Process Safety ManagementPROCESS SAFETY INDICATORS CAN...

Process Safety ManagementPROCESS SAFETY INDICATORS CAN DRIVE CHANGE

Hasan Alaradi, RRC International

Objectives• Why are Process Industries a Special Case? – Examples from History

• What is Process Safety?

• Process Safety Management Elements

The US Federal Model (29 CFR 1910.119)

The EU Federal Model (Seveso III)

• Process Safety Indicators

Overview:

• High hazard industries

• Chemical Processing

• Refineries

• Oil & Gas Production

Process Industries

Potential for catastrophic events

• Major fires, explosions, toxic release

• Rare, complex causes, diffi lt t di t

BP Oil Refinery, Texas City, USA (2005)

Explosion and Fire

15 Dead

180 Injured

BP Oil Refinery, Texas City, USA (2005)

Some Immediate Technical Causes

• Drain valve left closed

• Level Indicators did not reflect reality

• High level alarms failed to activate

Some Underlying Causes• Culture of routinely not following procedures (procedures outdated)

• Inadequate process safety performance metrics (emphasis on low personal injury rates)

• Cost-cutting (aging plant "run to failure“)

• Ineffective leadership/Board oversight- Warning signs overlooked for many years

- Incidents not investigated effectivelyF i l t l ( i

Buncefield Oil Depot, UK (2005)

Multiple Massive Explosions

Extensive fire (burned for 5 days)

40 Injured


Massive Explosion

No Fatalities/Injuries

Tank 912 Overfilled

Overflowed

Ignites

Some Immediate Technical Causes

• Fill gauge became stuck

• High level Switch failed to operate (as did the alarm)

• No other mechanism to alert control room staff of impending overfilling

• Petrol overflowed into bund

• Bund and drains also failed (pollution)

Some Underlying Causes• Inadequate maintenance of critical equipment (e.g. the gauge was known to be unreliable)

• Inadequate management systems for tank filling (these systems were independently audited too!)

• Procedures not properly followed• Work pressures – increased work load and insufficient information to properly manage storage of incoming fuel

• Culture of “keep process operating” at all costs

• Lack of engineering support from


Unprecedented high explosion overpressures

“Before Buncefield a massive vapour cloud explosion at a tank farm was not deemed a credible major incident risk.”

Industries typically with:

• Large inventories of dangerous substances

• Complex processing (requires careful control)

What is Process Safety?

Focus on Prevention of catastrophic events:

• Major fires, explosions, toxic release

• Major pollution potential

“Hard Hat” safety tends to focus more on:

• Personal Injury (reactive performance measures)

Process Safety

• Analysis of credible (realistically possible) major accident causes and scenarios


Process Safety vs “Hard Hat” safety


Source: OGP

• Process Safety Relies on multiple barriers







Overview:

Process Safety Management Elements

Safety Management

System (SMS)

Technical Risk Control (TRC) +

Brings together: Plant, Procedures, People







Overview:

The US Federal Model of PSM – Focus on TRC Elements

1. Process Safety Information

• Needed for Hazard Analysis

• Process chemicals (toxicity, flammability)

• Technologies (inventory, operating parameters, process chemistry)

• Equipment (construction materials, design standards)


2. Process Hazard Analysis

• Major Accident Hazard Identification

• Assessment of liklihood of specific consequences

• What-if, Checklists, HAZOP, FMEA, FTA, Modelling, Previous Incidents, Existing Controls

• Issue of Foreseeability –i i i


3. Operating Procedures

• Safe Systems of Work/Procedures

• Permits

• Covering:

normal (start-up/shut-down)

abnormal (emergency)

Special (maintenance/cleaning/repair)

Pre-start up checks


4. Employee Participation

• Consultation

• Cooperation

• Information accessibility

• Positive Safety Culture


5. Training

• Competency Matrix

6. Contractor Control

• Contractors widely used in Process Industries

• Selection

• Induction

• Performance Monitoring


7. Pre-Startup Safety Review (PSSR)

• New/Modified Processes

• At Simplest – check confirming everything in place

- Design

- PHA

- Procedures

- Training

- Etc


8. Asset (Mechanical) Integrity

• Critical equipment fit for purpose

• Correctly installed

• Maintained

• Critical Equipment Identified – PR, ESD, Alarms, Sensors, Pressure Vessels


9. Hot-Work Permits

• Hot-work on or near relevant processes

• Link to LOTO10. Management of Change (MoC)

• Potential Consequences of change

• Change = Process, Equipment, Personnel etc

• Level of change needs to be d fi d


11. Incident Investigation

• Learning from Incidents

• Root Cause Analysis

• Analysis of what might have happened

12. Emergency Planning and Response

• Foreseeability

• ECC + Equipment + ERT

• On-site and Off-site


13. Audit

• Internal Compliance

• Feeds to Management Reviews

• Implies Performance Standards/Indicators






• Leadership in PSM


Overview:

The EU Federal Model of PSM – For Onshore Major Accident Hazard Sites

• Explicitly Integrates TRC and SMS

• Based on Seveso Incident (Italy, 1976)

• Seveso Directive in place since 1982

• Seveso III

- 2-tier system

- Requirements based on amounts and types of dangerous

The EU Federal Model of PSM – Top Tier Requirements

1. Notify Regulator

2. Major Accident Prevention Policy (MAPP)

• Aims

• Roles/Responsibilities

• Commitment towards Continuously Improving Control of Major Accident Hazards

• Essentially LEADERSHIP

The EU Federal Model of PSM – Top Tier Requirements3. SMS (Proportionate, to support

MAPP)

OH&S Policy

Planning

Implementation and Operation

Checking and Corrective Action

Management Review

Continual ImprovementLeadersh

ip

Hazard Analysis

MoC

Operating within Design Intent

CompetenceContractors

Asset Integrity

EmergencyIncident Investigation

Auditing


4. Domino Effects

• Where regulator identifies these

• Must cooperate/exchange information

• Update MAPPs and SMS accordingly


5. Safety Report that MUST Demonstrate

• MAPP and SMS implemented

• Major accident hazards and possible major accident scenarios identified

• Prevention and Mitigation Measures in Place

• Safety & Reliability –design, construction,

i i


5. Safety Report that MUST Demonstrate

• Internal emergency plans drawn up (including clean-up/restoration)

• Provide information for external emergency services to draw up external plans

• Sufficient information for regulator – planning of further developments


6. Regulators MUST

• Take account of Domino effects

• Take account of Land-use planning

• Provide essential information to Public

• Inspect Installations

• Prohibit operation of non-compliant installations







Overview:

Process Safety Indicators (PSI)Major Accidents often come as a surprise to top management

• Low Personal Injury rate (no accidents in last 10 million hours..)

• Lots of safety initiatives in place (“hold the hand rail” etc..)

Major Accidents seem Inevitable to operatives (something they get used to):

• Corroding plant

• Process always run outside design intent

Process Safety Indicators (PSI)Small number of good PSIs gives early warning

• Cascade down– set at different levels (organisation, site, specific plant)

• Choose based on factors that might lead to major accident scenarios

• Mixture of leading (active) and Lagging (reactive)

Need monitoring/recording

Process Safety Indicators (PSI)Leading PSIs

• Are things operating as intended?

• Develop for specific areas e.g. MoC, Operating Procedures, Competency (level of training)Example PSIs - Maintenance

• Failure rate of components when tested

• Number of overdue scheduled maintenance tasks

Process Safety Indicators (PSI)Lagging PSIs

• Number of unintended releases

• Authorised operation outside normal operating envelope

• Failure of control devices to operate as intended







Summary:

Process Safety ManagementPROCESS SAFETY INDICATORS CAN...

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