Prof Manzoor Iqbal Awan-Bahria University-Conflict Management-Fall 2012-BBA VI B-Student Projects...

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Bahria University- Fall 2012 BBA VI A - Group Case Studies

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Complied By: Ariba Zubair

SUBMITTED TO: Prof Manzoor Iqbal Awan, Col (R) Faculty Member and Senior Consultant * USQ (Australia), COMSATS & NUML * Bahria, Air & Preston Universities * University of Lahore * Dual Matrix Inc. & MDi Cell: +92 300 854 3122 Email: [email protected] & [email protected] Profile: www.linkedin.com/in/manzooriqbawan

Islamabad 31st December 2012

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Conflict Management

Submitted To: Sir Manzoor Iqbal Awan

Compiled By: Ariba Zubair Enrollment No.: 01-111101-020

Dated: 21-12-2012 Class: BBA 6 Section: B

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DEDICATION:

This script is lovingly dedicated to our respective course instructor Prof. Manzoor Awan, who has been our constant source of inspiration. He has given us the drive and discipline to tackle any task with enthusiasm and determination. Our respected sir is a person, who is interested in every one of his students’ ideas and believes in every one of them. He also truly believes that every idea should be spoken out openly, what is the use of one’s ideas and concepts are kept in one’s mind. Without his love and immense support this project would not have been made possible.

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Teacher’s Note I am a firm believer in the potential of our young generation. They possess all the basic ingredients to become excellent professionals, provided they are show the right direction in time. This talent has to be harnessed by the academic institutions.

Like all good universities, Bahria University strives to provide the right environment for producing business executives with ability to think out of the box. Taking full advantage of that and with a strong faith in the abilities and potential of our youth, the students of Bachelors of Business Administration 6th Semester Section B (during Fall 2012 semester) were encouraged to complete two projects. First one was an individual project, involving the writing of socio-cultural case studies based on their personal observations/knowledge or information gathered from someone else. The second project, based on team work, related to the study and presentation of some major conflict situations of national importance. They not only attempted these individual as well as group assignments with fair degree of success and produced some interesting and relevant project reports but also successfully conducted valuable discussions in the class as part of our overall learning drive.

There is a need to appreciate the first attempts by these budding business professionals in tackling conflict situations with vigor – notwithstanding the fact that there is considerable room for improvements in these. What is of special significance is the originality of effort/work, and that this could serve as a humble beginning towards attaining greater creativity in times to come. These reports could also be improved through further study and research by the students that follow. It is with this thought that these write ups are being compiled for appropriate placement.

It will be unfair if the efforts put in by Ariba Zubair in completing this compilation assignment are not acknowledged. The final product amply speaks of her hard work and creative talent. I wish the contributing students as well as the compiler success. May Allah Almighty be their guide. Ameen.

Prof Manzoor Iqbal Awan, Col (R) Faculty Member and Senior Consultant * USQ (Australia), COMSATS & NUML * Bahria, Air & Preston Universities * University of Lahore * Dual Matrix Inc. & MDi Cell: +92 300 854 3122 Email: [email protected] & [email protected] Profile: www.linkedin.com/in/manzooriqbawan

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Islamabad 31st December 2012

Compiler’s Note: First of all I would like to thank Almighty Allah who gave me the blessings to successfully finish this script. All that I have accomplished so far could not have been possible without the support of our course instructor Prof. Manzoor Iqbal Awan who provided me with all the facilities I demanded for. Every work I do is linked directly or indirectly too many different aspects, circumstances and people. As Sir Manzoor Iqbal Awan has handed over me a great responsibility of compilation of project reports of class BBA 6 B (2012-2013) that required proper timing and a lot of energy as if even the unnoticeable mistake could spoil my fellow

classmate’s effort. But I have tried my level best to put my finest efforts in this limited time at compilation. And I am really gratifying to Sir that he acknowledged me for this great responsibility. It was him who gave me an insight of what is called “the maximum utilization of resources”. The immense cooperation given by him is unforgettable. My fellow class mates has also helped a lot in the accomplishment of this document as they provided me with all of their work on time and also helped me out in anything else that I required for the assemblage of this reserve. This script consists of all the case studies produced by the students as their final projects, on the topics provided by Sir Manzoor Awan. I am deeply in debated to Sir Manzoor Iqbal Awan due to the fact that he showed so much trust and faith in me. I hope I have done justice to what was expected for this document to be like. I have tried to be most careful with this text and I anticipate that sir would feel that by giving this responsibility to me he has done the right thing. Ariba Zubair

BBA 6 B (2012-2013)

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Table of Contents

Serial Content Pages Groups

1 The Class 2 2 Dedication 4 3 Teacher’s Note 5 4 Compiler’s Note 6 5 Terrorism

(Group 1) 8-22 • Abid Gul Qazi (Leader)

• Faisal Shabir • Erum Iqbal • Anum amir • Rehmat Ullah Khan

6 Water Management (Group 2)

23-38 • Faisal J Khalil (Leader) • Ubaid Iqbal • Salaka Aslam Chaudhry • Anila Naheed • M. Umer Khokhar • M. Zeeshan Arshad

7 Sectarianism (Group 3)

39-57 • Mohammad Afzaal (Leader) • Hasan Munir • Sibtain Zubair

8 Kalabagh Dam (Group 4)

58-78 • Shafqat Ali (Leader) • Waqas Ismail • Shaeel Abrar • Aqib Javeed • Hasan Hani Ameen

9 Political Integration of Tribal Areas (Group 5)

79-91 • Fizza Saif (Leader) • Yumna Arshad khan • Ahsan Mirza • Maryam Khan • Hamza Bin Saud

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GROUP 1:

Abid Gul Qazi Faisal Shabir Erum Iqbal Anum amir Rehmat Ullah Khan

Theme of the case study:

Terrorism: One of the gifts of the proxy war in Afghanistan of1970s and 1980s is the curse of terrorist acts in Pakistan. No place is safe: may those be places of worship, funeral processions or peaceful family/social gatherings. There is an urgent need to settle this conflict and bring peace to the country.

Fighting terrorism is like being a goalkeeper. You can make a hundred brilliant saves but the only shot that people remember is the one that gets past you.

PAUL WILKINSON

If inciting people to do that [9/11] is terrorism, and if killing those who kill our sons is terrorism, then let history be witness that we are terrorists.

OSAMA BIN LADEN, interview, Oct. 2001

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What is Terrorism? Terrorism is an undefined entity even by United Nations. An act which is terrorism for someone maybe it’s the source of freedom for you.

Terrorism is not new, and even though it has been used since the beginning of recorded history it can be relatively hard to define. Terrorism has been described variously as both a tactic and strategy; a crime and a holy duty; a justified reaction to oppression and an inexcusable abomination. Obviously, a lot depends on whose point of view is being represented. Terrorism has often been an effective tactic for the weaker side in a conflict. As an asymmetric form of conflict, it confers coercive power with many of the advantages of military force at a fraction of the cost. Due to the secretive nature and small size of terrorist organizations, they often offer opponents no clear organization to defend against or to deter. That is why preemption is being considered to be so important. In some cases, terrorism has been a means to carry on a conflict without the adversary realizing the nature of the threat, mistaking terrorism for criminal activity. Because of these characteristics, terrorism has become increasingly common among those pursuing extreme goals throughout the world. But despite its popularity, terrorism can be a nebulous concept. Even within the U.S. Government, agencies responsible for different functions in the ongoing fight against terrorism use different definitions.

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The United States Department of Defense defines terrorism as “the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.” Within this definition, there are three key elements—violence, fear, and intimidation—and each element produce terror in its victims. The FBI uses this: "Terrorism is the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives." The U.S. Department of State defines "terrorism" to be "premeditated politically-motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. Outside the United States Government, there are greater variations in what features of terrorism are emphasized in definitions. The United Nations produced this definition in 1992; "An anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets." The most commonly accepted academic definition starts with the U.N. definition quoted above, and adds two sentences totaling another 77 words on the end; containing such verbose concepts as "message generators" and 'violence based communication processes." Less specific and considerably less verbose, the British Government definition of 1974 is"…the use of violence for political ends, and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public, or any section of the public, in fear."

Terrorism is a criminal act that influences an audience beyond the immediate victim. The strategy of terrorists is to commit acts of violence that draws the attention of the local populace, the government, and the world to their cause. The terrorists plan their attack to obtain the greatest publicity, choosing targets that symbolize what they oppose. The effectiveness of the terrorist act lies not in the act itself, but in the public’s or government’s reaction to the act. For example, in 1972 at the Munich Olympics, the Black September Organization killed 11 Israelis. The Israelis were the immediate victims. But the true target was the estimated 1 billion people watching the televised event.

The Black September Organization used the high visibility of the Olympics to publicize its views on the plight of the Palestinian refugees. Similarly, in October 1983, Middle Eastern terrorists bombed the Marine Battalion Landing Team Headquarters at Beirut International Airport. Their immediate victims were the 241 U.S. military personnel who were killed and over 100 others who were wounded. Their true target was the American people and the U.S. Congress. Their one act of violence influenced the United States’ decision to withdraw the Marines from Beirut and was therefore considered a terrorist success.

There are three perspectives of terrorism: the terrorist’s, the victim’s, and the general publics. The phrase “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” is a view terrorists themselves would accept. Terrorists do not see themselves as evil. They believe they are legitimate combatants, fighting for what they believe in, by whatever means possible. A victim of a terrorist act sees the terrorist as a

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criminal with no regard for human life. The general public’s view is the most unstable. The terrorists take great pains to foster a “Robin Hood” image in hope of swaying the general public’s point of view toward their cause. This sympathetic view of terrorism has become an integral part of their psychological warfare and needs to be countered vigorously.

Terrorism: A case Study of Pakistan At present the gravest problem that Pakistan is facing is terrorism. It has become a headache for federation and a nightmare for public. Though, it is a global issue but Pakistan has to bear the brunt of it. Pakistan’s involvement in the War on Terror has further fuelled the fire. We are facing war like situation against the terrorists. This daunting situation is caused due to several factors. These factors include social injustice, economic disparity, political instability, religious intolerance and also external hands or international conspiracies. A handful of people who have their vicious interests to fulfill have not only taken countless innocent lives but also distorted the real image of Islam before the world through their heinous acts. Terrorist acts like suicide bombings have become a norm of the day. On account of these attacks Pakistan is suffering from ineffaceable loss ranging from civilian to economic. People have become numerical figures, blown up in numbers every now and then. Terrorists have not spared any place. Bazars, mosques, educational institutes, offices, hotels, no place is safe anymore.

September 9/11: World Trade Centre After the September 11 terrorist attacks, Pakistan’s decision to join the U.S led global war on terror provided it with an opportunity and chance to address militancy and religious extremism is the country. Terrorism as it has been defined since 9/11 has so far taken a death toll of thousands of people, mostly in Iraq followed by Afghanistan and Pakistan. This version of war against terrorism has increased not only terrorists but it has perished almost 4,000 innocent people in Pakistan only.

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Genesis of Terrorism: There appear two main events that brought terrorism and intolerance to Pakistan on religious grounds. Prior to 1980, religion was not a controversial issue is Pakistan. However the sectarian anti-Shiite militant groups like the Sipah-e-Sahaba, were preaching hatred against the Shiite Muslims. This sectarian violence came to Pakistan only after the 1979 revolution in Iran, which transformed the nature and magnitude of sectarian violence in Pakistan. This was further aggravated when a sunni-dominated Iraq with the backing of USA and Saudi Arabia which waged a war upon Shiite dominated Iran. These sectarian organizations were instrumental in the transformation of Pakistan into a secondary battlefield which in turn is a major cause of rise in religious extremism and intolerance in Pakistani Society.

A large group of self-styled Islamic scholars t0day in Punjab who belonged to hard line Salafi tradition of Islam, do openly approve of suicide bombing. The followers of this group believe in

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waging jihad against The Jews and The Shias and have shown in democracy. The group leaders have preached that jihad should be waged until ‘Islam’ becomes the dominant force in the world. It is totally in conflict with the ideology on which Quid-e-Azam premised his struggle for Pakistan. He did not win Pakistan by waging a bloody Jihad but brought it into being by waging democratic struggle against the British and the Hindus. The Muslims of undivided India voted massively for a separate land where they would not be marginalized by a non-Muslim majority.

The Soviet Afghanistan War The soviet Afghanistan war was the most critical event responsible for spreading militancy and intolerance in Pakistan. A fundamental change that altered the very character of Pakistani society occurred after establishment of the soviet backed communist regime in Afghanistan. The aftermath of the soviet withdrawal exposed the damage, transformation of violence and weaponisation into Pakistani society. It ultimately plagued Pakistan with a new trend commonly referred as “Kalashnikov Culture” and “Talibaizetion”. Taliban terrorism is different from lashkar terrorism of Punjab. Pakistan has never had any problem with the way the tribal lived their lives. The government of Pakistan had never interfered with their rituals which they called “Sharia”. However when NATO and U.S troops, in the wake of 9/11, occupied Afghanistan, the tribal on the Pakistani side of the DL(Durand Line) as has been their wont for centuries came to the help of their kinsman across the border fighting the occupying troops in the same way as they did when Afghanistan was being occupied by the Soviet troops.

Terrorism in tribal belt of Pakistan Today terrorism is threatening the very roots and fabric of Pakistan’s nationhood. More tragically, terrorism in Pakistan draws its justification from the very faith which provides the country its ideological mornings.

Islamic point of view The religion of Islam (Submission), advocates freedom, peace and mutual agreement and admonishes aggression. The following verses make it very clear.

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“...You shall not kill * GOD has made life sacred * except in the course of justice. These are His commandments to you that you may understand.” (Quran 6:151)

“You shall not kill any person * for GOD has made life sacred — except in the course of justice.” (Quran17:33)

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In Islam, an amazingly powerful emphasis is laid on developing love for mankind and on the vital importance of showing mercy and sympathy towards every creature of Allah Almighty, including human beings and animals. For indeed, love and true sympathy is the very antidote of terrorism.

Injustice is one of the foremost factors that breed terrorism. When the grievances of the people are not redressed they resort to violent actions. So this is the case with Pakistan where timely justice has always been a far cry. Hence, the delayed justice is working as incentive for victims and dragging them to the swamp of terrorist organizations. Literacy is the root causes of extremism and terrorism. More than one in five men aged 15 to 24 unable to read or write, and only one in 20 is in tertiary education. such a high illiteracy rate has made Pakistan vulnerable to terrorism. Furthermore, technical and vocational education, and adult literacy, are especially important but unfortunately have been neglected the most in Baluchistan, Khyber Pukhtunkhwa and the Tribal Areas. Illiteracy and lack of skills provide fertile ground for those who wish to recruit young men and women to their cause, especially when significant monetary Payments are attached.

Regarding poverty, it is also an incubating cause of terrorism. And it is said that “a hungry man is an angry man.” Notably, majority of people in Pakistan are living below poverty line. While especially for the youngsters, unemployment has made the matter worse. In these adverse circumstances, some people go to the level of extremism and even commit suicide. These are the people whose services are hired by the terrorist groups and they become easy prey to terrorism.

Food insecurity is also linked with militancy and violence. When people remain unable to afford food and cannot meet their basic needs civil strife grows. A report by the Islamabad-based Sustainable Development Policy Institute the highest levels of food insecurity, for instance, exist in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, according to the report, where 67.7 per cent of the people are insecure. The next highest level is in Baluchistan, with food insecurity at 61.2 per cent, and then in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, 56.2 per cent. In Pakistan some extremist forces are exploiting the feelings of lower and lower middle class food insecure people. They are motivating their unemployed youth to commit heinous crimes such as suicide attacks against innocent people.

Another reason of terrorism is dissatisfaction. When a person is dissatisfied with the rulers and thinks that his rights are being humiliated or exiled, his living of life has not been compensated, he is

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deprived of rightful inheritance to office, wrongly imprisoned and property confiscated then he joins some religious parties. It does not matter which organization it would be. None of the organizations has any importance for him. Adopting an organization would only save him from the critical situation he is in and leaves him to play in the hands of his so-called leaders who destroy his public sense of security

Today’s Pakistan is facing democratic turmoil. A path chartered by the military regime of Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan then of Zia-ul-Haq was altered by yet another military regime that of Musharraf. All these regimes produced political instability, poor governance, institutional paralysis, by passing the rule of law, socio-economic downfall and so on. These fragile conditions along with deteriorating law and order situation have provided a fertile ground for terrorism to grow.

Furthermore, lack of proper government set-up and lack of coordination and information sharing between various institutions of government is also a cause of behind the escalating terrorist activities. Not to talk of providing security to common people, our law enforcing agencies (LEAs) have completely failed to protect high officials of the country. In the absence of law and proper trial the terrorists are entrenching their roots firmly. Failure of the (LAEs) to bring the terrorist to book has emboldened terror mongers to strike at a target of their choice at will. Schools, hospitals, markets and places of worship have become their favorite targets.

The soviet Afghanistan war was the most critical event responsible for spreading militancy and intolerance in Pakistan. A fundamental change that altered the very character of Pakistani society occurred after establishment of the soviet backed communist regime in Afghanistan. The aftermath of the soviet withdrawal exposed the damage, transformation of violence and Weaponisation into Pakistani society. It ultimately plagued Pakistan with a new trend commonly referred as “Kalashnikov Culture” and “Talbanization”.

Religion became the dominant force during the Zia regime when the Islamization of laws and education became a state policy. And the Islamic legislation was promulgated and a number of Islamic enactments were made, including the Hudood and blasphemy laws. One may also mention the vital role of the jihadis in their fight against the Soviet military occupation with the American support, as well as the generous patronage extended by the government to the religious parties and groups. It may be added that various religious groups benefited from the support they received from abroad, in particular from Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Religious Madrasah is not something new for the Islam or our country. But after Russian attack on Afghanistan it took a new dimension. They were being used as recruitment centers for jihadis. Thousands of Mujahedeen were trained and sent to Afghanistan for so-called jihad. After the fall of Russia, a sizeable number of the jihadis who returned to Pakistan got involved in terrorist activities.

Religious intolerance is another factor which is adding fuel to the fire of terrorism. Youth, educated through religious Madrassahs, are indoctrinated with extreme ideas. They become intolerant towards other religions and even other sects of their own religion. They impose their own extreme ideas and

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vent their fanaticism thorough violent actions. Intolerance makes society jungle. It is proving destructive phenomenon for social harmony, political stability, and economic growth.

The soviet Afghanistan war was the most critical event responsible for spreading militancy and intolerance in Pakistan. A fundamental change that altered the very character of Pakistani society occurred after establishment of the soviet backed communist regime in Afghanistan. The aftermath of the soviet withdrawal exposed the damage, transformation of violence and Weaponisation into Pakistani society. It ultimately plagued Pakistan with a new trend commonly referred as “Kalashnikov Culture” and “Talbanization”. This was perhaps an end to our long established pluralistic culture and values. Result was a wave of vicious cycle of Sectarian and Inter-sect and Interfaith violence/terrorism.

Religious extremism that took its roots in Pakistan after the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 is proving venomous for Pakistan. The increased danger of sectarian motivated acts of violence, have gained in power and influence over the recent past. External as well as internal influences have impacted the sectarian issues and have served to further intensify the magnitude and seriousness of the problem. Sectarian violence, therefore, was an extremely rare and unheard of phenomenon in Pakistan with sectarian disputes being very localized and confined rather than being frequent and widespread.

This religious extremism took a new shape of terrorism after 9/11. After the incident of 9/11 suicide bombing in Pakistan has become a norm of the day. The American invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, as well as the military operation in Pakistan, along with the American drone attacks, have served to fuel religious radicalism leading to violent reaction. The breakdown of state structures in Afghanistan created a void which was quickly filled by groups and individuals who took it upon themselves to continue the lost battle. Some of them also intruded into Pakistani tribal areas, thus inviting the US displeasure. Flushing out these foreign fighters by Pakistani security forces made Pakistan a battle ground, as foreign militants and some of their local hosts, joined hands to counter the security forces.

The drone strikes have increased anti-Americanism in Pakistan society and the region. The terrorists have used the collateral damage to maximize the environment and society to their benefit. Families of people killed in collateral damage become ideal nursery for suicide bombers In Pakistan society drone attacks are popularly believed to have caused even more civilian casualties than is actually the case. The persistence of these attacks on Pakistani territory is continuously creating public outrages and alienating people from government and Army. The drone is a tactical weapon and has certainly given good results tactically to support coalition forces operation on their sides of the border but strategically history has many unanswered questions.

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On account of anti-campaign and drone attacks scores of people have become homeless and even some have lost all their possessions Coupled with this, governments indifference towards these internally displaced people has further deteriorating the situation and encouraging people to join anti-state actors. Negligence on the part of government has alienated the people and has placed Pakistan in an undesirable situation domestically.

Furthermore, indiscriminate and brutal persecution of innocent citizen of Kashmir and Palestine by Indian and Israeli forces respectively is further boosting the monster of terrorism. the people of Kashmir and Palestine have been denied their basic rights for decades. Hence their feelings of antagonism springing out in the form violent acts and also their supporters are conducting these types of acts here in Pakistan in order the draw the attention of the world towards the injustices being done to them.

Pakistan has done its level best to rid terrorism and terrorists from its soil. In first step, many terrorist organizations were banned by the Musharraf government. After those successful military operations namely Rah-e-Nijat and Rah-e-Rast have been conducted. Pakistan army has fought bravely against terrorist and has destroyed their safe dens. It has broken the backbone of the terrorists and has forced them to flee. These operations still keep ongoing in some tribal areas. In this context, it is worth-mentioning that public support to military operations is very essential, and without people’s backing no army can win this ‘different war’ against terrorism.

For Pakistan the consequences of being the epicenter of the war on terror have been disastrous physically, psychologically and economically. Nobody understands terrorism better than us (Pakistanis). We have been victims of various manifestations of it since the Soviet Afghan war. Since 9/11, the wave of suicide bombing has so far killed scores of innocent Pakistani civilians and muffled the already slow pace of our economic growth. The financial cost of the ongoing global war on terror in the last two years alone has been $35 billion. This has badly affected in particular, the socio-economic development of Pakistan. Lest we forget, we even lost our prominent political leader Benazir Bhutto to an act of terror.

Since September 11, 2001, 21,672 Pakistani civilians have lost their lives or have been seriously injured in an ongoing fight against terrorism. The Pakistan Army has lost 2,795 soldiers in the war and 8,671 have been injured. There have been 3,486 bomb blasts in the country, including 283 major suicide attacks. More than 3.5 million have been displaced. The damage to the Pakistani economy is estimated at $68 billion over the last ten years. Over 200,000 Pakistani troops were deployed at the frontline and 90,000 soldiers are fighting against militants on the Afghan border.

The ongoing insurgency has accelerated the already dismal economic situation and has affected almost each and every economic aspects of the country, particularly in FATA and Khyber Pukhtunkhwa. All the main resources of revenue in affected areas have been hurt, including agriculture, the tourism industry, manufacturing and small-scale industry.

Due to insurgency, the loss to agriculture alone amounts to Rs.35 billion. The breakdown in law and order situation has damaged the fruit based economy of the northern areas. It has rendered billions of rupees losses to the landowners, laborers, dealers and farmers who earn their livelihood from these orchards. Also, the Economic survey of Pakistan report shows that the share of agriculture in the gross domestic product (GDP) has been constantly falling. It accounted for 25.99 per cent of GDP in 1999-2000; however, gradually its share shrank to 21.3 per cent in 2007-2008. The figures show that

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terrorism has not only decreased the productive capacity of agricultural activity in these regions but also in the entire country.

The manufacturing sector has been hard hit by frequent incidents of terrorism and has created an uncertain environment resulting into low level of economic growth. The manufacturing sector is witnessing the lowest-ever share of 18.2 per cent in the GDP over the last five years. In addition, the small and medium-size enterprises which are key area of manufacturing in Pakistan have been affected across the country because of power shortages and recurrent terrorist attacks.

According to a Harvard study (December 2000), higher levels of terrorism risk are associated with lower levels of net FDI. In case of Pakistan, terrorism has affected the allocation of firms investing money in the country. As a result, FDI, which had witnessed a steep rise over the previous several years, was adversely affected by the terrorist acts in the country, especially in FATA and other areas of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa.

According to the World Economic Forum, Pakistan ranked 113 out of 130 countries in 2009 as a tourist destination. The low ranking is attributed to incidents of terrorism and the lack of a tourism regulatory framework in Pakistan. On account of persistent terrorist attacks many hotels in the northwest areas have been closed. According to government’s own estimates, the hotel industry in Swat valley has suffered a loss of PRs. 60 billion. Many workers have lost their jobs and transport has also face a severe blow.

Due to war on terror, local people of war-ridden areas are migrating to other areas of Pakistan. Country has seen the largest migration since independence in 1947. These people have left their homes, businesses, possessions and property back home. This large influx of people and their rehabilitation is an economic burden for Pakistan. Unemployment is still prevalent and now the question of providing employment to these migrants has also become a serious concern. This portion of population is contributing nothing worthwhile to the national income yet they have to be benefitted from it. This unproductive lot of people is a growing economic problem of Pakistan

Social impacts have also been caused by this war. In a society where terror exists cannot be healthy. Social disorganization has occurred due to terrorism. Social relations, economic transactions, free moments, getting education, offering prayers etc. have suffered. Pakistan’s participation in the anti-terrorism campaign has led to massive unemployment, homelessness, poverty and other social problems and ills. In addition, frequent incidents of terrorism and displacement of the local \population have severely affected the social fabric.

On the political front Pakistan is badly impacted in fighting the war against terrorism. It has taken many valuable steps to defeat terrorists. In spite of all the sacrifices the country is making it is branded to be a country insincere or half-hearted in fighting the menace. Every time the country is told to “do more”. It is further alleged for infiltration of the militants inside US-NATO dominated Afghanistan. The failure of the Western troops in the neighborhood is blamed on Pakistan. This situation has eroded the trust between the governments and caused international image problem for the country.

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Similarly the terror has brought in its wake psychological problems. Fear in the hearts of the people is created. Trauma, depressions and confusion have been increased. The people feel insecure and unsafe whenever in their daily life activities, as time and again they watch the terror events taking place in different cities. Those have especially been suffered who have closely witnessed the suicidal bombings.

The religion is also impacted by the war against terrorism. The religion of Islam is perceived to be the one tolerating extremism and terrorism abroad. In the western world people equate violence, abuse against women and minority rights, and several acts of terrorism like suicidal bombing and coercion with Islam and Muslims. Whenever any such inhuman act takes place they tie it with Islam and its followers. When in the UK terror acts were committed the authority blamed it on Pakistani citizens for instance. And why these days Pakistanis are discriminately interrogated and have to be screened before they inter the US is due to the fact that they are Pakistanis and Muslims.

Causes and Recommendations How Can The Challenges Be Met: In case of lashkars, the Pakistani establishment needs to go to its basics crises. The self-styled and misguided ‘Islamic scholars’ preaching Jihad, the government should cut all the help. Pakistan’s biggest province-Punjab is recruiting ‘Mujahidin’ from among the poorest of poor people. The poverty of these regions should be eradicated on emergency grounds so that the poor masses get awareness about the misguided “Mullahs”. Negotiations with them, start building physical paraphernalia including roads, schools, hospitals, bridges and manufacturing units under, the so called reconstruction opportunity zones.

Preventing and resolving conflicts with Taliban’s and other religious groups. Strengthening the protection of vulnerable targets. A fully demarcated border with Afghanistan which will prevent the foreign intrusion in the

country. Specially, the role of RAW and Mosad. It wills also sooth the feelings of American troops in Afghanistan which always blows the old trumpet of “Do More”.

The government should enter into serious negotiations with Washington on the issues of drone attacks so that our sovereignty should be preserved as we reserve the right to undertake actions on our own land. A concrete time-table of withdrawal from Afghanistan needs to be announced by the U.S led forces. This trauma also needs better intelligence and sophisticated assessment such as threat Assessment Modeling, Artificial Neural Networks and there dimensional modeling in virtual operations center.

To begin with, a national commission needs to be set up, which identifies the fault lines and the root causes of the rise of extremism in Pakistan taking into consideration the post-Nine-Eleven developments.

It should also take up the question of reforming the madrassas. The heads of all the major religious groups should be contacted and engaged to explore short-term and long-term solutions.

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Our universities and research institutes should take up the intellectual task of re-interpreting the Islamic injunctions in the light of modern knowledge and 21st century challenges (with emphasis on social justice).

The government must improve its performance. Bad governance and corruption have lowered its credibility and clout,

Parliament must debate Pakistan’s present relationship with the US, with particular reference to the American war in Afghanistan and operations in Pakistan.

Our government should make efforts to develop sector. Without any doubt, these efforts will play a crucial role not only in providing employment to the millions of people but will also eliminate poverty in the country.

Pakistan’s government should particularly emphasis the need of technical education by promoting it. In this respect, more institutes should be opened in order to promote technical education.

It is mentionable that there are two types of terrorists, extremists and moderates. In order to cope with terrorism, our government should neutralize the moderate terrorists through reconciliation by offering them general pardon and asking them to renounce terrorism. Even extremist insurgents can be offered mediation. Nevertheless, those militants who reject the offer could be fought through military operations.

Nonetheless, for their on global and regional interests, US-led western allies must not only increase the military and economic aid of Pakistan but also provide direct market access to Pak products on zero rate duty to help stabilize the country’s bleak economy in the wake of the war against terror.

As Pakistan has been successfully coping with the menace of terrorism, US-led some western countries including India should also give up their propaganda campaign against Islamabad and blame game against its intelligence agency ISI.

US should help in resolving the Kashmir dispute to deal with the problem of militancy in the region.

In order to fight terrorism, Pakistan’s media should play a key role. It must point out the criminal activities of the militants like hostage-taking, killing of the innocent people? Torching the government buildings including girl schools and car-snatching. It should also indicate that Islam is a religion of peace and does not allow suicide attacks.

As Pakistan is already facing various crises of grave nature in wake of terrorism, so our politicians must stop manipulating the same for their own self-interests. By setting aside their differences and by showing power of tolerance, both our rulers and opposition parties need to act upon a policy of national reconciliation to cope with the problem of terrorism and to stand before external pressure.

Conclusion To conclude that a devastating and diabolical ideology which has manifested itself time and again is both sectarian and non-sectarian bloodshed before and after the 9/11 incidents, would hardly die if Pakistan were to close its alliance with U.S. So the remedy lies in countering poverty, unemployment, backwardness and illiteracy. Attention should also be given to monitoring the activities and curricula of the Madrasah- the breeding ground of extremism and intolerance. Moreover Terrorism will not disappear through military operations. It is a perverse mindset that needs to be treated like a disease.

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To conclude, Pakistan is a peace loving nation and playing its important role in combating terror. Recognition of efforts to fight menace of terrorism and sacrifices rendered thereof are testimony to the commitment and resolve to bring peace in the region. Unfortunately sometimes its commitment is doubted by some of its allies. Mistrust can lead to diversion of efforts, which will not be beneficial to common objective of peace in the region. Pakistan is a responsible nation; fully capable of defending its territorial integrity. Pakistan has singularly committed large forces to combat menace of terrorism more than any other country. No foreign troops are either present or deployed on Pakistan soil. All citizens of Pakistan must propagate moderate vibrant culture of Pakistan to promote good will of world community and shun misconstrued beliefs. Attacks on security forces personnel are executed at the sponsorship of hostile intelligence agencies. Such anti state elements must be singled out and brought to lime light to defeat evil agendas of our enemies. Pakistan has sacrificed the most in the ongoing war on terror; criticizing Pakistan’s efforts at national/international forum will be counter-productive to the overall objectives of war on terror

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References http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2012/09/16/comment/columns/talibanization-and-

politics/

http://alaiwah.wordpress.com/category/pakistan/talibanization/

http://www.cfr.org/issue/135/

http://www.terrorism-research.com/

http://www.terrorism.com/

http://www.insightonconflict.org/conflicts/pakistan/conflict-

profile/?gclid=CKPZocGXrrQCFaTMtAodcmAAdw

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terrorism_in_Pakistan

http://www.spopk.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=98:terrorism-

in-pakistan&catid=49:news-and-media&Itemid=92

http://www.pakistansocietyofcriminology.com/articles/TerrorisminPakistan.pdf

http://www.hamariweb.com/articles/article.aspx?id=15598

http://www.hamariweb.com/articles/article.aspx?id=15598

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GROUP 2:

Faisal J Khalil Ubaid Iqbal Salaka Aslam Chaudhry Anila Naheed M. Umer Khokhar M. Zeeshan Arshad


Water Management: The nature has blessed Pakistan in numerous ways; one such way being the alluvial plains and a network of rivers. Like all other resources, this water is to be divided equitably between the provinces, for which comprehensive framework was established. Still the provinces remain at loggerheads, with daily blame game.

We forget that the water cycle and the life cycle are one. - Jacques Cousteau

A river seems a magic thing. A magic, moving, living part of the very earth itself.

- Laura Gilpin - From The Rio Grande, 1949

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Introduction

Pakistan is one of the world’s most arid countries, with an average rainfall of under 240 mm a

year. The population and the economy are greatly reliant on an annual influx into the Indus

river system (including the Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas and Sutlej rivers) of about 180

billion cubic meters of water, that emanates from the neighboring countries and is mostly

derived from snowmelt in the Himalayas.

Pakistan is faced with an emerging water crisis in various forms, like irrigated agriculture,

municipal, rural water supply and sanitation, maintenance of supply systems, water for

industry, water for hydropower, water rights and allocations, economic and financial

management, groundwater, stakeholders participation, flood management, drought

management, drainage and reclamation, water quality, wetlands, ecology and recreational

water, information management and research, trans-boundary water sharing and institutional

and legal aspects.

History of Inter-Provincial Water Conflicts in Pakistan

River Indus with its seven tributaries forms Indus River System (IRS) and is considered as

hydrological life-line of Pakistan. This is also one of the largest rivers in South Asia; with a

drainage basin covering 1 million km² and a length of 3000 km. It originates in the

Himalayan range in Tibet while its major tributaries originates in the Himalayan and

Karakoram mountains ranges of Tibet and India, and the Hindukush ranges of Afghanistan.

The Indus basin covers 70% of Pakistan’s territory-the provinces of Punjab, Sindh and the

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the eastern portion of Balochistan. Among the large nations of the

world, perhaps only Egypt is more dependent than Pakistan on a single river-basiniDue to

being an agriculture driven economy, Pakistan is over dependent on IRS. Ninety percent of

the country’s agricultural output, which represents about one-quarter of the Gross Domestic

Product and most of the export earnings, depends on irrigation water from the Indus and its

tributaries.

As an important river system, which meets the agricultural, industrial and domestic

consumption demands of maximum people in Pakistan, it’s a source of confrontation among

the catchments areas. River Indus is being used as political weapon by the rulers since

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colonial days. Due to loyalty of Sikh soldiers in suppressing 1857 war of independence and

other British wars colonial rulers rewarded them by setting up canal colonies in Indus basin

of Punjab, where the retired soldiers could be settled. The waters of the five rivers were

harnessed in an ambitious irrigation development. The transformation of 6 million acres of

desert into one of the richest agricultural regions in Asia was seen as stupendous engineering

feat that was seen as colonial government biggest achievement. This was also an attempt by

the colonial government to establish loyalty among the soldiers staying in that area and dilute

the rising tide of nationalism .As Sir Charles Aitcheson maintained that “It is of greatest

importance to secure for these tracts manly peasantry capable of self-support and of loyal and

law-abiding disposition”. But in early decades of 20th century these colonies too came under

impact of growing nationalist movement and revolts took place there too. Afterwards

Bruisers changed their policies. In 1914 Michel O Dwyer developed the scheme for grant of

land in colonies to the ‘landed gentry’. Their holders were to provide natural leadership to the

settlers. Seven and half percent of Lower Bari Doab colony were reserved in this way. The

main beneficiaries were large land holders such as Noon’s and Tiwanas, who were loyalist

military contractors to the Raj. This process has led to emergence of feudalism in Punjab,

who was dependent upon waters from Indus to enrich and support their lavish life-styles. And

thus conflict for getting more water through diversion projects began. After the British left

the subcontinent and Pakistan came into being, the water from the IRS still occupied same

importance and is being still a source for interprovincial confrontation in Pakistan.

For the first time in 1901, the issue of water conflict between Punjab and Sindh came to the

fore, when the Indian Irrigation Commission prohibited Punjab from taking even a drop of

water from Indus without the approval of Sindh. Then in 1919, the then government of

British India issued the Cotton Committee report; where in, it prohibited Punjab from

undertaking any projects until Sukkur barrage was completed and water needs of Sindh were

determined. In 1925, Lord Reading, the British Viceroy of India, rejected Punjab’s request

for Thal canal from Indus considering the undue deprivation of Sindh’s lower riparian rights.

In 1937; however, the Anderson Commission allowed Punjab to withdraw 775 cusecs of

water on experimental basis from Indus for Thal canal. This happened even with the absence

of Thal canal in the terms of the commission and clearly constituted a direct violation of the

viceroy’s orders of 1925. In 1939, Sindh lodged a formal complaint with the government,

under the Government of India Act of 1935. Consequently, in 1941, the Rao Commission

recognized the injustice that was meted out to Sindh, recommended construction of two new

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barrages in Sindh on Indus, and ordered Punjab to pay 20 million Rupees of the construction

cost of these barrages to ameliorate Sindh’s losses due to the actions of Punjab. Under the

guidance of the Rao Commission, a committee comprising of the chief engineers of Punjab

and Sindh came out with an agreement in 1945, known as “Sindh- Punjab Agreement.” It

resolved the distribution of the waters of all Indus basin rivers between Punjab and Sindh.

Essentially, this agreement recognized Sindh’s supremacy over the Indus River and nothing

upstream could be changed or built without her formal consent and approval.

Causes for Water Supply Issues

Water management is a flashpoint in the context of Pakistani Federalism for a largely arid

and agrarian country like Pakistan. Water management is a vital priority as the country is fast

moving for water stressed situations to water scarce. Pakistan’s failure to device an effective

strategy for political, economic and technological management of water has led to fall in

water availability per person from 5000 cubic meters in 1947 to 1100 cubic meters in 2006.

Despite the water apportionment accord of 1991 and a federal body named Indus River

System Authority (IRSA) for the purpose, the provinces of Sindh and Punjab have serious

conflicts over water distribution, while KPK and Balochistan do not have the capacity to fully

utilize their apportioned share of water. The energy-deficit Pakistan is also not able to fully

utilize its’ hydro-power potential for cheaper generation of electricity.

Primarily the major phenomenon causing water issues in Pakistan are as follows:

Population Rise

There is scarcity of water throughout the 4 provinces of Pakistan, because the population of

Pakistan is increasing day by day. Population of Pakistan stands at 145 million and is likely

to increase to about 221(8) million by the year 2025. If we look at the 70% population located

in order to provide agriculture, they use water for their own consumption as well.

Consumption of water throughout Pakistan is extremely high and often wasted as well. A

WAPDA official termed the situation critical and said that the country would be deficient in

water to such an extent that it would be unable to meet the requirements of a rising

population and an economy heavily dependent on agriculture. “We are heading towards an

acute water shortage largely because of rapid population growth and failure of successive

governments to build reservoirs to store water,” the official added.

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Lack of Dams (water reservoirs)

The alarming drop in water level has also led to a serious shortfall in hydal power. And these

are genuine apprehensions if the situation lingers on for some time more, the energy crisis

would deepen as soon as the water level goes further down in Mangla and Tarbela. There is a

lack of dams built in Pakistan due to which there is a rise in water supply issues. Not a lot of

water is being reserved for future usage in Pakistan; it is causing a shortage of water for the

entire country, leading to desperation for water. Pakistan has only 18 water reservoirs and

seven barrages to cater the agricultural and hydel power needs of the country.

Pakistan is highly dependent on agriculture, which in turn is dependent on water. Of the79.6

million hectares of land that makeup Pakistan, 20 million are available for agricultural. Of

those 20 million hectares, 16 million are dependent on irrigation. It is estimated that up to

90% of Pakistan’s agriculture is dependent on irrigation. An even more important fact is that

many of Pakistan’s industries are agro-based, such as the textiles industry. These have a bad

impact on our country for example:

Drying Rivers

India has depleted water supplies from two rivers, the Ravi and Sutlej, which have their

sources in India but flow into north-east Pakistan, as well as from the Beas, an Indian

tributary of the Sutlej. The Sutlej and Beas are already dry, and the Ravi is partially dry. All

water is being stopped in India. The Indus Water Treaty, signed by Pakistan and India in

1960, reserves the waters of the Jhelum, Chenab and Indus for Pakistan, while the Ravi and

Sutlej are reserved for India

India’s dam building in Kashmir, however, has raised suspicions in Pakistan that it is taking

an unfair share of the waters of the Jhelum, Chenab and Indus. India continues to violate this

treaty by consuming more water and building dams. Pakistan has raised this concern with the

World Bank. Indian officials maintain they are operating within the boundaries of the Indus

Water Treaty, though the treaty is widely viewed within Pakistan as favoring India. World

Bank mediation of one dispute over dam building was decided in 2007 in India’s favor.

Pakistan is constructing several dams of its own on rivers in the area of Kashmir that it

controls, as well as in the country’s northern province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. If

supplies run low for irrigation or drinking water, local populations are likely to take the law

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into their own hands and grab what water is available. This could lead to serious localtensions

getting out of control.

Agriculture

Pakistan is an agriculture country which requires a lot of water to be supplied for their crops

and vegetation. Water shortage has badly affected the agricultural sector of Pakistan which

heavily depends on agro based economy. The agricultural lands of the Punjab and Sindh,

mostly depend on canal water irrigation because in some areas underground water is

brackish. Present water crisis, if allowed to continue, would reduce the production of wheat,

rice and sugarcane etc. Briefly water crisis in the country has spread deep concern. The

shortage is threatening to create famine like condition across Pakistan.

The direct impacts of water crises in Pakistan have reduced crop, range land, forest

productivity and water level. On the other hand, it has increased livestock, wildlife and

human beings mortality rates and damaged the wildlife and fish habitats. Direct or primary

impacts become so diffuse that it’s very difficult to come up with financial estimates of

damages.

The case further elaborates the different water issues that exist in Pakistan;

Tarbela Dam

Balochistan Water Conflict

Indo-Pak Water Conflict

Kalabagh Dam

Tarbela Dam

Pakistan’s cup of domestic woes is brimming and threatens to spill over — both literally and

metaphorically. The political and jihadi turbulence apart, lurking behind is a less noticed and

closely guarded hydro-economic monster threatening to strangulate Pakistan: the health of its

principal dam, Tarbela.

If the Bhakra Nangal dam springs a leak and empties overnight, India will be badly affected

but will not crumble. However, if the world’s largest earth and rock fill dam, the Tarbela dam

across the Indus, springs a leak and empties, Pakistan will be crippled. Pakistan has placed a

lot of its eggs in one basket. Some 30 per cent of Pakistan’s power generation is from hydel

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sources and the Tarbela dam provides 60 per cent of the hydel power generation and anchors

the country’s irrigation system. However, the Indus River is among the world’s largest silt

producers and the Tarbela reservoir is choking up with silt. The catastrophe in the making,

which was thought to be many years away, might actually be visiting Pakistan very soon, if it

is not already almost upon it. The current political woes in Islamabad have either got their

leaders to bury their heads in the sand or they do not want the rest of the world and their own

people to know the threat the country faces. With Pakistan having acquired nuclear weapons,

the rest of the world must know whether the remaining shelf life of Tarbela is only a few

months or a few years away. How fast Pakistan is becoming a failed state is the answer we all

have to know in an objective manner, devoid of any Indo-Pak animosity.

The Tarbela dam construction was completed in 1974 and while test-filling the site, sink

holes in the alluvium bed were noticed. This led to costly remedial measures and delay in

filling up by two years. Since then, every year, 200 million tonnes of silt has been deposited

in the reservoir. Predictably, a silt delta formed and crept towards the dam. It was envisaged

that the silt delta would be 48 km from the dam by 1983, but it actually loomed to within 19

km. By 1991, the delta crest was just 14 km from the dam and creeping towards the dam at

the rate of one kilometre a year. In 1997, M/s Tippetts-Abbett-McCarthy-Stretton

International Corporation recommended, that if remedial measures were not taken for the

management of sediments, the delta would cross the danger limit line by as early as 2006. If

the danger limit line is crossed and the delta slumps, there is a very real danger of the turbines

getting overwhelmed and being shut down. If the Tarbela dam stops producing electricity, the

entire grid of Pakistan will trip. The load-shedding that will have to be resorted to will cripple

industry, normal daily life and bring about a sudden flight of capital and civilian population.

Darkness will engulf the country, and Pakistan will implode. This scenario is neither far-

fetched nor fanciful.

To reduce the creep rate of the silt delta, the minimum level to which the reservoir was

allowed to deplete was being raised every year. This resulted in the live storage being

reduced not only to the extent of silt deposition, but also the extra water locked in because of

the rise in the minimum operating level. Foreigners are not allowed to visit the dam site.

In October 2005, an earthquake resulted in the earth loosening up and hill sides sliding down

into the valleys. All the valleys of the tributaries of the Jhelum and the Indus got choked with

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mud slides. Since the earthquake, two monsoons have washed the loosened earth into the

reservoirs.

This year the snowmelt and Southwest monsoons have been steadily leading to the Tarbela

filling to the brim by end of August 2007. Hardly two months have passed, and the Tarbela

reservoir has been depleted to less than half its capacity. The Pakistani media has been

reporting in a guarded manner that hydel generation is down and eight-to ten-hour power

outages are being predicted. Water shortage for the rabi crop is also feared. Balochistan

Water Conflict

Speakers at a seminar on World Water Day have warned that Balochistan would continue

facing water shortage crisis till 2025. This was said in a seminar on Water and Food

Insecurity organized by International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) on the

occasion of World Water Day 2012. IUCN Balochistan, Zabardast Khan Bangash said that

unfortunately, rainwater in Balochistan was not preserved but it swept away into sea.

In winter season, Karez water is not used more in Balochistan adding that it is not preserved

but there is report of waste of Karez water. There were four reasons of Water and Food

Insecurity in the province including population growth, climate change, energy crises and no

trend to bio fuel. Some other problems being faced by Balochistan included soil

mismanagement, salinization of irregulated areas and dry-land degradation from overgrazing.

Insufficient supply

This is apropos of Parvez Baloch’s letter ‘Water crisis in Gwadar’ (June 8). Gwadar is going

through a tough time due to lack of drinkable water. Being dependent on merely one dam, the

people of Gwadar are facing several problems. The Ankara Kaur dam was built in 1993 in

order to provide water to the inhabitants. Likewise, 50 per cent of Gwadar’s population relies

on Ankara Kaur dam. Unfortunately, its water level has decreased to a dangerous level.

According to an estimate, Gwadar city is supplied nearly 2 million gallons of water every

four or five days, against the requirement of 3.5 million, which unfortunately, forces the

people to go to far-flung areas to seek drinkable water. However, owing to lack of interest by

the authority’s concerned clean drinking water remains a distant dream for people on

Gwadar.

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Indo-Pak Water Conflict

A document titled “United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’ (UNFCCC),

reveals that India is all set to get the carbon credits of almost $700 million for 10 years

against seven hydropower projects being built on Pakistan’s river Indus, Chenab and Jhelum

from UN on 28 July . This will automatically provide legitimacy to all the projects. India’s

seeking carbon credits from UN is also linked with Kishanganga project. Pakistan is already

in a legal battle with India on Kishanganga Project in International Court of Arbitration at

The Hague.

The International Court of Arbitration (ICA) has granted a stay order, restraining India from

going ahead with the controversial hydro power project over river Kishanganga in Gurez area

of occupied Kashmir. Under the ICA order, India will not construct a permanent structure

over River Neelum/Kishanganga that may affect the flow of water downstream. Pakistan had

lodged a complaint in the court of arbitration that Indian bid to build Kishanganga dam was

violation of World Bank brokered Indus Water Treaty of 1960. On Indian refusal Pakistan

went to the ICA, which now issued the interim order on the issue restraining India from dam

construction. Pakistan is confronted with a situation whereby India is trying to make IWT

ineffective. Kishanganga is one among many projects that Pakistan is becoming wary of.

Pakistan is a lower riparian state, which gets almost all its water from Indian Held Kashmir.

To negate any major confrontation between the two countries, the World Bank helped them

reach an agreement through the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) in 1960. The treaty has withstood

two major wars between the nuclear-armed countries besides smaller conflicts.

India initiated the Kishanganga project, costing $820 million, in the Gurez-Bandipora area of

Kashmir, which would divert parts Neelum/Kishanganga flow which will be used to generate

energy and raised level of water in the Wullar Lake. It involves construction of a 37-meter

high concrete faced rock-fill dam which connected via a 22-kilometer water diversion tunnel.

If completed, the dam would result in a 21% drop in Neelum River’s inflow; thereby the

diversion of the Kishanganga River by India will reduce 27 per cent of the power-generation

capacity of its Neelum-Jhelum Hydroelectric Project. There is also fear of reduced river flows

for at least six months every year, irreparable loss to the environment, especially to the Musk

Deer Gurez Park, a vast national park in AJK near the LoC, and a dent in the tourism

potential of the Neelum valley. About 200 kilometers of riverbed will be affected by the

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project and about 40 kilometers of the length of the river will completely dry up; the water

reduction will also severely affect agriculture.

Kishanganga is not the only project that India and Pakistan have been fighting over. The two

countries had faced off over the Baglihar hydel-power project, built by damming the Chenab

River in Indian Kashmir. In 2008 Pakistan was faced with decreased flow of water in the

Chenab when India started to fill the dam. The river feeds water to 21 major canals and

irrigates about 2.8 million hectares of arable land in Pakistan. Pakistan Economy Watch

(PEW), an economic think-tank, calculated that filling the Baglihar dam would inflict a loss

of $1.5 billion on Pakistan. Analysts termed it a hydro weapon. The fast-flowing Chenab, a

vital river for Pakistan’s agriculture, has a high potential for generating power and India plans

to generate 16,000MW of energy by constructing nine power houses on it.

India maintains a huge military machine in Occupied Kashmir, much larger than the United

States and its allies, put together, have in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Occupied Kashmir, its

three-quarters of a million troops perhaps out number any such expeditionary force stationed

in an occupied or disputed area since the Second World War. On the face of it, the

deployment is tasked to deal with freedom fighters, which of course is a daunting challenge,

but more importantly, it is there to change the face of the Muslim-majority landscape called

Kashmir; its main weapon being brutal use of force against unarmed civilian population. But

where its work goes almost unnoticed is the security it provides to Indian engineers, who are

planning and working day and night to build dams on rivers that take water to Pakistan. So

furiously are they working and in such so-far inaccessible areas that of late, New Delhi is

thinking of bringing these projects under the enhanced protection cover of the Central

Industrial Security Force (CISF). All this work falls within the definition of an aqua war India

is preparing to foist on Pakistan. India is rapidly moving towards its target of making

Pakistan totally barren by building dams on three major rivers Chenab, Jhelum and Indus

flowing into Pakistan from the Indian side of the border.

These dams are being built in shrewd violation of provisions in Indus Water Treaty signed

between the two countries to ensure equitable distribution of water resources. India is doing

its best to overturn the IWT but Pakistan must not fall into the Indian trap by following a two-

pronged strategy. First, to pursue this case with full vigour, and ensure that the stay is

confirmed, second, to utilize this breathing space to start building irrigation-cum-generation

projects on the Indus. However, a permanent solution will involve a settlement of the

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Kashmir issue. It would mean a general Indo-Pak settlement, ridding us of threat of water

projects in Indian Held Kashmir.

Indus Water Treaty (IWT)

After Independence, problems between the two countries arose over the distribution of water.

Rivers flow into Pakistan territory from across India. In 1947, when Punjab was divided

between the two countries, many of the canal head-works remained with India. The division

of Punjab thus created major problems for irrigation in Pakistan.

On April 1, 1948, India stopped the supply of water to Pakistan from every canal flowing

from India to Pakistan. Pakistan protested and India finally agreed on an interim agreement

on May 4, 1948. This agreement was not a permanent solution; therefore, Pakistan

approached the World Bank in 1952 to help settle the problem permanently. Negotiations

were carried out between the two countries through the offices of the World Bank. It was

finally in Ayub Khan’s regime that an agreement was signed between India and Pakistan in

September 1960. This agreement is known as the Indus Water Treaty.

This treaty divided the use of rivers and canals between the two countries. Pakistan obtained

exclusive rights for the three western rivers, namely Indus, Jehlum and Chenab. And India

retained rights to the three eastern rivers, namely Ravi, Beas and Sutluj. The treaty also

guaranteed ten years of uninterrupted water supply. During this period Pakistan was to build

huge dams, financed partly by long-term World Bank loans and compensation money from

India. Three multipurpose dams, Warsak, Mangla and Tarbela were built. A system of eight

link canals was also built, and the remodeling of existing canals was carried out. Five

barrages and a gated siphon were also constructed under this treaty.

Kalabagh Dam

The Kalabagh dam, is a proposed hydroelectric dam on the Indus River at Kalabagh in

Mianwali District of the Punjab province in Pakistan. The project has been highly debated

and deemed a necessity since its inception.

In December 2004, General Pervez Musharraf, President of Pakistan, announced that he

would build the dam in the larger interest of Pakistan. On May 26, 2008, Federal Minister for

Water and Power of Pakistan, Raja Pervez Ashraf, said that the "Kalabagh Dam would not be

constructed" and the project has been cancelled. He said due to the "opposition from Khyber

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Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh and other stakeholders, the project was no longer feasible". However,

after the worst flood (2010) in Pakistan, the prime minister of Pakistan, Yousaf Raza Gilani,

stated that the devastation of floods would be less if Kalabagh dam were built.

Bashir A. Malik, former chief technical advisor of the United Nations and World Bank, has

said "Sindh and Pakhtunkhwah would become drought areas in the years to come, if

Kalabagh Dam was not built." At the same time former KPK Chief Minister Shamsul Mulk

has stated that the "Kalabagh Dam would be helpful in erasing poverty from Khyber-

Pakhtunkhwa, as it would irrigate 800,000 acres of cultivable land that is located 100-150

feet above the level of River Indus." Kalabagh Dam would provide 6.5 million acre feet of

water to cultivate seven million acres of currently barren land. This is in addition to the 3,800

MW of electricity it would provide. In response to the push towards side-lining Kalabagh

altogether in favor of the Basha Dam project, Engineer Anwer Khurshid stated that "Basha

Dam is no substitute for Kalabagh dam not because of its altitude which is high enough, but

because no irrigation canals can be taken out from it because of the hilly terrain".

In contrast, Former Chief Engineer WAPDA, Engr. Shahr-i-Yar Khan has claimed that the

construction of Kalabagh Dam is not suitable for NWFP which will cause unnecessary

wastage of huge funds as compared to many other suitable sites of dams proposed on Indus

river. Shahr-i-Yar Khan, who had served on various positions of WAPDA, besides getting

training abroad, highlight various issues related to the Kalabagh Dam construction at length.

He was of the view that the construction of Kalabagh Dam has a number of adverse effects

on the generation of Barotha power complex.

KPK viewpoints

The NWFP has two main objections to the dam:

•NWFP claims that the running of Cheshma-Jhelum link canal and over drawing of water

from Tarbela is a common feature.

• The entire system and canal of Ghazi- Barotha hydroelectric project runs in Khyber-

Pakhtunkhwa, however the electricity generating turbines were installed just 500 meters

inside Punjab so that the royalty is denied to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

• While the reservoir will be in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the dam's electricity-

generating turbines will be just across the provincial border in Punjab. Therefore, Punjab

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would get royalties from the central government in Islamabad for generating electricity.

Although, Punjab has also agreed not to claim any royalty on generation of resources from

Kalabagh dam.

• Concerns that large areas of Nowshera District would be submerged by the dam and

even wider areas would suffer from water-logging and salinity as has occurred with the

Tarbela Dam. As the water will be stored in Kalabagh dam as proposed, that will give water

level rise to the city that is about 200 km away from the proposed location.However,

engineers having expertise on dam construction repeatedly deny the opinion that Nowshera

city could be submerged by the dam lake.

• Punjab follows a paradox policy when it comes to canals to be taken out from

Kalabagh Dam. It talks of right bank canal which will supply water to D I Khan, but when

talking to Sindh, it denies construction of right bank canal being infeasible

Balochistan’s viewpoint

Balochistan is not directly affected by the dam as such. Rather, most nationalist

Baloch claim the dam is an instance of grievances of smaller provinces not being taken into

account. They have however, not included the dam in any of their statements after its

cancellation.

Indian involvement

Experts claim India was sponsoring opposition to Kalabagh Dam project through

various pressure groups. He observed that Pakistani politicians could not implement major

national projects like Kalabagh Dam due to political compromises and lack of national

consensus, terming it an unfortunate development.

Analysis

All Pakistanis agree that Pakistan faces a severe water shortage, and that some form of water

management must be implemented soon. Many point out that even if work on Kalabagh were

to start tomorrow, it would still take at least three years to complete and commission such a

large dam. In the meantime, the water situation would continue to worsen. Smaller dams,

barrages, and canals must be built before that, and water conservation techniques introduced

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The abrupt way in which President Pervez Musharraf announced the decision to build

the dam, overruling the objections of Small parties , had polarised public opinion. On 26 May

2008, Federal Minister for Water and Power of Pakistan Raja Pervez Ashraf abruptly

cancelled the project and that Kalabagh Dam will not be constructed. He said due to

opposition from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh and other stakeholders, the project is no longer

feasible.

The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani, announced that the fate of

the project would be decided by a plebiscite. The decision came after Pakistan faced extreme

power crisis and acute water shortages. The government is currently finding alternative

locations for the dam.

Options

1) Indo-Pak Resolution

2) Fully Utilize / No wastage of water

3) Pakistan should store rain water (using underground reservoirs)

4) Build more dams

The study on water management further taught us that a large amount of water is not

being utilized fully, and a high volume of water is being wasted throughout Pakistan. Just like

they say, “a penny saved is a penny earned”; likewise, throughout Pakistan the people should

realize that water is a scarce resource that should be utilized properly and wasted less. In our

Religion it also encourages that you should not waste a lot, because you should realize how

lucky you are to have been blessed by it (water in this case).

Wasting water is not the only case, because the supply is limited of water in Pakistan as well.

That is because there are lacks of reservoirs in Pakistan for water. The government should

build more reservoirs for saving water so that the water is not only being used efficiently, but

also stored for the future. The government should think long-term when it comes to saving

water because we are encouraging efficient use of water, but also reserving for the future.

Building dams could be a major project through which Pakistan can save a lot of

water. More water would mean that there can be more energy produced as well, such as

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Pakistan Energy Crisis. So with one arrow we are hitting two targets; increasing water

reservoirs as well as more energy produced.

The idea that we suggest is that we should build multiple dams in one region so that we can

save more and more water from one area. In Netherlands, there is a mountain through which

13 dams are built in order to reserve more water and produce more electricity. A likely

infrastructure can also be built in Pakistan. Pakistan only has 18 dams; compared to China

they have 80,000 dams. Therefore, building dams in Pakistan could help solve this problem

as it will save a lot of water as well as produce more electricity.

Lastly, the controversy and conflict between India and Pakistan that has continued since

centuries should come to an end. The Kashmir crisis should be reconsidered in order to

reduce them and both countries should start to move on. In today’s world of globalization,

almost every country is helping each other out. Pakistan and India are the two most common

countries that are known worldwide and the biggest threat the world could face is if Pakistan

and India start working together. The resolution does not promote Pakistan and India

becoming 1 country, nor does it encourage one to be a winner or a loser in Kashmir conflict,

but the three of them should work together towards working for water. This should help solve

out the water management issues from India to Pakistan/Kashmir to Pakistan; as well as help

increase the water supply for both countries. After analyzing the Kishanganga project, it

clearly highlights the fact that India has violated the IWT because of the old rivalry and

unresolved conflict between Pakistan and India, if Pakistan is to solve this issue with India,

further leg-pulling as such may not take place allowing both countries to develop.

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Bibliography

R. Mandokhail, Water Shortage in Balochistan Cities, 2012

Ghauri, Kalabagh Dam: A lingering Controversy, 2008

Government of Pakistan, Report of the National Commission on Agriculture, Ministry

of Food & Agriculture, 1987

TAMS-Wallingford, Tarbela Dam Sediment Management Study: Final Report,

Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), March, 1998

A Ambreen, Indo-Pak water dispute, 2012

A.N.G Abbasi and A.M Kazi: Kalabagh Dam: Look Before You Leap, February, 2000

M Altaf, An Overview of the History and Impacts of the Water Issue inPakistan, 2002

Published in The Express Tribune, December 2nd, 2012.

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GROUP 3:

Mohammad Afzaal

Hasan Munir

Sibtain Zubair


The Curse of Sectarianism in Pakistan Notwithstanding the fact that Islam is a religion of peace and harmony, our society is bitterly divided into sectarianism. Unfortunately the situation is getting worse with every passing day.

The dark shadow we seem to see in the distance is not really a mountain ahead, but the shadow of the mountain behind - a shadow from the past thrown forward into our future. It is a dark sludge of historical sectarianism. We can leave it behind us if we wish. By David Trimble

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1. ABSTRACT

The history of sectarian conflict in Pakistan is as old as the existence of this country. Yet, the

intensification of sectarian divide in Pakistan was observed during late 1970s and early 1980s

because of domestic political changes and the implications of Islamic revolution in Iran and

the subsequent adverse reaction in some Arab countries to the assumption of power by clergy

operating from the holy city of Qum. The military regime of General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq,

which seized power on July 5, 1977 pursued a policy of ‘Islamization’ resulting into the

deepening of sectarian divide between Sunnis and Shias on the one hand and among different

Sunni groups on the other. This case study attempts to analytically examine the dynamics of

sectarian conflict in Pakistan by responding to following issues: The background of sectarian

divide in Pakistan and how sectarian polarization between the Sunni and Shia communities

impacted on state and society; the phenomenon of religious extremism and intolerance led to

the emergence of sectarian violence in Pakistan; the state of Pakistan failed to curb sectarian

conflict and polarization at the societal level promoted the forces of religious extremism; the

role of external factors in augmenting sectarian divide in Pakistan and foreign forces got a

free hand to launch their proxy war in Pakistan on sectarian grounds; and strategies should be

formulated to deal with the challenge of sectarian violence in Pakistan.

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2. INTRODUCTION

Sectarianism in Pakistan has taken a distinctively violent form, separating it from the many

other Muslim societies with sectarian tendencies. Sectarian violence has worsened

progressively within the last two decades claiming thousands of lives. The long history and

evolution of sectarianism in Pakistan has been well documented and analyzed, especially the

process of the politicization and militarization of sectarian groups initiated both by national

and international actors. The leading character of this historical account is General Zia-ul-

Haq whose ‘Islamization’ project, although claiming to “manifest a universal Islamic vision”

This promoted a very specific Sunni school of thought. This makes Pakistan a valuable case

when trying to learn from the long-term dynamics of violent sectarianism in Muslim

societies.

Although sectarianism in the Pakistani context often refers to the conflict between the

majority Sunni and minority Shia traditions, this definition is misleading. These two groups

are not homogenous, having their own sub-sects, local variants and different schools of

thought. These, too, are in opposition to each other, the divide between different Sunni sub-

sects being equally wide as the divide with Shias.

Even though most of the violence branded as ‘sectarian’ is violence between Deobandis and

Shias, the sectarian terrain is wider. Thus, looking at sectarianism in Pakistan only as a Shia

Sunni problem is too simplistic, as is to assume that there is only one ‘sectarian conflict’ in

Pakistan.

Sectarian issue in Pakistan is a major destabilizing factor in the country’s political, social,

religious and security order. While causing unrest, disorder and violence in society, the

sectarian conflict in Pakistan for the last 27 years resulted into thousands of deaths from

suicide attacks, bomb blasts, assassinations and other terrorist acts. The state actors, instead

of seeking the management and resolution of a conflict, which has divided Muslims on

sectarian grounds, tried to exploit the issue for political objectives. Regardless of scattered

events of Shia-Sunni discord, sectarian harmony in Pakistan was a model of tolerance and

brotherhood amongst different sects in the religion of Islam. While Shias constitute roughly

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15-20% of the population of Sunni dominated Pakistan, that community lived in harmony and

peace until early 1980s when a series of events triggered sectarian violence. If viewed

historically, the Shia community struggled side by side with the Sunni majority in the anti-

Ahmadi movement of 1974. While the Ahmadis were declared as non-Muslims by the

Parliament of Pakistan, the Shia community observed with eagerness the central role played

by the clergy of Iran in the massive popular uprising against the Shah. The Islamic

Revolution of February 1979 was a watershed in mobilizing the Shias of Pakistan for an

assertive role in state and society. From any standpoint, the history of sectarian conflict in

Pakistan is as old as the existence of this country. This paper attempts to analytically examine

the important dynamics of sectarian conflict in Pakistan by responding to following

questions:-

1. What is Sectarian conflict and how it has permeated in Pakistani society?

2. What is the background of sectarian divide in Pakistan and how sectarian polarization

between the Sunni and Shia communities impacted on state and society?

3. How the phenomenon of religious extremism and intolerance led to the emergence of

sectarian violence in Pakistan?

4. Why the state of Pakistan failed to curb sectarian conflict and how polarization at the

societal level promoted the forces of religious extremism?

5. What is the role of external factors in augmenting sectarian divide in Pakistan and why

foreign forces got a free hand to launch their proxy war in Pakistan on sectarian grounds?

6. What plausible strategies should be formulated to deal with the challenge of sectarian

violence in Pakistan?

Pakistan as the second largest Muslim country of the world is facing an uphill task of curbing

intolerance, hate, extremism and violence targeting Shia or Sunni communities. Sunni

population in Pakistan is 75-80% of the total population while the Shia population is roughly

20%. Since early 1980s, when sectarian violence got an impetus in Pakistan till today,

thousands of people have been killed in sectarian violence in different parts of the country.

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3. PAKISTAN UNDER THE STATE OF SECTARIANISM

Pakistan is a state religiously comprised of multi-ethnic Muslims. Ninety-six percent of

Pakistan’s people are Muslims and the majority is divided into many sects, mainly Sunni and

Shias. Sunnis are estimated to account for 75 to 85 percent of the country’s Muslim

population, and Shiites are believed to number between 15 and 25 percent.

It should be clear that, like the terms ‘Muslim’, the terms ‘Sunni’ and ‘Shia’, Shia

encompasses groups with widely differing views. There are many Shia sects, such as the

Ismailis, the Bohras and the Ithna Asharis (twelvers). Sunnis include such groups as the Sufi-

inspired Barelvis, the Deobandis, and the Wahhabi-like Ahl-e Hadith. In such society

dissident ideas and experiments can be under taken with/without the threats of violence. This

is not just a case with Muslims in Pakistan but in all religions of the world: Christianity in

Catholics and Protestants; Jewish religion in Hasidism and Zionism; Hinduism and Buddhism

religions also full of sects and sub-sects.

Pakistan was created in the name of Islam which means it became an Islamic state by

drawing its guidance from the principles of Quran and the traditions of the Holy Prophet

(PBUH). On the other side if we will see the ideology of Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali

Jinnah. i.e. speech of 11th August 1947 that, “The new state would be modern democratic

state with sovereignty resting in the people and the members of the new nation having equal

rights of citizenship regardless of their religion, caste and creed.”

This appears to be a controversial vision of Pakistan given by the father of nation. Does it

mean that Jinnah wanted a secular state and not a religious one? It looks that he was secular

in his personal and political ideas so then who were the forces that pushed Pakistan towards

the establishment of particular system of religious belief and conflict within Muslims?

The long history and evolution of sectarianism in Pakistan has been well documented and

analyzed. The role of Ulemas/Mullahs, dictators, and civilians leader is not hidden at all. On

the other hand we can not deny the effects of two regional events which had a profound effect

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on the rise and growth of sectarian conflict in our country ‘the Iranian revolution’ and the

‘anti-Soviet Afghan jihad’.

After the 9/11 attacks Pakistan accepted the offer of the US to fight against terrorism. Gen

Musharraf had no other way but to accept the cooperation offer by US and decided that

Pakistan would extend full cooperation to the international community in its fight against

terrorism. In that situation where the whole religious parties were very much inspired by the

Taliban form of government in Afghanistan and Musharraf went against them which created

problems within the country, so in this regard sectarian organizations such as Sipah-e-Sahaba,

and Lashkar-e-Jangavi and many others were banned. Since the situation has not come under

control, the Mosques, Imam Barghas, religious places of minorities and the shrines of Sufi

clerics have been attacked.

It is generally believed that sectarian conflict is only between the majority Sunni and minority

Shia traditions, this definition is misleading. These two groups are not homogenous, having

their own sub-sects. These, too, are in opposition to each other, the divide between different

Sunni sub-sets being equally wide as the divide with Shias. Even though most of the violence

branded as ‘sectarian’ is violence between Deobandis and Shias, the sectarian terrain is

wider.

With the passage of time the sectarian violence has worsened progressively with the new

waves and methods of violence. Prominent figures and hit-men, members of each other’s

sects whether they are politicians, doctors, poets, intellectuals and renowned personalities,

businessmen or worshippers in mosques or religious processions have been on the target list.

Violence is also targeted at government functionaries, police officials and other professionals,

for either their sectarian identity or involvement in sectarian cases.

There are some people with little knowledge who have resorted to the Kufr slogans against

each other. Some Sunnis have called Shias Kafirs and some Shias have called Sunnis Kafir.

Some people use these slogans for their own political aims and objectives. It is the duty of

recognized scholars from among the Sunnis and Shias both to condemn such slogans. We

may explain our respective positions but we must not abuse each other. We should respect

each other’s life, property and institutions. There is no place in Islam for religious or

sectarian violence. No doubt that the sectarian violence in Pakistan cannot be the act of any

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sensible Muslim. This is either done by some foolish Pakistanis or by the enemies of

Pakistan. It is painful, shameful, criminal, most disgusting and horrible to see Muslims being

killed in a Muslim country in their Masjid. It is the responsibility of the Government of

Pakistan and all the people of Pakistan to see that those who committed such crimes are

brought to justice immediately.

Though the sectarian violence has reached alarming proportions, still we can control this

menace by initiating certain measures both internally and externally. First and foremost,

effective governance is required. Second, the state needs to increase its role in education.

Official sources claim the literacy rate to be 60 percent, but independent sources place it at

less than 40 percent, the lowest in South Asia. It is unfortunate that the state spends only two

percent of its GDP on education. Third, Iran and Saudi Arabia’s funding to the Madrasas

should be checked. All in all the individual participation is also required. If our policy

makers, politicians, public figures and media personalities do not make a concerted effort to

preach and practice tolerance, Pakistan will continue to head down an explosive path.

4. THE NEW PARADIGMS OF SECTARIAN CONFLICTS

Since 1980s onwards, Pakistan has experienced sustained sectarian violence resulting into the

killing and injury of thousands of people. Four important flashpoints, which emerged since

1980s in the context of sectarian violence in Pakistan are:-

1. Karachi

2. Jhang

3. Quetta

4. Lahore

Some of the facts discussed below may provide shocking information about the havoc played

by the menace of sectarian violence in Pakistan.

• In March 2005, 43 Shias were killed in a bomb blast in Fatehpur. On May 27, 2005, twenty

people were killed in a suicide bombing in Pakistan targeting the 12 Pakistan Vision Vol. 9,

No.1Sufi Shrine of Bari Imam, Islamabad. 20 In May 2005, six employees of a fast-food

restaurant were burnt to death in Karachi during a riot that followed a suicide attack on a

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mosque. Shiites set on fire the restaurant after the mosque attack in which at least five people

were killed.

• The year 2004 was one of the bloodiest on record in terms of sectarian violence in Pakistan

with more than 200 killings. 15 people were killed in a Karachi Shia mosque attack in May

2004. On May 30 in

Karachi an elderly Sunni cleric Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai was shot dead; 30 people were

killed in a suicide attack on a Shia mosque in Sialkot in October 2004. A car bomb killed 40

Sunnis in Multan in October 2004.21 On October 10; a Shia mosque in Lahore was the target

of a terrorist attack. A bomb was blasted at the entrance of the Husaini Hall mosque when a

suicidal bomber detonated a device as people had gathered for evening prayer. The incident

killed two security guards and four others including a boy of 13 years old. On May 14, six

members of a Shia family were shot dead.22

• July 4, 2003 in Quetta, Baluchistan, fifty-four Shias were killed in an Imambargah in

Quetta. In October 2003, Islamabad faced a spell of violence when a prominent Sunni leader,

Maulana Azam Tariq, the leader of Milat-e-Islamiya was gunned down. Around 100 people

were killed in Sectarian violence during the year 2003. According to the BBC news report of

September 28, 2005, around 4,000 people have been killed in the past 25 years of sectarian

violence in Pakistan. Sectarian Conflicts in Pakistan 13Major players in the Sectarian

conflict S. No Name of Player Type Role 01 STATE Neutral but sometimes taking sides

Blamed of not controlling the sectarian violence

5. ROLE OF RELIGION

Pakistan was created in the name of Islam which means it became an Islamic state by

drawing its guidance from the principles of Quran and the traditions of the Holy Prophet

(PBUH). On the other side if we will see the ideology of Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali

Jinnah. i.e. speech of 11th August 1947 that, “The new state would be modern democratic

state with sovereignty resting in the people and the members of the new nation having equal

rights of citizenship regardless of their religion, caste and creed.”

This appears to be a controversial vision of Pakistan given by the father of nation. Does it

mean that Jinnah wanted a secular state and not a religious one? It looks that he was secular

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in his personal and political ideas so then what were the forces that pushed Pakistan towards

the establishment of particular system of religious belief and conflict within Muslims?

ACCORDING TO QURAN

Though everyone talks about the curse of having different sects among Muslims, yet know

one seems to understand as what is required to get rid of it.

Allah says in Quran [3.103] and holds fast, all of you together, to the cable of Allah, and do

not separate. And remember Allah’s favor unto you: how ye were enemies and He made

friendship between your hearts so that ye became as brothers by His grace; and (how) ye

were upon the brink of an abyss of fire, and He did save you from it. Thus Allah maketh clear

His revelations unto you, that haply ye may be guided.

All mankind were once but one single community, and only later did they begin to differ...

Al-Qur'an, 010.019 (Yunus [Jonah])

All mankind were once single community...

Al-Qur'an, 002.213 (Al-Baqara [The Cow])

Sectarianism is always tied to religion since it “is the factor that makes an attitude, an action,

a belief, or a structure specifically sectarian –as opposed to being simply generally bad or

destructive”. Since the security paradigms struggle to grasp subject matters related to beliefs

and their interpretation it is easy to emphasize the political goals of the sectarian groups. But

religion is not merely a boundary marker, signifying the boundaries of the conflicting parties

without any significant content or influence to the ‘real’ dividing factors.

Sectarianism is not only about the purity of religious dogma either, but in Pakistan, the

political content of the sects and the religious content of politics are blurred realities. More

important than finding single-cause or exhaustive explanations for sectarianism is to ask why

religious discourses are effective frameworks for mobilization in today’s Pakistan –whether

that mobilization is initiated by political entrepreneurs or the Ulama. For one, sectarian

discourses are politicized because the language and symbols of Islam are an effective

medium through which modern Muslims accommodate change. Thus, while sects in the

Islamic world have largely maintained their traditional character their function is modern.

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AGAIN FROM QURAN

Allah sent His Messengers (A.S.) to give them glad tidings provided they lived together as

one family and to warn them about the consequences of a disintegrated society and resolve

their differences in accordance with the revealed book.

Allah sent Messengers with glad tidings and warnings; and with them He sent the Book in

truth, to judge between people in matters wherein they differed...


After departure of the Messengers (A.S.) who had accomplished their appointed tasks, their

followers again created differences amongst themselves because of their selfish rivalry, in

their desire to outdo and out-strive each other.

None but the very people who were given it (i.e. the Scripture) differed about it after clear

arguments had come to themò because of their selfish rivalry (in their desire to outdo and out-

strive each other)...


Those who call themselves Muslims have done the same. The Messenger of Allah,

Muhammad (A.S.) founded them into one nation, who would then make the whole world into

one single community again. But instead of making the whole world one, they themselves

became divided into numerous political and religious factions. This division was because of

nothing but the selfish rivalry among their so-called religious and political leaders which

seeped down to commoners as well. In doing so Muslims have violated Allah's Clear

Command, which is:

And be not like those who became divided and differed after clear arguments had come to

them, and these it is they who shall have a grievous penalty.

Al-Qur'an, 003.105 (Aal-E-Imran [The Family of Imran])

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6. CAUSES FOR SECTARIANISM

Many factors contributed to the growth of sectarianism. While some were direct causes,

others indirectly deepened the sectarian fault lines. So the causes which triggered the

sectarianism in Pakistan are:

a. SECTARIAN POLITICS

The following factors increased the sectarian divide, which was embedded in Pakistani

society in the 1980s, especially in Punjab. First, the formation of Shia and Sunni militant

organizations which were not representative of their respective communities although there

was support from them. The formation of the militant Sunni Sipah-i-Sahaba, Pakistan (SSP)

and the Shia Sipah-i-Mohammad, Pakistan (SMP) was the main factor underlying the

escalating conflict between the two communities. Apart from the Sipah-i-Sahaba, other

Sunni organizations like Sunni Tehrik were formed in Sindh. Later some SSP activists led by

Riaz Basra organized the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ), named after the founder of the SSP. The LJ

was more militant and has been banned. These organizations widened the sectarian divide

and both groups started using violence against each other. The strength of these militant

sectarian organizations increased in the 1980s and 90s, and they were only banned by

General Musharraf in January 2002. Second, factionalism within the religious parties and

militant organizations deepened the sectarian divide. The Jamiat-ul-Islam (JUI) got divided

into two factions led by Fazlur Rahman and Sami-ul-Haq and both factions attempted to build

their foundations on anti Shia tenets with each trying to be more virulently anti-Shia. Even

the militant organizations on both sides (the SSP and the SMP) faced divisions, and these

factions, devoid of effective leadership, were involved in arbitrary killings of the other

community.

Religious parties like the JUI provided indirect support to militant organizations. It is

essential to understand that sectarian violence is largely limited to Punjab, especially in the

district of Jhang, where the mainstream religious parties never enjoyed popular support.

Baluchistan, had been free of sectarian violence and so was Sind, except for

Karachi. The Jamiat Ulama-i-Pakistan (JUP), which enjoys support at the popular level in

Punjab belongs to the Brehlvi faith and does not share the antagonism of the Deobandis and

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Wahabis towards the Shias. In fact, unlike the latter two, the JUP considers them to be

Muslims and a part of the Islamic world.

Third, sectarian violence in Punjab was primarily due to Shia-Sunni economic, social and

political relations. For example in Jhang, where sectarian violence is high, the Shia

community forms the upper class, being landlords and enjoying political power; the majority

Sunni community forms the lower stratum in the social, economic and political hierarchy.

When the Sunni middle class grew, especially in the 1970s as a result of better education and

remittances from the Gulf, they demanded their share of social and political status, which was

resisted by the Shias. Maulana

Nawaz Jhangvi, assassinated in 1990 by Shia militants, formed the Sipah-i-Sahaba in Jhang

in 1985, largely to fight the Shia landlords.

b. ISLAMIZATION POLICIES OF ZIA

Islamic policies introduced by Zia-ul-Haq were also responsible for the growth of sectarian

violence inside Pakistan. An in-depth analysis would reveal that these policies were cosmetic

and peripheral, as they did not impinge on the bureaucratic military oligarchy or the feudal

structure of the society. In fact, these policies were aimed at gaining legitimacy within

Pakistan and were not meant to challenge the existing social and economic institutions.

However, the Islamization policies exerted a negative influence on the two communities. The

Sunni religious parties led by JUI and JUP became active vis-à-vis the Shias, as they wanted

the State to introduce the Sunnization of Pakistan, which the Shias feared.

This made the Shias defensive and they started supporting the PPP. Besides, the changes

made by Zia led to intense competition amongst the various Sunni groups, especially the

Wahabis,

Deobandis and Brehlvis, as they wanted the State to enforce their own version of Islam,

especiallythe Islamic laws, though they were united in their opposition to Shias.

However, the Islamic reforms introduced by Zia, especially relating to the legal field, alarmed

the Shia community. The Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Fiqh-i-Jafriya (TNFJ) was formed in 1979 to

enforce the Jafri fiqh; earlier in the same year Zia had declared that the

Hanafi fiqh would be enforced. The formation of

TNFJ was the political response of the Shia community. In its early years it fought to get

concessions such as exempting the Shia community from paying zakat and ushr.

c. JIHAD IN AFGHANISTAN

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Pakistan’s Afghan policy in the 1980s and 90s aggravated sectarian violence inside the

country.

Afghan resistance against the Soviet Union in the

1980s resulted in the proliferation and easy availability of small arms in Pakistan. The

emergence of and subsequent growth of the Taliban in the 1990s and their support to Sunni

organizations such as the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen impinged directly on sectarian violence. The

Sipah-i-Sahaba cadres were trained in Afghanistan and most of them fought the Taliban in

Afghanistan and the Shias inside Pakistan.

d. IRAN-IRAQ WAR

The impact of the emergence of the Khomeni regime in 1979 in Iran and the subsequent Iran-

Iraq war in the early 1980s on sectarian violence in Pakistan has generally been

underestimated. It is no coincidence that the TNFJ, the main Shite party in Pakistan, was

formed in 1979. When the Iran-Iraq war started, the Muslim world got divided into two

camps and started funding their faith. As a result, enormous funds flowed, especially from

Saudi

Arabia and Iran, into Pakistan to support the various Sunni and Shia organizations and the

madrassas run by them respectively, which were directly responsible for the growth of

organized opposition and violence.

e. JIHAD IN KASHMIR

Pakistan’s support and involvement in Kashmir was also responsible for sectarian violence.

While the Lashkar-e-Toiba and the Hizbul Mujahideen do not indulge in sectarian violence

inside Pakistan, the same cannot be said about other jihadi groups, especially the Harkat-ul-

Mujahideen and, its later incarnation, the Jaish-e-Mohammad. Both these groups were trained

in Afghanistan under the Taliban and were close to Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, the most violent

Sunni organization. Before the

Musharraf regime started its crackdown on sectarian organizations in 2001, these three were

involved in collecting funds for jihad in Kashmir. The security agencies could not do much,

as they could not differentiate which organization was involved.

f. THE MADRASSAS

Various madrassas, especially in Punjab and Karachi, accentuated existing sectarian

cleavage. Each Sunni schism (Deobandi, Brehlvi, Wahabi) and Shias ran their own madrassas

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for providing basic education. The curriculum was decided by the madaris. As a result, when

sectarian faultlines got pronounced, a hate campaign was introduced vis-a-vis the other sect.

Besides, the madrassas also provided manpower for these sectarian organizations, leading to

sectarian engagements on the streets and dividing them further. The communities started

defending their faith by protecting and supporting the offenders instead of condemning their

violence. This support took the form of political, personal and financial patronage, which

only accentuated the cycle of violence.

7. EFFECTS

Such killings also raise fears of further departures from the country by communities who

have contributed a great deal in terms of business, economy, development and diversity. It

seems than no minority sect, group, or community is safe from the sectarian horrors that have

cut across our country, leaving behind a trail of blood and gore. The tiny Bohra community of

Karachi, known as among the most peaceful of groups, had for years been able to avoid

getting caught up in the bloodshed. But they have finally failed.

The two home-crafted devices, laden with pellets, which went off in quick succession of each

other near Karachi’s Hyderi market clearly targeted the community. The first blast took place

as Bohras left their Jamaat Khana after prayers. The second, also controlled by a remote

device in the hands of unknown operators, was detonated only minutes later as the shocked

community gathered in the crowded street. The attack had obviously been well planned and

carefully executed. There had been a similar attempt in August which failed only because the

bomb was diffused. This time there was no escape. Eight persons, including a child died,

while 24 were injured. As a stunned community mourned its dead, familiar post-blast scenes

were witnessed at hospitals. We can fairly safely assume that responsibility for the attack lies

with one of the extremist groups who have expanded through the decades. They have targeted

Ahmadis and Shias before, and now appear to have come for even more helpless groups –

completely unable to defend themselves. Others too may fall prey next. It appears there is no

end in sight to the sectarian evil spread out all around us like a giant trap that more and more

people are falling into. No matter how hard they try to keep themselves safe, they simply

have no means of succeeding given the ruthlessness of the predators stalking them. It is clear

that the state needs to act now. It cannot afford to watch its citizens mowed down by men

who know no morality and no humanity. Extremists need to be targeted with all the force we

can muster. At present they are terrifyingly strong and determined to leave no group in peace.

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This simply cannot be allowed to continue, given the degree of destruction that has already

been inflicted on us. Our country simply cannot sustain more within this.

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8. OPTIONS

It seems the sectarian divide in Pakistan cannot be removed without pursuing a policy of

pragmatic realism. A policy of peaceful coexistence and reconciliation is essential so as to

manage, if not resolve, sectarian conflicts in Pakistan. What strategies should be formulated

and adopted in order to deal with sectarian violence in Pakistan and to bridge the gap between

the two major Muslim 14 Pakistan Vision Vol. 9, No.1 groups? What should be the role of

state in dealing with the sectarian conflict and how civil society can play a viable role to end

sectarian polarization in the country? In the last twenty-six years, sustained violence

resulting into the killing, injury and material losses of both Sunni and Shia communities seem

to have made the task of sectarian reconciliation difficult. Not only militant sectarian groups

happen to further divide the Shia and Sunni communities, but external factors also fuel

sectarian conflict in Pakistan. Yet, some of the strategies, which could be helpful in

controlling sectarian violence, are as follows:-

1. There should be a constitutional provision to declare promoting sectarian hatred and

violence a serious crime by awarding severe punishment.

2. In the syllabi taught in different educational institutions, particularly in schools, all such

materials which promote hatred and biases on the basis of religion, sect, sex, ethnicity and

culture must be removed from textbooks and other sources of reading.

3. The state apparatus must be neutral as far as dealing with Shia and Sunni conflict is

concerned. State should not favor any sectarian group.

4. The media, both print and electronic, must be instructed to do responsible reporting on

Sectarian matters.

5. Those sectarian organizations, which have been banned by the government, should not be

allowed to reappear under a different name.

6. External intervention in sectarian matters must be effectively checked.

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9. OPTIONS AVAILABLE UNDER LAWS

1. Recognize the diversity of Islam in Pakistan, reaffirm the constitutional principle of

equality for all citizens regardless of religion or sect, and give meaning to this by taking the

following steps:

(a) Repeal all laws, penal codes and official procedures that reinforce sectarian identities and

cause discrimination on the basis of faith, such as the mandatory affirmation of

(b) Repeal the Hudood laws and blasphemy laws.

(c) Disband privately-run Sharia courts in the KPK and take action against religious

organizations operating them.

(d) Do not use zakat or other sources of government funding to finance the activates,

educational or otherwise, of any sect; and

(e) Purge Islamic Studies textbooks of sectarian material that promises or undermines specific

sects.

2. Disband, in furtherance of Article 256 of the constitution, all private militias, including

those

Organized for sectarian and jihadi causes.

3. Make curbs on sectarian leaders and extremist groups more affecting by,

(a) Implementing the laws against hate speech and incident of communal violence;

Leaders responsible for verbal or written

(b) Taking legal action against the administration of any mosque or madrasa or religious

leader responsible for verbal or written edicts of apostasy.

(c) Take legal action against the administration of any mosque or madrasa whose leader calls

for internal and external jihad.

(d) Publicizing the evidence for banning Jihadi groups.

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(e) Canceling the print declarations (licenses) of jihadi publications and prosecuting the

publishers

(f) Closing down madrasas run by sectarian and jihadi organizations.

(h) Appoint prayer leaders and orators at mosques and madrasas run by the Auqaf

Department (the government department of religious endowments) only after verifying that

the applicant has no record of sectarian extremism, and dismiss those sectarian leaders who

are employees of the Auqaf Department.

10. LESSON LEARNED

The lessons which one learns from more than 3 to 4 decades of sectarian violence in Pakistan

is the level of tolerance which has gown down. For the management and resolution of any

conflict, it is imperative that the parties who are engaged in that conflict must express

political will, accommodation, flexibility, maturity and tolerance with each other.

Unfortunately, because of the mismanagement of the sectarian conflicts in Pakistan, neither

the state nor the society could prevent the emergence and strengthening of those groups who

carried a mission to annihilate each other. As a result, the sectarian divide in Pakistan is not

peaceful, as it used to be earlier but is marred with hatred and violence against each other.

Perhaps, the recommendations suggested in this paper to effectively and professionally deal

with the sectarian issue in this country may help restore religious harmony and coexistence

one the one hand and curb militancy, extremism and terrorism.

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11. REFERENCES

Karan R. Sawhny & Nidhi Narain, “Fratricidal Conflict Between Pakistan’s Shias and

Sunnis”

Searching for Peace in Central and South Asia (London: Lynne Reiner Publishers,

2002), p. 465.

The report of International Crisis Group (IGC) see www.hinduuonnet.com

Mukhtar Ahmed, Sectarian Conflict in Pakistan: A Case Study of Jhang (Colombo:

Regional Center for Strategic Studies, 2001), p. 15.

Hussain Haqqani, “Weeding Out the Heretics: Sectarianism in Pakistan “in Current

Trends in Islamic Ideology (Vo. 4) November 01, 2006. Hudson Institute’s Center for

Islam, Democracy and the Future of the Muslim World.

Ashok K. Behuria, “In throes of Sectarian Conflict” Asian Affairs p. 31.

Mohammad Waseem, “Sectarian Conflict in Pakistan” (Unpublished) pp. 4-5 quoted

in Mukhtar Ahmed Ali,

Zulfiqar Shah, Sectarian violence in Karachi 1994-2002 (Lahore: Human Rights

Commission of Pakistan, 2003), p. 7.

Mehtab Ali Shah, “Sectarianism – A Threat to Human Security: A Case Study of

Pakistan,” The Round Table (London) Vol. 94 (October 2005), p. 617

Hussain Haqqani, “Weeding Out the Heretics: Sectarian Conflicts in Pakistan” page

19

Sectarianism in Pakistan “in Current Trends in Islamic Ideology (Vo. 4) November

01, 2006. Hudson Institute’s

Center for Islam, Democracy and the Future of the Muslim World.

C.f. “Mumtaz Ahmed, “Revivalism, Islamisation, Sectarianism and Violence in

Pakistan” in Edited by Craig Bexter and Charles Kennedy (Boulder, Colorado: West

view Press, 1987), p. 108.

“Sectarian violence in Pakistan,” South Asian Terrorism

Portal at http // www.satporgtp / countries / Pakistan/

Database / sect.killing.htm quoted in Hussain Haqqani,

www.mukto-mna.com

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GROUP 4:

Shafqat Ali Waqas Ismail Shaeel Abrar Aqib Javeed Hasan Hani Ameen


Kalabagh Dam Controversy: The nature has blessed Pakistan in many ways. In a small geographical region, it has lofty mountains, alluvial plains, virgin deserts, mineral deposits, and a long coast line. What all was needed was to harness its natural resources, including water. Kalabagh Dam was a project to achieve that end, but regrettably that has become controversial.

"This issue Kalabagh Dam project] exposes some historic realities. It is necessary to refresh people's memories"

Source Unknown

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1.1 Brief Introduction of Kalabagh Dam Project

The Kalabagh Dam (KBD) is proposed to be located on the River Indus at about 120 miles

downstream of Tarbela Dam, 92 miles downstream the confluence of Kabul and Indus Rivers

and 16 miles upstream of the existing Jinnah Barrage. The site is a narrow and deep channel

extending over 5-mile distance where the river is about 1,300 feet wide.

According to the PC-II of the Project "KBD was initiated by GOP in 1953, and until 1973,

the project was basically considered as a storage project for meeting the irrigation needs, and

consequently, rapid increases in the cost of energy have greatly enhanced the priority of KBD

as a power project".

The project planning report, circulated in March 84, tried to establish the technical and

economic feasibility of the project, and the detailed designs/tender documents, commenced in

March 84, and was completed by December 1985.

The feasibility study and documentation have cost the GOP around one billion rupees so far.

According to one of WAPDA’s latest briefs on the KBD Project, the dam and its objectives

are described in the following words:

"It is expected to be a 260 ft. high structure and would create a reservoir 6.1 million acres

foot (MAF) of usable storage. The annual generation of energy would amount to about

11,200 GWH, generated by hydro power plant of 2400 MW capacity. This capacity may

ultimately be increased to 3600 MW, making KBD one of the largest hydro generation dams

in Asia. The total project cost covering civil and power facilities, as estimated by the

consultants at June 1987 prices, will be about US $ 5.153 billion, including the cost of

interest during construction, customs duties, taxes and price contingencies"

(Note: At the present day’s construction costs, the dam is expected to cost around US $ 8

billion)

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Another WAPDA release "WAPDA Projects in Brief" of January 1986, describes the project

as:

"Kalabagh Dam is a multipurpose project to be built across the River Indus. Basically; it is a

power project which aims at accelerating the tempo of economic development in Pakistan".

Briefly, in WAPDA’s terms, the proposed KBD has the following aims:

i. To generate large amounts of low cost hydroelectric power near major load centers,

and supply the existing grid for meeting the growing power demand of agriculture,

industrial and domestic consumers. In addition, it will increase the energy output of

the existing Tarbela scheme by permitting the conjunctive operation of the two

reservoirs.

ii. To provide additional storage on the Indus River, and thus reduce the existing system

shortfalls in irrigation requirements.

iii. To provide additional regulation on the River Indus, and thus provide better system

control and management for supplying assured, adequate and timely irrigation water

for crops.

iv. To compensate for the storage loss due to the silting up of exiting reservoirs till such

time that their substitutes, (presently planned) are actually available.

v. To eliminate and control the flood peaks in the River Indus so as to minimize flood

hazards downstream.

vi. To increase Pakistan’s capability to manage its water distribution and power

generation systems through the conjunctive operation of Tarbela and KBD reservoir

It is believed by WAPDA that “the conjunctive operation of Kalabagh Dam will enhance

Tarbela’s generation capacity to 336 million units of energy and 600 MW of peaking power.

Which will increase the share of Hyde power on the national grid, thus controlling the overall

cost of power generation, along with the reduction in thermal generation to result in savings

in fuel import”?

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1.2 Historical Overview of Interprovincial Water Conflict in Pakistan

In Pakistan, the interprovincial conflict over the allocation of the Indus Rivers’ water dates to

the beginning of the massive canal construction by the British in the Punjab from the mid-

nineteenth century onward. The first substantial interprovincial water allocation treaty

between the Punjab and the downstream riparian Sindh province dates to 1945. The treaty

allocated 75 percent of the waters of the main-stem Indus River to Sindh province, and 25

percent going to Punjab province. The treaty further allocated 94 percent of the water from

the five eastern tributaries of the Indus River to Punjab, and 6 percent to Sindh. The partition

of the Subcontinent and the subsequent signing of the IWT by India and Pakistan allocated

most of what was Punjab’s share of the Indus basin waters according to the 1945 Sindh

Punjab Agreement to India, and provided for construction of storage and link canals from the

western half of the Indus basin to the eastern half to compensate for the water lost to India.

The Sind his widely perceived the compensatory water and the storage on the Indus and

Jhelum Rivers to be compensation to Punjab province at the expense of Sindh.

The Kalabagh Dam controversy an argument between the dominant Punjab province and the

remaining smaller provinces in Pakistan, especially Sindh, over a proposed storage dam on

the main-stem Indus River in Punjab is perceived by the Sindh is as yet another insult that has

been directed at them by the Punjabis in the form of further appropriation of Sindh’s rightful

share of water.

Although the focus of subnational hydro politics in Pakistan has been surface water, it would

be useful here to point to the significance of groundwater in the basin and related problems of

water logging and salinity, which are likely to have much greater impact on water use,

agricultural productivity, and hence hydro politics in the long run. The estimated 0.8 million

water pumps in Pakistan supply almost 50 percent of the crop-water requirements in the

country. One of the consequences of this major groundwater development has been the

secondary salination of 4.5 million hectares of land, half of which affects the Indus basin’s

irrigated lands. An additional 1 million hectares of the 16 million hectares of irrigated land in

the Indus are affected by waterlogging from canal seepage and inappropriate irrigation

practices. The problem of salinity is acutest downstream in Sindh province, where 70 to 80

percent of the soils are classified as moderately to severely salinize. This land degradation is

severely hurting agricultural productivity, and most remedies have largely been unsuccessful.

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The simmering ongoing conflict between Sindh and Punjab on surface-water supplies should

be viewed in this context, where land degradation and groundwater salinity in the

downstream province make its thirst for surface-water supplies much more pronounced. This

is apart from the province’s pervasive problems of poverty, lost productivity, and consequent

social instability, which have not attracted the resources or attention from the country’s water

managers that they deserve.

The seemingly perpetual water conflict between Sindh and Punjab had a tentative settlement

in the form of the interprovincial water accord of 1991, when four provincial governments,

all governed by the same political party for the first time in Pakistan’s history, agreed to set

allocations among the four provinces. The accord, which was based on the assumed average

flow of 114.35 million acre-feet (MAF) of water in the Indus system, allocated 55.94 MAF of

water to Punjab and 48.76 MAF to Sindh province, the remaining 9.65 MAF divided between

Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan provinces.29 Although it has been argued that the

actual apportionment came closest to what a reasonable apportionment could be, the accord

nevertheless suffered a crisis of legitimacy. The legitimacy was in question primarily because

the negotiating process leading up to the accord was not transparent and did not include all

the stakeholders, particularly from the smaller provinces, and because of the suspect

legitimacy of the political setup in Sindh province at the time.

1.3The Dam Controversy

The official figures for average annual flows for the Indus basin used in the interprovincial

water accord and subsequent justifications for additional storage on the Indus River,

particularly for Kalabagh Dam, on the main-stem Indus River in Punjab province, are

suspect. Many have convincingly argued against the official methodology of using the higher

number for flows in the Indus system, particularly because it is based on a shorter time frame

that is, since 1977 and because the higher number works to the disadvantage of the

downstream riparian.

The accord of 1991 nevertheless suffered a crisis of legitimacy. Because the negotiating

process leading up to the accord was not transparent and did not include all the

stakeholder

The official argument in favor of the construction of the Kalabagh Dam on the Indus River

paints the picture of a scarce water resource, which is being wasted by being allowed to flow

out to sea, and outlines a doomsday scenario should additional storage not be built on the

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Indus River. On the internal security front, the water scarcity in Sindh, especially in the

aftermath of the drought in southern Pakistan in the latter half of the 1990s, coupled with the

single minded focus of the Pakistani water bureaucracy on water development, has made the

issue of the construction of the Kalabagh Dam project a surrogate for a litany of Sindhi

grievances against the Punjabi-dominated political, military, and bureaucratic system in

Pakistan. The controversy is beginning to polarize public opinion in Pakistan, particularly in

Sindh province, where more than 80 percent of the groundwater is saline, making the

province’s farmers exceptionally dependent on surface water supplies, which itself may be

compromised by the upstream dam. Furthermore, the ecology of the Indus Delta and the

livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of Sindhi fishermen are also in jeopardy because of

reduced fresh water flows to the delta, which are likely to be reduced further if the dam is

built. On the other hand, for the Pakistani water managers, Kalabagh Dam has become a

metaphor for the persistent meddling of the “untrained” and “non expert” politicians in what

they perceive to be, or wish to be, a purely engineering issue. All types of appeals to

patriotism, science, economics, and neoMalthusian scenarios are being pressed into service

by the Pakistani government and the engineering establishment to make the case for not only

Kalabagh Dam but also other storage projects on the Indus. The dam project at the moment is

in cold storage, particularly on account of the combined opposition of not just Sindh but also

of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan.34 Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa is concerned about the

potential flooding of rich farmland and Pashtun cultural heartland by the lake that will be

created behind the dam. The province is also reluctant to lend its support to the project

because of suspicions based on the poor record of the Pakistani government in providing for

the rehabilitation of those affected by earlier large-dam projects.

The objections to additional storage on the Indus are not limited to the nationalist politics of

smaller provinces. Other convincing arguments have also been made by environmental and

citizen groups in Pakistan, pointing out that Pakistan’s irrigation sector has some of the

lowest conveyance efficiencies in the world. The detractors argue that instead of going for

very expensive, environmentally damaging, and economically dubious storage and mega-

project solutions to the water issue in Pakistan, enhancement of the existing infrastructure’s

efficiency, coupled with better on-farm water management and more appropriate irrigation

and farming techniques, would perhaps more than make up for any additional water that

might be gained from megaprojects.35 In addition, the lack of sufficient flows in the Indus

Delta adversely affects the ecology of the delta, which has a direct effect on the livelihoods of

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thousands of fishermen and farmers in the lower basin. The interprovincial water debate is a

vigorous one and is frequently waged at expert forums in Pakistan. But as far as the Pakistani

press and public are concerned, the parameters of the debate are limited to how to build more

megaprojects and increase water supplies. A more sensitized and informed media coverage of

the debate could go a long way toward lowering the temperature on the issue among

politicians and the public.

The three provinces are not able to came on the single point and decide what is right decision

asthe personal interests are more important than the interest of the whole nation. The view

point of the three provinces can be given below

An agenda that started way back in 2004 and is still talked about is of ³Kalabagh Dam ³.It

come forward as one of the worst examples of national integration. The three provinces

known, Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are still in an unsettled dispute over the agenda.

Kalabagh dam is a proposed hydroelectric power on Indus River at Kalabagh in Mianwali

District in Punjab. But since the birth of the idea controversies came its way. The three

provinces had their individual concerns over the project, so much so that the

national perspective was sidelined. Trust deficiency amidst the provinces was the dominant

obstruction in the rolling of the project. The province of Punjab has always been in favor of

the project, as it is of the opinion that in order to meet the agricultural demand and to produce

cheap electricity is essential. However, province of Sindh has always opposed the idea and

Sindh

KPK

PUNJAB

The water flow from Indus

river will reduce as a result

of which the water which

flows into Arabian sea

would lessen which was a

major concern for people of

Sindh.

The province was not

willing to trust Punjab

regarding this matter

because the past experience

with Punjab suggested that

they don’t deliver what

they promise

Punjab was ready to

initiate the process

because of electricity

crisis and this project

could be beneficial

agricultural process

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has strongly disagreed upon the project. The view point of the province was that if Kalabagh

is constructed the water in the Indus River will lessen due to which the water that falls into

Arabian Sea will also be effected. This process will lead to inward intrusion of land and will

turn the agriculture areas of Sindh into barren lands. Sindh representative, Syed

Qamaruzzaman Shah rejects the construction of the Kalabagh dam, saying that Sindhis could

not trust anybody because of past experiences. "The Water Accord 1991 is not being

implemented and Sindh has not yet been provided money announced for the rehabilitation

of its irrigation system,"

1.4 SALIENT FEATURES

HYDROLOGY (Indus River at Site):-

Catchments Area 110,500 sq. Miles

Maximum Recorded Flood (1929) 1,200,000 Cusses

Average Annual Flow 91.4 MAF

RESERVOIR

Storage Capacity

Gross 7.9 MAF

Live 6.1 MAF

Retention Level:

Maximum 915 Feet Above Mean Sea Level

Minimum 825 Feet above MSL

DAM

Type Zoned Fill Embankment With Clay Core

Maximum Height Above River Bed 260 Feet

Total Length 11,000 Feet Total Fill Volume 60 Million Cu. Yds

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SPILLWAYS

Overflow Spillway Capacity 1,070,000 Cusses

Orifice Spillway Capacity 980,000 Cusses

POWER FACILITIES

Unite Size 300 MW

Turbines Francis Type

Turbine Design Head 170 feet

Power House Indoor Type

Installed Capacity 2400 MW (Initial); 3600 MW (Ultimate)

Average Annual Energy 11400 GWH

COST

Estimated Total Investment (June 1997) Rs. 250 Billion

1.5 CONSEQUENCES OF NOT BUILDING KALABAGH DAM

i) National food security would be jeopardized, thus subjecting the economy to additional

burden of importing food grains.

ii) Loss of storage capacity of the on-line reservoir due to sedimentation would result in

shortage of committed irrigation supplies

causing serious drop even in existing agriculture production.

iii) For implementation of Water Apportionment Accord 1991, a new storage project like

Kalabagh is essential. In its absence it would give rise to bitter inter-provincial disputes and

recriminations particularly in a dry water year. Dispute between Punjab and Sindh on

shortage of about 0.2 MAF water during Rabi maturing/Kharif sowing 1993-94 should be

eye-opener. It may be worth mentioning that Rabi 1993-94 had a normal river inflow pattern.

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iv The annual energy generated at Kalabagh is equivalent to 20 million barrels of oil. This

annual import of fuel for thermal generation, including augmentation of transportation

infrastructure, would be an additional burden to the economy.

v) Recently, Federal Government has entered into agreements with international private

sector to install over 3,000 MW of thermal power over next 3-4 years. Though it may help in

overcoming the load-shedding, the power cost will increase substantially. Therefore, large

scale injection of cheap Kalabagh hydropower would help to keep cost of electricity within

affordability of the consumers.

vi) Growth of domestic industrial and agriculture sectors would be impended due to high

power costs.

1.6 Cost And Benefits Of The Project:

Kalabagh would store surplus water in the flood season and make it available for controlled

utilization during the low flow season. This water would thus be used for sowing and final

maturing of the Kharif crops and entire Rabi crops. Irrigation oriented operation of the

project gives the highest overall economic return. Thus the full live storage of 6.1MAF would

be available for guaranteeing assured irrigation supplies throughout the year including

replacement of the storage loss on the three existing reservoirs. Kalabagh wit its installed

capacity of 2400 MW (ultimate 3600 MW) would add to the system a very large chunk of

cheap hydro-power. In an average year, 11413 million kilowatts hours (MKWh’s) of

electricity would be generated at Kalabagh. Further, as a result of conjunctive operation an

additional 336 million MKWh’s and upto 600 megawatts (MW) of additional peak power

would be generated at Tarbela. To put these figures in perspective, if Kalabagh was in

position today, there would have been no load-shedding in Pakistan. The energy generated at

Kalabagh would be equivalent to 20 million of oil per year. Kalabagh would reduce the

frequency and severity of flooding along the Indus particularly between the dam sites an

Indus/Punjab confluence, 300 miles downstream. For the riverain areas lower down in Sindh,

it would enable conversation of the existing ‘Sailaba’ areas to the year round tube well

irrigation.

Apprehensions of upper reparians included fear of flooding of Peshawar valley and

Nowshera, with negative impact on the drainage in areas of Mardan, Pabbi, Swabi and

Mardan SCARP, along with the submergence of fertile land in reservoir area coupled with

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population displacements. Lower reparians feared desertification of Sindh, non-availability of

surplus water to fill the Kalabagh reservoir, negative effects on cultivation of riverian areas,

sea water intrusion, mangrove forests and diminishing of fish resources below Kotri. They

have been fully analyzed by Wapda and almost all of them are not sustainable considering the

magnitude of benefits available to a large population of this country.

Benefits also include availability of water for entire Rabi, sowing and maturing of Kharif

crops, 3,600MW electricity and flood alleviation between downstream and Indus-Punjab

confluence. The Water Apportionment Accord of 1991 reflects consensus of all the four

provinces over issues of new storage on Indus and other rivers. This should serve as a starting

point for the construction of the Kalabagh dam.

Negative

Impacts

Without DAM With DAM

1. Construction,

O&M,

mitigation

No costs incurred.

Amount of employed resources for

construction of dam, irrigation system

and spillways, O &.M , and mitigation

PRs. 15 Million

2. Resettlement No resettlement required. Compensation and assistant expenses for

(1) 16700 Plots

(2) 10500 households for loss of

agricultural lands

3. Land

acquisition

Other feasible sites available

for dam and reservoir; present

situation remains.

164 square miles along with floods

mangroves forest. This will ruin wildlife

habitat, the ecosystem. For example, 3

species of dolphins of the mangrove

habitat will be lost from the reservoir

area.

Positive

Impacts

4. Flood control Free-flowing river.

On the average, 12,000 ha of

cultivated land will be

Controllable river flow and no flood

damage on 12,000 hectares of cultivated

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On a conservation basis, the overall direct benefits of Kalabagh Dam would be around PRs.

25 billion per annum. Thus the investment cost of project would be repaid within a very short

period of 9-10 years.

flooded up to 1-2 meters high

each year.

land.

5. Water for

irrigation

Free-flowing river; no control

over water for irrigation.

Regulated water supply for irrigation

during the dry season. The project will

provide water for 24,986.56 hectares

during the rainy season and 14,896

hectares in the dry season. Due to the

expansion of cultivated land, farmers will

produce more agricultural products.

6. Hydroelectric

power

Nohydroelectric power. Production of 11400 106 KWH per

year

7. Net

recreation and

fishery

Recreation and fishery

benefits of free-flowing river

particularly in Kalabagh

(proposed national park) from

February to July. Average of

300 tourists per year

1. It is expected that at least 1,000

persons will visit the dam and its

reservoir per day, in the future.

2. The amount of fish is expected to

increase by 323 tons a year

8. Municipal

and industrial

water supply

Supply from free-flowing

river.

Controllable and therefore reliable water

supply for towns and industries. The

project is expected to produce 47.3

million cubic meters a year of water.

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Average Annual Power Benefits

PRs. 25.50 Billion

Average Annual Irrigation Benefits PRs. 3.50 Billion

Average Annual Flood Alleviation

Benefits

PRs. 0.70 Billion

Additional Power From Tarbela PRs. 3.50 Billion

AVERAGE YEARLY BENEFITS PRs. 33.20 Billion

2. Causes of the Issues

In December 2004, General Pervez Musharraf, President of Pakistan, announced that he

would build the dam in the larger interest of Pakistan. On May 26, 2008, Federal Minister for

Water and Power of Pakistan, Raja Pervez Ashraf, said that the "Kalabagh Dam would not be

constructed" and the project has been cancelled. He said due to the "opposition from Khyber

Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh and other stakeholders, the project was no longer feasible". However,

after the worst flood (2010) in Pakistan, the prime minister of Pakistan, Yousaf Raza Gilani,

stated that the devastation of floods would be less if Kalabagh dam were built.

2.1Technical facts and differing opinions

Bashir A. Malik, former chief technical advisor of the United Nations and World Bank, has

said "Sindh and Pakhtunkhwah would become drought areas in the years to come, if

Kalabagh Dam was not built." At the same time former KPK Chief Minister Shamsul Mulk

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has stated that the "Kalabagh Dam would be helpful in erasing poverty from Khyber-

Pakhtunkhwa, as it would irrigate 800,000 acres of cultivable land that is located 100-150

feet above the level of River Indus."Kalabagh Dam would provide 6.5 million acre feet of

water to cultivate seven million acres of currently barren land. This is in addition to the 3,800

MW of electricity it would provide in response to the push towards side-lining Kalabagh

altogether in favor of the Basha Dam project, Engineer Anwer Khurshid stated that "Basha

Dam is no substitute for Kalabagh dam not because of its altitude which is high enough, but

because no irrigation canals can be taken out from it because of the hilly terrain".

Other experts who have strongly supported the construction of the Kalabagh dam at the "Save

Water Save Pakistan" Forum include: Dr Salman Shah, former finance minister, Abdul

Majeed Khan, TECH Society president, Shafqat Masood, former IRSA chairman, Qayyum

Nizami, former minister of state, Prof Abdul Qayyum Qureshi, former vice chancellor of

Islamia University, Bahawalpur, Dr Muhammad Sadiq, agricultural scientist, M Saeed Khan,

former GM of Kalabagh Dam Project, Mansoor Ahmed, former MD of Pakistan Atomic

Energy Commission Foundation and Jameel Gishkori, among other. The participants of Save

Water Save Pakistan Forum session demanded in their recommendations implementation on

building five dams, including Munda dam, Kurram Tangi dam, Akhori dam and Kalabagh

dam, at least by 2025 to store water and generate electricity to meet the demand.

In contrast, Former Chief Engineer WAPDA, Engr. Shahr-i-Yar Khan has claimed that the

construction of Kalabagh Dam is not suitable for NWFP which will cause unnecessary

wastage of huge funds as compared to many other suitable sites of dams proposed on Indus

river. Shahr-i-Yar Khan, who had served on various positions of WAPDA, besides getting

training abroad, highlight various issues related to the Kalabagh Dam construction at length.

He was of the view that the construction of Kalabagh Dam has a number of adverse effects

on the generation of Barotha power complex.

2.2 Political hurdles

Sindh is the lower riparian and strongest opponent of KBD and politicians presents many

objections against the proposed dam:

That their share of the Indus water will be curtailed as water from the Kalabagh will

go to irrigate farmlands in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, at their cost. Sindhis hold

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that their rights as the lower riparian have precedence according to international water

distribution law.

The coastal regions of Sindh require a constant flow of water down the Indus into

the Arabian Sea so that the flowing water can keep the seawater from intruding inland.

Such seawater intrusion would literally turn vast areas of Sindh's coast into an arid saline

desert, and destroy Sindh's coastal mangroves.

With the construction of dams, such as Mangla Dam and Tarbela Dam across the

Indus, Sindhis have seen the once-mighty Indus turned into a shadow of its former glory

downstream of the Kotri Barrage up to Hyderabad. They fear that there simply is not

enough water for another large dam across the Indus, let alone three.

Claims that the current flow of Indus River downstream of Kotri Barrage is only

because of rain. Hence in years of low rain, Sindh fears the Indus would stop flowing.

Damming the Indus has already caused a number of environmental problems that

have not yet addressed. Silt deposited in the proposed Kalabagh dam would further

curtail the water storage capacity of Manchar Lake and other lakes and of wetlands

like Haleji Lake.

President Musharraf, Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz and other leaders, have promised

"iron-clad constitutional guarantees" to ensure that Sindh gets its fair share of water.

However, these assurances mean little to most Sindhis, who claim that even the earlier

1991 Indus Water-Sharing Accord, which is a document already guaranteed by the

constitutional body, the Council of Common Interests, has been violated, and that Punjab

has "stolen" their water without any concrete evidence.

The objection to Kalabagh in Sindh is widespread. Even political parties of Sindh that are in

the central cabinet and are supported by General Musharraf, such as the Muttahida Quami

Movement, have strongly denounced the dam. Opposition towards Kalabagh Dam is such

that PML N's Sindh Chapter also were in unison with the opponents of the Dam and as a

result even PML N's leader Mr Nawaz Sharif, who as the Prime Minister of Pakistan had

stated in 1998 that he proposes to build the dam, retracted from his stance and declared that

Sindh's view point ought to be respected and no project, however essential, be carried out that

weakened Pakistan's Federation.[citation needed]

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2.3 NWFP's viewpoint

The NWFP has two main objections to the dam:

NWFP claims that the running of Cheshma-Jhelum link canal and over drawing of

water from Tarbela is a common feature.

The entire system and canal of Ghazi- Barotha hydroelectric project runs in Khyber-

Pakhtunkhwa, however the electricity generating turbines were installed just 500 meters

inside Punjab so that the royalty is denied to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa..

While the reservoir will be in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the dam's electricity-

generating turbines will be just across the provincial border in Punjab. Therefore, Punjab

would get royalties from the central government in Islamabad for generating electricity.

Although, Punjab has also agreed not to claim any royalty on generation of resources

from Kalabagh dam.

Concerns that large areas of Nowshera District would be submerged by the dam and

even wider areas would suffer from water-logging and salinity as has occurred with the

Tarbela Dam. As the water will be stored in Kalabagh dam as proposed, that will give

water level rise to the city that is about 200 km away from the proposed location.

However, engineers having expertise on dam construction repeatedly deny the opinion

that Nowshera city could be submerged by the dam lake.

Punjab follows a paradox policy when it comes to canals to be taken out from

Kalabagh Dam. It talks of right bank canal which will supply water to D I Khan, but

when talking to Sindh, it denies construction of right bank canal being infeasible.

2.4 Baluchistan’s viewpoint

Baluchistan is not directly affected by the dam as such. Rather, most nationalist Baloch claim

the dam is an instance of grievances of smaller provinces not being taken into account. They

have however, not included the dam in any of their statements after its cancellation.

2.5 Indian involvement

Experts claim India was sponsoring opposition to Kalabagh Dam project through various

pressure groups. He observed that Pakistani politicians could not implement major national

projects like Kalabagh Dam due to political compromises and lack of national consensus,

terming it an unfortunate development.

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3. Analysis

All Pakistanis agree that Pakistan faces a severe water shortage, and that some form of water

management must be implemented soon. Many point out that even if work on Kalabagh were

to start tomorrow, it would still take at least three years to complete and commission such a

large dam. In the meantime, the water situation would continue to worsen. Smaller dams,

barrages, and canals must be built before that, and water conservation techniques introduced.

The WAPDA for years repeatedly changed its statistics on the dam, to the point where no-one

in Pakistan now believes any of its figures. Government of Pakistan formed a technical

committee, headed by A. N. G. Abbasi, to study the technical merits of the Kalabagh dam

vis-a-vis the other two. The four-volume technical report concluded that Bhasha or Katzarah

dam should be built before Kalabagh, further complicating matters. The report also stated that

Kalabagh and Bhasha Dams could be considered feasible.

The abrupt way in which President Pervez Musharraf announced the decision to build the

dam, overruling the objections of Small parties, had polarised public opinion. On 26 May

2008, Federal Minister for Water and Power of Pakistan Raja Pervez Ashraf abruptly

cancelled the project and that Kalabagh Dam will not be constructed. He said due to

opposition from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh and other stakeholders, the project are no

longer feasible.

The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani, announced that the fate of the

project would be decided by a plebiscite. The decision came after Pakistan faced extreme

power crisis and acute water shortages. The government is currently finding alternative

locations for the dam.[1]

Timeline of Events on Kalabagh Dam Controversy

December 2004: General Pervez Musharraf, President of Pakistan, announced that he

would build the dam in the larger interest of Pakistan.

29, November 2012: The Lahore High Court (LHC) on Thursday ordered the federal

government to construct the Kalabagh dam.

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3.1 ALT ERNATIVES

The first solution to the dispute is to cut off the proposed project from the roots. Since there is

no consensus between the provinces over the project, construction of this dam would add fuel

to the fire and would further divide the nation. The ongoing clashes could lead to an even

worse battle. However, on the other hand if this project is not streamlined the economy of

Pakistan would suffer. Pakistan being an agro based country will see darker clouds of turmoil

since the fertile soils of the country will turn into barren lands. The shortfall in electricity

generation will never be met and problem will go far from worse.

Another alternative could be to appoint a Mediator Committee for the provinces. The

mediator committee will listen to the viewpoints of all the provinces and will try to bridge in

the gaps. This will ensure that no province is neglected and each one is given freedom of

speech. The mediator committee will make the provinces realize the importance of the project

and will take force stand if it comes to the interests and rights of the provinces but guarding

the interests of all the provinces could be challenging for the committee. Also it would be

difficult to find unbiased mediators to the interest of their own provinces and even so if they

decide that the best interest of the people is in accordance with the views of people of their

own province then the general public might repel against the decision. Another issue would

be that equal representation would immediately lead to the mediator from Punjab being

outnumbered by the other mediators.

A poll could be taken from all three provinces under controversy and the idea with majority

polls could be worked upon. The drawback of this would be that the province with the higher

population will have the desirable decision, where as the one with the lower population, their

idea will be oppressed. Moreover, the cost required to carry out the measure could be huge.

But statistically speaking it could be a good way to know the general opinion of the nation on

the project. Alternatives to Kalabagh Dam:

Carry over dam for storage of every drop of surplus water in high flood years and raising

water level in Mangla dam to offset the effect of silting. A de-silted Tarbela would yield the

same irrigation benefits as Kalabagh, but at one-seventh the cost in net present value terms,

Thermal power plant of equivalent use of Thar coal for generation. The Minister of Water

and Power has said that he will announce Power Policy in the month of July, 1997. It is

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suggested that run of the river hydel projects and coal based power generation should be hall

marks of this policy.

The implementation of de-silting the Tarbela dam would ensure long term and sustainable

storage with only a small annual reduction in capacity. The estimated retention at 6 MAF is

exactly what Kalabagh is designed to hold. However, flushing would reduce energy benefits

because reservoir levels would need to be held down in June and July. On the other hand, the

long-term energy producing potential of Ghazi Barotha clearly depends on Tarbela not silting

up.

Abstracting from social and environmental considerations, purely financial and economic

cost comparisons also unequivocally favor Tarbela rehabilitation over Kalabagh. But due to

the shorter life of this project Kalabagh dam is much preferred.

Source: Tarbela Dam Sediment Management Study, TAMS-Wallingford, March 1998

3.2 Conclusion & Recommendations:

Description With Kalabagh

(US $ million)

Tarbela Action Plan

(US $ million)

P.V. construction cost of Kalabagh 2,234 0

P.V. construction cost of project 0 343

P.V. construction cost of thermal

plant

0 918

P.V. incremental thermal operating

cost

0 20

Total P.V. Cost: 2,234 1,461

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They said that our rivers run with 150 MAF water out of which 43 MAF usually goes into sea

annually and we could only be able to store 6.1 MAF water if Kalabagh Dam is constructed.

About objections of the Sindh regarding ruination of land in the wake of abundant presence

of salty water at sea coasts he said, still rest of the water that is 43 MAF-61 MAF would go

into the sea.

There can be no two opinions that Pakistan is in dire need of efficient water management and

supply of cheap electricity. Dams are the way to meet this need. But this dam has become a

bone of contention, on the one side of which is the federal government and the Punjab, and

on the other the rest of the three provinces, whose assemblies had passed resolutions against

the project before the October 12 action. Therefore, it has to be handled very carefully

because it has the potential to jolt the federation. The official statement before the LHC talks

about efforts to build consensus on the scheme among the provinces. Hopefully, that is

actually the case, although there is nothing publicly visible. It is advisable that the Musharraf

government should give a comprehensive account of its policy towards the Kalabagh Dam

before it erupts into another controversy.

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References

1. ^ a b Kalabagh Dam shelved forever. Nation.com.pk (2008-05-27). Retrieved on

2012-06-06.

2. ^ Leading News Resource of Pakistan. Daily Times (2010-08-10). Retrieved on

2012-06-06.

3. ^ Malik, Bashir (October 10, 2011). "India behind Kalabagh Dam opposition:

water expert". The News International. Retrieved 11 July 2012.

4. ^ Mulk, Shamsul (May 22, 2012). "Need for early construction of Kalabagh Dam

stressed". The News International. Retrieved 11 July 2012.

5. ^ "Need for Kalabagh Dam". The Nation. January 19, 2012. Retrieved 11 July

2012.

6. ^ ANWER, KHURSHID (July 01, 2012). "CCI approves Kalabagh Dam". The

Nation. Retrieved 11 July 2012.

7. ^ "Experts for construction of dams". The News International. April 05, 2012.

Retrieved 11 July 2012.

8. ^ India behind Kalabagh Dam opposition: water expert. Thenews.com.pk.

Retrieved on 2012-06-06.

9. ^ [1]. Dawn.com Retrieved on 2012-11-29.

10. To build or Not to Build Kalabagh Dam, News Seminar, July 19, 1998

11. http://www.angelfire.com/az/Sindh/indus4.html

12. Ercelawn, A., Nauman, M., Damming Kalabagh: State versus Community, Center

versus Territory, Nation versus Federation, The News, June 21, 1998

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GROUP 5:

Fizza Saif Yumna Arshad khan Ahsan Mirza Maryam Khan Hamza Bin Saud


“Political Integration of Tribal Areas” The birth of Pakistan did not bring about any significant political and administrative change in its tribal areas since we virtually adopted all the British policies. In fact it only accentuated the issue, and led to divergent positions on their political future.

“Politics is a highly tribal business”.

Nick Clegg

“I suppose that the media and their portrayal of Islam and the almost tribal separations and divisions of the Muslims are the greatest issues confronting Muslims in the United Kingdom”.

Cat Stevens

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INTRODUCTION

The Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) is strategically located between the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and the settled areas of KPK (Khyber pakhtunkhwa). FATA, both historically and traditionally had a unique administrative and political status from the British times since 1849. However, in 1893, a demarcation was raised with Afghanistan called Durand Line. They controlled the area through a combination of effective Political Agents and tribal elders, while leaving the people with their traditions and internal independence. Pakistan inherited this system and more or less continues with it even today. Since the independence of Pakistan, FATA has not been accorded the same priority in terms of the development process being undertaken in other parts of the country. The development initiatives and allocations in FATA followed a compartmentalized approach, concentrated around sector facilities and benefiting few influential and politically active sections. This ad hoc approach deprived large segments of the population from social uplift, and economic empowerment.

To the north and east, the tribal areas are bounded by the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), while on the south is the province of Baluchistan. The Durand Line, which separates Pakistan from Afghanistan, forms the western border of FATA.

FATA is the focus of attention of international anti-terrorism organizations; it is considered by many of them as a safe haven from where the militants launch attacks against Afghanistan. Since 2002 Pakistan’s military has been fighting the militants in FATA and now in the NWFP districts.

BACKGROUND

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1. FATA

LAND

The seven Political Agencies and the six Frontier Regions comprise the Federally

Administered Tribal Area (FATA) which is located between the ‘settled’ districts of

NWFP and the international border with Afghanistan called the Durand line. The total

area of FATA comprising mountainous and rugged terrain in general is 27,200 square km

(FATA Secretariat, 2006, p 15)

PEOPLE

It has a population of approximately 3.18 million inhabitants ( ibid, pp 9) divided into

about a dozen tribes (Caroe, O. 1958, pp 3-24 ). The tribesmen who are ethnically

Pashtun follow their unique social code called ‘Pashtunwali’ which literally translated

means “the way of the Pashtun” and is based on the notions of honor, hospitality and

revenge.

2. History

From its takeover in 1849 till 1901 the North West Border area of British India (corresponding

generally to the present day NWFP and FATA) remained attached with the Government of

Punjab but was administered directly by the Secretary of State for India, under the guidance of

the Governor General India. North West Frontier Province (NWFP) was created in 1901 by

carving out the ‘settled ‘ districts of Peshawar, Kohat , Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, and Hazara ,

and the political agencies of Khyber, Kurram , North Waziristan, South Waziristan from Punjab

and adding the Dir., Swat and Chitral Agency to them for strategic as well as administrative

reasons. It was placed under a Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor General. (Rose,

H.A. 2002, p 26). The tribal areas though part of India were not deemed to be part of British

India since they were administered under special legal and administrative provision.

The Indian Independence Act of 1947 abrogated all the treaties that had tied the tribal areas with

the British government and therefore made them independent in the legal sense; it was for them to

decide whether to join Pakistan or India (Spain, J. W. 1963, pp 202-203). Mindful of their

geography and the fact that overwhelming majority of them were Muslims the tribesmen decided

to join Pakistan. An all tribal “Jirga” was held in April 1948 with Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the

Governor General of Pakistan at Peshawar in which the tribal elders or “Malik’s” pledged their

allegiance to Pakistan, and the latter guaranteed to continue with the same administrative

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arrangements and privileges for the tribal leaders as had been agreed upon with the British

government. On the demand of the tribesmen to keep them under the direct administration of the

central government, a new ministry of State and Frontier Regions was established under the direct

supervision of Quid-e-Azam (ibid, 1963, pp. 204-205). After independence in 1947 the army had

also been withdrawn from the tribal areas as the tribes were entrusted with its management with

the policing support of the Frontier Scoutsi (Nawaz, S. 2008, pp 33); it did not enter FATA until

2002. FATA has had a poor level of political empowerment since the inception of

Pakistan. Prior to 1997 members of National Assembly from FATA were elected only by

the Malik’s. They represented less than 1 % of the population that would have been

eligible voters if the principal of adult franchise were extended to FATA. Besides poor

levels of empowerment, FATA suffers from a lack of human and legal rights.

3. Constitutional status of the Tribal Areas:

All the constitutions of Pakistan have recognized the special status of the Tribal Areas. Articles

246 and 247 of the 1973 Constitution are applicable to FATA. Articles 247 (3), (5), (6), and (7)

provide the framework for relationship between FATA and the federal government. Accordingly:

No act of Parliament will be enforced in FATA unless the President may so especially

direct by a notification.

The President may make any regulation for the good governance of FATA.

The President has the power to end the classification of FATA over any area provided

that that President shall ascertain the views of the tribe through a Jirga first.

The jurisdiction of the Supreme and High Courts has been barred in FATA unless the

Parliament so provides under a law.

4. Judicial Structures

FCR

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FCR Jirga

Due process

Justice denied

Constitutionally the President of Pakistan is the chief executive for FATA who in turn

administers it through the Governor NWFP acting as his Agent. The federal government

provides the development and non-development budgets for FATA. From the time of

independence till 2002(when a separate Secretariat was created for FATA) the NWFP

bureaucracy managed its affairs. FATA Secretariat is presently being headed by an Additional

Chief Secretary who is assisted by five Administrative Secretaries. On key policy matters the

ACS FATA reports to the Chief Secretary NWFP and this way a linkage is maintained with the

province.

Political Agent (PA) is the chief administrator of a Political Agency who also wields the powers

of the chief judicial and police officer for his area of jurisdiction; he derives his authority from

the “Frontier Crimes Regulation 1901” which is based upon the principles of collective and

territorial responsibility of the tribesmen. The PA exercises his authority through the tribal elders

or “Malik’s” and their tribal councils or “Jirga’s” which act as jury in disputes of all kinds

amongst the tribesmen. The “Malik’s” also assist the PA in matters of security, and law and

order, and are paid allowances by the PA in lieu of these services. Policing functions are

performed by the tribal levies and “Khassadars” under the command and control of the PA. It is

to be noted that since British times the government has administered only a small portion of the

tribal areas (confined mostly to government infrastructure like roads, schools, hospitals,

residences and security buildings) directly, while the remaining area has been managed by the

tribes themselves as per their customs and traditions “Riwaj”( FATA Secretariat, 2006, pp 6).

After the deployment of regular army the traditional structure of FATA administration (based

upon the PA, the “Malik’s” and FCR) has been relegated to the background and the army has

assumed a paramount position in the administration of the agencies.

5. Parliamentary representation: FATA is representing by 12 members in the national

assembly and 8 members in the senate, there is no representative in the provincial

assembly. The Parliament has been explicitly banned from legislation for FATA and

related matters. Therefore though FATA parliamentarians can legislate for the whole

country they cannot legislate for FATA.

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6. Local government in FATA: At the moment there is practically no system of local

government in FATA since the devolution of power reforms as implemented in the

provinces in 2001 were not introduced in FATA despite some initial enthusiasm by the

then military government. Instead a local representational system based partly on

elections and partly on nominations of the PA was launched in 2004 which after

completing its stipulated time ended in 2008. Under this system Agency Councils were

established and their members were assigned the role of identifying and supervising the

development schemes at the local level. However the system could not muster the support

of the FATA parliamentarians as well as the political administration and ultimately ended

without achieving much.

7. Human Development status: Since independence FATA has remained relatively

backward as compared to other parts of the country; in terms of social indicators it lags

behind even the most backward districts of the neighboring NWFP, let alone the national

averages Selected Human Development Indicators for Pakistan, NWFP and FATA

(2003)*

Indicator Pakistan NWFP FATA

Literacy (both sexes %) 43.92 35.41 17.42

Male literacy 54.81 51.39 29.51

Female literacy 32.02 18.82 3.00

Population per doctor 1,226 4,916 7,670

Population per bed in

hospitals

1,341 1,594 2,179

Road ( per square km) 0.26 0.13 0.17

*Literacy rates according to 1998 census; all other figures for 2003

Source: Government of NWFP, 2005 a: Government of NWFP 2005 b, Government of Pakistan,

undated (b).

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CAUSES

Administrative Arrangements Geo strategic dimension Political landscape Social factors Human rights situation Cultural Aspects Financial Impact

Administrative arrangements:

Historically the administration of NWFP and FATA has remained finely interwoven with each

other. On behalf of the central government the bureaucracy of NWFP has been managing

FATA’s affairs both at the secretariat as well as the agency levels; the manpower for FATA is

still provided by the province even after the creation of a separate secretariat for FATA. This

model of administration did have obvious advantages like better bureaucratic coordination due to

integration at the vertical and horizontal levels, relatively smooth movement of human resources

and therefore the transfer of institutional knowledge and skills from NWFP to FATA. It also

worked better in law and order situations and security matters since the Tribal Areas are

inextricably linked with the settled districts. It was for this reason that the position of the defunct

Divisional Commissioner was revived at the provincial level and was given a say in the law and

order matters of the Agencies.

The main disadvantage of the old system was that FATA was relegated to a relatively secondary

position via viz provincial matters. There was also lack of accountability and scrutiny of FATA

affairs at the provincial level since FATA was not its part and was therefore not represented in the

provincial assembly. The federal government which was the provider of funds for FATA also

neglected it and so did the donors and multilateral lending agencies. The creation of a separate

Secretariat for FATA at least created a dedicated structure to deal with FATA though it created

problems of its own. Also with only five departments the Secretariat is unable to cope with its

assigned workload in an effective manner.

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Geo-strategic dimension:

Since the Great Game era (Hopkirk, P. 1992, p 1) between British India and Czarist Russia, the

tribal areas comprising the present day FATA possessed great significance for the British. In the

words of Simon Commission (Din M.H. 58. p1) “The North West Frontier is not only the frontier

of India –it is an international frontier of the first importance from a military point of view for the

whole Empire”. According to rules of the Great Game between the two great powers, Afghanistan

was kept as a buffer state between Russia and British India, while the Tribal Areas were kept as a

buffer zone between Afghanistan and NWFP by the British, and therefore its socio-economic

development and integration into the rest of the country was not an imperial priority. After

experimenting with different models (the Close Border and Forward policies) the British finally

settled for an indirect system of governance to maintain a minimum level of control in the region

(Major General Din, M. H. 1958, p 54). The difficult terrain and the fiercely independent nature

of its inhabitants were also partly responsible for the region’s isolation and for the non-

development of state structures. After independence the Government of Pakistan continued with

almost the same policies towards FATA.

The traditional social and political set up of the tribal areas was first disturbed in the mid-70s

when the Pakistani authorities in response to Afghanistan’s persistent slogans for ‘Pashtunistan’

invited Islamist rebels from that country and allowed them to establish military training camps in

FATA. Due to the turmoil created by these groups as well as internal political infighting

Afghanistan was invaded by Soviet troops in 1979 and since that time the traditional equilibrium

and social landscape of FATA has undergone a fundamental transformation. During the 80’s

FATA’s territory was used as the front-line area for waging a holy war (‘jihad’) by the Afghan

Resistance (‘Mujahedeen’) against the Soviet troops with the active support and collaboration of

US, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia (Coll, S. 2004, pp 53-70). After the withdrawal of the Soviet

troops in 1989 and following a protracted civil strife, a new group comprising religious students

called ‘Taliban’, emerged on the political horizon and took control of the country in 1996. As

part of its policy of seeking ‘strategic depth’ within Afghanistan, Pakistan provided complete

support and legitimacy to the Taliban regime (Rashid, A. 2000, pp 183-195). After the US led

military intervention of Afghanistan in 2001 most of the Taliban leadership and fighters escaped

into FATA and in due course established themselves as a potent force all over replacing the

traditional “Malik’s”, and minimizing the effectiveness of the Political Agents and therefore the

Pakistani state. The Pakistan army sent to FATA in 2003 to retrieve the lost land from the

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militants could not succeed and instead entered into various peace deals with them. The rise in the

influence of local as well as foreign Taliban subsequently spilled over to the settled districts of

NWFP (Rashid, A. 2008, pp 265-292). When the situation seemed to go totally out of control and

alarms were raised even at the international level, Pakistan army started a full-fledged military

operation in Bajuar, followed by that in Swat in NWFP and after achieving significant success

has now moved into South Waziristan.

Political landscape:

Since independence the public representatives from FATA were elected through an electoral

college of Malik’s which resulted into the emergence of a political elite that was perceived to be

non-ideological, unaccountable and always siding with the seat of power on issues of political

importance. Universal adult franchise in FATA was introduced as late as 1997 but the non

extension of the Political Parties Act and therefore the absence of normal political activities

hindered the development of a genuine political culture. The new political space thus created was

quickly captured by the religious elements (affiliated with religion-political parties) that had a

prominent presence in the region by virtue of their “madrassas” (religious seminaries).

Social factors:

Owed to the lack of local economic opportunities a large number of FATA youth have migrated

to the Gulf countries and the money they send has led to the creation of a new elite class that is

not willing to accept the dominance of the traditional elders/Malik’s (Fair, C., Howenstin, N. and

Thier, J. 2006). The local partially educated, unemployed and disenchanted youth is yet another

segment of the society that is not happy with the established social order and is demanding a

change.

Human Rights situation:

In the absence of a credible judicial system and the non-extension of the jurisdiction of the

superior courts to FATA, human rights have been violated with impunity in FATA. This has

assumed a more serious dimension due to the recent stepping up of the war against the militants

by the Pakistani military authorities. (Haider, Z. 2009).

Cultural aspects:

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The largest group on the Pakistan Afghanistan border is Pashtun. They are a highly seminary

ethnic group and are averse to the notion of a central authority or government. In fact for all

matters critical to their survival they look towards their family and tribe rather than an external

authority. This prevents state structures from taking roots in the tribal areas. Historically, from

Alexander to the Soviets, Pashtuns have never welcomed foreign rule. The British after failing to

conquer the Pashtuns built a romantic image of the tribal and portrayed them as warlike, brave,

and stoic. The tribal areas are governed based upon the century’s old traditions of “Pashtunwali”

which includes conflict resolution mechanisms, legal codes and alternative forms of governance.

These areas are therefore not lawless and unruly as they are conceived to be in the eyes of

outsiders rather in the eyes of their inhabitants they are managed in a better way. Scholars have

divided Pashtun into two main types; the ‘hill ‘Pashtuns and those living in the lower fertile and

irrigated farmlands in the settled districts. “Nang” or honor is an important value for the hill men

and this creates a culture of defiance in them (Johnson, T. H. and Mason, M. C. 2008, pp 50-53)

Financial impact:

The federal government provides for the entire development and non-development budget of

FATA and there has been a significant increase in both since 2002. At the agency level the

political administration is also allowed to levy and collect taxes in order to run the administration

and to pay for the allowances of the tribal “Malik’s”. Extension of the normal system of

government in FATA would require much more resources than those collected through the

existing system. In case FATA is merged with NWFP, the latter would have to foot the bill for its

development and non-development budget which could be an added burden on the already weak

finances of the province. The pro-status quo bureaucrats (who have stakes in the existing system)

take this argument for not extending the normal system of government to FATA. Per se this is a

not a strong argument and the federal government will need to foot the bill for this extra cost in

case of introduction of normal form or government and/or its integration into NWFP. It is also

possible that NWFP’s financial position may improve in future as a result of implementation of

the recently agreed National Finance Commission’s Award.

OPTIONS

Keeping in account the causes/issues in FATA the options which could be endow with are the government should discuss the policy regarding insurgency and all other regional

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and international matters regarding FATA in the National Assembly for obtaining its decisions. However this should only be done after intensive homework and after all the stakeholders, such as major political parties represented in the Parliament, are on board about the results to be obtained from the National Assembly.

1. Security

The National Assembly may extensively review militancy and inter alia approves;

Approve a Counter-Insurgency Strategy for Pakistan Approves policy for a joint civil-military based stabilization and reconstruction

(S&R) approach for holding areas after clearing them from militants. Stabilization plans should be supported by separate budget and financial rules. The funds will be auditable. Such S & R plans will be prepared before the start of any deterrent operation

Approves a new framework of Policing based on community involvement, good intelligence gathering and quick response teams

The government should review all policies in various fields which lead to division of society on sectarian lines

The Frontier Corps should be placed under the Governor NWFP and the ACR of IGFC initiated by him

The Frontier Constabulary should be placed under the Chief Minister NWFP and the ACR of the CFC be written by him

All private schools and all Madrassas must be registered. It should be made an offence to run an unregistered Madrassa. The Government must also carry out a comprehensive reform of the Madrassa system as ordered in the important Supreme Court decision on this matter

The Government should enforce previously enacted laws against militias and Jihadi outfits; a disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation scheme should be initiated in this context.

2. Justice

The FCR should be suitably amended in the light of the recommendations of the Justice Ajmal Mian committee and it should also be renamed as the FATA Regulation 2008

It should contain provision of Habeas Corpus and provision for exercise of writ jurisdiction by creating a FATA Tribunal with the powers of a High Court

Revisions and appeals under the FCR will also lie to this tribunal

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A monitored grievance addressable system should be designed in consultation

with Jirga’s The NWFP Home Secretary and Chief Secretary should be actively engaged in

matters relating to tribal areas and the province. One of their functions should be to act as advisors to the Governor on law and order and other service issues

3. Empowerment

The Political Parties Act must be extended immediately to FATA Effective and an empowered local government model should be designed for

FATA which is based on the Nikat system Regulatory framework should be provided under law to register tribal

organizations as CBOs for dealing with basic needs sectors and other monitoring roles

The tribal quotas in jobs and services should be enhanced including employment overseas

4. Development

Investment by government in development can open some opportunities; FATA has very low indicators in human social development, therefore the Panel recommends the speedy implementation of the Sustainable Development Strategy for 2006-2015. However, the Panel recommends opening up development possibilities for the private sector for speedier progress. The recent opening up of the disputed Ziarat Marble Mining in Mohmand agency by the militants should encourage the tribal administration to be proactive

Focus development on skill development and employment The tribal quotas in jobs and services should be enhanced including employment

overseas US should be pursued to approve the Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs)

for FATA. All safeguards should be built in to ensure that non-FATA investors do not hijack the scheme and that benefits of the scheme should accrue to FATA and the tribesmen. Ownership by and Employment of tribesmen should be the essential features of ROZsThe tribesmen must have the right in having equity and a share of employment

Large projects be started based on work for money idea Entrepreneurial development should be encouraged

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5. Long-term Strategy

The Panel, after detailed lengthy discussions, reached the conclusion that the Government should prepare a 10 year perspective plan for integration of FATA into NWFP because it is one people and region and should have a single administration. However, understanding the needs of the tribesmen to retain their traditions and social system they should be allowed to retain their system. For this purpose the Panel has the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas model in mind. It is for this reason that the panel speaks of “integration” and not “merger.” Such reforms will permit FATA to have representation in the provincial assembly which will make the provincial departments more responsive to the needs of FATA

The Panel was of the view that the creation of a separate secretariat for FATA was a mixed blessing since FATA will always be borrowing officers on deputation from NWFP. The creation of a separate secretariat also broke the easy coordination that was available in the past. Secondly, it is difficult to provide long term capacity building as the trained officers will return to NWFP where their parent department remains

It is hoped that with the implementation of these recommendations with the support of the stakeholders the conditions in FATA and the rest of the country will change for the better. However, there will be resistance to these reforms from those who are beneficiaries of the existing limited access system. This can be by-e passed by strong advocacy and leadership.

Prof Manzoor Iqbal Awan-Bahria University-Conflict Management-Fall 2012-BBA VI B-Student Projects...

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