (to fusecommunications between hot zones and otherresponder locations) and portability (for example,getting equipment for contaminated witnessinterview or suspect questioning into a hot zone).Otherwise, the technology limitations are similar

to those in Chapter III (DIDA); that is, knowingabout the presence of hazards and the parametersof the hot and warm zones.

Gap Fillers:

Since technology is relatively mature, no gapfillers were considered.

CI.2 – Contaminated Evidence Recovery andPreservation. The ability to collect, process andpreserve potentially contaminated evidence (toinclude devices and fragments), in a contaminatedenvironment while ensuring chain of custody.

Goals:

• Process contaminated fatalities.

• Secure separate storage facility for custody andexamination of contaminated evidence.

• Tracking of evidence that supports the chainof custody.

• Contamination control for selective deconta-mination without cross-contamination toolsthat do not destroy evidence.

• Safe transportation and containers for contam-inated evidence to include contaminatedcorpses.

• Remote or stand-off devices for collection ofevidence.

• Easily decontaminated or disposable process-ing tools for all of the above.


Responders have this capability in the high explo-sive and incendiary environments. This capabil-ity is marginal in the biological and chemicalenvironments, and is non-existent among mostresponder jurisdictions for the nuclear and radio-logical environments.

Collection and preservation of evidence is criticalto responders. Much evidence is collected afterincident, but contaminated evidence poses chal-lenges in transporting, analyzing, and using it forevidentiary purposes. This is an issue of expertise

2 0 9


Criminal Investigation and Attribution

and training as much as it is an issue of technology.

Responders generally rely on clear plastic baggingfor sending contaminated evidence out of hotzones. One notable exception is a corpse orhuman remains, which are still wrapped andsealed so to avoid contamination.

Forensic standards for bioagents are not wellestablished, either in law or practice. This is anarea that is still evolving, and the anthrax attacksfollowing September 11th may eventually providelessons or direction that can be used to shape theappropriate technologies needed for forensictrace-back. In addition, state courts (and thus,local responders) will probably look to federallegal experience, procedures, and case law whenapplying forensic standards, in the event a terror-ist attack would be a subject for state courts.Much will be learned from the use of theDaubert test and the introduction of new tech-nologies and procedures at the federal level.

Responders have marginal capability to collectbioagents as evidence. The technology to do this has been bulky, expensive and not widelyavailable.

For secure storage of contaminated evidence (forcustody and examination), it is unlikely that theexpertise and capabilities to exploit the evidencefully (including for leads) will exist in sufficientquantity and quality to perform these analysesand examinations, without federal help and inter-vention. Some of the expertise already exists(e.g., identification of microorganisms) within thestate and county public health laboratories.However, this expertise does not extend to theforensic analysis and investigation of the event.Virtually all of the forensic expertise and capabil-ity related to these events resides at the federallevel. Unique sets of complementary expertisereside in various components of the federal gov-ernment (with help from a select group of con-sulting experts, some of whom are at the state,local or university levels).

State of the Art:

Technologies exist for connecting contaminatedsamples from hazardous buildings. Samples con-taminated by biological and chemical agents (orwhen sampling the agents themselves) usuallyrequires secure transport of the samples to a labo-ratory for final composition analysis. While thereare only a few “Gold Standard” laboratories inthe country that can make a 100% accurate iden-tification, there has been an increase in the num-ber of “Silver Standard” laboratories that canmake a 90-99% accurate identification. In thelast two years, a number of the field-deployableNational Guard Civil Support Teams (CSTs) haveadded this silver standard laboratory capability. Itshould be noted, however, that the application ofthese standards is usually for identifying a biolog-ical agent and its characteristics, rather than nec-essarily identifying the origin of a biological agentfor forensic attribution purposes. The two appli-cations are related, but not distinct, and requiredifferent standards of effectiveness.

Another application for biometric technologies ishandling contaminated evidence. This includes“triage tags” for contaminated items, to includeevidence tags. With current commercial technol-ogy, it is possible to image any piece of evidencein the hot zone prior to it being moved, and thuscreate a visual tag. Potentially, this could belinked with other automated means of “tagging”that could minimize the amount of manpowerinvolved with collecting and tagging evidence.

The FBI’s Hazardous Materials Response Unitand the FBI Laboratory have spent years develop-ing capabilities and procedures for collecting, pre-serving, and the administrative handling of con-taminated evidence. Furthermore, the FBIconducts training for responders, especially HAZ-MAT and WMD response teams, on issuesregarding preservation of evidence. Saving livescontinues to be first priority for responders.However, sensitizing responders to criminal evi-dence issues and collection requirements can helpto avoid unnecessary damage to the forensic valueof potential evidence. FBI procedures are to bag

2 1 0


Chapter XII

the evidence in the hot zone, and then “double-bag” it. The outer bag is then decontaminated inthe warm zone, and the evidence bag is tagged ineither the warm or cold zone by an EvidenceResponse Team Technician, who then preserveschain of custody. Tagging evidence in the hotzone is not something easily accomplished now.

On some occasions, it might be necessary to cap-ture images of the crime scene as rescue opera-tions begin, in order to capture the visual evi-dence of what the scene looked like prior toresponders conducting operations there. Even ifphysical evidence is moved, an imaged sceneallows investigators to recreate where certainpieces of evidence were in relation to the originallayout prior to recovery operations, and then putthis together for potential criminal prosecutionlater on. Furthermore, it might be important forjuries and judges to visualize the evidence in con-text of the scene of the crime. Current technol-ogy can be used to portray the crime scene safelyin court, using robotics, aerial reconnaissance(unmanned or manned), CCTV, etc. Taking les-sons from the imagery intelligence (IMINT)community, it is possible to develop extensiveanalyses using imagery of what happened.Responders noted that using robotics is clumsy,but is sufficient to ensure chain of custody inorder to meet rules of evidence.


The technologies are basically available today toprovide this capability, with some challenges.Occasionally the decontamination processdestroys evidence. Contaminated objects cannotbe entered into evidence or handled and stored inthe same way as uncontaminated evidence.Traditionally the court questions the chemicalalteration from compounds or added surfacedeposits due to the decontamination process.Attorneys will argue about what was done to“decon” the evidence, and how this may havecompromised its forensic value.

Gap Fillers:

Technologists have noted rapid improvements inbio-genomics, which are useful in the develop-ment of forensics biological databases.

Potentially, this can improve the process of deter-mining origins of biological samples.

CI.3 – Coordination between Law Enforcementand Public Health Authorities. The ability tocoordinate among law enforcement, public healthauthorities and medical examiners/coroners, for epi-demiological surveillance, information to supportattribution (and vice versa), to include fusing epi-demiological surveillance information from publichealth with law enforcement epidemiological evidence.

Goals:

Provide evidence and analysis to law enforce-ment, supported by the documentation, andwithin the parameters by which law enforcementreceives notification of epidemiologists’ observa-tions and conclusions.

• Receive and interpret epidemiological infor-mation to support the investigation.

• Provide evidence and information to epidemi-ologists to support their efforts.

• Automate alert and cueing system supportingtwo way information flow between lawenforcement and medical examiners.

• Standardized and interoperable technologiesand mapping, information sharing, etc.


This capability is marginally available today toemergency responders in the chemical, biological,and radiological operational environments. Thisfunctional capability is not relevant to the high-explosive/incendiary and nuclear (i.e., blast effectsper se) operational environments.

Much of this functional capability is dependentupon coordination between law enforcementauthorities and public health/epidemiologicalofficers. This cooperation exists today. However,automation would greatly enhance this functionalcapability.

2 1 1



State of the Art:

The CDC has funded several new labs that fuseinformation between hospitals and law enforce-ment. For example, in April 2003, the CDCopened the new Marcus Emergency OperationsCenter, a facility that improves the agency'sresponse to health crises and enables faster andmore coordinated response to public health emer-gencies nationally and worldwide. It has com-munication links with the Department of Healthand Human Services, federal intelligence andemergency response officials, the Department ofHomeland Security, and state and local publichealth officials.

The Syndromic Surveillance System is a bench-mark of current capabilities, including some tech-nologies that enable automation. Its data focusand staff includes:

• Epidemiology

• Health Planning

• GIS/Mapping

• Administrative Coordination

By May 2003, the CDC estimated that state andlocal health departments have begun syndromicsurveillance systems in about 100 locationsaround the country, with the goal of earlier detec-tion of epidemics and faster public healthresponse (i.e., from days to hours).

The Los Angeles County Terrorism EarlyWarning Group (TEW) has an epidemiologicalintelligence (“epi-intel”) team that monitorshealth service information for indicators andwarning of a potential outbreak. Respondersnoted that bio-information needs to tie intoinvestigations for quickly finding the perpetra-tors, and then removing them from further threatand hopefully deriving valuable information tohelp mitigate the current threat. The LA TEWdoes this by directly linking epi-intel into terror-ism investigation groups through its investigativeliaison office. TEWs are being established in anumber of cities nationwide, especially on theEast and West Coasts.

TEW and the HHS Metropolitan MedicalResponse System (MMRS) are state-of-the-artpractices, as opposed to technologies. MMRSenhances the capabilities of existing systems thatinvolve hazardous materials, law enforcement,and emergency medical services personnel, publichospitals, and the American Red Cross, as well aspublic health agencies and laboratories, privatehospitals, clinics, independent physicians, andother private-sector organizations. Over the lastsix years, HHS has established contracts with 122cities. HHS provides the cities with funding forspecial equipment and pharmaceutical and med-ical supplies, and in return, HHS requires citiesto provide detailed plans on how the city willorganize and respond to chemical, biological, orradiological agents.


Technologies in support of this functional capa-bility are available today, including informationtechnologies that would automate informationsharing. Primary limitations and barriers arecost, organizational, or, in some cases, politicaland legal. For example, responders noted that ifthe syndromic information is collected in hospi-tals, the technology readily exists to flag it for dis-semination to law enforcement, but the questionof compliance with privacy laws is not necessarilyresolved. A good deal of the medical data sourcesroutinely collected for other purposes, such asemergency room logs, pharmacy sales, schoolabsenteeism, etc. can be fused and analyzed forspotting emerging trends. There is legal concernabout this though, since this is not generallysomething done by health departments.

Responders noted that law enforcement officersneed basic training in the “epi-intelligence”process. This is not a traditional area of standardlaw enforcement training curricula, either at theacademy level or advanced training.

Gap Fillers:

There are already extensive law enforcement andpublic health communications and informationsystems already in place; responders and technol-ogists agree that a critical gap filler is simply

2 1 2


Chapter XII

expansion of existing systems. In addition toexpansion, information flows in these systemsneed to be two-way: health authorities need tobe sensitized and responsive to law enforcementand public security issues, and law enforcementmust be equally sensitive to the needs of thehealth services community.

CI.4 – Post-Incident Forensic Modeling andSimulation. The ability to reconstruct and ana-lyze the incident, to support inferential evidence,and to support investigation and prosecution.

Goals:

• Models that support analysis in three dimen-sions, and take into account environmentalconditions such as atmospheric, humidity, etc.

• Portable (for responders) laptop systems todocument and gather data at incident site touse as inputs for the model.

• Reconstruct passage of events.

• Automated playback of events.

• User-friendly, low cost, and easily upgraded.


This functional capability is marginally availableto responders today, mainly because of cost limi-tations. Technology exists to support this capa-bility today to a limited extent, but tends to beprohibitively expensive and only large jurisdic-tions can afford it.

Forensic modeling and simulation are criticalobjectives for responders. They represent theability to “see” what has happened or is happen-ing respectively on the ground regarding CBRNcontamination or effects. Forensic modeling isfar more detailed than simulation modeling, andprobably less defined in some respects, because itis potentially used for evidentiary purposes andnot just to enable operational decision-making.For example, the wildland fires in SouthernCalifornia in Fall 2003 exhibited what can happen when those managing a dynamic series of very large, destructive incidents cannot

predicatively “model” what is happening or goingto happen. Since it is unknown if some of thesefires are related to terrorism, causality could beassumed either way regardless. With that said,there are many good fire prediction modelingsoftware applications available, but the results ofthe fires speak for themselves. With nearly 3000homes destroyed, sixteen lives lost and over $2billion in damage, there is now the problem ofcreating a detailed forensic model that can helpinvestigators determine causality and, eventually,culpability.

State of the Art:

There exist several plume modeling programs(notably those developed by the DoD DefenseThreat Reduction Agency and the Department ofEnergy), but within these programs there is stillthe need to add the fourth dimension of time.These models have various strengths and weak-nesses, but as static constructs, their utilitydiminishes over time as contamination areas shiftwith weather and other factors.

Various laboratories have been developing meth-ods for early detection and rapid treatment. Forexample, universities in New Mexico have formeda consortium with Los Alamos and SandiaNational Laboratories and the New Mexico StateDepartment of Health, to develop a model forpopulation surveillance using real-time reportingby health professionals in emergency departmentsof any patients reporting flu-like symptoms.These technology efforts can be applied to foren-sic modeling.


The technologies to provide forensic modelingare marginally available in the near term, and areof medium technology risk for development, forall operational environments except biologicalthreats. For the biological operational environ-ment, the technology is not available in the nearterm, and development of the technology faceshigh development risk. In addition to the limita-tions described below, technology in this area willface many of the same challenges inherent indetecting, identifying, and assessing threat agents

2 1 3



(see Chapter III (DIDA), for a discussion of thesechallenges). This functional capability relies onmany of the capabilities described in Chapter III.

Most models today have limited model validationand certification, with no centralization. Thisundermines their effectiveness for forensic model-ing. Many models rest on data that is either out-dated or limited in the range of threat agents.Modeling systems work well for anthrax but notothers. Models that function for chemicalweapons do not work well for toxic industrialchemicals/materials, and vice versa. In manycases the working models or projections rely onoutdated, obsolete data. Biological models areespecially problematic in their underlying data, asthere are few effective simulants for the models,and thus the models cannot be tested for effec-tiveness short of actual deployment in a realattack. There is a need for new models and adap-tive models that can be tailored to specific urbanenvironments and fused with other datapoints(i.e., terrain, population, meteorological input,etc.). Furthermore, many models are limited bydata entry and human factors issues: to be moreeffective, forensic models must have automateddata entry (i.e., tied to agent and environmentalsensors), and be more user friendly.

Models are also undermined by a poor under-standing of incendiary physics (especially thermo-barics), fate and effects for biological agents, andeffects from combinations of agents in attacks.This lack of comprehension undermines the ana-lytical basis and thus accuracy of models.

The effects of chemicals and biological agents dis-persed in urban or complex terrain are difficult tomodel effectively with current technology. DoDmodelers for U.S. Northern Command’s exercise“Determined Promise ’03” had to manually altermodels to reflect urban terrain, environmentalimpacts, and “micro-climates” of the Strip area ofLas Vegas. Several research projects are under-way, but there is still no software package avail-able that can automatically adjust for this com-plexity. In particular, biological models are thehighest risk for technology development. Inaddition to the above limitations and barriers, it is inherently more difficult to model for contagion.

Gap Fillers:

There is much data in the federal government(especially DoD) that could be used to enhanceor update the underlying data sets of existingmodels. Added data sets needed in these modelsinclude inputs for microweather variations foundin vertical terrain, such as urban areas. In addi-tion, “After Action Reports” on public health orterrorist events, notably the October 2001anthrax attacks, can be useful for strengtheningexisting models’ data sets.

Note: Responders and technologists felt that thecritical technologies supporting this NTRO arebeing proposed in other NTROs, principallyChapter II (PPE), Chapter III (DIDA) andChapter IV (UIC). Therefore, no ResponseTechnology Objectives are offered here.

2 1 4


Chapter XII

Definition

Mitigation and Restoration for Plant and AnimalResources is the ability to prevent or mitigate,detect and neutralize damage to plant-life, ani-mals (i.e., wildlife, livestock, exotics, pets andother domesticated animals), food, feedstuffs, andhumans caused by a terrorist event aimed at agri-culture and human and animal health.14

In line with the Project Responder emphasis onresponders, this NTRO leaves out many impor-tant elements of plant and animal resource pro-tection. For example, research on novel vaccinesand prophylaxis (as opposed to responder deliv-ery of these medicines), and developing resistantstrains of plants and animals, are outside thescope of Project Responder.


Mitigation and Restoration for Plant and AnimalResources occur in six operational environments:Animal, Plant, Human Health, Food Processing,Food Distribution, and Feedstuffs. Rather thanrestricting animal and plant environments ofpresent concern to livestock and crops, it wasconcluded that there should be a wider perspec-tive that would encompass animal wildlife,insects, weeds, flowers and decorative plants.While these may not be the focus of catastrophicterrorism, they reflect the very broad scope of thefood and agriculture sector and the activities andresources it involves. Feedstuffs are of concernbecause of previous deliberate contaminations ofanimal feed with toxic substances like insecticides

and dioxins, and because the incorporation intoanimal feed of central nervous system materialscarrying bovine spongiform encephalopathy(Mad Cow) disease has had such a devastatingeffect on the English beef industry and is cur-rently the cause of an embargo on Canadian beef.Food processing and food distribution are alsodistinct environments with different methods forsurveillance, detection and decontamination.Human Health is called out separately as anoperational environment to ensure adequate con-sideration of the effects of vector borne andzoonotic diseases that are transmitted to people.

In contrast to the other NTROs, although insome instances firefighters and law enforcementpersonnel may be pressed into service to protectplant and animal resources, the first line ofdefense will be extension agents, employees ofstate departments of agriculture and naturalresources, veterinarians, forest rangers, and simi-lar professionals.


Responders and technologists considered a set of eight functional capabilities to handle theoperational context described above. These capa-bilities are presented below in order of descend-ing priority:

• Rapid Diagnostics and Detection to Confirmthe Introduction of CBR Agents to Animals,Plants, and Food/Feed

2 1 5


Chapter xiii

Mitigation and Restoration for Plantand Animal Resources (MRPA)Chapter Chair: Dr. Thomas W. FrazierChapter Coordinator: Dr. Maria Powell

14 The MRPA NTRO evolved from the Agricultural Mitigation and Restoration NTRO that was discussed as being under development in the March2003 Project Responder Interim Report, Emergency Responders’ Needs, Goals and Priorities.

• Coordination of Animal and Plant Entitieswith Public Health, Law Enforcement, andState, Local, and Federal Government andIndustry

• Identification of Outbreak Origins and Spread

• Animal and Plant Diagnostic Surge Capacity

• Vaccination/Treatment and Protection

• Quarantine, Isolation and Recall

• Rapid and Humane Euthanasia and Disposalof Contaminated Carcasses, Plants and FoodProducts

• Decontamination

It should be noted that under directives forAwareness and Warning, Mitigation Strategies,Response Planning and Recovery, Outreach andProfessional Development, the HomelandSecurity Presidential Directive/HSPD-9 Defenseof the United States Agriculture and Food, January30, 2004, touches upon a number of issues sub-sumed under these functional capabilities.HSPD-9 establishes anational policy to defendthe agriculture and foodsystem against terroristattacks, major disasters,and other emergencies.

Overall State ofTechnology forMitigation andRestoration forAnimal and PlantResources

The matrix below pres-ents a mixed picture ofthe current and near-term availability ofneeded technologies andthe degree of technicalrisk associated withdeveloping and fieldingthe needed capabilitiesfor the future. For rapiddiagnostics and detection

technology needed to confirm a CBR incident,the technologies needed to achieve the desiredlevel of capability do not yet exist. By contrast,capabilities for organizational and technical com-munications networking needed to coordinateremedial action are lacking but the technology tosupport these capabilities is readily available.

Technology for determining outbreak origin andspread generally exists, but is not operationallyavailable to emergency responders in the animal,plant, or human health areas. For food process-ing, food distribution and feedstuffs, the technol-ogy is commercially available and used in prac-tice. Similarly, the animal and plant agriculturecommunities have yet to establish functionalcooperative relationships for meeting surge diag-nostic needs, although the technical capability todo so exists. The human health, food processing,food distribution, and feedstuffs areas are betterprepared to meet surge capability needs and haveprocedures and technology in place to do so.

The Vaccination/Treatment and Protection(MRPA.5) ratings reflect that the technology gen-erally exists, but is not operationally available to

2 1 6


Chapter XIII

12

3





Mitigation and Restoration for Plant and Animal Resources

1. Rapid Diagnostics and Detection to Confirm Introduction of CBR Agents

2. Coordination of Animal and Plant Authorities with PH, LE

3. Identification of Outbreak Origins and Spread

4. Animal and Plant Diagnostic Surge Capability

5. Vaccination/Treatment and Protection

6. Quarantine, Isolation and Recall

7. Rapid and Humane Euthanasia and Disposal

8. Decontamination


Functional CapabilitiesFood

ProcessingFood

DistributionHumanHealthPlantAnimal Feedstuffs

meet the challenges of some potential attacksinvolving relevant chemical, biological, or nuclearthreats. Relative to the overall readiness of vac-cines and alternative treatments to meet the fullthreat spectrum, a “red” rating could have beenjustified. (The Project Responder focus is not onthe availability of vaccines and treatments but theavailability to responders of the means to admin-ister them.)

Quarantine, Isolation, and Recall (MRPA.6) tech-nology is also relatively available to emergencyresponders, although the capabilities would notbe fully adequate for catastrophic incidentsinvolving large numbers of animals or large grow-ing areas. The same applies to rapid and humaneeuthanasia and disposal of contaminated car-casses, plants and food products. The technologyexists, although it could be improved. It is notimmediately available to emergency responders inagriculture and they would need orientation andtraining for using it in emergency situations.

Contaminated animals and plants are usuallydestroyed rather than decontaminated. The sameapplies to feedstuffs. Technology for decontami-nation of food processing and distribution facili-ties exists. Emergency responders who work inthese settings are familiar with its use and haveaccess to it.

MRPA.1 – Rapid Diagnostics and Detection toConfirm the Introduction of CBR Agents toAnimals, Plants, and Food/Feed. The ability toeither run a field test, or a more definitive test at astate or regional laboratory, and to perform aggrega-tion and analysis of the results. This capabilityincludes ongoing surveillance and rapid detectionof chemical contaminants, pests, pathogens, tox-ins, and adulterants (known and unknown). Fieldcapabilities should include software-assisted syn-dromic evaluation of animal or plant symptomsand signs as well as testing of specimens. Over-lapping or similar capabilities are addressed inDIDA.1 (On Scene Detection), DIDA.3 (Classi-fication and Mitigation), MR.4 (Rapid ClinicalEnvironmental and Veterinary Field Assessment),PHRBAE.1 (Surveillance and InformationIntegration System), and PHRBAE.2 (Rapid, High-Throughput Clinical Assessment and Testing).

Goals:

• Rapid (i.e., 15 minute-test) field diagnosticsfor use by emergency responders are critical.

• Reduction of the time between pathogenintroduction and response.

• Adequate field instrumentation to both detectand identify chemical contaminants, pests,pathogens, toxins, and adulterants.

• Lab tests to identify genomic components.

• Rapid laboratory identification and verifica-tion of highly contagious diseases that requireimmediate attention and drastic actions asopposed to those conditions with similarsymptoms (high sensitivity and specificity).

• Education, training, and equipping staff inidentification and sourcing, of potential front-line responders (including producers) to knowwhat to look for, whom to contact, appropri-ate procedures, and incentives to report poten-tial threats.

• Adequate stocks and distribution of diagnosticreagents and resources (cells, primers, tests,reagents, etc.) with long shelf lives.

• Surveillance grid that is automated and activefor remote plant and animal disease surveil-lance to indicate deviation from baselinewithin 4-6 hours (for animals) twenty-fourhours (for plants) and four-six hours (for foodprocessors/distributors).

• Standardization of diagnostic methods, andinstituting an accreditation process for diag-nostic laboratories.

• Improved techniques for screening bulk con-tainers (including ships, barges, trucking andrailcars) and methods to screen and analyzefoods/feedstuffs.

• Redundant laboratory capabilities, able tomanage nationally distributed/multi-targetincidents and handle varying levels of biologi-cal materials; good workability between publicand private industry reference laboratories.

2 1 7



• Identification and testing for prodromalstate/onset of symptoms based on behavioraland/or physiological parameters/signs in real-time.

• Access to animal and plant disease databaseswith reference images, which includes diagnos-tic test procedures available for pathogens andwhere they are performed; contact informationfor scientific experts by disease agent; andplant and animal pathogen/pest informationfor initial identification.

• Mobile laboratories suitable for Biosafety Level3-4 disease management and analysis for fielduse, so that specimens don’t have to betrucked to the laboratory.

• Real-time detection and analysis capability forviability and disease potential assessments.

Additional Considerations Regarding Goals forMRPA.1:

• Many (especially plant and insect) exotic dis-eases are not widely known by American fieldpersonnel, suggesting the need for visually richelectronic field diagnostic aids and tropicaldisease networking with foreign laboratoriesand state and private sector laboratories.

• Field tests are needed for prohibited adulter-ants, antibiotics, hormones, and geneticallymodified varieties.

• Testing capabilities should include tests forbiological toxins, which may be the main waythat a pathogen attacks a host.

• Rapid diagnostics capabilities also need toinclude capabilities for testing dead animalswhich many screening tests cannot do.

• A complete rapid diagnostics capability should include field screening tests that canhelp emergency responders avoid exposure to pathogens (especially viral) agents that might be dangerous to them, including protective gear for use while making thesedeterminations.

• Special emphasis needs to be placed on tech-nology transfer and human engineering activi-ties concerned with transforming laboratorytests into field analyzers suitable for use by rel-atively untrained emergency responders andproducer staff.

• DIDA surveillance capabilities should includemonitoring of water and air for pathogens andchemical contaminants of concern to plantand animal health.

• Wildlife biologists and ornithologists shouldbe considered emergency responders.

• Weed analysis tests are also needed since weedscan be most destructive to plant crops.


There is limited understanding of the baselinedata to adequately differentiate between what isnormal and what is not. Current screening testsdon’t apply to all animals/species or all pathogens,since some remain either unknown or poorlystudied. However, analytic capabilities are betterfor most chemical contaminants than forpathogens.

There is no rapid high through-put diagnostics.State and local jurisdictions lack facilities, highvolume sample processing potential and adequatestaffing for emergencies. While all State diagnos-tic facilities have ELISA (enzyme-linkedimmunosorbent assay) test capabilities, only somehave PCR (polymerase chain reaction) tests for alimited number of pathogens only There is alsoan insufficient number of national reference labo-ratories; currently, there is just Plum Island (NewYork) and the Ames (Iowa) USDA Centers.

Currently, veterinary diagnostic laboratories rou-tinely handle many pathogen analyses and couldsubstantially increase surge capacities if necessary.For classical pathogens, veterinary laboratoriesalready undertake a great deal of pathology andoperate successfully under an established self-accreditation system under the AmericanAssociation of Veterinary LaboratoryDiagnosticians (AAVLD).

2 1 8


Chapter XIII

State of the Art:

One approach would be to monitor the environ-ment for pathogens before they become endemicin flora and fauna. As discussed in Chapter III(DIDA) and Chapter VIII (PHRBAE), there area host of detection strategies for biological agents,but each has significant limitations. Such surveil-lance systems must be automated with little needfor user intervention or servicing. BW agents needto be identified at extremely low concentrations incomplex, changing backgrounds, in near real timeand with low power requirements and no reagents.Clearly, existing systems do not meet the needswell. They suffer from relatively poor sensitivity,occasional false positives, and lengthy responsetimes. Good detection equipment would deter theuse of such weapons by reducing an attack’s effec-tiveness and increasing the probability of detectingthe perpetrator. However, improved detection sys-tems would present a host of positive spin-offs,such as in medical diagnostics, environmentalmonitoring, food and beverage processing, andproduct tracking.

Despite a multitude of ongoing and proposeddevelopment efforts on systems to meet RapidDiagnostics and Detection to confirm the delib-erate introduction of CBR agents to Animal,Plants, and Food/Feed, this technology remainsstill far from where it needs to be in meetinghomeland security needs. This large gap existsacross all the relevant operations environmentsreviewed. This combination of overall signifi-cance of MRPA in the face of a relatively earlypoint in the state of the art supports making amajor funding investment in these detectionstrategies, tools, and analytical systems at bothbasic and applied research and development levelsof the systems development process.

A variety of federal agencies are now addressingthese pressing, high-priority needs for rapid diag-nostics and detection equipment to confirm thepresence of CBR agents in these different opera-tional environments. Some of the programs ofearly particular note include:

• DARPA programs: TIGER and on-chip technology

• Navy/DLA: food perishability tracking(smart-tags)

• Coast Guard/DHS: container inspection

• NASA: Satellite imagery forplants/crops/forestry

• Nano-fabrication (existing for chemical base-lines and now being worked on in biologics)to get protein profiles as the baseline for detection

• FDA: food container inspection

• Commercial program initiatives: Wal-Martprogram for tracking food processing and distribution

• Food safety inspection programs at Universityof Maryland, College Park’s FDA lab, theFDA Food Safety Lab (Chicago), and theFDA Center for Food Safety and AppliedNutrition

• Los Alamos National Laboratory program onhigh-throughput diagnostics labs

• Genomics research and data for setting base-lines and distinguishing betweenpathogens/adulterants

• Work in progress on gas chromatography forplant/animal studies

• The National Seed Health System (NSHS)works to implement diagnostic methods thathave been evaluated and proven to be accu-rate, reproducible, and capable of detectingpathogens at a defined level of sensitivity; alsoconducts research in the development andstandardization of seed health testing methods.


A variety of different technology limitations andbarriers limit progress in developing and intro-ducing rapid-diagnostics/detection systems forconfirming introduction of CBR agents in thefood and agriculture sector.

There have been substantial advances in technol-ogy for important biological agents, but they

2 1 9



have often not included agriculturally importantpests or pathogens, nor have they been inexpen-sive or field-deployable. PCR-based tests cannotbe used for newly emerging pathogens or novelgenetically engineered pathogens/agents. Thus itis desirable to develop approaches orientedtoward identifying classes of related agents.Genomics has potential to provide such screeningtests, but contemporary knowledge of genomicstructures and functional genomics for plantspecies, pests, and pathogens is very incomplete.Knowledge of functional genomics is actually stillin its infancy. Analyzer technology cannot com-pensate for this deficit in basic knowledge. Thegreat majority of plant species, for example, stillremain to be subjected to genomic study. Thesame limitations exist for pathogens and pests,especially those associated with foreign plant dis-ease. Prions too remain poorly understood.15

Another source of limitations and barriers relatesto funding abilities and incentives of the privatesector for new technology development in theabsence of commercial demand. Once a new dis-ease has become established, then a market willbe created for such diagnostic equipment. Forsome threat agent that has not been experienced,however, the private sector will not invest capitalfor development in the absence of return on thisinvestment.

An associated barrier has to do with sharing intel-lectual property. Researchers and R&D compa-nies that have developed genomics information or other related kinds of information considerthis information proprietary. Some charge fees to access genomics databases, for example. Other companies will simply not divulge thisinformation.

Other financially related barriers include difficul-ties private sector and state laboratories experi-ence in meeting overhead costs during austeretimes and associated collapsing infrastructures,maintaining program continuity, and recruitingand keeping talented scientists and technologistsin uncertain times. Recruiting foreign nationalscientists and technologists has become an

increasing problem because of new immigrationand national security restraints placed on theseprofessionals from particular countries.

An associated problem is that laws and regula-tions associated with biosecurity RDT&E are inan evolutionary period at present.

Gap Fillers:

Considering the present state of flux in agencymissions, budgets, state and private sector initia-tives and perceived vulnerability of the food andagriculture sector, two broad initiatives areimportant. These initiatives have to do with: (a) continuing productive basic RDT&E programsthat need funding continuity and expansion; and(b) expanding national capabilities in personneland institutional resources to build operationalcapabilities for surveillance and detection.

Past these broad institutional directions, an SRAand two RTOs have been identified to fill theidentified gaps. As described in the Introduction(Chapter I), the SRA on biomarkers includes afocus on markers of CBR exposure in plants andanimals; MRPArto.1 (Plant and AnimalResponders’ Decision Aid) addresses the respon-der need for a portable decision aid to help inter-pret signs and symptoms, to guide further infor-mation acquisition, to facilitate reach-back toadditional expertise, and to suggest mitigationcourse of action; and MRPArto.2 (Field Screeningand Assessment Tests) addresses technologies forrapid screening and testing of plants and animalsfor exposure to and contamination/infection bythreat agents.

MRPA.2 – Coordination of Animal and PlantEntities with Public Health, Law Enforcement,and State, Local, and Federal Government andIndustry. The ability to bring together full powerof local, state and federal emergency managementand supporting agencies, as well as private industry-civilian intelligence, on a plant/animal/food event.

Goals:

• Access to common (shared and standardized)communication devices and integrated (shared

2 2 0


Chapter XIII

15 Prions (improperly formed proteins) are the causative agent in Mad Cow and related degenerative diseases of the central nervous system.

and standardized) data systems is essential foremergency responders.

• Intelligence agencies including private onesshould be included in coordination efforts.

• Legal authority to protect both security andcommercial sensitive data and to share data(surveillance, health alerts and response data)– needs to be considered as a national securityresource; national, state and local levels; gov-ernment/public safety sensitive.

• Incentive structure to encourage industry par-ticipation in information sharing.

• Integrated and coordinated mechanism orplatform for a shared database or e-warningsystem; needs to include the ER community.

• Interface with a national/state hotline forplant/animal/food incidents.

• Better awareness of threats to the food andagriculture sector by the law enforcementcommunity (especially rural), producers andindustry.

• Establishment of diverse cooperator and stake-holder relationships with worldwide, national,state, and local agricultural entities, industrythrough joint programs and regulatory frame-work initiatives; to include consequences/understanding of international trade implications.

• Ability to establish a two-way informationflow between plant/animal specialists andhuman epidemiological surveillance activities(See PHRBAE.1 (Surveillance and InformationIntegration System)). Currently, plant/animalspecialists do not have access to human epi-demiological surveillance information.

• More effective communication systems (otherthan conference calls) to discuss incidents;broadly distributed peer communication sys-tem; secure and redundant.

• Smart distribution of information to includeindustry.

• Multi-agency command (MAC) on thenational level; interagency work group at thefederal level.

• Tailored emergency response task force thatcan be activated in a matter of hours that ispre-established and composed of government,industry, and academia.

• Integration into federal, state, county andlocal, emergency management and incidentcommand systems as well as private industry(Infraguard16 and existing Information Sharingand Analysis Centers [ISACs]).

• A single ISAC from food production throughprocessing to consumption.

• Integration into Incident Command System.


A study by the National Research Council17 con-cluded (2003) that coordination amongst federal,state/local and private entities appears to beinsufficient for effectively deterring, preventing,detecting, responding to, and recovering fromagricultural threats. It is difficult to develop acoordinated emergency plan for agriculturebecause there is no publicly-available, in-depth,interagency or interdepartmental national planfor defense against intentional introductions ofbiological agents directed at agriculture. Whilethe Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service(APHIS) does have emergency plans for dealingwith unintentional introductions of plant andanimal pests and pathogens, they are not ade-quate for responding to agricultural bioterrorismincidents.

Specifically, there is poor industry/governmentinteraction and cooperation. In addition, state-based incident command structures and plans arenot well-defined or integrated with industry.

2 2 1



16 InfraGard is a cooperative undertaking between the U.S. Government (led by the FBI and the National Infrastructure Protection Center) and anassociation of businesses, academic institutions, state and local law enforcement agencies, and other participants dedicated to increasing the securityof United States critical infrastructures. The goal of InfraGard is to enable information flow so that the owners and operators of infrastructureassets can better protect themselves and so that the United States government can better discharge its law enforcement and national security responsibilities.

17 National Research Council of the National Academies, “Counting Agricultural Bio-Terrorism,” National Academics Press, Washington, D.C.(2003)

Currently, there are limited public/private part-nership capabilities.

Current efforts include a food ISAC which isbeing restructured toward some of the abovegoals. APHIS has a reporting system and aNational Animal Health Emergency ManagementSteering Committee (NAHEMS). Other net-works do exist even if ad-hoc or informally, suchas the animal health emergency response systemand state veterinarians.

Capabilities for a Uniform Surveillance andReporting System:

Currently, there is no uniform reporting systemfor all zoonotic diseases but, as identified above,there have been programs and proposals movingtowards this capability. The requisite funding tofully implement and create these programs andproposals seems to be stalled. In 2000, the CDCsponsored the West Nile Virus NationalSurveillance System or ArboNet that nowincludes all 50 states. Surveillance data is simul-taneously collected on humans, horses, mosqui-toes, dead birds and sentinel chicken flocks. Anoffshoot of this is the National Zoo SurveillanceSystem or ZooNet which started in 2001 as apilot project sponsored by the CDC to includeanimal data not normally found or integratedinto traditional surveillance channels. ZooNetnow represents 157 zoos and animal facilities thatsubmit samples for West Nile Virus testingthrough the Cornell University Animal HealthDiagnostic Laboratory. Some additional fundingwas provided by the Ellison Foundation and puttowards the creation of a Web-based system toprovide approved parties with automatic updates.ZooNet is distinct because it is the only animaldisease surveillance network to share real-timedata on disease threat with public health nationally.

A framework for a National ZoonoticSurveillance System has also been proposed. Thebasic concept is to expand the reporting systemto other agents and to bring in additional veteri-nary diagnostic labs to maintain real-time diag-nostics and reporting. The goal is to deploy anation-wide data network that centrally collects

animal health and diagnostic information, andallows access by epidemiologists, public healthofficials, and defense agencies to real-time analyses and reports. The purpose of such a sys-tem is to be able plan responses to a potentialepidemic as an early warning system for theinfection of humans. Over 2000 participatingorganizations would give inputs to the systemwhich would include zoos, veterinary clinics,wildlife rehabilitators (both captive and free-rang-ing). Through routine sampling and medicalexams using existing infrastructure within theseorganizations, it is projected that a new workingnational system could be operational within ayear. Costs are estimated at $1.95 Million for thefirst year, and $10 Million over 5 years the fullimplementation and operation of the system.

Basically, the technological and the architecturalwherewithal to produce a national surveillancesystem for zoonotic diseases exists, but has notbeen harnessed to the task. While coordinationof animal and plant entities with public health,law enforcement, and state, local and federal gov-ernments and industry was rated as one of thetop priorities for federal emphasis, there is still avery long way to go in achieving coordinationobjectives for all of the operational environments.

State of the Art:

From a technology perspective, all the hardwareand software that such systems would require areavailable today. This includes multi-level securityon information system, XML for data taggingand tracking, and ICS technologies.


The barriers that need to be overcome, beyondthose that are organizational and financial, relateto system scalability, information systems archi-tecture, rural digital signal bandwidth availability,dialogue design/human factors system usability,and reporting format development.

The main thrusts of the work that will berequired to realize these coordination goals willbe largely concerned with devising appropriatefield study tactics, techniques and procedures andintegrating this information into an overall crisis

2 2 2


Chapter XIII

field communications plan. This requires creativedevelopment cooperation between discipline specialists and IT professionals during systemsdevelopment, followed by thorough human fac-tors assessment of system usability. This wouldbe an iterative approach to development of designspecifications and adoption of standardized fieldobservation and reporting practices.

Design issues include compensating for lackingontology/terminology or standards for communi-cating information on genomics and proteomics.Also, the architecture must accommodate require-ments for standardized reporting at all levels andacross all involved disciplines, which does not yetexist.

System portability, reliability, and usability acrossthe various operational environments are a signif-icant issue, especially where work has to be donein environmentally challenging settings.

It will be important to involve the diagnostic lab-oratories in the design process for helping deter-mine approaches to field and follow-on diagnos-tics, test result interpretations, reporting systems,and reporting formats.

Finally, the coordination needs in the MRPA areashare most technical characteristics and manyusers with the general and specialized coordina-tion needs addressed under other NTROs.Moving forward with special purpose networkingsystems in any of these areas could erect new bar-riers to effective collaboration and coordinationduring planning and response phases.

Gap Fillers:

The major goals can be roughly broken downinto two general areas: (1) issues concerning net-working in an organizational sense; and (2) issuesconcerning networking from a data integrationand technical communications sense. The orga-nizational issues include such concerns as indus-try incentives for cooperation, pre-trained teamsfor responding to outbreaks and better integratedcommand systems. The data integration andtechnical communications issues include develop-ment of trace-back data systems, hotline services,

and common communications across operationalenvironments, uniformity and standardization ofdata requirements, and linking mechanismsamong technically relevant networks (networkingacross networks).

The strategy for approaching these networkingand coordination problems that seems mostattractive at present is one of building on theongoing efforts of those organizations that havealready demonstrated initiatives and operationallysound networking systems for which demand canbe demonstrated. These various initiatives can benourished and expanded through helping provideexpansions of capabilities and a sound annualfunding base for their continued operation.Private sector industries that remain unmotivatedto cooperate with the federal biodefense programat DHS and elsewhere can be dealt with in a reg-ulatory fashion. This would be an overall “car-rots and sticks” approach that can be selectivelyapplied where it is important to national securityto do so.

In all cases these efforts should be conducted incoordination with efforts to increase coordinationcapability needed for other NTROs.

MRPA.3 – Identification of Outbreak Originsand Spread. The ability to track movements ofanimal and plant shipments and plant pest out-breaks and to identify the origin of individual ani-mals and the spread of pestilence.

Goals:

• GIS enabled systems.

• National secure database.

• DIDA capabilities applied to tracing.

• All possible movements of infectious animalsmust be identified as quickly as possible andmodes of potential spread eliminated.

• National identification system is needed forlivestock.

• Expansion of diagnostic network worldwide totrack multiple pest outbreaks.

2 2 3



• Trained and equipped staff in shipment trac-ing and evaluations.

• Trained staff are needed for overt and covertmonitoring of international and domesticmovements of infectious substances and pests,including training in pattern recognition andanalysis, offshore staffing and surveillancecapabilities.

• Ability to trace and track processed crops andlivestock optimally down to the individualanimal level.

• Access to an integrated tracking system thatincludes purchasing, identification, sale anddistribution records.

• Ongoing global risk assessment and pathwayanalysis.


The National Research Council has stated thatinformation about agricultural diseases and infes-tations in foreign countries is often vague and notalways time-sensitive. Since substantial expertisein exotic plant, animal, and insect diseases doesexist in other countries sharing information,ideas, and programs through international scien-tific collaboration would be able to help fortifyour national system for safeguarding plants andanimals against intentional threats.

Regarding plants, even a serious plant disease in apopulated area can go undetected for a very longtime, and as such, domestic surveillance needs tobe bolstered. Infrared remote sensing technologyfor crop analysis exists but is not generallyapplied to disease propagation.

Work is being done on animal tags and informa-tion systems to determine the history of diseasedanimals and to allow rapid intervention to limitan outbreak. The FDA has recently publisheddraft regulations for trace-back informationreporting for the agriculture industry for publicreview and comment. In addition, the EuropeanUnion has recently completed a large study ondifferent methods for storing animal history

information in or on the animal. Differentmethods were found to be suitable, includingchip-based methods. Being able to pinpoint themovement of a specific animal in relation to itspotential contacts and infection is very useful aidin trace-back during an outbreak. This is an areathat can be further developed. However, whilethe technology itself generally exists to supportfurther development of these goals, factors suchas limitations on funding availability and politicalwill have restrained progress across all the opera-tional environments.

State of the Art:

Different sources can be useful for identificationof outbreak origin and spread information. Thisincludes county extension agents, state veterinari-ans and departments of agriculture and wildlife,the American Farm Bureau, and APHIS intelli-gence. For foreign outbreaks, the World HealthOrganization and Office International desEpizooties (OIE) organizations can be queriedthrough their Internet information services.

Geographical information systems offer promisefor such analyses and for sentinel systems deploy-ment. Sandia National Laboratories, for exam-ple, has done productive work in this area andhas been demonstrating a relevant system offeringrecently. Some of this work is also being accom-plished at state departments of agriculture andwildlife, land grant universities, and at APHISlaboratories.


Some of the analytical modeling work has gonebeyond the capacity of the current scientificknowledge base to support its further develop-ment. This technology is limited, for example,by the fact that many plants have not had theirgenomic structures established. Pathogengenomics is also far from completely understood.Yet, tracing is somewhat dependent on applica-tions of bioinformatics, and of comparative andfunctional genomics for understanding specificorigins and comparative threats of foreignpathogens.

2 2 4


Chapter XIII

Gap Fillers:

Identifying origins of specific pathogens andplant life is a valuable analytic tool. Tagging andinformation systems can assure that the history ofa diseased plant or animal in commerce can betraced back to its source to help determine thesource of an outbreak; for successful interventionit would also be useful that all plants and animalsthat have moved through the relevant loci can berapidly located and sequestered as well. Trackingdiseases of wild animals poses different problems;some populations could be tagged and locationsmonitored but the value and cost of such anapproach is unclear at present.

Some specific legal and policy amendments toexisting statutes are needed to treat intellectualproperty rights issues, confidentiality issues, andbalance scientific information sharing vs. divul-gence of national security-sensitive information.The last issue is equivalent to optimizing accessto DNA repositories through properly balancingthese two competing areas of consideration.

Two review projects seem particularly relevant tothis capability. One would be an interagencycooperative review of remote sensing capabilitiesfor detecting crop disease and contamination.This project would involve the various agenciesthat do satellite and aerial surveillance of geo-graphical areas (see MRPArto.3 (OverheadImaging for Wide-Area Surveillance andAssessment). The other project would review whatremains to be done in developing the chip-basedsolutions to trace-back for tracking the move-ments of livestock, harvested plant crops, andfood products from origin to the points of retailsale (MRPArto.4 (Trace-Back Capabilities UsingInformation Systems and Tags)). All the indica-tions are that the technology in both cases isready to place into commercial operations. Issuesof costs to producers, processors, and consumersnow need to be examined. Cost/benefit of com-mercialization needs to be analyzed

MRPA.4 – Animal and Plant Diagnostic SurgeCapability. The ability to rapidly mobilize (hire,contract and deploy) private animal health profes-sionals or qualified diagnosticians and other

emergency responders (public and private) in a crisis situation.

Goals:

Animals:

• Sufficient numbers of trained personnel avail-able on two weeks or less notice to assist in anoutbreak. There is no firm general estimateon how many persons this might usuallyinvolve, but it could range up to several hun-dreds of thousands for a major national event.

• Ability to identify the numbers of responders:trained personnel and support personnel.

• Mandatory requirements for certification inresponding to large-scale animal emergenciesfor all vets in training.

• Development of nationwide State AnimalResponse Teams (SART) teams.

• Online capability to approve surge personnel rapidly for foreign animal disease diagnosticians.

Plants:

• Surge capability for qualified diagnosticians torespond effectively to outbreaks and to assesspotential outbreaks.

• National and state notification tree.

• Technological advances would curtail out-breaks by expanding the use of digital cam-eras, electronic communication of pest photosand impacts, and treatment strategies.

• Incentives for private sector/industry tobecome involved.

• Security clearance issue – more are needed formore existing personnel and surge personnel.

• Draw upon trained global resources.


A number of states have recently just begun to develop mutual assistance agreements with

2 2 5



adjacent cooperative status to realize veterinaryand diagnostic surge capability expansions foremergencies. Federal-state cooperation has beenbetter for addressing these objectives in thehuman health and food/feed environments thanfor animal and plant agriculture. Leadership andvoluntary initiatives in support of this area andothers is growing on the part of associations,especially associations such as the AmericanPhytopathological Society and different veteri-nary medical associations and state diagnosticlaboratory associations.

There are a number of organizations or organiza-tional structures that can be used for surge capac-ity. These include:

• EMAC (Emergency Management AssistanceCompact) agreements.

• TEW (Terrorism Early Warning) type virtualsurge capacity.

• Veterinary schools and their students in large-scale emergencies.

• Mutual aid agreements among adjacent states.

• VMAT (Veterinary Medical Assistance Teams)can find a helpful place in veterinary and diag-nostic surge capacity expansions.

• SART (State Animal Response Teams) alsohave a place but exist only in a few states.

However, drawing upon human resources acrossoperational environments, the capability is notavailable for the animal and plant environmentsbut is marginally so for the other areas.

State of the Art:

Building surge capabilities for diagnosticians pres-ents substantial challenges in coordination, train-ing, orientation, and mission management. Thatcapability does not yet exist for the animal andplant communities. It has advanced forward fur-ther in the human health, food processing, fooddistribution, and feedstuffs communities.

Precedents exist, however, such as the emergingnetwork of Terrorism Early Warning (TEW)

groups, based on the Los Angeles County TEWmodel and similar intelligence fusion centers andtheir technologies. The Medical Response (MR)NTRO discusses telemedicine applications insupport of this objective, development of fieldlaboratories and other measures as stop-gaps andsurge support.

The National Animal Health LaboratoryNetwork (NAHLN) is a potentially valuablesurge capability resource. It is moving towardbringing the APHIS national laboratories andstate and university labs together into a net-worked community, along with CDC’sLaboratory Reporting Network (LRN) and FDA’sFood Emergency Reporting Network (FERN).Also, it can support training and certificationneeds and coordinate with the appropriate aca-demic institutions. The National PlantDiagnostic Network (NPDN) is the plant field’sanalogous entity, but its funding did not surviveCongressional review in the last cycle.


A limiting consideration in building a surge capa-bility in the U.S. at this time has to do with thefact that government has lost a large amount ofits previously available personnel pool in USDA,APHIS, and other relevant federal agencies.States are, therefore, increasingly unwilling to relyon federal personnel resources that might ormight not be available or sufficient when needed.Consequently, states especially interested in thisissue are increasingly developing their own plansand programs. However, budget limitations ofstates have restricted relevant personnel to skeletallevels in many of our states. Another problem isthat small animal veterinarians have rather differ-ent skill sets than large animal veterinarians. Thetwo specialties are not the same and thereforecannot always be tapped into for surge.

These personnel and budget limitations place aheavy responsibility on technology to compensatefor them. There are the problems of maintaininghuman resources databases and of developingcommunications and coordination mechanismsfor contacting and using them productively.Outbreaks require the swiftest possible

2 2 6


Chapter XIII

interventions for containment and mitigation.However, the necessary technologies already existand could be made quickly available with thenecessary financial resources and incentives.

Gap Fillers:

The animal and plant diagnostic surge capabilityproblem could be addressed by:

• Expanding these capabilities through supportto the two major agricultural diagnostic associations;

• Creating the proposed center for plant biose-curity at Ft. Detrick;

• Engaging university departments of plantpathology and schools of veterinary medicinethrough collaboration with the proper associa-tions in organizing conferences on emergencyprograms for agricultural mitigation andrecovery;

• Development of database and communica-tions networking systems for this particularapplication; and

• Provision of a small number of demonstrationgrants to support promising initiatives on thepart of state departments of agriculture.

None of these have a particularly high technolog-ical content. To some extent surge will be facili-tated by the decision support technology that willbe encouraged via MRPArto.1.

MRPA.5 – Vaccination/Treatment andProtection. The ability to produce, distribute andadminister large numbers of safe and secure vaccinedoses, or alternative treatments, for highly conta-gious animal diseases, and distinguish vaccinatedanimals; the ability to make crops and livestockmore resistant or less susceptible to disease andthreat agents.

Goals:

Animals:

• Limitation of the number of animals thatmust be sacrificed.

• Restoration of ability to export if “clean” ani-mals can be distinguished from exposed ones.

• Multivalent vaccines needed to be useful atmultiple stages of exposure.

• Animal vaccine stockpile to respond to anylikely threat.

• Vaccine procedures are needed for free-rangingwildlife.

• Strategic and fieldable stockpile of vaccinesand therapeutics; accessible to emergencyresponders under expert supervision.

• Rapid prioritization of vaccines needed; pro-duction of vaccines appropriate to size of incident.

• Marker vaccines (that indicate prior exposure).

• Government sponsored orphan (low produc-tion) vaccines.

• Modeling of vaccination strategies (for costeffectiveness, etc.).

• Alternatives to widespread aerial chemical con-trol of insect vectors of human, animal andzoonotic diseases.

• Ability to draw quickly upon the global vac-cine stockpile.

• Development of alternative treatment (sys-temic treatments are very expensive).

• Improved knowledge on host resistance to diseases.

• Maintain broad and diverse genetic base forplants and animals.

Plants:

• Establishment multi-pronged treatment meas-ures including biologicals for dealing withresistant diseases.

• Secure doses (chemicals and biologicals) areneeded for treatments, including credibility of

2 2 7



same for efficacy, purity, and safety; ensureswift distribution.

• Better validation of treatment methodologies.

• Improvement of plant genetic resistancethrough classic breeding techniques, geneti-cally modified organisms (GMOs) and othermechanisms.

• Improved understanding of foreign/exoticplant diseases and pests.

• Assessment/modification of regulations to rap-idly approve (1) access to genetic material; and(2) development of new crop lines and theirfield utilization.


Development and production of vaccines andalternate treatments is a slow moving process, andthe capability is hampered by economic andpolitical issues. There is no current capability tomake vaccination production and administrationdecisions from an economic standpoint. Conflictsexist between trade issues and security issues.There is also a gap between publicly fundedresearch and private industry needs. The scienceexists but costs and commercial considerationsraise barriers to company initiatives. There is alsoinsufficient industrial capacity to produce newvaccines quickly; it takes months to ramp up pro-duction (domestically). The orphan vaccine issuesare not being addressed

State of the Art:

The state of the art in vaccines and alternativetreatment/protection is advanced and vaccines areavailable for numerous diseases and species. Arecent announcement has been made that aneffective West Nile Virus vaccine is even nowavailable. A number of the new vaccines havebeen given conditional approvals, which makethem available for release, but they lack confirm-ing tests of efficacy. Other vaccines still are con-sidered experimental and can be released onlythrough an emergency declaration.

Current research emphasizes recombinant DNA-based vaccines, virus-carried vaccines, subunitvaccines and study of bacterins. For wildlife uses,emphasis is being placed on oral vaccines avail-able through salt licks, range cubes and otherfeeding devices. Water and aerosol administra-tion is also being contemplated as alternatives toinjection methods.

Other kinds of treatments and protective meas-ures being emphasized at present include crop“hardening” through genetic modification or theuse of GMOs, and classical breeding methods fordisease resistance. Other treatment developmentapproaches emphasize fungicides and bacteri-cides, and prophylactic sprays. However, whilethe science for GMOs development as well ascommercialization exists, it is currently a verycontroversial political issue, and remains evenmore so for Genetically Modified Animals.

The traditional mass euthanasia/mass vaccina-tion strategies are coming increasingly into question, as a result of the European experiences.Vaccination ring strategies are being examined.Quick tests are being emphasized as ways toguide vaccination strategies. Epidemiologicalmodels taking weather variables into account are also receiving special attention with respect to vaccination and mass euthanasia. Thesenewer, more discriminate, strategies may place a greater burden on testing and on skilled personnel.


The main barriers limiting progress in the vac-cines area are not technical, but rather financialand political. Vaccines development is verycostly. When there is an insufficient market toinduce the private sector to assume these costs,government can be given a heavy cost burden.Animals and plants have not been given the polit-ical or financial support that the human vaccineshave received. This seems unlikely to changeunless what is perceived as a low probabilitythreat becomes a reality. Plant vaccination18 pro-gram cost-benefit estimations are more marginal

2 2 8


Chapter XIII

18 Technique is similar to human/animal vaccine; involves inserting small amount of DNA from virus into plant’s chromosome allowing the plant torecognize and destroy a virus when it attacks. It gives the plant the ability to see what the virus looks like so that its defenses are ready. Unlike tra-ditional vaccines, however, immunity from a plant vaccine passes onto succeeding generations.

than those calculated for livestock vaccines. Theneglect of insect vectors still remains, but that sit-uation may improve because of the West NileVirus experience and an effective vaccine for thedisease. Delivery methods for vaccine adminis-tration of vaccines to livestock and wildlife repre-sent a difficult challenge that is not present inhuman vaccination situations.

The most limiting factor in new vaccine develop-ment from a technological and scientific perspec-tive relates to the lack of fundamental knowledgeof genome structure, and the molecular biologyof disease processes and associated pathogens.This, however, is just a negative way of sayingthat the most promising prospect for advancingvaccine development depends upon makingmajor investments in animal and plant genomics.

Gap Fillers:

There are three major areas of special technologi-cal emphasis that can be identified to aid theprocess:

• Applied research on developing new multiva-lent vaccines, marker vaccines, and orphanvaccines;

• Inexpensive but accurate field screening testsfor quickly discriminating between healthyand infected animals (for guidance of contain-ment efforts through vaccination); and

• A vaccine production program capable ofmeeting large crisis needs for selected diseases.

The USDA, in cooperation with DHS and otherentities, has recently completed a draft report ona national agricultural vaccination program plan.Currently, the report is not publicly releasable.

It is clear that the main needs are in the areas ofdevelopment and production of vaccines andother treatments rather than innovations inresponder distribution and administration ofthese treatments and prophylactic measures.Therefore there is little in this functional capabil-ity of immediate interest to technical develop-ment as Project Responder is now defined.

MRPA.6 – Quarantine, Isolation and Recall.The ability for responding agencies (to includeindustry) to segregate, condemn, detain, or recallcontaminated plant/animal/food/feed.

Goals:

• Expansion of offshore data collection fordetermining potential pests that can reachU.S. shores.

• Determination and prioritization of lists onpests.

• Extensive domestic and international “datamining” to seek information on control strategies.

• Ability to safely and rapidly secure, isolate,and transport suspected infectious or contami-nated material for evaluation.

• Ability to rapidly quarantine infected, infested,or exposed areas, plants, animals, or com-modities and to initiate delimiting surveys.

• Threat Analysis Critical Control Points pro-gram schema and execution plans to combatdeliberate disease/adulterants, contaminationof raw materials, and processed foods (similarto the Hazard Analysis Critical Control Pointsprograms used to combat natural risks).

• Ability to modulate and communicate perme-ability of quarantine zone (for roads, ports,airports, etc.).

• Ability to enforce quarantine zones and criticalcontrol points.

• Biosecurity of quarantine facilities needsimprovement where they exist.

• Establishment of perimeters or perimeter secu-rity for plants, animals. See also R&R.3(Establishment of Perimeters).

• Legal authorities to enforce quarantine.

• All goals apply to protective isolation as well.

2 2 9



• Quarantine facilities – improve biosecurity(e.g., mosquitoes).

• National real-time permitting system.

• Ability to access database from MRPA.1(Rapid Diagnostics and Detection) at all quar-antine systems.

• National ID system for plants/animals.

• Reduction of quarantine time; varies byspecies/agent.

• Unaffected animals in quarantine zones needto be fed and cared for.

• Ability to shut down air corridors.


Quarantine and containment facilities exist atpresent. There are three national facilities andadditional facilities located at airports and in pri-vate facilities. USDA and FDA have well estab-lished and workable systems for food recall.

More research is needed to develop and test epi-demiological models for plant and animal pestsand pathogens so that optimal eradication andcontainment strategies can be developed before athreat agent is introduced.

Eradication plans that have been tested, ideally inthe area of origin of the target pest or pathogen,need to be developed. Such complex programsare unlikely to be initiated and accomplished in atimely fashion if plans are made on an ad hocbasis.

Capabilities for human health are not applicablein this context because humans are not quaran-tined for exposure to contaminated animals,plants, food, or feed. See PHRBAE.5 (Isolationand Quarantine). However, humans can carrydiseases affecting animals such as West NileVirus.

State of the Art:

The basic technology exists for targeting animals/plants/foods for isolation, areas to

quarantine, and for rapid food products recall.Accuracy and reliability might be enhanced fur-ther, however, through recourse to military pre-dictive modeling software and other associatedtechnology. General availability of these tech-nologies is marginal in the near-term, however,because of costs limitations, knowledge limita-tions, and modeling content. Therefore, there isevery reasons to expect that a large-scale, multifo-cal outbreak would quickly overwhelm resourcesas mentioned above.

Gap Fillers:

Three RTOs were developed to improve uponthe present state of the art in this area.MRPArto.5 aims to develop a Threat AnalysisCritical Control Points Program to help protect thefood chain; MRPArto.3 (Overhead Imaging forWide-Area Surveillance and Assessment) addressesoverhead surveillance capabilities for detectingand isolating geographic areas affected by out-breaks; and MRPArto.6 (Modeling of Plant andAnimal Outbreaks, Surveillance, and Response)addresses modeling tools to optimize planning forand responses to outbreaks.

MRPA.7 – Rapid and Humane Euthanasiaand Disposal of Contaminated Carcasses,Plants and Food Products. The ability tohumanely kill and dispose of up to thousands/mil-lions of animals and plants within 24 hours ofdetection of disease or exposure and to destroy plantpests.

Goals:

• Limiting spread of disease and ceasing produc-tion of infectious particles as quickly as possible.

• Assessment of port and regional facility incin-eration and laboratory autoclaving capabilities.

• Identification of appropriate rendering,slaughter, landfill, cremation, compost, andburial facilities.

• Ability to safety transport contaminated live-stock to burial.

2 3 0


Chapter XIII

• Ability to burn continuously at 2000 degrees(required to destroy prions, CB agents, fats,proteins).

• BSL-3 slaughter facilities.

• Temporary refrigerated storage ofcarcasses/plant materials until disposal.

• Need a more adequate understanding of thetoxic biological products of massive animaldisposal.

• Needs for environmentally safe disposal andeuthanasia procedures.

• High numbers (poultry houses) and high massloading (as in elephant/whale disposals)throughput – slaughter and burial.

• Animal welfare needs to be considered.

• Information on costs and impacts of alternative measures (burial, composting,incineration).


Animal carcass digesters exist, but are not widelyfielded. These are being modeled to be portable,but this will not solve the scalability problem. InEurope, plasma destruction has been used as wellas a dirty transport corridor from contaminatedarea to burial area.

Current techniques include rendering, incinera-tion (open and curtain), and burial (on-site or inlandfill). However, there is limited landfill capa-bility. Mass burial and burning are the mainalternatives to disposal of infected and potentiallyexposed animals. Both are expensive, repugnantto many, and raise environmental concerns.

Although these types of technologies exist for dis-posal, capabilities vary depending upon incidentcharacteristics. For example, the technology issimply not the same for 800 lb steer as it wouldbe for human bodies. The technology is suitablefor dealing with smaller amounts but in a bigincident how would we be able to scale up?What process for 1000s works for 10,000s?

There are no large scale humane slaughter methods.

A similar concept applies for the capability infood distribution: if there is a problem at onerestaurant chain, they have the capability todestroy and dispose of contaminated food: if theproblem occurs at many restaurants on a nation-wide basis, it becomes more difficult to over-come. While capability exists to deal with biolog-ical agents in the food processing environment, ifradiological or chemical agents are used, there isnot the desired capability. Capabilities vary depending upon type of agent and size of event.

State of the Art:

Euthanasia and disposal technology exists in allthe four applicable environments, but is some-what less suitable and available for animal carcassdisposal than for plants or food products. Theonly facility with BSL-3 biosafety capabilities forwork with large animals that also includes meas-ures for worker protection is Plum Island. Itcould take five years to build a comparable facil-ity at Ft. Detrick. Protective suits for individualsinvolved in euthanasia and disposal of contami-nated carcasses exist, but do not permit activework while wearing them for very long workperiods. At present, there is no alternative to theburial/landfill and burial methods that had to beused in England for the FMD cattle disposals.Bio-bag systems for transporting large animals orlarge numbers of smaller animals can be usefulfor transport safety purposes. Animals, harvestedplants, and food can also be quick-frozen inpreparation for safe transportation and subse-quent disposal. There is technology also forbreaking down and microwaving remains for san-itary disposal purposes.

For humanely euthanizing animals, aerosolizedchemical agents deserve consideration.


Plant crop disposal presents some special prob-lems that can degrade effectiveness in destroyingdiseases of concern. One such problem relates tothe fact that plant diseases sometimes choosealternative hosts. For example, soybean rust has

2 3 1



kudzu as an additional host. Soybean rust is ofparticular present concern because of its extremetransmissibility and the fact that it is presentlyendemic in Mexico. Another example isRalstonia solanacearum Race 3, Biovar 2, whichcauses Southern Bacterial Wilt. The initial entryinto the U.S. was on geraniums found in green-houses from several states this last winter.However, this pathogen is known to be a perni-cious pathogen of potatoes, causing serious lossesin Europe in recent years. It will also attackother solanaceous crops such as tomato, pepper,tobacco and some weed species. It survives insoil and in temperate and subtropical climates insoil and host weed species.

Weather and climate effects greatly affect the sur-vivability, wind-borne transmission, and replica-tion ability of crop pathogens. Tropical climatesespecially are preferred by many pathogens,which is reflected by the abundance of varieties oftropical diseases, many of which still have yet tobe studied and understood for the first time.Weather also affects eradication efforts throughincineration and other approaches, as well as thegeographic spread of incineration byproducts.

The three main limitations of present technologyhave to do with portability, scalability, and con-tamination avoidance in carriers. There are noportable disposal systems capable of more thanvery small-scale disposal problems. Differenttechnologies are needed for large-scale, numer-ous-animal disposal needs, with no fully satisfac-tory methods available. Contamination avoid-ance through transportation carrier and storagecontainer systems is still in need of systematicenvironmental engineering study and associatednew system design.

On animal euthanasia, aerosol applications formass humane euthanasia require highly skilledoperators. Also, aerosol dissemination has otherwell-known problems when conducted in openenvironments that can degrade effectiveness andproduce unintended adverse consequences of var-ious kinds.

Gap Fillers:

The earlier statement that the three main limita-tions of present technology include portability,scalability, and contamination avoidance providesa good guide in this case for filling gaps. Threeengineering development activities would addressthese gaps:

• Engineering study of portable systems employ-ing digesters and plasma burners for disposalof contaminated animals in field settings (seeMRPArto.9 (Digesters and Plasma Burners)).

• Development of a prototype prefabricated cre-matorium facility that can be rapidly con-structed on field sites to undertake disposal orlarge animals in large numbers (seeMRPArto.10 (Prototype PrefabricatedCrematorium Facility)).

• Design specification study of refrigeratedtransport carriers suitable for the sanitarytransport of animals infected with diseases ofspecial concern to national security (addressedthrough decontamination rather than special-ized transport).

Feedstuffs were not discussed much because feedis usually destroyed if contaminated.

MRPA.8 – Decontamination. The ability toameliorate the effects of the pathogen or adulterantwith minimal damage to animal/plant/food or theenvironments, including facilities and equipment.

Goals:

• Quick, effective, and inexpensive post-expo-sure treatment and prophylactic countermea-sures for those responders that are potentiallyexposed to agents/pathogens.

• Need for further technological developmentand research on irradiation of food and fiber.

• Rapid tests for efficacy of decontamination.

• Establishment of on-the-shelf work plans forlikely pests.

2 3 2


Chapter XIII

• Discovery of potential “self-imposed” regula-tory obstacles (permit requirements, pesticideregistrations, etc.) to rapid reaction and todevelopment of needed protocols, plans andagreements for effective response.

• Easier compliance with environmental andlegal rules.

• Better fumigation procedures (time and cost)of plant/plant products to make rapidlyacceptable for commerce.

• Full decontamination of transportation carri-ers/facilities that contained diseased animals orplants.

• Metric for decontamination or destruction:maintain commercial viability (or safety in thecase of household pets or items of substantialintrinsic value, etc.).

• Utilization of modeling tools for decision sup-port to determine physical boundaries fordecontamination (see Chapter VIII(PHRBAE)).

• Faster process than sentinel animals for verify-ing decontamination efficacy.


Contaminated animals and plants are usuallydestroyed rather than decontaminated, so capabil-ities are not always used.

There are approved lists for animal decontamina-tion that contain detailed instructions, but thiscan be difficult and time consuming. There arelimited plume/pathogen/containment models toaid in decontamination planning.

Food processing becomes a liability issue, it issimply easier to destroy it; in addition, there arebusiness incentives to support rapid decontami-nation of a processing plant or distribution facil-ity. Feedstuffs are usually destroyed rather thandecontaminated, so there are no capability con-cerns for decontaminating feedstuff.

More efficient and effective methods for large-scale sterilization of soils, equipment, and

facilities are needed (in the aftermath of euthana-sia and disposal).

State of the Art:

Most decontamination approaches involve find-ing or assessing contamination, applying chemi-cal agents to wash off and kill harmful bacteria orviral agents or toxins and chemicals. Somedecontamination procedures, however, use irradi-ation to sterilize surfaces, food products, etc.Food may be decontaminated by applications ofhydrogen peroxide or ozone under some circum-stances. Surfaces may be decontaminated usingparaformaldehyde or formaldehyde in some set-tings, but they present a potential HAZMATproblem in disposing of the residuals. Medical orveterinary treatments may be used to treat skindamage or disease resulting from contamination,but that is not directly relevant to this functionalcapability.

Relevant military research and development activ-ities are in current progress at Edgewood Arsenaland at Ft. Detrick on advanced methods fordecontamination.

A key final step is to provide assurance thatdecontamination has been successful. This canbe achieved either by detection technology simi-lar to that which may have located the contami-nation in the first place, or by knowledge ofdecontamination effectiveness gained either fromfirst principles or empirical studies.

More extensive discussions of both the decontam-ination and the sensor states of the art can befound in the DIDA, PHRBAE, MR, R&R andPPE NTROs.


The major limitations and barriers in this MRPArelate to food-borne bacteria. Since such con-tamination occurs routinely and under naturalconditions, terrorist recourse to introducing suchcontamination does not usually become apparentuntil much later after many individuals becomesick. It would be very difficult to discriminatebetween a naturally occurring gastrointestinal

2 3 3



pathogen and one caused by a deliberate intro-duction into the food supply.

Higgins et al. (1999)19 concluded that there isutility in rapid detection assays for: (1) prophy-lactic monitoring of food or water suspected ofbeing the target of a bioterrorist attack and (2)serving as “first use” diagnostics when an other-wise routine outbreak of gastrointestinal illnessshows evidence of being something else entirely.The same investigators suggested that the rapidsample preparation techniques and real-timediagnostic assays developed at USAMRIID wouldallow authorities to perform the quickest andmost accurate tests to determine if the threat isreal and decontamination or disposal actions areneeded.

A number of passenger cruise liners have beenplagued by recurrent gastrointestinal pathogens.Part of the problem of decontaminating theseships is attributable to the rough surfaces andmany nooks and crannies built into these vessels.

Exotic Newcastle Disease is one good example ofthe difficulty an infectious animal disease canpresent in decontamination. It can be carried byhumans on nasal surfaces, clothing, shoes orboots, or even on cleaning and transportationequipment. A poultry production facility canonly be decontaminated through total destruc-tion or through draconian measures includingdestroying all the poultry and eggs and removingearth surfaces down to 3-4 feet below the surface.

There is a further problem in recognizing biologi-cal pathogens that have been carried into thecountry in humans, live animals, in feed, or inother ways. Parasites are the most commonproblem associated with foreign travelers, andthey remain poorly treated if at all upon arrival.

Gap Fillers:

Chemical decontamination technology seems tobe generally available and receiving appropriatecurrent emphasis by military laboratories. Also,food processing and retail chain restaurants seemgenerally prepared to engage in appropriate

decontamination procedures when needed underordinary circumstances. However, other publicfacilities and transport systems such as postagefacilities and both cargo and passenger ships stillpresent difficult and time-consuming challengesin decontamination. Therefore, it is suggestedthat new RDT&E be undertaken to explore newand refined decontamination techniques. Themain thrust would involve exploring differentforms of irradiation and chemical fumigation toidentify potential faster and cheaper solutions totreating especially difficult facilities for deconta-mination purposes.

Also, a requirement continues to exist for usingappropriate low-level and benign irradiation tech-niques to prevent contamination of foods and torestore food safety when environmental condi-tions may have allowed bacterial contaminationof food or feed to exceed threshold levels or fortreatments for reducing pest problems. TheUSDA has recently approved the use of irradia-tion for extending shelf life of packaged foods,but this approval has not as yet had much influ-ence on commercial practices.

Two RTOs are suggested for addressing theseneeds. MRPArto.7 (Improved IrradiationMethods) addresses irradiation methods for con-trolling bacterial, funga, and pest infestations inpackages, containers, or large storage and trans-port facilities; and MRPArto.8 (EnhancedFumigation Technology) addresses fumigationtechnology for decontaminating food processingand storage facilities, and transportation carriers.

Mitigation and Restoration for Plantand Animal Resources ResponseTechnology Objectives (MRPArto)

MRPArto.1 – Plant and Animal Responders’Decision Aid

Objectives:

A CBR event may well involve exotic damagemechanisms outside of the experience of typicalplant and animal professionals, not to mentionpublic safety officers. In surge situations

2 3 4


Chapter XIII

19 Frazier, T. W. and D. C. Richardson (Editors), “Food and Agricultural Security,” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, vol. 894 (1999).

relatively untrained people will be called on to perform field assessment roles. This RTO willprovide content that will allow plant and animalresponders to apply codified knowledge and toreach back to specialists so that they will act tomost efficiently assess and identify damage, limitonward contamination, and embark on the cor-rect mitigation strategy.

Payoffs:

Early accurate assessment and initia-tion of appropriate mitigation islikely to localize the impact andminimize damage. Codification of best practicesand making them available in the field will alsoenable meaningful surge by relatively unspecial-ized individuals. Wide availability of the systemsand content would enable effective surge.

Challenges:

While no unique systems technologies need bedeveloped for this purpose, the wide range ofenvironments in which the system would be usedand the need for relatively low cost (especially foruse in surge) requires careful attention to systemdesign. Multiple connectivity modes for reach-back would be required. The need for high-fidelity visual component (with a high-end vari-ant involving two-way communication of images)will need to be traded off against cost. If possi-ble, this capability should have an option forimplementation as a software add-on to existingresponder systems rather than as a stand-aloneaddition. This RTO should be carried forward incoordination with similar RTOs in DIDA andMR.

Milestones/Metrics:

FY2004: Initial system requirements definitionand characterization of cognate available systems;initiation of content development through appro-priate contracting means.

FY2005: Demonstration of alternative systemconcepts using COTS systems.

FY2006: Availability of initial suite of validatedcontent; finalization ofcommercialization/deployment strategy.

FY2007-2009: Demonstration of improved sys-tems concepts integrating COTS technologiesand initial content.

FY2010: Demonstration of final system variants.

MRPArto.2 – Field Screening and AssessmentTests. Development of rapid screening tests foranimal and plant viral pathogens in conjunctionwith improved surveillance and trace-back sys-tems offers a way to allow the adoption of newstrategies for identification, location, and eradica-tion of diseased animals and crops. It could alsohelp direct emergency responders in employingeffective small-scale vaccination strategies.

Objectives:

Build on the research from the Strategic ResearchArea (see Chapter I) on SBR exposure and else-where to develop a cost-effective set of rapidscreening tests for plant and animal disease andthe presence of CBR agents in plant and animals.These tests should allow identification of thepathogen (ideally including ones not expected inadvance).

Payoffs:

Validated screening tests would allow emergencyresponders simple and inexpensive ways to con-tribute to initial epidemiological analyses for esti-mating scope, locations, and rates at whichpathogens are spreading across a geographicalarea. This information can be useful for deter-mining specific containment, isolation, and eradi-cation strategies, including vaccination strategies.This can help limit the number of animals thatmust be sacrificed and delimit areas that must besprayed using aerial chemicals.

2 3 5



Plant and Animal Decision Aid

$7 $6 $6 $4 $3 $3 $31.5

ThrustMRPArto.1 – Budget in Millions

20102005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Totals

$2.5

2004

Challenges:

As a strategically important foundation of sec-toral defense, this line of research needs contin-ued emphasis and funding for the entire periodof the present planning horizon and beyond.Teaching emergency responders to use, interpret,and report upon these tests is a slowly movingprocess. Widespread distribution of such testscan be costly.

Milestones/Metrics:

An annual allocation of $30 million seems rea-sonable if it includes development costs and costsof production and distribution of test materials.

MRPArto.3 – Overhead Imaging for Wide-AreaSurveillance and Assessment

Objectives:

Exploit existing imaging technology involvingearth orbit satellite and unmanned surveillanceaircraft to remotely survey agricultural terrain forthe presence of crop plant disease, down live-stock, and wildlife remains.

Payoffs:

Different agencies employ this technology forother purposes and the proposed application goesall the way back to the 1960s. Since agriculturecovers such a large portion of the countryside,aerospace and aerial sensing technologies couldprovide a very cost-effective approach to surveil-lance and detection of emerging or near-termbiological impacts of terrorist attacks.

Challenges:

Different agencies have this technology in placeand working, but have as yet to develop a cooper-ative approach for crisis and consequences actionand epidemiological intelligence studies. Theseagencies include NASA, NOAA, and militaryimage mapping and surveillance agencies.However, these uses for platforms such asPredator and military satellite programs require

funded missions and approvals from the mili-tary/intelligence communities. These programsrequire substantial budgets in view of the costs ofunmanned satellites and unmanned military air-craft operations. High-level approvals wouldthen be needed to permit the suggested uses ofthis equipment and other program resources.

Milestones/Metrics:

FY2004: Develop an interagency working (steer-ing) group to develop and justify this program indetail and associated applications, resulting in anofficial authority to proceed.

FY2005: Develop a program for validation andtesting representative applicationsof the technology for food andagriculture surveillance and analy-sis: conduct several pilot studiesof simulated attacks, as scientific

payloads on other programmed missions. Obtainapproval to proceed into building an operationalcapability.

FY2006-2007: Create a fully operational missioncapability that can become a part of the national’shomeland security emergency response armamen-tarium and test on convenient natural disastersand crises experienced during this time.

MRPArto.4 – Trace-Back Capabilities UsingInformation Systems and Tags

Objectives:

Validate an optimized system approach to usingminiaturized chip technology for tracking plant,animals and food products back to points-of-origin with data updating at critical controlpoints. Review European findings on taggingsystems and FDA regulations on data itemrequirements for these purposes. Undertake fieldtests of alternative system configurations.Undertake cost analyses of costs for national andinternational implementation of the recom-mended tagging and trace-back system.

2 3 6


Chapter XIII

Overhead Imaging $0.4 $4 $25 $54.4$25

Thrust 2004 2005 2006 2007 Totals

MRPArto.3 – Budget in Millions

Field Screening and Assessment Tests

$30 $30 $30 $30 $30 $30 $210


20102005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Totals

$30

2004

Payoffs:

This technology exists now and can offer earlyreturns in a health and food safety area of estab-lished importance. Implementation of this pro-gram will satisfy long-standing calls for develop-ing a viable tagging and trace-back system for usein the different operational environments undercurrent consideration. The system findings willfacilitate epidemiological investigations of animaland plant disease outbreaks and help refine andreduce the costs of recalls and destruction of con-taminated food products.

Challenges:

FDA has taken the lead on forming data itemrequirements for producers, but has left the deci-sions on how to comply in satisfying theserequirements to producers, processors, etc. TheEuropean studies have shown that a variety ofmethods for on-animal or in-animal data captureand storage are completely feasible The majorchallenge will be the overall aggregated costs ofoperating such a massive information system andthe associated investigation and enforcementactivities needed to ensure compliance withrequirements. The costs will ultimately be paidfor by consumers, but they are very high. ThisRTO should be conducted in coordination withwork in the Logistics Support (LS) area address-ing tracking and tagging issues.

Milestones/Metrics:

FY2004: Review the appropriate literature anddevelop a research strategy under FDA auspicesto demonstrate a cost-effective system compatiblewith FDA proposed requirements. Secure thecooperation of the relevant industries to pursue alarge-scale validation study.

FY2005: Develop and demonstrate one or moreprototype hardware/software system configura-tions for tests and evaluation purposes.

FY2006: Conduct a series of pilot studies in therelevant operational environments and modifythe system as indicated to be necessary.

FY2007: Design and conduct a one-year valida-tion and cost-benefit field study to confirm the

efficacy and payoff potential of the system; also,locate interested vendors and solicit bids on sys-tem fabrication and purchase costs.

MRPArto.5 – Threat Analysis Critical ControlPoints Program for the Food Chain

Terrorist attacks, like the accidental spread ofpathogens and accidental contaminations, canoccur at many vulnerable points in the food pro-duction, processing and distribution process fromthe farm to the table. Consequently, surveillanceshould be exercised at key points in the process toachieve the earliest possible detection of acciden-tal or intentional introduction of pathogens orcontaminants. A Threat Analysis CriticalControl Points Program modeled after the USDAHazard Analysis Critical Control Points Programoffers good prospects for this kind of target-hard-ening. This approach, linked with trace-backdata systems, could become an important detec-tion and analysis tool for field use.

Objectives:

Use systems analysis to identify the key points inthe food chain at which detection is to beattempted and the detection techniques and tech-nologies (including visual inspection) that wouldbe most cost effective. Evaluate alternative con-cepts of operation for use of these detection tech-nologies (including those developed underMRPArto.2).

Payoffs:

For a relatively modest federal investment, thedemonstrated value of the HACCP programdevised by the USDA Food Safety and InspectionService (FSIS) could be extended to underlineand enhance industry’s cooperation with federalnational biosecurity program. Such enhancedcooperation would be a very valuable objective,since such cooperation might be generalized toother aspects of homeland security requiring

2 3 7



Trace-back Capabilities

$0.5 $4 $4 $13.5$5

Thrust 2004 2005 2006 2007 Totals

MRPArto.4 – Budget in Millions

voluntary industry cooperation. The programcould, at the same time, provide opportunities formonitoring industry compliance with FDA regu-lations concerning trace-back records compliance.

Challenges:

The greatest technical challenge is the need todetermine the most cost-effective detection strat-egy given the wide range of possible terroristattacks on the food chain and changing modes ofdetection that may become available over thenext decade.

Milestones/Metrics:

FY2004: Organize a cooperative FDA/USDAtask force from the appropriate internal entitiesto devise a TACCP program plan and draft asso-ciated prospective regulations. Invite industryand general public inputs and hold regional hear-ings with groups from the different operationalenvironments to be involved.

FY2005: Devise and undertake pilot study exer-cises to confirm that the proposed system willwork efficiently and that it is minimally intrusiveto business operations. Undertake user surveys ofthe system to test acceptability.

FY2006: Conduct red team field tests exercisesto test the systems usability during a prospectivecrisis and operator conformity with regulations.

FY2006-2010: Evaluate advanced technologyscreening systems and incorporate them into thesystem plan.

MRPArto.6 – Modeling of Plant and AnimalOutbreaks, Surveillance, and Response

Objectives:

Develop modeling tools for use by cognizantagencies and incident commanders that can aidin optimizing plant and animal surveillance andresponse strategies.

Payoffs:

Extensions and new applications of this technol-ogy can significantly help prevent and mitigatethe impacts of foreign pest introductions andoutbreaks that threaten agricultural productivityand ecosystems, including plant crops, exoticspecies, companion animals, livestock and animalwildlife. These measures will enhance humanhealth assurance and national security, as well asprotect U.S. agriculture from diseases and con-taminations that would jeopardize food and fibersales abroad.

Challenges:

The U.S. still has deficiencies in its emergencyresponse infrastructures and little experience incoping effectively with large-scale, multifocal ter-rorist attacks or naturalistic spread of animal andplant disease. The most challenging experiencein recent times has been the Exotic NewcastleDisease (END) poultry outbreak which beganthis year in California. Lack of advance prepara-tion, limited analytic tools and staff limitationsthwarted its early control. A post eradication sur-veillance program is ongoing and a national pro-gram for END is tying together education andstrategy and working on issues such as how todeal with non-traditional agricultural entitiessuch as live bird markets and exotics in the sur-veillance chain. It is hoped that this program willeventually include other avian diseases. The pro-posed technology development effort can addressthese deficiencies in preparedness to face threatsto our agriculture and environment both with

respect to ongoing surveillance, analy-sis, and prescriptive action when asignificant crisis is discovered that isamenable to study by remote imagingtechnology or by epidemiological

reporting by producers. One other associatedchallenge is that of helping discriminate betweena natural disease occurrence and an intentionalintroduction of a contaminant or pathogenthrough the application of this technology.

Milestones/Metrics:

FY2004: Develop an organizing committee com-prised of representatives from APHIS, the DHS

2 3 8


Chapter XIII

Critical Control Points Program

$3 $6 $1 $7 $2 $5 $26


20102005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Totals

$2

2004

S&T directorate, HHS, Department of theArmy, state departments of Agriculture andWildlife, DARPA, and potentially theDepartment of Commerce to flesh out a multi-faceted program for surveillance and modelingtechnology applications to epidemiological analy-sis, population control, and mitigation actions.Develop an RFP and associated statements ofwork for use in applications for grant support byuniversity centers, and associated in-house partic-ipation by APHIS and other appropriate govern-ment research activities.

FY2005: Approve and initiate individual projectsin the relevant application areas (animal, plantcrops, wildlife, and environmental health).

FY2006: Create an integrated action plan forreal-world application of the technology andlaunch a training program for creating andexpanding expertise in selected state universitysettings, based upon competitive bids.

FY2007: Undertake case studies as outbreak or large-scale contamination incidents opportuni-ties are presented for further assessments of cost-benefit.

MRPArto.7 – Improved Irradiation Methods

Objectives:

Find quick, effective and inexpensive prophylac-tic and post-exposure treatment countermeasuresfor contaminations and infestations in food andfeed through different forms of irradiation.

Payoffs:

Food losses due to bacterial contamination andassociated disposal are massive every year, even inthe U.S. Developing more effective sanitarymethods for preserving food safety would reducethese losses and reduce the associated food-borneillnesses that attack millions of Americans every

year and precipitate associated hospitalizationsand mortalities. Fresh fruit and vegetables lossesthrough spoilage would be very significantlyreduced. Container facilities and food processingfacilities can be made more sanitary, thus con-tributing to reducing food contamination.Microwave and ionizing radiation represent thetwo major approaches to food irradiation thathave proven helpful thus far.

Challenges:

This technology needs further exploration andrefinement. The public has to become convincedof the efficacy of irradiation as a safe means fordecontamination. To create a market for irradi-ated foods, industry needs to be convinced thatmarkets exist for long shelf-life packaged foodstreated in this way and that legal liabilities willnot threaten the adoption of these food preserva-tion methods. Applicator personnel safety can bea particular health problem and legal liability ifaccidents occur in the commercial use of thistechnology. Little is known yet about the biolog-ical effects of EMP beams, which are used mostlyfor military purposes at this time. The humanhealth hazards of exposure to lasers, microwaves,and ionizing radiation, of course, can be substantial.

Milestones/Metrics:

FY2004: Undertake a literature review and thendesign an experimental R&D program forextending the state of the art in this applicationarea in different operational environments andtask appropriate national laboratories to designthe different individual project tasks involved.

FY2005: Integrate the individual studies into anoverall program proposal and commence pilotstudies work following an authority to proceed bythe DHS.

FY2006: Specify the replanning suggested by ini-tial pilot study findings and begin a one-year for-mal study effort.

FY2007: Analyze results and develop demonstra-tions and orientation materials concerning

2 3 9



Modeling of Outbreaks, Surveillance, and Response

$10 $20 $10 $10 $52


2005 2006 2007 2008 Totals

$2

2004

commercialization of the validated technology forindustry and government.

MRPArto.8 – Enhanced FumigationTechnology

Objectives:

Fumigation technology has been used for a longtime and military chemical commands know a lotabout how to use it effectively. Nonetheless, therecent experiences in decontaminating congres-sional buildings and postal facilities followinganthrax mailings to these locations vividly illus-trated the complexities and major outlays neededin manpower time and costs that the currentstate-of-the-art technology requires. An associ-ated objective is to find cheaper and more effi-cient ways to decontaminate transportation carri-ers such as cruise ships, ambulances, food storagefacilities, and food processing facilities.

A variety of contaminants and biologicalpathogens are of concern here, such as parasites,pests, molds, spores, bacteria and viruses. So thisreview would be concerned with: (a) contami-nants and pathogens (including toxins), (b) dif-ferent decontamination agents, and (c) facilitiesand containers (large and small).

Payoffs:

The resulting recommendations from thisextended study activity could be used as the basisfor undertaking a major DHS initiative inimproving new contamination technology utiliza-tion. The longer-term payoffs include improvedfood safety, positive impacts on animal andhuman health, and reduced losses in agriculturaland food products domestic sales and exports dueto contamination and spoilage.

Challenges:

The main procedural challenge to this study proj-ect is that some of the most relevant informationis classified by military authorities. The findings

would need to be edited so that they do not con-vey useful information to potential terroristadversaries. This is a rather routine challengethat is faced frequently when dealing with sensi-tive matters that affect national security. Theother main consideration is that of ensuring thatthe study panel that is organized and the outsidecontributors brought into meetings to make addi-tional technical and scientific contributions arecarefully chosen.

Milestones/Metrics:

A two-year study effort is envisaged: (a) a firstyear effort concerned with study design andtopic selection, as well as panel organization andidentification of desirable outside contributors;and (b) a second year concerned with the con-duct of review meetings and preparation of thecommittee report.

FY2004: Perform the detailed review studydesign and develop the needed expert humanresources.

FY2005: Undertake the actual study programand publish and distribute a final report includ-ing recommendations.

MRPArto.9 – Digesters and Plasma Burners

Objectives:

Undertake a literature review on portable systemsfor carcass disposal and develop a program forascertaining the relative strengths and weaknessesof the individual systems and their operationalcapacities, limitations, and costs of procurementand operation in representative field settings.

Payoffs:

These systems exist and have been used inEurope. We have not yet found technical litera-ture that describes the strengths and limitationsof these systems sufficiently or whether they areavailable from U.S. suppliers. Nonetheless, somepathogens such as BSE and its human counter-

2 4 0


Chapter XIII

Enhanced Fumigation Technology

$2.5 $3.5


2005 Totals

$1

2004

Improved Irradiation Methods

$3 $10 $5 $21


2005 2006 2007 Totals

$3

2004

part require extreme heat for their destruction.Also, in cases of large masses of carcass materialsdisposal, minimal ash residuals or other residualscan be significant attractions.

Challenges:

The main technical challenge has to do withdetermining how far these technologies can betaken for large-number and small/medium-animal disposal situations.

Milestones/Metrics:

FY2004: Undertake an engineering study asdescribed above.

FY2005-2007: If findings show continuedpromise, procure several units and test their oper-

ational capacities, limitations, and costs of opera-tion in field settings.

MRPArto.10 – Prototype PrefabricatedCrematorium Facility

Objective:

An important part of preparing the nation tobecome capable of managing large-scale agroter-rorism incidents is to develop a better way to dis-pose of contaminated carcasses and plants. It isneither practical nor economical to build crema-torium facilities for burning carcasses and con-taminated harvested crop materials all over thecountry. However, a prefabricated system thatcould be erected and made operational in a mat-ter of several days to alternative sites by trainedworkers is feasible and could meeting this partic-ular need if and when it arises.

Payoffs:

Availability of this system would be valuable inorienting state governments and emergencyresponders in agriculture about animal disposalproblems. A training facility housing this equip-ment would allow specific training on the systemto be used for emergency responders from coop-erating jurisdictions.

Challenges:

The effectiveness of this approach would bedependent upon the number of such facilitiesavailable and their distance from the locationsfrom which infected animals or contaminatedcrops originated. The system would needdesigned in conjunction with a safe and securetransportation carrier system for deliveries of car-casses and plant material. If multiple focal siteswere involved within a particular geographic areaserved, computer decision support systemsinvolving optimization algorithms would best beused to minimize carrier travel distance and timeand optimize avoiding travel through populatedareas and travel over heavily used roads duringperiods of heavy traffic.

Milestones/Metrics:

FY2004: Design and conduct of an engineeringstudy of the general approach.

FY2005: Construction of a central facility fordesign verification and training.

FY2006: Construction and modification of aprototype transportable facility and pilot testingof disposal capacities for a simulated large-scaleincident.

FY2007: Make needed modifications and beginconstruction of operational models; begin train-ing program; undertake a supervised simulationwith a cooperating entity.

2 4 1



Digesters and Plasma Burners

$1 $1 $0.5 $3


2005 2006 2007 Totals

$0.5

2004

Prototype Crematorium Facility

$20 $30 $40 $92


2005 2006 2007 Totals

$2

2004

2 4 2


Chapter XIII

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

• Rapid Viral Screening• Improved Surveillance

and Trace-Back Systems

• Miniaturized Chip Technology for Plant, Animal and Food Products

• Application of Codified Knowledge and Reach-Back to Specialists

• Remotely Survey Agricultural Terrain

• Mitigate Impacts of Foreign Pest Introduction

• Detection of Accidental or Intentional Introduction of Contaminants

• Contamination Technology Study

• Prophylactic and Post-Exposure Treatment Countermeasures

• Portable Systems for Carcass Disposal

• Disposal System for Contaminated Carcasses and Plants

MRPArto.2 – Field Screening and Assessment Tests

MRPArto.6 – Modeling of Outbreaks, Surveillance and Response

MRPArto.8 – Fumigation Technology

MRPArto.10 – Prototype Prefab Crematorium Facility

MRPArto.1 – Plant and Animal Responders Decision Aid

MRPArto.3 – Overhead Imaging for Wide-Area Surveillance

MRPArto.5 – Critical Control Points Program

EMPPrto.7 – Improved Irradiation Methods

EMPPrto.9 – Digesters and Plasma Burners

MRPArto.4 – Trace-Back Capabilities

Mitigation and Restoration for Plant and Animal Resources Technology Roadmap

The need for Emergency Responders to be pre-pared for catastrophic terrorism has been evidentto experts for some time. However, it has onlybegun to attract sustained government attentionand resources since September 11th, 2001.

It was to be expected that, in many capabilityareas, gaps in responder capabilities could bereduced through straightforward, near-term adap-tations (or “transfers”) of existing commercial andmilitary technologies. The Project Responderplanning effort has verified this expectation and suggests that much relevant investment isalready being made by the federal governmentand industry.

For such an intractable problem as catastrophicterrorism, it was also to be expected that areaswould be identified where major progress ineliminating capability gaps would require signifi-cant technology investment and even basicresearch—if progress could be made at all. Thecurrent effort has verified this expectation as well.

Finally, in many areas, significant improvementin capability can be expected from near-termtechnology (and non-technological solutions), yetfurther dramatic improvements can be expectedto result from a later generation of technology.In these instances, technology planners andresponder organizations must be concerned thatpursuit of ultimate performance levels does notunnecessarily inhibit early deployment of signifi-cantly improved systems, and also that earlydeployment of improved systems does not unnec-essarily impede the later adoption of further system improvements. Explicit attention to

intermediate design points and upgrade paths canboth maximize prospects for a smooth, interoper-able, transition where that is feasible, and avoidrecriminations about misplaced expectationswhere it is not.

In other words, technology planning to improvecapabilities for dealing with potentially cata-strophic terrorism cannot be undertaken in a vac-uum; instead it must be cognizant of the chan-nels through which technology will actually beintegrated into systems and deployed to improveresponder capability. Moreover, while the currentproject focused initially on responder require-ments (or “technology-pull”), room must bemade in the S&T process for the fruits of “tech-nology-push” as well (for example, the fruits ofwork in the Strategic Research Areas defined inthe Introduction). A full discussion of how thisshould be accomplished is beyond the scope ofthe current project. However, this appendix pres-ents some of the concepts should be consideredby the Department of Homeland Security inmanaging a portfolio of science and technologyactivities aimed at enhancing future respondercapabilities.

As noted in the Preface and Introduction, thedecentralized and diverse character of responderorganizations means that technology adoption byresponders is very different from the procurementprocess that most federal science and technologyplanners are used to. Whereas a successful federaltechnology development program usually leads tofederal government procurement (indeed, theterm “acquisition” was adopted to describe thecombination of development and procurement),

2 4 3


Appendix A

Spiral Development andCommercialization of AffordableAdvanced Technology Systems

2 4 4


Appendix A

in the case of emergency responders the engineer-ing and manufacturing development (EMD) andproduction will usually be performed by com-mercial suppliers. However, the heavy role ofgovernment organizations at all levels and thestrong requirement for standardization and inter-operability means that the market is also very dif-ferent from the typical commercial market forhigh technology goods.

Responder organizations have very limited pro-curement budgets and so it would only take a fewinstances where a deployed system was unexpect-edly rendered obsolete by the next generation, tosour responders on the process. Similarly, com-mercial suppliers to responder organizations havelimited product development budgets, and a keyrole of federal technology programs will bereduce uncertainty about the future marketplaceso that suppliers will have the confidence toinvest in developing appropriate products. Acooperative process of integrated demonstrationand consensus-building will be an important ele-ment of the technology transfer process.

Many of the federal officials and organizationsnow involved in developing technologies forresponders have experience in the Department ofDefense. DoD has learned from the commercialmarket place that attempts to leap a generation oftechnology and meet specified “requirements”through development of an integrated systemusing new technology in all the subsystems leadsto slower progress as well as the risk of total failure.

By contrast, an “open systems” approach that usesdefined (but not permanent) architecture andinterface specifications to allow competitivedevelopment at the subsystems/level allows bothearlier deployment of improved capability andmore rapid technological evolution beyond thatlevel. DoD officials have come to understandthe need for “spiral development” and “evolution-ary acquisition” in order to get systems in thefield early that take advantage of current technol-ogy and then continually refreshing the technol-ogy embodied in deployed systems in order toimprove capability over time.

In contrast to earlier acquisition concepts, sys-tems can be deployed for operational use beforethey are fully developed, and they do not have apredefined end state. Early operational use ofnew capabilities and new operational conceptsenabled by new technology has benefits for oper-ational effectiveness and also for the developmentprocess. Getting advanced technology in thehands of users early helps refine the true opera-tional value of the technology and thus helpsmake design tradeoffs; it also increases the con-stituency for useful innovations and helps extin-guish invalid ones.

Of course, this new thinking in DoD bringsDoD much closer to the evolutionary approachthat is already typical of industry—in which thenotion of working more closely with customers(or a lead customer) in developing new productshas taken hold. One key process within DoD forthis new approach is the “Advanced ConceptTechnology Demonstration (ACTD).” ACTDsinvolve the application of advanced technology toa military problem, but the focus is on the mili-tary application rather than the development ofthe technology itself. The focus is not just on theoperational test of a new piece of equipment butgenerally an assessment of a new operational ororganizational approach that is made possible bythe new technology.

Both a user organization as well as a technologydeveloper are required as co-sponsors before theACTD can be initiated. An essential element ofthe ACTD is that there be a small operationalleave-behind capability after the demonstrationperiod has ended.

In the DoD acquisition process, the intendednext step after a successful ACTD was the initia-tion of a formal procurement including a fullscale engineering and manufacturing develop-ment phase. In the responder world, a successfulACTD-like demonstration would instead be fol-lowed by the commitment by one or more com-mercial suppliers to develop products based onthe demonstration. This commitment wouldlikely be facilitated by responder involvement inintegrated demonstrations and by a national level

2 4 5


Spiral Development and Commercialization of Affordable Advanced Technology Systems

identification of the new capability as an appro-priate standard.

Thus the Department of Homeland Securityshould consider replacing the DoD phrase “evo-lutionary acquisition” with “evolutionary com-mercialization and deployment.” Beyond thischange in words, it will be necessary to calibratethe S&T investment process to the realities of theresponder adoption process.

In other words, to be successful, a science andtechnology effort focused on responder capabili-ties will affect the assessed demand for, as well asthe supply of, technology. Vendors need to feelcomfortable with the level of commercial risk inselling a product as well as the technical risk indeveloping it. Testing and standards and harmo-nized expectations of future technology availabil-ity will be as important to success as incrementsof technical performance.

While the ACTD focuses on new operationalapplications of relatively mature technology, anolder form of technology demonstration – the“Advanced Technology Demonstration” (ATD) –typically focuses on proving the feasibility of thebasic technology underlying a novel system.Such ATDs generally involve system-level tests,though component-level demonstrations are alsopossible. Because of the expense involved indeveloping a prototype, such demonstrations areonly appropriate if there is a high degree of confi-dence that the demonstration will succeed. Aslew of research and engineering activities,including experiments of various types, must generally be undertaken before an ATD is considered.

The difference between an experiment and ademonstration is that an experiment is primarilyconducted for the purpose of learning while ademonstration aims at verification (and perhapsimproving the “art” that goes into producing thetest articles.) In modern engineering practice,the expectation is that the underlying science willgenerally be understood before an attempt ismade to develop a product based on a new discovery.

Open systems architectures are important toallow innovation to occur at many levels. Someof this innovation will be pleasant surprises tofederal S&T planners, and the planning processmust be flexible enough to accommodate it. Butthere is still room for a systems engineeringapproach that assesses the risk at the level of eachsystem component and helps generate an appro-priate level of redundancy in technical approachand in scheduling to reduce the overall risk toacceptable levels.

One element of such a risk managementapproach is the use of Technology ReadinessLevels (TRLs). TRLs are a set of nine gradeddescriptions of stages of technology maturity.They were originated by the NationalAeronautics and Space Administration andadapted by the DoD for use in its acquisition sys-tem. TRLs are used by program managers toplan the phases of their spiral development pro-grams. As the program manager considers whento insert a new technology into future evolutionsof his system, he or she uses TRLs to understandwhen the technology will have been matured tothe point where there is acceptable risk in usingthat technology. That way, the continuousupgrade of complex systems can move forwardwithout unexpected perturbations to cost andschedule.

Because complex system developments usuallyinvolve the integration of various componenttechnologies that may have different technologyreadiness levels, and because the integration evenof mature technologies is not a simple task,NASA personnel have recently developedIntegration Readiness Levels (IRLs) that are use-ful in assessing development risk and appropriatetesting approaches from the point of view of thesystem as a whole.

The TRLs and IRLs are themselves only descrip-tions of stages of technical maturity (or riskreduction); by themselves they are not a manage-ment tool. However, rules of good practice canbe developed that address (for example) the mini-mum TRL that must be attained before a compo-nent is considered for inclusion in a particular

2 4 6


Appendix A

system-level test (IRL). However, compared tothe Department of Homeland Security, NASA(even with the increased international participa-tion in its missions) is able to comprehend moreof the overall system of concern in its own plan-ning and development process; it controls its own procurement, and it still generally developssystems to a particular requirement rather than

envisioning a continual increase in capability. SoDHS will need to adapt this system for its moredifficult environment and its required focus onevolutionary commercialization and deployment.

Descriptions of the TRLs and IRLs, togetherwith clarifying definitions, are provided in thetable below and on the next page.

1. Basic principles observed and reported.

2. Technology concept and/or application formulated.

3. Analytical and experimental critical function and/or characteristic proof of concept.

4. Component and/or breadboard validation in laboratory environment.

5. Component and/or breadboard validation in relevant environment.

6. System/subsystem model or prototype demonstration in a relevant environment.

7. System prototype demonstration in an operational environment.

8. Actual system completed and qualified through test and demonstration.

9. Actual system proven through successful mission operations.

Lowest level of technology readiness. Scientific research begins to be translated into applied research and development. Examples might include paper studies of a technology’s basic properties.

Invention begins. Once basic principles are observed, practical applications can be invented. Applications are speculative and there may be no proof or detailed analysis to support the assumptions. Examples are limited to analytic studies.

Active research and development is initiated. This includes analytical studies and laboratory studies to physically validate analytical predictions of separate elements of the technology. Examples include components that are not yet integrated or representative.

Basic technological components are integrated to establish that they will work together. This is relatively “low fidelity” compared to the eventual system. Examples include integration of “ad hoc” hardware in the laboratory.

Fidelity of breadboard technology increases significantly. The basic technological components are integrated with reasonably realistic supporting elements so it can be tested in a simulated environment. Examples include “high fidelity” laboratory integration of components.

Representative model or prototype system, which is well beyond that of TRL 5, is tested in a relevant environment. Represents a major step up in a technology’s demonstrated readiness. Examples include testing a prototype in a high-fidelity laboratory environment or in simulated operational environment.

Prototype near, or at, planned operational system. Represents a major step up from TRL 6, requiring demonstration of an actual system prototype in an operational environment such as an aircraft, vehicle, or space. Examples include testing the prototype in a test bed aircraft.

Technology has been proven to work in its final form and under expected conditions. In almost all cases, this TRL represents the end of true system development. Examples include developmental test and evaluation of the system in its intended weapon system to determine if it meets design specifications.

Actual application of the technology in its final form and under mission conditions, such as those encountered in operational test and evaluation. Examples include using the system under operational mission conditions.

Technology Readiness Level Description

1. Concept Systems Analyses Completed

2. Detailed System Design Completed

3. System Mockup or Prototype, Subjected to Simulated Test Environments

4. Prototype/Demonstrator Exercised in Representative Operational Environments

5. Operational System Deployment

Requires definition of how system components operate together to achieve functionality, together with rough performance specifications for components.

Interfaces and component characteristics are specified and subjected to engineering analysis and simulation.

Focus is on risk reduction of novel interfaces and identification of unexpected interactions. Well-defined components may be simulated as well as the environment.

Focus is on system demonstration in operational environments that may not be fully characterized by simulations.

Actual application of the technology in its final form and under mission conditions, such as those encountered in operational test and evaluation.

Integrated Readiness Level Description

2 4 7


Spiral Development and Commercialization of Affordable Advanced Technology Systems

1. Breadboard

2. High Fidelity

3. Low Fidelity

4. Model

5. Operational Environment

6. Prototype

7. Relevant Environment

8. Simulated OperationalEnvironment

Integrated components that provide a representation of a system/subsystem and which can be used to deter-mine concept feasibility and to develop technical data. Typically configured for laboratory use to demonstrate the technical principles of immediate interest. May resemble final system/subsystem in function only.

Addresses form, fit and function. High fidelity laboratory environment would involve testing with equipment that can simulate and validate all system specifications within a laboratory setting.

A representative of the component or system that has limited ability to provide anything but first order information about the end product. Low fidelity assessments are used to provide trend analysis.

A reduced scale, functional form of a system, near or at operational specification. Models will be sufficiently hardened to allow demonstration of the technical and operational capabilities required of the final system.

Environment that addresses all of the operational requirements and specifications required of the final system to include platform/packaging.

The first early representation of the system which offers the expected functionality and performance expected of the final implementation. Prototypes will be sufficiently hardened to allow demonstration of the technical and operational capabilities required of the final system.

Testing environment that simulates the key aspects of the operational environment.

Environment that can simulate all of the operational requirements and specifications required of the final system or a simulated environment that allows for testing of a virtual prototype to determine whether it meets the operational requirements and specifications of the final system.

Clarifying Definitions Description

2 4 8


Appendix A

2G General Packet Radio Services(GPRS)

3-D Three Dimensional

3-D GIS Three Dimensional GeographicInformation System

3G Universal MobileTelecommunication Service(UMTS)

3PL 3rd Party Logistics

AAVLD American Association ofVeterinary LaboratoryDiagnosticians

AC/DC Alternating Current/DirectCurrent

ACPLA Agent-Containing Particles perLiter of Air

ACTD Advanced Concept TechnologyDemonstration

ADASHI™ Automated Decision Aid Systemfor Hazardous Incidents

AFCEA Armed Forces Communications& Electronics Association

AFRL Air Force Research Laboratory

AIDS Acquired Immune DeficiencySyndrome

AIS Automated Information Systems

ALP Advanced Logistics Program

ANSI American National StandardsInstitute

APDS Autonomous Pathogen DetectionSystem

APHIS Animal and Plant HealthInspection Service

ARA Applied Research Associates, Inc.

ARL Army Research Laboratory

ASCO Advanced Systems and ConceptsOffice

ASOCC Area Secure OperationsCommand and Control

ASU All-Source SituationalUnderstanding

ATCC American Type CultureCollection

ATD Advanced TechnologyDemonstration

BAA Broad Agency Announcement

BioAlirt Bio-event Advanced LeadingIndicator Recognition

Bio-ToF MS Biological Time-of-Flight MassSpectrometer

BSL-3/4 Bio-Safety Level-3/4

BMG Building Model Generator

BSE Bovine SpongiformEncephalopathy

BSPS-ESI/MS Biological Sample Prep System –Electrospray Ionization/MassSpectrometry

BTCM Bio Threat ConsequenceManagement

BW Biological Warfare

C2 Command and Control

2 4 9


Appendix A

Acronyms

C4ISR Command, Control,Communications, Computers,Intelligence, Surveillance, andReconnaissance

CAC Common Access Cards

CADB Chemical Agent DetectionBadges

CAMEO Computer Aided Management ofEmergency Operations

CapWin Capital Wireless IntegratedNetwork

CATS Consequence Assessment ToolSet

CB Chemical and Biological

CPR U.S. Customs and Border Patrol

CBR Chemical, Biological andRadiological

CBRE Chemical, Biological,Radiological, and Explosive

CBRNE/HE Chemical, Biological,Radiological, Nuclear, andExplosive/High Explosive

CBRNE Chemical, Biological,Radiological, Nuclear, andExplosive/Incendiary

CBW Chemical Biological Warfare

CCTV Closed-Circuit Television

CDC Centers for Disease Control (andPrevention)

CE Crisis Evaluation andManagement

CECOM Communications ElectronicsCommand (Army)

CFU Colony Forming Units

CGNS Carrier Grade NotificationSystem

CI Criminal Investigation andAttribution

CICC Community IntelligenceCoordination Center

CINC Commander in Chief

CMIS Consequence ManagementInformation System

CMI-Services Consequence ManagementInteroperability Services

CMT Citizen Mobilization Teams

CNN Cable News Network

CNS Community Notifications System

CO2 Carbon Dioxide

COA Course of Action

CoBRA Chemical Biological ResponseAide

CONOPS Concept of Operations

COP Common Operating Picture

COTS Commercial-Off-the-Shelf

CPIE Command Post InformationEnvironment

CPOF Command Post of the Future

CRM Customer Relations Management

CRNE Chemical Radiological NuclearExplosive

CRT Cathode Ray Tube

CTIC California Anti-TerrorismInformation Center

CW Chemical Warfare

DAE Disaster Assistance Employee

DARPA Defense Advanced ResearchProjects Agency

DATSD Deputy Assistant to the Secretaryof Defense

DCTS Defense Collaborative Tool Suite

DEA Drug EnforcementAdministration

2 5 0


Appendix B

DERIS Domestic Emergency ResponseInformation Service

DHS Department of HomelandSecurity

DIDA Detection, Identification, andAssessment

DISA Defense Information SystemsAgency

DLA Defense Logistics Agency

DMAT Disaster Medical AssistanceTeams

DMORT Disaster Mortuary ResponseTeam

DNA Deoxyribonucleic Acid

DoD Department of Defense

DOE Department of Energy

DoT Department of Transportation

DREAMS Disaster Relief and EmergencyMedical Service

DSS Decision Support Systems

D-S3 DARPA Syndromic SurveillanceSystem

DTB Mycobacterium TuberculosisComplex Direct Detection Assay

DTRA Defense Threat ReductionAgency

ECBC Edgewood Chemical andBiological Center

EDIS Emergency Digital InformationSystem

ELINT Electronic Intelligence

ELISA Enzyme-Linked ImmunosorbentAssay

EMAC Emergency ManagementAssistance Compact

EMALL Electronic (Commerce) Mall

EMAN Emergency Medical AlertNetwork

EMD Engineering and ManufacturingDevelopment

EMERRS Emergency Regional ResponseSystem

EMP Electromagnetic Pulse

EMPP Emergency ManagementPreparation and Planning

EMS Emergency Medical Service(s)

ENCOMPASS Enhanced ConsequenceManagement Planning andSupport system

END Exotic Newcastle Disease

ENS Emergency Notification System

EOC Emergency Operations Center

EPA Environmental ProtectionAgency

ESP Extranet for SecurityProfessionals

ESRI Environmental Systems ResearchInstitute

ESSENCE II The Electronic SurveillanceSystem for the Early Notificationof Community-based Epidemics

EXML Expanded eXtensible MarkupLanguage

FACA Federal Advisory Committee Act

FAST PHRBAE.2 (Anteon Prog)

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FCC Federal CommunicationsCommission

FCE Functional Capability Element

FD Fire Department

FEMA Federal Emergency ManagementAgency

2 5 1


Acronyms

FERN Food Emergency ReportingNetwork

FID Flame Ionization Detector

FIST Field Inventory Survey Tool

FPD Flame Photometric Detector

FRED Facilities Resource EmergencyDatabase

FSIS Food Safety Inspection Service

FTIR Fourier Transform Infrared (spectroscopy)

GC Gas Chromatography

GCSAW Gas Chromatography SurfaceAcoustic Wave

GCSS Global Combat Support SystemCINC/JTF Commander in Chief/Joint Task

Force

GenCon Genomic Resources Managementand Services

GIS Geographical InformationSystems

GMO Genetically Modified Organism

GOTS Government Off-the-Shelf

GPR Ground Penetrating Radar

GPS Global Positioning System

GPS/GIS Global PositioningSystem/GeographicalInformation System

GRIP Global Response IncidentPlanner

GUI Graphical User Interface

H&AI Hicks & Associates, Inc.

HACCP Hazard Analysis and CriticalControl Point

HAN Health Alert Network

HANAA Handheld Advanced NucleicAcid Analyzer

HARC Houston Advanced ResearchCouncil

HAZMAT Hazardous Materials

HE High Explosive

HEPA High Efficiency Particulate Air

HERF High Energy Radio Frequency

HHS (Department of ) Health andHuman Services

HHSA Health and Human ServicesAgency (San Diego County)

HIPPA Health Insurance Portability andAccountability Act

HLS/HDC2 Homeland Security/HomelandDefense Command and Control

HMO Health MaintenanceOrganization

HPAC Hazard Prediction andAssessment Capability

HPM High Powered Microwave

HRSA Health Resources and ServicesAdministration

HSARPA Homeland Security AdvancedResearch Projects Agency

HUMINT Human Intelligence

HVAC Heating, Ventilation, & AirConditioning

I&W Indications and Warning

IAB (Federal) Interagency Board

IC Incident Commander

ICD-9 International Classification ofDiseases (Ninth Edition)

ICE Immigration and CustomsEnforcement

ICIT Incident Command InformationTool

2 5 2


Appendix B

ICMS Incident Command ManagementSystem

ICS Incident Command System

ID Identification

IDS Intrusion Detection Systems

IEEE Institute of Electrical &Electronics Engineers

IFC Intelligence Fusion Center

IMINT Imagery Intelligence

IMS Ion Mobility Spectrometry

IPB Intelligence Preparation of theBattlefield

IPO Intelligence Preparation forOperations

IR Infrared

IRL Integration Readiness Level

IRRIS Intelligent Roadway and RailwayInformation System

ISAC Information Sharing and AnalysisCenters

ISN Institute for SoldierNanotechnology

ISR Intelligence Surveillance andReconnaissance

ISS Internet Security Systems

IT Information Technology

ITS Intelligent TransportationSystems

JBREWS Joint Biological Remote EarlyWarning System

JDST Joint Logistics Decision SupportTools

JIC Joint Intelligence Center

JISE Joint Intelligence SupportElement

JPG Graphics file type (developed bythe Joint Photographic ExpertsGroup)

JRIES Joint Regional InformationExchange System

JSIPP Joint Service Installation PilotProject

JSLIST Joint Services LightweightIntegrated Suite Technology

JTF Joint Task Force

JTRS Joint Tactical Radio System

JWARN Joint Warning and ReportingNetwork

KIPP Knowledge and IntelligenceProgram Professionals

LACRCIC Los Angeles County RegionalCriminal Information Center

LAN Local Area Network

LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory

LEADERS Lightweight Epidemiology andAdvanced Detection, EmergencyResponse System

LEO Law Enforcement Online

LEWG Law Enforcement WorkingGroup

LIBS Laser Induced BreakdownSpectroscopy

LIDAR Light Detection and Ranging

LIS Logistics Information System

LPOSS Long Path Optical Sensor System

LRN Laboratory Reporting Network

LS Logistics Support

LSTAT Life Support for Trauma andTransport

M&S Modeling and Simulation

MAC Multi-Agency Command

2 5 3


Acronyms

MALDI Matrix Assisted Laser DesorptionIonization

MASINT Measurement and SignatureIntelligence

MBLM Multi-Zonal Blowdown Model

MEF Marine Expeditionary Force

MEVA Munitions EffectivenessVulnerability Assessment

MHz Megahertz

MIDAS-AT Meteorological Information andDispersion Assessment SystemAnti-Terrorism

MIPT Memorial Institute for thePrevention of Terrorism

MIT Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology

MLS Multilevel Security

MMMWR Morbidity and Mortality WeeklyReport

MOU Memorandum of Understanding

MPEG Motion Picture Experts Group

MR Medical Response

MRPA Mitigation and Restoration forPlant and Animal Resources

MTMC Military Traffic ManagementCommand

NAHEMS National Animal HealthEmergency Management SteeringCommittee

NAHLN National Animal HealthLaboratory Network

NAI Named Areas of Interest

NARAC National Atmospheric ReleaseAdvisory Center

NASA National Aeronautics & SpaceAdministration

NATO North Atlantic TreatyOrganization

NBC Nuclear/Biological/Chemical

NBCR Nuclear/Biological/Chemical/Radiological

NBS National Bureau of Standards

NC North Carolina

NDPIX National Drug Pointer Index

NE Nuclear, Explosive, andIncendiary

NEDSS National Electronic DiseaseSurveillance System

NEST Nuclear Emergency ResponseTeam

NFPA National Fire Protection Agency

NGA National Geospatial-IntelligenceAgency

NIFCC National Interagency FireCommand Center

NIJ National Institute of Justice

NIMS National Incident ManagementSystem

NIOSH National Institute forOccupational Safety & Health

NIST National Institute of Standardsand Technology

NMIC National Military IntelligenceCenter

NOAA National Oceanic andAtmospheric Administration

NOC Network Operating Center

NOTAMs Notice to Airmen

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NRE Nuclear, Radiological, Explosive

NRIC-VI National Reliability andInteroperability Council (rechartered)

2 5 4


Appendix B

NSHS National Seed Health System

NSOF Network Sensors for theObjective Force

NTRO National Terrorism ResponseObjective

NVESD Night Vision and ElectronicSensors Directorate

OASIS Organization for theAdvancement of StructuredInformation Standards

ODISC4 Office of the Director ofInformation Systems forCommand, Control,Communications & Computers(Army)

OEM Office of EmergencyManagement

OES Office of Emergency Services(California)

OIE Office International desEpizooties

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom

OFDM Orthogonal Frequency DivisionMultiplex

OLES Office of Law EnforcementStandards

OLETS Oklahoma Law EnforcementTelecommunications System

OPSEC Operational Security

OSAC Overseas Security AdvisoryCouncil

OSD Office of the Secretary ofDefense

OSHA Occupational Safety and HealthAdministration

OSIS Open Source Information System

OSMLS Operating Systems Multi-LevelSecurity

OT&E Operational Test & Evaluation

PCR Polymerase Chain Reaction

PDA Personal Digital Assistant

PEAC Palmtop Emergency Access forChemicals

PHRBAE Public Health Readiness forBiological Agent Events

PKI Public Key Infrastructure

PLC Programmed Logic Controllers

PNNL Pacific Northwest NationalLaboratory

ppb parts per billion

PPE Personal Protection andEquipment

PPO Preferred Provider Organization

PPW Partnership for Public Warning

PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment

R&D Research and Development

R&R Response and Recovery

R3S Remote Surveillance SupportSystem

RAP Ring Airfoil Projectile

RDT&E Research, Development, Test &Evaluation

REACT/S Radiation Emergency AssistanceCenter/Training Site

RF Radio Frequency

RFID Radio Frequency Identification

RFP Request for Proposal

RHTCAT Rapid High-Throughput ClinicalAssessment and Testing (System)

RIMS Response InformationManagement System

RISS-ATIX Regional Information SharingSystems – Anti-TerrorismInformation eXchange

2 5 5


Acronyms

RISSNET Regional Information SharingSystem Network

RNA Ribonucleic Acid

ROC Regional Operations Centers

RPG Rocket Propelled Grenade

RTO Response Technology Objective

S&T Science & Technology

SAIC Science ApplicationsInternational Corporation

SARC Surveillance and ReconnaissanceCenter

SARS Severe Acute RespiratorySyndrome

SART State Animal Response Teams

SATURN Statewide Anti-Terrorist UnifiedResponse Network

SAW/IMS Surface Acoustic Wave / IonMobility Spectrometry

SBCCOM Soldier & Biological ChemicalCommand (Army)

SCA Software CommunicationsArchitecture

SCADA Supervisory Control and DataAcquisition

SCBA Self-Contained BreathingApparatus

SESI IR MS Systems Engineering Solutions,Inc. Infrared Mass Spectrometry

SIGINT Signals Intelligence

SIGP Single Integrated Ground Picture

SIP Single Integrated Picture

SLD Second Line of Defense

SMART Situation Management andAwareness in Real Time

SMO Semiconducting Metal Oxides

SMPTE Society of Motion Picture andTelevision Engineers

SNORT Proper name of an open-sourceintrusion detection system

SONET Synchronous Optical Network

SPAWAR Space & Naval Warfare SystemsCommand (Navy)

SRA Strategic Research Area

SWAT Special Weapons And Tactics

T&E Test and Evaluation

TACAS Thermal Access Control andAuthorization Systems

TACCS Threat Analysis and CriticalControl Point

TADMUS Tactical Decision Making UnderStress

TASSS Tulsa Area SyndromicSurveillance System

TD Technology Demonstration

TEW Terrorism Early Warning(Group)

TIC Toxic Industrial Chemicals

TIGER Team Integrated ElectronicResponse

TIM Toxic Industrial Material

TRANSCOM Transportation Command

TRC Terrorism Research Center, Inc.

TRL Technology Readiness Level

TSR Technical Search and Rescue

TSWG Technical Support WorkingGroup

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UGS Unattended Ground Sensors

UIC Unified Incident CommandDecision Support andInteroperable Communications

UNWD Unconventional NuclearWeapons Defense

2 5 6


Appendix B

UPS United Parcel Service

USAMRIID United States Army MedicalResearch Institute of InfectiousDiseases

USAR Urban Search and Rescue

USDA United States Department ofAgriculture

USMC United States Marine Corps

UV Ultraviolet

UWB Ultra Wide Band

VLSTRACK Vapor Liquid and Solid Tracking

VMAT Veterinary Medical AssistanceTeams

VR Virtual Reality

VTC Video Teleconferencing

WATS Wide-Area Tracking System

WET Weather, Enemy and Terrain

WETT Weather, Enemy, Threats, andTerrain

WHO World Health Organization

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

XML eXtensible Markup Language

2 5 7


Acronyms

2 5 8


Appendix B

Congress

Subcommittee on Emerging Threats andCapabilities, Senate Armed Services Committee

Subcommittee on National Security, VeteransAffairs, and International Relations, HouseCommittee on Government Reform

House Republican Conference TerrorismWorking Group

Executive Office of the President

National Security Council

Office of Homeland Security

Office of Management and Budget

Office of Science and Technology Policy NationalSecurity and International Affairs Division

Department of Homeland Security

Science and Technology Directorate

Emergency Preparedness and ResponseDirectorate

Office of the Chief Counsel

Bureau of Transportation and SecurityDirectorate, Office of Domestic Preparedness

National Domestic Preparedness Office

Plum Island Disease Center

National Emergency Training Center

National Bioterrorism Detection and AnalysisAssessment Center

FEMA Senior Advisor for Terrorism

FEMA National Technology Transfer Center

FEMA WMD Resource Database

FEMA Urban Search and Rescue MassachusettsTask Force 1

Department of Justice

FBI Counterterrorism Division, DomesticTerrorism WMD Group

National Institute of Justice

FBI Laboratory

FBI Hazardous Materials Response Unit

Department of Defense

Interagency Board for EquipmentStandardization and Interoperability

Technical Support Working Group

Office of the Undersecretary of Defense(Comptroller)

Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense(DATSD) for Counterproliferation and Chem-Bio Defense (CP&CBD)

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense(Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict)

Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defensefor Civil Support

Joint Staff Deputy Directorate for CombatingTerrorism (J-34)

2 5 9P R O J E C T R E S P O N D E R

D R A F T

Appendix C

Home Agencies of Project ParticipantsAnd Interviewees

2 6 0


Appendix C

Joint Forces Command Joint Task Force (CivilSupport)

US Army Communications and ElectronicsCommand

US Army Medical Research Institute of ChemicalDefense

US Army Medical Research Institute ofInfectious Diseases

US Army Soldier Biological and ChemicalCommand

US Marine Corps Systems Command

US Marine Corps Security Force Battalion

US Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory

National Guard Bureau

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

Defense Intelligence Agency

National Defense University

Department of Energy

Sandia National Laboratories

Idaho National Engineering and EnvironmentalLaboratory

Department of Commerce

National Institute of Standards and Technology,Office of Law Enforcement Standards

Department of State

Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism

Department of Health and HumanServices

Centers for Disease Control and PreventionBioterrorism Preparedness and Response Program

Food and Drug Administration, Center for FoodSafety and Applied Nutrition

Department of Agriculture

Office of Crisis Planning and Management

Homeland Security Staff

Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), Officeof Food Safety and Emergency Preparedness

Animal Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)

Agricultural Research Service

Department of Transportation

Office of Emergency Transportation

National Academy of Sciences

Environmental Protection Agency

Central Intelligence Agency

State and Local Jurisdictions

Arlington County, VA, Fire Department

Baltimore MD Department of Health

Baton Rouge LA Coroner’s Office

Baton Rouge LA Police Department

Boston Emergency Management Agency

Boston Emergency Medical Service

Boston Fire Department

Chicago Department of Public Health

Chicago Office of Emergency Management

City of Tulsa Department of Public Works

City of Tulsa Fire Department/HAZMAT Team

City of Tulsa Health Department

Commonwealth of Virginia Chief Veterinarian

Home Agencies of Project Participants And Interviewees

District of Columbia Emergency ManagementAgency

District of Columbia Metropolitan Transit Police

Fairfax County HAZMAT Response Unit

Fairfax County Police Department

Fairfax County Urban Search and Rescue/Virginia Task Force 1/USAID SAR Team 1

Fire Department of New York City

Fishers, IN, Fire Department

Harris County TX Department of Public Health

Illinois Department of Public Health

Kansas City MO Health Department

Los Angeles City Fire Department

Los Angeles Department of the Coroner

Los Angeles County Fire Department

Los Angeles County Sheriff ’s DepartmentEmergency Operations Bureau

Los Angeles County Terrorism Early WarningGroup

Los Angeles Police Department

Matteson, IL, Police Department

Metropolitan Boston Transit Authority

Miami/Dade County Office of EmergencyManagement

Miami/Dade County Urban Search and Rescue

Montgomery County Fire Department

North Carolina Department of Agriculture andConsumer Services, Emergency ProgramsDivision

New Hampshire Office of EmergencyManagement

New York City Mayor’s Office of EmergencyManagement

Oklahoma City Metropolitan Medical ResponseSystem

Oklahoma City/County Health Department

Orange County, CA, Sheriff Department of theCoroner

Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture

Pennsylvania Department of Health

Philadelphia Police Department

Pittsfield, MA, Fire Department

Redlands, CA, Police Department

San Diego Sheriff ’s Department

Salt Lake City Corporation Management ServicesDepartment

Salt Lake City Fire Department SpecialOperations Coordinator

Seattle Fire Department

Seattle Urban Search and Rescue/MetropolitanMedical Strike Team

Sheffield, MA, Police Department

South Carolina Law Enforcement Department

Utah Department of Health

Utah Department of Public Safety

Tulsa Area Emergency Management Agency

Private/Academic/ResearchOrganizations

American Meat Institute

American Phytopathological Society

American Veterinary Medical Association

Auburn University

2 6 1P R O J E C T R E S P O N D E R

D R A F T

2 6 2


Appendix C

Aurora Safety

Banfield Pet Hospital, Fredericksburg, VA

Cactus Technology

Center for Strategic and International Studies

CMI-Services

Communications Applied Technology

Cornell University

Cugaar Software

Dartmouth University Media Labs

Defense Group Inc.

Drexel University

Federation of American Societies forExperimental Biology

GenCon, Inc.

Institute for Defense Analysis

Institute for the Study of Terrorism and PoliticalViolence

International Association of Chiefs of Police

Lion Apparel

Louisiana State University

Maryland Institute for Emergency MedicalService Systems

McDonalds Corporation

MIT Lincoln Labs

MITRE

Monmouth University

Natick Labs

National Association of Emergency MedicalTechnicians

Monterey Institute of International StudiesCenter for Nonproliferation Studies

National Research Council

Nuclear Threat Initiative

OrthoOklahoma Healthcare

Radix Corporation

RAND Corporation

Sabiosi, Inc

Science Applications International Corporation

Southern Research Institute

Tex-Shield, Inc

Tulsa Hillcrest Health Care System

University of Kansas

University of Florida

University of Georgia at Griffin

University of Guelph, Canada

University of Maryland, Baltimore, NationalStudy Center for Trauma and EMS

University of Nebraska

University of Pittsburgh Graduate School ofPublic Health

University of Texas at Austin Institute forAdvanced Technology

University of Texas, San Antonio

University of Texas Medical Branch (Galveston)

Virginia Polytechnic Institute and StateUniversity

Washington State University

GUY BEAKLEY, PH.D., is Vice President of C4ISRfor Hicks & Associates, Inc., senior scientist ofthe DoD/Intelligence Community MotionImagery Standards Board, and a member of theSAIC Executive Science and Technology Council,a small group of scientists and technologistsselected from SAIC and Telcordia as representa-tive of the highest standards of technical quality.Recent programs he led include full-motion wire-less video, voice and data communications sys-tem, International Telecommunication Unionand NATO standards development, higher orderprotocols for Common Data Link, distance learn-ing using optical fiber networks and satellites,and future imaging systems meeting the require-ments of Joint Vision 2010. His current interestsinclude high resolution systems for precision tar-geting, new technology compression systems, andbroadband communications systems for urbanand mobile environments. Prior to joining Hicks& Associates he was Director of GovernmentPrograms for Optivision, Inc., Vice President ofResearch and Development for Scientific-Atlanta,Inc. and Head of Image Processing Research atSarnoff. He is a member of MPEG, IEEE,SMPTE, AFCEA, author of more than 60 papersand the recipient of the 1996 SMPTE JournalAward for most outstanding paper. Dr. Beakleyreceived a B.E. in Electrical Engineering fromVanderbilt University and M.S., M.Phil., andPh.D. degrees from Yale University inEngineering and Applied Science.

THOMAS W. FRAZIER is the President of theNational Consortium for Genomic ResourcesManagement and Services (GenCon). Dr. Frazieris an experimental and physiological psychologistwith a research and management background inaerospace and military biomedical research pro-grams. Prior to creating GenCon, he was a

biomedical research specialist at the JohnsonManned Spacecraft Center. He then came toWalter Reed Army Institute of Research where hebecame Chief, Department of ExperimentalPsychophysiology. He founded BehavioralTechnology Consultants, Inc, which was aresearch, teaching, and consulting firm special-ized in behavioral research and treatment pro-grams, office automation technology develop-ment, and research on human stress and fatigue.

Now at GenCon, he has developed various con-ferences and workshops for senior professionals,and organized congressional briefings concernedparticularly with issues confronting genomicresearchers, administrators and legislators in theemerging threats arena. Through GenCon he hasdeveloped concept proposals for technologyassessments investigating how to optimize surveil-lance and containment strategies through detec-tion devices technology development. Onemerging threats to food and agriculture, he hasfocused especially on emerging threats of radicalenvironmental and animal rights organizations tomodern U.S. agricultural biotechnology and tocontemporary agricultural and food productionprocesses and processor organizations.

THOMAS M. GARWIN is Vice President of Hicks& Associates, Inc., where he undertakes nationalsecurity research and consulting tasks, primarilyfor the Departments of Energy and Defense. Hehas focused on counter-terrorism, counter-prolif-eration, defense transformation, and the health ofthe nuclear weapons stockpile. Before joiningHicks & Associates, Mr. Garwin served on theprofessional staff of the Committee on ArmedServices of the U.S. House of Representatives.Mr. Garwin managed the full committee’s hear-ings and developed policies on defense budgets

2 6 3


Appendix D

About the Authors and Editors

2 6 4


Appendix D

and force structure, military roles and missions,European and Asian security, and export controls.As a policy and economics advisor to CommitteeChairman Les Aspin, Mr. Garwin helped formu-late policy initiatives regarding post-Cold Warnational security strategy, military force posture,technology development, and defense conversion.Before joining the House Armed ServicesCommittee, Mr. Garwin served as the AmericanCoordinator of the Nuclear History Program atthe University of Maryland. In this position, heoversaw the startup of a multimillion-dollar inter-national research and training program. As afull-time consultant to the John D. andCatherine T. MacArthur Foundation from 1985through 1987, Mr. Garwin helped define priori-ties, select grantees, and solidify support for theFoundation’s $20 million-a-year InternationalSecurity Program. Mr. Garwin previously servedas an analyst with the U.S. Congressional Officeof Technology Assessment from 1983 to 1985,where he managed research on the role of com-putation and communications in future U.S. eco-nomic growth. From 1981 to 1983, he was aresearcher with the Brookings Institution, wherehe analyzed OPEC’s role in oil markets andrelated national security issues. Mr. Garwin wasa senior consultant to the Analytic AssessmentsCorporation from 1978 to 1983, where heinvented “tagging” systems for arms control veri-fication. He also analyzed intelligence collectionsystems and requirements, wartime commandand control, and nuclear targeting issues. Mr.Garwin worked in the Office of the AssistantSecretary of Defense for International Affairsfrom 1976 to 1977, where he represented theOffice of the Secretary of Defense on NationalSecurity Council Task Forces concerning defensestrategy, technology, and arms control. Mr.Garwin holds a Master of Public Policy fromHarvard University’s John F. Kennedy School ofGovernment and an A.B. degree in History fromHarvard College. In 1994, Mr. Garwin returnedto the Kennedy School to attend the Program forSenior Executives in National and InternationalSecurity.

JAMES HAMMILL is Vice President forGovernment Special Projects at Telcordia

Technologies, where he supports public sectorprojects related to Telcordia’s core telecommuni-cations and IT functions. Mr. Hammill repre-sents Telcordia as a member of the FCC’sNational Reliability and InteroperabilityCommittee (NRIC-VI), Homeland SecurityPublic Safety Committee; and through theMITRE Corporation, represents Telcordia in thePartnership for Public Warning, which willbecome a Federal Advisory Committee for thestandardization of emergency warning for theUnited States. In this capacity, Mr. Hammillserves as chair of the Operating System StandardsCommittee for Public Warning Technology, andco-chair of the Standards TerminologyCommittee.

HAL KEMPFER of Knowledge & IntelligenceProgram Professionals (KIPP) is a public and pri-vate sector intelligence professional with over fif-teen years of experience in the field. Involvedwith business intelligence since 1992, Hal hashad subsequent lengthy engagements involvedwith cutting-edge law enforcement and militaryintelligence program initiatives. LieutenantColonel Kempfer, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve,completed a tour overseas last year as theDirector of Intelligence (J-2) of the CombinedJoint Task Force for Consequence Management,and is currently the Marine EmergencyPreparedness Liaison Officer for California,Arizona, Nevada and Hawaii. KIPP is teamedwith leading companies in the area of competitiveintelligence and strategic risk management with avariety of clients in government and industry.Hal currently appears on ABC 7 television andNPR radio in Southern California as a militaryand terrorism analyst, and lectures at theNational Interagency Civil-Military Institute.

DR. STEVEN KORNGUTH is currently the Directorof Chemical and Biological Defense at theInstitute for Advanced Technology and visitingProfessor of Neurobiology at the University ofTexas at Austin. Dr. Kornguth is PrincipleInvestigator on the University of Texas Compo-nent of the Biological Chemical CountermeasuresEffort of a National Consortium. He has researchactivities in sensors, magnetic resonance imaging

and human performance. Dr. Kornguth has aB.S. Chemistry from Columbia University, aM.S. in Biochemistry and Ph.D. Biochemistryfrom the University of Wisconsin, Madison.

MR. BRETT KRIGER was Deputy Director of theLouisiana Office of Emergency Preparednessfrom 1990 to 1997. He has over 30 years ofdomestic and international military and civilianexperience in all aspects of planning, training,and exercise development and evaluation for all-hazards including: national security, CBRNEaccidents/incidents, nuclear weapon accidents,nuclear power plants, industrial chemicals, andterrorist attack. He is an expert in emergencyresponse and has coordinated planning teams todevelop WMD incident management plans, wasa Team Leader for the National Guard WMDStudy, and a member of the planning team and aplayer/controller for the FBI series of ImprovisedNuclear Device exercises held prior to the AtlantaOlympics. He assisted in the development of theinitial guidelines for the Chemical StockpileEmergency Preparedness Program and serves as aRegional Coordinator and Team Leader forFEMA’s Radiological Emergency PreparednessProgram. He is a nationally recognized expert inWMD planning and response with extensivequalifications in developing state and local terror-ist incident response capabilities.

JASPER C. LUPO, PH.D., is Director of SensorSystems and Principal Scientist at AppliedResearch Associates, Inc. He leads ARA pro-grams in the areas of space and defense, especiallysensor initiatives. Dr. Lupo is a senior technolo-gist with over thirty years experience in conduct-ing and leading defense research and develop-ment, from the laboratory to the Office ofSecretary of Defense. This experience is mainlyin science and technology, but spans the rangefrom basic research to early production. Many ofhis projects have been fielded or been incorpo-rated into fielded military systems. From 1996to 2001 he served as Director, Sensor Systems,Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense(OSD) for Science and Technology, where hemanaged the $1.4B Department of Defense(DoD) science and technology investment in

sensors, electronic components, electronic war-fare, space platforms, space propulsion, medicalsensing, and space sensors. From 1993 1996 heserved as Director for Research, in the Office ofthe Director, Defense Research and Engineering,where he managed the $1.1B Department ofDefense (DoD) Basic Research Program, chairedthe Defense Committee on Research, managedthe DoD Multidisciplinary University ResearchProgram, and established the DoD StrategicResearch Objectives and first Basic Research Plan.Before joining OSD, he was Assistant Directorfor Smart Weapons, Tactical Technology Office,Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency(DARPA). He directed programs in smartweapons, sensor development, sensor processing,and automatic target recognition; he also chairedthe DARPA Neural Network Study. Dr. Lupohas a Ph.D. in Physics from GeorgetownUniversity.

JOHN W. LYONS, PH.D., is a physical chemist,technology consultant, retired director of theArmy Research Laboratory (ARL), and memberof the National Academy of Engineering. Heserved in research and development positionswith the Monsanto Company for 18 years. In1973 he joined the Commerce Department’sNational Bureau of Standards (NBS). At NBS,Lyons was the first director of the Center for FireResearch. In 1990, Dr. Lyons was appointed byPresident George H.W. Bush to be the ninthdirector of NBS; by that time renamed theNational Institute of Standards and Technology(NIST). In September 1993, he was appointedthe first permanent director of ARL. At ARL,Dr. Lyons managed a broad array of science andtechnology programs. He has served on manyboards and commissions, to include the FederalAdvisory Commission on Consolidation andConversion of Defense Research andDevelopment Laboratories. He currently serveson two boards of visitors at the University ofMaryland. He is a member of the NationalResearch Council’s Board on Army Science and Technology, as well as a member of a congressionally chartered committee at theNational Defense University to study the poten-tial effectiveness of the DoD laboratories in the

2 6 5



transformed military of the future. Dr. Lyonswas elected to the National Academy ofEngineering in 1985. He is a Fellow of theAmerican Association for the Advancement ofScience and of the Washington Academy ofScience, and is a member of the AmericanChemical Society and of Sigma Xi.

LOU MASON is Director of LogisticsTransformation at the Hicks & AssociatesAdvanced Systems and Concepts Office. Prior toarriving at Hicks & Associates, he was theDARPA Program Manager for the LogisticAdvanced Concept Technology Demonstrations,including the Joint Logistics ACTD and the JointTheater Logistics ACTD, with the mission todevelop and integrate web-based Joint LogisticsDecision Support Tools (JDSTs) into the GlobalCombat Support System. Several of his productsare currently being integrated into the GCSSCINC/JTF and Army Logistics TransformationAgency programs. Lou came to DARPA fromMITRE Corporation, where as a Senior LeadEngineer, he was the GCSS Task Lead for theDARPA/DISA Joint Program Office (JPO). Heis a retired Army logistician with over 36 yearsexperience in strategic and operational planning,analysis, and logistic systems integration. He hasextensive joint logistics and Special Operationsexperience, and has authored key joint logisticsdoctrine. While on active duty in the Army, heserved as the Director of Operations for theArmy Material Command, the Deputy Chief ofStaff for Logistics U.S. Army Special OperationsCommand, Commander of the SpecialOperations Support Command, Chief ofOrganization and Mission Defense LogisticsAgency, and Chief of Supply Systems U.S. ForcesKorea. Lou has supported numerous DARPAprojects, including the Logistics for the WarriorProgram, the Logistics Anchor Desk, and theAdvanced Logistics Program (ALP). He is agraduate of the Army War College and the ArmyCommand and General Staff College. Lou is alsoa graduate of the University of SouthernMississippi, and holds advanced degrees fromGeorgia State University and the University ofNorth Alabama.

MICHELLE ROYAL is Director for StrategicPlanning at Hicks & Associates, Inc., where shesupports technology planning for the MemorialInstitute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT),and the Border and Transportation SecurityAdministration within the Department ofHomeland Security (DHS). Prior to joiningHicks & Associates, Inc., Ms. Royal was a ProjectDirector at Science Applications InternationalCorporation, where she was responsible for pro-gram management of a number of projects,including a market survey and analysis of thehigh explosives market (to include DoD, foreign,and private industry procurement and demilita-rization), DoD ODISC4 Smart Card/CommonAccess Card/Public Key Infrastructure analyticalsupport, and an assessment of the U.S. solidrocket-motor propellant market for a foreign pro-pellant manufacturer. In addition to programmanagement duties, Ms. Royal supported thedevelopment of technology roadmaps for the AirForce Research Laboratory (AFRL). Prior tojoining SAIC, Ms. Royal was an IntelligenceResearch Specialist for the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation, where she conducted research andanalysis for foreign counterintelligence opera-tions. Ms. Royal has a B.A. in InternationalRelations and Italian, an M.A. in Security PolicyStudies, and an M.B.A. from The GeorgeWashington University.

NEAL A. POLLARD, J.D., is Vice President,Emerging Threats & Capabilities, at Hicks &Associates, Inc., where he leads ProjectResponder, as well as consults on numerous gov-ernment projects as a terrorism expert, technol-ogy planner, and national security lawyer. Mr.Pollard has over twelve years of experience inresearching terrorism and transnational threats,and eight years’ experience developing counterter-rorism strategies and plans. In 1996, Mr. Pollardco-founded the Terrorism Research Center, Inc.(TRC), an institute with representation in sevencountries worldwide, and dedicated to researchand analysis of terrorism, counterterrorism policyand strategy development, and public informa-tion and education. Mr. Pollard continues to serve on the TRC Board of Directors.

2 6 6


Appendix D

Mr. Pollard holds degrees in mathematics andpolitical science, an M.Litt. in InternationalSecurity Studies from the University of St.Andrews, Scotland, and a Juris Doctor cum laudefrom the Georgetown University Law Center,where he specialized in international and nationalsecurity law.

MARIA E. POWELL, PH.D., is a Senior Directorwith the Terrorism Research Center. Her mainportfolio includes work with the emergencyresponder community and technologists to definerequirements, priorities, and roadmaps in orderto develop a national technology planningprocess for capabilities to respond to terrorism;and to develop a model of the Terrorism EarlyWarning Group concept that can be tailored andreplicated in other local jurisdictions. From1997-2003, Dr. Powell was a Project Analyst/Director with Science Applications InternationalCorporation where she specialized in terrorism,nuclear strategies, biological technologies, non-lethal weapons, and the Revolution in MilitaryAffairs. Dr. Powell has also worked on deminingissues in the Department of Humanitarian Affairsof the United Nations in New York, and was amember of a delegation to a preparatory confer-ence in Geneva for the Convention on CertainConventional Weapons. Dr. Powell received a B.A. in Russian and Political Science fromAllegheny College, and an M.Phil. and Ph.D. in International Relations from the University ofSt. Andrews, Scotland, where she focused on ter-rorism, police and intelligence cooperation tocombat terrorism in the European Community,and the interplay between international humani-tarian law and arms control in the context of thelandmine and chemical weapons regimes.

BARBARA REAGOR, PH.D., is Vice President forHomeland Security and Government Markets, atTelcordia Technologies. Dr. Reagor has workedfor the last 33 years in the fields of BroadbandNetworking, Enterprise Management Solutions,e-Business Solutions, Community Notification(Reverse 9-1-1), Disaster Prevention & Recovery,Crisis Management, Chemical Contamination,Network Reliability and Network RiskAssessment associated with telecommunications

and information technology systems. For morethan 26 years, Dr. Reagor and her departmentworked on such events as World Trade CenterBombings, Pentagon Bombing, Mt. Saint Helens,Hurricane Andrew, the Hinsdale Fire, theNorthridge Earthquake, the Oklahoma CityFederal Building Bombing and many more disas-ters associated with fires, floods, hurricanes,earthquakes, and dust storms. She has been theTelcordia Spokesperson for Homeland Securityand Critical Infrastructure Protection since theSeptember 11th Terrorist Attacks, and is coordina-tor of the Telcordia Task Force in support of theU.S. Governments Homeland Security initiatives.Over the past 3 years, Dr. Reagor lead theresearch, development and commercialization ofan advanced messaging platform ideally suited forPublic Safety Notification for large and small-scale emergencies, including hurricanes, floods,gas leaks and missing children. She is currentlyon the Interim Board of Directors for a newlyforming FACA organization called the“Partnership for Public Warning.” Dr. Reagorhas a B.Sc. in Chemistry, an M.S. in OrganicChemistry, and a Ph.D. in Inorganic LaserChemistry from Seton Hall University.

ROBERT V. TUOHY is Vice President for StrategicPlanning at Hicks & Associates, Inc. Since com-ing to Hicks, Mr. Tuohy has been advising severalgovernment and non-government organizationson technology planning. Besides leading thedevelopment of Project Responder’s NationalTechnology Plan for Responding to Terrorism, heis also assisting the Department of HomelandSecurity in developing processes for addressingtheir Border & Transportation Security technol-ogy needs. Prior to joining Hicks & Associates,Mr. Tuohy served as the Director of Science andTechnology Plans & Programs in the Office ofthe Secretary of Defense. Mr. Tuohy was respon-sible for developing and coordinating theDepartment’s science and technology strategicplanning and program assessment activities. Mr.Tuohy has a B.A. in Applied Behavioral Sciencesfrom National-Louis University, and an M.S. inScience and Technology Commercialization fromthe University of Texas at Austin.

2 6 7



2 6 8


Appendix D

1st Marine Expeditionary Force 199(MEF)

2G/3G 68, 249

54th Quartermaster (U.S. Army) 171

7th Transportation Command 174(U.S. Army)

9/11 94

access control 70, 167, 185, 256

acoustic detectors 181

Active Citizen 197-198

Activity Based Sensors 36

Advanced Concept Technology 4, 73, 78-79, Demonstration (ACTD) 134, 170, 193,

205-206, 244-245,249, 266

Advanced Technology Demonstrations 4, 161, (ATD) 245, 249

Advice Nurse 129

Aeromedical Isolation Team 157

aerosol dispersal 130-131

Aerosol Gel 36

aerostats 174

Affordable Specimen Transport 142for CW/BW

Affymetrix 150

agricultural bioterrorism 221

AIDS 123, 153, 249

Alion Corp 158

All-Source Information Fusion viii, 205-206and Analysis System

All-Source Situational iii, viii, xi, xiv, Understanding (ASU) 94, 189-190,

194-195, 206, 249

alpha radiation 36

alternate power sources 87

Alternate/Mobile Hospital vii, 101, 107, Contingencies 116-118, 124, 126

Amber Alert System 88

American Association of 218, 249Veterinary Laboratory Diagnosticians (AAVLD)

American Farm Bureau 224

American Phytopathological Society 226, 261

American Red Cross 90, 212

American Type Culture Collection 156, 249(ATCC)

Ames, IA USDA Center 218

Animal and Plant Diagnostic Surge 216Capacity

Animal and Plant Health 221-222, 224, 226,Inspection Service (APHIS) 238-239, 249, 260,

275

Animal Genomic Structures 8

animal tags 224

Animal Vaccine Stockpile 227

ANSI 102 68

2 6 9


Index

Appendix E

Index

anthrax vi, 15, 22, 92, 96, 120, 127, 130, 133, 135, 141-142,

144, 153, 210, 214, 240

antibiotics 32, 119-122, 136, 149, 159, 218

Anti-Terrorism Information 195, 198, 250Center (ATIC)

anti-toxins 119

antivirals 119-121, 136, 141, 159

Apple Computer 66

Applied Biosystems 150

Applied Physics Laboratory 128

ArboNet 222

Area Secure Operations 72, 193, 249Command and Control (ASOCC)

Armed Forces Radiobiology 18, 22Research Institute

Army Medical Command 152

Army Telemedicine Program 49

Artificial Intelligence Virtual Clinician 135

Assessment of Safe Air, Sea and 164, 174-175Ground Bases of Operations (Supply Depots)

Association of Public Safety 68Communications Officials

Automated Decision Aid System 40, 249for Hazardous Incidents (ADASHI)

Automated Information Systems (AIS) 70, 249

Automatic Generation and 164, 169, 175Assessment of Supply Requirements

bacteria 32, 120, 141, 149, 151, 154, 233, 240

bandwidth 7, 45, 68, 74, 105, 118, 135, 137, 174, 184, 194, 198, 204, 206, 222

bar code vii, 85, 125, 137, 151, 166, 168, 185

batteries 65, 71, 88, 164, 171-173

Beta Radiation 36

Bio Threat Consequence 43, 249Management (BTCM)

Bio-Defense Initiative 43

Bio-Event Advanced Leading 147, 249Indicator Recognition (BioALIRT)

bio-genomics 211

bioinformatics 224

Biological Agents iii, v, vii, ix, xi, 6-7, 15, 22, 32-33, 38, 41-42, 44, 53, 54-56, 85, 119-121, 130,

132-133, 141-142, 145, 147-153, 156-158, 160-162,

183, 210, 214, 219, 221

biological toxins 141, 218

Biological Warfare Agents 54, 145

biomarkers ix, 7-8, 142, 144, 150-151, 159-160, 220

biometrics 70, 132-133, 137, 139, 152, 180, 186, 209

Biosafety Level 218

Biosite 150

Blackberry 181

Blue Cross/Blue Shield 146

body protection v, 11, 16, 23, 25-27, 29

Bomb Damage Assessment 50

Bovine Spongiform 215, 240, 249Encephalopathy (BSE)

Bronx Zoo 146

Building Model Generator (BMG) 50, 249

Bureau of Diplomatic Security 210

Burning Man 198

California Anti-Terrorism 195, 198, 250Information Center (CTIC)

2 7 0


Appendix E

California Office of Emergency 184, 255Services (OES)

California Polytechnic University 204

CAMEO 73, 250

Capillary Electrophoresis 36

Capitol Wireless Integrated 193, 250Network (CapWIN)

Carrier Grade Notification 89, 250Systems (CGNS)

Casualty Management System vii, 125, 137-139

Casualty Management System 137Architecture

CBRNE Effects Modeling and v, 33-34, 45, Simulation 58, 145, 152-153

CECOM 43, 65-66, 72, 90, 172, 174, 250

Cell Based Sensors 36

Centers for Disease Control 45, 108-109, 114, (CDC) 116, 123, 128, 143,

153, 155-156, 160, 212, 222, 226, 250, 260

Cerner 125, 145

chain of custody 156, 209, 211

Chem Bio Response Aid (CoBRA) 40, 73, 250

Chemical Agents v-vi, ix, 6-7, 32, 38, 42, 53-55, 59, 61,

83, 108, 128, 210, 231

Chemical Biological Response 40, 73, 250Aide (CoBRA)

chemical decontamination 83, 234

Chiron 150

Cisco Systems, Inc. 70

Citizen Mobilization Team (CMT) 196, 250

Classification and Mitigation 33-34, 40, 84, 95

classified information 70, 130, 199, 205

CNN 73, 250

Coast Guard 193, 219

cold zone 86, 208, 211

Collection and Dissemination 33-34, 38,of Weather and Environmental 47, 145Conditions

Combined Effects Modeling v, 46, 48, 58, 61for Urban Canyons

Command Post Information 203, 250Environment (CPIE)

Command Post of the Future (CPOF) 203, 250

commercial carriers 173

Commercial-Off-the-Shelf (COTS) 12, 63, 65, 70, 72, 250

commercialization iv, xii-xiv, 3, 9, 77, 84-85, 95-96,

136-138, 161, 169, 187, 228, 235, 240,

243, 246, 267

Common Access Card (CAC) 70, 250, 266

Common Operational Picture 67, 107, 114, (COP) 124-125, 191, 198,

201, 203-204, 250

Communications Electronics 43, 65-66, 72, Command (CECOM) 90, 172, 174,

250, 260

Community Intelligence 197, 250Coordination Center (CICC)

Community Notification 89, 250Systems (CNS)

Consequence Assessment Tool 45, 117, Set (CATS) 196, 250

Consequence Management 32, 40, 43, 100, 115, 185, 189-190, 193, 195-196, 203,

249-250, 264

Consequence Management 203, 250Information System (CMIS)

contagious 8, 32, 133, 141-143, 148, 152, 154-158, 161, 217

2 7 1


Index

containment 32, 96, 126, 142-143, 145, 148, 152, 154, 157, 159, 183, 227, 230, 233, 235, 263

Contaminated Evidence 207, 209Recovery and Preservation

Contaminated Victim vi, 94, 97, 135-136Knowledge Base

Coordination between Law 207, 211Enforcement and Public Health Authorities

Coordination of Animal and 147, 216, Plant Entities with Public 220, 222Health, Law Enforcement, and State, Local, and Federal Government and Industry

CorpNet 103

Course of Action (COA) 64, 139, 189, 195, 250

Course of Action Development vii, 63-64, 101, 109,

117-118, 189

credentialed 133, 185

criminal intelligence analysts 179

Criminal Investigation and iii, xi, xiv, Attribution (CI) 207, 250

Crisis Evaluation and iii, viii, xi, xiv, 177,Management (CE) 186-187, 199, 250

Crop “Hardening” 228

Crop Disease and Contamination 225

Cybercop Secure Portal 193

DARPA 39-41, 49, 65, 70, 90, 93, 134, 147, 151, 168,

170, 174, 182, 193, 203, 208, 219, 239,

250-251, 265-266

DARPA “Force Provider” 90

DARPA Advanced Diagnostics Program 49

DARPA Syndromic 41, 251Surveillance System (D-S3)

Data Correlation Engines 70

data fusion 43-45, 193

data mining 72, 74, 78, 123, 148, 158-159, 166, 190, 229

data standards 148

Daubert test 210

DaVinci 72

decision support tool 72, 145, 155, 165, 167,169-170, 174, 253, 266

decontamination v-vii, ix, 5, 11, 16, 22-23, 25, 28-29, 36, 40, 48, 52, 81-86, 88, 91-92, 94-97, 120-121, 127, 131-132, 138-139, 157, 183, 208, 211, 215-216, 232-234,

239-240

Defense Advanced 39-41, 49, 65, 70, 90, 93, Research Projects 134, 147, 151, 168, 170, Agency (DARPA) 174, 182, 193, 203, 208,

219, 239, 250-251, 260, 265-266

Defense Collaborative Tool Suite 72, 74, 251

Defense Information Systems 193, 251, 266Agency (DISA)

Defense Logistics Agency 167, 251, 266

Defense Technology Objective 42

Defense Threat Reduction 39, 43-45, 47, 50, Agency (DTRA) 102, 115, 117, 251, 260

definitive decontamination 84, 120-121, 131

Dell 167

Department of xii, 1, 3-4, 6, 18, 23-26, Defense (DoD) 28, 32, 36, 39, 43-44,

46-48, 50-55, 57-60, 70, 76-78, 84, 87, 90, 93, 96,

104, 113-114, 123, 130, 133-134, 147, 157, 172-173,

181, 187, 193, 199, 205, 213-214, 244-245, 251,

259, 263, 265-266

Department of Defense Joint Medical 134Operations – Telemedicine Program

2 7 2


Appendix E

Department of Energy 33, 36, 151, 183, (DOE) 200, 213, 251, 260

Department of Health and 150, 212, 252, 260Human Services

Department of Homeland xi, 4-5, 13, 75, 102, Security 117, 123, 133,

155-156, 158, 182, 199, 212, 243, 245-246,

251, 259, 266-267

Department of Justice xi, 179, 259

Department of State 201, 260

Department of 87, 156, 251, 260Transportation

Detection, Identification, iii, v, ix, xi, xiv, 5-7,and Assessment (DIDA) 16, 21, 23, 31-34, 37,

39-42, 44, 46, 48-49, 51, 56, 61, 64, 81-83,

86-87, 95, 107, 121-125, 127-128, 131, 135, 141, 165, 174, 184, 208-209, 214, 218-219, 223, 233,

235, 251

Detector Arrays and 33-34, 38, 42, 47, 145Networks

Determined Promise 03 214

Diagnostic Assays 234

Digesters and Plasma viii, 232, 240-242Burners

Digital Area Thermography 49

digital fingerprinting 70, 181

Disaster Assistance Employees 133, 250(DAEs)

Disaster Management 193, 196, 203Integration Services (DMI-Services)

Disaster Medical Assistance 133, 251Teams (DMAT)

Disaster Mortuary Operational 92, 251Response Team (DMORT)

Disaster Relief and Emergency 125, 251Medical Service (DREAMS)

Disposing of CBRNE Devices 177, 183

distance learning 84, 103-105

DNA viii, 150, 151, 171, 176, 225, 228, 251

DoD Office of Technology Transition 84

Domestic Emergency Response 197-198, 251Information Service (DERIS)

Doppler 130

dosimeters 35, 37, 86

Drug Enforcement 180, 193, 251Administration (DEA)

Dry Decontamination 22, 131-132, 139

Dual GC 36

E9-1-1 65-66, 88

East Carolina University 134

Ebola 141

Eclipsys 145

Edgewood Chemical and 85, 132, 251Biological Center (ECBC)

E-learning 103

Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) 37, 113, 239, 251

Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) 202, 251

Electronic Surveillance System 44, 147, 251for the Early Notification of Community-based Epidemics (ESSENCE)

EMALL 167, 251

Emergency Broadcast System 88

Emergency Digital Information 184, 251System (EDIS)

Emergency Management 226, 251Assistance Compact (EMAC)

2 7 3


Index

Emergency Management iii, vi, xi, xiv, 91, 99, Preparation and Planning 101, 114, 118, 133, (EMPP) 173, 185-186, 251

Emergency Management 112XML Consortium

Emergency Medical Alert 201, 251Network (EMAN)

Emergency Medical 108, 120, 124-125, 144, Services 193, 212, 251, 260, 262

Emergency Notification 88-89, 251Systems (ENS)

Emergency Operations 99-101, 103, 108-113, Center (EOC) 115-118, 124-125, 197,

200, 212, 251

Emergency Regional 204, 251Response Systems (EMERRS)

Energy Systems Transformation 200Initiative

Enhanced Consequence 40-41, 147, 251Management Planning and Support System (ENCOMPASS)

Enhanced Fumigation viii, 234, 240Technology

Enteyosys 70

Environmental Monitoring 21, 38, 42, 47, 219

Environmental Protection 43, 83, 91, Agency (EPA) 251, 260

Environmental Protection 46Agency’s Office of Research and Development

Enzyme Based Devices 36

Enzyme-Linked Immunosorbent 218, 251Assay (ELISA)

Epidemiological Information 152, 211

Escape Mask 24-25, 29

Escape Respiratory Protection v, 11, 16, 23-25, 28-29

ESRI 197, 251

Establish Emergency 101, 110, 112Operations Center

Establishment of Perimeters 81-82, 86, 229

Evacuation/In-Place Shelter 81-82, 90, 93Management

evidence 91, 102, 156, 171, 178, 183, 207, 209-211, 213, 234

Exotic Newcastle Disease 234, 238, 251(END)

Expanded eXtensible Markup 102-103, 112Language/ xTensible Markup Language (EXML/XML)

Explosive and Incendiary Devices 33

Explosive Sniffing Robots 38

exposure vi-vii, 7-9, 18, 22, 28, 32-34, 38, 40, 43, 45,

48-49, 51-53, 58-59, 61, 75-76, 78-79, 95, 119-121,

123, 126, 129-130, 132-134, 141-145, 148-150,

152, 154, 159-161, 186, 218, 220, 227, 230, 235, 239

facial recognition 70, 178, 180-181, 208-209

Facilities Resource 109, 252Emergency Database (FRED)

Facilities/Infrastructure Hardening 101, 113

false negatives 36, 149, 151, 159, 186

false positives 36, 83, 149-151, 186, 219

FBI 104, 179-180, 190, 193, 195-196, 200, 208, 210,

221, 251, 259, 265

FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force 195

FBINET 180

Federal Biodefense Program 223

Federal Emergency 87, 89, 91, 102,Management Agency (FEMA) 104, 111,

113-114, 117, 133, 166, 169, 252, 259, 265

2 7 4


Appendix E

Federal Express 125, 156

Federal Urban Search and 89Rescue Task Forces

FEMA 87, 89, 91, 102, 104, 111, 113-114, 117, 133, 166, 169, 252, 259, 265

FEMA HAZUS-MH 117System

fiber optic 38, 182

field hospitals 107, 125-126, 155

Field Inventory Survey Tool 40, 252(FIST)

Field Screening and Assessment viii, 220, 235-236, 242

FIREBIRD 180

Flame Ionization Detector (FID) 36, 252

Flame Photometric Detector (FPD) 36, 252

fluid electrolyte cells 172

Food and Drug Administration 137, 260

Food Emergency Reporting 226, 252Network (FERN)

food irradiation vi, 92, 96, 239

Food Safety and Inspection 237, 252, 260Service (FSIS)

Food-borne Bacteria 233

forensic identification 171

Fort Detrick 126, 227, 231, 233

Fort Huachuca 182

Fourier Transform Infrared 38, 252Spectroscopy (FTIR)

Functioning in the Absence 81-82, 87of Critical Infrastructure and Restoration of Essential Public Services

fungi 120, 141, 151, 234

Future Force Warrior 18, 76

gamma rays 33, 36, 38-39, 42, 52-53

Gas Chromatography 36, 252Surface Acoustic Wave (GCSAW)

Geiger counters 22

gel cells 172

Genetic Assay 36

Genetically Modified Animals 228

Genetically Modified Organisms 228, 252(GMO)

GENOA 194

Genomic Test 160

genomic-based tests 150

genomics 8, 211, 219-220, 224, 229

Geographical Information 42, 45, 87, 93, 102, System (GIS) 106, 109, 117, 123,

192, 197, 204, 212, 223-224, 252

Gila Bend 182

GIS ArcView 192

Global Grid 77

Global Positioning System 252, 45, 66, 116, 118, 154, 171, 174,

185, 201

Global Response Incident 40, 252Planner (GRIP)

GlucoWatch 150

Google 199

Government Off-the-Shelf 43, 72, 252(GOTS)

Graphical User Interface 84, 95, 97, 135, 252(GUI)

GridWise 200-201

Ground Penetrating vi, 50, 89-90, 96, 252Radar (GPR)

Ground Penetrating Radar vi, 96-97for Specialized Search and Rescue

2 7 5


Index

half-life 119

Hazard Analysis Critical 229, 237, 252Control Points Program

Hazard Prediction and 45, 47, 252Assessment Capability (HPAC)

Hazardous Materials 210, 259Response Unit

HAZMAT 15-17, 19, 91, 103-104, 156, 185,

208, 233, 252, 260-261

Health Alert Network (HAN) 108, 147, 252

Health and Crisis Response 81-82, 88Education

Health Maintenance 129, 252Organizations (HMOs)

Health Privacy Regulations (HIPAA) 144

Health Resources and Services 108, 252Administration (HRSA)

Health Surveillance for Early vii, 158, Detection of Biological Agent 161-162Events

heating, ventilation, and air 90conditioning (HVAC) systems

HEPA filters 155

high energy particulate air 90(HEPA) filters

High Explosive/Incendiary 11, 16, 19, 34, 81-84, 86, 90, 92, 99, 101, 119, 121,

177, 207, 211

High Power Microwave (HPM) 178, 252

High Value Target Identification 101, 105, 113and Monitoring

High-Energy Radio Frequency 178, 186, 252(HERF)

Home Depot 169

Homeland Security Advanced 2, 252Research Projects Agency

Homeland Security Command 73, 78, and Control ACTD 205-206

hot zone 27, 35, 37, 48, 85-86, 89, 120, 131, 150, 156, 208-211

Houston Advanced Research 153, 252Council (HARC)

Human Identification from a 208Distance (HID)

Human Intelligence (HUMINT) 72, 202-203, 252

Hyperspectral Imaging 38

i2 167, 174

I3 Systems 74

Idaho National Engineering 50, 260Laboratory

Identification of Outbreak 216, 223-224Origins and Spread

Identifying, Locating, Disarming, 177-178and Seizing Perpetrator(s)

IEEE 802 68

Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) 202, 211, 253

Immune Buildings Program 90

Immunoassay 35-37, 151, 160

Improved Irradiation Methods viii, 234, 239-240, 242

Incident Action Planning 81-82, 93

Incident Command Information vi, 63-64,Management and Dissemination 71, 77-78,

80, 109

Incident Command Information 203, 253Tool (ICIT)

Incident Command Management 41, 253System (ICMS)

Incident Command System (ICS) 69, 99-100, 112, 125, 137,

166, 202, 221, 253

2 7 6


Appendix E

Incident Commander 9, 40-41, 57, 63-64, 72-73, 78, 83, 99-100,

105, 111, 117-118, 169-170, 186, 191,

202-203, 205, 238, 252

Indications and Warning v, 56, 190-191, 252(I&W)

Individual and Collective 120-121, 125, 154Protection of Health Care Personnel and Facilities

infectious 7-8, 119, 126-127, 133, 141, 148-149, 151, 153-155,

158-160, 183, 223-224, 229-230, 234, 257, 260

Information Assurance vi, 63-64, 67, 69, 71, 76-78

Information Sharing and 221-222, 253Analysis Centers (ISACs)

InfraGuard 193, 200, 221

Infrared imaging 178, 181-182

Initiating Crisis Management 177, 184Process

Institute for Soldier 18, 253Nanotechnology (ISN)

Integrated Logistics Information vii, 164-165, System (ILIS) 175-176

Integrated Networked Sensors v, 44, 48, for CBRNE Detection 56, 61, 77

Integrated Project Team 1

Integrated Remote Detection v, 40, 53, 61of CB Agents

Integrated Spatial Recognition 75

Integration Readiness Levels (IRL) 246

INTELINK 179

intelligence viii, 54, 72-73, 77, 102, 135, 138,177, 179-180, 182-183, 189-206, 211-212, 220-221, 224, 226, 236, 250-254, 256, 260, 263-264, 266-267

Intelligence Fusion Center 195, 202-203, 226, 253

Intelligence Preparation for 189-190, 194-196, Operations (IPO) 198-202, 253

Intelligence Preparation of 195-196, 253the Battlefield (IPB)

Intelligence Support to 189-190, 202Unified Incident Command Structure

Intelligence, Surveillance 177-178, 182, 253and Reconnaissance (ISR)

Intelligent Roadway and 174, 253Railway Information System

Intelligent Transportation System 88, 253

Interagency Board for 24, 194, 252, 259Equipment Standardization and Interoperability (IAB)

International Aerospace 201

International Classification 143-144, 252of Diseases (ICD – 9)

International Telecommunication 74Union and International Standards Organization

Internet Security Systems (ISS) 70, 253

interoperability iv, 2, 4, 24, 43, 63, 67-71, 74, 76-77, 94,

102, 104, 112, 115-118, 137, 148, 159-160, 166, 168-171, 191, 209, 244,

250, 255, 264

Intrusion Detection Systems 70, 253(IDS)

inventories viii, 166-167, 170, 175

Inventory Management 164, 170-171, 175

Ion Mobility Spectrometry 35-36, 253, 256(IMS)

iontophoresis 150-151

Iontrack 36

IR spectroscopy 150-151

2 7 7


Index

Iris recognition 70

Iris scans 208

irradiation vi, viii, 92, 96-97, 232-234, 239-240, 242

Irradiation and Gaseous vi, 96-97Decontamination for Mass Fatalities

isolation 120, 126-127, 142-143, 148, 152, 154-155, 157,

160, 208, 216-217, 229-230, 235

Isolation and Quarantine 142, 148, 154-155, 160, 230

Johns Hopkins University 126, 128

Joint Biological Remote Early 44, 253Warning System (JBREWS)

Joint Drug Intelligence Group 196

Joint Intelligence Center 202, 253

Joint Intelligence Support Element 202, 253

Joint Interoperability Test Command 74

Joint Medical Operation Telemedicine 134

Joint Project Office for CB Defense 44

Joint Regional Information 179-180, 253Exchange System (JRIES)

Joint Service Installation 44, 253Pilot Project (JSIPP)

Joint Services Lightweight 17, 253Integrated Suit

Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) 68, 253

Joint Theater Logistics 170, 175, 266

Joint Warfighting Science and xiiTechnology Plan

Joint Warning and Reporting 44, 253Network (JWARN)

just-in-time 167

Khobar Towers 33, 46

Laboratory Reporting Network 226, 254(LRN)

Land Warrior 18, 65, 76

Laser Diode Technology 39

Laser Induced Breakdown 36, 253Spectrometry (LIBS)

Laser Trace Explosives Detection 42

Law Enforcement Online (LEO) 71, 179-180, 190, 253

Law Enforcement Working 194, 253Group (LEWG)

Lawrence Livermore Laboratory 44, 65, 156

less-than-lethal 186-187

Less-Than-Lethal Safe Seizure 187of Perpetrators

LexisNexis 192

Life Support for Trauma and 157, 254Transport (LSTAT)

Light Detection and Ranging 39, 253(LIDAR)

Lightweight Epidemiology 40, 253and Advanced Detection, Emergency Response System (LEADERS)

Lightweight, Long-lived 88, 164, 171Power Sources

Lincoln Laboratory 36, 262

lithium 172

lockdown systems 126

Logistics Information vii, 109, 164-166, System 168-169, 175-176, 253

Logistics Support (LS) iii, vii, xi, xiv, 22, 111, 163-164, 175-176,

237, 254

Long Path Optical Sensor 36, 253System (LPOSS)

Long-Term Respiratory 11, 16, 19, 21-22, 24Protection

2 7 8


Appendix E

Los Alamos National 39, 45, 50, 128, Laboratory 153, 213, 219, 253

Los Angeles Clearinghouse 191

Los Angeles County Regional 198, 253Criminal Information Center (LACRCIC)

Management of Contaminated 207Suspects and Witnesses

Manugistics 167

Many-to-Many DNA Matching viii, 176of Body Parts

Marcus Emergency Operations Center 212

Maryland Institute of Trauma Studies 134

Mass Casualty Medical 108, 120-121, Care Management 123, 126, 145

Mass Euthanasia 228

Mass Fatality Management 81-82, 91

Mass Medical Prophylaxis 120-121, 124

Mass Prophylaxis vii, 136-137, 139Delivery System

Mass Prophylaxis Knowledge vii, 135-136, 139Base and Decision Aid

Mass Spectrometry 35-36, 249, 256

Mass Victim Decontamination 81-82, 84, 91

Matrix Assisted Laser 128, 254Desorption Ionization (MALDI)

Measures and Signature 202, 254Intelligence (MASINT)

Media Management and 177, 186Accommodation

Medical Response (MR) iii, vii, ix, xi, xiv, 7, 92, 119-121, 128-129,

135, 139, 163, 186, 212, 226, 233, 235, 254, 261

Medical Response to Public Affairs 120, 128

Medical Staff Surge, Re-Supply 120-121, 132and Proper Accreditation

medical waste 142-143, 158

Memorial Institute for the iii, xi, 254, 266Prevention of Terrorism

Metropolitan Medical 212, 261Response Team (MMRS)

microclimate cooling 17, 26

Microsoft Office 192

micro-weather effects 130

Military Traffic Management 174, 254Command

millimeter wave 39, 177-178, 181-182

Millimeter Wave Imaging 39, 177

MindTel 198, 203

Mission Rehearsal, Simulation, 100-101, 103, Embedded Training and Distance 125, 132Education

Mitigation and Restoration iii, viii-ix, xi, xiv, 7, for Plant and Animal 215-216, 219, 223, Resources (MRPA) 233-234, 242, 254

MITRE Corporation 184, 262, 264, 266

Mobility Spectrometry 35-36, 253, 256

Modeling & Simulation iv, vi, 3, 33-34, 45-46, 54, 57-59,

71-72, 77, 84, 122, 130, 135-136, 145, 152-153, 161, 207,

213, 254

Modeling of Exposure 142-143, 145, 152and Containment

Modeling of Exposure/ 120-121, 129, Casualties for Location 145, 152and Numbers

Modeling of Plant and viii, 230, 238Animal Outbreaks, Surveillance, and Response

Models for Re-Dissemination vii, 161-162and Contagion of Bio-Agents

Monkeypox 144

2 7 9


Index

morbidity 123, 127, 149, 153, 155, 157, 160, 254

Morbidity and Mortality 153, 155, 254Weekly Report

morgues 171

mortality 127, 153, 155, 157, 160, 254

Mortuary Affairs Management 164, 171

Multi-Agency Command 221, 254

Multilevel Security Systems 70, 199, 254(MLS)

Multimedia Supported vi, 63-64, 73, 78-80Telepresence

MultiSpectral Solutions, Inc. 66

Multi-Zonal Blowdown 50, 254Model (MBLM)

Munitions Effectiveness 50, 254Vulnerability Assessment (MEVA)

muons 39

Murrah Building 133

Mutual Assistance Agreements 225

NADDIS 180

Nanogen 150-151

Nanotechnology ix, 5, 18-19, 25-27, 253

Natick Army Research & 127Development Center

National Animal Health 222, 254Emergency Management Steering Committee (NAHEMS)

National Animal Health 226, 254Laboratory Network (NAHLN)

National Atmospheric Release 45, 254Advisory Center (NARAC)

National Disaster Medical System 107

National Drug Pointer Index 180, 254(NDPIX)

National Electronic Disease 147, 254Surveillance System (NEDSS)

National Fire Protection 104, 254Agency (NFPA)

National Geospatial-Intelligence 102, 254Agency (NGA)

National Guard 38, 74, 84, 104, 154-155, 196, 210, 260, 265

National Guard Civil Support 38, 210Teams (CST)

National Institute for 24, 254Occupational Safety & Health (NIOSH)

National Institute for Standards 50and Technology Fire Research Laboratory

National Institute for Urban 197Search and Rescue

National Institute of Allergy 8, 160and Infectious Disease

National Interagency Fire 204, 254Command Center (NIFCC)

National Laboratories 33, 39-40, 44-45, 50, 128, 132, 151, 153,

193, 200, 213, 219, 224, 226, 239, 253, 255, 260

National Libraries of Medicine 88

National Medical Response Plan 92

National Oceanic and 47, 130-131, Atmospheric Administration 236, 254(NOAA)

National Pharmaceutical Stockpile 157

National Plant Diagnostic 226Network (NPDN)

National Seed Health 219, 255System (NSHS)

National Terrorism Alerts 199

National Terrorism Response iii-v, ix, xi, 1, 4,Objectives (NTRO) 7, 9-12, 16, 22,

27, 31, 64, 81, 99-100, 112, 119-120,

141-142, 163, 177, 179, 187, 190, 207,

214-215, 226, 255

2 8 0


Appendix E

National Weather Service 48, 88

National Zoo Surveillance System 222(ZooNet)

Naval Air Systems Command 65

National Incident Management 93-94, 254System (NIMS)

Network Operating Center (NOC) 70, 255

Network Sensors for the Objective 43, 255Force (NSOF)

neutrons 19, 33, 36, 52-53

Non-Intrusive, Stand-off Inspection 33-34, 41

Non-Structured Information 192-194

Novel Decontamination - Research 138

novel electrochemistries 172

nuclear iii, v, xi, 1, 11, 15-16, 31, 33-41, 43-45, 52-53, 56-57,

63, 81-82, 85-88, 92, 99, 101-102, 106-107, 111, 113-114,

119, 121, 123, 128, 141, 177, 183, 207, 209, 211, 217, 250,

254-255, 257, 262-265, 267

Nuclear Emergency Response 183, 254Team (NEST)

Nuclear Regulatory 87-88, 255Commission (NRC)

Nuclear Weapons v, 33, 39-40, 43, 52-53, 57, 106-107,

257, 263, 265

Oak Ridge National Laboratory 132

Objective Force (U.S. Army) 43, 66, 172

Observables and Sensing for ix, 6Stand-off Inspection of Containers with Chemical or Biological Agents

Occupational Safety and Health 104, 255Administration (OSHA)

Office International des Epizooties 224, 255

Office of Emergency Management 93, 109, 255

Office of Law Enforcement 194, 255Standards (OLES)

Oklahoma City iii, xi, 33, 46, 130, 171, 200, 261, 267

Oklahoma Law Enforcement 200,255Telecommunications System (OLETS)

online learning 103

On-Scene Assessment for vi, 49, 59, 61Low-Dose Exposure to Chemical Agents

On-Scene Detection 5, 33-35, 37-38, 42

OnStar 174

Open Source Community Research 70

Open Source Database 192, 193

Open Source Information 179-180, 255System (OSIS)

OpenNET 180

Operating Systems Multi-Level 70, 255Security (OSMLS)

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 203, 255

Operational Security (OPSEC) 199, 255

Operational Test & 89-90, 246, 255Evaluation (OT&E)

optical motion detectors 181

Overhead Imaging for viii, 225, 230, Wide-Area Surveillance 236, 242and Assessment

Overseas Security Advisory 201, 255Council (OSAC)

Pacific Northwest National 193, 200, 255Laboratory (PNNL)

Palmtop Emergency Access 73, 255for Chemicals (PEAC)

Pan-American Health Organization 146

pandemic 141

2 8 1


Index

Partnership for Public 88, 255, 264, 267Warning (PPW)

Patient privacy 137, 159

Peer-to-Peer Collaboration 192

Pentagon 24, 67, 267

perimeter 47, 65, 81-82, 86-87, 93, 106, 116, 119, 177-178,

181, 185-186, 229

Perimeter Security 177-178, 181, 185, 229

perpetrator viii, 60, 177-182, 186-187, 196, 207, 212, 219

Personal Digital 37, 40, 61, 84, 95, Assistant (PDA) 135, 137, 153, 171, 255

Personal Protection and iii, v, ix, xi, xiv, 5,Equipment (PPE) 11, 15-16, 24, 29, 255

pharmaceutical stockpiles 122, 157

Physical Security Systems 70

Picatinny Arsenal (U.S. Army) 178

Plant and Animal Responders’ viii, 220, Decision Aid 234-235, 242

Plant Biosecurity 227

Plant Crop Disposal 231

plant vaccination 228

Playbook Manager 40

playbooks 195-196

Plum Island, NY USDA Center 218

plume modeling 45, 86, 91, 102, 130, 197, 213

plumes v, 32, 38-39, 45, 53-54, 58-59, 73, 86, 91, 102,

130, 197, 213, 233

Point Location and vi, 5, 7, 48, 52, Identification 63-64, 75-77, 80, 173

Polychromator Chip 36

Polymerase Chain Reaction 35-37, 218, (PCR) 220, 255

portable fuel cells 172

Portable, Stand-off v, 42, 54, 61Container Inspection

Post-Incident Forensic 207, 213Modeling and Simulation

Preferred Provider 129, 255Organizations (PPOs)

Presidential Decision Directive 63, 193

Pre-Triage/Differentiation 33-34, 40, Among Levels of Exposure 48, 58, 95

prevention iii, xi, 31, 33, 167, 250, 254, 260, 266-267

prions 220, 231

Programmed Logic 107, 255Controllers (PLC)

Project Guardian 44

Project Responder iii, xi-xii, 1, 9-11, 122, 141, 146, 202, 215, 217,

229, 243, 266-267

prophylaxis v, vii, 51, 120-124, 135-137, 139, 143,

150, 152, 215

Protective Coatings for vi, 95, 97Critical Equipment

Public Health Readiness iii, vii, ix, xi, xiv, for Biological Agent 7, 119, 141-143, Events (PHRBAE) 145, 147, 149,

157-158, 162, 255

Public Health Service 109, 116

Public Key Infrastructure 70, 108, 119, (PKI) 141, 255, 266

Public Relations and 81-82, 94Media Management

Public Safety Wireless 68-69Network Program

Public/Private Partnerships xii, 222

pyrolysis 35

2 8 2


Appendix E

quarantine 32, 91, 107, 142-143, 148, 152, 154-155, 160-161, 186, 208, 216-217, 229, 230

Quarantine, Isolation 216-217, 229and Recall

radar motion detectors 181

radiacs 22

Radiation Emergency 132-255Assistance Center/Training Site (REACT/S)

Radio Frequency Identification 65, 168, 255(RFID)

radio frequency tags 125, 166

radiological iii, v, xi, 1, 11, 15-17, 19, 31-36, 38-39, 41, 52, 56-57, 81-83, 86,

92, 96, 99, 101-102, 113, 117, 119, 121, 123, 127, 129, 131-132, 152, 177, 179, 182-183, 207-208,

211-212, 231, 250, 254-255, 265

radiological Agents 15, 32, 123, 132, 152, 179, 212, 231

Raman Spectroscopy 36

Rapid and Humane 216-217, 230Euthanasia and Disposal of Contaminated Carcasses, Plants and Food Products

Rapid Assessment of Structural 33-34, 49Integrity/Other Risks

Rapid Decontamination of 5, 81, 82, 84, 91High Value and Critical Response Equipment

Rapid Diagnostics 127, 145, 215-219, 230

Rapid Diagnostics and 145, 215, 217, 219Detection to Confirm the Introduction of CBR Agents to Animals, Plants, and Food/Feed

Rapid High-Throughput 161, 256Clinical Assessment and Testing System (RHTCAT)

Rapid Responder 196

Rapid, Clinical, Environmental 120, 121-122, and Veterinary Field Assessment 127, 217

Rapid, High-Throughput vii, 122, 142-143, Clinical Assessment and 145, 148, 159-162, Testing 217, 256

Ray Neutron Activation Analysis 42

Real-Time Structural Stress vi, 51, 60-61Measurement

Regional Information Sharing 179-180, 256System Network (RISSNET)

Regional Purchasing Arrangements xii

Remote and Stand-off Detection 33-34, 37-38

Remote Detection of Deception/Intent 51

Remote Surveillance Support 89, 255System (R3S)

Residual Hazards Assessment 5, 81-82, 9and Mitigation 1

respiratory protection v, 11, 16, 19, 21-29, 126

Response and Recovery iii, vi, ix, xi, xiv, 5, (R&R) 23, 57, 81-82, 94, 97,

99, 132, 163, 233, 255

Response Information 184, 256Management System (RIMS)

Response Technology iv, 1, 4, 9-13, 24, Objectives (RTO) 34, 51, 54, 75, 94,

114-115, 135-136, 138, 156, 158, 160-161, 175,

186, 205-206, 214, 234-235, 237

Reverse 911 Systems 129

Risk Awareness and vi, 100-101, Assessment 109-110, 115, 118

RISS-ATIX 190, 256

Roche 150

2 8 3


Index

Rome Laboratory 178

rules-based medicine 150

Safe Handling of Medical Waste 142-143, 158

SAFECOMM 69, 76-77

SAIC 197, 256, 263, 266

Salmonella 142

Sandia National Laboratory 39-40, 128, 213, 224, 260

SARS 128, 141, 144, 150, 152, 154-155, 256

Seamless Connectivity and vi, 76Information Assurance

Seamless Connectivity and 63-64, 67Integration

Second Line of Defense 39, 256

Secure ID 70

Secure Internet Protocol Router 256Network (SIPRINET)

security clearances 131

Self-Accreditation 218

Self-Contained Breathing v, 6, 21, 24, Apparatus (SCBA) 27, 256

Semiconducting Metal 36, 256Oxides (SMO)

September 11th 112, 243 67, 173, 192-193, 198-199,

203, 210, 267

Sequenom 150

Severe Acute Respiratory 128, 141, 144, 150,Syndrome (SARS) 152, 154-155, 256

Shadow Bowl 198

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) 202, 256

Single Integrated Ground 74, 174, 256Picture (SIGP)

Single Integrated Picture 201, 256

Situation Management and 201, 256Awareness in Real Time (SMART)

Smallpox 123, 133, 141

smart cards vii, 36, 48, 105, 115-116, 118, 132-133,

185, 266

Smart Healthcare Management System 43

smart sensor networks 123

Smart SensorWeb 43

Sodium Iodide Detectors 36

Software Communications 68, 256Architecture

solar cells 172

Sony 169

Specialized Search and Rescue 81-82, 89Capabilities

spiral development iv, xiv, 2, 57, 69, 73, 76-77, 205, 243, 245

standardization vii, 24, 68, 93, 102, 112, 116, 133, 148, 163,

171-172, 217, 219, 223, 244, 259, 264

Standardization Committee 112of the Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS)

standards iv, vii, xiii, 2, 17, 19-21, 41, 50, 63, 68-69, 72-74, 76-77, 79-80, 84, 88-90,

94, 101-105, 108, 112-114, 116, 125-126, 147-148, 156-160, 163, 194, 197,

210, 223, 245, 249, 254-255, 260, 263-265

Stand-off Automatic Choke vi, 51, 60Point Screener

Stand-off Radiation ID 39, 52, 61

Starlight 193-194

2 8 4


Appendix E

State Animal Response 225-226, 256Teams (SART)

Statewide Anti-Terrorism 196, 256Unified Response Network (SATURN)

Steve Wozniak 66

Strategic Research iv, ix, xiv, 3, 5, 7-8, Area (SRA) 25, 27, 90, 95, 128,

151, 159-160, 220, 235, 243, 256

Supervisory Control 107, 256and Data Acquisition Systems (SCADA)

supply chain management 167

supply depots 164, 171, 174

Sure-Beam 92

Surface Science ix, 5

Surveillance & Information 108-109, 122, Integration Systems 142-143, 149,

217, 221

Surveillance and Reconnaissance 202, 256Center (SARC)

Synchronous Optical 77-78, 256Network (SONET)

syndromic information 158, 212

syndromic surveillance system 145, 200, 212, 251, 256

Synthetic Ligands 36

Tactical Decision Making 144, 256Under Stress (TADMUS)

Tactical Threat Assessment 177-178, 181

target folders 110, 195-196, 198

Technical Search and 49, 257Rescue (TSR)

Technical Support Working xii, 24, 36, 42, Group (TSWG) 73-75, 132, 257, 259

Technology Readiness 4, 245-246, 257Levels (TRL)

TECS II 180

telemedicine vii, 49, 120, 121, 133-135, 138-139, 226

Telemedicine Advanced 134Concepts Technology Demonstration

Telemedicine in Support of Surge 120-121, 133

Telemedicine Test Bed vii, 135, 138-139

Terminal Access Control and 70Authorization Systems (TACAS)

Terrorism Early Warning 195-196, 200, 212, Group (TEW) 226, 256, 261, 267

Test & Evaluation (T&E) 27-28, 57, 90, 159,246, 256

third party logistics 167, 170, 249providers (3PL)

third wave technology invader systems 151

Thomas Brothers maps 192

Threat Analysis Critical Control viii, 229-230, Points Program (TACCP) 237-238

Threat Analysis Critical Control viii, 230, Points Program for the Food Chain 237

Threat Assessment 177-179, 181, 189-190, 196

Threat Assessment/Data 189-190Collection/Analysis

Threat Relevant Data Distribution 189-190

Three Mile Island 88

Time Domain Corp 66

Tissue Based Sensors 36

Top Secret Sensitive Compartmentalized 257Information (TS/SCI)

Toxic Industrial Chemicals 16, 32, 38, 46, 54, (TIC) 59, 61, 82-83,

214, 256

2 8 5


Index

Toxic Industrial 82-83, 214, 256Materials (TIM)

Trace-back viii, 210, 223, 224-225, 235-238, 242

Trace-back Capabilities Using viii, 225, 236Information Systems and Tags

tracking vi, viii, 38, 42, 44-46, 57-59, 65-66, 71-73, 75,

77, 80, 83-84, 96-97, 109, 116-117, 122-123, 143-144, 146, 165-169, 171, 175-176,

178, 191, 209, 219, 222, 224-225, 236, 257

traffic management 44, 81-82, 92-93, 163, 174, 254

Transdermal IR chromoscopy 151

Transdermal IR spectroscopy 150

Transport of Contagious Patients 142-143, 156

Transportation Command 174, 256(TRANSCOM)

Transportation Optimization 164, 167, 173

Trump Marina Casino 209

Tulsa Area Syndromic Surveillance 200, 256System (TASSS)

U.S. Army Edgewood Arsenal 23, 233

U.S. Army Land Warrior Program 18, 65, 76

U.S. Army Medical Research 183, 257, 260Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID)

U.S. Army Night Vision UWB Prototype 75

U.S. Army NVESD 65

U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) 193

U.S. Department of 88, 218, 226, Agriculture (USDA) 229-230, 234, 2

37-238, 257

U.S. Immigration and 178, 193178, 193Customs Enforcement

U.S. Navy Space and Naval 93, 256Warfare Systems Command

U.S. Northern Command 214

Ultra Wideband (UWB) ix, 7, 9, 65-66, 75, 90, 168, 257

Ultra Wideband Communications ix, 7, 90

Ultraviolet Sensing 38

Unattended Ground 43, 106, Sensors (UGS) 185, 191, 257

Unconventional Nuclear 39, 43, 257Weapons Defense (UNWD)

Unified Incident Command iii, vi, ix, xi, xiv, Decision Support and 5, 7, 9, 22, Interoperable Communications 63-65, 67, 69, (UIC) 71-73, 75,77, 79,

80, 84, 93-94, 99, 112, 189-190, 202, 205, 257

United States Marine 170, 203, 257, 260, 264Corps (USMC)

Universal Serial Bus (USB) 43

University of Pittsburgh 155, 262

University of Texas at Tyler 126, 262

University of Texas Medical Branch 134, 262

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) 78, 182, 257

Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV) 257

UPS 167, 173, 257

urban canyon effects 130

Urban Search and Rescue 49, 81, 89-90, 96, (USAR) 169, 197, 257,

259, 261

USS COLE 46

Vaccination Ring Strategies 228

Vaccination/Treatment 216, 227and Protection

vaccines xii, 120, 123, 136, 141, 159, 215, 217, 227-229

2 8 6


Appendix E

Vapor, Liquid, and Solid 46, 257Tracking (VLSTRACK)

Veterinary Medical Assistance 226, 257Teams (VMAT)

Video teleconferencing 72, 74, 197, 257(VTC)

Virtual Clinician 135, 138-139

virulence 37, 141, 152-154

viruses 32, 120, 141, 151, 240

voice print analysis 178

Wal-Mart 146, 167, 169, 219

War Room 191-192

warm zone 82, 84-86, 208-209, 211

Wearable Integrated v, 37, 52, 61CBR Sensors

weather, enemy and 195, 257terrain (WET)

web-based learning 103

West Nile Virus 146, 152, 222, 228-230

Wide-Area Tracking System 44, 257

World Health Organization 146, 224, 257(WHO)

World Trade Center 50, 72, 129, 133, 171, 267

zoonotic 152, 215, 222, 227

2 8 7


Index

2 8 8


Appendix E

Project Respoder: N

ation

al Tch

no

logy Plan

o

r Em

rgn

cy Rspo

ns

to C

atastroph

ic Trro

rismA

pril 2004

Project Responder National Technology Plan - Illinois Fire Service

Documents

Transcript of Project Responder National Technology Plan - Illinois Fire Service