Title:HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. vs SECRETARY MICHAEL DEFENSORCitation:G.R. No. 163980 August 3, 2006Ponente:TINGA, J.:

Facts: A number of presidential issuances prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9207, authorized the creation and development of what is now known as the National Government Center (NGC).On March 5, 1972, former President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1826, reserving a parcel of land in Constitution Hills, Quezon City, covering a little over 440 hectares as a national government site to be known as the NGC. On August 11, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 137, excluding 150 of the 440 hectares of the reserved site from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826 and authorizing instead the disposition of the excluded portion by direct sale to the bona fide residents therein. In view of the rapid increase in population density in the portion excluded by Proclamation No. 137 from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826, former President Fidel Ramos issued Proclamation No. 248 on September 7, 1993, authorizing the vertical development of the excluded portion to maximize the number of families who can effectively become beneficiaries of the governments socialized housing program. On May 14, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9207. Petitioner Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association) is a homeowners association from the West Side of the NGC. It is represented by its president, Nestorio F. Apolinario, Jr., who is a co-petitioner in his own personal capacity and on behalf of the association. The instant petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, seeks to prevent respondents from enforcing the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9207, otherwise known as the "National Government Center (NGC) Housing and Land Utilization Act of 2003."

Issue:Whether or not in issuing the questioned IRR of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee was not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function and should be declared null and void for being arbitrary, capricious and whimsical.Held:Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle, however, applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power.The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the Committee expressly authorized by R.A. No. 9207. The petition rests mainly on the theory that the assailed IRR issued by the Committee is invalid on the ground that it is not germane to the object and purpose of the statute it seeks to implement. Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assailed IRR issued by the Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the judicial course to assail its validity must follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.

Matuguina Integrated Wood Products Inc. vs Court of AppealsIn 1973, license was issued to Milagros Matuguina to operate logging businesses under her group Matuguina Logging Enterprises. MIWPI was established in 1974 with 7 stockholders. Milagros Matuguina became the majority stockholder later on. Milagros later petitioned to have MLE be transferred to MIWPI. Pending approval of MLEs petition, Davao Enterprises Corporation filed a complaint against MLE before the District Forester (Davao) alleging that MLE has encroached upon the area allotted for DAVENCORs timber concession. The Investigating Committee found MLE guilty as charged and had recommended the Director to declare that MLE has done so. MLE appealed the case to the Ministry of Natural Resources. During pendency, Milagrosa withdrew her shares from MIWPI. Later, MNR Minister Ernesto Maceda found MLE guilty as charged. Pursuant to the finding, DAVENCOR and Philip Co requested Maceda to order MLE and/or MIWPI to comply with the ruling to pay the value in pesos of 2352.04 m3worth of timbers. The Minister then issued a writ of execution against MIWPI. MIWPI filed a petition for prohibition before the Davao RTC. The RTC ruled in favor of MIWPI and has ordered to enjoin the Minister from pursuing the execution of the writ. DAVENCOR appealed and the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC. MIWPI averred that it is not a party to the original case (as it was MLE that was sued a separate entity). That the issuance of the order of execution by the Minister has been made not only without or in excess of his authority but that the same was issued patently without any factual or legal basis, hence, a gross violation of MIWPIs constitutional rights under the due process clause.ISSUE:Whether or not MIWPIs right to due process has been violated.HELD:The SC ruled in favor of MIWPI. Generally accepted is the principle that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case not bound by judgment rendered by the court. In the same manner an execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court. There is no basis for the issuance of the Order of Execution against the MIWPI. The same was issued without giving MIWPI an opportunity to defend itself and oppose the request of DAVENCOR for the issuance of a writ of execution against it. In fact, it does not appear that MIWPI was at all furnished with a copy of DAVENCORs letter requesting for the Execution of the Ministers decision against it. MIWPI was suddenly made liable upon the order of execution by the respondent Secretarys expedient conclusions that MLE and MIWPI are one and the same, apparently on the basis merely of DAVENCORs letter requesting for the Order, and without hearing or impleading MIWPI. Until the issuance of the Order of execution, MIWPI was not included or mentioned in the proceedings as having any participation in the encroachment in DAVENCORs timber concession. This action of the Minister disregards the most basic tenets of due process and elementary fairness. The liberal atmosphere which pervades the procedure in administrative proceedings does not empower the presiding officer to make conclusions of fact before hearing all the parties concerned. (1996 Oct 24)

Tan v. COMELECG.R. No. 73155, July 11, 1986

NOTA BENE: This case is relevant to the current buzz regarding the "Sugbuak." The issue in this case, however, is a bit on the technical side.

- when the boundaries of a LGU is substantially altered, there are necessarily more than one unit affected -- the parent LGU and the new LGU that was created as a result of the alteration

FACTS:

This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, effective Dec. 3, 1985. (Cities of Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto.

Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for January 3, 1986. Petitioners opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and contending that the B.P. 885 is unconstitutional and not in complete accord with the Local Government Code because:

(1) The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within the territory of the new province of Negros del Norte, were not included in the plebiscite(2) The area which would comprise the new provinc of Negros del Norte would only be about 2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute

The Supreme Court was in recess at the time so the petition was not timely considered. Consequently, petitioners filed a supplemental pleading on January 4, 1986, after the plebiscite sought to be restrained was held the previous day, January 3.

ISSUE:

W/N the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites under Article XI, Sec. 3 of the Consititution, which states that --

"Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected."

HELD:

In interpreting the above provision, the Supreme Court held that whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries, "the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected" must first be obtained.

The creation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the division and alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental.

"Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte."

The Supreme Court further held that the case of Governor Zosimo Paredes versus the Honorable Executive Secretary to the President, et al., G.R. No. 55628, March 2, 1984 (128 SCRA 6), which the respondents used to support their case, should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent. Rather, it held that the dissenting view of Justice Vicente Abad Santos in the aforementioned case is the forerunner of the applicable ruling, quoting that:

"...when the Constitution speaks of "the unit or units affected" it means all of the people of the municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger. I see no ambiguity in the Constitutional provision."

It appeared that when Parliamentary Bill NO. 3644 which proposed the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte was passed for approval, it recited therein that "the plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas affected within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the approval of this Act." However, when the bill was enacted into B.P. 885, tehre was an unexplained change from "areas affecte" to "the proposed new province, which are the areas affected." The Supreme Court held that it was a self-serving phrase to state that the new province constitutes the area affected.

"Such additional statement serves no useful purpose for the same is misleading, erroneous, and far from truth. The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the petitioners."

Consequently, the Supreme Court pronounced that the plebscite held on January 3, 1986 has no legal effect for being a patent nullity."WHEREFORE, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is hereby declared unconstitutional. The proclamation of the new province of Negros del Norte, as well as the appointment of the officials thereof are also declared null and void.SO ORDERED."

UY KIAO ENG vs. NIXON LEE G.R.No. 176831 January 15, 2010 Nachura, J.:Facts:Respondent Nixon Lee filed a petition for mandamus with damages against his mother Uy Kiao Eng, herein petitioner, before the RTC of Manila to compel petitioner to produce the holographic will of his father so that probate proceedings for the allowance thereof could be instituted. Respondent had already requested his mother to settle and liquidate the patriarchs estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so without any justifiable reason. Petitioner denied that she was in custody of the original holographic will and that she knew of its whereabouts. The RTC heard the case. After the presentation and formal offer of respondents evidence, petitioner demurred, contending that her son failed to prove that she had in her custody the original holographic will. The RTC, at first, denied the demurrer to evidence. However, it granted the same on petitioners motion for reconsideration. Respondents motion for reconsideration of this latter order was denied. Hence, the petition was dismissed. Aggrieved, respondent sought review from the appellate court. The CA initially denied the appeal for lack of merit. Respondent moved for reconsideration. The appellate court granted the motion, set aside its earlier ruling, issued the writ, and ordered the production of the will and the payment of attorneys fees. It ruled this time that respondent was able to show by testimonial evidence that his mother had in her possession the holographic will. Dissatisfied with this turn of events, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The appellate court denied this motion. Left with no other recourse, petitioner brought the matter before this Court, contending in the main that the petition for mandamus is not the proper remedy and that the testimonial evidence used by the appellate court as basis for its ruling is inadmissible.

Issue:Whether or not mandamus is the proper remedy of the respondent.

Held:The Court cannot sustain the CAs issuance of the writ.

Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from operation of law. This definition recognizes the public character of the remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no interest. The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the performance of a public duty, most especially when the public right involved is mandated by the Constitution. As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station.

The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt exists, although objection raising a mere technical question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the case is meritorious. As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board, or person against whom the action is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer, board, or person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled. On the part of the relator, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of respondent to perform the act required.

Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot be used to enforce contractual obligations. Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private contract rights, and will not lie against an individual unless some obligation in the nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed. The writ is not appropriate to enforce a private right against an individual.] The writ of mandamus lies to enforce the execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice would be obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases relating to the public and to the government; hence, it is called a prerogative writ. To preserve its prerogative character, mandamus is not used for the redress of private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the public.

Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there should be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy of mandamus being invoked. In other words, mandamus can be issued only in cases where the usual modes of procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to afford relief. Although classified as a legal remedy, mandamus is equitable in its nature and its issuance is generally controlled by equitable principles. Indeed, the grant of the writ of mandamus lies in the sound discretion of the court.

In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation involved herethe production of the original holographic willis in the nature of a public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production of the original for purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not prevent him from instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same is in his possession or not.

There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the production of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice it to state that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition. Thus, the Court grants the demurrer.