Progress meeting EISS5 CIEMAT: SL 53-2 & 53-4aTasks Organisation and QA Task SL53.2: Safety...

download Progress meeting EISS5 CIEMAT: SL 53-2 & 53-4aTasks Organisation and QA Task SL53.2: Safety Important Components (SIC) Task SL53.2: Safety operational.

If you can't read please download the document

Transcript of Progress meeting EISS5 CIEMAT: SL 53-2 & 53-4aTasks Organisation and QA Task SL53.2: Safety...

  • Slide 1
  • Progress meeting EISS5 CIEMAT: SL 53-2 & 53-4aTasks Organisation and QA Task SL53.2: Safety Important Components (SIC) Task SL53.2: Safety operational limits Task SL53.4a: Outline of the description of the maintenance programme
  • Slide 2
  • Progress meeting EISS5 CIEMAT: SL 53-2 & 53-4aTasks Organisation and QA CIEMAT CO-ORDINATES, REVIEW DRAFTS, AND ACCEPTS REPORTS PRIOR TO SUBMITTAL Project co-ordinator: Beatriz Braas, assisted by Pablo Zuloaga Support by Safety Department: Caridad Roldn, Paloma Daz-Arocas PUBLIC CALL FOR BIDS: Spec with all Project and QA requirements Commented by EFDA, ITER-France before consultation Public consultation published in Official Journal (BOE) Assigned to IBERTEF Task 53.8 (Hot cell functions during decommissioning) not yet launched, pending on design approval).
  • Slide 3
  • Progress meeting EISS5 CIEMAT: SL 53-2 & 53-4a Tasks Organisation and QA IBERTEF (Empresarios Agrupados - Sener) QA manual Three task groups with specific task leaders: SL53.2 SICXavier Jardi SL53.2 OLCJ A Carretero SL53.4a ODMPOlga Asuar IBERTEF produces draft reports sent to CIEMAT for review, and reports including CIEMAT comments CIEMAT keeps responsibility and presents reports to EFDA ITER
  • Slide 4
  • Task SL53.2: Safety Important Components (SIC)
  • Slide 5
  • 5 Task Objectives: For RPrS Definition of criteria for the safety classification of ITER systems and components As a function of the above criteria, preparation of a list of safety- important systems and components (SIC), including: Type of component (isolation valve, cryopump, etc) Safety function of the component How the component performs its safety function Seismic classification
  • Slide 6
  • 6 Task Objectives: For support document Identification of applicable codes and standards Demonstration that the list of systems and components classified as SIC is complete by cross-checking it with the normal, incidental and accidental situations
  • Slide 7
  • 7 Level of Completion Objetive% Definition of criteria for the safety classification of ITER systems and components 100% List of systems and components with SIC classification80% Codes and standards70% Cross-checking of the list10%
  • Slide 8
  • 8 SIC Classification Criteria SIC structures, systems and components are those relied upon to remain functional during and following the reference events to ensure: Confinement safety function, including the ancillary safety functions protecting it, and Personnel protection by limitation of exposure to radiation of workers and environment
  • Slide 9
  • 9 Seismic Classification Criteria Three seismic categories will be considered: ITER structures that must remain integral and systems and components (including their foundations and supports) that must remain functional or retain their confinement barriers in the event of a SL-2 earthquake are designated Seismic Category I (SCI). Structures, systems and components that perform no safety function, but whose structural failure or interaction could degrade the functioning of a Seismic Category I item to an unacceptable level of safety are designated Seismic Category II (SCII). These items are designed to structurally withstand the effects of a SL-2. Structures, systems and components that are not categorized as Seismic Category I or II are designated no Seismic Category (NSC).
  • Slide 10
  • 10 Systems classified (1/2): WBSSystemSIC 1.1Toroidal Field (TF) Coils SystemsSIC 1.2Poloidal Fiel (PF) Coils SystemsSIC 1.3Central Solenoid System (CS)SIC 1.5Vacuum VesselSIC 1.6Blanketnon SIC 1.7Divertornon SIC 1.8Fuelling and Wall ConditioningSIC 1.9Plasmanon SIC 2.3Remote Handling EquipmentSIC 2.4CryostatSIC 2.6Cooling Water SystemsSIC 2.7Thermal Shieldsnon SIC 3.1Vacuum Pumping and Leak Detection SystemsSIC 3.2Tritium PlantSIC 3.4Cryoplant and CryodistributionSIC
  • Slide 11
  • 11 Systems classified (2/2): WBSSystemSIC 4.1Coil Power SuppliesSIC 4.2Heating and Current Drive Power Suppliesnon SIC 4.3Steady State Electrical Power NetworkSIC 4.5Supervisory Control Systemnon SIC 4.6Interlock SystemSIC 4.7Poloidal Field Controlnon SIC 5.1Ion Cyclotron H&CDSIC 5.2Electron Cyclotron H&CDSIC 5.3Neutral Beam H&CDSIC 5.4Lower Hybrid H&CDSIC 5.5DiagnosticsSIC 5.6Test BlanketsSIC
  • Slide 12
  • 12 Systems to be classified: WBSSystemSIC 6.2BuildingsSIC 6.3Hot Cell Processing and Waste TreatmentSIC 6.4Radiological ProtectionSIC 6.5LiquidSIC 6.6Gas DistributionSIC 6.7Plant Sampling SystemsSIC
  • Slide 13
  • 13 Task sample for RPrS : WBS 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 SIC CLASSIFICATION SUMMARY Main Components SIC Classific ation Safety FunctionSafety Requirements Seismic Classificati on WBS 1.1: TOROIDAL FIELD (TF) COILS SYSTEM 1. TF coilsnon SIC--NSC 2. Feeders through the cryostatSICConfinementConfinement function with cryostatSCI (S) 3. Other auxiliary systemsnon SIC--NSC 4. Magnet gravity supportsSIC--SCI (S) 5. Other mechanical structuresnon SIC--NSC WBS 1.2: POLOIDAL FIELD (PF) COILS SYSTEM 1.PF Coilsnon SIC --NSC 2. Feeders through the cryostatSICConfinementConfinement function with cryostatSCI (S) 3. Other auxiliary systemsnon SIC--NSC 4. Correction coilsnon SIC--NSC WBS 1.3: CENTRAL SOLENOID SYSTEM (CS) 1.Central solenoidnon SIC --NSC 2. Feeders through the cryostatSICConfinementConfinement function with cryostatSCI (S) 3. Other auxiliary systemsnon SIC--NSC
  • Slide 14
  • 14 Task sample for RPrS : WBS 2.6 (1/2) SIC CLASSIFICATION SUMMARY Main Components SIC Classifi cation Safety Function Safety Requirements Seismic Classifica tion WBS 2.6: COOLING WATER SYSTEMS 4. Vacuum vessel primary heat transfer system (PHTS) 4.1 Circulating pumpSICConfinement Confinement of HTS source terms. Provide heat removal by natural circulation under accident SCI (S) 4.2 Water-Air Heat Exchangers (3 per loop)SICConfinement Confinement of HTS source terms. Provide heat removal by natural circulation under accident SCI (S) 4.3 Electtrical HeaterSICConfinementConfinement of HTS source terms.SCI (S) 4.4 Pneumatic PressurizerSICConfinement Confinement of HTS source terms. Provide heat removal by natural circulation under accident SCI (S) 4.5 Isolation ValvesSICConfinement Confinement of HTS source terms. Provide heat removal by natural circulation under accident SCI (SF) 4.6 Control valvesSICConfinement Confinement of HTS source terms. Provide heat removal by natural circulation under accident SCI (SF) 4.7 Piping and associated valvesSICConfinement Confinement of HTS source terms. Provide heat removal by natural circulation under accident SCI (S) 4.8 FilterSICConfinementConfinement of HTS source termsSCI (S) 4.9 Relief valvesSICConfinement Confinement of HTS source terms. Provide heat removal by natural circulation under accident SCI (S) 4.10 Pressure relief tankSICConfinementConfinement of HTS source termsSCI (S) 4.11 Drainage tankSICConfinementConfinement of in-vessel source terms and hydrogenSCI (S) 4.12 Drain sump tankSICConfinementConfinement of HTS source termsSCI (S)
  • Slide 15
  • 15 Task sample for RPrS : WBS 2.6 (2/2) SIC CLASSIFICATION SUMMARY Main Components SIC Classifi cation Safety Function Safety Requirements Seismic Classifica tion WBS 2.6: COOLING WATER SYSTEMS 4.13 Sump pumpSICConfinementConfinement of HTS source termsSCI (S) 4.14 Drain coolerSICConfinementPrevent coolant lossSCI (S) 4.15 Isolation valves from/to HXsSICConfinementPrevent coolant lossSCI (SF) 4.16 Isolation valves to N-VDSSICConfinement Confinement of HTS source terms. Provide heat removal by natural circulation under accident SCI (SF) 4.17 Isolation valves to associated CCWSSICConfinement Confinement of HTS source terms. Provide heat removal by natural circulation under accident SCI (SF) 4.18 Associated loops of Draining & Refilling System SICConfinementConfinement of HTS source termsSCI (S) 4.19 Helium Supply Systemnon SIC 4.20 Isolation valves to Helium Suply SystemSICConfinementConfinement of HTS source termsSCI (SF) 4.21 Associated loops of Drying SystemSICConfinementConfinement of HTS source termsSCI (S) 4.22 Isolation valves (Evacuation Unit)SICConfinement Confinement of HTS source terms. Provide heat removal by natural circulation under accident SCI (SF)
  • Slide 16
  • 16 SIC Classification Summary (sample)
  • Slide 17
  • 17 Sample of cross-checking:
  • Slide 18
  • 18 Task SL53.2: Safety operational limits
  • Slide 19
  • 19 OLCs are a set of operating rules that include safety limits, safety system settings and operational limits on equipment and conditions on inventories, surveillance and administrative requirements. Introduction (1/2) Objectives: To ensure safe operation and protection of site personnel, the public and the environment from radiological hazards To guarantee the required operation flexibility Most of the limits are controlled automatically, such as for pressure or concentration. Others (such as inventories) are controlled through administrative procedures.
  • Slide 20
  • 20 Introduction (2/2) LC: limites de conduite LF: limites de fonctionnement LS: limites de sret LD: limites de dimensionnement OLC classification in France: OLC interrelationship
  • Slide 21
  • 21 Task Objectives: (1/2) OLCs updating Review of previous study of operational domain (Definition of Authorized Operational Domain for ITER licensing, final report of task EFDA 93/851-JA (2005)) Review and updating of OLCs based on current project documents: PSR, GSSR, DRG1, DRG2, PID, DDDs Incorporating of OLCs resulting of new experiments: TBM (Test Blanket Module), NBI (Neutral Beam Injection), diagnostics, etc, and DCR (Design Change Request) OLCs
  • Slide 22
  • 22 Selection of a series of limits more representative for safety (Top Level Safety OLCs), combining them in a reduced group of parameters Task Objectives: (2/2) Top Safety OLCs With a view to their inclusion in the DAC (Dcret dAutorisation de Cration) The result has been embodied in a report (Top Level Safety OLCs)
  • Slide 23
  • 23 Review of Input Documents Input data: ITER Technical Web (Baseline Documentation) New versions: PID: Project integration document, Release 2.0 September 2005 No OLC changes Other/New Inputs ? New experiments, Test Blanket Module, Neutral Beam Injection, diagnostics, DCR Open issue
  • Slide 24
  • 24 Safety Top OLCs: Methodology 1. OLCs of the various systems were grouped per parameter (for example: tritium inventory and content, dust amount, dose, pressure, loads, temperature, leaktightness, etc). 2. The most significant parameters for safety (confinement, limitation of external exposure, residual power evacuation) were selected.
  • Slide 25
  • 25 Safety Top OLCs: List (1) Tritium inventory in vacuum vessel, tritium plant and hot cell Tritium concentration in water systems Tritium concentration to isolate and initiate ADS Efficiency of Detritiation System Dust and activated products in vacuum vessel and water systems
  • Slide 26
  • 26 Safety Top OLCs: List (2) Radiation and dose levels for personnel evacuation Leak tightness in system components forming part of primary or secondary confinement barriers, in tritium plant, ventilation and detritiation, in cooling water and heat rejection system and in buildings Pressure of primary and secondary confinement barriers VVPSS bleed and drain line actuation pressure, and opening pressure of VVPSS rupture disks Level of water in VVPSS tank
  • Slide 27
  • 27 Activities in course Documentation of the cross-checking performed between Top OLCs and the Reference Events. Table of the surveillance method / instrumentation foreseen in the project for Top OLC.
  • Slide 28
  • 28 Safety Top OLCs: List (3) VV temperature in Baking Degraded levels of Voltage/Time delays for initiating full transfer/start of Class III loads (switch DG) Time intervention of Fusion Power Shutdown System Top OLCs to be discussed Maximum fusion power TF magnetic energy dumping VV heat transfer system
  • Slide 29
  • 29 Top Level OLCs EX Table Sample Top Level OLCLimitPossible instrument or procedure to measure the limit Rationale for choice of the limit ITER safety analysis Documentat ion reference Tritium inventory in the vacuum vessel < 450 gThe amount of tritium is assessed monitoring inventories and flows Radiological consequence assessments remain valid provided that these inventories remain lower than the specified limits (maximum inventory project guidelines). For the safety assessment in GSSR, as noted in Volume III, assessment inventory values are used to provide margins for uncertainty PSR, GSSR I.5.2.1, PID 3.1.1.2 Tritium content in Cooling water VVPHTS (Vacuum vessel cooling system).