Process Control Networks · PDF fileGuest SpeakerGuest Speaker Robert Alston Principle Lead...

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Process Control Networks Secure Architecture Design

Transcript of Process Control Networks · PDF fileGuest SpeakerGuest Speaker Robert Alston Principle Lead...

Page 1: Process Control Networks · PDF fileGuest SpeakerGuest Speaker Robert Alston Principle Lead Network and Security Consultant Over 25 years network experience including design

Process Control NetworksSecure Architecture Design

Page 2: Process Control Networks · PDF fileGuest SpeakerGuest Speaker Robert Alston Principle Lead Network and Security Consultant Over 25 years network experience including design

Guest SpeakerGuest Speaker

Robert AlstonPrinciple Lead Network and Security Consultant

Over 25 years network experience including design, implementation, troubleshooting and integration of firewalls, routers switches and infrastructure Robert has several certifications in the field of networks and security (CISSProuters, switches and infrastructure. Robert has several certifications in the field of networks and security. (CISSP, Cisco CCNA, Cisco CCDA, Certified Unix Engineer (CUE), Control System Security –US Department of Homeland Security) and Robert also has a Six Sigma Green Belt .  Robert is based in Duluth, Georgia USA.

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Page 3: Process Control Networks · PDF fileGuest SpeakerGuest Speaker Robert Alston Principle Lead Network and Security Consultant Over 25 years network experience including design

AgendaAgenda

Secure Process Control Architecture

• Defining Secure Network Architecture– What is a secure network architecture– Why a secure network architecturey– Who needs a secure network architecture

• Designing Secure Network Architecture– Defense in depth– Layers of security– Security levels

Z d C d it M d l– Zone and Conduit Models– Building Blocks

• Questions & Answers

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• Questions & Answers

Page 4: Process Control Networks · PDF fileGuest SpeakerGuest Speaker Robert Alston Principle Lead Network and Security Consultant Over 25 years network experience including design

Defining Secure Network ArchitectureDefining Secure Network Architecture

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Page 5: Process Control Networks · PDF fileGuest SpeakerGuest Speaker Robert Alston Principle Lead Network and Security Consultant Over 25 years network experience including design

What Is a secure Network Architecture?What Is a secure Network Architecture?

• Controlled Access

• Defined security zones

• Layered levels of security

• Highly available (Redundancy)g y ( y)

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Page 6: Process Control Networks · PDF fileGuest SpeakerGuest Speaker Robert Alston Principle Lead Network and Security Consultant Over 25 years network experience including design

Why a secure network architecture?Why a secure network architecture?

• Compliance and Regulation

• Targeted Attacks

• Open Systems

• Risks associated with breach

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Page 7: Process Control Networks · PDF fileGuest SpeakerGuest Speaker Robert Alston Principle Lead Network and Security Consultant Over 25 years network experience including design

Who needs a secure network architecture?Who needs a secure network architecture?

• Critical Infrastructure

• Regulated Industries

• Manufacturing

• Businesses that depend on Process Systemsp y

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Page 8: Process Control Networks · PDF fileGuest SpeakerGuest Speaker Robert Alston Principle Lead Network and Security Consultant Over 25 years network experience including design

Designing Secure Network Architecture

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Page 9: Process Control Networks · PDF fileGuest SpeakerGuest Speaker Robert Alston Principle Lead Network and Security Consultant Over 25 years network experience including design

Defense in depthDefense in depth

Defense in depth approach provides layers of i i i lsecurity to protect critical assets

• Multiple protection mechanisms

• Layers of protection

• Resilient to attack

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Page 10: Process Control Networks · PDF fileGuest SpeakerGuest Speaker Robert Alston Principle Lead Network and Security Consultant Over 25 years network experience including design

Layers of securityLayers of security

• Physical y– Gates, locks, doors, etc.

• ElectronicProcess Control

SystemProcess Control

System

– Biometric, proximity, etc.

• Cyber ElectronicElectronic

Cyber

– Firewalls, IDS/IPS, Access-lists, etc.

• Process controlApplication access role based access etc

PhysicalPhysical

– Application access, role-based access, etc.

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Page 11: Process Control Networks · PDF fileGuest SpeakerGuest Speaker Robert Alston Principle Lead Network and Security Consultant Over 25 years network experience including design

Security Assurance Levels (SAL)Security Assurance Levels (SAL)

• SAL 1 – PROTECTION AGAINST CASUAL OR COINCIDENTAL VIOLATION (I.e. changing a setpoint to a value outside engineering defined conditionschanging a setpoint to a value outside engineering defined conditions, interception of a password send over the network in clear text.)

• SAL 2 – PROTECTION AGAINST INTENTIONAL VIOLATION USING SIMPLE MEANS (I.e. virus infection, exploiting commonly known vulnerabilities of DMZ hosts)

• SAL 3 – PROTECTION AGAINST INTENTIONAL VIOLATION USINGSAL 3 PROTECTION AGAINST INTENTIONAL VIOLATION USING SOPHISTICATED MEANS (I.e. exploits in operating systems, protocols. Attacker requires advanced security knowledge, advanced domain knowledge, advanced knowledge of the target system. I.e. password cracking.)

• SAL 4 – PROTECTION AGAINST INTENTIONAL VIOLATION USING SOPHISTICATED MEANS WITH EXTENDED RESOURCES (Similar to SAL 3 but attacker now has extended resources to their disposal. I.e. StuxNet attack)

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Page 12: Process Control Networks · PDF fileGuest SpeakerGuest Speaker Robert Alston Principle Lead Network and Security Consultant Over 25 years network experience including design

Manufacturing automation architectureManufacturing automation architecture

• ISA95 functional hierarchical model

IN

Level 4Business Planning

& LogisticsPlant Production Scheduling,Operational Management, etc

4 - Establishing the basic plant schedule -production, material use, delivery, and shipping. Determining inventory levels.

Time FrameMonths weeks days O

FFIC

E D

OM

AI

Level 3

Manufacturing Operations Management

3 - Work flow / recipe control to produce the desired end products. Maintaining records and optimizing the production process.

Time Frame

Months, weeks, days OM

AIN

Level 2

p gDispatching Production, Detailed Production

Scheduling, Reliability Assurance, ...

2 - Monitoring, supervisory control and automated control of the production process

Time FrameDays, Shifts, hours, minutes, seconds

CO

NT

RO

L D

OM

ISA

99

Level 1

BatchControl

DiscreteControl

ContinuousControl

1 - Sensing the production process, manipulating the production process

Time FrameHours, minutes, seconds, subseconds

PRO

CE

SS C

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Level 0 0 - The actual production process

Page 13: Process Control Networks · PDF fileGuest SpeakerGuest Speaker Robert Alston Principle Lead Network and Security Consultant Over 25 years network experience including design

Typical PCS Network TopologyTypical PCS Network Topology

Firewall

Enterprise Switch

Level 4

Comm flow

L4 to L4

y ited

5

to L

4ee

n L4

& L

3

Domain Controller

ESF EASPHDServer Experion

Server

Firewall

3RD Party App SubsystemInterface

Level 3.5 DMZTerminalServer

PatchMgmtServer

AntiVirusServer

eServer PHD ShadowServer

Limited L3.5 to L3.5

y ited

L3

3.5

Very

Lim

iL3

.5m

unic

atio

ns b

etw

e

Router

ESC ESF ESTACE ExperionServer

ESVT SafetyManager

TerminalServer

Optional HSRPRouter

Level 3

Domain Controller

L3 to L3

Lim

ited

L2 to

L3

Very

Lim

to L

y m

ited

L2

L3.5 N

o D

irect

com

mor

L2

3

Qualified Cisco SwitchesLevel 2

Level 1 ite 2 to

L2 to L2

Very

Lim

to L

s be

twee

n L1

& L

3

Level 1

L1 to L1

Lim

d L2

L1N

o co

mm

unic

atio

nsor

L4

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Page 14: Process Control Networks · PDF fileGuest SpeakerGuest Speaker Robert Alston Principle Lead Network and Security Consultant Over 25 years network experience including design

Security levelsSecurity levels– Level 1 - Controllers and real time control

L l 2 S O t St ti d i t l– Level 2 – Servers, Operator Stations and supervisory control.

– Level 3 - Historians and Advanced Control and other Level 2 areas or units.

– Level 3.5 - DMZ accessed from the Business Network and the PCN.

– Level 4 - Is the business network with clients for Historians or Advanced Control applicationsAdvanced Control applications.

– Level 3 and 3.5 utilizes standard open systems Ethernet technology and Level 4 utilizes standard open systems LAN technology.

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Page 15: Process Control Networks · PDF fileGuest SpeakerGuest Speaker Robert Alston Principle Lead Network and Security Consultant Over 25 years network experience including design

Level 4Level 4

Firewall

Enterprise Switch

Level 4

Comm flow

L4 to L4

y ited

5

to L

4ee

n L4

& L

3

Domain Controller

ESF EASPHDServer Experion

Server

Firewall

3RD Party App SubsystemInterface

Level 3.5 DMZTerminalServer

PatchMgmtServer

AntiVirusServer

eServer PHD ShadowServer

Limited L3.5 to L3.5

y ited

L3

3.5

Very

Lim

iL3

.5m

unic

atio

ns b

etw

e

Router

ESC ESF ESTACE ExperionServer

ESVT SafetyManager

TerminalServer

Optional HSRPRouter

Level 3

Domain Controller

L3 to L3

Lim

ited

L2 to

L3

Very

Lim

to L

y m

ited

L2

L3.5 N

o D

irect

com

mor

L2

3

Qualified Cisco SwitchesLevel 2

Level 1 ite 2 to

L2 to L2

Very

Lim

to L

s be

twee

n L1

& L

3

Level 1

L1 to L1

Lim

d L2

L1N

o co

mm

unic

atio

nsor

L4

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Page 16: Process Control Networks · PDF fileGuest SpeakerGuest Speaker Robert Alston Principle Lead Network and Security Consultant Over 25 years network experience including design

Level 4Level 4

I th b i t k ith li t f Hi t i Ad d– Is the business network with clients for Historians or Advanced Control applications.

– Untrusted Network

– Separated by a firewall

– No direct connection to Level 3 or below

– Managed by Business IT department

– Level 4 utilizes standard open systems LAN technology.

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Page 17: Process Control Networks · PDF fileGuest SpeakerGuest Speaker Robert Alston Principle Lead Network and Security Consultant Over 25 years network experience including design

Level 3.5Level 3.5

Firewall

Enterprise Switch

Level 4

Comm flow

L4 to L4

y ited

5

to L

4ee

n L4

& L

3

Domain Controller

ESF EASPHDServer Experion

Server

Firewall

3RD Party App SubsystemInterface

Level 3.5 DMZTerminalServer

PatchMgmtServer

AntiVirusServer

eServer PHD ShadowServer

Limited L3.5 to L3.5

y ited

L3

3.5

Very

Lim

iL3

.5m

unic

atio

ns b

etw

e

Router

ESC ESF ESTACE ExperionServer

ESVT SafetyManager

TerminalServer

Optional HSRPRouter

Level 3

Domain Controller

L3 to L3

Lim

ited

L2 to

L3

Very

Lim

to L

y m

ited

L2

L3.5 N

o D

irect

com

mor

L2

3

Qualified Cisco SwitchesLevel 2

Level 1 ite 2 to

L2 to L2

Very

Lim

to L

s be

twee

n L1

& L

3

Level 1

L1 to L1

Lim

d L2

L1N

o co

mm

unic

atio

nsor

L4

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Page 18: Process Control Networks · PDF fileGuest SpeakerGuest Speaker Robert Alston Principle Lead Network and Security Consultant Over 25 years network experience including design

Level 3.5Level 3.5

– Level 3 5Level 3.5

• Is commonly called the DMZ

• Typical nodes WSUS, Anti-Virus Server, Terminal Server, etc.

• Provides connectivity for devices that are to be accessed from theProvides connectivity for devices that are to be accessed from the Business Network and the PCN.

• Security zone between the PCN and outside networksSecurity zone between the PCN and outside networks

• Can be redundant, but not FTE capable

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Page 19: Process Control Networks · PDF fileGuest SpeakerGuest Speaker Robert Alston Principle Lead Network and Security Consultant Over 25 years network experience including design

Level 3.5Level 3.5

Firewall

Enterprise Switch

Level 4

Comm flow

L4 to L4

y ited

5

to L

4ee

n L4

& L

3

Domain Controller

ESF EASPHDServer Experion

Server

Firewall

3RD Party App SubsystemInterface

Level 3.5 DMZTerminalServer

PatchMgmtServer

AntiVirusServer

eServer PHD ShadowServer

Limited L3.5 to L3.5

y ited

L3

3.5

Very

Lim

iL3

.5m

unic

atio

ns b

etw

e

Router

ESC ESF ESTACE ExperionServer

ESVT SafetyManager

TerminalServer

Optional HSRPRouter

Level 3

Domain Controller

L3 to L3

Lim

ited

L2 to

L3

Very

Lim

to L

y m

ited

L2

L3.5 N

o D

irect

com

mor

L2

3

Qualified Cisco SwitchesLevel 2

Level 1 ite 2 to

L2 to L2

Very

Lim

to L

s be

twee

n L1

& L

3

Level 1

L1 to L1

Lim

d L2

L1N

o co

mm

unic

atio

nsor

L4

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Page 20: Process Control Networks · PDF fileGuest SpeakerGuest Speaker Robert Alston Principle Lead Network and Security Consultant Over 25 years network experience including design

Level 3Level 3

– Level 3• Connections for Historians and Advanced Control

• Routing

• Access List control

• connect other Level 2 areas or units

• Can be redundant, but not FTE capable

• HSRP

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Page 21: Process Control Networks · PDF fileGuest SpeakerGuest Speaker Robert Alston Principle Lead Network and Security Consultant Over 25 years network experience including design

Level 2Level 2

Firewall

Enterprise Switch

Level 4

Comm flow

L4 to L4

y ited

5

to L

4ee

n L4

& L

3

Domain Controller

ESF EASPHDServer Experion

Server

Firewall

3RD Party App SubsystemInterface

Level 3.5 DMZTerminalServer

PatchMgmtServer

AntiVirusServer

eServer PHD ShadowServer

Limited L3.5 to L3.5

y ited

L3

3.5

Very

Lim

iL3

.5m

unic

atio

ns b

etw

e

Router

ESC ESF ESTACE ExperionServer

ESVT SafetyManager

TerminalServer

Optional HSRPRouter

Level 3

Domain Controller

L3 to L3

Lim

ited

L2 to

L3

Very

Lim

to L

y m

ited

L2

L3.5 N

o D

irect

com

mor

L2

3

Qualified Cisco SwitchesLevel 2

Level 1 ite 2 to

L2 to L2

Very

Lim

to L

s be

twee

n L1

& L

3

Level 1

L1 to L1

Lim

d L2

L1N

o co

mm

unic

atio

nsor

L4

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Page 22: Process Control Networks · PDF fileGuest SpeakerGuest Speaker Robert Alston Principle Lead Network and Security Consultant Over 25 years network experience including design

Level 2Level 2

– Level 2– Level 2

• Connections for Servers and Operator Stations

• Supervisory control

Connection to Level 1• Connection to Level 1

• Protection for Level 1 with access lists

• FTE capable

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Page 23: Process Control Networks · PDF fileGuest SpeakerGuest Speaker Robert Alston Principle Lead Network and Security Consultant Over 25 years network experience including design

Level 1Level 1

Firewall

Enterprise Switch

Level 4

Comm flow

L4 to L4

y ited

5

to L

4ee

n L4

& L

3

Domain Controller

ESF EASPHDServer Experion

Server

Firewall

3RD Party App SubsystemInterface

Level 3.5 DMZTerminalServer

PatchMgmtServer

AntiVirusServer

eServer PHD ShadowServer

Limited L3.5 to L3.5

y ited

L3

3.5

Very

Lim

iL3

.5m

unic

atio

ns b

etw

e

Router

ESC ESF ESTACE ExperionServer

ESVT SafetyManager

TerminalServer

Optional HSRPRouter

Level 3

Domain Controller

L3 to L3

Lim

ited

L2 to

L3

Very

Lim

to L

y m

ited

L2

L3.5 N

o D

irect

com

mor

L2

3

Qualified Cisco SwitchesLevel 2

Level 1 ite 2 to

L2 to L2

Very

Lim

to L

s be

twee

n L1

& L

3

Level 1

L1 to L1

Lim

d L2

L1N

o co

mm

unic

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Page 24: Process Control Networks · PDF fileGuest SpeakerGuest Speaker Robert Alston Principle Lead Network and Security Consultant Over 25 years network experience including design

Level 1Level 1

Level 1Level 1

• Controllers and real time control

• Controllers and Console Stations.

FTE Bridge (FTEB) or C300• FTE Bridge (FTEB) or C300

• Protected by all other levels

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Page 25: Process Control Networks · PDF fileGuest SpeakerGuest Speaker Robert Alston Principle Lead Network and Security Consultant Over 25 years network experience including design

Zone & Conduit modelZone & Conduit modelCONDUITS

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Page 26: Process Control Networks · PDF fileGuest SpeakerGuest Speaker Robert Alston Principle Lead Network and Security Consultant Over 25 years network experience including design

Example – Zones and conduitsExample Zones and conduits

Switch PairPKS Svrs ESCESCDC ES-T ESVT ESVT PHDESFESFESC

CCR Sub-Station A LCN-1

AVAILABLE CONDUITS

L2 to L2

Switch PairNIM

LCN

Control Firewall

P iited

L2 to

L1

L1 to L1

C200 Controller

NIM FSCPMFamily

Pair

C300 Controller

Lim

i

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Page 27: Process Control Networks · PDF fileGuest SpeakerGuest Speaker Robert Alston Principle Lead Network and Security Consultant Over 25 years network experience including design

Malicious code – Building BlocksMalicious code Building Blocks

Threat protection by anti virus /

Content Security and Control

The IACS shall employ malicious code protection mechanisms.

SR 3.2 MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION Threat protection by anti-virus / content filtering at the firewall

ASA 5500 series firewall(Cisco CSC)

(1) Malicious code protection mechanisms shall be employed at workstations, servers, or mobile

computing devices on the network.

(2) Malicious code protection mechanisms shall be employed at critical entry and exit points (e.g.,

firewalls, web servers, proxy servers, remote-access servers).

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Building BlocksPrincipals

Page 28: Process Control Networks · PDF fileGuest SpeakerGuest Speaker Robert Alston Principle Lead Network and Security Consultant Over 25 years network experience including design

Additional security boundariesAdditional security boundaries

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Page 29: Process Control Networks · PDF fileGuest SpeakerGuest Speaker Robert Alston Principle Lead Network and Security Consultant Over 25 years network experience including design

ArchitectureArchitecture

Honeywell building blocks

Standards build

ISA99.03.03

SELECTEDPRINCIPALS

SELECTEDBUILDING BLOCKS

IDENTIFIED SECURITY ASSURANCE

LEVELDESIGN

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Security planning and Functional design

Page 30: Process Control Networks · PDF fileGuest SpeakerGuest Speaker Robert Alston Principle Lead Network and Security Consultant Over 25 years network experience including design

Thank you www honeywell com/pswww.honeywell.com/ps

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