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Tamar and Aharon were married in April 2006, and resided in Silver Spring. They were blessed with a child, C, in November 2007.

In late March 2008, on Aharons birthday, Tamar told Aharon she was divorcing him. Tamar told Aharon she wanted to relocate C to Pennsylvania (PA). Aharon objected. Tamar told Aharon that if he didnt move out of their apartment, she would take C to PA. Aharon told Tamar that she may not relocate C to PA. Aharon moved out of the apartment.

On April 10, 2008, Tamar unilaterally relocated C from Silver Spring to PA.1 When Aharon arrived in the parties apartment on April 10 to see C and she was not there, he phoned Tamar. Tamar said that she had taken C to PA, and if Aharon didn't like it, Aharon should call her lawyer. Tamar did not ask a Court or Beis Din (Rabbinical Court) to rule that she could relocate C. Tamar likely acted upon legal advice to take C and establish residency in PA, and then delay adjudication for as long as possible so that the relocation would be a fait accompli.

Tamar claimed that she would consider reconciliation, which Aharon wanted - but only if Aharon allowed her to temporarily keep C in PA. Aharon later agreed to temporarily let Tamar keep C in PA after several rabbis promised they would work to foster reconciliation despite Aharons lawyer warning that this was likely a trick to keep C in PA permanently.

On May 5, the parties signed an agreement, called Separation for Purposes of Fostering Reconciliation, providing that Aharon would let Tamar keep C in PA for two months, but only because she made that a precondition for considering reconciliation. The agreement provided that this arrangement would not affect jurisdiction or be detrimental to Aharon with regard to child custody.2

During those two months, Tamar refused to as much as attend marital counseling with Aharon. After the two months were over, Tamar informed Aharon on the phone that their marriage was

1 Defendant [Tamar] admits that although she initially left the marital home with their child against the Plaintiffs

[Aharons] wishes, the parties soon thereafter agreed to remain separated and for Defendant to reside in Pennsylvania. Defendants Answer to Complaint for Custody and Other Related Relief and Counterclaim for Limited Divorce, par. 9. Defendant informed Plaintiff of her desire to separate in March, 2008. She briefly left the marital home with [C]. Plaintiff was opposed to the separation a n d expressed a desire to salvage the marriage. Defendant returned to the marital home with the child and requested that Plaintiff move out. He complied with her request and spent time with [C] on a daily basis until April 10, 2008, when Defendant took her and moved to Pennsylvania. Defendant did not consult Plaintiff regarding the move. July 2009 Order, p. 3. 2 Separation for the Purposes of Fostering Reconciliation

Jeffrey Eric (a.k.a Aharon) Friedman agrees to allow [C] to live in Merion Station, Pennsylvania with Tamar Friedman for the two month period commencing April 16, 2008. Aharon will be allowed to visit with [C] only on Sundays (except for the two Sundays in the two month period that are Jewish holidays) in Merion Station or Silver Spring on an alternating basis for up to eight hours, at the times and places mutually agreed by the parties; and possibly one other time per week, which the parties will try to arrange. Tamar recognizes that Aharon has consented to these conditions because he would like to reconcile with Tamar and she has made this a condition of engaging in a reconciliation process. The parties have agreed that this consent shall not result in any detriment to Aharon with respect to any future determination relating to child custody or any other issue, that it shall not affect the jurisdiction of the courts in the state of the marital home and that it shall in no fashion confer jurisdiction to the courts of Pennsylvania.

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over. Tamar refused Aharons repeated requests to bring C back. Tamar said that for several years, she would, at most, generally only allow C to see Aharon on Sundays during the daytime.

Under halacha [Jewish Law], custody matters are supposed to be adjudicated in Beis Din [Rabbinical Court]. But any specific Beis Din generally only has jurisdiction if both parties agree. The matter was extremely time-sensitive. Tamar was allowing C to spend very little time with Aharon. Tamars continuing to hold C in PA would transfer jurisdiction over the matter to PA, unless the case was filed in MD court. In addition, Tamars continuing to hold C in PA would be extremely prejudicial in any eventual adjudication, no matter what the forum. Tamar refused to negotiate or mediate. Tamar also refused to see a rabbi together with Aharon to find a way to resolve custody issues according to halacha. Aharon certainly had as much legal right to physically seize C and bring her back to MD, as Tamar did to physically seize C and relocate C to PA. But Aharon did not do so. Aharon received a psak [Jewish Law ruling] to bring an emergency child custody motion in Court, but only on the condition that after the emergency motion Aharon would bring the matter to Beis Din for the case to be decided, before any further proceedings in Court. Aharon brought an emergency custody motion in late July 2008, at which point Tamar had not allowed C to spend any time with Aharon on Shabbos [the Jewish Sabbath] or Yom Tov [Jewish Holidays] for almost three months.

The emergency custody hearing was held on August 1, 2008. Tamar violated the parties Reconciliation Agreement by arguing that Maryland did not have jurisdiction.3 Tamar also violated the Reconciliation Agreement by extensively arguing that the custody arrangement during the time covered by the Agreement should be prejudicial.4 Tamar falsely claimed that she had taken C to PA with Aharons consent.5 The Court recognized Tamar was depriving Aharon of meaningful access to C but said that the matter was not an emergency because the kid's not in any danger and nobody's bleeding.6

The Court said that the emergency hearing was not a trial on the merits and that the custody order after a trial would be different than the custody order at the emergency hearing.7 The

3 Defendants Opposition to Emergency Motion, para. 16, July 2008.

4 Liotta [Tamars lawyer]: The child is being seen on the same schedule they agreed to and its been continuing.

August 1 2008 hearing transcript, p. 8,9. Liotta: he wants contact every day, but he was certainly willing, I agree, because he was hoping for a reconciliation, to only one day a week, one day. August 2008 hearing transcript, p. 17. Liotta: [Tamar] has, to this day, complied 100% with what the parties agreed to and its going on right today. August 1 2008 hearing transcript, p. 18. Liotta: But then he agreed that the child could go away and the childs been away now for four months, April, May, June, July, four months. The childs been up there in Pennsylvania with no problems and all of a sudden we have an emergency motion that the child has to come back tomorrow. August 1 2008 hearing transcript, p. 18-19. 5 Defendant denies the allegations that she unilaterally and without notice to plaintiff removed the minor child

from the marital home. Opposition to Emergency Motion, par. 9, July 2008; Liotta: This [taking C unilaterally] was not something that was done; as you said, the Court would look badly on this if she just packed up and left. August 2008 hearing transcript, p. 16. 6 Court: Why is it an emergency? The kids not in any danger.

Webb [Aharons lawyer]: Hes being deprived of meaningful contact with his daughter. Court: Yes, he is. You are correct but nobodys bleeding. August 2008 hearing transcript, p. 7. 7 Court: Theres a custody hearing and a custody determination. A Court might decide that the father has custody

I have no clue whats going to happen but why is this an emergency? August 2008 hearing transcript, p. 4-5.

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Court ruled perhaps because Tamar had convinced the Court that Well, they agreed that she would leave8 C would remain in PA in the interim, with C to be with Aharon every other weekend. The Order was to be temporary; for example, it did not address holidays in any way.

The Court indicated that at trial (the pendete lite trial was subsequently scheduled for October 6, 2008) there was a good chance that C would be returned to Silver Spring.9 In addition, the Court said that if Tamar had unilaterally taken C, the Court would look upon that badly.10 Even Tamars lawyer, after falsely claiming that Tamar had not unilaterally taken C [This [taking C unilaterally] was not something that was done], acknowledged: as you said, the Court would look badly on this if she just packed up and left.11 And indeed, the law does not look kindly upon a parent who unilterally relocates a child. The Comment to Section 208 of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction & Enforcement Act [codified by nearly every State, including MD and PA] describes the unilateral relocation of a child by one parent as reprehensible and explains that the section ensures that abducting parents will not receive an advantage for their unjustifiable conduct including a parent who abducts the child pre-decree.

Tamar filed suit in MD court for limited divorce.12 Aharon opposed Tamars claim for divorce.13

In September 2008, the parties signed an agreement to cancel the October trial and bring the matter to the Baltimore Beis Din (if the parties could not reach a settlement through mediation), and providing that custody arrangements before any litigation would not be prejudicial.14

Aharon agreed to cancel the October 2008 trial15 only because that was required by the psak and Aharon wanted to follow halacha. Aharon followed the psak to cancel the trial even though it was to his own severe disadvantage as: (1) Aharon had every reason to believe that the Court would have ruled in Aharons favor at the October 2008 trial; and (2) even if Aharon prevailed in Beis Din (or the Beis Din would not decide custody as turned out to be the case), he would be at risk that the Court would ultimately decide the issue at a later date (the Court may not show deference to a Beis Din decision in custody cases, even if the parties have agreed to binding

Court: when you have your custody hearing, its not going to look like this order that I just issued, Ill tell you that. August 2008 hearing transcript, p. 35. 8 August 2008 hearing transcript, p. 16.

9 Court: apparently shes made overtures that shes going to take up life there, live there, and may want to keep the

kids there. Its not easy for her to do that. You know that. She cant just do that. August 2008 hearing transcript, p. 4. 10

Court [to Liotta]: Now, your client knows, does she not, that if what Ms. Webb as saying is true [that Tamar had unilaterally relocated C], and I have never heard Ms. Webb say things in Court that werent true, thats not going to bode well at a custody hearing? That aint going to look too good. August 2008 hearing transcript, p. 8. Court: He is in a tug-of-war and its going to get worse. Let me hear from you, sir [Liotta], because Im really concerned about this. August 2008 hearing transcript, p15. 11

August 2008 hearing transcript, p. 16. 12

Defendants Answer to Complaint for Custody and Other Related Relief and Counterclaim for Limited Divorce. 13

Plaintiff/ Counter-Defendants Answer to Plaintiff/Counter-Plaintiffs Counterclaim for Limited Divorce. 14

None of the post-separation arrangements relating to custody transportation schedule of time spent with [C] or residence identification shall be prejudicial with respect to future negotiations or litigation. Mediation Agreement. September 2008. 15

Joint Motion to dismiss the pendete lite trial, September 26, 2008.

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arbitration),16 and Aharon would be severely prejudiced in such a later proceeding by the fact that C would have been in PA for a much longer period.

Tamar rejected as a basis for negotiation the mediators proposal that C mostly live in PA, but be with Aharon about one-third of the time; equally split marital property; and a get given and accepted. Tamar ended mediation.

Beis Din's resolution of the matter was repeatedly delayed. Aharon agreed to postpone the Court trial scheduled for December 2008 until June 2009 (at further prejudice) in order for the Beis Din to hear and decide the case. Until the Beis Din issued an interim custody schedule in March, Tamar generally refused to let C spend time with Aharon (such as on holidays) other than the time explicitly required by the August 2008 Order, except for a brief period covered by the mediation agreement. At Beis Dins first hearing in January 2009, Beis Din refused Tamar's request that Beis Din order Aharon to entirely dismiss the case from the Maryland courts, as this would have allowed Tamar to file the case in PA, and in any case, the parties would eventually have to bring the matter to civil Court to file the Beis Dins decision as the parties settlement.

Beis Din heard the child custody issue in March, and said that the next step in the process was that Beis Din would issue a custody decision immediately after Pesach [Passover] in April 2009; Beis Din issued an interim custody schedule under which C was to be with Aharon four out of the six weekends (and starting on Thursday instead of Friday) before Beis Din was to issue a custody decision. Tamar wrote Beis Din she had a settlement proposal that she would present in five days.17 Then, Tamar wrote Beis Din that she had a proposal and wanted to mediate.18 Aharon agreed to consider any proposal but said he would not enter into mediation if it seemed unlikely to work because he did not want the ruling of Beis Din to be delayed.19 Tamar took four weeks to submit a proposal, which Aharon believed indicated the parties were too far apart to reach agreement. Aharon wrote Beis Din that there was no agreement regarding Cs schedule, and asked Beis Din to rule that C return to Silver Spring.20 Tamar wrote Beis Din that she still wanted to mediate and falsely accused Aharon of lying as to whether the parties had an agreement regarding Cs schedule.21 Aharon again wrote Beis Din to rule that C return to Silver Spring.22

Given that Beis Din had previously said that it would issue a custody decision shortly after Pesach and that it would hold no further hearings on custody, Beis Dins decision on custody seemed to be imminent.

Without Beis Dins permission, Tamar filed a motion to postpone the June 2009 civil Court trial. Her grounds were that she needed more time to prepare for the civil Court trial and wanted a court-ordered custody evaluation (both of which were irrelevant if Beis Din was to decide the matter). Tamar specifically told the Court that the Court not Beis Din would decide the

16 Kovacs v. Kovacs, 98 Md.App. 289, 633 A.2d 425 (1993).

17 Letter from Tamar to Beis Din, March 18, 2009.

18 Letter from Tamar to Beis Din, March 23, 2009.

19 Letter from Aharon to Beis Din, March 27, 2009.

20 Letter from Aharon to Beis Din, April 27, 2009.

21 Letter from Tamar to Beis Din, April 29, 2009.

22 Letter from Aharon to Beis Din, May 2, 2009.

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case.23 Tamar thus violated the parties agreement for Beis Din to decide the case. Should Beis Din have decided that C return to Silver Spring, postponement of the civil trial would have made it much more unlikely that the Court would effectively uphold such a decision, given the further time that C would have spent in PA. Thus, Aharon refused Tamars request that he agree to postpone the trial so that Tamar could have more time to prepare for trial and so that the Court could conduct a custody evaluation because the Court, not Beis Din, would decide the case.

Beis Din then told Aharon to postpone or dismiss the civil trial,24 apparently based on ex parte communications between Tamar and Beis Din in which Beis Din was misled about the status of the case. Beis Din wrote that the parties were still mediating (despite Aharons requests that Beis Din rule that C return to MD) and that if the parties wanted Beis Din to issue a ruling, the next step would be for Beis Din to hold another hearing (despite Beis Dins statement that the next step in the process was for it to issue a decision on child custody, and that it would not hold another hearing on that issue). Aharon filed a motion opposing the continuance, arguing that further delay would be extremely prejudicial,25 as he also wrote to Beis Din.26 Beis Din threatened Aharon with seruv [contempt] if he didnt drop or postpone the civil case, but said that Tamar would have to sign an agreement not to bring the case in the PA courts.27 Tamar filed suit in civil court for absolute divorce, without permission from Beis Din.28 Aharon asked Beis Din to clarify Beis Dins next steps in the case.29 Beis Din acknowledged that the next step in its process was for it to issue a custody decision, not to hold further hearings.30 Aharon filed a motion to postpone the Court trial as per Beis Dins order, despite the further legal prejudice (as explained above). The Court denied the motion to postpone the trial.

Before the civil trial occurred, Beis Din ordered Tamar and Aharon to sign a jurisdictional agreement (that Tamar would not bring the case to a PA court) and dismiss the MD case before it went to trial. Aharon agreed to Beis Dins order. Tamar refused Beis Din's order.31 (Such a jurisdictional agreement combined with a dismissal would have been prejudicial to Aharon, not Tamar, as explained above, especially as Tamar had already violated an agreement with Aharon regarding jurisdiction.)

The civil trial on custody and Tamars motion for divorce was held in June 2009. Tamar urged the Court to rule that C should remain in PA because Tamar had already kept her there for so long in violation of the parties Reconciliation and Mediation Agreements.32 Tamar specifically argued that C should remain in PA because Aharon had agreed to postpone the civil Court trial from October 2008 to June 2009 (to take the case to Beis Din).

23 Defendants Motion for Continuance; Defendants Supplemental Continuance Motion.

24 Letter from Beis Din, May 21, 2009.

25 Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants Motion for Continuance.

26 Letter from Aharon to Beis Din, May 26, 2009.

27 Letter from Beis Din, May 27, 2009.

28 Defendants Complaint for Absolute Divorce.

29 Letter from Aharon to Beis Din, May 31, 2009.

30 Letter from Beis Din, May 31, 2009.

31 Letter from Aharon to Beis Din, June 2, 2009.

32 The minor child has been residing in the Philadelphia Area with Defendant for fourteen of her nineteen

months. The child has little connection with the State of Maryland, having lived there for only five months of her life. She has been in the Philadelphia Area since April, 2008. The court sees no reason to make any substantial changes in the schedule when it is working so well. Defendant's Findings of Fact, p. 3-4.

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Tamar deliberately asked the Court to impose a custody schedule that would render moot most of Cs monthly time with Aharon because he is Sabbath observant. Tamar requested that C be with Aharon on alternate weekends starting at 6pm on Fridays (instead of Thursdays) and that C and Aharon be restricted during such times to the vicinity of Tamars house in PA. Tamar also said that she should bring C to Aharon in Silver Spring for one additional Sunday each month.33 Tamar recognized very well that these alternate weekends would actually be limited to Sundays, as Tamar knew Aharon could not generally leave work early enough on Fridays to pick C up from Tamars house before Shabbos, even when sundown is late. In addition, Aharon would not generally be able to pick C up on Saturday night as he would not be able to leave Silver Spring early enough to arrive at Tamars house before Cs bedtime.

At trial, Aharon opposed Tamars motion for divorce.34 Tamar acknowledged that there were no grounds for divorce at that time.35

After the civil Court trial, but before the Court issued a ruling, Beis Din ordered the parties to jointly dismiss the civil court case. Aharon agreed to follow Beis Dins order and dismiss the civil case but Tamar violated the Beis Dins order and refused to dismiss the civil case.36

As Tamar had urged, that C had already been in PA for fourteen months at the time of the trial was largely the basis for the Courts decision that C should remain in PA,37 even though the Court concluded both parties are fit and proper to have physical custody of the child and that Defendant has made minimal efforts to foster the relationship between Plaintiff and his daughter. The Court further finds that Defendants indifferent approach to C having a mutually awarding relationship with her father is rooted in spite and is not beneficial to the child.38

The Court largely adopted the general custody schedule suggested by Tamar: C to be with Aharon every other weekend in the vicinity of Tamars house and one additional weekend per month.39

Tamar later filed a contempt motion against Aharon, demanding that Cs relationship with Aharon be limited to supervised visits that is, C could not be alone with Aharon. Tamar alleged that she had used tracking devices [hidden, amongst other places, in Cs diaper wipes and

33 Defendant's Findings of Fact, p. 6 - 7.

34 See also Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants Answer to Defendant/Counter-Plaintiffs Claim for Absolute Divorce.

35 Defendant filed a Counterclaim for Limited Divorce and subsequently filed a Supplemental Complaint for

Absolute Divorce based on mutual and voluntary separation without cohabitation. Plaintiff testified and the court finds that Plaintiff has repeatedly asked Defendant to reconcile, thus eliminating the grounds of mutual and voluntary separation. However, either party may file an Amended Complaint for Absolute Divorce based on two years of separation and the hearing will be held on April 12, 2010; two years after the date of separation. Defendant's Findings of Fact, p. 5. The civil Court later granted a divorce in April 2010 at Tamars request. 36

Letters from Beis Din to the parties, and from Aharon to Beis Din, June 5 - 24, 2009. 37

At this time, the child has spent fourteen months of her life in Pennsylvania with Defendant and her maternal grandparents and is undisputedly thriving. Uprooting the child from her current environment at this time is likely to have a detrimental impact upon her. July 2009 Order, p. 5. 38

July 2009 Order, p. 4-5. 39

July 2009 Order.

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stuffed teddy bear] to prove that Aharon and C were outside the vicinity of her house.40 Aharon then filed a contempt motion alleging that Tamar had repeatedly refused to let C be with him during times they were to be together under the Order and asking that the Order be modified to remove the vicinity restriction.41 The Court denied the contempt motions but changed the custody schedule so that C was to generally be with Aharon only every other weekend (instead of generally three out of four), but that the time would generally not be vicinity restricted and would usually start on Thursday at 5 p.m. instead of Friday.42 However, Aharon frequently cannot leave work very early on Thursday to pick up C in PA at 5 p.m. Various relatives of Aharon have picked up C when Aharon could not, but this involves being harassed by Tamar and her family. In addition, some of Cs time with Aharon continues to be rendered impossible because Aharon is Sabbath observant, either because those times start on Friday or shortly before Jewish holidays.

C being with Aharon starting on Thursdays is predicated on Cs missing school on Fridays. Tamar argued repeatedly to the Court at the July 2011 trial, as she had at the June 2009 trial, that Cs weekends with Aharon should start on Fridays (which would make most of the time moot, given that Aharon is Sabbath observant), not Thursdays. The Court rejected Tamars arguments that it would be harmful for C to travel to Silver Spring and that C should not miss school on Fridays. However, the Court said that it would be much more receptive to Tamars argument that C should not miss school on Fridays as she gets older, and scheduled a hearing to revisit the custody schedule in October 2012.

The Baltimore Beis Din did not rule that a get be given, perhaps because Tamar violated Beis Dins orders thus directly causing severe harm to Aharon and C, or perhaps because Beis Din, after holding several hearings on the matter, concluded that there are no grounds for ordering a get. Tamar later attempted to involve the Washington Beis Din, which ruled that it could not assert jurisdiction over the case, given that the parties had brought the case to the Baltimore Beis Din.43 Tamar eventually found a third Beis Din to condemn Aharon. One of the judges condemning Aharon on the third Beis Din, Rabbi Shmuel Kamenetsky, has extremely close connections, financial and otherwise, to Tamars family for many years,44 and issued public statements taking Tamars side long before Aharon was even summoned by the third Beis Din.45

40 Defendants Amended Motion for Contempt, November 18, 2010.

41 Plaintiffs Petition for Contempt, Febrauary 4, 2011; Plaintiffs Motion to Modify Custody, Febraury 10, 2011.

42 July 2011 Order.

43 Letter from the Washington Beis Din to the parties, September 6, 2010.

44See, e.g., http://articles.philly.com/2010-04-20/news/25213049_1_family-physician-geriatric-medicine-future-wife Dr. Epstein [Tamars father] was an active supporter of Talmudical Yeshiva of Philadelphia, a religious school for Orthodox Jewish boys and young men in Overbrook. He volunteered his medical services to the school and was on call to care for the students 24/7, said a close friend, Rick Goldfein [Tamars lawyer]. Rabbi Kamenetsky is founder and dean of the school. 45

Public letters by Rabbi Kamenetsky, May 2010, September 2010 and December 2010.