Process Safety for Project Leaders

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Process Safety for Project Leaders Society of Petroleum Engineers Trinidad & Tobago 19 th August 2008 Final Version 14 th August 08

Transcript of Process Safety for Project Leaders

Page 1: Process Safety for Project Leaders

Process Safety for Project LeadersSociety of Petroleum EngineersTrinidad & Tobago

19th August 2008

Final Version 14th August 08

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Agenda

2. What do we mean by Process Safety3. Risk Assessment and Management4. Process Safety in Design5. Process Safety in Project Delivery6. Conclusions7. Questions

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1 What do we mean by Process Safety

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What do we mean by Process Safety?

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Process Safety Definition

• Process Safety is a disciplined framework for managing the integrity of hazardous operating systems and processes by applying good design principles, engineering and operating practices.

• It deals with the prevention and control of incidents that have the potential to release hazardous materials or energy.

• Such incidents can cause toxic effects, fire or explosion and could ultimately result in serious injuries, property damage, lost production and environmental impact.

(BP, based on Centre for Chemical Process Safety, AIChE)

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History of Process Safety

• 1066 in England, William The Conqueror issued instructions to cover and damp down fires before retiring

• 1566 In Manchester the Manorial Court decreed that sacks of twigs used in bake house ovens were to be stored a safe distance from the bake house and it was an offence to lay straw in the streets and to light fires in rooms with no chimney

Legislation almost always follows directly a major safety incident

• Further fire legislation followed in the 17th and 18th centuries as a result of events such as the Great Fire of London (1666)

• Industrial revolution and the emergence of the chemical and petroleum industries required legislation to ensure safety in the workplace and to the public

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History of Unsafe Processes - FLIXBOROUGH

• June 1974 - explosion at a caprolactam process killed 28 people and seriously injured 36

• Temporary 20cm bypass pipe ruptured releasing about 40 tons cyclohexane that formed a vapour cloud 100-200m in diameter

• Ignited, probably by a furnace in a nearby hydrogen plant, releasing equivalent to 15 ton of TNT

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History of Unsafe Processes - SEVESO

• July 1976 - Small chemical plant north of Milan, Italy released dioxin to residential populations leading to death and slaughter of animals, hospitalisation of the local population and a massive clean up

• Subsequent safety regulations passed by the European Commission in 1982 called ‘The Seveso Directive’

• Seveso Directive updated in 1999 and 2005, referred to as Seveso II Directive (or COMAH Regulations in the UK)

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History of Unsafe Processes - BHOPAL

• December 3, 1984 a Union Carbide subsidiary pesticide plant released 40 tons of methyl isocyanate gas killing approximately 3800 people immediately

• Approximately 20,000 people are believed to have died subsequently as a result of the disaster

• Caused by the leakage of water into methyl isocyanate holding tank as a result of poor maintenance procedures

• Resulting reaction generated a major increase in temperature of the liquid causing a large volume of toxic gas to be released

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History of Unsafe Processes – PIPER ALPHA

• Piper Alpha was a North Sea oil production platform operated by Occidental Petroleum

• Platform began production in 1976 first as an oil platform and then converted to gas production

• July 6, 1988 Explosion and resulting fire destroyed platform killing 167 men

• To date the worlds worst offshore oil disaster in terms of lives lost and impact to industry

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History of Unsafe Processes – PETROBRAS

• March 2001 sinking of the world’s largest oil platform

• Explosions and fire killed 11 people

• Floating production unit producing oil and gas

• Draining of a tank used for storage of oil and water during maintenance led to an explosion

• Second larger explosion led to flooding of column compartments and pontoon tanks

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History of Unsafe Processes – TEXAS CITY

• March 23, 2005 - during start up of isomerisation unit, a distillation column flooded and over-pressurised causing release from a vent stack resulting in a series of explosions. 15 workers killed and 180 others injured

• Baker Panel Report :-

− Process safety considerations have not been considered adequately

− All levels of management and supervision play an important role in process safety performance.

− Personnel and contractors need process safety knowledge and competence

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Incidents that define Process Safety

WHEN WHERE WHAT FATALITIES• 1966 Feyzin, France LPG Bleve 18• 1974 Flixborough, UK Cyclohexane 28• 1976 Seveso, Italy Dioxin 1• 1979 Bantry Bay, Ireland Crude ship 50• 1982 Ocean Ranger, CanadaPlatform 84• 1984 Mexico LPG Bleve 600+• 1984 Bhopal, India Methyl isocyanate 20000+• 1986 Challenger Space shuttle 7• 1986 Chernobyl, USSR Nuclear powerplant 100+• 1986 Sandoz, Bale, Switzerland Warehouse 0• 1987 Texas City, USA HF 0• 1987 Grangemouth, UK HCK HP/LP interface 1• 1988 Piper Alpha Platform 167• 1988 Norco, USAPropane FCCU 7• 1989 Pasadena TX, USA Ethylene/isobutane 23• 1992 La Mède, France Gasoline/LPG FCCU 6• 1994 Milford Haven, UK FCCU feedstock 0• 1998 Longford, Australia LPG, brittle fracture 2• 2001 Toulouse, France Ammonium Nitrate 30• 2001 Petrobras Platform 11• 2003 Columbia Space shuttle 7• 2004 Skikda, Algeria LNG 27• 2005 Texas City, US Gasoline ISOM 15• 2005 Buncefield, UK Gasoline 0• 2005 Bombay High, India Platform 13

REGULATIONSFirst LPG prescriptive regulations

EU Seveso I Directive1982US Chemical Emergency Preparedness Program 1985US Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act 1986US Chemical Accident Prevention Program 1986 US Chemical Safety Audit Program 1986EU Seveso I Directive update 1987

US Clean Air Act Amendments 1990

UK HSE Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 1992

US OSHA 1910-119 Process Safety Management 1992

US EPA Risk Management Program1996

EU Seveso II Directive 1996

UK Control of Major Accident Hazard Regulations 1999

EU Seveso II update 2002

UK HSE Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005

API RPs on occupied buildings and vents

OSHA Refinery National Emphasis Program

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What do the regulations require ?

Employee participationTraining

Process hazard analysisMechanical integrity

Process safety informationOperating procedures

Hot work permitManagement of change

Pre start-up reviewEmergency planning & response

Incident investigationContractors

Compliance auditsTrade secrets

OSHA 1910.19

Platform descriptionReservoir descriptionManagement system

PolicyOrganisationProcesses

Risk assessmentPermit to work

MoC etcPerformance measurement

Audit & reviewMajor hazard identification

SystematicMajor hazard risk assessment

Demonstration of:Prevention

ControlMitigation

Evacuation Rescue & RecoverySafety Case

SAFETY CASE

Process descriptionSurrounding environment

Management systemPolicy

OrganisationProcesses

Risk assessmentPermit to work

MoC etcPerformance measurement

Audit & reviewMajor hazard identification

SystematicMajor hazard risk assessment

Demonstration of:Prevention

ControlMitigation

Emergency Response PlansSafety Report

SEVESO II (COMAH)

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Process Safety Definition

• Process Safety is a disciplined framework for managing the integrity of hazardous operating systems and processes by applying good design principles, engineering and operating practices.

• It deals with the prevention and control of incidents that have the potential to release hazardous materials or energy.

• Such incidents can cause toxic effects, fire or explosion and could ultimately result in serious injuries, property damage, lost production and environmental impact.

(BP, based on Centre for Chemical Process Safety, AIChE)

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2 Risk Assessment & Management

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Model for an Incident

HAZARD

CONSEQUENCE

BARRIERSBARRIERS

ESCALATION CONTROLSESCALATION CONTROLS

TOP EVENT

HAZARD

CONSEQUENCE

BARRIERSBARRIERS

ESCALATION CONTROLSESCALATION CONTROLS

TOP EVENT

Mitigation

Prevention

Control

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Process safety framework

Concept Design

Residual Risk

Detailed Design

Residual Risk

Operation

Selecting Technology, Process and Location

Risk Reduction Measures• Prevention• Control• Mitigation

Management of Process Safety

Layers of Protection • Passive• Active• Administrative

• Hazard Identification• Risk Assessment• Inherently Safer Design• HAZOP

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What Hazard ?

How often ?How bad ?

So what ?

Hazard Identification & Risk Assessment

What can gowrong ?

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3 Process Safety in Design

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Inherently Safer Design (ISD)

• The intent of ISD is “to eliminate the hazard completely or reduce its magnitude sufficiently to eliminate the need for elaborate safety systems and procedures. Furthermore, this hazard elimination or reduction would be accomplished by means that were inherent in the process and thus permanent and inseparable from it.”

• ISD goes beyond elimination or reduction of a hazard. It also applies to layers of protection. “In the broad sense, the strength of a layer of protection can be improved by features that are permanent and inseparable from that layer.”

Trevor Kletz “Process Plants: A Handbook for Inherently Safer Design, 1998”

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Inherently Safer Design

Improving plant design by:

• Minimizing quantities of hazardous substances

• Substituting hazardous materials with less hazardous substances

• Moderating hazardous conditions (temperature, pressure, composition) to reduce the impact of a release of hazardous material or energy

• Simplifying the design to eliminate unnecessary complexity and make operating errors less likely.

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Tangguh Offshore Platform

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Tangguh offshore platform

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No hydrocarbon processing to reduce leaks and inventories

Open layout and grated decks to

increase gas dispersion

No helicopters philosophy to

minimise hazards

No platform power generation to avoid hazardous storage

and operations

NUI with no overnight accommodation to

avoid personnel exposure

CRA piping to eliminate corrosion

Topsides rated for WHSP to simplify

and avoid overpressure

Export riser located within structure

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Design hazard management

Inherent Safety

Appraise Select Define Execute Operate

Engineered SafetyProcedural

Safety

Continuous Risk Reduction

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Engineered Safety

• Competent engineers doing the engineering

• Working within the boundaries of established standards and practices

• With a system of checks and assurance to make sure competence is being applied and standards are being followed.

• What else?

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Choosing the right assessment for the risk

LOW PROJECT EXPOSURE

HIGH PROJECT EXPOSURE

Brainstorming with the knowledge andexperience of a carefully selected team

Structured and withexperience based ranking

Call in the specialists

CONCERNED –

WO

RRIED –

ANXIO

US

TEAMASSESSMENT

STRUCTUREDTEAM ASSESSMENT

SPECIALISTASSESSMENT

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Design Assurance - HAZOP

• Hazard and Operability Study. A systematic qualitative technique to identify and evaluate process hazards and potential operating problems, using a series of guidewords to examine deviations from normal process conditions.

• In 1963 ICI applied ‘critical examination’ to the design of a phenol/acetone plant and discovered many potential hazards and operating problems.

• The HAZOP technique was refined and first used outside of ICI at Ilford Ltd in 1967.

• Sound design process together with a thorough HAZOP are fundamental to ensuing the safety of the design.

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4 Process Safety in Project Delivery

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Flare line failure during commissioning

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What else, besides design integrity?

• Quality management (QC and QA of design, procurement and construction)

• Clear roles and accountabilities

• Interface management

• Information & document management

• Management of change

• Systematic completions and handover

• Communication of design intent

• Regulatory compliance

• What else?

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Project HSSE Review.

The way BP assures itself that the project has done all that is necessary to deliver a safe facility.

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5 Conclusions

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Summary

• You can’t address a risk you haven’t identified.

• You need to understand the risk to decide what action to take.

• What you don’t have can’t leak – Inherently Safer Design.

• Protect the design intent – Quality Control and Management of Change.

• Make sure the operator understands the design intent – Document Control.

• Processes are not a substitute for competent people.

• Assurance (QA, HAZOP, PHSSER) is essential but not a substitute for doing the job properly in the first place.

• Start early and keep Process Safety in your spotlight.

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6 Questions.