ABSTRACT. The cause of ethical failure in organi-sations often can be traced to their organisationalculture and the failure on the part of the leadershipto actively promote ethical ideals and practices. Thisis true of all types of organisations, including theprofessions, which in recent years have experiencedongoing ethical problems. The questions naturallyarise: what sort of professional culture promotesethical behaviour? How can it be implemented by aprofession and engendered in the individual profes-sional? The answers to these questions are of interestto business ethicists since the causes of ethicalproblems in business are often the same and the pro-fessions, as ethically challenged organisations, makeuseful and informative analogues for the measures tobe adopted or avoided when the attempt is made toraise the ethical standards of business.

Given this focus on the professions, it will beargued that the usual, direct attempts to controlunethical behaviour by using codes of ethics, legisla-tion and self-regulatory regimes, are not successful.

The answer, it will be argued, lies in using anenforced self-regulation model that aims for ethics

indirectly. Such a strategy seeks to develop a goal-orientated professional culture which is activelypromoted by the leadership of the profession as wellas the members. Specifically, the culture is one thatseeks to promote trust in the profession and trust-worthiness as a virtue exemplified in each individual.It will be argued that in order to develop a profes-sional culture that cultivates trust a profession willneed to develop certain institutions, programs and

structures within the profession. I conclude by settingout a model of these trust-cultivating structures.

I. The problem1

In any society that has them, the professionsoccupy important and powerful roles. They areimportant because they possess specialised knowl-edge which is not generally held by all membersof a society, but which is essential to living inand to the life of that society. The professionalenables members of a society and society as acollective to use and benefit from this complexand important knowledge. Professionals arepowerful because they exercise an enormousamount of control over this knowledge and itsuse. They are, as individuals, largely autonomouswhen acting professionally and self-regulating asa group.2 For these reasons, society and itsmembers depend upon the professional and arevulnerable to the actions of the profession andindividual professionals. It is this dependence andvulnerability of society and its members and theprofession’s control of vital knowledge thatempowers the members of the profession: quiteliterally the non-professional is at their mercy.

The problem that faces the community andthe individual client is how it can police thisasymmetry of power. How can the communityand individual client be assured that the powerof the professional will not be abused? And if itis, ensure that there is an effective remedy? Inother words, how can the non-professionalensure that the professions are not, to quoteGeorge Bernard Shaw (borrowing it from AdamSmith), “conspiracies against the laity”?

The problem that faces any professional com-

Professional Ethics andThe Culture of Trust Andrew Brien

Journal of Business Ethics 17: 391–409, 1998.© 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

Dr Andrew Brien is lecturer in philosophy in theDepartment of Philosophy at Massey University,Palmerston North, New Zealand. His teaching andresearch interests take in theoretical, business and pro-fessional ethics, social and political philosophy andancient philosophy.

munity is one of ethical quality control: how canit regulate itself effectively so as to justify itsautonomy, while ensuring that the clients of itsmembers and the society as a whole benefit fromthe profession’s and the individual professional’sactions, rather than become their victims. Forboth groups the problem is one of preventing andpolicing abuses of power without intruding intothe activities of the profession and preventing itfrom functioning in society as a profession ideallyought to.

II. The standard solutions

The usual way to forestall unethical behaviour ordeal with it once it occurs is to tackle theproblem directly. Such measures focus on uneth-ical behaviour, make it clear what unethicalbehaviour is, proscribe it, and attempt to deterand punish it by imposing or threatening toimpose sanctions. Such measures may alsoinvolve, conversely, measures that seek to high-light and reward ethical action. For example,some professions in the United States haveestablished awards for the ethical behaviour ofmembers, defence funds to protect members whohave acted ethically, usually by “blowing thewhistle”, or awards and ratings for employerswho encourage ethical behaviour.3

Aiming for ethics directly involves using,singly or in combination, two different types ofregulatory mechanism. First there is governmentlegislation. In effect, such legislation changesunethical behaviour into illegal behaviour.Second, there is self-regulation. Such anapproach leaves questions of ethics and disciplineto the profession. It is not uncommon in the caseof the professions for these mechanisms to givecodes of ethics a central role in the overallregulatory program. Consequently, unethicalbehaviour may be identified and proscribed orethical behaviour prescribed by maintaining,rewriting, updating, or writing for the first time,a code of ethics.

Consider first of all codes of ethics. These areused in both regulatory and self-regulatoryregimes. According to Lisa Newton drawing onthe work of John B. Cullen,4 their effectiveness

is not ‘borne out by observation’.5 Codes areoften poorly known and not used as a basis foraction.6 They do not appear to diminish thelevel of unethical behaviour on the part of pro-fessionals.7 Or they simply may be “windowdressing”, intended for public consumption, butnot intended to be used.8

An important reason for the ineffectiveness ofcodes is that often they are not enforced orimplemented. In fact, effective and vigorousenforcement of self-regulatory codes often “isconsidered to be contrary to the primary goalsof many professional bodies of protecting andpromoting the interests of their members”.9

According to Bernard Barber (using as hisexamples the medical and legal professions in theUnited States), and Roman Tomasic and StephenBottomley (writing about codes of ethics forprofessions involved in business in Australia) it isthis absence of enthusiastic enforcement, or evenmore seriously, the absence of effective and activeenforcement mechanisms,10 that are the majorcause of their failure.

We can conclude from this that codes ofethics, in either a regulatory or self-regulatoryregime are ineffective in promoting ethicalbehaviour unless they are promoted, imple-mented and enforced. Codes minister only to theethical since the unscrupulous will not bepersuaded to be ethical or deterred from wrong-doing by a code any more than a thief will bereformed by reading the criminal law. Ethicalrules do not make ethical people.

While it is clear that, in general, codes do notwork, the reason is that enforcement and imple-mentation is not done nearly as much as it ought.To be sure, codes that are implemented andenforced do have an important role to play inprofessional life. When well formulated they notonly prohibit but may prescribe certain actions,and may therefore be used as benchmarks ofbehaviour and a basis for discipline or praise.More importantly, they express the values andideals of the profession – the same values whichmotivate its best members. At the heart of suchcodes will be a vision of professionalism for thatprofession. Such codes, if implemented andenforced, have the capacity to be used, not onlyas a cudgel but as a lamp.

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Consider now legislation. The initial problemwith using legislation to deal with professionalethics issues is that it is antithetical to the verynature of a profession. One of the properties thatdefines an organisation as a profession is theabsence of regulatory legislation and the relianceby the community upon the profession toregulate itself. So, using legislation to regulateethical behaviour – as opposed to using legisla-tion to constitute a vocation as a profession –would tend to de-professionalise the profession.Such a move takes control of the profession awayfrom the profession itself and places it in thehands of civil regulatory authorities and institu-tions, such as the courts. Nevertheless, there maywell be a temptation to put such theoreticalniceties aside and promulgate legislation to dealwith unethical behaviour.

The major problem with legislation is thevarious sorts of costs that detailed legislationproduces. This can be financial, red tape, stulti-fication of innovation, corruption of purpose, ordelay in the workings of the regulatory mecha-nisms.11 For example, where a regulatory mech-anism exists the sheer cost of using it, such asattempting to prosecute a professional in court,acts as a deterrent to the injured or the regula-tory agency. And Michael Bayles summed upsome of the problems of regulatory agencieswhen he observed that,

. . . they are sometimes captured by the regulated.When staffing such agencies, the first thought isto obtain experts, and these turn out to be personsworking in the regulated field. In short, suchagencies are apt to be staffed primarily by membersof the professions. To the extent that they arecareer members of the agency, the economicconflict of interest is removed, but professional biaswould probably remain. Moreover, governmentagencies are not always the most efficient organi-sations. They have often been hesitant to act, andthe process involved is often slow.12

While legislation does not seem to be a viableoption for promoting ethical behaviour within aprofession, at least by these arguments, there issome suggestion that it may be, in fact, positivelydangerous. John Wolters, the RegionalCommissioner of the Australian SecuritiesCommission has pointed out,

. . . the drawback of the complete codification ofacceptable behaviour as we are starting to see it inAustralia, is that it brings out literal conduct anda checklist mentality of compliance. It leaves nosense of shame if a loophole is exploited...Blackletter law, if applied by the community devoid ofany reference to residual community values – whatis good, what is just, what is equitable – will turnus into a nation of loophole hunters.13

Let’s now consider self-regulation. This hasbeen the ‘traditional’ way that professions haveoperated and have been one of their definingmarks. Nevertheless, as Bernard Barber notes, “Ifself-regulation worked very well in the profes-sions, it would produce high standards of trust-worthiness with respect to technically competentperformance and fiduciary obligation and respon-sibility”. Yet it does not seem to do so.14 Theprofessions often display a noticeable reluctanceto report the ethical violations of their membersand to discipline them.15 If a profession disci-plines a member the public may find thatprofessionals who face even the most seriousallegation that a profession can raise against oneof its members may have their identities sup-pressed, the details of the case held in confidence,the hearing held in camera and the result of theinquiry usually remains undisclosed.16 Undersuch circumstances the accountability of theprofession is highly attenuated and the capacityof society and individual clients to bring mis-creant professionals to book is severely limited.

Despite the problems that self-regulation faces,problems that can be traced to the absence ofcredible sanctions and mechanisms that imposethem,17 it does possess a number of importantadvantages.18 First, the regulations can be tailor-made for the organisation to be regulated. Theycan, therefore, encapsulate those elements ofthe organisational culture that are considereddesirable and eliminate those that are not.Second, the cost is borne by the organisationrather than the community; thus there is anincentive for efficiency. Third, self-regulation canincrease the coverage of those individuals whoare placed under a regulatory regime. This occurswhen a vocational body is established thatregulates itself but which it is in the interests ofmembers of that vocation to join.

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Finally, self-regulation has the capacity, moreso than government legislation, to address thecauses of problems as well as identifying problemsthat may be hidden from government inspectors.Inspectors who are themselves members of theprofession are less likely to face the antipathy thatemerges within a select group to an outsider,especially one asking awkward questions. Themembers of a profession are often betterequipped than a lay person to know what to lookfor. Thus, self-regulation has the potential forgreater “inspectorial depth: . . . compliancepersonnel are more likely than governmentinspectors to know where ‘the bodies are buried’and be able to detect cover-ups”.19 Despite theobvious advantages of self-regulation, however, itmay not be translated into firm actions or clearprograms. This is the flaw in self-regulatoryregimes.

Attempts to aim for ethics directly (throughusing codes, legislation and self-regulation) bytheir very nature cleave ethical action from theprofessionally virtuous character – which is anessential ingredient of being a professional. Thesemeasures focus on what people do rather thanthe sort of person an agent is and so they fail toengender ethical norms. Such measures failto take sufficient account of the fact that animportant part of being a professional is being acertain sort of person who values certain thingsin certain ways. Consequently, direct attempts atpromoting ethical behaviour tend to be cudgelsrather than lamps. And, these direct regulatorymeasures fail to address the fundamental problemin professional ethics: how can ethics be engen-dered?

The task then is to develop a regulatoryregime that, based around a code of ethics (andso utilising the benefits that codes have to offer),engenders ethical norms and which uses theadvantages that self-regulation offers a commu-nity. It must do this while at the same timeavoiding the problems that self-regulation suffersas well as those other problems that emerge whenan organisation aims for ethics directly. Part ofthe solution, it will now be argued, is to use anenforced self-regulation (ESR) strategy.

III. Enforced self-regulation

Under normal self-regulatory models the organ-isation regulated is left alone to act as it sees fit.Under ESR, self-regulation would be enforcedby society.20 The government would require eachprofession to write a code of ethics tailored tothe unique circumstances of that profession. Aregulatory agency would either approve thesecodes or send them back for revision. The codeswould have to be sufficiently stringent, addresscommunity concerns, protect the communityfrom unacceptable operators, offer redress andremedies in the case of wrongdoing and containeffective education and engendering programs,amongst other things. After adoption the codewould have the force of law. Any breach of thecode, including non-enforcement, would beprima facie breaches of the law and leave themiscreant open to legal processes.

Enforcement would be left to the profession.It would be required to develop internal mech-anisms to carry out this task. ESR places theinitial responsibility for engendering, encour-aging and enforcing ethical conduct upon theprofessional community. The costs would beborne by the profession itself. This is, in itself,an act of trust by and on the part of the generalcommunity. The role of the governmentregulatory agency would be to act as a ‘fail-safe’mechanism that intervenes in the workings of theprofession only when the internal self-regulatorymechanisms fail to carry out their tasks. Or touse the leitmotiv of this paper, when the profes-sional community has shown that it is nottrustworthy and is incapable of discharging thetrust placed in it is by the community. As JohnBraithwaite has written (speaking of the role ofgovernment in dealing with white-collar crimerather than unethical behaviour, though the pointis the same),

. . . The role of government then becomes increas-ingly one of auditing the effectiveness of thesecommunity controls, stepping in when they fail,and selecting the most egregious cases of crimefor formal public punishment to fulfil the moraleducation function of the criminal law and tounderwrite the legitimacy of community controls

394 Andrew Brien

by showing that the state backs them up withsevere deterrence when they are snubbed.21

ESR has two major virtues. First, it does notintrude into professional life. The profession isallowed to carry on without interference unlessthere are good reasons to intervene. Thus itpreserves the self-regulatory nature of the pro-fessions while providing a guarantee to society,with little financial cost.

Second, it can be imposed upon alreadyexisting mechanisms and would require littlechange to existing regulatory mechanisms inmany of the professions. It would simplyempower them with additional authority (sincetheir internal mechanisms would have thebacking of law) and an additional duty: they mustact. Thus, the advantages are that the benefits ofself-regulation are retained while the burdens arediminished and the profession is more likely tobe responsible and accountable.

ESR is silent on how one goes about attainingethical behaviour; it is, after all, a theory aboutthe nature of the regulatory mechanism and hasnothing to say about the specific goal, or whetherit needs to be the proximate or ultimate goal ofa regulatory system. ESR offers an account ofhow whatever goal is selected may be achievedin the most efficient manner. Nevertheless, itseems to me that proponents of ESR wouldfavour selecting those goals that are most easilyattained if, in the process of attaining that goal,other more desirable goals were promoted, andas a consequence, the effectiveness of the ESRstrategy was enhanced. The reason is simple. Themotivation for selecting ESR rather than someother model is that it delivers desired results mostefficiently. Efficiency is a reason that applies notonly to the regulatory mechanism but to a moregeneral concern about how we as agents goabout attaining our goals. It is generally rationalto attain our goals in the easiest way that involvesthe least effort. We have seen that the success ofpromoting ethical behaviour directly, using thecommon regulatory mechanisms, is at leastquestionable. We have also seen that ESR offerssome hope in that it can remove the flaw in self-regulatory programs. But that is not all the story.

IV. A new solution: aiming for ethics

indirectly

How then can ethical behaviour be promoted?22

The solution is not only to adopt an ESRstrategy but to aim for ethics indirectly by aimingfor some more proximate and attainable goal.Such an approach identifies a goal that theprofession morally and prudentially ought to aimfor and which can be attained only throughethical behaviour, and then require through ESR,the profession to pursue it.

True enough, actors who perform such actionsmay not act because such actions are ethical, butonly because they are likely to promote thedesired goal. In other words, such actors may notbe moved by strictly ethical motivations.Consequently, in important cases a person maydefect and act unethically. Does this matter?Surely when a person acts in a professionalcapacity the right advice is more important thanthat it is delivered with a caring smile. The testis not whether the motivation is apt, but whetheraiming for a proximate goal increases the rate ofcompliance with professional norms, reduces thelevel of defection and still permits the profes-sional to assist her clients. Moreover, no systemis perfect. There will always be ethical defectorsas there will always be wanton criminals. Thepoint is: does this approach work any better? Theanswer to that depends upon the goals selected.In this case, as we shall see, the goal is such thatit would reduce defection and require the pro-fessional to be transparent as to her motivation,thus overcoming this criticism in any case.

V. The proximate goal of ethics programs: trust

The question then is whether there is a goal thatif pursed directly will result, albeit indirectly, ina higher level of ethical behaviour. In this sectionI argue that there is such a goal that can bepursued directly and that it is trust. To be sure,my claims are: 1) that not only is it true that trustis the correct characterisation of the relationshipbetween client and professional, and so sits wellwith established professional cultures; but 2) this

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is a goal that professions morally and prudentiallyought to aim for in order to fulfil their role andresponsibilities as professions. On this view,trust is the essential and central element in thedevelopment of a professional culture and trust-worthiness is the first virtue of professional life.

To sustain the first claim we will need, a) toexamine the nature of the professions and whatbeing a professional involves; and b) to look atthe nature of trust. To sustain the second claimwe need to show, a) how cultivating a culture oftrust promotes ethical behaviour indirectly; andb) why prudentially and morally trust is part ofprofessional life and that trustworthiness is thefirst virtue of professional life.

What is a profession?

Two different accounts can be given of the natureof the professions, each tied to a major schoolof sociology.23 One view of the professions, the“functionalist” approach, holds that the profes-sions are, by their nature, self-conscious com-munities whose members know the norms thatattach to membership of that community andwho identify themselves to each other and tooutsiders as members of that community. Aprofession, on this view, is a distinct type ofoccupation. The members of the communitypossess specialist, theoretical knowledge and prac-tical skills that are directed at solving real humanproblems and meeting human needs. Professionsand professionals have, on this (idealistic) view,an altruistic orientation, or rather, a sense ofsocial responsibility. The professional’s actionsare directed not primarily at the betterment ofthe individual professional’s interests, but at thebetterment of those of his or her client andultimately, society as a whole. Being a profes-sional is more than collecting a salary. In theargot of our time, the professions and theirmembers have a ‘mission’.

A profession is also not only characterised byesoteric and complex knowledge possessed by theprofession’s members, but a defined process ofeducation to attain this knowledge as well as theskill or technical competence for its application.Typically, a professional community engages in a

formal effort to pass skills and knowledge on tonew generations, through institutions andprofessional schools. Such special education iscontrolled by the profession. It is necessary toacquire this knowledge to gain entry to theprofession. In other words, the criteria of admis-sion, legitimate practice and proper conduct aredetermined and controlled largely by the pro-fession itself. Thus, professions are self-regulating.A profession’s members are autonomous; theypractise their art on their own recognisancewithout regulatory bodies overseeing each andevery action. As well, the professional commu-nity and its members are also engaged in anon-going effort to add to and improve existingknowledge.

All this has been be summed up in AbrahamFlexner’s account of a profession. In a speechentitled “Is Social Work a Profession?”, Flexnerexpounded seven points which defined a profes-sion:24

1. Possess and draw upon a store of knowl-edge that is more than ordinarily complex[and, I would add, this knowledge is boththeoretical and practical, the latter beinglearnt through experience, such as ansupervised practice or apprenticeship];

2. Secure a theoretical grasp of the phenom-enon with which it deals;

3. Applies its theoretical and complex knowl-edge to the practical solution of human andsocial problems;

4. Strives to add to and improve its stock ofknowledge;

5. Passes on what it knows to novice gener-ations, not in a haphazard fashion butdeliberately and formally;

6. Establishes criteria of admission, legitimatepractice and proper conduct. [Or as Iwould say, it has a ‘professional ethic’];

7. It is imbued with an altruistic spirit.

Taken together these features make up a pro-fession’s ‘ethic’. The function of a professionalethic is two fold. It is the glue that binds theprofessional community together and in whichthe professional culture is embedded. Second, theprofessional ethic is in effect a guarantee andforms the basis of trust between a profession and

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society. It is intended to assure and re-assuresociety that, even though it and its members arevulnerable because esoteric knowledge and skillshave been consolidated within a particular classof people, nevertheless these people will act forthe benefit of society and its members. Itprovides a tangible standard against which theperformance of a professional can be measured.This promise is not free, however. A quid pro quo,effectively another promise based upon trust, hasdeveloped between society and the professions.It is that in return for the professions’ altruisticorientation they will be left to regulate them-selves.

The opposing view, what could be called the“power” approach, views the professions as littlemore than “conspiracies against the laity”. Onthis view, the professions are a “semi-mythicconstruct, fashioned by members of an occupa-tion for the purpose of obtaining social andeconomic advantages, who then successfullypersuade the rest of society to accept their con-struct and honour their claim for special protec-tion and privileges”.25 The professions, on thisview, are monopolies based upon self-interest andwhatever the alleged altruistic orientation of theprofession is merely a ploy to maintain theirprivileged position.

There is an element of truth in both theseviews. The nature of a profession may be that ofa distinct occupational grouping characterised byesoteric knowledge, whose dissemination iscontrolled. But it may also be the case that, forsome professions at least, the primary motiva-tion in being a profession is self-interest, ratherthan the altruistic goal of community service thatis imputed to them by the functionalist school.

How then should we view the professions?Recall, that we are concerned with the problemof how society can police the asymmetry ofpower between, on the one hand, the individual(and society) and, on the other, the professionand professional, so as to ensure that the profes-sions do not become (or remain, if one adoptsthe “power” view) conspiracies against the laity.What means can society use to impose upon theprofessions a level of accountability that protectsthe vulnerable, while not imposing upon thesociety enormous financial burdens that arise

from regulation, or practical burdens by dimin-ishing the capacity of a profession to function asa profession?

The solution is separate the function that aprofession ideally has in society from the moti-vations that may give rise to and maintain theinstitution of professionalism. There is so muchknowledge available to any individual now thatthe only way that a person can possibly use itfor their own benefit is if there are peoplespecially skilled in the use of that particularknowledge. In other words, if there is a divisionof (epistemic) labour.

On this view, the professions are an essentialelement in a division of labour that facilitates theuse of complex knowledge. They are natural,rational outgrowths of living in urbanised,complex societies. The professions are requiredin order to make available to a community or anindividual esoteric knowledge. In that way theypromote human flourishing. The justificationfor creating and maintaining the professions istherefore purely Utilitarian.

It may be the case that the professions fall shortof this ideal. The point, however, is that there isan ideal and that the professions should beencouraged to move towards it as much aspossible. Thus, a profession is defined as that sortof vocation that attempts to approximate the idealof professionalism and which would not face anystructural or inherent problem in doing so. (Itmay be, for example, that some vocations, suchas “business executive”, cannot be professionssince the role that the professions have in societywould conflict with the sort of role that thevocation has in virtue of being that vocation.)

The nature of trust

What is trust? To answer this consider this story.Suppose you have taken a job and moved to anew town to take it up. Soon after your arrivalyou discover that you need to consult a doctor.You mention this to one of your new colleagueswho appears to be reliable, a good judge ofpeople and in whom you have developed acertain amount of confidence. She recommendsa doctor to you, whom you go to see. As you

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sit in Doctor Jones’ surgery, describing yourcondition, how would you describe your attitudetowards the doctor? And how would youdescribe your attitude towards your new col-league, the attitude that prompted you to ask herrather than someone else, for advice? I think thatwe would say that we trusted the doctor, and hadconfidence in our new colleague, but wererelying upon them both, albeit for differentthings. From one’s colleague, accurate advice;from the doctor, accurate diagnosis and (hope-fully) a cure.

Why would we say that we trusted Dr Jonesin this situation rather than that we felt confidentin her diagnosis or that we were merely relyingon her? Confidence occurs in situations in whichwe have good and identifiable reasons to expectsomething to happen. Feeling confident aboutX is in effect to predict that X will occur and tofeel secure that it will. Feelings of confidence aredirected at another’s ability to perform success-fully certain specifiable tasks.26 “I feel confidentthat Jones”, is an incomplete locution. Thespeaker always can be asked, “Will do what?”Feeling confident in others is, therefore, a feelingof security based on a belief generated by asubjective assessment that this actor can achievecertain identifiable goals. Thus, to feel confi-dence in another a person one must have infor-mation about the abilities of that other person.This information grounds a judgement that sheis likely to attain some goal successfully. Sinceyou lack such information about Dr Jones we saythat you trust her, as indeed you do. Confidencemay come in time, as you learn more about her,in the same way that you developed confidencein your colleague and that prompted you to askher for advice.

What distinguishes trust from reliance? To relyupon another is to make some of one’s goals andprojects and so on, depend upon another actorsuccessfully acting in some expected and antici-pated way. I may rely upon the train to come at11:00 in order that I arrive in time for mymeeting, though I have no confidence that it willsince it is often late. To rely upon another is ineffect to make the success of the other’s actionsa necessary condition for some actions of one’sown. This is why when we say, for instance, “I

relied upon you to mow the lawn!” and you ask,“Why?”, I would not tell you the reasons why Irelied upon you. Instead, I may reply that, forinstance, your mowing the lawn would haveenabled me to paint the house. To return to ourexample of consulting a doctor. You rely uponDr Jones to cure you, since other of your goalsand projects depend upon this; and you rely uponyour new colleague to give you the name of agood doctor in order that you may be cured.

To trust something, in contrast, is to havecertain expectations that it will behave in acertain desired way that promotes, or at least doesnot diminish the putative truster’s well-being orthat of something in which she has an invest-ment. To trust is not merely to have certainexpectations, however. It is importantly to feelsecure that the thing trusted will act as expectedand that one’s expectations about it will befulfilled. From this we can see that trust andreliance tell us different things about anotherperson and what they are doing. The focus ofan act of reliance is one’s own projects, and howa certain act of another, which is outside of one’scontrol, is necessary in order for projects of one’sown to come off. The focus of an act of trust isa person’s feelings of security and expectations.In other words, a person’s psychological state thatmay ground other of one’s actions – though theiractions may not depend upon them.

Trust takes place within a certain context: thetrustee can, through her actions, damage thetruster or something in which she has a stake.What this shows is that trust involves a recogni-tion of one’s vulnerability to the actions andchoices of the trustee. It involves importantly,retaining this vulnerability by not attempting toerect barriers to protect one’s interests or byremoving defences and expose oneself to theactions of the trustee. Thus, to trust anotherinvolves acting in certain sorts of ways. You tellthe doctor your symptoms and in that wayconfide to her information about yourself. Or,to return to the train example, I may not havetrusted it to arrive on time; that is to say, I maynot have felt secure that it would and did not asa consequence leave myself vulnerable to it failingto arrive: I may have, for example, made otherarrangements.

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One trusts only those things (for example,people such as doctors, lawyers, nurses or otherpeople who possess power in some context)which are in a position to harm or damageoneself or things in which one has some invest-ment; in other words, trust presupposes asituation of risk.27 Thus, relationships that arecorrectly described as involving trust contain anasymmetry of power: the trustee has power overthe truster. For example, suppose your head ofdepartment is about to leave and take up aposition at another university. As her last dutyshe must complete your annual staff appraisal. Shewrites that she feels fully confident that you willcomplete the projects that you have outlined forthe coming year. Why does she not say that shetrusts you to do this? The reason is clear. She isnot vulnerable to your failure and has no invest-ment in your success or lack of it. She does notneed to trust you.

Further, she has evidence that enables her tomake a prediction based upon her perception ofthe probabilities; true, she may feel secure thatyou will succeed, but she has no investment inyour success. If you fail it would sound strangefor her to say, “Look, I trusted you to do this”.What is it to her? Why was it important to herthat you succeeded, and how is she going to bedamaged if you don’t? Conversely, you trust herto be fair, impartial and objective. The point isthat it is logically inappropriate for your erstwhilehead of department to trust you in this sort ofsituation, but it is appropriate for her to feelconfident; it is, in contrast appropriate for youto trust her since you have an investment in herassessment of you. This appropriateness restsupon the asymmetry of power as exemplifiedby your own ongoing vulnerability to heractions.

The lesson, then, is that in cases where thereis no vulnerability to another’s power, thequestion of trust does not come up. True, theperson in the position of power has confidencein her subordinates to do their job and even maybe relying on them to do so. However, she truststhem, and it is logically appropriate to do so, onlyif their success in some way may affect her ownposition or that of something in which she hasan investment. I trust the baby sitter to care for

my children and rely upon her to do so in orderthat I may do what other tasks I must do. Thisneatly highlights an important and necessaryelement of trust that is lacking from confidenceand reliance. Trust occurs between actors whoare in a relatively proximate relationship. Itsounds odd to say that one trusts the world’sleaders to reach an agreement on ozone deple-tion but quite natural to say that one feels con-fident about it and it is certainly true that manypeople are relying on them to do so. The oddnessresides in the fact that while I am vulnerable totheir actions we stand in no proximate relation-ship to each other.28

To trust another then, involves a feeling ofsecurity about another and a prediction about thebehaviour of that person, when that person hasthe capacity to damage you or something inwhich you have an investment. Specifically, thisfeeling is directed at the trustee’s underlyingmotivation or disposition;29 and it is that this isnot directed at doing harm to you or things inwhich you have an investment and that she willact as anticipated. This is why we say that wetrust Dr Jones, rather than we have confidencein her.

Now, it is a platitude to observe that therelationship between client and professional restsupon trust.30 The analysis of trust and theaccount of professionalism just developed canshow why it is true. Clients and professionalsform a close relationship with each other; theymust, in order for the confidence to develop thatis necessary for the professional to do her job,and so that the information about the client’sneeds may be given to the professional. Further,trust is what people in positions of vulnerabilitymust do in order to participate in and benefitfrom a relationship that contains an asymmetryof power, but which promises desirable resultsthat are obtainable in no other way. It is amechanism we as social creatures use to over-come the power and freedom of others when wehave limited knowledge about their abilities. Theanalysis of professionalism showed clearly that therelationship between client and professionalcontained this asymmetry of power and that thiswas created because the professions are by theirnature based upon the control of esoteric knowl-

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edge and its use. Nevertheless, the professionalrelationship promised great benefits to thevulnerable. It also showed that, given the natureof social life, professions are needed and that clearideals of professionalism can be identified.Consequently, the asymmetry of power in theprofessional relationship is unavoidable. Trust isnecessary to overcome this asymmetry. It is,therefore, an essential and necessary componentof an effective relationship between professionaland client. This is not to deny that confidencebetween client and professional certainly developsover time, or that it is desirable or that it oughtto be aimed for. The point is, rather, that trustis a permanent and necessary feature of theprofessional-client relationship; and unlike con-fidence, the focus of trust is the client’s vulner-ability and the process through which an actormust work in order to overcome the disempow-ering consequences of feeling vulnerable andthereby come to utilise the professional’s exper-tise. As Michael Bayles points out, speaking aboutthe relationship between professional and client,“The weaker party depends on the stronger inways in which the other does not and so musttrust the stronger party”.31

How directly cultivating trust, indirectly promotesethical behaviour.

“Trust” then is a permanent feature of therelationship between client and professional.How does trust promote ethical action? As weinteract with others we build a picture of thatperson and come to conclusions about her capac-ities, her beliefs, and the things that matter toher. We come to conclusions about her characterand how she is likely to behave. It is throughknowing something of a person’s history, whoshe is, what she is like and so on, that we formconsidered judgements about whether we cancontinue to trust her. While we may be forcedby circumstances to trust other people, with littleor no knowledge about them, such as when wetake to the road and place our lives in the handsof other motorists, trust is sustained and builtover time and is based upon knowledge of theother person’s character and history.

This process can be assisted if people are tosome extent transparent to others in the appro-priate ways. For example, if their motives areknown, if we can see an alignment between wordand deed, or if they are members of a recognis-able institution which we trust, which in turngrounds a judgment that those others believevarious things or hold various values and thatthese will provide a basis for their actions. Forexample, in virtue of Dr Jones being a doctor sheis the member of a certain social group. You infersomething of her history. You know that herhaving attained membership of an institutionwhose members you know, through experience,can be trusted, indicates that she too can betrusted. You infer that they would not grantmembership to a person who is untrustworthy.

A person can also promote trust in themselvesby showing that she is a reliable, conscientious,honest person who ‘does the right thing’. Inother words, by acting ethically or being amember of an institution whose members areknown to be ethical actors, and who police suchentry standards. Conversely, we do not trustpeople who fail to abide by the norms of asociety in which we have an investment, be it asociety or a sub-group, such as a profession, orwho are members of a sub-group known to beethically dubious. We tend not to trust peoplewhom we believe are dishonest or otherwiseunethical.

The reason is simply that such people areunreliable and unpredictable. With an unethicalactor, we can never be as certain of the courseof their actions as we can be of the actions ofethical actors. Unethical actors may harm us orthose things about which we care, so there is anatural tendency to erect defences against them.Ethical action, in contrast, provides a great levelof predicability and this makes planning our ownlives possible. It means we can get on with livingin the midst of our vulnerability to the actionsof others. As a result we do not need to erectdefences against them. As we saw in our analysisof trust, trusting another involves removingdefences, it is to reveal one’s vulnerability to thepower of the other person. We do this if we havegood grounds to believe that the putative trustee’sactions are predictable, through being based upon

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their adherence to and participation in sharednorms; that is, that they are ethical.

Ethical action, on this view, is one index to anagent’s character. A person who habitually actsethically is likely, so we infer, to act ethically onmost occasions. We feel secure in forming expec-tations about that person’s reliability and feelingsecure about her acting as she says she will, orhow we expect her to, that she will not takeadvantage of our vulnerability, and that she willpromote either our own interests or those whomshe has been engaged to promote. In otherwords, we are justified in trusting her.

So, if a person wants to be trusted she mustact or be seen or be believed to act ethically; thatis, in accord with the norms of the society inwhich the actor is operating. (Of course, actingethically is easier, since ethical action provides aready framework in which to plant one’s otheractions. Unethical action cannot fit into such aframework and one unethical action maydiminish trust. As Abraham Lincoln said, ‘Liarsneed good memories’; but few have memoriesso good that they can construct a framework thatconceals unethical action and yet maintains trust).The best way to encourage others to trust youis to act ethically and be transparent about it.Therefore, if being trusted is your proximate goalthen one of the essential components in attainingthis is acting ethically. By aiming for trust directlyone must act ethically. Ethical behaviour isachieved indirectly, since the object of the action,what motivated it and what was intended, wasnot that it be ethical because the agent attachedsome especial value to ethical action, but that itlead to trust. The agent aimed to be trustworthyand could only be so by acting ethically.Interestingly, aiming for trust provides a simplerule of thumb for a professional faced with amoral quandary. Simply, if an action is unlikelyto promote trust then it is also unlikely to beethical.

Cultivating trust can produce ethical action intwo ways. First, an individual may wish to betrusted. Being trusted is her goal and the bestway to attain this goal is to act ethically. Second,we may wish for ethical action in another. Oneway to attain this is to trust that person. That is,instead of ordering that a person acts in this way

or that, set them to act in a way indicated, buton their own recognisance. If that person wantsto maintain this trust then they must attain thegoal you desire. The first case is like that of theindividual professional or a profession seeking tobe ethical. They would focus on trust and seekto attain it. The second case is like that of societyseeking to enhance the ethical profile of a pro-fession. Trust it with certain tasks; let it completethose tasks based upon its own recognisance. Ifthe profession wants to maintain that trust, andthe advantages trust brings with it, then there isonly one way it can: it must act ethically.

At this point an interesting fact emerges. Trustis not something that is depleted through use;rather it is enhanced.32 If a trust is honoured onone occasion this adds to the trustee’s image ofbeing the sort of agent who is worthy of trust.So, the truster has good grounds for trusting hereven more in the future. Similarly, being trustedon one occasion encourages most actors toperform the task allotted partly on the basis thaton the next occasion the task allotted mayinvolve rather more responsibility and be moreimportant. As a result, the agent’s level ofautonomy and sense of freedom will increase.Moreover, merely using this institution in onearea will encourage its use in other areas and theoverall freedom of the actors in the system,freedom from coercion, constraint, interferenceand surveillance will increase. For these reasons,through using trust the level of trust and its atten-dant benefits tend increase. As David Putnam hasobserved,

Stocks of social capital, such as trust, norms andnetworks, tend to be self-reinforcing and cumula-tive. Virtuous circles result in social equilibria withhigh levels of cooperation, trust, reciprocity, civicengagement and collective well-being.33

Does it work? John Braithwaite and ToniMakkai found clear evidence that “when chiefexecutives of nursing homes believed that theywere treated as trustworthy, their homes experi-enced a significant improvement in compliancewith the law”.34 To put this another way, throughtrusting the chief executives to comply, bettercompliance with legal norms was achieved, sincethe chief executives wanted to be trusted – and

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so they ensured that their actions complied withthe legal norms. The chief executives saw thatthe best way to be trusted was to be seen to becomplying with the legal norms. The effective-ness of trust in producing compliance has beenobserved in other, unexpected, areas. In a studyof taxpayers, John Scholz found that compliancewith tax law was higher amongst upper-middleclass New Yorkers who not only trusted thegovernment but when they perceived other tax-payers to be trustworthy and likely to pay theirtaxes.35

The conclusion then is that through trustingothers, being trusted and seeking to be trusted,that is, actively participating in and cultivating aculture of trust, a higher rate of compliance withlegal (and I suggest ethical) norms can beachieved. This occurs in all areas of life includingthose that commonsense beliefs would suggestshould have low compliance rates, such as pay-ment of taxes. In short, if you want compliancewith norms then develop an atmosphere of trust;if you want to be trusted, then comply withnorms.

The place of trust in professional life

We have seen that trust is a prudentially proxi-mate goal to pursue in aiming, albeit indirectly,for ethical action. But why ought professions,individual professionals and society select trustabove other goals? The fact that trust can be usedas a proximate goal or happens to be the waythe relationship between professional and clientis characterised is not in itself a decisive argumentto show why it is the goal that must be selected.This is what I attempt to show in this section.There are two sorts of reasons: prudential reasonsand moral reasons.

Prudential reasons. There is, as we saw, muchto be gained from trust. In an enforced self-regulatory regime which takes trust as its proxi-mate goal, compliance and enforcement costs arereduced; it has greater inspectorial depth andgreater reach. It forestalls legislative interventionand it can be implemented easily by using,adapting and developing existing professionalinstitutions.

Moreover, if the importance of trust is recog-nised and the professions are trusted, greatercompliance is likely since the leadership will seekto discharge this trust. As a result, trust in theprofession is seen to be justified and trusters areencouraged to trust even more. The leadershipof the profession will see the advantages of trust(autonomy, self-regulation, freedom fromexternal interference – the very hallmarks ofprofessionalism) and will be motivated to dis-charge any trust placed in them.

Of course there are exceptions to this; thereare in any system reluctant participants in, andopportunistic defectors from, the networks ofnorms that enable society to function; venal andegregious actors who play the game but neverbelieve in it. Nevertheless, trust is resilient andworks. The best relationships we enjoy are basedupon this virtue and the most successful socialsystems are highly cooperative ones grounded onhigh levels of trust.36

Further, through encouraging trust within aprofession the glue that binds the professiontogether will be strengthened, making stillstronger the ethical culture that a culture of trustrequires. All these things benefit both the pro-fession, the individual professional and society.They provide strong prudential reasons foradopting trust as a proximate goal.

Cultivating trust enables the profession topursue the ideal of professionalism that anyorganisation that aspires to be a profession mustpursue. Why? This is an ideal that can be pursuedonly if the organisation is trusted since it assumesself-regulation, a strong ethic and an altruisticorientation – things that will endure withoutinterference only if there is trust. Familiar featuresof professional life, such as autonomy and self-regulation are not, then, only the result of aspecific bargain struck between the professionand society, but part of what it is to be a pro-fession, and arise, in modern societies, as an actof trust on the part of society when the profes-sion is constituted or from its ongoing mainte-nance. Thus, society must trust the profession inorder for it to be in a position to move towardsthe professional ideal; and the profession mustactively cultivate a culture of trust in order toattain the professional ideal.

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Moreover, as we saw there is an asymmetryof power in the relationship between professionaland client which leads to the client beingvulnerable to the professional. This asymmetryprovides to a rational agent a good reason foravoiding such a relationship. Yet the relationshipwith the professional, like any sort of collectiveaction, promises many benefits. So that thesebenefits can be obtained, trust must be cultivated.It is a means of overcoming the effects of theasymmetry of power and dealing with thefreedom that this power confers upon the pro-fessional. This is not unusual. This is the waytrust operates in all areas of life.37 “Fabrics oftrust”, Robert Putnam writes, “enable the civiccommunity more easily to surmount whateconomists call “opportunism,” in which sharedinterests are unrealised because each individual,acting in wary isolation, has an incentive todefect from collective action”.38

Not to be trustworthy effectively erects abarrier in front of the less powerful. Potentialclients are unable, or unwilling, to utilise thebenefits offered by a professional relationship.Professionals would be unable to act as profes-sionals, since they would fail to retain thecooperation of their clients and so be unable tohelp them. Putnam makes this point succinctly:

Trust lubricates cooperation. The greater the levelof trust within a community, the greater the like-lihood of cooperation. And cooperation itselfbreeds trust.39

Therefore, there are good prudential reasonsfor a profession, society and individuals to selecttrust as a proximate goal.

Moral reasons. Adopting trust as a proximategoal will benefit the professions, society andindividuals. On a utilitarian ethic this would beconsidered a good outcome, ceteris paribus.Therefore, not only is it true that it is wise toadopt trust as a proximate goal but that there isa sound moral reason on a utilitarian ethic andso there is an obligation to do so. In fact, froma utilitarian point of view, it is obligatory thatprofessions, professionals, individuals and societiescultivate trust. There are, however, other impor-tant reasons.

Consider the profession’s relationship with

society. The profession and professional, as wesaw, is maintained and empowered by societysimply because this is thought to confer benefitsupon society as a group and individually. As aresult of having a particular role conferred uponit, a profession has identifiable role obligations,namely to promote the well-being of societythrough altruistic action. These role obligationscan be fulfilled only with the cooperation ofsociety. Such cooperation occurs only if there istrust between society, its members and the pro-fession and its members. Thus, the profession canfulfil its role obligations only if it is trusted. Now,it seems that if a person has an obligation to dosomething then she has also an obligation toperform those actions that will enable her to fulfilher initial obligation. If this is true then clearlythe professions have an obligation to society tobe trustworthy so that they may discharge theirrole obligations.

This is a powerful argument since it can beadapted to show an obligation of trustworthinessbetween professional and client. Holding oneselfout to be a professional involves an implicitpromise to use one’s professional capacitiesaltruistically. This promise can be fulfilled onlywith the cooperation of the client. Such coop-eration occurs only if there is trust between clientand the professional. This means that the pro-fessional must act so as to promote trust betweenherself and the client. Since the professional haspromised to help, it follows that the professionalhas an obligation to do those things that will leadto the client being helped. Trustworthiness onthe part of the professional is such an action,since it promotes cooperation. Therefore, theprofessional has an obligation to her client to betrustworthy and this is based upon her promiseto help.

Consider now the relationship between aprofessional and her colleagues. A person’s actionsas a member of a professional community reflectupon all members of that community. A profes-sional who is perceived by clients to be untrust-worthy harms the reputations of the entireprofessional community. Harming others unjus-tifiably is considered morally wrong. Therefore,a professional has an obligation to be trustworthyin order to not harm her colleagues.

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This argument is fairly uncontroversial. Amore controversial argument concerns theobligations that membership of the professionalcommunity seemingly entail. By obtaining mem-bership a person promises to abide by the normsthat exist within that group. Since professionalsare autonomous such compliance is largely amatter of trust. Trust is assumed necessarily as thebasis of a person’s membership of the professionalcommunity and it is a norm that guides profes-sional life. In other words, by becoming amember of the community a person has promisedto be trustworthy. Thus the obligation to betrustworthy is generated by the promise, explicitor implied, that is made when entering theprofessional community.

There is another argument that cuts across allthese. It is based upon the importance of trust-worthiness in social life. Trustworthiness is oneindex to an agent’s character. It is on this basis,partly, that an actor is admitted to and maintainsmembership of society. Now, people are socialcreatures. They flourish best in groups, specifi-cally harmonious communities in which they areactively engaged in a network of relationships.This is an old point made by Aristotle.Trustworthiness enables an actor to become amember of a community and maintain member-ship, and in that way flourish as a human being.Actors who are not trustworthy will not beadmitted to full membership of a community andwill therefore not be able to participate fully inthe network of relationships that enable them toflourish best.

This is as true of narrow communities, suchas the professions, as it is of wider communities.So, in order to be a member of a community andto participate in the life of that community onemust be trustworthy and be trusting. Alienationis the alternative. At this point this is still a pru-dential matter, rather than a moral judgement.It seems to me, however, that it does become amoral matter if it is true that flourishing as ahuman being is morally significant, not only inso far as it affects other people (a judgementwhich is relatively uncontroversial) but as it mayaffect oneself. That is, a failure to actively seekto flourish as a person is a moral failure of sorts.I believe it is, but will not argue that point here.

My aim is to signal what it seems to me is apowerful argument. It becomes all the morepowerful when we recall the nature of trust, itsinescapable necessity for a social life that is morethan mean, as well as the ideal of being a pro-fessional. To flourish as a professional (as indeeda person) would then involve adopting andappropriating certain traits of character in orderto move towards the professional (or individual)ideal. And one of these traits of character istrustworthiness.

The conclusion from all this is that pruden-tially and morally trust ought to be adopted as aproximate goal in the professions. The cultiva-tion of trust and according it a high valuationmust be a central part of the professional ethic.It is, in fact the first virtue of professional lifesince without it professionals cannot function asprofessionals; they cannot aim for the professionalideal, and they cannot discharge their role oblig-ations. Quite literally, for a professional all elseflows from it.

VI. Cultivating trust

What practical measures can be adopted by aprofession that will promote trust? The shortanswer is that the profession must develop aculture of trust. This can only develop if thereis an appropriate professional (or organisational)culture. ‘Professional culture’ may be defined asa). those assumptions, norms, values, beliefs,attitudes and patterns of behaviour which havedeveloped within a profession, which are,formally and informally actively promoted by it,are shared by its members, and which ground andregulate the actions of an actor within theorganisation, or when acting in an professionalcapacity; b). those institutions within a profes-sion that exemplify, realise, promote andengender these values, beliefs and so on. Workingtogether these values, institutions and so on guidea member’s judgments about what actions andother behaviour are acceptable or not. The pro-fessional culture is a ‘world view’ and serves as aglue that binds the profession together.

On this view, a culture of trust has twoelements. First, various beliefs, norms and values

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that focus on trust and which exemplify it. Thesewill include, respect for individuals, sincerity,honesty, community service and a commitmentto the profession’s clients – in fact, the sorts ofvalues that a person requires in order to be aprofessional. Second, specific institutions thatpromote trust through their actions and throughbeing themselves trustworthy. This would includecodes of ethics, education programs, disciplinarybodies, adjudication and interpretation bodies,which all work together to engender and artic-ulate a professional ethic.

What is the role of ESR in this? First, ESRrequires the development of specific institutionsand programs that make the profession account-able. Second, it provides a means of ensuringaccountability should the profession prove to beinept or unwilling to act against unethical oper-ators. The non-professional community will thenhave good grounds to trust the profession, sincethe profession’s regulatory programs will be putinto effect. The role of ESR is that of a foun-dation upon which the culture of trust can bebuilt.

To build a culture of trust, it is not enough,however, to only build regulatory structures thatpromote trust. The professional culture focussingon trust must be engendered and it must replaceany existing cultural elements that do not valuetrust. Why does it need to be engendered? First,people act as they do because of the values thatthey possess; that is, because of what they believeis good or bad, right or wrong or important orunimportant. If a person believes that trust isimportant then that person has a strong reasonfor performing actions that promote trust.Second, people are more likely to promote trustif they can understand that what they do is rightand good, rather than if they merely follow a ruleor an order. In other words, people are morehighly motivated if they can see that their actionsare good and right, rather than if they are merelytold to do this or that.

Finally, being a professional is not merely amatter of doing a job. It means something morethan merely collecting a salary. It involves, as wesaw, being a certain sort of person, with par-ticular values, attitudes and traits of character, thatare no less important than the knowledge and

skills a professional possesses. A person can onlybe a “true professional” if she has a certain sortof character and if certain sorts of values andbeliefs are engendered in her character. For thesereasons, a culture of trust must be engenderedin the hearts of professionals; and any programthat seeks to cultivate trust must not only estab-lish formal structures that promote trust butengendering programs (such as educationalinitiatives) that do so too.

Having these formal structures is only part ofthe story, however. We know from history thatthe separation of church and state and the devel-opment of the doctrine of the separation ofpowers marked a major step in the developmentof accountable, responsible and trustworthygovernment. The moral to be drawn from thisis that the manner in which the institutions thatcomprise a system relate to each other is vitallyimportant to the amount of trust that peoplehave in the system. For this reason, the modelproposed here is an arrangement of mutuallyaccountable or interlocking regulatory institu-tions that are open to public scrutiny. They worktogether to make a regulatory mechanism that isperceived to be sincere and is, as a consequence,trustworthy. These regulatory institutions mustbe inter-locking or mutually accountable so thatthey function as a check and balance on eachother and in that way can be self-correcting.They audit the activities of each other and reporton irregularities and successes. For this reason,each institution is allocated specific duties andthen one more: to monitor the activities of theother institutions.

As in public life, the institutions must bepublicly knowable, operate in public ways and beimpartial if they are to promote accountabilityand thereby cultivate trust. The reason is clear:unethical behaviour can only thrive in a profes-sional culture in which secrecy over the opera-tion of the profession is regarded as acceptable(as distinct from secrecy over a client’s affairs,which if those matters are ethical, such secrecyis to be encouraged). For this reason, professionsconcerned about ethics must be as open aspossible. So, in order to be trustworthy andtrusted, the professional must be ethical and beseen to be ethical.

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For this last reason too there must be a sepa-ration of the powers of the regulatory mecha-nisms so as to prevent different and sometimescompeting processes being confused andinternecine disputes developing. For example, ina regulatory mechanism that has, as constituentelements, proactive elements such as an educa-tion committee and an adjudication committeethat interprets the professional code, there couldbe a conflict with an investigative committee anda disciplinary committee which deal largely withreactive matters.

Moreover, the mechanism will be non-hier-archical in order to foster ethical action andthereby trust. To be sure, most, if not all, pro-fessions are organised along hierarchical lines.Consequently, the centres of power tend to beat the top (with the leadership) and vested ingroups, while individual actors tend to be rela-tively powerless. Power tends to be lineal, movingfrom those groups, usually committees, with littlepower over matters thought not terribly signifi-cant, such as the annual picnic, through to thosecommittees regraded as more important, such asthe management committee. The idea is thateach level of power is responsible to the next;each successive layer is the guardian of the layerbefore.

While this is an obvious way to organisematters it suffers from a fatal flaw: since theprofessions are by and large self-regulating, thereis always at the top a committee over whom thereis no other committee. This invites the obviousquestion: Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? Who willwatch over the watchers themselves?40

In an hierarchical arrangement the answercannot be, “the members!” There are enormousdifficulties from within the profession facing anymember of a profession who seeks to bringunethical behaviour to the attention of othermembers or who attempts to get something doneabout it.41 The inertia comes not only from othermembers but also from the executive who veryoften see questions about behaviour as dissentand challenges to their authority.

Moreover, if the leadership of the professionis insufficiently motivated to be ethical, such atti-tudes will drift down and a culture contemptuousof ethical concerns will develop. There is a lot

of truth in Mark Twain’s observation that fishrot from the head down. So do organisations,including professions. Hierarchical organisationsalso tend to encourage higher levels of alienationfrom the common purpose and the community’svalues, which in themselves tend to be observedweakly. This leads to a failure of cooperation andtrust. The moral is that hierarchical structuresdo not foster trust at all, and can easily be per-verted.42

It might be objected that mutual account-ability models, like hierarchical models, are notmodels that embody trust at all; that they are infact, cultures of distrust. In a culture of trust, sothe argument goes, agents are left alone toact without being monitored. Such organisedmonitoring as is suggested here hardly constitutesa culture of trust.

This misconceives the nature and phenome-nology of trust. When one trusts another onemay have no active means of dealing with untrust-worthy behaviour; after all, to trust is to admitand live within one’s admitted vulnerability toanother. But this does not mean that a truster isnot receptive to the trustee’s actions, or that shefails to evaluate them or that she forswears thecapacity to act should she have to. We assessothers to see how they have fulfilled our trustand we act as best our capacities allow if our trusthas been broken. The trusting agent in a rela-tionship is passive in terms of defence and doesnot seek to discover problems; but she willinvestigate problems when they come to herattention. Such a “non-interference unless war-ranted” stance is consistent with trust and it ishow trust works in everyday life. The trust thatgrounds any sort of cooperation, to be sure, isnot blind; nor does it seek to continue to be so.The other agent is allowed to get on with heractivities but mechanisms exist to deal withuntrustworthy behaviour: education, oppro-brium, criticism and exclusion; and they can beinvoked in appropriate circumstances. Thisreflects what is found in practice: that culturesof trust tend to be non-hierarchical and involverelationships of mutual accountability: eachcentre of power is responsible to the others inan open network mutual monitoring.43 In thisway, those who possess power will not be

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invulnerable to scrutiny or immune fromaccountability.

VII. Conclusion

I have argued that instead of aiming for ethicsdirectly, professions ought to aim indirectly, atsome proximate goal. That goal, I suggested, istrust. Not only is this a prudent goal for a pro-fession to aim for but one that it ought to aimat. We saw also, that trust was a goal that wasattainable only through ethical action. Thus, byaiming for trust ethical action was attainedindirectly. I suggested that the best way to cul-tivate trust is to develop a professional culturebased around trust, whose institutions promotedtrust. I suggested that the model to adopt was anon-hierarchical, enforced self-regulatory modelwhich was made up of constituent elements thatwere mutually accountable.

The most important point to be drawn fromthis paper, however, does not concern profes-sional ethics. It is rather the powerful regulatorypossibilities of trust. That trust can be an effec-tive mechanism should not surprise us. In com-munities where there is a high level of trust,backed by effective punishments for defectors,there tends to be a higher rate of compliancewith societal norms.44 This is important since itis not solely deterrence based upon communitydisapproval that grounds compliance; it is in theend belief in the norm itself. And that is ulti-mately what the professions and society must seekto do: through developing a culture of trust leadthe profession’s members to ethical action at firstby the hand, then through the heart.

Notes

* A shorter version of this paper was read to aseminar at Nelson Polytechnic, Nelson, New Zealand,and to the 1994 annual conference of the AustralianAssociation for Applied and Professional Ethics atAdelaide. Comments from the seminar and confer-ence participants and the anonymous reviewer for TheJournal of Business Ethics improved it and are muchappreciated.1 This paper is about professional ethics. Why should

it be of interest to devotees of business ethics? Thereare two reasons. First, many business organisationsemploy professionals. Business organisations mustdevelop ways of promoting and respecting professionalethics in order to promote their own ethical profile.After all, who would trust an organisation that didnot respect the professionalism of its professionals orseek to promote it? Such an organisation may not bereceiving the right sort of advice from its professionalemployees, for one thing. Second, as is the case withthe professions, ethical failure in businesses can oftenbe traced to the organisational culture and activitiesof the leadership of the business organisation. In thisrespect, the professions are no different from businessorganisations. Although I do not argue it out here, Iwould argue that by looking at the way that ethicalbehaviour can be promoted within the professions,through changes to organisational culture and patternsof leadership, lessons can be drawn for the businesscommunity and business ethicists. My argumentwould rest upon the view that the patterns of moti-vation and the values that underpin it, as well as thenature of the institutional actor’s agency are suffi-ciently similar so as to make the arguments that applyto the professions apply also to business organisations.2 For more on this distinction see Bayles (1989), p.190.3 Beder (1993), p. 41.4 Cullen (1978), p. 161.5 Newton (1982), p. 35.6 Davis (1991), p. 160, n. 9.7 Barber (1983), pp. 139, 142–163; Tomasic andBottomley (1993), pp. 94–96.8 Beder (1993), pp. 36, 40.9 Tomasic and Bottomley (1993), p. 95.10 Barber (1983), pp. 145, 151–15211 Braithwaite (1982), p. 1470 and notes 17–20.12 Bayles (1989), p. 195.13 Wolters (1994), pp. 3, 4.14 Barber (1983), pp. 139, 142–163. 15 Bayles (1989), pp. 193, 197–200.16 Bayles (1989), pp. 199–200.17 Tomasic and Bottomley (1993), p. 96.18 Braithwaite (1982), p. 1468; Ayres and Braithwaite(1992), pp. 106–116.19 Braithwaite (1982), p. 1468; Ayres and Braithwaite(1992), pp. 104–105.20 This discussion of enforced self-regulation is basedupon Braithwaite (1982), p. 1470–1471 and Ayres andBraithwaite (1992), pp. 101–116.21 Braithwaite (1989), p. 150, quoted in Tomasic andBottomley (1993), p. 218.22 It needs to be pointed out that what I suggest is

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not a plan that will produce one hundred per centcompliance. Rather, the program discussed here, Isuggest, produces a higher rate of compliance thanthe usual methods.23 Newton (1982), p. 33.24 Bowie (1991), p. 18.25 Newton (1982), pp. 33–34.26 Dasgupta (1988), p. 52, n.3.27 Gambetta (1988), p. 219; Luhmann (1988), p. 97.28 The place of vulnerability in a relationship of trustalong with the proximity of the relationship canexplain why it is we have confidence in our newcolleague’s recommendation of a doctor, or that werely upon her to make a good recommendation, butthat it is not appropriate to say we trust her. Whilewe may we vulnerable, we also test the recommen-dation to determine whether our reliance or confi-dence is justified. In other words, we act in such away as to reduce our vulnerability to our new col-league’s recommendation. So we do not need to trusther. And while she may be our new colleague, she isjust that: our new colleague, and the proximity thatis needed for trust has not yet developed. Thus, weat no time possessed the disposition of trust; nor, forthat matter, the disposition of distrust; or the rela-tionship with our new colleague upon which adisposition of trust rests. The issue simply does notarise.29 Dasgupta (1988), p. 52, n. 3.30 An observation shared with Ellin (1982), p. 84.31 Bayles (1989), p. 79.32 Dasgupta (1988), p. 56 and n.5; Gambetta (1988),p. 234.33 Putnam (1993), p. 177. My thanks to JohnBraithwaite for drawing my attention to this work.34 Braithwaite and Makkai (1993), quoted inBraithwaite (1993), p. 3.35 Braithwaite (1993), p. 4.36 See Putnam (1993), esp. p. 115, 169–171.37 Luhmann (1979), esp. Ch. 2; Luhmann (1988), pp.99, 103–104; Gambetta (1988), p. 219.38 Putnam (1993), p. 89.39 Putnam (1993), p. 171.40 Braithwaite (1993), p. 10, recognises this type ofproblem in political and civil life.41 Beder (1993), for examples amongst engineers inAustralia.42 Putnam (1993), pp. 101–104, 115.43 Putnam (1993).44 For a general discussion of this in civic society,see Putnam (1993).

References

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Barber, B.: 1983, The Logic and Limits of Trust (RutgersUniversity Press, New Brunswick).

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Bowie, N. E.: 1991, ‘Business Ethics as a Discipline:The Search for Legitimacy’, in R. E. Freeman(ed.), (1988) Business Ethics: The State of the Art(Oxford University Press, New York).

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Dasgupta, P.: 1988, ‘Trust as a Commodity’, in D.Gambetta (ed.), Trust: Making and BreakingCooperative Relations (Blackwell, Oxford), pp.49–72.

Davis, M.: 1991, ‘Thinking Like an Engineer: ThePlace of a Code of Ethics in the Practice of aProfession’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 20,150–167.

Ellin, J. S.: 1982, ‘Special Professional Morality andthe Duty of Veracity’, Business and Professional EthicsJournal 1, 75–90.

Gambetta, D.: 1988, ‘Can We Trust Trust?’, in D.Gambetta (ed.), Trust: Making and BreakingCooperative Relations (Blackwell, Oxford), pp.194–237.

Luhmann, N.: 1988, ‘Familiarity, Confidence, Trust:Problems and Alternatives’, in D. Gambetta (ed.),Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations(Blackwell, Oxford), pp. 94–108.

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408 Andrew Brien

Newton, L.: 1982, ‘The Origin of Professionalism:Sociological Conclusions and Ethical Implications’,Business and Professional Ethics Journal 1, 33–43.

Putnam, R.: 1993, Making Democracy Work: CivicTraditions in Modern Italy (Princeton UniversityPress, Princeton).

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Department of Philosophy,Massey University,Palmerston North,

New Zealand.

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